BAES VS.

LUTHERAN CHURCH of the PHIL

FACTS: On September 9, 1993, petitioners Manuel G. Del Rosario and Elmer J. Baes wrote
letters addressed to Rev. Eduardo Ladlad, as LCP President requesting for an extension to stay
at their residences and they dont have place to go and said that they cant afford to rent a
decent house. Petitioners Baes and Del Rosario eventually left the premises.[10] Petitioners-
spouses San Ramon did not write any letter but they were able to leave the premises by
befriending the guards posted at the gate. n December 3, 1993, petitioners filed an action for
forcible entry with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary mandatory
injunction against the respondents herein.
In ruling that there was no force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, Judge Ponferrada
gave weight to: the letter of petitioner Rev. Elmer Baes to the LCP President asking that they be
allowed to live in the LCPs Caloocan property and signifying that they (Spouses Baes) will leave
the yellow house once they find another place to live in; the testimony of petitioner Angela Baes
that the sheriff did not approach her concerning the enforcement of the writ and that she is not
aware that the sheriff approached her husband; the testimony of petitioner Nenita San Ramon
that she and her husband were able to leave the premises by befriending the guard posted in
their compound; and the joint affidavit of the petitioners which stated that the guards and the
counsel of LCP, Atty. Almazan, stopped Nenita San Ramon from leaving the premises to
prevent her from appearing in the criminal complaint she filed against them

ISSUE: whether there was force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth in this case
HELD: There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land
or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto.[47] In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior
physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[48] It is also settled that
in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical
possession of the property.[49] Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de
facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself[50] since such cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior
possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
It is true that petitioners Baes and Del Rosario wrote LCP expressing their willingness to
voluntarily vacate the premises upon finding another place to live in, but this is after
respondents had padlocked the premises and used armed men to prevent their coming to and
from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters do not negate the initial use of force by
respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that respondents owned the
property occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in evicting petitioners therefrom was not
justified.
SERIA vs. CABALLERA
FACTS: On August 11, 1982, Dr. Jesus Seria and his wife, Enriqueta Seria filed a Complaint
for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against respondents Victor Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela
and Oliver Donela. When Dr. Seria died on August 6, 1983, he was substituted by his children,
petitioners Jesus, Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel. The petitioners alleged in their
complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive
possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of land. The petitioners averred that sometime in
March 1982, they discovered that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said
land and offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the
respondents Donelas were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land. The
petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seria, bought the land from Lucia Vda. de Marbella
who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri.5 They presented a Deed of Sale6 dated August 23,
1947 showing that Dr. Seria bought 5 hectares of ricefield, bounded on the North by
Raymundo Seria and Dr. Seria was issued Tax Declaration No. 4029 allegedly for the said
property. While espondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in
actual physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He averred that the
disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot No. 3533, C-7 of the Cagayan Cadastre and originally
owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. The respondents averred that Eustaquio
Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes even before the war. Tax
Declaration No. 2442 was issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed during the war

ISSUE: Whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the

petitioners.

HELD: The CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land
in possession of the respondents is the same as the subject of their complaint, their claim of
acquisitive prescription is clearly untenable.

The petitioners argue that they would not have regularly paid taxes on the land since 1947 had
they not believed that they owned the same.35 The respondents, for their part, aver that the
petitioners were only able to prove seven (7) years of actual possession of the land through
cultivation by their tenants.The respondents contend that acquisitive prescription applies only
when there is no dispute as to the identity of the property. We agree with the respondents.
Since the property has not been clearly identified by the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive
prescription cannot be considered. Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed in
absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. Assuming, however, that the
disputed land has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor of the
petitioners because they were not able to prove that they have been in possession of the
property for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten years, in case the
possession is in good faith and with just title
The petitioners argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31, 1948
constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is untenable. Tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute
mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the
absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership