Professional Documents
Culture Documents
nation
This article is a subset article under the
main article Signals intelligence, which
addresses the unifying conceptual and
technical factors and common
technologies in this intelligence
discipline. This article deals with current
signals intelligence collection
equipment by nation, including fixed
and mobile ground stations, ships,
submarines, aircraft and satellites. See
Signals intelligence by alliances,
nations and industries for the
organization of SIGINT activities, and A United States Air ForceBoeing RC-135 aircraft
for context, see Signals intelligence in in flight
modern history. For a complete
hierarchical list of articles, see the
intelligence cycle management
hierarchy.
Contents
1 Ground platforms
1.1 Australia: Ground platforms
1.2 Cuba: Ground platforms
1.3 France: ground platforms
1.3.1
France: strategic ground platforms
1.3.2
France: tactical ground platforms
A52 Oste, an Oste class ELINT and
1.4 Germany: ground platforms reconnaissance ship, of the German Navy
1.4.1
Germany: strategic ground platforms
1.4.2
Germany: tactical ground platforms
1.5 New Zealand: ground platforms
1.6 Russia: ground platforms
1.6.1
Russia: strategic ground platforms
1.6.2
Russia: tactical ground platforms
1.7 Turkey: ground platform
1.8 United Kingdom: ground platforms
1.8.1
United Kingdom: strategic ground platforms
1.9 United States: ground platforms
1.9.1
United States: strategic ground platforms
1.9.2
United States: tactical ground systems
1.9.2.1
US Army: tactical ground
stations
1.9.2.2
US Marine Corps: tactical ground
stations
1.9.2.3
US Army and Marines: tactical
ground stations
2 Ship platforms
2.1 China: ship platforms
2.2 Denmark: ship platforms
2.3 France: ship platforms
2.4 Germany: ship platforms
2.5 New Zealand: ship platforms
2.6 Norway: ship platforms
2.7 Poland: ship platforms
2.8 Russia: ship platforms
2.9 Spain: ship platforms
2.10 Sweden: ship platforms
2.11 United States: ship platforms
3 Submarine platforms
3.1 Australia: submarine platforms
3.2 Canada: submarine platforms
3.3 Chile: submarine platforms
3.4 China: submarine platforms
3.5 Denmark: submarine platforms
3.6 Egypt: submarine platforms
3.7 France: submarine platforms
3.8 Germany: submarine platforms
3.9 Greece: submarine platforms
3.10 Italy: submarine platforms
3.11 Israel: submarine platforms
3.12 Netherlands: submarine platforms
3.13 Russia: submarine platforms
3.14 South Africa: submarine platforms
3.15 South Korea: submarine platforms
3.16 Spain: submarine platforms
3.17 Sweden: submarine platforms
3.18 Taiwan: submarine platforms
3.19 United Kingdom: submarine platforms
3.20 United States: submarine platforms
4 Aircraft platforms
4.1 Argentina: aircraft platforms
4.2 Australia: aircraft platforms
4.3 Chile: aircraft platforms
4.4 China: aircraft platforms
4.5 France: aircraft platforms
4.6 Germany: aircraft platforms
4.7 Israel: aircraft platforms
4.8 India: aircraft platforms
4.9 Mexico: aircraft platforms
4.10 Russia: aircraft platforms
4.11 Saudi Arabia: aircraft platforms
4.12 Spain: aircraft platforms
4.13 Sweden: aircraft platforms
4.14 Turkey: aircraft platforms
4.15 United Kingdom: aircraft platforms
4.16 United States: aircraft platforms
4.16.1
United States: tactical aircraft platforms
4.16.2
United States: strategic aircraft platforms
5 Satellite platforms
5.1 European military space policy
5.1.1 WEU/EU military force
5.1.2 European Union Satellite Centre
5.1.3
Sharing the more sensitive disciplines
5.1.4
European Space Council and current
concerns
5.1.5 Next generation
5.2 Belgium: satellite platforms
5.3 France: satellite platforms
5.4 Germany: satellite platforms
5.5 Greece: satellite platforms
5.6 Italy: satellite platforms
5.7 Russia: satellite platforms
5.8 Spain: satellite platforms
5.9 United States: satellite platforms
6 References
Ground platforms
It can be difficult to draw the line between a ground-based SIGINT receiving station, and facilities that have control, coordination,
and processing functions in the "bigger picture" of signals intelligence. Many stations, for the countries with stations in many parts of
the world, do have both aspects. There are also some that are clearly intercept only
.
The first signals intelligence platforms were listening stations on the ground. Early tactical stations were in use as early as World War
I, but permanent strategic signals intelligence stations were established as world tensions grew before WWII.
Arguably, one combined intercept and jamming technique of WWI was the use of shotguns against carrier pigeons, followed by
reading the message attached to the bird.
While pigeons can probably be safe, other collection techniques may enjoy a resurgence. One specialized technique, originally used
in the First World War but again in the Korean War, was interception using ground return from wired telephones. In mountainous
terrain, it might again have applications, such as Afghan caves where wire might be run without the danger of free-space interception.
Satellite communications generally must be intercepted by large parabolic antennas on the ground, although there are possibilities
that aircraft, intelligence satellites, and ships might also intercept. "To receive satellite signals ... only parabolic antennas are used. If
the parabolic antennas are standing on an open site, it is possible to calculate on the basis of their position, their elevation and their
compass (azimuth) angle which satellite is being received. This is possible, for example, in Morwenstow (UK), Yakima (USA) or
Sugar Grove (USA)."[1]
Another station, at Pine Gap, was established in 1966 and jointly operated by Australians and Americans. As opposed to many
military-only bases, Pine Gap has a significant number of CIA as well as military NAVSECGRU staff. It has 18 antennas, and has
been considered first a receiving station for SIGINT satellites, but the size of some of its antennas are more associated with a
requirement to intercept communications from commercial communications satellites. The station in Pine Gap was established in
1966. It is run by the Australian Defence Signals Directorate, and roughly half of the 900 station personnel are Americans from the
CIA. "Until 1980 no Australians were allowed to work in the signals analysis department; since then, they have been granted free
[2]
access to all parts of the station, with the exception of the Americans own cryptography room."
The European Parliament report stated that the Shoal Bay facility is "run solely by the Australian Intelligence Service. Of the satellite
antennas visible on photographs, the five larger ones have a maximum diameter of 8 m, and the sixth antenna visible is smaller still.
According to information provided by Richelson, the antennas are trained on the Indonesian PALAPA satellites. It is not clear
[1]
whether the station is part of the global system for the interception of civilian communications."
Russia and China, at various times, have operated or are operating intercept stations in Cuba. The largest and best-known, Lourdes
SIGINT Station, was shut down by Russia in 2001, along with the Russian station at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.[3] Of the additional
[4]
bases are in Cuba, two of which are operated by China:
Bejucal
Yaguajay
Santiago de Cuba
Paseo
Chinese personnel, in 1998, began operating the Bejucal and Santiago de Cuba facilities. The first seems concerned with intercepting
US telephone communications and data traffic, while the second appears aimed at US military satellites One is a large complex at
Bejucal, just south of Havana, which has ten SATCOM antennas, and which is primarily concerned with intercepting telephone
communications in the US.[4] A 'cyber-warfare' unit at the station focuses on computer data traffic. The second is located northeast of
Santiago de Cuba at the easternmost part of the country and is 'dedicated mainly to intercepting U.S. military satellite
communications'.
The SAEC is an armored vehicle carrying ELINT and the Thales XPLORER COMINT to complement EW platforms. It will have
wideband acquisition, direction-finding and analysis sensors, for real-time monitoring and recording for subsequent analysis. It can
operate standalone, or network using VHF (PR4G) and HF (TRC3700) communication systems for networking with other SAEC and
the SGEA higher level EW system.
Bad Aibling: ex US Army SIGINT now BND Satcom and cellular monitoring
Bramstedtlund: BND directionfinder
Butzbach: BND directionfinder
Gablingen: ex US Army SIGINT now BND directionfinder
Hof: ex US Army SIGINT now BND Satcom intercept
Langen: ex USAF Rhein/Main site now BND cellular monitoring
Rheinhausen: BND Satcom intercept
Schningen: BND Satcom intercept
bersee: BND directionfinder
.
As of 2013, New Zealand has two ground-based signals intelligence stations at Tangimoana in the North Island's Manawatu-
Wanganui region and the Waihopai Valley in the South Island's Marlborough region.[12] These two stations are currently run and
operated by the Government Communications Security Bureau, the successor to the NZCSO and New Zealand's main signals
intelligence agency which was established in 1977.[13] The GCSB is also member of the five-member UKUSA Agreement, which
also includes the SIGINT intelligence services of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia. The Tangimoana
Station was built in 1981 by the Third National Governmentand began operations in 1983.[14] Its existence was first revealed by the
peace activist Owen Wilkes and subsequently confirmed by the National Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon in June 1984.[15]
Meanwhile, the Waihopai Station was built by the Fourth Labour Government in April 1988 and began operations on September 8,
1989. According to Nicky Hager, the Waihopai Station was established to operate in tandem with the Australian Defence Satellite
Communications Stationnear Geraldton in Western Australia.[16]
According to the academic Teresia Teaiwa, New Zealand, as part of the UKUSA alliance, collected and analyzed low frequency radio
and international satellite communications from the South Pacific region. Known targets have included Vanuatu, the French overseas
departments of New Caledonia and French Polynesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands. Besides Pacific
governments, other targets have included non-UKUSA diplomatic missions businesses, and international organizations operating in
the South Pacific.[17] According to Hager, the GCSB's ground-based signal stations have in the past intercepted a wide range of
foreign electronic communications including Japanese diplomatic cables, French military activities and nuclear weapons testing in
the South Pacific, Pacific states' military maneuvers and trade agreements with the Soviet Union, and Russian/Soviet ships in the
region and research bases inAntarctica.[18]
Europe
Germany
Bad Aibling. After deactivation in 2004 area handed over to the German authorities. Bundeswehr installed a
communications unit on the premises using most of the antennas and several buildings. They are converted
into a Technological Park. Current status: Bundesheer Bundesnachrichtendienst and various civil investment
groups.
Dagger Complex. The INSCOM European Cryptologic Center (ECC) - Darmstadt, also comprising the
ICEBOX facility at 4951'20"N 835'12" E and the TENCAP facility at 4951'18"N 835'43"E. All are assigned
66th Military Intelligence Brigade - Wiesbaden.
Geraldton
Pine Gap
Shoal Bay
Asia
NSA/CSS Colorado
NSA/CSS Georgia
NSA/CSS Hawaii
The Marine units report National SIGINT Operations Center at NSA headquarters at Ft. Meade, MD.[21] These facilities often have
both a SIGINT receiving and a higher-level management and control function.
Jeffrey Richelson, for the George Washington University National Security Archive, links the Air Force's 544th Intelligence Group
with ECHELON operations.[22] He places its Detachment 2 located at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico; Detachment 3 at Sugar Grove, West
Virginia; and Detachment 4 at Yakima, Washington.
In the 1994 Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) history, Misawa is specifically associated with ECHELON only in the context of a
collection system called LADYLOVE. Misawa, although many of its SIGINT units were deactivated in 20002001, still had an
RSOC coordination role.[23] The AIA history says the "Misawa LADYLOVE activity was initiated during the Cold War to intercept
Soviet military communications transmitted via satellitealong with similar operations at Menwith Hill, UK; Bad Aibling,
Germany; and Rosman, North Carolina."
According to Duncan Campbell, "In 1999, the Sabana Seca field station appeared to have at least four radomes for satellite
communications, one located beside an existing high frequency interception system targeted on Cuban radio communications."[5]
According to Richelson, this is the assignment of Detachment 2 of the544th Intelligence Group.[22]
The Yakima site, home of Detachment 4 of the 544th, is considered an ECHELON site:[1] "Six satellite antennas have been installed
on the site [they are claimed to be] trained on INTELSAT satellites over the Pacific (two satellite antennas) and INTELSAT satellites
over the Atlantic, and on INMARSAT Satellite 2.
"The fact that Yakima was established at the same time as the first generation of INTELSAT satellites went into orbit, and the general
description of the tasks of the 544th Intelligence Group, suggest that the station has a role in global communications surveillance. A
further clue is provided by Yakima's proximity to a normal satellite receiving station, which lies 100 miles (160 km) to the north."
TROJAN SPIRIT II is being replaced by AN/TSQ-226(V)TROJAN SPIRIT LITE. The TROJAN SPIRIT LITE is fielded in three
versions:
(V)1 -a commercial off-the-shelf version in a transit case configuration used to augment Military Intelligence
dissemination and communications requirements primarily at corps and division, and some EAC
(V)2) for the Marines
(V)2-SBCT (pallet, shelter, ECV, trailer) for Army Brigade Combat T eams
(V)3 is similar to (V)2 but adds an additional shelter and workstation.
(V)4 for Echelons above Corps
Both TROJAN SPIRIT II and TROJAN SPIRIT LITE will transition to the W
arfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
Physically, the basic Prophet platform is built around a mounted AN/PRD-13(V)2 direction-finding (DF) system designed to provide
force protection in a DS role to the maneuver brigade. This system operates in the HF, VHF and UHF spectra. It provides line-of-
bearing (LOB) data and intercept on unencrypted, single-channel push-to-talk transmissions.
It can be put into subassemblies that can be carried by a four-man team individual soldiers, although the more common deployment
will be in an M1097 HMMWV. In the vehicle-mounted variant, it can operate while moving; the vehicle also has racks for two
AN/VRC-92 SINCGARS Combat Net Radios with backpacks, and carries an antenna mast and other equipment.
Tactical communications, not just for SIGINT, are "flattening", such that units do not just report up their chain of command, but to
adjacent units. One of the rationales for doing so is that a combat unit can see an opportunity and move against it, without it being
misidentified by a neighboring unit and being engaged with "friendly fire."
Prophet Block II adds electronic attack (EA) capability to Prophet, while Block III upgrades the Prophet receiver to collect against
advanced and special signals. These enhancements will be coordinated with UAVs and tactical aircraft with expanded SIGINT
capability. Blocks IV (expected IOC 2008) and V (expected IOC 2015) [28] add MASINT along with micro-and robotic receivers to
the Prophet Ground system.
MASINT will include ground surveillance radars (PPSSD) and the ImprovedRemotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (I-
REMBASS) aboard a shelter-mounted HMMWV. Prophet, with the I-REMBASS monitoring system, will form the Ground Sensor
Platoon of the brigade combat team Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron.
For SIGINT operations, the basic US Marine augmentation to Force Recon is a 6-man detachment from a Radio Reconnaissance
[29]
Platoon. There is a SIGINT platoon within the Intelligence Company of the new Marine Special Operations Support Group.
Army Special Forces have theSpecial Operations Team-Alpha that can operate with an SF team, or independently
. This is a low-level
collection team, which typically has four personnel .[30] Their primary equipment is the AN/PRD-13 SOF SIGINT Manpack System
[31]
(SSMS), with capabilities including direction-finding capability from 2 MHz to 2 GHz, and monitoring from 1 to 1400 MHz.
Two WJ-8618B(S1) acquisition receivers anda WJ-32850 MANTIS DF system which, together
, provide signal
intercept and radio direction finding
One AN/ULQl9(V) electronic attack set
a secure communications system,
an intercom system installed
logistics variant of the light armored vehicle (LA
V)-25
The AN/PRD-12 is a tactical, man-transportable system that provides search, intercept, and DF on communications signals in the
HF/VHF/UHF bands. Up to four PRD-12 stations can be networked, providing DF data to a mission control station via radio link
with single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) equipment. Any of the four stations can act as mission
control.[21]
Assigned 1 per Marine Division, 1 per Marine Air Wing, and one per Radio Battalion, the AN/MSC-63A is a shelterized
communications switch that provides a secure semiautomated data communications switch and terminals for the processing of
general service (GENSER) or defense special security communications system (DSSCS) sensitive compartmented information (SCI)
record message traffic.[21]
The AN/TSQ-130(V)2/(V)5 technical control and analysis center (TCAC) is a tactical, transportable, SIGINT-processing, analysis
and reporting system installed in a large, selfcontained, modified S-280G shelter. TCAC is the primary system used by the Radio
Battalion SIGINT support unit. The (V)2 is the baseline system, while the (V)5 has upgraded communications capabilities. It is to be
replaced by the AN/MYQ-8 TCAC-PIP will replace the TCAC.
AN/MYQ-8 will consist of three remoteable analysis workstations (RAWSs), one communications interface module (CIM), and one
supervisor control module (SCM). Remoteable Analysis Workstations (RAWS) provides the capability to do analysis and reporting in
or away from the shelter, connecting via LAN or radio in the latter case. It also can operate in a stand-alone mode. Communications
Interface Modules (CIM) provide man-machine interface between the TCAC PIP and other RadBn systems (e.g., team portable
collection system, mobile electronic warfare support system) or external intelligence agencies. The Supervisor Control Module
[21]
(SCM) is an administrator interface to file server and system supervision of the TCAC.
The AN/USC-55 commander's tactical terminal (CTT) is a multiservice-developed, special application, UHF satellite
communications receiver that can be dedicated to receive critical, timesensitive intelligence by commanders and intelligence centers
at all echelons, in near-real-time, at GENSER or SCI levels. The receiver provides one full-duplex and two receive-only channels.
The team portable collection system (TPCS) upgrade is a semiautomated, man-transportable communications intelligence (COMINT)
system. It provides intercept, collection, radio direction finding, analysis, reporting, and collection management support. T The TPCS
upgrade made up of three subsystems:
COMINT collection subsystem (CCS), including the AN/PRD-12 direction finding set (to be replaced byOPMAKER)
T
and collection receivers
analysis subsystem (AS)
communications subsystem (CS) using single-channel radio nets are used to link TPCS upgrade outstations with the
RadBn TCAC to allow automated processing and dissemination of collected information and ultimate dissemination
to the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and other organizations.
Intended for the Radio Reconnaissance Teams attached to Marine Expeditionary Units, the radio reconnaissance equipment program
(RREP) SIGINT suite (SS)-1 is a semiautomated, integrated, open architecture radio intercept and DF system composed of a
ruggedized computer and six functional modules that plug together. RREP SS-1 modules may operate independently or semi-
independently. SS-1 enables the radio reconnaissance teams (RRTs) to target the majority of low-level, single-channel, unencrypted
tactical signals of interest used by military,police, insurgents, and other potential hostile forces throughout the world.
The RREP SS-2 will provide a highly deployable, man-transportable, signals intercept and DF system employed by RRTs in support
of the entire spectrum of MAGTF operations. RREP SS-2 employs advanced receiver capabilities, cellular phone and other digital
communications collection and DF technology, global positioning system map navigation software, a more modular design, and
electronic attack capabilities. As with RREP SS-1, the SS-2 operates at the modular level and at the integrated system level. The
system can be controlled manually or via subcompact personal computer
.
The handheld integrated directional receiver and homing (HIDRAH) system is a man-transportable, tactical, cordless, radio intercept
and signal line-of-bearing (LOB) DF system consisting of several COTS items in an enclosure appropriate for the field. HIDRAH
provides RRTs with a threat I&W capability during radio reconnaissance foot-mobile patrols and signal homing support for tactical
recovery of aircraft and personnel operations. The HIDRAH system has a unique design that may be employed independently in a
handheld manner or by mounting it to anM16 or M4 rifles.
Ship platforms
Ad hoc installations were placed on US warships in the 1940 on. Modern ship installations generally involve intercept stations in
mobile vans, which can be put onto the deck of a warship, although some nations, such as Russia and Spain, use essentially unarmed
modified fishing vessels.
There is a high level of interoperability among NATO vessels, using the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).
While not all ships have sufficiently secure areas for all-source (i.e., including SIGINT) intelligence sensors, commanders with
access to all-source information can distribute appropriate parts to units under their command.
On 14 January 2002, the French Ministry of Defense launched a new purpose-built "Intelligence Gathering Auxiliary" ship project
called MINREM, and will be named the Dupuy-de-Lme. This vessel entered service in 2006, to replace Bougainville.[35] Thales is
providing the electronics, and Compagnie Nationale de Navigation is building the ship, to requirements defined by the Military
Intelligence Directorate (DRM). with a planned 30 year lifetime. Thales is assigning overall systems and COMINT to its Thales
Communication division, whileThales Systmes Aroports will do the ELINT.
The Navy's hydrographic vessel HMNZS Monowai was also used by the GCSB to intercept Fijian military radio communications
during the 1987 Fijian coups d'tat. The GCSB also outfitted the frigates Canterbury and Waikato with GCSB mobile stations, which
were staffed by Navy EW personnel but answereddirectly to the GCSB. These two warships were also assigned with UKUSA station
designationsNZC334 and NZC335 respectivelyand were deployed on six-week missions to the South Pacific and Southeast
Asia during the late 1980s and 1990s.[37]
Current USN warships carry some version of the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, which has ESM capabilities.
In addition to the AN/SLQ-32, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are in the process of evaluating an open-architecture Integrated
Radar/Optical Sighting and Surveillance System (IROS3) and Ship Protection system, currently including an AN/SPS-73 radar, an
achine guns.[43]
electro-optical/infrared sensor, acoustic sensors and spotlights, coupled with remotely controlled m
Standardized USN systems go beyond simple direction finding and into COMINT. The AN/SLR-25 is a passive cryptologic
exploitation system principally for tactical use, but that can make contributions to higher levels of intelligence. The SLR-25(V)1
Advanced Cryptologic Carry-on Exploitation System (ACCES) is a portable version of the SLR-25(V)2 SSEE (Ship Signal
Exploitation Equipment) without dedicated SIGINT spaces. Coupled with an AN/SSQ-120 Transportable Radio Direction-Finding
system, the ACCES provides a complete SIGINT collection system.[43] The AN/SSQ-120 has HF, VHF, and UHF antennas and
direction-finding logic.[44]
More capable than the AN/SLR-25 with AN/SSQ-120 is the AN/SSQ-137 Ship Signal Exploitation System, an open-architecture
system for command & control as well as intelligence.
Submarine platforms
Submarines are the original stealth platforms. When no more than a mast breaks the surface, in the worst case they can become radar
targets, so virtually all modern submarines will have the minimum ELINT of a radar warning receiver. Far beyond that, however,
many submarines will penetrate hostile areas, raise SIGINT receiver masts, usually with some type of radar-observant covering, and
listen. Especially sophisticated SIGINT submarines may tap undersea cables.
The minimum radar-warning receiver is usually a set of spiral antennas, backed with resonant cavities, whose amplitude can be
compared to determine the direction of greatest signal strength. To go to the next level of sophistication, phase is considered as well
as amplitude, and interferometry adds further information.[45]
As part of the upgrade of the Upholder-class submarine purchased from the UK, the Litton Marine Guardian Star is on the Victoria-
class submarines.[45]
EADS (formerly DASA) also equips German submarines with the elegon
T 12 HF interception andDF suite.
Author Sherry Sontag asserted in Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage that British submarines
[48]
have been involved in collaborative SigInt collection since the 1950s.
US submarines infiltrated the territorial waters of potential opponents to raise low-observability antennas and collect radio SIGINT.
[51][52] Various
US submarines made extensive clandestine patrols to measure the signatures of Soviet submarines and surface vessels.
submarines, including the USS Parche and USS Halibut, from the early seventies onwards, reportedly tapped Soviet copper and
optical undersea cables, using divers, probes from the main vessel, orremotely operated vehicles.[51][53]
While the Sturgeon class submarines have been retired, as with any class of submarines, their design had tradeoffs. Sturgeons were
more optimized for reconnaissance than the subsequent Los Angeles class, which have greater speed, but less internal space, and
optimized for blue water, principally antisubmarine, missions. They used the AN/WLQ-4 "Sea Nymph" SIGINT system, which may
have been too large to fit the Los Angeles class. (Some Sturgeon class submarines such as the Gurnard (SSN-662) were fitted with
the An/WLR-6 and AN/BRD-7 Systems in the late 1960s.) The Sturgeon class submarine Parche (SSN-683) received an addition
100-foot (30 m) hull extension containing "research and development equipment" that brought her total length to 401 feet (122 m).
Of the three-vessel Seawolf class, the Jimmy Carter also is of extended length for intelligence systems and special operations.
Seawolf and Los Angeles classes were directed at a Soviet threat, so the newer Virginia class has additional capabilities for the
littoral environment.
Los Angeles class submarines have modernized and smaller ELINT, the AN/WLR-18 "Classic Salmon" for lower frequencies and
the AN/WSQ-5 "Cluster Spectator" for higher frequencies. The latter is in a series of code names suggesting it is for tactical use,
while the former name is more associated with strategic systems, especially for intelligence. Newer submarines have an AN/WLR-8
radar signal analyzer and an AN/WLR-10 (or AN/BLR-15) radar warning receiver. There are variants, among the classes, of a radar
antenna, interferometric direction finder, COMINT receiver.[45]
All US submarines, as new construction on the Virginia class submarines and retrofitted to the Improved Los Angeles class
submarines and possibly Seawolfs, will receive an upgraded Electronic Support (ES) suite, designed as a minimally manned, passive
receiving system capable of detection, acquisition, identification, and localization of a variety of signals of interest.[54] ES contains
the AN/BLQ-10 SIGINT system, which gives detection, emitter location and MASINT identification, direction finding, and strategic
[43]
intelligence support. It was first implemented in 2000 and should be in all US submarines by 2012.
ES is not limited to the AN/BLQ-10 alone, but a major improvement in receiving, with an expected 200% improvement in
performance with the Type 18I periscope and Integrated Electronics Mast (IEM), especially in the littorals. Completing the current
ES concept is the AN/ULR-21 CLASSIC TROLL system that increases the probability of SIGINT intercept by 500%, supporting
tactical and national requirements.[54]
Aircraft platforms
A wide range of aircraft were used with low-tech aircraft such as the WWII [B-24] with temporarily mounted electronics, to
platforms extensively modified for the mission, and evolved to strategicRC-135 and EP-3E Aries II aircraft.
Originally manufactured by the companies MBB, Nord Aviation and VFW formed the Transall group in 1959 for the development
and production of the C-160 for the air forces of France, Germany, South Africa and Turkey. Production of the aircraft by the three
companies ended in 1972, with 169 aircraft having been delivered. In 1976, responsibility for production of the aircraft was given to
Aerospatiale in France and MBB (now DaimlerChrysler Aerospace) in Germany. Both companies are now part of EADS (European
Aeronautics Defence and Space). Production of the aircraft from 1976 to 1985 included updated avionics, a reinforced wing housing
and additional fuel tanks.
French Transalls were upgraded in 1999, with a new head-up display and an upgraded electronic warfare suite, with a radar warning
receiver, missile approach warner and chaff and decoy dispensers. Navigational systems include EFIS 854 TF Electronic Flight
Instrumentation System, which includes an Electronic Attitude Director Indicator (EADI) and Electronic Horizontal Situation
Indicator (EHSI). Three new sensors have been installed for aircraft position and attitude control: an inertial reference unit (IRU), an
attitude and heading reference unit (AHRU), and a global positioning system (GPS). A flight management system with two Gemini
10 computers and a new radio management system have also been installed.
For a number of years, France operated DC-8 aircraft "Sarigue" dedicated to ELINT.[64] A reengined version, Sarigue-NG, went into
service in 2000. The name stands for Systeme Aeroporte de Recueil dInformations de Guerre Electronique (Airborne Electronic
Warfare Information Gathering System) and also is the French word for Opossum, a shy and retiring animal. The updated aircraft was
known as the SARIGUE-NG, with the NG standing for Nouvelle Generation or New Generation. Both DC-8s had a SIGINT system
from Thompson-CSF, and operated in the Baltic, Mediterranean, French Africa, and during Desert Storm and NATO Kosovo
operations.
It had a distinctive sideways looking airborne radar (SLAR) in a "canoe" under the fuselage, as well as large rectangular antenna
arrays at each wingtip.
The aircraft was fitted with equipment developed by Thompson-CSF, similar to that installed in the earlirt Transall Gabriels. It is
believed that the aircraft operated with a 24-man crew and as well as COMINT and SIGINT duties, it could even intercept mobile
phone calls. Operated by the French Air Force on behalf of the armed forces and security services, it was seen in the Baltic,
Mediterranean and French Africa, as well as being used in support of coalition operations during the Gulf War and NATO peace
keeping operations in Kosovo.
On 19 Sep 2004, it was reported that in addition to a 50% cost overrun on an electronics upgrade by Thales, the weight of the new
upgrade violated safety limits. The French Defence Minister confirmed the Sarigue would be retired because of high operating
costs. An Airbus replacement for the DC-8 was considered and rejected.
Germany has selected a UAV platform for SIGINT, the EuroHawk version of the U.S. Air Force RQ-4 Block 20 Global Hawk. The
aircraft is made by Northrop Grumman, with the airborne and ground station equipment from EADS. As with Global Hawk in the
US, EuroHawk is approved to operate, unmanned, in the same airspace as commercial aviation. Five EuroHawks have been ordered
so far, as a replacement for Germany's aging fleet ofBreguet Atlantiques.[65]
Israel: aircraft platforms
Israel is reported to have converted at least four Boeing 707 aircraft, codenamed Re'em (Antelope) and based at Lod to an electronic
warfare role, two for countermeasures and two or more for SIGINT. An indicator of an ELINT role is the presence of a cheek-
antenna array externally similar to the AEELS (Automatic ELINT Emitter Locating System) on the RC-135U/V/W. These aging
aircraft are due for replacement, probably by Gulfstream G500 executive jets.
The aircraft are known as Re'em (Antelope) and are operated by 134 Tayeset at Lod. Some other IAF 707s are possibly configured
for AAR/SIGINT operations. Israel is currently looking for up to 9 dual role aircraft to replace their 707's and will purchase a number
of Gulfstream G500s.[55]
According to the US Department of Defense, the Tactical Airborne Surveillance System and upgrades will be installed on Saudi E-3
[66]
and E-6 aircraft. The estimated cost is $350 million.
In addition to the SIGINT payload, the aircraft has a Tamam Stabilised Long Range Observation System (LOROS) high-resolution
TV camera and recording systems.[68] The SLOROS is reported to have a range of at least 62 miles (100 km).
The Nimrod was retired from RAF use in 2011,.[69] Under the AirSeeker program 3 Rivet Joint RC-135 signals intelligence aircraft
have been purchased for 670 million in 2013.[70] It is reported that one of these is already permanently operating over Iraq as part of
the RAF effort to combat Islamic State militants.UK E3D AWACS do not have SIGINT capability.
In 1968, the next tactical improvement was the RU-21 LAFFIN EAGLE and the JU-21 LEFT JAB, the latter being the first with
computerized direction finding and data storage. Even more advanced ASA equipment was on P-2V aircraft borrowed from the
Navy, and called CEFLIEN LION or CRAZY CA
T platforms.
During the Vietnam era, six UH-1 helicopters were converted to SIGINT platforms, called EH-1 LEFT BANK aircraft and operated
in direct support of combat aircraft.
US tactical SIGINT aircraft include the EH-60A Quickfix helicopter, which has interception capabilities in the 1.5150 MHz and
direction finding between 2076 MHz. The EH-60L has better communications and ungradability than the A model, with the
AN/MSR-3 TACJAM-A system.[71] RC-12 Guardrail aircraft provide a corps-level ESM capability, with the unusual approach of
putting all the analysis equipment on the ground, with the RC-12K/N/P/Q aircraft acting purely as intercept and relay platforms. The
Guardrail aircraft normally fly in units of three, to get better cross-bearings in direction-finding.
The Navy EA-6 replaced the USAF EF-111 EW aircraft for all services, and the EA-6 is being replaced by the EA-18G Growler. All
EW aircraft have some ELINT capability if for no other reason than tar
geting.
Dedicated RC-135 aircraft, operated by the US Air Force, are in a variety of SIGINT and MASINT configurations. An effort is
underway to develop a standard RC-135 open architecture, allowing at least some of the aircraft to be quickly reconfigured. RIVET
JOINT is the most common SIGINT type.
On the long-range Navy P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft is the AN/ALR-66B(V)3 ELINT/MASINT system targeted against radars.
Major improvements are an improved direction-finding antenna and an EP-2060 pulse analyzer.[43] The dedicated SIGINT EP-3 uses
a JMOD (Joint Airborne SIGINT Modification) program to a JMOD common configuration (JCC).
Northrop Grumman developed the SIGINT package for the Global Hawk UAV. An upgraded version of the same SIGINT payload is
flown on U-2. Boeing has proposed a SIGINT variant of the P-8 multimission maritime patrol aircraft it has under development.
[72]
Raytheon and Northrop Grumman would be the partners for the actual SIGINT electronics.
Boeing also has built a "Wedgetail 737" for Turkey, and appears to be marketing this as an alternative to the lower-end systems being
built for business jets such as the Gulfstream.[73] Australia also has ordered this aircraft.
Satellite platforms
The US launched the first SIGINT satellites, followed by the Soviets. Recently
, however, the French have been launching intelligence
satellites, on French and Russian rockets, and are exchanging information with the Germans and Italians, both of which are deploying
synthetic aperture radar MASINT constellations, with an undefined IMINT or electro-optical MASINT capability on the Italian
satellites.
Additional nations have launched IMINT satellites; SIGINT seems to be a lesser priority, with radar MASINT often a higher priority.
There are a number of bilateral agreements for satellite cost and intelligence sharing.
Quite a number of issues are driving European needs for intelligence policy. During the 1991 Gulf War, France's dependence on US
assets convince it that it needed its own, or at least European, space-based intelligence. Balkan operations and both dependence on
US assets, and exclusion from certain information, further pushed the desire, although the topmost levels of government had not yet
been convinced.
In 1998, a British-French meeting in St. Malo, France, produced a declaration that the EU needed "a capacity for analysis of
situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning (emphasis added). This was a major change in
British policy toward the EU, in that Britain had wanted the EU to stay out of defense issues, leaving them to NATO. At a 1999
meeting in Cologne, Germany, while Kosovo was being bombed by NATO, the EU leadership repeated the St. Malo declaration,
including having EU military forces not dependent on NATO. They also called for "the reinforcement of our capabilities in the field
of intelligence/".
WEU has concentrated on IMINT, which is increasingly less sensitive than other intelligence disciplines due to the availability of
commercial imagery. The WEY headquarters does have an Intelligence Section that produces finished intelligence for the member
states, within the capabilities of a staff of six.
The center contributed to planning with reference to situations in the Balkans and Africa in the mid-1990s. Up to May 13, 1997, the
Center was only allowed to study an area after the WEU council agreed that an area was in crisis. After that date, they received a
"general surveillance mission" and permission to build databases.
Bosnian operations continued to point out dependency on the US for C4I. The balance between building European capability without
duplicating NATO remained an issueGerman SIGINT units that were part of the French-led Multinational Division (MND) in Bosnia
provided intelligence to the division-level French headquarters.
Should Europe proceed on its security objective, a policy needs to be defined that will not jeopardize the peaceful application.[75]
This needs to happen without creating a false firewall with military activities, as the US created NASA as an ostensibly civilian-only
organization, deliberately picking a civilian,Neil Armstrong to put the first footprint on the Moon.
China's anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007 concerned ESA, as debris from the test has produced numerous near-misses of other
satellites. ESA also suggested it might work on a data relay satellite such as TDRSS, which is dual-use. Some of its present
communications projects are dual use.
Next generation
A pointer to the direction is whether there will be consensus on a next-generation European system of IMINT and radar MASINT
satellites. A proposal in process is to generate the Multinational Space-based Imagery System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
Observation (MUSIS). The participants are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. EADS Astrium and Thales Alenia
Space are competing, under the direction of the French defense procurement agency, DGA. This system could be operational
somewhere around 20152017, around the time that the French Helios and joint French-Italian Pleiades IMINT satellites need
[76]
replacement. The GermanSAR Lupe and Italian CosmoSkyMed radar satellites will last up to 2017 or 2018.
Belgium is a MUSIS partner, which should be considered in assessing the potential of informationsharing among the partners.[76]
France and Britain had both been facing both the desirability and cost of intelligence satellites independent of the US. In the mid-
1980s, with the development of the Ariane launcher and its associated large launch complex in French Guiana, the French liked the
idea of such independence. Planning started on French IMINT satellites called Helios, a radar imaging satellite called Osiris and then
Horus, and a SIGINT satellite to be called Zenon when operational. France would launch technology demonstrators before a fully
operational SIGINT satellite. France began its intelligence satellite program with Helios IMINT satellites, although they also planned
on Horus (first called Osiris) radar MASINT and Zenon ELINT platforms.
France, still desiring to have three different space-based intelligence systems (IMINT, radar surveillance, SIGINT), had to face
extremely high costs. In 19941995, French legislators tried to reduce some of these plans. In response, the French government
sought Italian and Spanish funding in, and cooperation with, the HELIOS 1 program. They also sought German involvement in
Helios 2.
Two first-generation Helios satellites, with 1-meter optical imaging resolution and no infrared capability, were launched in 1995 and
1999. Helios 1 was an Italian-Spanish. Helios 2 is a FrenchBelgianSpanish partnership.
On 18 December 2004,[78] Helios 2A, built by EADS-Astrium for the French Space Agency (CNES), was launched into a Sun-
synchronous polar orbit at an altitude of about 680 kilometers. There it will serve the French defense ministry, as well as cooperating
European countries. Helios 2B is scheduled for launch in 2008.
[79]
The same launcher carried French and Spanish scientific satellites and four Essaim ("Swarm") experimental ELINT satellites.
Sources in the French procurement agency, DGA, confirmed Essaim, a system of ground station and satellite constellation, is
working well.[80]
DGA, the French military procurement agency, announced that the constellation of four Essaim ELINT satellites launched with
Helios 2A on 18 December 2004 would begin operations in May 2005. Essaims operate in a linked system of three active satellites
with an in-orbit spare. There is one active earth station, with two due to follow
.
Essaim is a third-generation technology demonstrator with some operational capability. A radio propagation experiment, S80-T, was
launched in 1992, as a predecessor of the ELINT experiments. The first generation was Cerise, launched in 1995 and damaged in
1996 by a collision with the French SPOT-1 earth resource observing satellite. Clementine, the second generation, was launched in
1999.
Some French defense officials have criticized the DGA for insisting on a third in-orbit demonstrator program after a decade of initial
validation with the previous satellites. DGA officials note that Essaim has greater capacity than its predecessors and will provide
some operational data. They say Essaim is designed to maintain French expertise long enough to persuade other European
fort, which France alone cannot afford.[80]
governments to join in an operational eavesdropping ef
France is also developing the new generation PLEIADES two-satellite optical dual-use (military-civilian) system. PLEIADES is
intended to succeed France's SPOT system is considered part of the Franco-Italian ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth
Observation) programme, being due for launch around 200810.[75] France is a MUSIS partner, which should be considered in
[76]
assessing the potential of information sharing among the partners.
SAR is usually considered aMASINT sensor, but the significance here is that Germany obtains access to French satellite ELINT
.
Germany is a MUSIS partner, which should be considered in assessing the potential of informationsharing among the partners.[76]
[83]
Italy and France are cooperating on the deployment of the dual-use Orfeo civilian and military satellite system.
Orfeo is a dual-use (civilian and military) earth observation satellite network developed jointly between France and Italy. Italy is
developing the Cosmo-Skymed X-band polarimetric SAR, to fly on two of the satellites. The other two will have complementary
French electro-optical payloads. The second Orfeo is scheduled to launch in early 2008.
While this is not an explicit SIGINT system, the French-Italian cooperation may suggest that Italy can get data from the French
Essaim ELINT microsatellites.
Italy plains joint development, with France, of the ORFEO (Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation) system, to be launched
in 200810.[75] Italy is a MUSIS partner, which should be considered in assessing the potential of information sharing among the
partners.[76]
Both Tselina O and D versions were flying side by side until 1984, when Tselina O subsystem was abandoned and its functions
integrated into those conducted by the Tselina D spacecraft. As the Western observers noted, the Tselina D spacecraft, known in the
West as the "heavy ELINT," would orbit the Earthin groups of six satellites spread 60 degrees apart in their orbits.
Requirements for the Tselina-2 series were issued in 1974, with a first test launch scheduled for 1980 and full operational capability
in 1982. Requirements grew until the Tselina-2 was too heavy for the Tsyklon-3 booster, and the program was switched to the Zenit
booster in development. With the capacity of the Zenit, additional capabilities were added, including telemetry through relay
satellites. An interesting but poorly understood feature of the Tselina-2 system is that the satellites are placed into orbits that interact
strongly with features of the Earth's gravitational field ("14th order harmonics") in such a way that the natural orbital decay caused by
atmospheric drag is inhibited for long periods of time.
On April 27, 1979, the Military Industrial Commission, VPK, officially approved the Zenit as a launcher for the Tselina-2 satellite.
The VPK scheduled the beginning of flight tests for the 2nd quarter of 1981. The first Tselina-2 blasted off in September 1984 under
official name Cosmos 1603 and declared operational in 1988.
Tselina-2 system was declared operational in December 1988, which was confirmed by a government decree issued in December
1990. The most recent launch was on June 29, 2007, named Cosmos-2428. It is believed that was the last Tselina-2, with a next
generation coming.[84]
According to,[85] the Tselina-2 is intended for land targets, while the US-PU EORSAT is intended for naval ELINT. EORSAT is
passive, not to be confused with the nuclear-powered radar ocean surveillance satellites (RORSAT), no longer operational. A full
constellation of US-PU includes 34 spacecraft in LEO of 400 km, but not more than one has been in orbit since 2004, along with
two Tselina-2's. A new generation of ELINT satellites, possibly combining the land and sea missio
ns, may be in development.
While there had been considerable resistance, in the 1970s, to admitting to "the fact of" satellite IMINT,[86] there was considerably
more sensitivity to admitting even to "the fact of" US satellite SIGINT.[87] The US decided to admit to using satellites for SIGINT
and MASINT in 1996.[88]
US SIGINT satellites have included the CANYON series Rhyolite/Aquacade series, succeeded by the Vortex/Magnum/Orion and
Mentor. Where the preceding satellites were in close to geosynchronous orbit, JUMPSEAT/TRUMPET satellites were in Moliyna
orbits giving better polar coverage.[53]
From 1972 to 1989, low earth orbit SIGINT satellites were launched only as secondary payloads with KH-9 and KH-11 IMINT
satellites. They were code-named after female sex symbols, such as RAQUEL,ARRAH,
F BRIDGET and MARILYN.
Four geosychronous RHYOLITE satellites were launched in the seventies, with COMINT and TELINT missions. After having the
name compromised whenChristopher Boyce sold information to the Soviets, the code name was changed to AQUACADE.
In the late seventies, another class of geosynchronous SIGINT satellites, first called CHALET and renamed VORTEX after the code
name was compromised. After the loss of Iranian monitoring stations, these satellites were also given a TELINT capability
.
MAGNUM geosynchronous SIGINT satellites were first launched from the Space Shuttle in 1985. These were believed to be more
[51]
sensitive and perhaps stealthier than RHYOLITE/AQUACADE.
References
1. "European Parliament Report on ECHELON"(https://fas.org/irp/program/process/rapport_echelon_en.pdf)(PDF).
July 2001. Retrieved 2006-08-14.
2. "Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications
(ECHELON interception system)"(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT%20REPOR
T%20A5-2001-0264%200%20DOC%20XML%20V0//EN) . europa.eu. Temporary Committee on the ECHELON
Interception System A5-0264/2001. Retrieved 10 June 2016.
3. Cable News Network (2001-10-18)."Russia to close Cuban spy station"(https://web.archive.org/web/200710261453
19/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/17/putin.cuba/index.html). CNN. Archived from the original (htt
p://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/17/putin.cuba/index.html) on 2007-10-26. Retrieved 2007-10-13.
4. Cereijo, Manuel (February 2003)."Information Warfare (IW): Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW)
and Cyber-Warfare. Asia and Cuba"(https://web.archive.org/web/20080416174325/http://www .cubainfolinks.org/web
page/Articles/bejucal.htm). Archived from the original (http://www.cubainfolinks.org/webpage/Articles/bejucal.htm) on
2008-04-16.
5. Campbell, Duncan. "Interception Capabilities 2000: Report to the European Parliament"(https://web.archive.org/we
b/20080224205659/http://duncan.gn.apc.org/stoa_cover .htm). Archived from the original (http://duncan.gn.apc.org/st
oa_cover.htm) on 2008-02-24.
6. Thales (27 November 2006)."Tactical SIGINT stations for force protection"(https://web.archive.org/web/2008010512
3002/http://www.thalesonline.com/landjoint/Activities/Details.html?link=09101D63-655B-112A-6D31-08497B253F1
C%3Acentral%20activities%20all&locale=EN-gb&T itle=SAEC&dis=1). Archived from the original (http://www.thaleso
nline.com/landjoint/Activities/Details.html?link=09101D63-655B-112A-6D31-08497B253F1C:central%20activities%2
0all&locale=EN-gb&Title=SAEC&dis=1) on 5 January 2008. Retrieved 2007-10-18. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag;
name "Loring2007" defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
7. Hager, Nicky (1996). Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network(https://fas.org/irp/eprint/s
p/). Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton Publishing. pp. 5859.ISBN 0908802358.
8. Hager 1996, p. 6264.
9. Peter Clayworth (16 November 2012)."Intelligence services The Cold War, 1945 to 1984" (http://www.teara.govt.n
z/en/photograph/34077/naval-communications-station-at-waiouru). Te AraThe Encyclopedia of New Zealand.
Retrieved January 1, 2014.
10. Hager 1996, pp. 6869.
11. Hager 1996, pp. 6975.
12. "The Organisation: About Us"(https://web.archive.org/web/20131105200737/http://www .gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/orga
nisation.html). Government Communications Security Bureau . Archived from the original (http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/ab
out-us/organisation.html)on 5 November 2013. Retrieved 31 December 2013.
13. "History of the GCSB: About Us"(https://web.archive.org/web/20130817045611/http://gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/history .
html). Government Communications Security Bureau . Archived from the original (http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/hi
story.html) on 17 August 2013. Retrieved 31 December 2013.
14. Hager 1996, pp. 5862.
15. Hager 1996, pp. 1920.
16. Hager 1996, pp. 18083.
17. Teaiwa, Teresia (2012). "Good Neighbour, Big Brother, Kin?: New Zealand's Foreign Policy in the Contemporary
Pacific". In Mallon, Sean; Mahina-Tuai, Kolokesa; Salesa, Damon. Tangata O Le Moana: New Zealand and the
People of the Pacific. Wellington: Te Papa Press. p. 252. ISBN 978-1-877385-72-8.
18. Hager 1996, pp. 42, 15152, 171, 202.
19. Shcherbakov, Aleksey (March 22, 1999)."Major Loss of Intelligence Gathering Capability"(https://fas.org/irp/world/ru
ssia/fapsi/shcherbakov.htm). Retrieved 2007-10-08.
20. Thomas, Timothy L. "Information Warfare in the Second (1999Present) Chechen War: Motivator for Military
Reform?" (https://archive.is/20070801170345/http://leav-www .army.mil/fmso/documents/iwchechen.htm). US Army
Foreign Military Studies Office. Archived from the original (http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/iwchechen.htm)
on 2007-08-01. Retrieved 2007-11-14.
21. US Marine Corps (22 February 1999)."Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 215.2, Signals Intelligence"
(https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcwp2-15-2.pdf)(PDF). US Marine Corps. Retrieved 2007-10-11.
22. Richelson, Jeffrey T. (January 13, 2000). "National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 24: The National
Security Agency Declassified"(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index2.html). Retrieved
2007-10-11.
23. US Air Force (15 June 1995)."History of the Air Intelligence Agency, 1 January 31 December 1994"(http://www.gw
u.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/12-01.htm) . Retrieved 2007-10-11.
24. Commander, Naval Security Group (September 3, 1991). "NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj:Mission,
Functions and Tasks of Naval Security GroupActivity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia," (http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/09-02.htm) . Retrieved 2007-10-11.
25. Association of the US Army (July 2007)."Key Issues Relevant to Army Intelligence T
ransformation" (https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20071009114714/http://www .ausa.org/webpub/DeptILW.nsf/byid/JRAY-75LT2E). Archived from the
original (http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptILW.nsf/byid/JRAY-75LT2E) on 2007-10-09. Retrieved 2007-10-14.
26. "AN/MLQ-40(V)3 Prophet"(http://www.deagel.com/Special-Purpose-Vehicles/ANMLQ-40V3-Prophet_a000507001.a
spx). Retrieved 2007-11-13.
27. Kevin C. Peterson (July 2000)."Prophet: Tactical SIGINT for the 21st Century ground signal intelligence system"(h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20080417031944/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_3_26/ai_67544226) .
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Archived from the original (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_3_
26/ai_67544226) on 2008-04-17. Retrieved 2007-11-13.
28. Lawlor, Maryann (October 2002)."Signal Intelligence System Uncovers Enemy Sites"(https://web.archive.org/web/2
0071024063953/http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_T emplate.asp?articleid=324&zoneid
=31). Signal. Archived from the original (http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.as
p?articleid=324&zoneid=31)on 2007-10-24. Retrieved 2007-11-13.
29. "U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command(MARSOC)"(http://www.usmc.mil/sgtmaj/smmcsymposiu
m.nsf/440ade826dba63718525685f0055d7d5/41a370d83d1384dd852573360065ecc3/$FILE/MARSOC%20Brief.pd
f) (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-17.
30. "FM 3-05.102 Army Special Forces Intelligence"(https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-102.pdf)(PDF). July 2001.
31. L3/Linkabit Communications."The AN/PRD-13 (V1) Man Portable Signal Intelligence System"(http://www.asitinc.co
m/products-services/docoutput.aspx?id=899).
32. US Marine Corps (22 February 1999)."Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) MCWP 340.5 Electronic
Warfare" (https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcwp3-40-5.pdf)(PDF). US Marine Corps. Retrieved 2007-10-13.
33. Ball, Desmond (March 1999)."Signals Intelligence in China"(http://www.afio.com/sections/wins/2001/2001-15.html).
ISBN 0-7315-5447-7. Retrieved 2013-10-11. "Jane's Defence Weekly 24"
34. "Flyvefisken-klassen PG/MHC/MLC (Standard Flex 300)"(https://web.archive.org/web/20070811235219/http://www .f
utura-dtp.dk/FLEET/Skibe/flyvefisken.htm). Archived from the original (http://www.futura-dtp.dk/FLEET/Skibe/flyvefis
ken.htm) on 2007-08-11.
35. Alain Duhamel; Michel Masselin (November 2002)."A New Sigint Vessel for France" (https://web.archive.org/web/20
071012012138/http://www.guerrelec.asso.fr/Archives/lettre18UK.pdf)(PDF). The French AOC's Newsletter. Archived
from the original (http://guerrelec.asso.fr/Archives/lettre18UK.pdf)(PDF) on 2007-10-12. Retrieved 2007-10-18.
36. Hager 1996, pp. 189191.
37. Hager 1996, pp. 191194.
38. http://www.mw.mil.pl/image.php?vhost=3fo&id_lg=24637
39. http://www.mw.mil.pl/image.php?vhost=3fo&id_lg=24641
40. http://www.mw.mil.pl/image.php?vhost=3fo&id_lg=24638
41. HJH (March 2005). "Recycled AGI" (http://www.cvni.net/radio/e2k/e2k027/e2k27agi.html). ENIGMA 2000 Newsletter.
Retrieved 2007-10-08.
42. Joris Janssen Lok (2007-11-20)."Sweden's Next Spy Ship"(http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.js
p?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogV iewPost&plckPostId=Bl
og%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a9e4b4749-4eb2-4ca1-b9a5-6d64a3ca4358) . Aviation
Week. Retrieved 2008-04-09.
43. "Navy ISR" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080417053158/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3738/is_200601/ai_
n17169607/pg_1). Sea Power. January 2006. Archived fromthe original (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3738/
is_200601/ai_n17169607/pg_1)on 2008-04-17. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
44. "Transportable Radio Direction Finding (TRDF) System (AN/SSQ-120)"(http://fbodaily.com/cbd/archive/1999/03(Mar
ch)/22-Mar-1999/58sol001.htm). Commerce Business Daily. March 22, 1999. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
45. Friedman, Norman. "Up Periscope, Up Antenna: Hunter-Killer Submarines increasingly are Hunter-Gatherers of
Intelligence" (http://www.harpoonhq.com/waypoint/articles/Article_042.pdf) (PDF). Journal of Electronic Defense.
Harpoon Waypoint. Friedman2003. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
46. Craven, Michael (Winter 20062007)."A Rational Choice Revisited Submarine Capability in a rTansformational
Era" (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/craven-eng.asp). Canadian Military Journal. pp. 2132. Retrieved
2013-10-11.
47. Fisher, Richard Jr. (November 22, 2005)."Growing Asymmetries in the China-Japan Naval Balance"(https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20071010153153/http://www .strategycenter.net/research/pubID.83/pub_detail.asp). International
Strategy & Assessment Center. Archived from the original (http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.83/pub_det
ail.asp) on October 10, 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-08.
48. Sontag, S.; Drew, C.; Drew, A. L. (1998). Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage
.
Harper. ISBN 0-06-103004-X.
49. Pike, Jon (Federation of American Scientists)."HOLYSTONE" (https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/holystone.htm)
.
https://fas.org/. Intelligence Resource Program. Retrieved 5 December 2016. Check date values in: |date= (help);
External link in |website= (help)
50. "The U.S. Intelligence Community 8: Signals Intelligence"(https://cryptome.org/jya/usic08.htm). cryptome.org.
Retrieved 2016-12-06.
51. Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1989). "Chapter 8: Signals Intelligence".The U.S. Intelligence Community(https://web.archive.
org/web/20071019023801/http://jya.com/usic08.htm) . Ballinger. ISBN 0-88730-245-9. Archived from the original (htt
p://jya.com/usic08.htm)on 2007-10-19.
52. Sontag, Sherry; Christopher Drew; Annette Lawrence Drew (1999)."Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American
submarine Espionage"(https://www.amazon.com/Blind-Mans-Bluff-Submarine-Espionage/dp/006103004X). Harper
Torch. ISBN 0-06-103004-X.
53. "submarine cable interception"(http://akadeemia.kakupesa.net/arhiiv/PSI/lectures/l4_echelon) . Political and Social
Issues in Digital Interactive Media: Lecture 4 the Big Brother on Menwith Hill
. Tallinn University. Retrieved
2007-10-05.
54. Fages, Malcolm I (23 March 2000)."Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee Seapower Subcommittee on
submarine Warfare Systems for the 21st century" (http://www.navy.mil/navydata/testimony/seapower/fages000323.tx
t).
55. "The Spyflight Website" (http://www.spyflight.co.uk/boeing707.htm). 1 January 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-09.
56. McPhedran, Ian (2011).Air Force: Inside the New Era of Australian Air Power
. Pymble, New South Wales: Harper
Collins. p. 359. ISBN 9780732290252.
57. McCaughlin (2007). "Quiet Achiever": 41.
58. "Updated Orion Aircraft Delivered To The RAAF". Forecast International. 2001-12-08.
59. "Defence confirms acquisition of two ISR and EW Gulfstreams"(http://australianaviation.com.au/2016/01/defence-co
nfirms-acquisition-of-two-isr-and-ew-gulfstreams/)
. Australian Aviation. 7 January 2015. Retrieved 8 January 2016.
60. Waldron, Greg (4 January 2016)."L-3 G550 contract suggests new Australian surveillance deal"(https://www.flightgl
obal.com/news/articles/l-3-g550-contract-suggests-new-raaf-elintsigint-jet-420465/)
. Flightglobal. Retrieved
6 January 2016.
61. "P-8A Poseidon - Royal Australian Air Force"(https://www.airforce.gov.au/Boeing-P8-A-Poseidon/?RAAF-Z4PUOpG
XH/eLtWmc6qxYl9xYycb+rKng/). Royal Australian Air Force. 7 January 2015. Retrieved 22 September 2016.
62. "C-160 Transall Cargo Aircraft" (http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/transall/). Airforce-technology.com.
Transall. Retrieved 2007-10-26.
63. Wentz, Larry. "Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, IV. Intelligence Operations"(https://web.archive.org/we
b/20071020195353/http://fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/bosch04.htm). Archived from the original (https://fas.org/irp/op
s/smo/docs/ifor/bosch04.htm)on 2007-10-20. Retrieved 2007-10-26.
64. "Douglas DC-8 Sarigue NG"(http://www.spyflight.co.uk/db8.htm). The Spyflight Website. Retrieved 2007-10-18.
65. Northrop Grumman (February 1, 2007)."Northrop Grumman, EADS Joint Venture Awarded $559 Million to Develop
German Euro Hawk" (http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=112873). EuroHawk-NG.
Retrieved 2007-10-08.
66. DefenseLink (September 5, 1996)."Memorandum for Correspondents"(http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1996/m
090596_m197-96.html). Retrieved 2007-10-08.
67. "EL/L-8300 (Israel), AIRBORNE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT), ELECTRONIC SUPPOR T AND THREAT
WARNING SYSTEMS" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080416223424/http://www .janes.com/extracts/extract/jrew/jre
w1088.html). Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems. July 12, 2007. Archived fromthe original (http://www.jan
es.com/extracts/extract/jrew/jrew1088.html)on 2008-04-16. Retrieved 2013-10-11.
68. "Electro-optical payloads"(http://www.iai.co.il/Default.aspx?FolderID=18688&lang=en).
69. "Nimrod R1 makes final flight"(http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=16738) Archived (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20120325162031/http://www .defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=16738) 2012-03-25 at
the Wayback Machine. Defence Management Journal, 28 June 2011. Retrieved 28 June 2011.
70. Perry, Dominic (12 November 2013)."PICTURES: First RAF Rivet Joint aircraft arrives in UK"(http://www.flightgloba
l.com/news/articles/pictures-first-raf-rivet-joint-aircraft-arrives-in-uk-392875/)
. Flight Global. Retrieved 18 December
2013.
71. Pike, John. "EH-60L Advanced Quick Fix"(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/eh-60l.htm).
Retrieved 2007-10-06.
72. Boeing Integrated Defense Systems."P-8A Poseidon" (http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/p8a/index.htm
l).
73. "737 AEW&C Wedgetail" (http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/737aewc/). Air Force Technology.
74. Villadsen, Ole R. (Summer 2000)."Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy"(https://www.cia.gov/librar
y/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art07.html)
. Studies in
Intelligence. CIA. Villadsen 2000. Retrieved 2007-10-20.
75. Johnson, Rebecca E. (28 March 2007)."Europe's Space Policies and Their Relevance to ESDP"(http://www.redorbi
t.com/news/space/883287/europes_space_policies_and_their_relevance_to_esdp/index.html?source=r_space) . Red
Orbit. Retrieved 2007-10-20.
76. Wall, Robert; Michael A. Tavernan (September 24, 2007)."France Steps up European Milspace Push"(http://www.av
iationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw092407p2.xml) . Aviation Week &
Space Technology. Wall 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-20.
77. Pike, John. "DGSE General Directorate for External Security (Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure)"
(http://
www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/france/dgse.htm). PikeFrenchSIGINT. Retrieved 2007-10-06.
78. Malik, Tariq (18 December 2004)."Ariane 5 Successfully Orbits France's Helios 2A Satellite"(http://www.space.com/
missionlaunches/ariane5_helios_launch_041218.html) . Malik 2004. Retrieved 2007-10-19.
79. McDowell, Jonathan (25 December 2004)."Jonathan's Space Report No. 541: Helios 2"(http://www.planet4589.org/
space/jsr/back/news.541). McDowell 2004. Retrieved 2007-10-19.
80. de Selding, Peter B. (21 March 2005)."ESSAIM, Micro-Satellites In Formation"(https://web.archive.org/web/200804
16194819/http://www.aboutspace.com/spacenews/archive05/Milcheck_0321.html). Space News Business Report.
Archived from the original (http://www.aboutspace.com/spacenews/archive05/Milcheck_0321.html)on 16 April 2008.
Retrieved 2007-10-19.
81. Office of Science and Technology, French Embassy in the US (18 December 2004)."HELIOS IIA: A New Boost for
European Defence" (https://archive.is/20080225040523/http://www .info-france-usa.org/sst/home/page.asp?target=nf
o-let&LNG=us&PUBLID=9&LIVRID=8238). Space News Business Report. France 2004. Archived fromthe original
(http://www.info-france-usa.org/sst/home/page.asp?target=nfo-let&LNG=us&PUBLID=9&LIVRID=8238)on 25
February 2008. Retrieved 2007-10-19.
82. Space War (July 3, 2007). "Successful Launch Second German Sar-Lupe Observation Satellite"(http://www.spacew
ar.com/reports/Successful_Launch_Second_German_Sar_Lupe_Observation_Satellite_999.html) . Space War.
Retrieved 2007-10-19.
83. Deagel.com (October 19, 2007)."Successful Launch Second German Sar-Lupe Observation Satellite"(http://www.d
eagel.com/C3ISTAR-Satellites/COSMO-SkyMed_a000256001.aspx). Deagel 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-19.
84. "Spacecraft: Military: Tselina" (http://www.russianspaceweb.com/tselina.html). Retrieved 2007-10-19.
85. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies."Russia: Military Programs"(http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/ru
ssia/mil.htm). Retrieved 2007-10-19.
86. Laird, Melvin R. (June 8, 1972). "Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Af
fairs, Subject:
Revelation of the Fact of Satellite Reconnaissance in Connection with the Submission of Arms Limitation
Agreements to Congress"(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/doc02.pdf) (PDF). Laird. Retrieved
2007-10-02.
87. Ellsworth, Robert M. (June 16, 1976)."Memorandum for [then-Director of Central Intelligence] Mr
. Bush, Subject:
Declassification of Satellite Reconnaissance"(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/doc10.pdf)
(PDF). Ellsworth. Retrieved 2007-10-05.
88. The White House (September 19, 1996)."National Space Policy"(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB
231/doc41.pdf) (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-05.
Text is available under theCreative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License ; additional terms may apply. By using this
site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia is a registered trademark of theWikimedia
Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.