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Fisheries case: basis for formulation of a doctrine which has come to be called the doctrine of

persistent objector but you have to see the fisheries case to indicate that the word persistent
came into use because the opposition of Norway began from lex ferenda to lex lata. And thats
persistent enough.

The more problematical doctrine, is the doctrine of subsequent objector: which means that the
objector state is outside the regime of lex ferenda and lex lata but it makes a reference to a
norm of customary il that is already established. And a number of new states and even old
states that are bound by it began opting out leading to the formation of a new customary norm.

We are now in the regime of customary norm changing and one example of the doctrine of
subsequent objectortake not of difference between persistent and subsequentin other
words, the doctrine of subsequent objector leads us toof a new customary norm.

A good example of that is: the changes of a great number of states from the Geneva convention
setting out the continental shelf of 1958 into the formation of a new continental shelf in 1992
under UNCLOS

A number of words have to be explained and one of these is the question as to how long would
be the time required for the formation of a customary norm? But one publicist who theorized
that some customary norms have transformation into that regime only by 1 year.

It is not clear WON it has a fixed period of time for its formation.

But in NSC case, the court made reference to the following proposition: that whatever might be
the time that took the formation of a custom norm, uniform consistent and it involves specially
state parties

Example: in the formation of customary norm with respect to the EEZ or the formation of the
continental shelf, if a great majority of states may be said to have comprised with the regime of
CS or EEZ as customary norm of International Law. But it might not be sufficient to count the
number of statesgeneral practicebut it must, according to the court, if it is the formation of
a custom norm with respect to EEZ, it might not be sufficient that all the states adhering to it
are landlocked states. They are not coastal states.

The court is suggesting that it might not be enough to have a fair majority of states but it must
include specially affected states. And therefore the customary norm for the formation of the
continental shelf, will not only consist of states that are landlocked but it must include coastal
states and these are in reference to the requirement that the states must include specially
affected states.

Depends on the nature of the subject matter: with respect to the application of UNCLOS to the
Philippines Phil may, because of disadvantages with respect to the app of UNCLOS in Phil
territory, Phil may decide to denounce meaning to opt out under the appropriate articlethat if
a State denounces the enforcement of the UNCLOS the decision may take effect only after 1
year, but even if the UN convention is denounced by the Philippines, there are international
regimes that will remain as part of the Philippines for the reason that the Conti Shelf as well as
EEZ have already become custom law and the state would need no convention

There are regimes that continue to apply as customary international law even without the
conventional rule in UNCLOS

Id like you to take note that the cases we have taken up, in particular, North Sea Continental
Case and Fisheries case will affect your interpretation of article 38 in the statute of the ICJ

NICARAGUA
--pay attention to authority of the Court in dealing with the reservation of the US
--please take note of this methodology; always dont pay attention to the dispositive
--raise problems and make the problem the basis of your own interpretation

the ICJ will interpret the relationship between that will affect interpretation of a and b of art 38.
This is the doctrine of dual character of norms.

The court has the following formulation a customary norm may be subject to codification and
therefore become a treaty of international conventional law but the customary was codified
will continue to exist and continue to apply even if it is not identical with the treaty codifying it.
(Im sleepy)

How will this affect the interpretation of the relationship bet par a and b of art 38.
Methodologies of reasoning that you should pay attention to.

This is the doctrine formulated by the court to deal with the reservation of the US. US wanted
to avoid jurisdiction of ICJ, it said that it will only accept the jurisdiction of the court if the court
will accept its reservation

But since the court will apply multilateral treaties of international convention, it is necessary
that all the state parties of the multilateral treaty shall also be parties to the present case of
Nica v. US

That kind of reservation gives you a sense of impossibility, the US did not expect that the court
will accept it. But the Court did. And on the basis of the dual character of norms, did not apply
multilateral conventions but cust norms, in particular article 2 (4) of the UN charter. Which is
the general prohibition against the use of force in international relations of states. And so the
court will not apply the charter but applied custom norm which applies prohibition against the
use of force
But take note of the more creative approach of the court in CN because it applied it asnorm
that is not susceptible to change or derogationwas applied with no excuse in the part of the
US

Read case to find out how can the court verify that Nicaragua and US subscribe to the general
prohibition against the use of force by means of treaties and diplomatic documents of which
both Nicaragua and US are parties and these docs and treaties contains the subscription of the
two state parties that they consider as law as customary norms against the use of force

Read case on that basis and we go to the LAW OF TREATIES

Read whole convention

Two ___ convention on the law of treaties


1.
2. Vienna convention between states and intl org and between intl org our interest is limited
to the first Vienna convetion

if you go over the second, corresponds to the first


difference bet 2 conventions is with respect to the parties and subjects of international law
which are parties

concentrate on the law of treaties

There are resolutions in art 10 (GA) which would make them recommendatory. But the GA may
adopt resolutions and they might be categorized under Art. 10, but their effect is to give
implementation of some obligations of some of the members under the UN Charter. Lets take
as an example: Resolution of the GA which is all too familiarthe declaration of the UN
Declaration of Human Rightswhich the IL community celebrates every December 10 because
it was adopted Dec. 10 1948.

The Univ Declaration of Human Rights, except for two articles:


articles referring to the right to own property
right of asylum
Embodied in UDHRthe only articles which were not embodied later on in the two treaties,
they were later transformed into International Conventionbut at the time when the adoption
of UDHR by the GA, it is important to take note, that one of the principal obligations under the
UN Charter is respect for human rights and fundamental freedomwhich is expressly provided
in the UN Charter under 35 and 36 that they are obligations of every state. While subject
matter of every obligation, no specific rights of fundamental freedom were provided in the UN
charter and the only reference available was the content of the UDHRin other words, here is
a resolution of GA intended to be recommendation but became authoritative with respect to
obligations of its members respecting fundamental human rights and freedom.
In other words, it is an example of the rec resolution of GA which becomes part of the UN
charter as an authoritativethat are intended to be principal obligations under the UN charter.

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