DELA CRUZ VS.

COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October
1990 by the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with the administrative complaints filed before its office by their respective principals
for participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil
Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, grossinsubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely
participating in a peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of their constitutional right and insist their assembly does not constitutes
as a strike as there is no actual disruption of classes.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercise of their right to freedom to assembly and petition were valid.

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines

Philippine government in action and the Philippine constitution
The Philippine constitution explained

Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the exercise of their right to ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for
redress should be done within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly
prejudicial to the best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the
manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse
effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.
 NAZARENO VS. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

FACTS: Petitioners were all bona fide employees of the City Government of Dumaguete. They were appointed to various positions by the City Mayor Filipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. some time in June 2001, shortly
before the end of his term. On July 2, 2001 the newly elected City Mayor Agustin Perdices announced during a flag ceremony held at the City Hall that he was not recognizing the appointments by former Mayor
Remollo, which include the petitioners. Thereafter, City Administrator Dominador Dumalag, Jr. issued a Memorandum dated July 2, 2001 directing Assistant City Treasurer Erlinda Tumongha to
"refrain from making any disbursements, particularly payments for salary differential[s]" to those given promotion al appointments by former Mayor Remollo. Thus, petitioners filed with the RTCa Petition for
Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against respondents City Mayor Perdices and City Officers Dumalag, etc.

ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to compensation for services actually rendered by them while the disapproval of their appointment was pending with CSC?

HELD: While it is true that it is the ministerial duty of the government to pay forthe appointees' salaries while the latter's appeal of the disapproval of the ir appointments by CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO is still pending
before the CSC Proper, however, this applies only when the said appointments have been disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of civil service l aw. Such is not the case in the instant Petition.
Until the Court resolves the Petition in G.R. No. 181559 (issue on whether petitioners' appointments should be disapproved for having been made in violation of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June 2001),
reversing the disapproval of petitioners appointments or declaring that the disapproval of the same was not on grounds which constitute violation of civil service law, the Court cannot rule in the instant Petition that it is
the ministerial duty of the City Government of Dumaguete to pay petitioners' salaries while disapproval of their appointment was pending with CSC. Thus, there is yet no ministerial duty compellable by a writ of
mandamus
 FLORES VS. DRILON AND GORDON

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon
of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the
Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without
the distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall
assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise
discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
 Benguet State University vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 169637. June 8, 2007 NACHURA, J
FACTS:
The Congress enacted the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8292).Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of Benguet State
University(BSU) passed and approved a Board Resolution granting rice subsidy and health care allowance
to BSUs employees. The sums were taken from the income derived from the operations of BSU
and were given to the employees at different periods. The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance was disallowed in audit under a Notice of Disallowance, stating that
R.A. No. 8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees and officials of the university.BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the Commission on
Audit (COA) Regional Office, but the same was denied.BSU subsequently filed a petition for review with the COA, alleging that the grant of Rice Subsidy and Health Care allowance
to its employees in 1998 is authorized by law, specifically Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, which reads thus:
Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards
d) Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any income generated by the university or college, from tuition fee and other charges, as
well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/Trustees for instruction,
research, extension or other programs/projects of the university or college x xx

The COA declared that a closer look at the said provision clearly negate such claim of authority. It is noted that the term other programs/projects refers to such programs which the
university may specifically undertake in pursuance of its primary objective which is to attain quality higher education. The law could not have intended that the term program/projects
embrace all programs of BSU, for these benefits, though part of the overall operations, are not directly related to BSUs academic program. Under the maxim of ejusdem generis,
the mention of a general term after the enumeration of specific matters should be held to mean that the general term should be of the same genus as the specific matters
enumerated and, therefore, the other programs and projects should be held to be of the same nature as instruction, research and extension. The inclusion of an incentive such as
Rice Subsidy and Health Care Allowance to its teachers and non-teaching personnel is a patent or blatant disregard of the statutory limitation on the powers of the governing Board
of SUCs, as these benefits are indubitably not one of instruction, research or extension. The COA denied the petition for review. Dissatisfied with the decision of the COA, petitioner
BSU filed a petition for review with the SC.BSU ascribes legal error and grave abuse of discretion to the COA in affirming the disallowance of the rice subsidy and health care
benefits. Relying on R.A. No. 8292, BSU maintains that it can grant said benefits to its employees. It argues that the said law vests state universities and colleges with fiscal
autonomy and grants them freedom in the appropriation and disbursement of their funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care Allowance and Rice Subsidy to its employees and still be entitled to reimbursement.

HELD:
No. BSUs contention that it is authorized to grant allowances to its employees is based on Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292. The provision reads: SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of
Governing Boards.

The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of
directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines: xd) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary
school charges, such as but not limited to matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as their respective boards may deem proper to impose after due consultations with
the involved sectors. Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall
be deposited in any

authorized government depository bank, and all interests shall accrue therefrom shall part of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, That income derived
from university hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the operating expenses of the hospitals .Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, any income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as well a from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be
retained by the university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/ Trustees for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/ projects of the university or
college: Provided, That all fiduciary fees shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which they are collected .If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college, shall not
be able to pursue
any project for which funds have been appropriated and, allocated under its approved program of expenditures, the Board of Regents/Trustees may authorize the use of saidfunds
for any reasonable purpose which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent for the attainment of the objectives and goals of the universities or college; Similarly, Commission
on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum No. 03-01, the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for R.A. No. 8292, provides:
RULE V
Powers and Duties of the Governing Boards SECTION 18. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards (GBs).

The GBs of chartered SUCs shall have the following powers and duties, in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to a Board of
Directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation Code of the Philippines, thus:
(d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary charges, such as, but not limited, to matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as they may deem proper to impose, after
due consultations with the involved sectors. Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by the university or college, shall constitute special
trust funds and shall be deposited in any authorized government depository bank, and all interest that shall accrue therefrom shall be part of the same fund for
the use of the university or college: Provided, That income

derived from university or college hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the operations of the hospitals. Any income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and
other charges, as well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the university or college, and may be disbursed by its GB for instruction,
research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or college: Provided, That all fiduciary fees shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which they are collected.
If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college shall not be able to pursue any project for which funds have been appropriated and allocated under its approved program
of expenditures, its GB may authorize the use of said funds for any reasonable purpose which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent for the attainment of the objectives and
goals of the university or college; What is clear from Section 4 (d) of R. A. No. 8292 cited by BSU as legal basis of its claim aswell as from its implementing rules is that income
generated by the university may be disbursed
by its Governing Board for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of theuniversity or colleges.The theory of BSU that the phrase other programs/projects of
the university or college in
Section 4 (d) covers all projects and programs of the university, including those designed to uplift the economic plight of the employees is clearly erroneous. Under the principle of
ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a
similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute which would repel such inference. The COA correctly ruled that the
other programs/projects under R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be of the samenature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSUs case, the disbursements
were for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way, intended for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 (d) cannot, therefore,
be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances. Hence, the petition was denied, and the decision of the COA was affirmed.
 251. PERALTA VS. MATHAY

double compensation

FACTS:

Peralta was the trustee of the GSIS. He was granted an optional retirement gratuity of P40T. However, he did not receive sums pertaining to 1) COLA, 2) Incentive Bonus, 3)
Christmas Bonus.
Such items were not passed in audit, in view of the Auditor Generals finding that they should be deducted from his gratuity because they partake the nature of additional
compensation. The Auditor General argues that the trustees remuneration is fixed by law o P25 per diem for every board meeting.
As to the COLA, Peralta argues that it is in the nature of reimbursement rather than additional compensation. He argues that the cola is an allowance to take care of expenses
incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his duties.

ISSUE: Is Peralta entitled to the other sums? Are they prohibited compensation?

SC:

The constitution provides that no officer or employee of the government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. This is because public
office is a public trust. He is there to render service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of his functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the
overriding consideration. Thus, an officer or employee of the government may receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. He is not expected to avail himself of devious
or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position.

It is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it that he should receive something more. If it were so, there must be a law to
that effect. As a trustee, he is an officer of the government, as such officer, he cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

As to the COLA, he was unable to show that the COLA received by him was in the nature of reimbursement. It thus amounts to additional compensation.

As to the Bonuses, by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional compensation. The very characterization of what was received by petitioner as bonus being intended by way
of incentive to spur him to more diligent efforts and to add to the feeling of well-being during Christmas season would remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice but
to deduct such items from the gratuity.

No additional compensation unless authorized by law.

 Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18 1990
Brillantes vs. Yorac
G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990

FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate
his chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no
case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be
appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their
functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the
COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.
 Cayetano vs Monsod

201 SCRA 210, 1991

FACTS

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not

possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the

business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or

prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in

a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court

for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences

as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more

than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
 253. CAYETANO VS. MONSOD

comelec practice of law

Christian Monsod was nominated by President Cory as Chairman of Comelec.

Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
According to the Consti, members of Comelec must have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
The CA nevertheless confirmed the nomination of Monsod. He took his oath of office and assumed office as Chair.
Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for Prohibition, praying tha the confirmation and appointment of Monsod be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Monsod possessed the qualification that he had engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years?

SC: YES.

The practice of law is defined as the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and techniques to serve the interest of another with his consent.
It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising or assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising persons as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective before any court, commission,
referee, board, body committee, etc, and in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law.
As long as the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions, then it is a practice of law.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform the acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generaly, the practice of law is to give notice or render any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.

PRIVATE PRACTICE = means an individual or organization (firm) engaged in the business of delivering legal services. But most lawyers do not only spend time in litigation or
courtrooms. Substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time business counseling rather than trying cases.
Background of Atty Monsod:

After graduating from UP College of Law, he worked in the law office of his father. He then worked for the World Bank as operations officer in Costa Rica y Panama. After returning
to the Philippines, he worked with Meralco, served as CEO of bank, and subsequently of a business conglomerate. In 1986, he has rendered services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or adviser. He was also Sec-Gen and Chairman of Namfrel, and in fact appeared before the Comelec during the hearing for accreditation. He became
a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body investigating on the coup detats. He was a member of the Con-Com, and Chairman of its Committee of Accountability of
Public Officers.

Interpreted in the light of the modern concept of law practice, and taking into account the liberal construction of the Constitution, Atty Monsods past experience as lawyer-economist,
lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator, lawyer-legislator, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement. He has engaged in the practice of law for at least
10 years.
 252. MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

comelec temporary appointments

President GMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,3 and Borra4 and Tuason5 as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oath of office and assumed the positions. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.6 However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments.
President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years. They took their oaths of
office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments.
In his capacity as Comelec Chair, Benipayo issued a Memorandum, reassigning Matibag to the from the Education Department to the Law Department
Matibag sought reconsideration, arguing that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period, both by the Election Code and a Civil Service
Memorandum
Matibag filed an administrative and criminal case against Benipayo.
Matibag also questioned the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by
the Commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence
of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. The rationale behind petitioners theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments can
guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed appointee is beyond the influence of the President or members of the Commission on Appointments since his
appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers since his
appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause.
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their
ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed
because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees
who have assumed office, which is the situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in character.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim
appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

SC:

1. MATIBAG IS WRONG.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

2. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one
that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a
by-passed appointee. Thus, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.

In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive
objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President may then issue new appointments - not because of implied
disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments
only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer
appoint those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim
appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the
President is free to make ad interim appointments or reappointments."

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there
is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without
reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman,
because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before
his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result
in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the
appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will
result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
 The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in
his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the
second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven years,
but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits
reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or
three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the
intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.

However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start
and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the
Commission on Appointments.

The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such
person completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can
apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments.

In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad
interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved
by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid
disruptions in vital government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.

The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons.
The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that
the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.

As to the transfer of Matibag

COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial
body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel
transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of
personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
 The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is
Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayos
order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
 GALIDO VS. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the January 18, 1988 local elections for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of
Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Private respondent Saturnino Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of
Bohol, Tagbilaran City, wherein the court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC which reversed the trial courts
decision through its First Division and declared private-respondent the duly-elected mayor. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc, affirming
the decision of the First Division. COMELEC held that the 15 ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots, and, therefore,
invalid. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court, who resolved to dismiss the said petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied with finality by the SC. Still, the petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and injunction which contained the same allegations and legal issues. A TRO was issued by
the SC and the private respondent Galeon now seeks for the dismissal of the present petition for 3 main reasons: 1) Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable. 2) The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence
which is beyond the power of review of the SC. 3) It is exactly the same petition which was already dismissed with finality by the SC. These allegations were answered by the
petitioner: 1) According to the Constitution, the present petition can still be brought to the SC by certiorari, not by an ordinary appeal. 2) The petition involves pure questions of law.
3) The dismissal with finality of the first petition did not refer to the merits of the petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case

(2) May a COMELEC decision be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?

(3) Did the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in rendering the decision?

Held:
(1) Yes. COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

(2) Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving municipal and barangay officials are final, executory, and not appealable, does not
preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari.

(3) No. COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest and the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be
controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. But this petition has become moot and academic because private respondent has already
assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected Mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. Petition dismissed.
 PEOPLE vs. DELGADO
189 SCRA 715, 1990

Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an
information against each of the private respondents for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was
conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases.
The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the
decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses filed in said court.

Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and
administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election
offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all
the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or
unless so ordered by the court.
 PEOPLE VS. INTING

Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case
for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against
the accused OIC Mayor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not
authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the
Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to
insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right
and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would
thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the
constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.