Russias Image and Soft Power Resources I PDF

Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 38, No. 3 (2016), pp.
44575 DOI: 10.1355/cs38-3d

2016 ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic
Russias Image and Soft Power

Resources in Southeast Asia:
Perceptions among Young Elites
in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam1
ALEXANDER BUKH
Since the early 2000s, soft power has become one of the most
popular analytical tools in International Relations scholarship devoted
to analyzing the influence of states in the international arena. Although
scholars of Russian foreign policy have also embraced the notion of
soft power, they have mainly limited the scope of their analysis to
Western countries and the former Soviet republics. In contrast, this
article focuses on Laos, Vietnam and Thailand, countries whose history
of relations with Russia are fundamentally different from both the
West and Russias near abroad. By analyzing the images of Russia
and its soft power resources in these countries, this article seeks to
create a more comprehensive understanding of the ways contemporary
Russia is perceived in the world and its potential tools of influence in
Southeast Asia. Drawing on the results of a survey conducted among
university students, this article examines the ways young educated
elites in the three countries perceive Russia. It also explores the degree
of correspondence between these images and the self-image of Russia
espoused by its political elites. The results of this study suggest that
while overall Russia is perceived as a Great Power, and its role in the
world is seen as mostly positive, there are also important dissonances
Alexander Bukh is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in

the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Victoria University
of Wellington. Postal address: Politics and International Relations
Programme, Victoria University of Wellington, P.O. Box 600, Wellington
6140, New Zealand; email: Alexander.Bukh@vuw.ac.nz.
445
04 Alexander-2P.indd 445 10/11/16 11:32 am

446 Alexander Bukh
between the two images. Based on discernible differences among the

three groups of respondents in the ways they perceive Russia, the
article also suggests that historical memory plays an important role in
shaping these perceptions.
Keywords: Russia, Southeast Asia, soft power, perceptions, historical memory.
The main purpose of this study is to analyze Russias soft power

resources in Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. To achieve this goal, it
draws on the results of a survey on perceptions of Russia conducted
by the author in 201213 among students enrolled at the National
University of Laos, Vientiane, Thammasat University in Bangkok
and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi.
As Anton Tsvetov has argued, Southeast Asia today plays
a secondary role in Russias foreign policy.2 Nevertheless, for a
number of reasons it is important to understand the ways Russia
is perceived in the region. From a purely academic perspective, the
extant academic literature that deals with perceptions of Russia,
its soft power and related topics is scarce and focuses almost
exclusively on the former Soviet republics and Western countries.3
Thus, a study of other countries and regions with different political
structures and histories of relations with Russia such as Southeast
Asia is needed to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the
ways Russia is perceived in the world today.
A better understanding of perceptions of Russia in Southeast
Asia is also important from a policy perspective. Russias
involvement in the conflict in Syria, and the strengthening of
SinoRussia relations, suggest that Russian policymakers are
continuously seeking new arenas for its foreign policy aimed at
re-establishing Russias position as a truly global player in
international relations. Importantly, Russias strong support for the
establishment of the New Development (BRICS) Bank, peace treaty
negotiations with Japan, mediation in peace talks for Syria and
recently voiced desire to mediate in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict,
show that the tools deployed by Russia are not limited to the use
of force but include soft measures as well. To a certain extent
these transformations in Russias foreign policy can be attributed
to the recent crisis in Moscows relations with the West brought
about by the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its ongoing
involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Arguably, however,
the worsening of Russias relations with the West served more as a
catalyst in the process of re-establishing Russias position as a Great

Russias Image and Soft Power Resources in Southeast Asia 447
Power rather than its cause. One needs only to recall President
Boris Yeltsins fierce reaction to the bombings conducted by North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warplanes in Kosovo in 1998,
and the subsequent dispatch of Russian troops to Pristina airport, or
President Vladimir Putins unexpected meeting with North Korean
leader Kim Jong Il before the July 2000 G8 Summit during which
he secured a moratorium on test-firing of long range missiles, to
understand that Russias self-perception as a global player and
attempts to act as such are not a new phenomenon.
Overall, soft attempts to reshape international public opinion
and improve Russias image became an integral part of its attempts
to re-establish itself as a global power in the early 2000s. It was
at this time that Russian official policy documents started to refer
to the soft tools of foreign policy, such as the promotion of
Russias language, culture and history, as well as its stance on
international issues.4 In 2005, Russia Today (later known simply as
RT), a government funded English language news channel aimed
at improving Russias image abroad, was launched. Russkiy Mir
(Russian World) Foundation, whose purpose is to promote Russian
language and culture in other countries, was established by a
Presidential decree in 2007. In 2008, Soyuz Sovetskih Obshestv
Drujby (Union of Soviet Friendship Societies), the main organ
of Soviet public diplomacy that was closed down in 1994,
was resurrected as Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad
and International Humanitarian Cooperation).
So far, most of these and other efforts to enhance Russias
influence have been directed mainly at Western countries and
the former Soviet republics, often referred to as Russias near
abroad.5 However, certain developments in Russias policy towards
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the
establishment of a branch of the Russkiy Mir Foundation in Bangkok
in 2012, the re-opening of the Russian Cultural Center in Vientiane in
2013, and the ASEANRussia Summit in Sochi in May 2016, suggest
that Russian policymakers are paying more attention to Southeast
Asia. Arguably, the regions importance in the global economy and
regionalism in the Asia Pacific, but also its relative lack of political
cohesion and the deepening internal rift over the South China Sea
dispute, make it an attractive arena for Russias growingly assertive
foreign policy. Moreover, the leaders of some ASEAN countries find
appealing certain ideas and norms of international relations espoused
by Russia, such as sovereign democracy and non-interference in

448 Alexander Bukh
the internal affairs of other states. There is also a certain hope that
Russias turn to the East will increase multipolarity in the region
and thus help offset Chinas overwhelming presence.6 As such, the
interest in deeper relations between Southeast Asia and Russia is
not just limited to Moscow but is also shared, to a certain degree,
by some ASEAN members.
From this perspective, further understanding of the ways
Russia is viewed in the region, and the degree of correspondence
between these views and Russias self-image, may provide important
clues for anticipating and analyzing certain developments in
Moscows relations with Southeast Asia, when and if its own
pivot to Asia gains momentum. Admittedly, this study is based
on a relatively small sample size and hence the conclusions that
can be drawn from it are limited. Nevertheless, it is the authors
hope that it will provide at least partial answers to the questions
raised above.
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section I outline
the analytical framework that guides this study and explain the
reasons for focusing on soft power resources rather than on
soft power per se, as well as the importance of self-image and
perceptions within this framework. I then move on to explain the
reasons for focusing on Laos, Vietnam and Thailand by providing
a brief historical overview of Russias relations with these three
countries. The next section presents the main tenets of Russias
self-image as espoused by Russias political elites. The main part
of this article then presents and analyzes the results of the survey
conducted by the author. In brief, I argue that there is a certain
degree of correspondence between Russias self-image and the way
it is perceived by the respondents. At the same time I show that
there are some important dissonances between the two that relate
to Russias previous incarnation as the Soviet Union. Based on the
results of the survey, I also argue that historical memory plays an
important role in shaping images of contemporary Russia.
Soft Power and Soft Power Resources

The concept of soft power was coined by the American political
scientist Joseph Nye in the early 1990s, but gained worldwide
popularity after the publication of his influential book Soft Power:
The Means to Succeed in World Politics.7 In brief, Nyes soft
power refers to any states ability (my emphasis) to shape other
states foreign policy choices through non-coercive measures.

Culture, political values and foreign policies are seen as the main
sources of a states ability to attract and co-opt others to act in the
interests of the wielder of soft power.
Despite the overwhelming popularity of the concept among
scholars and policymakers alike, measuring the actual effects of
soft power (or lack thereof) as defined by Nye is not an easy task.
As Nyes definition of the concept implies causality, the biggest
problem is measuring the effectiveness of various non-coercive
strategies deployed to influence other states policies and showing
the existence of a causal relationship between these strategies and
certain policy changes.8 Needless to say, Nyes definition of soft
power is not the only one in the voluminous body of related
scholarship that is generally divided along the agency/structure
line.9 While the former,10 similar to Nye, implies causality between
soft action and policy, the latter downplays the importance
of domestic factors in favour of examining broader structures of
power.11
It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a theoretical
debate regarding the primacy of either structure or agency. No
doubt, global or regional structures of power are important, but so
are domestic trends and policies. However, establishing causality
between certain perceptions or soft measures and policy change
is a very complicated, if not impossible, task. As such, in this
article I choose to focus on soft power resources rather than soft
power per se.
How are soft power resources defined? As Roselle et al. have
argued, widely accepted narratives about actors characteristics can
be important soft power resources.12 These narratives shape the
way people see other actors and the international environment as
well as their as an individual or as a collective actor place
in it, and can be utilized by states to achieve certain foreign
policy goals. Roselle et al. also suggest the need to study the
content of strategic narratives deployed by political actors as well
as their reception.13 Elsewhere, the importance of alignment between
the self-perception of an actor and the way it is viewed by others
was noted by Kiseleva.14 None of this implies that the alignment
of perceptions will necessarily result in soft power effects, as there
are multiple structural or agency level factors that can preclude
this. Nevertheless, a focus on perceptions and their alignment
can provide us with new insights into the bilateral relationships
of the countries in question and provide some food for thought for
policymakers.

450 Alexander Bukh
As already noted, the extant literature on Russias soft power,

and the ways Russia is perceived in other countries, focuses mainly
on the former Soviet republics and Western countries. 15 When
it comes to Western countries, most commentators suggest that
Russias efforts to improve its image have been in vain. 16
Scholars like Nye 17 and others suggest that Russias failure to
attract others should be attributed to its current domestic and
international policies. However, this interpretation seems to
ignore the traditional centrality of Russia and the USSR as the
constitutive other in European and US identities.18 Thus we
can argue that along with Russias contemporary policies, the
historical memory or the residual images related to the USSR and
Russia, embedded in the national identities of these countries,
play an important role in shaping current perceptions of Russia.
A recent study of the frames used by the US media to describe
Russia today confirms this argument by showing the dominance of
Cold War era narratives and images in these depictions.19 Annual
public opinion polls on perceptions of Russia in various countries
conducted by the Pew Research Center also seem to support
this study. These opinion polls show that Russias actions are
interpreted differently across the world,20 and these differences do
not necessarily reflect geographical proximity to Russia or direct
experience of its policies. When it comes to Southeast Asia, it
seems that at least some policymakers have a rather positive image
of Russia.21
The importance of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai views of
post-Soviet Russia lies not only in the scarcity of related scholarship,
but also in the history of Russias relations with these countries
which is fundamentally different from both the West and former
Soviet republics. The following section will briefly review the history
of Soviet/Russian relations with these countries, and explain the
reasons for focusing on Laos, Vietnam and Thailand.
Historical Background
Vietnam
Beginning in the 1930s, the Soviet Union was an important source
of ideological legitimacy for the Vietnamese communists, with the
1917 Bolshevik Revolution being one of their most important points
of reference. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union started to play an
important role in the Second Indochina Conflict (the Vietnam War),

gradually expanding its assistance to the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam). In the 1960s, and especially after
the United States rapidly increased its involvement in the Vietnam
War, in addition to military equipment, the Soviet Union helped
North Vietnam to construct factories, ports and oil refineries, as well
as providing technical and military expertise.22 After reunification in
1975, and as a result of US sanctions and worsening relations with
China, the Soviet Union became the Socialist Republic of Vietnams
main source of military and civilian aid, and its biggest trading
partner and most important strategic ally.3 The ties between the two
countries were expansive, and Soviet influence was visible in almost
all spheres of Vietnams social and cultural life. The Soviet Union
was the main destination for Vietnamese students, and over the years
over half a million Vietnamese received some kind of training in
the Soviet Union.24 In the 1980s, over 100,000 Vietnamese workers
were trained in the Soviet Union and returned home to work in the
educational, scientific, industrial and agricultural sectors.25 In 1980
alone there were over 300,000 Soviet non-military experts in Vietnam
engaged in a wide range of activities, from providing guidance at
construction sites to university lecturers.26
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a drastic
shrinking of ties between Hanoi and Moscow. RussiaVietnam
relations started to recover only in the early 2000s, after the
signing of a strategic partnership agreement in 2001. The actual
rebuilding of relations, however, is an ongoing process. In 2012, the
relationship between Russia and Vietnam was elevated to the status
of a comprehensive strategic partnership. In his May Decrees
of 2012, President Putin named Vietnam as one of Russias main
partners in the Asia-Pacific region, along with India and China.27
High-level visits occur frequently, and Vietnam recently surpassed
China as the second largest buyer of Russian arms after India.28
Also, in 2015, Russian state-owned Rosatom inked an agreement
with Vietnamese state-owned Vietnam Electricity to build Vietnams
first nuclear power plant.29 In broader terms, however, it was only
in 2011 that RussoVietnamese bilateral trade reached the level of
SovietVietnamese trade, and even today neither country is among
the others top ten trading partners.30 In 2012, there were only
3,800 Vietnamese students in Russia.31 By comparison, in the same
year, 22,500 Vietnamese were studying in Australia and 15,500 in
America.32 The Russian Cultural Center in Hanoi was re-opened
in 2003, but due to financial constraints the scope of its activities
remains very limited.33 Russian language, which used to be the

452 Alexander Bukh
main foreign language taught at Vietnamese universities, has lost

its dominance and today lags far behind English and French.34 As
such, Russias relations with Vietnam today are rather limited, and
Russias direct influence in the country has drastically diminished.
Laos
Laos relations with the Soviet Union were not as intimate as
Vietnams. During the civil war the communist/nationalist forces
(Pathet Lao) received most of their assistance from North Vietnam.
While the Soviet Union did provide military aid to the communists
in the early 1960s, Moscows interest in Laos was rather limited.
Soviet aid to Laos was provided as part of its aid to North Vietnam,
and delivered via Hanoi.35 Soviet aid increased in the late 1970s
after the communist victory in 1975 and the establishment of the
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR). A number of technical and
economic assistance agreements between Laos and the USSR were
signed in 1978.36 In the mid-1980s, about 1,500 Soviet experts resided
in Laos, working on various projects including infrastructure, hospitals
and telecommunication facilities. Overall, Soviet aid accounted for
more than half of all Laos foreign assistance. Similar to Vietnam,
a large number of Laotian military and civilian experts received
training in the USSR.37 The total number of Laotians educated in
the Soviet Union is estimated at 8,000, eight of whom currently
occupy ministerial posts in the Laotian government.38
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changes in Russias
relations with Laos were similar to those that occurred with Vietnam.
Namely, while official ties were maintained, aid, trade and other
forms of interaction were drastically reduced. In 1998, the Russian
Cultural Center in Vientiane was closed down. From the early 2000s,
bilateral trade, Russian investment in Laos and high-level visits
started to develop, but only gradually and they are still a far cry
from the Cold War era. In 2014, for example, there were only
twenty-nine Laotians studying in Russia; and this was the highest
number since 1990.39 Russian companies have invested in Laos
mining, hydropower and telecommunications sectors. In 2013, however,
Russia ranked only 25th among foreign investors in Laos,40 far behind
China, Vietnam and Thailand.41 The Russian Cultural Center in
Vientiane re-opened in 2013, but the scope of its activities remains
very limited.
While Soviet/Russia relations with Laos closely resemble those
with Vietnam, there is one important difference between the two.

For Vietnam, the Soviet Union was its closest ally and main source
of influence. In the case of Laos, however, its socialization into
the communist realm was through Vietnam. The ties between the
Vietnamese and Laotian communists date back to the 1930s. After
the victory of the communists in both countries in 1975, a special
relationship between Vietnam and Laos was formed on the basis
of their common revolutionary struggle that took place over the
thirty-year period from the end of the Second World War.42 In the
1980s, Vietnam became the second largest donor after the Soviet
Union, and provided a large number of civilian and military
advisers.43 The special relationship between the two countries was
formalized in a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
signed in 1977. Ties between the two countries were extensive
and sometimes described as deeper than the water of the Mekong
River.44 Importantly, this close relationship survived the drastic
changes that occurred in Southeast Asia after the end of the Cold
War. While Thailand and China became the main investors in Laos,
party level ties, socio-economic, educational and cultural cooperation
between the two countries remains intact, and Vietnams influence
and presence in Laos remains extensive.45
Thailand
In contrast to the USSRs close ties with Vietnam and Laos during
the Cold War, its relations with Thailand were almost non-existent.
Although Siam/Thailand and Imperial Russia enjoyed fairly close
relations in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, these ties dissipated after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
Throughout the Cold War, Moscows relations with Thailand and
other non-communist Southeast Asian countries were distant, and
both sides viewed each other with suspicion. Thailand was the
United States key ally in Southeast Asia and occupied an important
place in Americas global strategy to contain communism. Thai elites
perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to the countrys national
security. Thailand continued to maintain diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, but the Thai elites
hostility and suspicion of Soviet intentions grew proportionally with
the expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia during the late
1970s and 1980s.46 In 1979, a SovietThai Friendship organization
was established in Moscow, but the Thai authorities did not allow
an office to be established in Bangkok. In the 1970s, the number
of Thai students in the Soviet Union was less than a dozen each

454 Alexander Bukh
year, and despite the development of bilateral relations after Mikhail

Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the number was less than a
hundred in the late 1980s.47 The Soviet presence in Thailand was
limited mostly to a handful of diplomats, and its influence in the
Kingdom was practically non-existent. Importantly, however, while
viewed with suspicion, the USSR was never the dominant communist
other in the Thai Cold War discourse: that role was played by
China and Vietnam.48
Russias relations with Thailand started to deepen in the early
2000s, after President Vladimir Putins visit to the country in 2003.
Thailand became one of the most popular destinations for Russian
tourists: 1.3 million Russians visited the Kingdom in 2012.49 Overall,
however, the political, cultural and economic ties between the two
countries remain underdeveloped. Despite the rise in two-way trade,
commerce with Russia accounts for only 1 per cent of Thailands
overall trade.50 Annually, the Russian government only provides
about twenty scholarships for Thais to study in Russia, but the
exact number of Thai students in Russia today is not captured in
the statistical data provided by various Russian agencies. Clearly
though their number is very low as the Thais are not classified as
a stand-alone group in the statistics on foreign students prepared
by the Russian Federal State Statistic Service.51
To summarize, both Vietnam and Laos emerged out of an anti-
colonial struggle and never had a history of close relations with
Imperial Russia. Furthermore, none of the three countries have a
history of being directly ruled, dominated or in conflict with Russia/
USSR. As such, the history of their relations with Russia/USSR is
fundamentally different from the countries that are usually noted
in Russias soft power related scholarship. During the second half
of the Cold War, the USSR had very close relations with Vietnam
and relatively close ties with Laos. During the 1970s and 1980s,
the Soviet Union was Vietnams closest ally and the ties between
the two countries were extensive. Soviet relations with Laos were
similar to those with Vietnam. However, as a result of continuous
Vietnamese presence in the country, Soviet influence was less
profound and was mostly mediated through Vietnam. In contrast,
Thailand and the USSR were on different sides of the Cold War
divide and bilateral relations were weak.
Since the 1990s, Russias relations with all of the three countries
have been very limited. Despite various attempts to revive its relations
with traditional partners, Russias current relations with Laos and
Vietnam are mostly limited to high-level political exchanges and

Russian investment in certain areas. Thailand has become one of

the most popular destinations for Russian tourists, but the economic,
cultural and political interactions between the two countries remain
very limited.
Russias Self-Image
The disappearance of communism as the dominant ideology and
the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in deep confusion about
the way Russian elites and ordinary people viewed their country
and its place in the world. The elite discourse about Russian
identity went through a number of phases and continues to contain
a number of contradictory elements.52 While still quite ambiguous
and at times contradictory, Russias self-image evolved significantly
during the Putin era.53 No doubt that Russia as a Great Power
and its special mission to create an alternative international order
is the main trope in the discourse promoted by Russias political
elites today. The idea of Russias greatness takes various forms and
manifestations. In addition to the traditional elements of Russias
greatness such as culture and science,54 the recent discourse has been
enriched with a number of new constructs. While the construction
of Russias greatness does not rely on identification with the Soviet
Union, certain elements of Soviet history, such as its victory over
Nazi Germany in the Second World War, as well as its scientific
and other achievements, are used in todays discourse to narrate
Russias greatness. In the main, the Russian elite today identifies
more with Imperial Russia rather than with its communist successor,
the Soviet Union.55
The Eurasianist narrative or the perception of Russia as
uniquely different from both Europe and Asia, but combining
elements from both civilizations, is one of the key elements in the
discourse on Russias greatness and its special mission. Eurasianism
as a philosophical school was conceived among the Russian migr
intellectuals in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution.56 It is
rather diverse and should be seen more as an umbrella for various
interpretations of Russian historical development rather than a
coherent ideology. The idea of Eurasianism has informed Russian
foreign policy thinking since the mid-1990s. In its 1997 National
Security Concept, Russia dubbed itself a European-Asian power.57
Today, however, the most important version of Eurasianism for Russian
political discourse is the one advocated by Alexander Dugin, the
leader of the International Eurasianist Movement.58 Dugin is a prolific

456 Alexander Bukh
writer, but his Eurasianist view of Russias present and future are
summarized in a 2002 manifesto entitled The Eurasian Way as a
National Idea.59 In it he argues that Russia has always followed a
unique path of historical development shaped by its geographical,
civilizational, cultural and economic characteristics. Russia has a
civilizational mission that evolves from its geopolitical location;
namely, Russia should be the centre and the main consolidating force
for all continental powers and civilizations. Russias mission is a
universal one and stands in opposition to the maritime civilization
centred around and led by the United States. The new world
order or the Atlanticist ideology, based on Western values and
promoted by the United States, is presented by Dugin and his
followers as the main threat to Russia and the world. Presenting
an alternative to the new world order is one of the main
components of Russias universal mission. Dugins view of Russia
and its place in the world clearly resonates with the self-image
promoted by Russias political elites both externally and internally.
For example, the image of Russia as a multicultural and multiethnic
entity, which is also a powerful civilizational centre, is seen as one
of the main sources of its soft power by the practitioners of Russian
public diplomacy.60
Another manifestation of Russias greatness and its special
mission can be found in the narrative on the role of the Soviet Union
in the Second World War. There is no doubt that the collective
memory of the Soviet sacrifice and victory was shaped during the
Soviet period in the 1960s80s and today constitutes one of the main
pillars of Russian national identity.61 At the same time, however,
the narrative on Soviet victimhood and heroic victory has acquired
a very specific strategic value in Putins foreign policy narrative.
The victory and the post-war international arrangements which
the USSR helped design are used to legitimize Russias quest for
a key position in todays world affairs, the pursuit of a multipolar
system and the need for support from other nations for these
objectives.62
Another related image promoted by the Russian elite is Russia
as a global military power. This image is present not only in both
the Eurasianist and the Second World War narratives, but also
cultivated through other means such as military parades and the
showcasing of new weapons, as well as the numerous photographs
portraying Putin as a man of action. There are other elements of
self-image such as, for example, the notion of the Russian World
(russkii mir) that exists in todays elite discourse but these relate

mainly to Russias relations with the former Soviet republics and

Western countries.63
To summarize, the self-image that Russias political elite tries to
project today both domestically and internationally is that of a Great
Power with a unique history and culture, in pursuit of a mission to
challenge the West and establish a more multipolar world which is
not dominated by one universal ideology. While Russias greatness
and the legitimacy of its quest for an equal footing with other powers
derive from multiple sources that include its unique geopolitical
position, achievements in culture and science, the strength of its
military and the Soviet victory in the Second World War, it is not
based on identification with the Soviet Union. For the purposes of
this article, this is the self-image of Russia that the ruling elite tries
to project both internally and internationally as an integral part of
Russias foreign policy.
As Valentina Feklyunina aptly points out, it is possible that
the self-image(s) a country tries to project may differ according to
the targeted audience.64 While it is true that most of the public
diplomacy efforts described above are directed at the West and the
former Soviet republics, how about Russias image-building policies
in the three countries under examination in this article?
In Thailand, there is no Russian Cultural Center at present. A
branch of the Russian World Foundation was established in 2012
and mainly promotes Russian language education. The Russian
Embassy in Thailand organizes various activities mostly aimed at
promoting Russian culture.65 The activities of the Russian cultural
centres in Hanoi and Vientiane consist mainly of promoting Russian
(mainly classical) literature and cinema, Russian language and
various exhibitions that present Russian achievements in science
(chiefly space related) and culture. The choice of movies to be
screened is often arbitrary and based on the availability of DVDs
with subtitles, but war movies depicting Russian and Soviet heroism
in various wars are the most popular. Another aspect of the two
centres activities is the promotion of bilateral economic ties and
Russian higher education.66
According to the Director of the Russian Cultural Center in
Vientiane, when promoting Russian culture an emphasis is made
on presenting it as equal to other cultures rather than as superior
or universal.67 The Soviet victory in the Second World War plays
an important part in Russian public diplomacy in both countries,
and the centres organize exhibitions and events related to various
important events in the war such as for example the 900-day siege

458 Alexander Bukh
of Leningrad.68 One interesting aspect of the 2015 celebration of the

Second World War victory in Laos organized by the Center was the
emphasis on the Soviet role in the victory over Japan, which briefly
occupied Laos in 1945.69 As such, no distinction was made between
the war in Europe and the one in the Pacific. The two wars were
presented as one, and the emphasis on the Soviet contribution to
the war in the Pacific can be interpreted as legitimizing Russias
claim to Great Power status not only in Europe but also in Asia.
Overall however, it can argued that Russia lacks a specific public
diplomacy strategy designed for Southeast Asia and the self-image
it seeks to promote in the three countries corresponds to the one
described above.
Perceptions of Russia in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam

The Survey
The main aim of the survey was to explore the ways young educated
elites with an interest in international relations, and a potential to
play an important role in forming their countrys foreign policy,
perceive Russia. For this purpose, a questionnaire-based survey
was conducted by the author in Vietnam in August 2013 and in
Laos and Thailand in January 2014. The anonymous survey was
conducted with the author and a lecturer from the university in
question present in the room. The respondents were presented with
a questionnaire in English that contained a mix of multiple choice
questions and open-ended questions. The results below are given
in percentage of respondents. For the sake of convenience, decimal
numbers were rounded off to the nearest integer. In some questions,
the respondents could make a multiple choice and hence the total
is sometimes greater than a 100.
The total number of respondents in Vietnam was 226, in Laos
125 and in Thailand 100, with a response rate of 100 per cent,
though some respondents chose not to answer certain questions. The
gender breakdown in Vietnam was 72 per cent female and 28 per cent
male; in Laos 48 per cent and 52 per cent; and in Thailand 60 per
cent and 40 per cent. In Vietnam, the survey was conducted among
undergraduate students majoring in subjects related to international
affairs at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV). The DAV is
one of the most prestigious academic institutions in the country and
is affiliated with Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Laos, the
survey was conducted among students at the International Relations

Department at the National University of Laos (NUOL). NUOL is the

only university that teaches International Relations. In Thailand, the
survey targeted undergraduate students majoring in political science,
International Relations and public administration at the Faculty of
Political Science, Thammasat University. Thammasat University is
one of the two oldest and most prestigious universities in Thailand.
Its Faculty of Political Science is the second oldest in the country
and its degree in political science is one of the most prestigious
and competitive in the country.
This survey represents a first attempt at exploring the views of
Russia in the three countries in question. Admittedly, the sample
is relatively small if compared to Pew polls on perceptions of
various countries and does not allow for making general statements
about the ways Russia is viewed by the public in general. In
any case, under the current political situation in all of the three
countries, a large scale survey on political issues is all but
impossible. Furthermore, the purpose of this study is not to explore
the general publics perceptions of Russia but rather the way it is
viewed by young, educated elites who could potentially play a key
role in shaping the foreign policies of their respective countries.
Also, unlike the Pew polls that usually have a very limited number
of questions and answer options, this survey included both semi-
structured and open-ended questions. This provides for a deeper
understanding of the ways respondents view Russia. The analysis
below combines the use of qualitative and quantitative methods to
explore the perceptions of Russia and variations among the three
groups of respondents.
Exposure to Russia and Desire to Visit Russia

In all three groups, an overwhelming majority of the respondents
had never been to Russia and had had no exposure to Russian
public diplomacy. As such, we can assume that for most of the
respondents, perceptions of Russia were not shaped by direct
experience but through exposure to the dominant narratives in their
respective countries. A majority of the respondents who had never
been to Russia expressed an interest in visiting the country. Most
Thais and Vietnamese were interested in Russia for tourism rather
than education or work. In contrast, Laotians, who are the poorest
and have the lowest literacy rate among the three countries, held a
slightly stronger preference for study versus tourism. However, few of
them cited an interest in working there (see Tables 1 and 2). Overall,

460 Alexander Bukh
the respondents in all three countries viewed Russia positively. While

there were certain variations among the three groups, the majority
of respondents in all three countries held either a very favourable
or somewhat favourable view of Russias government, economy and
culture (see Tables 3, 4 and 5.)
Table 1
Exposure to Russia and Desire to Visit Russia
(Percentage)
Participated Would Like Would Not

Visited Russia in Activities to Visit Like to Visit
Laos 4 5 99 1
Thailand 3 9 92 8
Vietnam 3.5 8 94 6
Table 2
Reasons to Visit Russia
(Percentage)
Tourism Education Work
Laos 51 40 9
Thailand 82 13 5
Vietnam 75 19 6
Table 3
Views of Russias Government System
(Percentage)
Somewhat
Very Favourable Favourable No
View View Negative View Response
Laos 19 43 34 4
Thailand 9 73 13 5
Vietnam 24 71 3 2

Table 4
Views of Russias Economic System
(Percentage)
Somewhat
Very Favourable Favourable No
View View Negative View Response
Laos 18 42 36 4
Thailand 10 76 11 3
Vietnam 25 65 8 2
Table 5
Views of Russian Culture
(Percentage)
Somewhat
Very Favourable Favourable Negative View No
View View of Culture Response
Laos 18 37 45 0
Thailand 40 55 5 0
Vietnam 61 34 5 0
In order to obtain a more complex understanding of the respondents

image of Russia, they were asked to provide a list of 34 things they
associated with Russia (see Table 6). Based on the answers received,
it can be argued that despite the over two decades that have passed
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the numerous drastic
changes that have taken place in post-Soviet Russia, the Soviet past
is still quite dominant in the imagery of Russia. For Vietnamese
and Thai respondents, Russia is mostly associated with the Soviet
past, President Putin and a number of universally shared images of
Russian food, the capital, weather and the nesting doll matryoshka.
The main associations listed by Laotian respondents included
explicitly Soviet-related ones and also more general ones such as
technology, history, culture and politics. While the latter group can
be attributed to both the USSR and Russia, this combination of
the two groups of associations closely resembles the image of the
Soviet Union disseminated by Soviet public diplomacy agencies in

462 Alexander Bukh
Table 6
Russia Related Associations
Laos Communism (17%), Cold weather (15%), Technology (16%),

Lenin, Stalin and Food (12%) History (14%),
Marx (14%) Culture (14%),
Politics (14%),
War (11%),
Power (10%)
Vietnam Lenin, Stalin and Cold weather (27%), Putin (24%)

Marx (20%), Famous places (25%),
USSR (8%), Moscow (17%),
Cold War (5%) Matryoshka (16%),
Large size (10%)
Thailand Communism (18%), Food and drinks (32%), Putin (22%)

Cold War (18%), Moscow (21%),
Lenin and Stalin (21%), Famous places
USSR (11%) (20%), Cold Weather
(20%), Matryoshka
(17%)
developing countries during the Cold War; namely, an image of a

leading communist country, but also a culturally and technologically
advanced Great Power.70 This difference between Laotian respondents
and the other two groups and the close correspondence of the former
to the image disseminated during the Soviet era, could be due to
a relatively low exposure to information about post-Soviet Russia,
but could also be attributed to the continued dominance of Cold
War era narratives in Laotian society today.
Regardless of the importance of Soviet and Cold War related
associations, these do not play an important role in determining
the attitude of respondents towards Russia as these do not appear
in the list of things liked or disliked about Russia (see Table 7). In
all three groups, culture related answers topped the list of things
respondents liked about Russia. In Vietnam, culture, food and people
were the most popular things liked about Russia with nothing
in particular chosen by 19 per cent of respondents. In Laos, the
situation was quite similar though economy topped the list of liked

Table 7
Liked/disliked things about Russia: Top Answers
Laos Thailand Vietnam
Liked Economy (15%), Culture (13%), Culture (23%),

Culture (14%), history (11%), food (19%),
food (14%), architecture (11%), people (16%),
people (13%), famous places (11%), nothing in particular
nothing in nothing in particular (19%)
particular (14%) (25%)
Disliked Weather (7%), Weather (21%), Weather (9%),

politics (3%), unfriendly people (9%), violence and gangs (13%),
nothing in mafia (6%), nothing in particular
particular (58%) nothing in particular (46%)
(54%)
things and 14 per cent chose nothing in particular. In Thailand,

culture, history, architecture and famous places topped the list of
likeable things. Nothing in particular was selected by 25 per cent
of the respondents probably reflecting the relative cognitive distance
of Russia as compared to the other two groups. For things
respondents disliked about Russia, the answers were quite similar
across the three groups. Weather topped the list in all three
cases. In Vietnam violence and gangs came second, in Laos it
was politics and in Thailand, unfriendly people. Nothing in
particular was chosen by 20 per cent of Vietnamese respondents,
36 per cent of Laotians and 54 per cent of Thais, again possibly
reflecting the difference in exposure to information about Russia.
Overall, these results show that while the respondents probably
had a rather limited knowledge of Russia, its overall image in all
three countries is quite positive. For the majority of respondents
in all three countries, associations with the Soviet Union are
quite strong, although Russias positive image is based mostly on
non-political associations.
Russias Influence
This section explores the level of correspondence between the
self-image of Russia advocated by the Russian elite and the images
espoused by the respondents. Overall, the responses show that
while there are differences between countries, there is a certain

464 Alexander Bukh
alignment between Russias self-image and the way the respondents

perceived it.
To gauge whether the differences between countries were large
and systematic enough to pass standard thresholds of statistical
significance, I conducted a series of comparisons-of-means tests using
STATA for the questions I deemed to be the most important (Russia
as a Great Power, Russias influence in the world, Russias role in
the Asia-Pacific region, and Russias influence in your country).
From these, I generated for each country-pair a p-value indicating
the probability that there was no difference.
As noted above, Russia as a Great Power is currently the
main trope in Russian elite discourse. A majority of respondents
in each of the three groups perceived Russia as a Great Power.
As can be seen in Table 8, Vietnamese respondents were the most
prone to believe that Russia is a Great Power, followed by Laotians
and then the Thais. The difference between the Vietnam/Laos and
Vietnam/Thailand pairs is statistically significant at p < .001. In
contrast, Laotian and Thai responses did not differ at significant
levels (p = .500).
Table 8
Russias Status in the World
(Percentage)
Russia is: Great Power Middle Power Ordinary State No Response
Laos 55 31 10 6
Thailand 53 37 8 2
Vietnam 75 17 2 6
Eurasianism, or the perception of Russia as belonging to both

European and Asian civilizations, plays in important role in
Russias self-image of a unique country with a special destiny. To
understand whether this self-mage resonates with the young elites
in the three target countries, the respondents were asked whether
they see Russia as a European country, an Asian country or both
(see Table 9). Among Thai students, an equal number of respondents
saw Russia as a European country and as both European and Asian.
In Laos and Vietnam the majority of respondents saw Russia as both
European and Asian.

Table 9
Russia is a European Country, an Asian Country or Both
(Percentage)
Russia is: European Asian Both No Response
Laos 39 5 52 4
Thailand 48 1 48 3
Vietnam 27 5 62 6
Great Power status, and unique geographical location, are intrinsically

value-free concepts. While the Russian elite obviously carry positive
and normative connotations, for others these can be negative or
neutral. In order to get a clearer understanding of the respondents
perceptions of Russias power, the questionnaire asked respondents
views of Russias role in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region,
as well as the nature of Russias influence in their own country.
Respondents were also asked to name the most important country
in their countrys international relations.
Table 10 shows that the number of respondents who observed
no Russian influence in the world was the highest in Thailand,
reaching almost one third of respondents. The remaining Thai
respondents were divided almost equally between those who saw
Russias influence as positive and those who saw it as a negative.
In contrast, Russias influence was seen as positive by most of the
Vietnamese and Laotian respondents. The difference between each
national group was statistically significant at p < .001, with the
exception of the VietnamLaos positive comparison, which was
significant at p = .006, still a notable difference.
Table 10
Russias Global Influence
(Percentage)
Positive Negative
Influence in Influence in No No
the World the World Influence Response
Laos 74 7 14 5
Thailand 37 31 26 6
Vietnam 88 6 4 2

466 Alexander Bukh
Most of the Laotian and Vietnamese respondents believed that

Russia today plays an important role in the Asia-Pacific region
(see Table 11). Here again, Thai responses were split almost equally
between those that saw it as important and those that did not see
Russias role in the region as such. Here, the difference between
Thailand/Vietnam and Thailand/Laos groups was significant at
p < .001. In contrast, there was no difference between the Laos/
Vietnam group (p = .394).
Table 11
Russias Role in the Asia-Pacific Region
(Percentage)
Important Not Important No Response
Laos 88 8 4
Thailand 44 47 9
Vietnam 87 6 7
Turning now to Table 12, in Vietnam and Laos, the majority of

respondents viewed Russias influence in their country as positive.
In Thailand, almost an equal number saw it as positive or Russia
as having no influence at all. Here again there was a statistically
significant difference between each national group for positive
perceptions of Russias influence and for observing no influence at
all. In terms of areas of influence (see Table 13) political was the
highest in Vietnam and Laos, followed by economic and cultural.
In Thailand economic influence came first and was followed
by no influence and cultural, with political influence coming
last. Interestingly however, when asked about desired areas of
cooperation, the economy was dominant in all three groups with
politics and culture coming second in Vietnam/Laos and Thailand
respectively (see Table 14). While this result probably reflected
the respondents general understanding of foreign policy priorities,
it also conflicted with what is generally seen as Russias main
asset, namely its culture. To reiterate, only in the case of Laos,
was the economy mentioned among things respondents liked about
Russia (see Table 7).

Table 12
Russias Influence in Your Country
(Percentage)
Positive Negative No Influence No Response
Laos 74 2 19 5
Thailand 40 17 43 0
Vietnam 86 5 6 3
Table 13
Areas of Russias Influence in Your Country
(Percentage, multiple choices possible)
Political Economic Cultural

Influence Influence Influence Other None
Laos 58 36 6 2 4
Thailand 13 51 17 3 20
Vietnam 62 51 24 3 1
Table 14
Areas of Desired Cooperation with Russia
(Percentage, multiple choices possible)
Economy Politics Culture Other None
Laos 66 30 10 6 0
Thailand 81 8 22 4 3
Vietnam 77 45 39 3 1
In terms of the most important countries (see Table 15), in Vietnam,

Russia came third after the United States and China. In Laos, China
was seen as the most important country by the majority of respondents,
with Vietnam and Russia coming second with an equal number of
votes. Incidentally, the United States was chosen only by 2 per
cent of the Laotian respondents. For Thai respondents, the United
States topped the list with China coming second and Japan in third
place. Russia was chosen only by 2 per cent of the respondents.

468 Alexander Bukh
Table 15
Most Important Country in Your Countrys Foreign Policy
(Percentage)
Laos China (60) Vietnam (18) Russia (18) America (2) Other (2)
Thailand America (49) China (35) Japan (9) ASEAN (5) Russia (2)
Vietnam America (40) China (33) Russia (23) Other (4)
These choices can be attributed to various factors including the

Russia focused nature of the survey. In the case of Vietnam and
Thailand, the choice of the two Great Powers that compete for
influence in the region as the most important countries is self-
explanatory. The choice of Russia as the third most important country
by the Vietnamese respondents could be attributed to historical
memory of bilateral ties with the USSR, the current strategic
partnership between the two countries and the importance of Russia
as a supplier of arms for Vietnam. In the case of Laos, China is the
biggest investor in the country but Vietnam continues to play an
important role in the countrys economy and politics. The choice
of Russia as the third most important country could be attributed
to the historical memory of bilateral relations, but I find it hard to
explain the absence of Thailand and the relatively low importance
assigned to the United States by the Laotian respondents.
Conclusion
The article has explored the views and perceptions of Russia
among young elites in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand and their
correspondence to Russias self-image. The limitations of this study
are self-evident. The relatively limited number of respondents in
all three surveys do not allow us to make overarching arguments
about the way Russia is viewed in these three countries. The
surveys were conducted in the presence of the author and in an
organized institutional environment which may have influenced
the respondents to give answers they thought were expected from
them. Some of the answer choices presented to the respondents,
such as for example, Great Power, are not univocal and can
have multiple meanings. Furthermore, the surveys were conducted

before the onset of Moscows annexation of Crimea in 2014 and

subsequent involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. Thus they do
not reflect the Crimea effect, though Pew polls suggest that the
impact of the conflict on the way Russia is viewed in non-Western
countries has been rather limited.71
The cautious observations that can be made about the
perceptions of Russia in the three countries are as follows. First,
there is a certain degree of correspondence between the self-image
held by the Russian elite and the images of Russia elucidated
in the survey. Russia is seen by many of the respondents in all
three countries as a Great Power that plays an important and
positive role in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region. It is
also seen as a Eurasian power and this perception could be
utilized by Russian policymakers as a source of legitimacy for
Russias greater involvement in the region.
There are probably numerous ways to interpret these positive
perceptions. The possible factors that shape these images are
multiple. For example, they can be traced to certain similarities
between the political regimes in Russia and in the surveyed
countries or the officially endorsed historical narratives in Laos
and Vietnam that emphasize the continuity between the countrys
present and its revolutionary past.72 Arguably, however, historical
memory defined as broadly as possible plays an important
role in shaping these perceptions. Namely, identification with the
Soviet Union is quite important in shaping the perceptions of
contemporary Russia.
Although Russias actual relations with the three countries
today are rather limited, there were statistically significant differences
among the three groups. These could also be attributed to the
historical memory of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.
Despite the drastic decline in bilateral relations with Vietnam and
Laos, Russia today is still viewed as exerting influence in these
countries. For Laos, the Soviet Union was a more distant partner
and hence the difference in the perceptions of Russia, as well
as its role in the region and its influence in the country as
compared with Vietnam. The results in Thailand show a relatively
positive view of Russia as a whole, but at the same time a divided
perception of its importance in world politics and its influence
in the region and in Thailand. For Thailand, the Soviet Union was
a distant other and unlike in the case of Europe, USSR/Russia

470 Alexander Bukh
did not play a role in the construction of their national identities.

Hence it could be argued, the Thai respondents view todays
Russia through very thin lens of the memory of the Cold War and
contemporary events which have had little impact on Thailand.
The utility of these relatively positive perceptions of Russia
as soft power resources however is quite limited as there are also
certain important dissonances between Russias self-image and
the images elucidated here. Namely, the perception of Russia as
a Great Power relies heavily on its association with the Soviet
Union. In the Russian elites narrative, however, the argument about
the continuity between todays Russia and its Soviet past is quite
limited. Hence, the narrative on Russias greatness is based mostly
on other constructs. Furthermore, while most of the respondents had
a positive view of Russias government and economy, its culture is
seen as its main asset. Also, in all three groups, respondents chose
economy as the most desired area of cooperation between their
respective countries and Russia. As such, Russias attractiveness
seems to be mostly value-free and is not based on any particular
set of values or ideas. Based on this, it can be argued that Russias
deeper economic involvement in the region, and further attempts to
promote its culture, would probably be welcomed by the young elites.
In contrast, further political involvement or a quest for leadership
in the region would not be supported by soft power resources, as
elucidated in this study.
Lastly, the findings of this article have important implications
for the broader scholarship on soft power. Namely, they suggest
that images and perceptions that can be utilized as soft power
resources do not necessarily reflect the present actions or ideas
of the wielder of soft power, but at least to a certain degree are
shaped by historical memory of past interactions. In other words,
soft power resources are not only about an agents actions today
but also about its actions in the past and the historical memory
of these actions as narrated today.
NOTES
1
The research conducted for this article was funded by the Faculty Research
Fund, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, VUW and Visiting Scholar
Fellowship, Slavic Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University. The author
would like to thank Saysavanh Phomeviengsay from the National University
of Laos; Nam Duong, Nguyen Cat Ngoc and Phan Thanh Thuy from the DAV;

and Decha Tangseefa from Thammasat University for their invaluable help
with conducting the surveys for this study. The author would also like to
thank Ted Hopf from the National University of Singapore and my colleagues
Stephen Epstein and Jason Young for their suggestions and comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. Special appreciation goes to my colleague Jana von
Stein for introducing me to the fascinating world of quantitative analysis and
assisting me with analyzing the results of the surveys used in this article.
2
Anton Tsvetov, After Crimea: Southeast Asia in Russias Foreign Policy
Narrative, Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 1 (April 2016): 5580.
3
To the best of my knowledge, the only academic work on mutual perceptions
between Russia and ASEAN is Ekaterina Koldunova and Paradorn Rangsimaporn,
20 let spustya: kakimi Rossiya i ASEAN vidyat drug druga [20 Years Later:
How Russia and ASEAN See Each Other], Russian Journal of International
Affairs 5 (2016), available at <https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/1480>. This
article provides an insightful overview of Russias relations with ASEAN but
only touches very briefly on perceptions of Russia in ASEAN countries.
4
Yulia Kiseleva, Myagkaya Sila Rossii [Russias Soft Power], paper presented at
the Trendy Mirovovo Politicheskogo Razvitiya: Vozmojnosti dlya Rossii [Recent
Trends in World Political Development: Opportunities for Russia], MGIMO,
Moscow, 2425 September 2010.
5
Andrei P. Tsygankov, If Not by Tanks, Then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power
in Putins Foreign Policy, Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 7 (November 2006):
107999.
6
Koldunova and Rangsimaporn, 20 Years Later, op. cit.
7
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004).
8
Li Mingjiang, Soft Power: Chinas Emerging Strategy in International Politics,
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2009).
9
Galia Press-Barnathan, Does Popular Culture Matter to International Relations
Scholars? Possible Links and Methodological Challenges, in Popular Culture
and the State in Southeast Asia, edited by Nissim Otmazgin and Eyal Ben-Ari
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 2945.
10
See, for example, Janice B. Mattern, Why Soft Power Isnt So Soft:
Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in
World Politics, Millennium-Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (June
2005): 583612; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How Chinas Soft
Power is Transforming the World (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 2007).
11
Edward Lock, Soft Power and Strategy: Developing a Strategic Concept of
Power, in Soft Power and US Foreign Policy, edited by Inderjeet Parmar and
Michael Cox (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2010), pp. 3250.
12
Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon and Ben OLoughlin, Strategic Narrative: A
New Means to Understand Soft Power, Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (April
2014): 7084.
13
Ibid. p. 71.
14
Kiseleva, Russias Soft Power, op. cit., p. 12.

472 Alexander Bukh
15
For example, Fiona Hill, Moscow Discovers Soft Power, Current History
105, no. 693 (October 2006): 34147; Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr
Lytvynenko, A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine, briefing
paper, The Aims and Means of Russian Influence Abroad series, Chatham
House, January 2012; Agnia Grigas, Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian
Influence in the Baltic States, briefing paper, The Aims and Means of Russian
Influence Abroad series, Chatham House, August 2012.
16
Kiseleva, Russias Soft Power, op. cit., p. 18; Sergei Karaganov, Russia in
the World of Ideas and Images, Russian Embassy in the UK website, available
at <http://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/21>.
17
Joseph Nye, What China and Russia Dont Get about Soft Power, Foreign
Policy 29 (April 2013), available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-
china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/>.
18
For example, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy
and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 1992); Iver B. Neumann, Russia as Europes Other, Journal of Area
Studies 6, no. 12 (March 1998): 2673.
19
Andrei Tsygankov, The Dark Double: The American Media Perception of
Russia as a Neo-Soviet Autocracy, 20082014, Politics, published online,
18 April 2016, available at <http://pol.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/04/18/
0263395715626945.abstract>.
20
Pew Research Center, Opinion of Russia 2015, available at <http://www.
pewglobal.org/database/indicator/27/survey/all/>.
21
Koldunova and Rangsimaporn, 20 Years Later, op. cit.
22
Evgenyi Glazunov, V dni voiny i mira [Times of War and Peace] (Moscow:
RIOR, 2010), pp. 86114.
23
Leszek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia (London: Croom
Helm, 1986), pp. 15055.
24
Aleksandr Arefyev and Franz Sheregi, Inostrannye studenty v rossiiskih vuzah
[Foreign Students in Russian Universities] (Moscow: Russian Ministry of
Education and Science, 2014), p. 43.
25
Analtolyi Voronin and Evgeniy Kobelev, SSR/Rossiya-Vietnam: Vehi
Sotrudnichestva [USSR/RussiaVietnam: Milestones of Cooperation] (Moscow:
Kuna, 2011), p. 119.
26
SSOD, Deyatelnost SSODa vo Vietname v 1980 gody [SSOD Activities in
Vietnam in 1980], Russian State Archive (GARF), Font 9576R, Opis 20, Delo
2873.
27
Vladimir Putin, O merah po realizatsii vneshnepoliticheskogo kursa Rossiiskoi
Federatzii [On Measures for Realization of the Foreign Policy of Russian
Federation], Presidential Degree 605, 7 May 2012, available at <https://
rg.ru/2012/05/09/vn-polit-dok.html>.
28
According to the SIPRI arms trade database, for the period 201415, the value
of Russias arms exports to Vietnam was US$1.795 billion, to India US$3.834
billion and to China US$1.538 billion. See <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/
page/values.php>.
29
Tsvetov, After Crimea, op. cit.

30
Vladimir Mazyrin, Rossisko-vietnamskie otnosheniya na novom etape [Russo
Vietnamese Relations at a New Stage], in Rossisko-vietnamskie otnosheniya:
sovremennost i istoria [RussoVietnamese Relations: Contemporary and History],
edited by Evgenii Kobelev and Vladimir Mazyrin (Moscow: IDV RAN, 2013),
pp. 2447.
31
Arefyev and Sheregi, Foreign Students, op. cit., p. 43.
32
Francesca Turauskis, Vietnamese Students on the Move, Student World
Online, 29 January 2014, available at <http://www.studentworldonline.com/
article/vietnamese-students-on-the-move/55/>.
33
Author interview with Aleksei Lavrenyev, Russian Cultural Center in Hanoi,
19 June 2012.
34
Ngan Nguyen, How English Has Displaced Russian and Other Foreign Languages
in Vietnam since Doi Moi, International Journal of Humanities and Social
Science 2, no. 23 (December 2012): 25966.
35
Paul Langer, The Soviet Union, China and the Pathet Lao: Analysis and
Chronology (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1976), pp. 1119.
36
Dorothea Arndt, Foreign Assistance and Economic Policies in Laos, 197686,
Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 2 (September 1992): 188210.
37
Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), p. 177.
38
Russian Embassy in Laos, O prieme laosskih studentov v Posolsteve [About
Reception of Laotian Students at the Embassy], 14 October 2014, available at
<http://laos.mid.ru/>.
39
Ibid.
40
LaosRussia to Deepen Ties, Cooperation, Vientiane Times, 22 September
2014, available at <http://www.vientianetimes.org.la/Video_FileVDO/Sep14_Laos_
Russia.htm>.
41
US Department of State, Investment Climate Statement-Laos, April 2013
available at <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204674.htm>.
42
Martin Stuart-Fox, Laos: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances
Pinter Publishers, 1986), p. 172.
43
Ronald B. St. John, Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia:
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2006), pp. 5758.
44
Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, op. cit., p. 170.
45
Vatthana Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong, Laos: From Buffer State to Crossroads?
(Bangkok: Mekong Press, 2006), pp. 5355.
46
Ekaterina Koldunova and Paradorn Rangsimaporn, RussiaThailand Relations:
Historical Background and Contemporary Developments, in ASEANRussia:
Foundations and Future Prospects, edited by Victor Sumsky, Mark Hong and
Amy Lugg (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 16171.
47
Anna Simonenok, Sovetsko-tailandskie otnosheniya 1940e1991 [SovietThai
Relations 1940s till 1991], Kandidat Nauk in Regional Studies Dissertation,
Russian Far Eastern University, 2013, pp. 3435.
48
For a detailed analysis see Tom Marks, Making Revolution: The Insurgency of
the Communist Party of Thailand in Structural Perspectives (Bangkok: While

474 Alexander Bukh
Lotus, 1994); Puangthong Rungswasdisab, Truth in the Vietnam War: The First
Casualty of War and the Thai State (Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing, 2006).
49
Thai Department of Tourism, International Tourist Arrivals to Thailand by
Nationality 2012 and Tourism Receipts from International Tourist Arrivals
JanuaryDecember 2012, available at <http://newdot2.samartmultimedia.com/
home>.
50
Itti Ditbanjopng, Tailand pridaet bolshoe znachenie ukrepeleniyu svyazei s
Rossiey [Thailand Pays a Lot of Attention to Strengthening Ties with Russia],
Konsul 2, no. 29 (March 2012): 46.
51
Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Inostrannye Studenty [Foreign
Students], 2014, available at <www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b14_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/
d01/07-55.htm>.
52
Ted Hopf, Crimea is Ours: A Discursive History, International Relations 30,
no. 2 (June 2016): 22755.
53
Valentina Feklyunina, Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West,
EuropeAsia Studies 60, no. 4 (June 2008): 60529.
54
Farid Mukhametishin et al., Sovremennaya obeshestvennaya diplomatiya:
rossiiskoye izmerenie [Contemporary Public Diplomacy: The Russian Dimension]
(Moscow: Rossotrudnichestvo, 2011), pp. 1419.
55
Hopf, Crimea is Ours, op. cit., p. 233.
56
On the history of Russian Eurasianism see Charles Clover, Black Wind, White
Snow: The Rise of Russias New Nationalism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 2016).
57
Boris Yeltsin, Ukaz Presidenta No 1300 [Presidential Decree Number 1300],
17 December 1997, available at <http://zakonbase.ru/content/base/24975>.
58
Andrey Tolstoy and Edmund McCaffray, Mind Games: Alexander Dugin and
Russias War of Ideas, World Affairs 177, no. 6 (March/April 2015): 2531.
59
Aleksandr Dugin, Evraziiskii put kak nazionalnaya ideya [Eurasian Way as a
National Idea] (Moscow: Arktogeia Zentr, 2002).
60
Mukhametshin et al., Contemporary, op. cit., p. 16.
61
Lev Gudkov, Pamyat o voine i massovaya identichnost rossiyan [Memory
of the War and Russian Collective Identity], in Pamyat o voine 60 let spustya
[Memory of the War 60 Years Later], edited by Mikhail Gabovich (Moscow:
NLO, 2005), p. 95.
62
For example, Vladimir Putin, Speech of the President of Russia on the
Occasion of a Parade on the 70th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic
War, 9 May 2015, available at <http://www.kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/117/
events/49438>.
63
Marlene Laurelle, Russian World: Russias Soft Power and Geopolitical
Imagination (Washington, D.C.: Center on Global Interests, 2015).
64
Feklyunina, Battle, op. cit., p. 608.
65
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the
Kingdom of Thailand, available at <http://thailand.mid.ru/en/>.
66
Author interview with Aleksei Lavrenyev, Russian Cultural Center in Hanoi,
19 June 2012.

67
Author interview with Lyudmila Kuntysh, Russian Cultural Center in Vientiane,
9 January 2014.
68
Author interviews with Lavrenev and Kuntysh.
69
Rossotrudnichestvo, Meropriyatiya posvyashennye Pobede nad Yaponiey
[Activities Dedicated to the Victory over Japan], 2 October 2015, available at
<http://rs.gov.ru/press/news/10091>.
70
For example, SSOD, SSOD Activities, op. cit.
71
Pew, Opinion of Russia 2015, op. cit.
72
St. John, Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia, op. cit., pp. 19395.

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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 38, No. 3 (2016), pp.

44575 DOI: 10.1355/cs38-3d

Russias Image and Soft Power

Alexander Bukh is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in

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between the two images. Based on discernible differences among the

Keywords: Russia, Southeast Asia, soft power, perceptions, historical memory.

The main purpose of this study is to analyze Russias soft power

04 Alexander-2P.indd 446 10/11/16 11:32 am

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Soft Power and Soft Power Resources

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As already noted, the extant literature on Russias soft power,

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gradually expanding its assistance to the Democratic Republic of

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main foreign language taught at Vietnamese universities, has lost

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year, and despite the development of bilateral relations after Mikhail

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Russian investment in certain areas. Thailand has become one of

04 Alexander-2P.indd 455 10/11/16 11:32 am

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mainly to Russias relations with the former Soviet republics and

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of Leningrad.68 One interesting aspect of the 2015 celebration of the

Perceptions of Russia in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam

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Department at the National University of Laos (NUOL). NUOL is the

Exposure to Russia and Desire to Visit Russia

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the respondents in all three countries viewed Russia positively. While

Participated Would Like Would Not

Tourism Education Work

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In order to obtain a more complex understanding of the respondents

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Laos Communism (17%), Cold weather (15%), Technology (16%),

Vietnam Lenin, Stalin and Cold weather (27%), Putin (24%)

Thailand Communism (18%), Food and drinks (32%), Putin (22%)

developing countries during the Cold War; namely, an image of a

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Laos Thailand Vietnam

Liked Economy (15%), Culture (13%), Culture (23%),

Disliked Weather (7%), Weather (21%), Weather (9%),

things and 14 per cent chose nothing in particular. In Thailand,

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alignment between Russias self-image and the way the respondents

Russia is: Great Power Middle Power Ordinary State No Response

Eurasianism, or the perception of Russia as belonging to both

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Russia is: European Asian Both No Response

Great Power status, and unique geographical location, are intrinsically

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Most of the Laotian and Vietnamese respondents believed that

Important Not Important No Response

Turning now to Table 12, in Vietnam and Laos, the majority of

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Positive Negative No Influence No Response

Political Economic Cultural

Economy Politics Culture Other None