Approaches To Language, Culture, and Cognition The Intersection of Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Anthropology by Yamaguchi Et Al 2014 PDF

edited by
masataka yamaguchi,
dennis tay, and
benjamin blount
approaches to
language, culture,
and cognition
the intersection
of cognitive
linguistics and
linguistic
anthropology
Approaches to Language, Culture, and Cognition
Also by Dennis Tay
METAPHOR IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: A Descriptive and Prescriptive Analysis
Also by Benjamin Blount

ENVIRONMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A Reader (editor)
ETHNOECOLOGY: Knowledge, Resources, and Rights (co-editor)
LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY: A Book of Readings (editor)
SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE CHANGE (co-editor)
SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE USE (co-editor)
Approaches to Language,
Culture, and Cognition
The Intersection of Cognitive Linguistics
and Linguistic Anthropology
Edited by
Masataka Yamaguchi
University of Queensland, Australia
Dennis Tay
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong
and
Benjamin Blount
SocioEcological Informatics, US
Palgrave
macmillan
Selection, introduction and editorial content Masataka Yamaguchi, Dennis Tay,
and Benjamin Blount 2014
Remaining chapters Contributors 2014
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014
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Approaches to language, culture, and cognition : the intersection of cognitive
linguistics and linguistic anthropology / edited by Masataka Yamaguchi,
University of Queensland, Australia ; Dennis Tay, The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, China ; Benjamin Blount, SocioEcological Informatics, US.
pages cm
This book developed out of an international symposium titled Cognitive Linguistics
and Second Language Acquisition: Towards an Integration of Language, Culture and
Cognition at the University of Otago, New Zealand, 21-22 January 2011.
Summary: The study of language, culture, and cognition has become increasingly
fragmented into separate disciplines and paradigms. This volume aims to
re-establish dialogue between cognitive linguists and linguistic anthropologists
with 11 original papers on language, culture and cognition, and an editorial
introduction. It demonstrates that cognitively-informed perspectives can
contribute to a better understanding of social, cultural, and historical phenomena,
and argues that cognitive theories are relevant to linguistic anthropology.
Provided by publisher.
1. Cognitive grammar. 2. Psycholinguistics. 3. Language and culture.
4. Anthropological linguistics. I. Yamaguchi, Masataka, 1968- editor.
II. Tay, Dennis, editor. III. Blount, Ben G., 1940- editor. IV. University of Otago.
Department of Languages and Cultures.
P165.A68 2014
306.44dc23 2014024391
Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables vii

Acknowledgments ix
Notes on Contributors x
1 Introduction: Approaches to Language, Culture,

and Cognition 1
Masataka Yamaguchi, Dennis Tay, and Benjamin Blount
Part I Cognitive Linguistic Approaches to Language
and Culture
2 Culture and Cognition, Lexicon and Grammar 27
Ronald W. Langacker
3 Deliteralization and the Birth of Emotion 50
Dirk Geeraerts
4 Overthrowing Yesterdays ICM: (Re)focusing of Meaning in a
Hong Kong Chinese (Cantonese) Constructional Idiom 68
Kam-yiu S. Pang
Part II Cultural Linguistic Approaches to Language
and Culture
5 Advances in Cultural Linguistics 99
Farzad Sharifian
6 Sloppy Selfhood: Metaphor, Embodiment, Animism, and
Anthropomorphization in Japanese Language and Culture 124
Debra J. Occhi
7 The Ceremonial Origins of Language 145
Gary B. Palmer, Jennifer Thompson, Jeffrey Parkin, and
Elizabeth Harmon
v
vi Contents
Part III Intersection of Cognitive Linguistics and

Linguistic Anthropology
8 On Intersubjective Co-construction of Virtual Space
through Multimodal Means: A Case of Japanese Route-
Finding Discourse 181
Kuniyoshi Kataoka
9 Discovering Shared Understandings in Discourse:
Prototypes and Stereotypes 217
Masataka Yamaguchi
10 Experiences as Resources: Metaphor and Life in
Late Modernity 234
Lionel Wee
11 An Analysis of Metaphor Hedging in Psychotherapeutic Talk 251
Dennis Tay
Part IV Summary and Future Directions
12 Situating Cultural Models in History and Cognition 271
Benjamin Blount
Glossary 299
Index 303
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
4.1 Distribution of use by speech act function in percentages 74

4.2 Incidence by discourse domains 79
4.3 The person split into non-identical self at time t and
self at time t-n 82
4.4 Self at time t daa2 dou2 self at time t-n 82
4.5 The person split into identical self at time t and
self at time t-n 86
4.6 Self at time t daa2 dou2 self at time t-n; where the two
are identical, resulting in the anomaly of self supplant-
ing self, and hence no self left 87
5.1 A diagrammatic representation of Palmers (1996)
proposal for cultural linguistics 101
5.2 Diagrammatic representation of a cultural schema
(adapted from Sharifian, 2011) 105
6.1 AC advert for ai, print version 127
7.1 Homo heidelbergensis sites 150
7.2 Homo heidelbergensis from Broken Hill, Kabwe, Zambia 151
7.3(a) Late Acheulian hand axe from Kathu Pan, 600K ya 152
7.3(b) Late Acheulian cleaver from Elandsfontein, South Africa 152
7.4 Time line for development of vocal apparatus 153
8.1 Four major types of perspective-taking considered 188
8.2 Central face of Peak 4 (a) and a schematic map of trails
under discussion (b) 190
8.3 Another example of intersubjective migi right 209
12.1 The basic cultural model of the soul from Aristotle and
the Greeks 291
12.2 The expanded model of soul from Galen 292
vii
viii List of Figures and Tables
Tables
3.1 Raw frequencies of mouvoir and mouvoir across periods
and senses 59
3.2 Semasiological proportions for mouvoir and mouvoir across
periods and senses 60
3.3 Onomasiological proportions for mouvoir and mouvoir
across periods and senses 61
3.4 Syntactic patterns for mouvoir and mouvoir in Old French 64
4.1 Topics within discourse domains and their incidences 80
4.2 Incidences of topics against total number of samples 80
5.1 A comparison of Aboriginal and Anglo-Australian meanings
for family 112
7.1 Dates of some African Homo heidelbergensis 149
8.1 Viewer-oriented spatial frames of reference considered 187
8.2 Different experiential status as to spatial segments 191
8.3 Representing spatial entities/movements through
language/body 200
9.1 Triplet of I [dont] look in Japan 225
9.2 Triplet of Peters ascribed identities in New Zealand 225
11.1 Seven step guide for exploring and transforming
patient metaphors 254
11.2 Most frequent two-word clusters in the corpus 256
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank John R. Taylor, who has been instrumental in

the process of materializing the plan for this edited collection. This
book developed out of an international symposium titled Cognitive
Linguistics and Second Language Acquisition: Towards an Integration
of Language, Culture and Cognition at the University of Otago, New
Zealand, 2122 January 2011. The symposium was funded by the Japan
Foundation (Grant Program for Japanese-Language Education Activities;
Reference No: 22 JTE 62) and New Zealand Japan Exchange Programme
(NZJEP) grant, provided by ILANZ (International Languages: Aotearoa
New Zealand).
This project would not have been possible without the generous
support of a number of institutions and individuals. The Division of
Humanities at the University of Otago supported the project: Nicola
Richmond helped us immensely in preparing for the event. Elaine
Webster of the Centre for Innovation provided us with great assis-
tance in many ways. At various stages of planning the event, we
benefited from consultation with the following: Takashi Shogimen at
the University of Otago, Dirk Geeraerts at the University of Leuven,
Seiichi Makino at Princeton University, Kuniyoshi Kataoka at Aichi
University, Keiko Ikeda at Kansai University, Kazuko Shinohara at Tokyo
University of Agriculture and Technology, and Ren Dirven at Mechelen
in Belgium. The symposium was planned in honor of John R. Taylor at
the University of Otago, who had retired in April 2010. He constantly
encouraged us to organize a symposium for cognitive linguistics. We
deeply respect and admire John in many ways. He brought interna-
tional prestige to the University of Otago through his numerous and
highly influential publications.
ix
Notes on Contributors
Editors
Benjamin Blount is the owner of SocioEcological Informatics, a

consulting business based in the US. He has taught anthropology and
linguistics at the University of Texas Austin, the University of Georgia,
and the University of Texas San Antonio, US. Among his publications
are three edited books on language, culture, and society, and an edited
book on ethnoecology. He was the inaugural editor of the Journal of
Linguistic Anthropology. His recent and current interests are in cogni-
tively based accounts of information systems and local knowledge.
Dennis Tay is Assistant Professor at the Department of English, the

Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He is a cognitive linguist and dis-
course analyst, and has been researching the linguistic and discursive
characteristics of psychotherapeutic metaphors in different cultural
contexts including the USA, New Zealand, and China (including Hong
Kong). His recent publications include Metaphor in Psychotherapy: A
Descriptive and Prescriptive Analysis, and papers in Cognitive Linguistic
Studies, Journal of Counseling & Development, Metaphor and the Social
World, Discourse Studies, Language & Communication, and Text & Talk.
Masataka Yamaguchi is Lecturer at the University of Queensland,

Australia. He is on the editorial board of Discourse, Context and Media,
and has published widely in Language & Communication, Discourse &
Society, Journal of Sociolinguistics, and Journal of Multicultural Discourses,
among other journals. His current interests include the development
of cognitively informed sociolinguistic discourse analysis by synthe-
sizing semiotic anthropology, cognitive anthropology, and cognitive
linguistics.
Contributors
Dirk Geeraerts is Professor of Linguistics at the University of Leuven,

Belgium, where he founded the research group Quantitative Lexicology
and Variational Linguistics. His main publications include The Structure
of Lexical Variation (1994), Diachronic Prototype Semantics (1997), Words
and Other Wonders (2006), and Theories of Lexical Semantics (2010).
x
Notes on Contributors xi
As founding editor of the journal Cognitive Linguistics and editor of

The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, he contributed significantly
to the international expansion of Cognitive Linguistics.
Elizabeth Harmon, deceased, was a PhD candidate in Physical

Anthropology at Arizona State University, Tempe and Visiting Lecturer
in Anthropology and Ethnic Studies at the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas. Her specialization was the evolution of African hominins.
Kuniyoshi Kataoka is Professor of English Linguistics in the Faculty of

Arts and Letters at Aichi University, Japan. He is particularly interested in
multimodal analysis of para-/meta-linguistic means of representation of
poeticity in written and spoken discourse. His articles have appeared in
many journals and books, and he is currently an editorial board member of
Pragmatics, Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, and Language & Communication.
Ronald W. Langacker was Professor in the Department of Linguistics

at the University of California, San Diego, US, until his retirement in
2003. After a decade devoted primarily to the study of Uto-Aztecan,
he initiated an ongoing effort to develop a radical alternative to
mainstream linguistic theory. Now called Cognitive Grammar, the
resulting theoretical approach continues to be refined and extended
in the broader context of the ever-growing movement known as
Cognitive Linguistics.
Debra J. Occhi is Professor of Anthropology at Miyazaki International

College, Japan. Her research topics include Japan, anthropology, lan-
guage, and culture. Her recent publications appeared in Embodiment via
Body Parts: Studies from Various Languages and Cultures edited by Zouheir
A. Maalej and Ning Yu, and in Japanese Studies, Social Semiotics, Journal
of Sociolinguistics, among others.
Gary B. Palmer is Professor Emeritus at the University of Nevada at

Las Vegas. His early studies in language and culture involved Salish lan-
guages of the American Northwest. In the 1990s, his discovery of the
emerging field of cognitive linguistics led to the approach presented in
Toward a Theory of Cultural Linguistics (1996), which treats the scenario
as a key conceptual base. Finding the theory highly productive, he
has applied it to studies in Austronesian, Bantu, Indo-European, and
Salish languages on topics ranging in scope from classifiers and spatial
prefixes to the language of social movements. A recent publication is
xii Notes on Contributors
Emotional, Evaluative, and Ideological Subjectification in Tagalog and

Shona, International Journal of Language and Culture 1(1), 520 (2014).
Kam-yiu S. Pang is Assistant Professor of Linguistics at the University

of Macau. His main research focus is on Cognitive Linguistics, in par-
ticular how Cognitive Linguistics may inform issues in the interactivity
between the self and language, how the self is organized cognitively,
both inter- and intra-personally, how it is conceptualized, constructed,
and expressed in linguistic behaviors, and how self-conceptualizations
in turn motivate linguistic behaviors.
Jeffrey Parkin was a graduate student in Physical Anthropology at the

University of Nevada at Las Vegas. His work on Chapter 7 was submit-
ted as part of a paper for Gary Palmers graduate seminar on the origins
of language.
Farzad Sharifian is Professor of Linguistics and Director of Language

and Society Centre at Monash University, Australia. He is the author
of Cultural Conceptualisations and Language (2011). He is the founding
Editor-in-Chief of The International Journal of Language and Culture and
the editor of The Routledge Handbook of Language and Culture.
Jennifer L. Thompson is an independent scholar. She taught at Durham

University, University of Toronto (Scarborough), and University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. Her research on immature individuals has focused
on the evolution of the modern pattern of growth and development
and what it meant to be a juvenile in prehistory. She has two co-edited
books: Tracing Childhood: Bioarchaeological Investigations of Early Lives
in Antiquity (2014) and Patterns of Growth and Development in the Genus
Homo (2005). Recent publications include with Nelson, A. J. Middle
Childhood and Modern Human Origins in Human Nature.
Lionel Wee is Professor in the Department of English Language &

Literature at the National University of Singapore. His books include
Language without Rights (2011), Style, Identity and Literacy (with Chris
Stroud, 2011), Markets of English (with Joseph Park, 2012), Consumption,
Cities and States (with Ann Brooks, 2014). His forthcoming book is The
Language of Organizational Styling (2015).
1
Introduction: Approaches to
Language, Culture, and Cognition
Masataka Yamaguchi, Dennis Tay, and Benjamin Blount
1.1 Why language, culture, and cognition now?
By recognizing that the study of language, culture, and cognition

has been fragmented into separate disciplines and paradigms (see
Beller, Bender, and Medin, 2012; Kronenfeld, Bennardo, de Munck,
and Fischer, 2011), we aim to re-establish dialogue between cognitive
linguistics and linguistic anthropology in order to advance our under-
standing of the relationship among language, culture, and cognition
(see Blount, 1995[1974]; Blount and Sanches, 1977; Casson, 1981;
Dougherty, 1985; Giglioli, 1972; Gumperz and Hymes, 1972; Sanches
and Blount, 1975 for earlier attempts). This volume particularly high-
lights the ways in which cognitive linguistics can contribute to a better
understanding of cultural and social phenomena. In so doing, it aims to
provide insights into the theory and practice of linguistic anthropology,
which has been mainly concerned with the cultural contextualization
and social uses of language, and the acquisition of communicative
competence (Keesing, 1992: 604; also see Duranti, 2001, 2009).
In linguistic anthropology, however, [t]here is much work to be done
on exploring languages as conceptual systems, as Roger M. Keesing
(1992: 605) points out. We take this suggestion seriously, even after
more than two decades has passed since 1992 (and we will come back
to this point at the end of this chapter). At the same time we also
draw explicit attention to the reciprocal contributions that cognitive
linguistics and linguistic anthropology can make toward each other
in both conceptual and empirical terms, which we hope will provoke
further thought and discussions. For these purposes, the volume col-
lects empirical papers that demonstrate ways of integrating language,
culture, and cognition through actual analyses of discourse, as well as
1
2 Approaches to Language, Culture, and Cognition
showcasing the ways in which cognitive linguistic approaches to gram-

mar, semantics, and metaphor are useful for investigating sociocultural
and historical issues (see Section 1.3).
As noted, this collection draws on cognitive linguistics and other
cognitive theories, including cognitive anthropology (e.g., Brown,
2006; DAndrade, 1995; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997) while
covering diverse topics. The eleven chapters that follow are arranged
in terms of theoretical orientations: Part I (Cognitive Linguistic
Approaches) consists of three chapters that represent foundational
cognitive linguistic approaches (Langacker; Geeraerts; Pang); Part II
(Cultural Linguistic Approaches) contains three chapters that intro-
duce what Cultural Linguistics is (Sharifian) and illustrate the field
by two case studies (Occhi and Palmer et al.); Part III (Intersections of
Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Anthropology) collects four chap-
ters (Kataoka; Yamaguchi; Wee; Tay) that are located at the intersections
of cognitive linguistics and linguistic anthropology. All of the authors in
Part III show commitment to empirical analyses of discourse data. The
volume concludes with a historical overview, current trends, and future
directions for integrating language, culture and cognition (Blount).
For the rest of this introductory chapter, we list existing significant
collections as precursors, which point to both uniqueness and continu-
ity of this collection (see Section 1.2). We then present an overview of
this volume and the connections and cross-readings of the chapters.
Finally we conclude with a call for further investigations of language,
culture, and cognition against the backdrop of the current trend in lin-
guistic anthropology (see Section 1.3).
1.2 Language, culture, and cognition: precursors
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the vast

amount of the literature on this topic, which necessarily makes our
selection highly selective, we should recognize several collections as
significant contributions in the history of the field of language, culture,
and cognition. We only list edited collections that are directly relevant
to this volume. First of all, Language, Culture, and Society: A Book of
Readings, edited by Ben G. Blount (1995), should be noted as a synthetic
volume that has implications for framing the study of cognition in the
history of linguistic anthropology. It is an expanded version of his ear-
lier collection (1974), which divides the study of language, culture, and
society into three historical periods (cf. Duranti, 2003): the 19101940s
as the formative period, in which Boas, Sapir, and Whorf played a major
Introduction 3
role; the 1950s1970s as the period of paradigm development; and

1980s1990s as the period of new directions (Blount, 1995). Among
the ten selected articles published between the 1950s and 1970s, three
papers fall within the category of cognitive anthropology and linguis-
tics (Charles O. Frakes The Ethnographic Study of Cognitive Systems
in 1962, and his How to Enter a Yakan House in 1975[1964], and Brent
Berlins Speculations on the Growth of Ethnobotanical Nomenclature
in 1972). A foundational linguistic/semiotic anthropological paper,
Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description (Silverstein,
1976), occupies a prominent place by synthesizing the cognitive papers
with the other sociocultural and sociolinguistic articles (see Blount,
1995: 106107, for an explication).
Blounts collection is also notable in that he selects cognitive anthro-
pological/linguistic papers, which were published after 1980s (Eugene
Hunns Ethnoecology: The Relevance of Cognitive Anthropology for
Human Ecology in 1989, and Paul Kay, Brent Berlin, and William
Merrifields Biocultural Implications of Systems of Color Naming in
1991), as well as a linguistic anthropological paper Whorfs View of the
Linguistic Mediation of Thought by John A. Lucy in 1985. If we follow
Durantis (2003) vision of the three paradigms, the period of paradigm
development between 1950s and 1970s should have no classic cogni-
tive papers. However, cognitive lines of inquiry in linguistic anthropol-
ogy were alive and well throughout the 1970s, into the 1980s1990s
(Berlin, 1992), and at present (Beller and Bender, 2011; Hunn, 2006;
Kronenfeld, 2008; Strauss, 2006; cf. Silverstein, 2004, 2007). Thus,
we might question the statement language was no longer a window
on the human mind Rather it was primarily a social phenomenon,
to be studied in the midst of speech events or speech activities in
1970s and 1980s (Duranti, 2003: 329, italics in the original). We agree,
of course, that language is fundamentally social, but to say that it is
not a window on the human mind seems unnecessarily restrictive.
Social activity cannot occur in the absence of a coordinated nervous
system, even among eusocial animals. Among humans, language has to
be cognitively based and, moreover, is a major avenue of inquiry into
how social and cultural phenomena are processed and integrated in
the brain. Marginalization of cognition within linguistic anthropology,
however, has been an unfortunate trend for several decades.
Cognition in linguistics has not been subject to the same margin-
alization. In linguistic anthropology, views about its marginal status
are related to developments in the 1970s (see Blount, 2011; Quinn,
2011). Decomposition of lexical items within domains, e.g., kinship,
was pursued from the late 1960s as a way of searching for underlying
features of organization. The arrangement of underlying features, or
components, was originally thought to have psychological validity. The
components upon which classification was based were considered to be
units upon which cognition operated, but by the late 1970s that view
was known to be inadequate, requiring modification. As in linguistics
(Fillmore, 1975; Taylor, 2003[1989]), feature analyses gave way to proto-
type perspectives (Rosch, 1973), producing new directions in cognitive
anthropology. An early success was in color term research (Berlin and
Kay, 1969), but other successes followed, in particular the concept of
cultural models.
Marginalization of cognition in linguistic anthropology came about,
in part, through an erroneous equation of lexical classificational
analyses (componential analysis) to cognition in language in general.
Cognitive approaches in linguistic anthropology have been portrayed,
incorrectly, as a continuation of the formal lexical analyses, thereby
rendering them as deficient and marginal. That point of view unfor-
tunately became widespread. The incorrect reading of cognition and
language within linguistic anthropology has been previously noted and
discussed in a number of publications. Strauss and Quinn (1997), for
example, addressed the problem in detail and serves as a good source
for historical contextualization of the issue. We return to this topic at
the end of this chapter.
Among the most widely known topics in the study of language, culture,
and cognition is the linguistic relativity hypothesis also known as the
Whorfian Hypothesis. Rethinking Linguistic Relativity, edited by John J.
Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson (1996), is an authoritative and com-
prehensive collection of publications since the late 1960s and early 1970s,
in which the idea of linguistic relativity was ignored at best and dismissed
at worst. Known as the neo-Whorfian movement (Lucy, 1992; Silverstein,
1979), the theory and methods for investigating the issue of linguistic rela-
tivity is refined by taking typological universals into account. The Gumperz
and Levinson volume points to the necessity to study language, culture,
and cognition from a broadly ethnographic perspective of observing and
recording ordinary usages (fashions of speaking) in cultural context, com-
bined with psychological experiments for testing the relativity hypothesis.
Some of the findings from the neo-Whorfian approach to spatial cognition
(Levinson, 1996, 2006a) are utilized by Kataoka (Chapter 8),who combines
them with multimodal discourse analysis in this volume.
Naomi Quinns discourse-oriented approach to cultural models is
entitled Finding Culture in Talk: A Collection of Methods (2005), a volume
Introduction 5
mainly written for graduate students in cultural anthropology. Technical

details in linguistics are not explored in depth, although the linguisti-
cally sophisticated analyses made by Jane Hill (2005a) and by Claudia
Strauss (2005) are informative even for seasoned cognitive linguists. In
relation to this current volume, Yamaguchi and Blount are particularly
inspired by the cognitive anthropological notion of culture as shared
knowledge among a socio-culturally defined group of people, which
was proposed by Goodenough (1957). In Chapter 4, Sharifian also
describes the recent conceptual developments of Cultural Linguistics,
which are partly influenced by cognitive anthropology. Furthermore,
in Chapter 12, Blount refines the meaning of sharing from a cognitive
anthropological perspective (see Section 1.3).
Another volume that makes strong contributions to linguistic relativ-
ity is Language, Culture, and Society: Key Topics in Linguistic Anthropology,
edited by Christine Jourdan and Kevin Tuite (2006). The publication
is from the Cambridge University Press series of Studies in the Social
and Cultural Foundations of Language, and it contains four chapters
written by notable experts (John Leavitt, Regna Darnell, Penny Brown,
and Paul Kay). This volume also features eminent linguistic anthropolo-
gists such as Monica Heller, Elinor Ochs, Bambi Schieffelin, and Paul
Friedrich. The editors, however, did not intend to integrate the contri-
butions in either conceptual or empirical terms. They did not, in other
words, make an effort to bring cognitive consideration into play. One
of the chapters in the current volume, however, shows how important
an integration can be in those terms. In Chapter 6, Occhi draws on
Friedrichs conceptualization of ethnopoetics in her cognitive linguis-
tic analysis of metaphors in lyrics (cf. Lakoff, 1993). By this combina-
tion, she confronts and manages the dilemma of poetic nuance versus
universals, the role of tropes or figures, [and] the harmonization of
verbal art and scientific approaches (Friedrich, 2006: 207).
In linguistic anthropology, Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition,
and Interaction, edited by N. J. Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson (2006),
needs to be acknowledged. It covers the diverse topics of Properties
of Human Interaction, Psychological Foundations, Culture and
Sociality, Cognition in Interaction, and Evolutionary Perspectives
in a well-balanced and synthetic manner. The collection shows not
only depth and breadth but the continuity of the study of cognition in
linguistic anthropology and related disciplines, including psychology.
With reference to this present collection, Kataoka develops some of the
conceptual tools for analyzing interaction, proposed by such contribu-
tors as Schegloff, C. Goodwin, Hutchins, and Enfield, in Enfield and
Levinson (2006). Also, in Chapter 12, Blount places his proposal for
neurocultural cognitive models within an evolutionary framework (see
Sperber, 2006).
Calls for greater attention on culture and interaction have also
resounded across cognitive linguistics, with many upholding the posi-
tion that these variables should, or have always occupied a central place
in cognitive linguistic theorization (e.g., Geeraerts and Grondelaers,
1995; Kvecses, 2005; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). An early collec-
tion, Discourse and Perspective in Cognitive Linguistics (1997), edited by
Wolf-Andreas Liebert, Gisela Redeker, and Linda Waugh, examined how
interactional phenomena such as modal expressions, focus particles, and
tag questions are both sites of application and enrichment for cogni-
tive linguistic constructs including metaphor and Cognitive Grammar.
Sociocultural and interactional perspectives are also prominent within
what are traditionally regarded as independent branches of cognitive
linguistics. Langacker (2001), for instance, demonstrated that the seem-
ingly abstract analytic units of Cognitive Grammar are able to provide a
coherent framework for contextually driven discourse analysis. Within
the province of conceptual metaphor theory, the study of how context,
culture, and interaction shape the characteristics and use of metaphors
is a programmatic and ongoing strand of research (Cameron, Maslen,
Todd, Maule, Stratton and Stanley, 2009; Gibbs, 1999; Kvecses, 2009;
Steen, 2011, among others), which exemplifies the presently envisioned
intersection between cognitive linguistics and linguistic anthropology.
A recent series of collections which include Advances in Cognitive
Sociolinguistics, edited by Dirk Geeraerts, Gitte Kristiansen, and Yves
Peirsman (2010), New Directions in Cognitive Linguistics, edited by Vyvyan
Evans and Stphanie Pourcel (2009), and Body, Language, and Mind, edited
by Roslyn Frank, Ren Dirven, Tom Ziemke, and Enrique Bernrdez
(2008), have gone on to articulate how this intersection is realizable in
different ways. The papers in Advances in Cognitive Sociolinguistics explore
the interplay between conceptual meaning and variationist factors
(Geeraerts, Kristiansen, and Peirsman, 2010: 1). On the one hand, the
notion of sociolinguistic variation should inhere in cognitive linguis-
tic constructs, if the latter claims to be derived from abstractions over
socially situated instances of language use. On the other hand, cognitive
linguistics may enrich sociolinguistic inquiry by providing insights into
the meaningfulness of linguistic variation; i.e., how speakers them-
selves construe and make sense of the fact of variation.
The papers in New Directions in Cognitive Linguistics survey
state-of-the-art research and propose new frontiers in different branches
Introduction 7
of cognitive linguistics such as metaphor, blending, embodiment, and

grammar. Among the proposed new frontiers, Crofts (2009) argument
for a social cognitive linguistics reinforces the point that cognitive lin-
guists must go outside the head and incorporate a social-interactional
perspective on the nature of language (Croft, 2009: 395). The papers in
Body, Language, and Mind span two volumes and elaborate on the notions
of embodiment, together with what is referred to as sociocultural
situatedness. This is defined as the ways in which individual minds
and cognitive processes are shaped by their interaction with socio-
cultural structures and practices (Frank, 2008: 1). The traditional char-
acterization of cognitive structures and schemas residing in individual
minds, and their corresponding relations with linguistic structure and
use, is thus broadened to, and examined at, the collective sociocultural
level. Taken together, these collections reaffirm the complex interplay
between language, culture, and cognition, and provide some concrete
directions for future research from the cognitive linguistic perspective.
Against the background of these collections, this volume is a new and
unique attempt to reconcile linguistics and anthropology in such a way
that cognitive linguistic theories, concepts, and methods are applied
to linguistic anthropological concerns, while some of the chapters sug-
gest that more discourse-oriented analyses be incorporated into cogni-
tive linguistic research in order to strengthen its empirical basis (see
Kataoka, Yamaguchi, Wee, Tay, and Blount).1
However, our goal is modest in that we can only indicate several
points of intersection between cognitive linguistics and linguistic
anthropology. Furthermore, the scope and the diversity of data should
be qualified. This volume has no chapter that directly addresses, empiri-
cally tests, or conceptually refines the linguistic relativity hypothesis
(see Gumperz and Levinson, 1996; Hill and Manheim, 1992; Jourdan
and Tuite, 2006; Leavitt, forthcoming; Lucy, 1992, 1996; Silverstein,
1979). Furthermore, our data sources are not linguistically diverse as
anthropologically oriented language studies should be. Only Cantonese
(Pang), Japanese (Occhi and Kataoka), and Persian are examined in
depth, and Australian aboriginal languages and cultures are mentioned
(Sharifian), among the non-Western languages.
1.3 Overview and cross-references among the chapters
Part I (Cognitive Linguistic Approaches to Language and Culture) consists

of three chapters that represent foundational cognitive linguistic
approaches. First, Ronald Langacker, in his Culture and Cognition,
Lexicon and Grammar (Chapter 2), firmly rejects the traditional stance
that the dividing line between lexicon and grammar reflects its corre-
sponding dichotomy between culture and cognition. Drawing on the
notions of embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002) and usage events (Tummers,
Heylin, and Geeraerts, 2005), he elaborates on a balance between bodily
embodiment and cultural embeddedness in human cognition, from
the perspective of the usage-based theory of grammar. Furthermore, he
situates Cognitive Grammar broadly in cognitive science (Beller, Bender,
and Medin, 2012; also see Ross and Medin, 2011). In assuming that
cognition is universally embodied and culturally embedded, he argues
that lexicon and grammar form a continuum of meaningful structure.
From this perspective, he points towards direct avenues for closer col-
laboration between cognitive linguists and linguistic anthropologists.
In conclusion, he argues that [o]n the one hand, linguists need anthro-
pology in order to properly assess and characterize the cultural basis of
linguistic meanings. On the other hand, linguistic analysis reveals
the details of the mental constructions constitutive of culture (this
volume: 47). The rest of the contributions in this volume elaborates and
develops his insights by providing detailed linguistic analyses in diverse
sociocultural and historical contexts.
Dirk Geeraerts (Chapter 3) takes a case study approach to diachronic
prototype semantics (Geeraerts, 1997) in his Deliteralizaiton and the
Birth of Emotion, further exploring a delicate balance between
cultural factors and embodied experience. Specifically, he empirically
examines the historical changes in the domain of emotion and the cul-
tural influences of the humoral theory (also see Blount, this volume) by
critically engaging with the tenet of embodiment in cognitive linguis-
tics. Building upon his influential paper (Geeraerts and Grondelaers,
1995), which shows the ways in which the concept of anger is also a
cultural artefact of the humoral theory, as much as a product of embod-
ied cognition, he adds another cultural layer to the early universalist
accounts (Lakoff and Kvecses, 1987). In this chapter, Geeraerts dem-
onstrates how the word emotion itself has its etymological roots in
the humoral theory. However, it should be noted that he by no means
denies embodied cognitive mechanisms. In his corpus analysis, he dem-
onstrates that metaphorical and metonymic interpretations played a
significant role in the specialization of the meanings of mouvoir (which
is the verbal form of motion in Old French) from spatial to purely psy-
chological readings.
By making a conceptual distinction between semasiology and ono-
masiology (Geeraerts, Grondelaers, and Bakema, 1994), he proposes
Introduction 9
a functional explanation of the birth of emotion as the conceptual

onomasiological salience or entrenchment: there was a diachroni-
cally growing need for concepts referring exclusively to psychological
phenomena between the middle of the 14th century and the 16th
century (this volume: 61).2 Interestingly, his findings provide empirical
evidence for the philosophical speculation on the rise of individualism
after the Renaissance (C. Taylor, 1989), which deserves the attention
of linguistic anthropologists. In sum, Geeraerts offers a more nuanced
picture of the domain of emotion from cognitively informed historical
and cultural perspectives.
Kam-yiu S. Pang (Chapter 4) is also concerned with diachronic
changes, by examining the meanings of a popular proverb in Cantonese
in his Overthrowing yesterdays ICM: (Re)focusing of meaning in
a Hong Kong Chinese (Cantonese) constructional idiom. He takes a
semasiological viewpoint by historically tracing the ways in which a
particular proverb is used to denote distinct states of affairs. For this
purpose, proverbs are conceptualized as constructional idioms (Taylor,
2002, 2012) within the framework of cognitive linguistics. Through
analyzing the data taken from the Internet periodically, he demon-
strates that the Cantonese proverb on overthrowing the todays self,
which was predominantly used for praising, has been changing in the
direction of negative or censuring uses, particularly in the domain of
political discourse. Empirically, this chapter shows the semasiological
transformations of the proverb as a constructional idiom.
In order to illuminate a conceptual integration of the two selves,
Pang uses the blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).
Moreover, central to his conceptual framework is the idealized cog-
nitive model (ICM) (Lakoff, 1987), which is also referred to as cul-
tural model (Holland and Quinn, 1987) or cultural cognitive model
(Blount, this volume; also see Sharifian; Yamaguchi, this volume). He
constructs ICMs by discerning the worldview (Hill and Manheim,
1992) in the contextual uses of a proverb. The new proverbial uses also
contribute to the renewal of the culturally constructed self in the Hong
Kong Chinese context (also see Occhi, this volume, for the cultural
construction of self).
Seen this way, language is inseparable from culture, and thus a pro-
verbial phenomenon instantiates languaculture (Agar, 1994; Friedrich,
1986), by which it is assumed that each language represents a unique
worldview. The topic of proverb has been studied in language and cul-
ture (e.g., Briggs, 1985; White, 1987), and more recently under the rubric
of ritual communication (Senft and Basso, 2009), by highlighting the
notion of interdiscursivity or connectivity across discourses, in the

uses of proverbs (Goddard, 2009). From this languaculture perspec-
tive, Pang illustrates one of the ways in which cognitive linguistics and
linguistic anthropology meaningfully intersect.
Taking the notion of languaculture as a fundamental assumption, the
three chapters in Part II (Cultural Linguistic Approaches to Language and
Culture) squarely address linguistic anthropological concerns by apply-
ing cognitive linguistic insights. In Chapter 5 (Advances in Cultural
Linguistics), Farzad Sharifian defines the field of Cultural Linguistics
as a multidisciplinary area which explores the interface between lan-
guage, culture, and conceptualization (this volume: 99). The notion
of conceptualization is placed at the nexus of language and culture.
By the notion of conceptualization, he denotes the cultural aspects
of cognition or what he calls cultural conceptualizations, which
include schemas, categories (prototypes), and metaphors. It should
be noted, however, that he emphasizes socially distributed cognition
(see Hutchins, 1995; Kataoka this volume), as well as culturally shared
cognition. His chapter usefully indicates several connections among
other chapters in this volume. In his overview of Cultural Linguistics,
we see that it intersects with cultural model theory (Pang; Yamaguchi;
Blount this volume); conceptual metaphor theory (Occhi; Wee; Tay, this
volume); cultural categorization (Yamaguchi, this volume); and cultural
metaphor (Geeraerts, this volume), among others.
Toward the end, Sharifian illustrates the current research agendas with
sample analyses: World Englishes, intercultural (mis)communication,
and political discourse. In his attempt to incorporate a contextually
sensitive (or indexical) perspective into his analysis, he draws on the
notion of contextualization cue (Gumperz, 1982) in analyzing the cases
of intercultural miscommunication. However, his focus is on the denota-
tionally explicit aspects of communication and lexicalized information
in particular. Thus, he will benefit from keyword analysis, which has
been developed by Blount (this volume; also see Quinn, 2005; Strauss,
2005; Wierzbicka, 1996), who systematically and rigorosly analyzes
discourse.
The other two chapters in Part II are in-depth case studies. Chapter
6 is entitled Sloppy Selfhood: Metaphor, Embodiment, Animism, and
Anthropomorphization in Japanese Language and Culture, in which
Debra J. Occhi addresses herself to the issue of the cultural construc-
tion of the self (Duranti, 1997) in the Japanese context. She starts with
observing the phenomena of animism and anthropomorphization
across the domains of religion, traditional art forms (such as poetry and
Introduction 11
paintings), and contemporary public discourses, including visual media.

Based on her insightful observations, she conceptualizes the Japanese
self as a sloppy self, by which she means that the self is closely con-
nected with or even inseparable from nature. Among the data taken
from her fieldwork, Japanese popular media, and historical-literary
documents, she particularly makes an in-depth analysis of enka lyrics
or traditional Japanese love songs. Her conceptual tools derive from
ethnopoetics (Friedrich, 2006) in linguistic anthropology, and the
blending theory in cognitive linguistics (see Pang, this volume), which
is applied to the Japanese language as HUMANS ARE NATURE/ NATURE
IS HUMAN (Hiraga, 1999). Analytically focusing on the co-occurrences
of the first- and second-person pronouns (and other indexical features
such as address terms and reported speech) with body-part synecdoche
and metaphor, she reveals gendered patterns as schemas (see Blount,
this volume), in which the Japanese self is constructed in the sentimen-
tal scenarios for romance. In doing so, she rejects the Cartesian dichot-
omy of mind and body, and instead argues for embodiment by positing
the schemas that blend human beings and natural phenomena.
One of the implications of her analysis for linguistic anthropology
is the existence of close connections between metaphor and ideology,
which is underexplored in the field of language ideologies (Woolard,
Schieffelin, and Kroskrity, 1998; see Wee, this volume). As Occhi argues,
[u]nderstanding the ideological basis for Japanese human-nature
metaphor is crucial to understanding its force and endurance (this
volume: 125). By taking an ethnopoetic approach to performance (see
Yamaguchi, this volume), she illuminates the ways in which the sloppy
Japanese self is metaphorically and metonymically embodied in verbal
and visual images, which should appeal to linguistic anthropologists.
To wrap up Part II, Gary Palmer, Jennifer Thompson, Jeffery
Parkin, and Elizabeth Harmon (Chapter 7) propose a hypothesis on
the genesis of language in their The Ceremonial Origins of Language.
The first author is known for founding the field of Cultural Linguistics
(see Sharifian; Occhi, this volume) as a synthesis of cognitive linguis-
tics and linguistic anthropology (Palmer, 1996). The arguments they
make for supporting the hypothesis take into account evidence from
archeology and physical anthropology, as well as linguistic and other
semiotic data. In brief, their hypothesis is that Homo heidelbergensis, who
originated in Africa in the Middle Pleistocene period (between 800K and
130K ya) is the first hominine species who possesses the anatomical
and brain characteristics that would have allowed the use of a proto-
language comparable to the language used by Homo sapiens.3 Palmer
et al. speculate that Homo heidelbergensis engaged in mimetic per-

formances in (proto) events and ceremonies, which provided ample
opportunities for vocalizations in intersubjective spaces. The contex-
tualized vocalizations could, then, in time, be conventionalized and
come to stand for the performances. Eventually the vocalizations
could become symbols, replacing the mimetic-contextualization as the
message. It should be noted that the fundamental insight from which
they formulate their hypothesis derives from the idea of the emergence
of symbolization (Sinha, 2007). By symbolization Palmer et al. mean
the normative conventionalization of communicative signs, which is
the sine qua non of language in their view. If they are right, the first
hominine species with proto-language(s) were capable of conceptual
metaphor, conceptual metonymy, conceptual blending, and iconic
sound symbolism (this volume: 169).
An interested reader is referred to the rich background literature they
provide on the alternative theories of the origins of language (such as
the song theories, the naming theory, and the gesture theory, to
name just a few). In this chapter, Palmer et al. further attempt to inte-
grate the alternatives into their ceremonial origin hypothesis.
In relation to other chapters, this chapter particularly emphasizes the
significance of intersubjectivity (Kataoka, this volume) by situating the
origins of language in the evolutionary-biological framework (Blount,
this volume). The general point that Palmer et al. make is that language
use (or the emergence of language-in-use) presupposes the basic cogni-
tive linguistic mechanisms, including conceptual metaphor, conceptual
metonymy, cultural categorization, spatial orientation, schema and
cultural model, among others, as all the contributions in this volume
amply demonstrate.
Part III (Intersections of Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Anthropology)
collects four chapters at the several intersected areas of cognitive lin-
guistics and linguistic anthropology. The common thread that unites
the four authors is their commitment to the analysis of empirical dis-
course data in social contexts, from cognitively informed perspectives.
First, Kuniyoshi Kataoka (Chapter 8) takes a thoroughly intersub-
jective stance to better understand the domain of space, in his On
Intersubjective Co-construction of Virtual Space through Multimodal
Means: A Case of Japanese Route-finding Discourse. Specifically, he
analyzes an interaction among nine Japanese rock climbers by focusing
on the spatial relations in an accident story, which is collaboratively
recalled by the rock climbers. By making painstakingly elaborate analyses,
his aim is to show a shared mental map or a discursively constructed
Introduction 13
mutual understanding of the accident, which emerges intersubjectively.

In doing so, he critiques the traditional studies of perspective-taking in
the spatial domain, which often underestimate the variability of knowl-
edge and experience among interlocutors. In practice, perspective-taking
is interactionally negotiated, which is strongly influenced by the back-
ground of each contributor, as he argues.
In conceptual terms, Kataoka is inspired by the Husserlian notion of
intersubjectivity (Cicourel, 1973; Duranti, 2010; Sacks, 1992), discussed
also in 1968 by Blount, which has been recently reinvigorated both
in cognitive linguistics (Zlatev, Racine, Sinha, and Itkonen, 2008) and
linguistic anthropology (Danziger and Rumsey, 2013). Kataoka analyti-
cally highlights the properties of the system of interaction, which are
distributed across brains, bodies, and a culturally constituted world
(Hutchins, 1995: 353354, 2006: 376). In other words, he takes seriously
the argument for the distinctness of the properties of the emergent
system from the individual properties, although he does not deny the
existence of the latter.
The point of Kataokas chapter is to argue that we need to holistically
look at gaze, gesture, and posture in order to reveal cognitive processes
in situ. Simultaneously we need to take into account various degrees of
knowledge and experience that each person brings to interaction. In his
formulation, intersubjectivity will only be adequately investigated by
incorporating multiple facets of bodily and environmental affordances,
but it will provide us with a focalized porthole into the workings of the
embodied coordination of distributed cognition (this volume: 209210).
This chapter connects with Sharifian (Chapter 5) in his emphasis
on distributed cognition, and with Occhi (Chapter 6) and Yamaguchi
(Chapter 9) in his analytic focus on indexical or situationally contin-
gent aspects of language use (such as the Japanese deictic verbs that
correspond to come and go and other deictic terms, and pointing
gestures, etc.), as well as on revealing the poetic or repetitive patterns
of discourse. In this volume, Kataoka is most broadly multimodal in
analyzing all the relevant semiotic cues in context, which also repre-
sents the recent trend in linguistic anthropology.
Masataka Yamaguchi (Chapter 9) focuses on individual-level cogni-
tion in his Discovering Shared Understandings in Discourse: Prototypes
and Stereotypes, while taking an intersubjective stance to discourse.
Hutchins (1995: 353) rejection of the cognitive definitions of the con-
cept of culture notwithstanding, Yamaguchi defines it cognitively as
shared understandings, and attempts to uncover the cognitive proper-
ties of an individual in an intersubjective process. Through analysis,
he hypothesizes racial taxonomic structures (x is a kind of y) in the

repetitive or poetic patterns of discourse. The taxonomic structures
are presumptively shared among a group of people (and in his case
New Zealanders), which needs to be empirically investigated, using
cognitive anthropological elicitation techniques and methods. His goal
is to hypothesize cultural models (Pang; Blount, this volume) in the
domain of ethnic and racial categories, based on the poetic structures
(Occhi, this volume).
In the process of analysis, he goes back and forth between the indexi-
cal at the token level and the symbolic at the type-level, by mainly
drawing on linguistic anthropology for the former and cognitive
anthropology for the latter. He also critically compares the notions of
stereotype and prototype, drawing on Taylor (2003[1989]), Geeraerts
(2008), and others in cognitive linguistics. By the comparison, he syn-
thesizes them as cultural concepts in discourse (Silverstein, 2004).
By drawing out the implications, he summarizes commonalities and
differences among linguistic anthropology, cognitive anthropology,
and cognitive linguistics. He proposes that the three paradigms can be
synthesized in an empirical cycle of research, which consists of the for-
mulation of hypotheses, operationalization, falsification, and the gen-
eration of new hypotheses. He concludes by suggesting that Cognitive
Grammar (Langacker, this volume; Taylor, 2002) be incorporated into
discourse analysis.
The next two chapters apply conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff,
1993) to empirical discourse analysis. Chapter 10 is entitled Experiences
as Resources: Metaphor and Life in Late Modernity, in which Lionel
Wee adroitly bridges the gap between the social and the cognitive in
the analysis of a contemporary metaphor. Specifically, he focuses on
the metaphor Experiences as Resources, by which the sharing of the
success stories of an entrepreneur or a celebrity who overcame her post-
partum depression is conceptualized as resources in politico-economic
terms. By this conceptualization, he points to the recent trends of the
study of the commodification of discourse in linguistic anthropology
(Agha, 2011; cf. Tay, this volume) and a turn to small stories in narra-
tive studies (Bamberg, 2006). One of the original aspects of this chapter
is to situate the discourse of sharing in the sociological theory of reflex-
ive modernity (Beck, 1994), which theorizes contingent and uncertain
life styles in late modernity (Giddens, 1991). His synthesis may be a
precursor in the study of language, culture, and cognition, in which the
issue of language and globalization (Coupland, 2010) has been under-
studied, presumably due to the relative lack of interest in social theory
Introduction 15
among cognitive scientists (Keesing, 1987). From this perspective, Wee

responds to the critique of asocial cognitive linguistics by bringing
society to cognitive linguistic research.
In methodological terms, the data in Chapter 10 are all taken from
the Internet, which perhaps epitomizes the contemporary world char-
acterized as late modernity. Wee shares this data collection technique
with Pang (Chapter 4) and Tay (Chapter 11) in this volume. In general,
systematic uses of the Internet for data collection can enhance research
outcomes, and search engines represented by Google offer a conveni-
ent and reasonably reliable corpus, which can be applied in linguistic
anthropology (see Hill, 2005b), in combination with the traditional
fieldwork methods.
Dennis Tay (Chapter 11) is also concerned with metaphors in context
(Wee, this volume), and specifically with the contextual modulation of
metaphoric meanings, in his An Analysis of Metaphoric Hedging in
Psychotherapeutic Talk. While much has been written about how the
cognitive import of metaphors help patients to understand and change
their views on the issues for which they seek help, Tay draws attention
to the pragmatic tension between wanting to use metaphor, and the
need in professional counselling to maintain a semblance of objective
truth. He illustrates how this tension is negotiated with the use of
hedging expressions (Lakoff, 1975), such as in a way or sort of, in the
data taken from psychotherapeutic sessions. Particularly noteworthy is
his observation that the inferential potential of metaphors can be ben-
eficially exploited for psychotherapeutic purposes. His analytic point
is that metaphors are non-factual approximations of the patients
circumstances, which can facilitate further exploration of alternative
metaphoric representations in psychotherapy. By recognizing the ideo-
logical, context-creating, or constitutive aspects of metaphors in use
(Occhi; Wee, this volume), Tay suggests the complementarity and par-
tial convergence of cognitive linguistics and linguistic anthropology in
the analysis of psychotherapeutic discourse. In sum, Part III illustrates
multiple methods for integrating language, culture, and cognition
through empirical analyses of discourse, from social, cultural and cogni-
tive perspectives.
As a summary of this collection, Benjamin Blount (Chapter 12), in
his Situating Cultural Models in History and Cognition, provides an
overview of the history of the study of language, culture, and cognition,
while noting the current theoretical developments and the future direc-
tions, from social, cultural, linguistic, and neuro-biological perspectives.
Although he anchors his theoretical discussion in the framework of
cultural model (or cultural cognitive model) in cognitive anthropology,

the scope of his chapter is far-reaching and covers the issues discussed
in the other chapters of this volume. He proposes a new cognitive
paradigm that synthesizes cognitive linguistics (Langacker; Geeraerts;
Pang; Sharifian; Wee, Tay, this volume), interactional approaches to
discourse and conversation (Kataoka; Yamaguchi; Tay, this volume), and
cultural models theory (Pang; Occhi; Yamaguchi, this volume), within a
biological-evolutionary framework (cf. Palmer et al., this volume). From
this perspective, he argues that a cultural cognitive model is a type of
cognitive model, environmentally adaptive, and subject to evolutionary
frameworks.
In his theoretical discussion of cultural models, Blount argues against
a distributed-cognition model (Kronenfeld, 2008), which concep-
tualizes cultural models as psychologically shallow. In contrast, he
proposes an enriched lexicon model, which theorizes cultural models
as deeply internalized (cf. Sperber, 2006), by synthesizing cogni-
tive anthropology (Strauss and Quinn, 1997), cognitive linguistics
(Taylor, 2012), interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz, 2006), and
neuro-biological studies. The enriched lexicon model also resonates
with Langackers (Chapter 2) view of lexical items as points of access to
extensive bodies of knowledge that are not specifically or even primarily
linguistic (this volume: 28).
In empirical terms, his case study argues for the cognitive depth of
cultural models, by showing the historical endurance of the cultural
models of soul. Blount illustrates the continuity of the humoral theory
as a cultural model (Geeraerts, this volume) within the historical-cultural
cognitive models of the cosmos and the soul that persisted from the
Greek period until the 18th century (Zimmer, 2004). Interestingly, the
historical reconstruction of the cultural models shows that the scien-
tific versus the humanistic is a false dichotomy by deconstructing
erroneous stereotypes about cognitive science as non-humanistic.
In the end, Blount notes the controversial issue of the relation-
ship between the mind (or the brain) and the external environment
in cognitive processes. The polar positions are noted: one argues
that cognition is exclusively internal and the environment is irrel-
evant. The other puts priority on the external in cognitive processes
(cf. Hutchins, 1995). In this volume, Kataoka (Chapter 8) and Yamaguchi
(Chapter 9) manifest the tension between a distributed-cognition per-
spective and an individual-cognition perspective. As Ross and Medin
(2011) note, scholars working in the situated cognition paradigm
Introduction 17
(e.g., Hutchins, 1995, 2006) explicitly deny that cognition is a property

of individuals (Ross and Medin, 2011: 359). They thus look at activi-
ties by only recognizing cognition at the intersubjective level. In light
of the debate between the internalism and the externalism, Blount
concludes by commenting that anthropologists have been rejecting
psychological-cognitive explanations as reductionist for more than a
century, despite ample evidence for supporting psychological explana-
tions in cognitive science.
To sum up, the eleven papers we collected in this volume, all of
which are written from cognitive perspectives, will be able to inform
the theory and practice of linguistic anthropology in meaningful ways.
By way of conclusion, we thus argue for more cognitively informed
research, while recognizing the current dominant trend, which is
counter-posed to our attempted renewal of the relation between cogni-
tive linguistics and linguistic anthropology. As noted, the general point
is provided by Blount (Chapter 12) as the debate over the internal ver-
sus the external in cognitive science, as well as the protest against psy-
chological explanations as reductionism in anthropology and social
sciences, which have been particularly influenced by phenomenological
perspectives (see Blount, 1968; Cicourel, 1973 for earlier explications).
We briefly discuss this problem of regarding cognitive theorization
as reductionism in linguistic anthropology by describing the current
trend. It is not difficult to observe the dominant anti-cognitive ethos in
linguistic anthropology. For example, as Stephen C. Levinson (2006b)
points out, there is a widely held misconception among some lin-
guistic anthropologists, and discourse and conversation analysts, who
mistakenly think that: There are serious differences between theories
of discourse that turn on the role of cognition in the theory (2006b:
85). In a similar vein, Teun A. van Dijk comments, there is another,
even more fundamental form of exclusion, [which is] the study of cogni-
tion. There is a widespread misunderstanding that identifies cognition
with an individual and therefore nonsocial approach to language and
discourse (2003: 340, italics added). His comments are made on the cur-
rent trend in linguistic anthropology (Duranti, 2003) and related areas
in discourse studies (see van Dijk, 2014, for a synthetic sociocognitive
approach).4
It remains to be seen that the assumption of individual-level cogni-
tion in cognitive linguistics can be reconciled with the anti-cognitive
view held by linguistic anthropologists. The latter are often agnostic
or indifferent to cognition, and generally not interested in cognitive
definitions of culture and in the notion of internalization. The

relatively new generation of linguistic anthropologists have been on
postmodern holiday since the 1980s and have not come back to cogni-
tion yet (Levinson, 2012), which also accelerates anti-cognitivism and
anti-scientism.
In light of the dominant trend in linguistic anthropology, we propose
that more conscious, sustained, and systematic efforts are required in
order to integrate language, culture and cognition in the 21st century.
Our sincere hope is that this volume offers a new point of departure
and directions for future endeavors toward that goal, by indicating that
a point does exist at the intersection of cognitive linguistics and linguis-
tic anthropology, a point made clear by Keesing (1992), among others,
more than two decades ago.
Notes
1. There are notable exceptions among linguistic anthropologists (e.g., William
F. Hanks, James M. Wilce, Richard Parmentier, and Paul Kockelman). For
example, Hanks (1996) draws on the cognitive notions of frame and
schema in order to conceptualize the background knowledge that Maya
participants assume, in his studies of the Maya deictic system. However,
Wilce (2009: 70) critiques the cognitive linguistic approach to emotion,
which largely overlooks the complex interactions of iconicity and indexi-
cality in emergent, entextualized discourse, although there is nothing
inherent in those phenomena that would preclude cognitive analyses.
His critique is, nonetheless, valuable and thus Kataoka (Chapter 8) and
Yamaguchi (Chapter 9) carefully consider iconic and indexical aspects of
language in this volume. Also Tay (Chapter 11) takes a phenomenological
or interactional approach to conceptual metaphor by examining the emer-
gent aspects of discourse.
2. The onomasiological perspective asks, for any given entity or state of affairs,
what range of linguistic expressions may be used to denote it while the
semasiological perspective is the converse (Taylor, 2003: 54). In Geeraerts
chapter, the increasing need for words to refer to particular psychological
phenomena (i.e. emotions) in the particular historical periods is at issue, so
that onomasiological salience is at the center of attention.
3. 100K ya means 100,000 years ago.
4. One of the important origins of anti-cognitivism in linguistic anthropol-
ogy goes back to a critique of speech act theory (Searle, 1969) by Michelle
Rosaldo (1982). She argues that John Searle ignores the external environment
by exclusively focusing on the speakers intentions. Her point has been sup-
ported by linguistic anthropologists, and perhaps most notably developed
by Duranti, who critiques the Western view of language as the personalist
language ideology (Duranti, 1993). In short, linguistic anthropology devel-
oped an anti-intentionalist approach to meaning, which contributed to
anti-cognitivism by erasing the speaker as an individual from the picture.
Introduction 19
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Part I
Cognitive Linguistic Approaches
to Language and Culture
2
Culture and Cognition, Lexicon
and Grammar
Ronald W. Langacker
2.1 Introduction
Theres a simple story, and then theres the inconvenient truth. The
simple story starts by positing a clear distinction between lexicon and
grammar. In contrast to lexicon, grammar has no intrinsic meaning,
being purely a matter of form. Whereas lexicon is idiosyncratic, gram-
mar is basically regular. And while lexicon is essentially just a list of
separate items, connected by nothing more than unsystematic associa-
tions, grammar presents us with complex structures described by gen-
eral rules. These latter properties suggest that grammar is theoretically
more interesting than lexicon and thus of greater scientific importance.
The story continues with the notion that grammar is mostly univer-
sal. Now a system that is purely formal in nature but is nonetheless
universal can hardly be due to learningit must be largely innate. And
if its transmission is genetic rather than social, grammar represents
a cognitive system affected by culture only in fairly minor ways. On
the other hand, the language-specific nature of lexicon implies that it
must be learned. And since this learning occurs through interaction in
a sociocultural context, cultural factors are quite important if not pre-
dominant. A moral of this story, consequently, is that grammar pairs
with cognition, and lexicon with culture.
Cognitive Grammar (CG) rejects this simple story (which, of course,
is just a straw manit is hard to imagine anyone actually subscribing
to such a view). Central notions include the embodied nature of cog-
nition as well as the usage-based nature of linguistic structure. Since
bodily experience is largely the same for everyone, it provides a basis
for universal tendencies. On the other hand, the notion that structure
is learned through usage, and thus via cultural transmission, provides a
27
basis for linguistic diversity. Both lexicon and grammar reflect the inter-
play of these factors. They form a continuum of meaningful structures,
and while meaning is identified as conceptualization, cognition at all
levels is both embodied and culturally embedded.
2.2 Lexical meaning
2.2.1 Conceptual content

The CG view of lexical meaning fully acknowledges its cultural basis.
A central claim is that a lexemes meaning is based on a set of cogni-
tive domains, which it invokes in a flexible and open-ended manner
(Langacker 1987a: ch. 4). Roughly comparable to a frame (Fillmore
1982) or an idealized cognitive model (Lakoff 1987), a domain is
a conception of any kind or any degree of complexity, ranging from
the simplest notions (e.g. the concept of a line) to elaborate systems
of knowledge (e.g. everything one knows about the Roman Catholic
Church). The essential point is that a domain of any size has the poten-
tial to be invoked as an initial basis for characterizing lexical meanings.
Consider the expression College of Cardinals, for example. Attempting to
describe its meaning directly in terms of minimal concepts or semantic
primitives (whatever these might be) would clearly be misguided. Its
import can hardly be characterized without invoking a fairly elaborate
conception of how the Catholic Church is organized and the role of the
College within it (notably its function of electing the pope from among
its members). So despite its complexity, this conceptiona cognitive
domainis presupposed as a basis for semantic description.
The domains which figure in a lexemes meaning cannot easily be
counted or enumerated. Rather than being distinct and separate, they are
related through overlap, inclusion, or combination into more complex
conceptual structures. Moreover, there is no evident basis for imposing
a definite boundary between linguistic and extralinguistic concep-
tions (Haiman 1980; cf. Wierzbicka 1995). Thus lexical items are not
containersin spite of the prevalent metaphor (Reddy 1979)and their
meanings do not reside in limited sets of semantic features. On the CG
account, they are seen instead as points of access to extensive bodies of
knowledge that are not specifically or even primarily linguistic. They consist
in conventional yet highly flexible patterns of evoking and exploiting net-
works of conceptions that in large measure are established independently.
To take just one example, the lexeme spoon recruits a wide array of
general knowledge concerning this type of entity. Some of this relates to
physical properties: the typical shape of a spoon; the range of standard
sizes; the materials they are made of, etc. Other conceptions pertain to
Culture and Cognition, Lexicon and Grammar 29
function, in particular the use of a spoon for eating, serving, stirring, and
measuring. Associated with these functions is the knowledge of different
types of spoons (teaspoon, tablespoon, serving spoon) as well the exist-
ence of standard measures based on them. Moreover, the conception
of a given function, say eating, incorporates many other conceptions
involving physical and human interaction: how a spoon is held, its
penetration of soft substances, its role as a transient container, raising a
spoon to the mouth, and so forth. These in turn incorporate more fun-
damental notions (e.g. person, hand, mouth, object, container, gravity).
Additionally, numerous other specifications are capable of being evoked
by spoon in context-dependent fashion: the association with knives and
forks; their expected arrangement on a table; how spoons are stored; the
expectation that they will be washed after use; how much they cost; and
so on indefinitely.
Collectively these varied conceptionseach a cognitive domain
serve to characterize the type of entity the lexeme designates. This is
not to say that they are all equal in status. Clearly they differ in degree
of centrality, i.e. the likelihood of being activated on a given occasion
of the lexemes use. To be sure, contextual factors greatly influence
the likelihood of their activation as well as its degree (hence their sali-
ence within the resulting conception). Nevertheless, the tendencies
established through usage are part of a lexemes conventional semantic
value. Its meaning consists not only in the range of associated knowl-
edge, but also in how these specifications tend to be accessed.
Referring to these specifications as cognitive domains in no way
implies that they are exclusively cognitive. It should be evident that the
vast majority of these domains are culturally influenced if not wholly
cultural in nature. In a society that did not use eating utensils, there
would be no lexeme for spoon and most of the domains just cited
would be lacking. At the same time, the cultural nature of such domains
does not in any way diminish their cognitive status. Though I would
not deny that some knowledge is distributed, or represented by mate-
rial anchors, for the most part we are dealing here with common knowl-
edge that is apprehended by individuals, who evoke it in the process of
using linguistic forms. A general question thus emerges concerning the
relative balance of cognitive and cultural factors in lexical meaning, or
whether these can even be distinguished in the first place.
2.2.2 Embodiment and culture

Relevant here are two basic notions of cognitive linguistics: embodi-
ment and the usage-based account of language structure. The latter
maintains that all linguistic units are abstracted from usage events
by the reinforcement of recurring commonalities (Langacker 2000).

A usage event is an actual instance of language use, in the full detail of
its contextual understanding. Thus all units are learned through interac-
tion in a physical, social, cultural, and discourse context. In this respect,
all aspects of language structure have a cultural basis. They are not how-
ever learned by disembodied minds. Learning takes place in the brain,
consisting in neural adjustments which have an effect on subsequent
processing activity. The brain is an integral part of the body, which
in turn exists in a world with which it interacts at many levels. Brain,
body, and world all have specific structural properties that shape and
constrain their interaction and thus the nature of human experience.
This is the notion of embodiment.
Embodiment is often presented as encompassing social factors: the
properties of certain categories are a consequence of the nature of human
biological capacities and of the experience of functioning in a physical
and social environment (Lakoff 1987: 12). In application, however, the
notion is mostly limited to the physical aspects of experience. It is usu-
ally discussed in relation to image schemas, schematic structures that
are constantly operating in our perception, bodily movement through
space, and physical manipulation of objects (Johnson 1987: 23). These
are simple analog structures (e.g. source-path-goal, center-periphery,
link, containment, compulsion, restraint, balance) which either inhere
in or emerge from perceptual and motor experience. They are seen as
fundamental units of conceptual structure (Mandler 2004).
Although something along these lines must certainly be correct, there
is no consensus about the specific nature and role of image schemas
(Hampe 2005). This notion is not per se a construct of CG, so I do not
adopt any particular formulation. Rather, I presume that different kinds
of conceptions are basic in different ways, all essential to an overall
account. For example, I posit a small set of cognitive domains that are
basic in the sense of being irreducible, i.e. they cannot be character-
ized in terms of anything more fundamental. These basic domains
include time, space, color space (the range of colors we can perceive),
and analogous spaces corresponding to the other senses. They are not
themselves concepts, but realms of potential experience within which
conceptions can emerge. Basic in another sense are minimal concepts
in particular domains, e.g. the notion of a line, a focal color, or temporal
duration. Also fundamental are maximally schematic notions inde-
pendent of particular domains: point vs. extension, change, contact,
multiplicity, etc. These are closely related to basic cognitive abilities,
such as grouping, comparison, and mental scanning. Quite different
are conceptual archetypes, by which I mean certain complex notions,

intermediate in their level of abstraction, that pertain to fundamental
aspects of moment-to-moment experience: a physical object, a sub-
stance, an object moving through space, a living creature, a person,
assuming or maintaining a posture, a container and its content, an
agent acting on a patient, a face-to-face social interaction, etc. Despite
their analytic complexity, we readily grasp these concepts as gestalts.
These various factors are basically the same for all people. Regardless
of language or culture, we are born with very similar bodies and largely
identical perceptual apparatus. We all have experience with physical
objects, with objects moving along paths, with entities being linked to
one another, and so on. We are all subject to the pull of gravity, must
learn to maintain our balance, and engage both actively and passively
in force-dynamic interactions. Beyond this, we share an inborn basis
for social interaction, manifested in the capacity to follow someones
gaze, to read intentions, and so on (Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner
1993). Collectively, these factors provide a universal basis for cognitive
development. And to the extent that it is based on them, we can say
that cognition is embodied.
At this juncture, two general statements appear to be warranted.
First, since the factors just cited provide an initial and continuing basis
for cognitive development, we can say that all cognition is embodied.
And second, since language is learned through sociocultural interac-
tion, we can say that all aspects of language structure have a cultural
basis. In and of themselves, however, these global statements are not
very informative in regard to lexical meaning. They seem, in fact, to
be pulling in opposite directions, respectively highlighting physically
grounded universality vs. culture-specific knowledge. Although there is
indeed a certain tension between the two perspectives, there is no real
opposition (if only because embodiment includes the basis for socio-
cultural interaction, while culture includes both material artifacts and
physical activities). What we need, then, is a coherent view of lexical
meaning that accommodates both embodied cognition and the pre-
dominant role of cultural knowledge.
We can start by rejecting any simple partitioning of lexical items
into those based on embodiment and those reflecting culture. It is
not just that there is no strict dichotomythere may not even be any
clear examples of either sort. If we look for lexical meanings based
solely on embodiment, perhaps the most obvious candidates would
be simple notions like in and on. These would seem to be based
on fundamental aspects of bodily experience involving both spatial
primitives (e.g. boundary, surface, verticality) and object manipula-

tion (containment and support). One might expect such notions to
be expressed in every language by semantically equivalent lexemes
acquired quite early, with cultural influence being limited to supply-
ing the appropriate labels. However, the empirical facts do not fulfill
this expectation. What investigators have found instead is that lexical
meanings are non-universal even in this basic area, that acquisition is
guided by language-specific conceptions from the earliest stage, and
that even a seemingly primitive notion like containment is shaped by
culture (Choi, McDonough, Bowerman, and Mandler 1999; Sinha and
Jensen de Lpez 2000).
Conversely, if we look for lexical meanings based solely on culture, we
will find them only by ignoring how the cultural notions invoked are
supported by embodied cognition. Recall the previous listing of cogni-
tive domains evoked by spoon. Some, like shape and size, are closely
tied to perception. Others, like the notion of grasping a spoon to lift
food and put it in the mouth, are based on physical interaction with
the human body. I suggested that some domains might be considered
wholly cultural in nature, e.g. the association with knives and forks
and their expected arrangement on a table. But even these invoke and
incorporate embodied conceptions. Inherent in the notion of placing
a spoon on a table, for example, is the background conception of the
table providing support to keep it from falling. It is only with respect
to the highest level of organization, where more basic conceptions
are brought together in a particular configuration, that such domains
might be thought of as exclusively cultural.
To be sure, a spoon is a physical object. What about terms for abstract
entities, e.g. College of Cardinals? Here, too, embodied conceptions have
an important constitutive role. For one thing, cardinals are people, and
when they select the pope they physically assemble inside a container
(the Sistine Chapel). Even the Colleges conception as a cultural institu-
tion is based on embodied cognition by virtue of being metaphorically
constructed (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980,
1999). Institutionally, the College is seen as a part within a larger whole
(the Catholic Church). As a group, it is construed metaphorically as a
container for its members. Selecting a member to be pope consists meta-
phorically in removing an item from the container and elevating it to a
higher position (the power is up metaphor). And so on.
Any attempt to partition lexical meaning along the lines of embodi-
ment vs. cultural influence would therefore be misguided. Their rela-
tionship is better thought of as a dialectic engagement manifested at
successively higher levels of conceptual organization. We can further

view it metaphorically in terms of embodied cognition providing raw
materials that are shaped by culture into specific forms. At all levels
cognition is both embodied and cuturally embedded. Starting at the
lowest level, with notions that are basic in various ways, embodi-
ment creates the potential for concepts to emerge. How this potential
is exploitedthe array of concepts that actually do emergeis strongly
influenced by sociocultural interaction. On the basis of further physical
experience, as well as cognitive processes such as metaphor and con-
ceptual integration (Fauconnier and Turner 2002), the conceptions then
available (both basic and derived) give rise to further conceptions, thus
representing a higher level of organization. These too are prompted and
shaped by the sociocultural context. This cycle continues throughout
life, creating structures at indefinitely many levels, their connection
with bodily experience becoming more and more indirect.
Starting from common origins, an infinite variety of higher-level con-
ceptions are capable of developing in this fashion. They are both the
product of cultural learning and constitutive of the cultural knowledge
that has to be acquired. And while much of this knowledge would never
develop without language, it is no less true that language recruits it as
the basis for lexical meanings. Conceptions at any level can function as
cognitive domains for this purpose. They range from notions that are
simple and directly experienced, e.g. a color sensation, to something as
complex and abstract as the organization of the Catholic Church.
Thus every lexical meaning reflects both embodiment and cultural
embedding. The proportions vary, and to some extent we can elucidate
the specific contributions made by each. This does not imply that we
can separate them, dividing a lexemes meaning into an embodied part
and a cultural part. Owing to their dialectic relationship, these factors
must instead be seen as mutually dependent, hence indissociable. In this
respect, their relation resembles the one between a letter of the alphabet
and its representation in a variety of different fonts. Although these
graphic representations may differ considerably in their fine-grained
detail, they can all be recognized as manifestations of the same sche-
matic configuration. In principle we can describe this configuration,
thereby defining the letters essence. We can also describe how each
font-specific letter elaborates this schematic characterization. But these
two components cannot be dissociatedneither stands alone. Since
the defining configuration is quite schematic, it cannot be manifested
independently; any actual graphic representation is more specific. Nor
can a graphic representation occur without the schema. Starting from
a particular graphic symbol, there is no way to segment out just those

facets which are font-specific and look at them independently. Because
they consist in elaborations of the schema, they have no independent
existence. The schematic configuration is immanent in (i.e. lies within)
the different font-specific symbols, which require its support for their
own manifestation.
I am not suggesting that embodied experience is always schematic
vis--vis cultural knowledge. The font analogy is only meant to illustrate
their mutual dependence: embodiment creates the potential for culture,
which constitutes a particular realization of that potential. Granted
their indissociability, we can still try to determine what each contrib-
utes to lexical meaning. For this purpose I need to introduce another
basic opposition, namely the distinction drawn in CG between concep-
tual content and the construal imposed on that content. Content and
construal are also indissociable. The two distinctions are not the same,
however, but are basically orthogonal. Although the mixture may be
different, embodiment and culture are mutually dependent factors not
only in contentour main concern thus farbut in construal as well.
2.2.3 Construal
As an inherent aspect of their meaning, linguistic units and expressions
incorporate particular ways of construing the conceptual content they
evoke. We can identify content with cognitive domains, so it has a
strong cultural component. We have seen, though, that domains cover
the full spectrum from embodiment to cultural knowledge, and that
even the most abstract and manifestly cultural domains are products
of embodied cognition. Construal is defined as our ability to conceive
and portray the same situation in alternate ways. Being closely tied to
basic cognitive abilities, construal phenomena are presumably universal
(Langacker 1993a). However the specific details of their linguistic appli-
cation are language-specific, hence culturally determined. It should
be quite evident that content and construal are indissociable: without
content there is nothing for construal to apply to, and content cannot
be invoked without construing it in some fashion.
I will consider just a few construal phenomena, which fall under
three broad rubrics: granularity, focusing, and perspective. These
are not limited to language, but can all be seen as general aspects of
embodied cognition. While they are most apparent in visual perception,
analogous phenomena are evident at the conceptual level, especially
in language. To reflect the extensive parallelism of perception and
conceptionwhatever might be its causeI use the term viewing for
both (Langacker 1995). For the same reason, Talmy (1996) speaks of
ception.
The main perceptual manifestation of granularity is visual acuity,
which correlates with distance: in a close-up view, we perceive an object
in fine-grained detail; but as we move away from it, the details are lost
and we can only make out coarse-grained features. The obvious concep-
tual analog is a basic dimension of lexical meaning, namely specificity:
the degree of precision and detail at which a situation is characterized.
We observe it in relations of hyponymy, like red > crimson, hit > punch,
or emotion > anguish. These often form lexical hierarchies such as thing
> plant > flower > rose > tea rose > crimson glory, where each expression
is schematic vis--vis the more specific one that follows. Through such
options we can describe situations at a level of specificity befitting our
objectives and the communicative circumstances.
All languages have a multitude of lexemes related in this fashion.
Obviously, though, the details are language- and culture-specific,
as each lexeme represents a conception of sufficient utility to have
been established as conventional in the relevant speech community.
Also, languages reflect cultural concerns in the depth and density of
their lexical coding. This is well known in the case of biological tax-
onomies, where languages vary in the prevalence of lower-level terms
like tea rose and crimson glory (in English these are mostly confined
to particular social groups). Depending on culture, they vary in the
number of words they have for different kinds of snow conditions,
camels, soft drinks, or ritual dances. Reflecting a less evident cultural
preoccupation is the great profusion in English of terms pertaining to
propositional judgment. The following predicates, for example, can
all be used to indicate the provisional acceptance of a proposition,
short of a final decision to accept it as valid: believe, think, suspect,
feel, figure, suppose, imagine, reckon, expect (e.g. I believe the operation
will be successful).
A second category of construal phenomena instantiate our general
capacity for directing and focusing attention. In visual perception, this
happens at several levels of organization. By facing in a certain direc-
tion, we delimit a possible field of view. Within that, we direct atten-
tion to a certain limited area (as in looking at a stage), from which we
select some element as the focus of attention (like watching a particular
actor on the stage). A number of levels of focusing figure in linguistic
meaning as well. And since a focused element is thereby rendered sali-
ent, focusing at successive levels translates into kinds and degrees of
conceptual prominence.
One level of focusing consists in the selection and relative acces-

sibility of the cognitive domains evoked as a lexemes conceptual
content. Recall that the domains associated with a given lexeme vary
in their degree of centrality, i.e. their likelihood and/or level of activa-
tion. Lexical items selecting the same domains may nonetheless dif-
fer semantically in terms of how they access them. For instance, one
domain evoked by both College of Cardinals and pope is the cultural
knowledge that the pope is elected by the College. While this concep-
tion thus figures in the meanings of both expressions, it does not have
the same status within them. This specification is quite central to the
semantic value of College of Cardinals, at least for typical speakers of
English, who know little about the College beyond its role in electing
the pope. On the other hand, it is less prominent in the meaning of
pope, since so much more about the pope is generally known.
Within each domain evoked by a lexical item, a certain portion (which
may be the whole) is put onstage as the general locus of attention. This
is referred to in CG as the expressions immediate scope. And within the
immediate scope, a lexeme singles out a particular element as the specific
focus of attention. Called the profile, this is the entity the expression
designates (its conceptual referent). Thus a central domain for terms like
eye, nose, and mouth is a conception of the body organized as a whole-part
hierarchy. As their immediate scope, these terms direct attention to the
face in particular, within which they profile different subparts. These in
turn function as immediate scope for other expressions, e.g. pupil, iris,
and cornea designate parts of the eye. Expressions that profile relation-
ships (as opposed to things, abstractly defined) exhibit yet another level
of focusing. One relational participant, called the trajector, is singled
out for primary focal prominence. Often a secondary degree of focal
prominence is conferred on another participant, called the landmark.
The verbs like and please, for example, differ mainly in this respect: like
confers primary and secondary focal prominence on the experiencer and
the stimulus, respectively, while please does the opposite.
I will briefly mention just two aspects of perspective. In visual per-
ception, we always view a scene from a particular vantage point while
facing in a certain direction. We also engage in visual scanning, whether
by turning our head or simply by shifting our gaze. Both perceptual
phenomena have conceptual analogs. For instance, tomorrow and yester-
day presuppose a temporal vantage point and profile the day adjacent
to the one containing it; the difference resides in orientation (look-
ing forward vs. backward in time). One analog of visual scanning is
the well-known phenomenon called fictive motion (Langacker 2005a;
Matlock 2004; Matsumoto 1996; Talmy 1996), e.g. An ugly scar runs
from his ear to the corner of his mouth. Despite the verb run and the path
prepositions from and to, the scene described is staticnothing actually
moves. The dynamicity and directionality conveyed by these lexemes
are purely conceptual, residing in how the scene is mentally accessed
by the conceptualizer.
In all its dimensions, construal is an essential and inherent compo-
nent of lexical meaning. Conceptual content cannot be apprehended in
a wholly neutral fashionit is always viewed at some level of specificity,
from a certain perspective, with particular elements made prominent,
etc. Even for lexemes whose content consists predominantly in cultural
knowledge, these factors are conventionally established as part of their
linguistic meaning. Construal must therefore be taken into account
when assessing the role of embodiment vs. culture in lexical semantics.
And since basic construal phenomena are manifestations of embodied
cognition, its role looms even larger. My main point, however, is that
the two determinants of lexical meaning cannot be neatly separated,
but are indissociable and mutually dependent. If the basic construal
phenomena are universal, the specific details of their lexical application
are language-specific and culturally transmitted.
2.3 Grammatical meaning
From the CG perspective, lexicon and grammar form a continuum of

meaningful structures, so beyond a certain point they cannot be studied
in isolation from one another. For grammar as well we can ask about the
respective roles of culture and embodied cognition. More generally, we
can ask how lexical semantics compares to the semantics of grammar.
It is claimed that lexicon and grammar consist in networks of
constructions, characterized in CG as assemblies of symbolic struc-
tures (Goldberg 1995; Langacker 2000, 2005b, 2005c). And because a
symbolic structure is simply the pairing of a semantic structure and
a phonological structure, all grammatical elements are meaningful.
Constructions range along the entire spectrum from general patterns
to particular expressions. Lexicon is defined in CG as the set of fixed
expressions in a language (i.e. those which are both psychologically
entrenched and conventional in a speech community). Observe that
most lexical items in most languages are symbolically complexto
some degree they are analyzable into component symbolic elements.
Monomorphemic lexemes are seen as degenerate symbolic assemblies,
consisting of just a single symbolic structure.
The gradient leading from general patterns to particular expressions is

primarily a matter of specificity. Compared to typical lexical items, the
structures customarily regarded as grammatical are always quite sche-
matic semantically and often phonologically as well. However, gram-
mar comprises not only general patterns, characterized at a high level
of schematicity, but also more limited regularities ranging all the way
down to patterns involving particular lexical items. Conversely, lexical
items are learned by abstraction from their use in particular grammati-
cal constructions, and to some extent their conventional occurrence
in these constructions is part of their overall characterization. In this
respect lexicon and grammar are indissociablejust like content and
construal, or cultural knowledge and embodied cognition.
Of course, if we focus on opposite ends of the spectrum, we observe
a fairly sharp distinction. A typical lexical item has a specific phono-
logical shape as well as detailed semantic content with a substantial
cultural component. By contrast, a high-level grammatical construc-
tion is maximally schematic both phonologically and semantically.
Grammatical meaning consists primarily in the construal imposed on
lexical content, so cultural knowledge would seem to have little role.
But naturally, a dichotomy obtained by ignoring intermediate cases is a
false one. Lexical items run the full gamut in terms of semantic specific-
ity, and in some cases their meanings are more schematic than those
of many grammatical elements. The word thing, for example, is highly
schematic in expressions like thats a good thing, one thing to consider, or
another thing which often happens. By the same token, grammatical ele-
ments range widely in their level of schematicity, some being at least as
specific as many lexemes (e.g. the deontic modal can is comparable to
be able to or know how to). This overlap in specificity is hardly surprising
given that grammatical markers evolve from lexical sources.
The absence of a definite boundary between lexicon and grammar is
further indicated by intermediate categories that are commonly treated
both ways. An example is the set of basic locative expressions in a lan-
guage, such as English prepositions. On the one hand, these are clearly
meaningful and have specific conceptual content that is sometimes
fairly substantial. And while they are limited in number (Jackendoff
and Landau 1991)depending on what is countedthey are more
numerous than the class of lexical adjectives in some languages (Dixon
1977). On the other hand, core members are regarded by Talmy
(1988a) as closed-class forms because the set is not readily augmented,
and their meanings have the topological nature and structuring
function characteristic of grammatical elements. Based on decades
of cross-linguistic investigation, his description of core spatial terms

(Talmy 2005) fits quite well with the view presented here. He proposes
that the meanings of such terms are drawn from a restricted inventory
of basic spatial distinctions: universally available conceptual compo-
nents of the sort attributable to embodied cognition. From this univer-
sal inventory, each language constructs a set of basic spatial schemas
constituting the pre-packaged meanings of the core spatial terms. The
potential created by embodiment is thus exploited in a manner that is
language-specific, hence culturally transmitted.
So as one moves from the lexical end of the continuum toward the
grammatical end, the elements encountered become progressively more
schematic in terms of content, with the consequence that the role of
construal is more predominant. As the balance gradually shifts from
content to construal, there is less scope for cultural variation, hence the
contribution of embodied cognition becomes more evident. I would
emphasize, however, that both factors come into play at all points along
the spectrum. The importance of embodiment for lexical meaning has
already been discussed. Likewise, grammar is by no means devoid of cul-
tural content. And despite its arguably greater measure of universality,
grammar varies considerably from language to language and is therefore
both shaped and learned through sociocultural interaction.
Lets take a closer look at grammar, starting at the endpoint of the
spectrum. Representing the extreme are grammatical elements whose
conceptual import resides exclusively in construal. Being maximally
schematic in terms of content, they are not subject to cultural influence.
They derive instead from basic cognitive abilities, an aspect of embodied
cognition, and are therefore universal. Rightly or wrongly, it is claimed
in CG that certain fundamental grammatical notions are characterized
in this manner, prime examples being the noun and verb categories
(Langacker 1987b, 2005c). A noun profiles a thing, defined abstractly
as any product of conceptual grouping and reification (whereby a group
is treated as a unitary entity in some higher-level conception). A verb
profiles a process, defined abstractly as a relationship mentally scanned
in its evolution through time. Both characterizations are independent
of any specific conceptual content. Rather, their semantic value is based
on construal (in particular profiling, a kind of focusing) and basic cogni-
tive abilities (grouping, reification, mental scanning).
Maximally schematic characterizations of this sort lie at the opposite
extreme from the richly detailed conceptual content of culturally sig-
nificant lexical items (e.g. pope). While the scale is presumably continu-
ous, for sake of discussion I will single out two intermediate positions.
At the first of these vaguely defined levels are grammatical elements

based on conceptual archetypes, e.g. the conception of a physical
object, a substance, an object moving through space, or an agent act-
ing on a patient. In contrast to thing or process (characterized solely in
terms of cognitive abilities), these experientially grounded notions have
substantial conceptual content. At the same time, they are considerably
more schematic than typical lexemes (like table, mud, walk, or kill). Their
grammatical significance is due to their tendency to be invoked as the
prototypical values of categories and constructions. Physical objects, for
instance, are prototypical for both count nouns and the class of nouns
overall, and an agent-patient interaction for transitive clauses.
It is reasonable to suppose that conceptions like these are universal.
Can we then conclude that their linguistic correlates are immune to
culture-specific variation? Is it the case, for example, that every lan-
guage distinguishes between count nouns and mass nouns, with the
same universal notions of physical object vs. substance as their respec-
tive category prototypes? The matter is less straightforward than one
might think. Resolving it will require both a clarification of issues and
a broader empirical basis. Here I can only frame the problem and offer
some initial speculations.
Suppose first that these archetypes are indeed universal and play a
role in every language. If so, their linguistic correlates may differ in sta-
tus from one language to the next, and also in the form of their mani-
festation. For example, we can easily imagine a language with a count/
mass distinction that is conceptually identical to the one in English
but much less importantinstead of the two noun classes showing a
whole series of contrasting grammatical behaviors (e.g. occurring with
different determiners and quantifiers), they might have just a couple.
Or beyond the number of distinguishing properties, languages might
show a more radical difference in how the opposition is manifested.
Presenting an alternative means of implementing the opposition are
languages with numeral classifiers, as discussed by Lucy (2004) for
Yucatec Maya (a language of Mexico). English implements the count/
mass distinction at the lexical level: a typical count noun like table desig-
nates a single, bounded object with a characteristic shape, while a mass
noun like mud designates a shapeless substance with indefinite expanse
(plurals behaving like mass nouns in many respects). By contrast, all
nouns in Yucatec are semantically unspecified as to quantificational
unitalmost as if they referred to unformed substances (Lucy 2004: 8).
Whereas English candle profiles a single long-thin object, Yucatec kib
designates the constitutive substance. It is only at the grammatical level,
by virtue of the numeral classifier construction, that bounding and

shape are specified: un-tzit kib one long-thin candle, ka-tzit kib
two long-thin candles, etc.
It is an open question whether such differences reflect independently
established cultural factors. In any case, a more fundamental question
is whether the conceptual archetypes are the same in all cultures to
begin with. I do not presume to know, but I speculate that even those
associated with universal grammatical phenomena are capable of lim-
ited variation in their form or cultural status. Consider possessive con-
structions, characterized schematically in terms of our basic reference
point ability: that of invoking one conceived entity to mentally access
another (Langacker 1993b; Taylor 1996). Obvious candidates for pro-
totypical values are the conceptual archetypes of ownership, kinship,
and whole-part relations (e.g. my house, her uncle, his nose). The ques-
tion I would raise is whether there is in fact any culture-neutral notion
of ownership that can be appealed to for this purpose. If so, it must of
course be considerably less specific and culture-laden than the English
word ownership. But I can easily believe that there is no such notion:
that the archetypes functioning as possessive prototypes in different
languages are culturally influenced in subtle ways.
Analogous questions arise in regard to clause structure, where the
archetypal conception of an agent-patient interaction provides the
prototypical basis for the grammatical notions subject, object, and
transitivity (Langacker 1991, 1993c). While force-dynamic interactions
of this sort are surely routine in all societies, it is not at all obvious that
notions like agent and patient invariably emerge and are precisely the
same irrespective of culture. Even should they be the same, languages
differ in the nature and extent of their grammatical exploitation, which
in turn raises questions about their cultural status. Languages differ, for
example, as to whether the prototype for clause-level subject is agent
or patient (Langacker 2004a). It is tempting to speculatebut hard to
demonstratethat the preference manifests broader cultural tenden-
cies. In a similar vein, Ikegami (1985) has suggested that English and
Japanese evidence different cognitive styles, the former making far
greater use of grammatical phenomena based on agentivity. Once more,
it is easy and tempting to relate this to broader cultural predilections,
but not so easy to establish anything conclusively.
Conceptual archetypes are still quite schematic. Moving further along
the scale in the direction of greater specificity, we encounter grammati-
cal elements whose cultural component is readily apparent. With certain
phenomena there is no question that grammatical distinctions reflect
independently existing cultural factors. Examples would be a system of

honorifics or alternate personal pronouns indicative of sociocultural
status (as in Japanese and Thai). In other cases the categories imposed
by grammar are language-specific, and in that sense are products of
culture, but are not obviously reflective of cultural notions evident on
non-linguistic grounds. This can be exemplified by the grammaticized
English modals (may, can, will, shall, must, might, could, would, should).
Illustrating another possibility, involving a weaker cultural component,
is animacy: a concept that emerges in infancy as an aspect of embodied
cognition (Mandler 2004) and thus has a universal basis. While it is not
unlikely that every language makes some kind of grammatical distinc-
tion based on animacy, the category boundarywhat counts as animate
for this purposeis subject to cultural determination.
I would not claim that these differences are clear-cut. The point is
rather to suggest the complexity of the issues that arise in assessing the
role of culture-specific factors in linguistic structure. In large measure
the issues are the same for lexicon and grammar, and certain grammati-
cal phenomena are comparable to lexicon in degree of cultural motiva-
tion. I would like to conclude with a brief case study that illustrates the
non-dichotomous nature of lexicon and grammar as well as of culture
and embodied cognition.
2.4 A case study
At the lexical level, English invests considerable wealth in what are

often referred to as predicates of propositional attitude. These are
quite numerous, even limiting our attention to predicates which take
a finite clause as complement and focus specifically on assessing the
validity of the proposition it expresses. There is both semantic and
grammatical evidence for dividing the predicates thus delimited into
five broad groups (Langacker 2004b). What is relevant here is that these
categories represent successive phases in the overall process of epistemic
judgment whereby a proposition comes to be accepted as valid. I will
call these the potential, assessment, inclination, action, and result
phases. Using perhaps the most neutral matrix predicates, these are
respectively exemplified by the following sentences: It is possible that
hes dishonest; I wonder whether hes dishonest; They think hes dishonest;
She will learn that hes dishonest; I know hes dishonest.
In the potential phase, the proposition is merely put forth as some-
thing to be considered, prior to any actual assessment. Just a few basic
predicates represent this phase: possible, conceivable, plausible. Predicates
that indicate assessment per se, prior to any outcome, are more numer-
ous: wonder, ponder, consider, question, ask, unclear, uncertain, mysterious,
debatable, arguable, questionable. One outcome of assessment is a kind
of provisional judgment, either a positive or a negative inclination
toward accepting the proposition as valid: think, believe, suspect, figure,
reckon, expect, imagine, feel, suppose, seem, appear, likely, probable, doubt,
doubtful, dubious, unlikely. Action predicates profile events by which a
proposition is finally accepted as being valid: learn, decide, figure out,
discover, find out, calculate, ascertain, realize, determine, notice, see, observe,
persuade, convince, inform, tell. Finally, result predicates describe the sta-
ble situation in which a proposition has been accepted as established
knowledge: know, realize, accept, understand, sure, certain, firm, convinced,
persuaded, adamant, obvious, clear, evident, apparent, plain, true, right, cor-
rect, valid, definite, undeniable.
Additional predicates could of course be cited, and some have alter-
nate senses representing different phases. Even so, the examples listed
are sufficient to show that this realm of human endeavor is densely
coded in the English lexiconspeakers face a rich array of choices for
describing their epistemic stance in regard to propositions. One could
certainly argue that this proliferation reflects a cultural preoccupation
with propositional judgment. That, however, is not our present con-
cern. What does concern us is a certain parallelism between this lexical
coding and a central facet of English grammar.
The grammatical phenomena are none other than those responsible
for a clause being finite, termed grounding in CG. In English, the core
grounding system consists of tense and the modals (Langacker 1991:
ch. 6, 2009: ch. 7). Each involves a binary opposition. For tense the
opposition is immediate vs. non-immediate, prototypically realized as
present vs. past in time. For modals the basic opposition is a matter of
whether or not to use one at all: absence vs. presence. When a modal is
included, the speaker has no less than nine forms to choose from: the
immediate may, can, will, shall, must, or the non-immediate might, could,
would, should. The subtleties of the modal meanings and the complexi-
ties of their conventional usage are notorious. Here, though, it suffices
to treat them as a class, focusing just on their epistemic use.
The key point is that the modals can be seen as the grammatical
counterpart of lexical predicates of propositional attitude. By and large,
the conceptual framework most effective for describing the lexical
predicates applies as well to the English modal system. There are dif-
ferences, to be sure, but these are natural correlates of structural status.
Being grammatical elements, the modals make fewer distinctions than
the predicatesin effect, they reduce the conceptual framework to its

essentials. A second difference reflects the fact that lexical predicates
take finite clauses as complements, whereas modality is part of their
internal structure. Since a finite clause expresses a proposition, the
epistemic status of propositions is what the predicates specify. Modality,
on the other hand, is a facet of the clausal grounding that produces a
finite clause and thereby defines a proposition. Thus it specifies the
epistemic status of the grounded process, pertaining to the actual or
potential occurrence of the profiled event or situation. In the sentence
She is certain that he will complain, the predicate certain indicates her
acceptance as valid of the proposition he will complain, in which will
presents the event of his complaining as a predicted occurrence. With
predicates, therefore, the epistemic judgment concerns the validity of a
proposition, but with modality it concerns the realization of a process.
Still, since propositions pertain to events and situations, judgments
at the two levels relate to the same overall process of striving for
epistemic control: our ongoing effort to arrive at an accurate picture
of the world and what transpires in it. We have seen that lexical predi-
cates correspond to five successive phases of this process: potential,
assessment, inclination, action, and result. With respect to this, the
grammaticized modal system offers a stripped-down version which
concentrates on the most important aspect of the process, namely on
the outcome. Recall that there are two stages with outcomesthe incli-
nation phase represents a provisional judgment, and the result phase, a
final judgment. The grounding system codes these kinds of outcome by
means of the binary opposition between the presence and the absence
of a modal. The absence of a modal (e.g. she is angry) indicates that the
profiled occurrence is accepted as having been realized (result phase),
whereas the presence of a modal indicates otherwise. In the latter
case, the choice of modal specifies the strength of the force tending
toward its realization, e.g. irresistible force with must, strong force with
should, and mere potentiality with may (Sweetser 1982; Talmy 1988b).
This degree of inclination is accessed via the same kind of mental
extrapolation that leads to the provisional judgments expressed by
inclination predicates.
At a certain level of abstraction, therefore, we observe a substantial
similarity between an important segment of the lexicon of English and
a central aspect of its grammar: both are based on a general cognitive
model pertaining to a multi-phase process of striving for epistemic con-
trol. I have no real empirical basis for judging the extent to which this
model is universal. I do presume that controlling a body of accepted
knowledge is part of the common human experience, and that the

process of acceptance admits of stages and matters of degree. I note in
this regard that think and know are included by Wierzbicka (1996: ch. 2)
in her set of semantic primitives, identified as lexical universals. At the
same time, the more specific details are no doubt subject to cultural
and linguistic variation. In an arbitrarily chosen language, one would
not expect to find anything precisely equivalent to the English system
of clausal grounding, nor even a comparable multitude of epistemic
predicates dividing naturally into the same five phases of proposi-
tional assessment. My immediate point, however, is thatin a given
languagethe same basic cognitive model can be invoked by both lexi-
cal and grammatical elements.
Let me further suggest that the model in question is non-dichotomous
not only with respect to lexicon and grammar, but also with respect to
embodiment and culture. The five-phase process (potential, assessment,
inclination, action, result) constitutes what I call the epistemic control
cycle. Given their degree of abstractness, predicates of propositional
attitude might seem to be good candidates for lexemes primarily shaped
by culture, with embodiment having at best a minimal role. I would
argue, however, that the epistemic control cycle instantiates a far more
general cognitive model grounded in fundamental aspects of embodied
human experience (Langacker 2002, 2004b, 2009: ch. 10). As living
creatures, we continually engage in activity geared toward achieving
and maintaining control of our circumstances (this is in fact one way
to characterize what it means to be alive). We do so in many and varied
ways, at both the physical and mental levels. This striving for control is
a force-dynamic process that occurs in episodes. It has a cyclic nature,
as each episode comprises a series of phases, the last of which sets the
stage for another cycle.
The baseline is a (momentarily) stable situation, a state of relaxa-
tion. The cycle begins when something appears in the agents vicinity,
thereby creating the potential for their interaction. Thus stimulated,
the agent has to deal with the target in some fashion. The agent then
engages in preparatory activity, the outcome being a state of tension in
which the agent is poised to act and thereby resolve the issue. Typically
the action is one in which the agent captures the target, i.e. brings it
under control (alternatively, the agent gains a kind of negative control
through an act of avoidance). The result is a stable situation where
control has been established. It is a state of relaxation because the prob-
lem has been resolved, producing a new baseline for the initiation of
another cycle.
Abstractly, then, the control cycle consists of the following

force-dynamic phases: relaxation > stimulation > preliminary activity >
build-up of tension > release through action > resulting control > relaxa-
tion. I do not believe I am being fanciful in seeing this as representing a
fundamental rhythm inherent in moment-to-moment living. Without
getting into details, I suggest that portions or all of the cycle are reason-
ably ascribed to many central facets of human experience. They are evi-
dent in basic bodily functions, such as eating, breathing, and urination.
I would characterize eye movements as resulting in perceptual cap-
ture: a stimulus is brought under control in the sense of being made
the momentary focus of attention. The focusing of attention at the
mental level might be treated analogously. The model applies straight-
forwardly to acts of physical capture (e.g. picking up a kitten and hold-
ing it), and on a larger time scale, to the acquisition of possessions.
It extends without much difficulty to the planning and execution of
actions (control consisting in successful execution). At the social level,
meeting someone new creates a state of tension that can ultimately be
resolved either by avoidance or by establishing a stable relationship
(thereby achieving social control).
The epistemic control cycle can therefore be seen as just one more
manifestation of this basic model. Since phases of the model are thus
invoked for the semantic characterization of predicates of propositional
attitude, such predicatesdespite their abstractnessreflect a funda-
mental aspect of embodied cognition. On the present account this is of
course quite consistent with their having a cultural basis.
2.5 Final words
As promised, the story told here is not a simple one, nor does it lend
itself to being summarized succinctly. A scheme which posits separate
components with clear boundaries is always easier to present than one
which acknowledges gradience and indissociability. But while the latter
is certainly inconvenient, it has the likely advantage of coming closer
to the truth.
Recently, an entire journal issue (Topics in Cognitive Science 4:3, 2012)
was devoted to the question of whether anthropologyespecially cul-
tural anthropologyis or even should be an integral part of cognitive
science as it is presently constituted. A basic tension was noted between
the primary concerns of the two disciplines: with basic processes of a
universal nature, in the case of cognitive science; and with the detailed
description of particular cultures, in the case of anthropology.
In conformity with the spirit of this volume, as well as John Taylors

own work, the position I have outlined argues against a schismatic
outlook. Both embodied cognition and cultural embedding figure in
all facets of language structure. Moreover, they are closely intertwined,
with no possibility of a neat separation. Although cognitive linguistics
is usually thought of as being part of cognitive science (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980), its connection with anthropology is hardly less essential
in terms of their mutual concerns and implications (Palmer 1996). On
the one hand, linguists need anthropology in order to properly assess
and characterize the cultural basis of linguistic meanings. On the other
hand, linguistic analysis (e.g. metaphor study) reveals the details of the
mental constructions constitutive of culture.
Language is both a mental and a sociocultural phenomenon (Langacker
2008). Despite their divergent agendas, relevant disciplines should all be
concerned with an integrated account of language, culture, and cogni-
tion, for these are by nature indissociable.
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3
Deliteralization and the Birth of
Emotion
Dirk Geeraerts
The embodiment hypothesis, a cornerstone of much thinking in

Cognitive Linguistics, has given rise to a renewed interest in the
interaction between cultural factors and embodied experience. In the
course of the previous two decades, an early assumption of a univer-
salist physiological basis (Lakoff & Kvecses 1987) gave way to a more
nuanced approach when it was established that the emotion vocabulary
in English is to a large extent determined by the historically trace-
able, culturally specific influence of the theory of humors (Geeraerts
& Grondelaers 1995; Gevaert 2007, 2008; Geeraerts & Gevaert 2008;
and see Sharifian 2003 and Kvecses 2005 for the incorporation of this
view in Conceptual Metaphor Theory). In this chapter, I will take the
exploration of the influence of the humoral theory one step further,
and sketch how the early history of the word emotion itself (or at least,
the French verb mouvoir from which it derives) is entangled with
the humoral theory. The study in the following pages is based on the
materials collected by Annelies Bloem in her PhD thesis (Bloem 2008),
which I co-supervised with Michle Goyens. The analysis offered here
is meant to be exploratory only: a full-fledged analysis of the history of
emotion, even if it is restricted to the emergence and the early history of
the word, would require a considerably more detailed description than
what can be offered here.
3.1 The birth of emotion
The English word emotion (strong) feeling is a loan from French motion,
which is itself a fairly late addition to the vocabulary, being introduced
in the late 15th century as a latinate derivation of the verb mouvoir. It
is to the latter then that we have to turn to get a grip on the genesis of
50
Deliteralization and the Birth of Emotion 51
the psychological reading of motion. The materials we will use are taken
from the dataset compiled by Bloem (2008) for the verbs mouvoir and
mouvoir. The data cover four periods: Old French, up to 1350; Middle
French, from 1350 to 1500; the 16th century; and the 17th century. For
each of these periods, quotations from literary sources (derived predomi-
nantly from the Frantext corpus), and quotations from scientific sources
are available. For the Old and Middle French periods, which will be the
focus of attention in the following pages, the scientific sources are the
following: LImage du Monde by master Gossouin, the Trsor by Brunet
Latin (either in the edition by Carmody or in the edition by Baldwin
Spurgeon and Barrette), the Livre de Sydrac, and Placides et Timo ou Li
secrs as philosophes for Old French: for Middle French, the Livre du Ciel
et du Monde and the Livre de thiques dAristote by Nicole Oresme, the
Livre des proprits des Choses by Corbechon, and the Livre des Problmes
and the Livres des Echecs amoureux moraliss by Evrart de Conty. (In the
following sets of examples, these sources will be referenced by a brief
indication of the title or the authors of the works only. The translations
accompanying the quotations are approximative rather than literal.)
An analysis of the attestations of mouvoir in Old French reveals a num-
ber of broadly defined senses. Examples (1) and (2) are straightforward
examples of the literal spatial reading of mouvoir, whereas the others lie
in the realm of psychological readings that link up with our present-day
interpretation of emotion. Within this set of psychological readings, two
subsets may be distinguished. Examples (3) and (4) refer to what we now
readily recognize as feelings: pity in (3), and desire in (4). In the other
two cases, the states to which people are moved do not fall within our
contemporary conception of the emotions: sin in (5) and wisdom and
knowledge in (6) are not considered to be feelings. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the distinction is as salient for the medieval mind as it is for us:
rather than being confined within the narrower conception of emotion
that is currently dominant (and whose historical emergence is traced in
Dixon 2003), the examples (3)(6) involve the affective life of the mind in
a broad sensepassions, sentiments, affects, moral judgments, feelings.
Specifically, mouvoir in these examples indicates a process by which a
persons affective life undergoes an important change of state; in many
of the examples, the resultant state is explicitly expressed.
1. En un an pluet plus que en un autre, cest premierement par la

volent de Dieu et par le mouvement du firmament et des plannetes
et des signes; car il sesmuevent par la volent de Dieu tel comme il
doivent. (Sydrac)
One year it rains more than the other, this is primarily by the will
of God and through the movement of the firmament and the
planets and the [zodiac] signs; because they move by the will of
God like they must.
2. Lors retorne la lune a son premier point dont ele estoit esmeue pre-
miers. (Trsor, ed. Carmody)
Then the moon returns to the point from which it initially

departed.
3. Por ce que quant [li] oant sont a ce venu, quil sont debonaire [],
certes il sont legierement esmeu a piti. (Trsor, ed. Baldwin Spurgeon
& Barrette)
For when the auditors [at a trial] have come to the point that they
are mild at heart [] certainly they are easily moved to pity.
4. Mes sinplement li coustans est meilleurs que li muables, [por ce ke li

movables] se torne a ciascun vent, mes li homs fermes & costans ne sera
ja esmues par fors desierres. (Trsor, ed. Baldwin Spurgeon & Barrette)
But the constant ones are better than the changeful ones, because
the changeful ones turn with every wind, but firm and constant
men are never moved by strong desires.
5. Garde toi de trop dormir, car le trop dormir fait le char precheuse et
esmeut homme a pequi. (Placides et Timo)
Beware not to sleep too much, because too much sleep makes the
flesh fastidious and incites man to sin.
6. Et puis trouverent la science de musique pour metre concordance en

toutes choses; aprs i mistrent lentendement dastronomie. Car par
lui furent il esme davoir vertu et science. (LImage du Monde)
And then they discovered the science of music to put harmony in

all things; afterwards they added an understanding of astronomy.
Thus they were moved to have virtue and knowledge.
How does this psychological reading of mouvoir relate to the literal,

spatial reading in (1) and (2)? A direct metaphorization is not unlikely.
In the context of Cognitive Linguistics, it needs no further explanation

that states are regularly conceived of as positions, and that motion verbs
may accordingly be used to express a change of state: in the notational
conventions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, STATES ARE PLACES and
CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION. In the case of mouvoir, however,
the situation is complicated by the presence of quotations like the
following.
7. Quant li corps est trop gaisa, si fait une menniere de craisse ou

descume, qui deschent en le vergue par icelle voie, et se le char ou
li corps ne se delivroit de celle cose qui est concheue en homme par
humeurs qui sesmeuvent par le gaiet de le char, tres grans perieuls
de maladie li em porroit venir. (Placides et Timo)
When the body is too excited, it produces a kind of fat or foam

that descends to the penis by this path, and if the flesh or the
body does not dispose of this matter, which is produced in man
by humors that are set in motion by the exhilaration of the flesh,
grave dangers of illness may come from it.
8. Luxure vient de gloutonnie et de pensser folement; quar comme

lonme a beu et mengi a outrage, les rains et les membres dont
luxure vient, qui sont voisins au ventre, sesmuevent moult tost et
eschaufent, et viennent les laides penssees. (Sydrac)
Lechery comes from glutony and fantasy; because if a man has

eaten and drunk excessively, the kidneys and the organs that
engender lechery, which are close to the belly, are very much
moved and heated, and dirty thoughts appear.
9. Le roy demande: Felonnie de quoi avient? Sydrac respont: Des

humeurs mauvaises qui aucune fois reflambent au cors comme le
feu, et esmuevent le cuer et eschaufent, et le font par leur reflambe-
ment noir et obscur; et por cele obscurt devient mornes et penssis
et melanconieus. (Sydrac)
The king asks: Where does felony come from? Sydrac replies: From
bad humors that at one point light up in the body like fire, and
that move the heart and heat it, and make it dark and black by
their burning; and from this darkness it becomes sad and thought-
ful and melancholy.
10. Met le frain en ta concupiscence, depart de toi delis qui priveement

esmeuvent le courage a desierrer. (Trsor, ed. Baldwin Spurgeon &
Barrette)
Put a brake on your lust, discard the pleasures that privately incite
the mind to desire.
Example (7) illustrates the literal, spatial reading of the verb, but the
moving entities are the humors, the bodily fluids. At the same time
(and this is, needless to say, typical for the combined psychophysiologi-
cal nature of the humoral framework), the movement of the humors is
linked to an affective condition, since it is the gaiet (joyful excitement,
exhilaration) of the flesh that causes the movement. Similar associa-
tions between physiological motion and psychological phenomena are
present in the next examples, but specific shifts and extensions occur.
In (8), the subject of smouvoir is not the humors as such, but meto-
nymically, bodily organs in which those humors play a role. In (9), the
relevant organ is the heart. Again, the heart is not just anatomical or
physiological, but it is an integrated psychosomatic entity in which
bodily fluids and thoughts co-occur and interact. In (10), the moved
entity is identified as courage. This is not our present-day courage, but
rather a persons mental disposition in the broadest possible sense, his
mind.
What we see in the series (7)(10), in other words, is a continuum,
couched in the framework of the humoral theory, from a purely physi-
ological to a psychological conception of the person. In (7) and (10), the
interpretation shifts naturally to one of the extremes of the continuum,
but in (8) and (9), the two aspects occur in an intimate combination.
The underlying mechanism is a metonymical one: if body and mind
are closely related parts of the same whole, a reference to one can be a
reference to the other. Crucially, examples such as (3)(6) can then also
be interpreted along the same metonymical cline: the person as the sub-
ject or object of mouvoir fits naturally into the same metonymical series
where we find the bodily fluids, bodily organs, the body and the mind.
As a consequence, we seem to have two paths leading from a spatial
reading of mouvoir to a psychological reading: a metaphorical one
based on conceptual metaphors of the type STATES ARE PLACES and CHANGE
OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION, and a metonymical one in which exam-
ples like (7)(10) constitute bridging contexts between spatial readings
like (1)(2) and psychological ones like (3)(6). Importantly from the
point of view of cultural history, the metonymical solution presupposes
an integrated view of the human person, in which physiological change

(viz. of the equilibrium of the humors) and psychological change natu-
rally co-occuran embodied view of the mind, in other words.
Given the two possible solutions, is it feasible to choose between
them? Pending a more comprehensive analysis of the available Old
French data, the following provisional argumentation can be devel-
oped. As a first step, it needs to be recognized that the choice between
the metonymical and the metaphorical solution is not an exclusive
one, in the sense that both pathways of change can co-occur. On the
one hand, the metonymical solution is definitely a real one, given
the strong presence of humorally based quotations in the data. On the
other, given the ubiquity of metaphor in natural language, metaphori-
cal influences can hardly be discarded on a priori grounds.
So, as a second step, it follows that the question is not so much
which of the two models should be selected to the exclusion of the
other, but rather how the two solutions work together. The interaction
between the two solutions could be modeled according to two basic
patterns. In one model, the psychophysiological inspiration is primary,
and the metaphorical pattern is merely a reinforcing factor working in
the background. In the other model, the metaphorical path is primary,
and the humoral view is a secondary reinterpretation that is developed
later in a scientific and scholarly context. More so than the first model,
the second model suggests a number of testable predictions: if the psy-
chological readings derive from a metaphorical mapping, we expect
mouvoir to express the CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION metaphor
more broadly than just in the psychological domain, and we also expect
those non-psychological instantiations of the pattern to appear no later
in time than the psychological ones.
As a third step, we may check these hypotheses against a sample of
Old French data drawn from non-scientific texts. To begin with, we note
that the psychophysiological conception of the emotions is not absent
from the non-scientific texts. References to blood, to the heart and to
courage, similar to what we came across in (9) and (10), may be found
in (11) and (12). Examples of mouvoir that are not strictly emotional
also occur in these non-scientific texts, as in the example (13), but they
are of the same broadly psychological type as the examples (5) and (6),
i.e. mouvoir may be paraphrased as to incite, to stimulate (someone to
a certain behavior). By comparison, instantiations of CHANGE OF STATE IS
CHANGE OF LOCATION that we do not find include changes affecting inani-
mate entities, or people changing their social positionalthough such
examples would have the same probability of appearing as narrowly
emotional or broadly psychological examples if CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE

OF LOCATION is the sole driving force. It would seem, in other words, that
if we wish to interpret the non-spatial readings of mouvoir in terms of
the STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION metaphor, we still have to admit that the
application of that metaphorical pattern is implicitly constrained by a
psychophysiological background conception. Also, cases like (13) seem
to arise later than the more purely emotional ones like (14) and (15):
the latter can be found in the 12th century already, whereas the exam-
ples of the former belong to the 13th century.
11. Car juennece si les emflambe, qui de feu les emple et de flambe et
touz leur fet par estovoir les queurs a folie esmovoir; et si legiers
et si volanz que chascun cuide estre Rolanz, voire Herculs, voire
Sanson. (Jean de Meun, Le roman de la rose)
Because youth enflames them, fills them with fire and flame and
without failing makes their hearts move towards folly; and so
light and so swift that each believes being Roland or Hercules
or Samson.
12. Bien sai que nobles courages ne sesmeut pas de po de chose. (Jean
de Meun, Le roman de la rose)
I know well that noble minds are not moved by small matters.
13. [Dieu] de neant fist tout saillir [] nonc riens ne lesmut a ce fere
fors sa volant debonere, large, courtaise, sanz envie. (Jean de Meun,
Le roman de la rose)
[God] made everything emerge from nothing [] never did

anything move him to do this, except his gentle will, generous,
benevolent, unenvious.
14. As tu tote bont perdue? Ques rage ta si esmee? (Lai de Narcisse)
Have you lost all goodness? What rage has excited you so?
15. Ice la plus dire esme que li cops quil a rece. (Gautier dArras,
Eracle)
This moved him more to anger than the blows he had received.
With some degree of caution in the absence of a more detailed scrutiny

of the oldest data, it can be concluded that the emergence of the psy-
chological readings of mouvoir is closely connected with an embodied
view of the mind: in the context of a humoral psychophysiological con-
ception of the human person, the psyche is moved because the physi-
ological fluids that determine ones state of mind are set in motion.
3.2 The specializiation of mouvoir
Remarkably from our contemporary point of view, the verbs mouvoir

and mouvoir are largely synonymous in Old French and Middle French,
in the sense that both occur with all the readings that we have distin-
guished. For illustration, let us note that in Evrart de Contys writings,
the verbs appear almost interchangeably in similar contexts. In the
examples below (all from Evrart de Conty), an attestation of mouvoir
with one of the main semantic categories is paired to an example of
mouvoir in the same category. Examples (16) and (17) present purely
spatial readings, while (22) and (23) are purely psychological ones. The
others illustrate the bridging contexts, in which a spatial movement of
bodily fluids is associated with psychological processes. Examples (20)
and (21) in particular demonstrate the overlapping semantics of the
verbs: the context in which they appear is almost literally the same.
Given that these two examples refer specifically to anger as boiling of
the blood, they also provide compelling evidence for the thesis formu-
lated in Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995) concerning the humoral his-
torical background of the anger as heated liquid metaphor.
16. Pour quoy est ce que les undes esmeues en grans yaues et parfondes
se cessent et apaisent plus tart que celles qui sont esmeues en petites
yaues et sont poy parfundes.
Why is it that waves that are stirred up in vast and deep waters
come to a halt and quiet down later than those that are brought
into movement in small and undeep waters.
17. Et pour ce veons aussi que la Mer Occeane est obeissans a la lune et
que elle flue et reflue deux foiz, que jour que nuit [] et en moult
dautres et diverses manieres se meut elle et debat.
And so we see that the Sea Ocean obeys the moon and flows and
reflows twice, during the day and during the night and in many
other ways does it move and be restless.
18. Pource devons nous savoir que li prins tans [], quant il troeuve le
cors trop plain et que la vertus ne sen poet mie bien delivrer lors
pour sa chalour et son humidit, il les esmoet et est souvent cause
de pluseurs maladies. Et pource dit ausy Ypocras que u prin tans les
melancolies se esmoeuvent.
That is why we have to know that in spring, when the body is too
full and the life spirit cannot easily get rid of them [the melancholic
humors] because of its warmth and humidity, it stirs them up and
this is often the cause of several illnesses. And that is why Hippocrates
also says that in spring the melancholies are in movement.
19. Et cest pour ce que les passions et les accidens de lame font la
chaleur naturele et les esperis transmuer et mouvoir en moult de
manieres diverses.
And that is why the passions and the different states of the soul
cause the natural warmth and the spirits to change and move in
many different ways.
20. Ire donc est une passion de lame qui esmoet et encline le coraige
humain a desirer vengeance de aucune iniure faite [] la naturele
chaleur e ire se retrait et asamble de le ordenance de nature aussi
comme toute entour le coeur [] et pour ce est il aussi dit que ire
est une maniere de ebullition de sanc chaut entour le coer pour le
desir de la vengance.
Anger is a passion of the soul that moves and directs the human
heart to wish vengeance from whatever wrong that has been done
The natural warmth of anger withdraws and comes together
round the heart in a natural way And that is why it is also said
that anger is a form of boiling of the blood around the heart due to
the desire for vengeance.
21. Ire est une des passions de lame et est une maniere de inflamma-
tion et de ebullition de sanc chaut et de esperis entour le coeur [].
Et pource se moet en ceste passion la chaleur au dehors du cors
impetueusement.
Anger is one of the passions of the soul, and a form of inflamma-

tion and boiling of warm blood and spirits round the heart And
that is why in this passion warmth moves out of the body in an

impetuous way.
22. Mais, dit il, ire nest mie du tout sans aucune raison, non mie que
raisons commande con se courouce, mais elle moustre et allege le
injure. Cest la cause qui le courage fait a ire esmouvoir.
But, says he, anger is not without cause, and it is not so that
reason commands that one becomes angry, but anger makes the
injury explicit and softens it. This [the wrong suffered] makes the
heart move towards a state of anger.
22. Et pource que li legislateur qui voient le acus telement opprim,

soubsmis et abaissi u regart de lacteur sont meu de pit et li sont
favourable.
And hence the legislators, seeing the accused in such a depressed,

subdued and humiliated state in view of the prosecutor, are
moved by pity and act favorably towards him.
In the course of time, this near-synonymy of the two verbs gives

way to the current specialization, in which mouvoir is restricted to
the psychological readings. The specification of mouvoir for psycho-
logical readings is a quantitative and gradual one, which reached its
completion only in the Modern French period. As an indication of the
gradual divergence of the two verbs, Table 3.1 (derived from Bloem
2008: 176, 220, 283, 321) presents the distribution of the readings
Table 3.1 Raw frequencies of mouvoir and mouvoir across periods and senses
Spatial Physiological Emotive Other
Ancien Franais mouvoir 300 21 18 143

mouvoir 131 40 53 103
Moyen Franais mouvoir 1290 183 64 269
mouvoir 131 138 213 453
Renaissance mouvoir 84 11 13 63
mouvoir 21 22 137 133
Classique mouvoir 620 107 20 86
mouvoir 44 136 520 151
Table 3.2 Semasiological proportions for mouvoir and mouvoir across periods
and senses
Ancien Franais mouvoir 62.2% 4.4% 3.7% 29.7%

mouvoir 40.1% 12.2% 16.2% 31.5%
Moyen Franais mouvoir 71.4% 10.1% 3.6% 14.9%
mouvoir 14.0% 14.8% 22.8% 48.4%
Renaissance mouvoir 49.1% 6.4% 7.6% 36.8%
mouvoir 6.7% 7.0% 43.8% 42.5%
Classique mouvoir 74.4% 12.8% 2.4% 10.3%
mouvoir 5.1% 16.0% 61.1% 17.7%
from the earliest attestations to the 17th century. (Moyen Franais cov-
ers the Middle French period, from 1350 to 1500. Renaissance refers to
the 16th century, and Classique to the 17th century. For the further
evolution to the present day, see Bloem 2012. Note that the category
physiological includes all bridging contexts, so both cases with a lit-
eral spatial movement of the bodily fluids, and cases with a combined
psychophysiological orientation.)
In Table 3.2, a semasiological transformation of the raw data shows
the proportion of each reading for each of the verbs over the four
time periods. We notice that already in the first period, the emotive
meaning takes a stronger position in the structure of mouvoir than in
that of mouvoir. In the course of time, the semasiological salience of
the emotive reading increases, and in the 17th century, it is without
competition the central reading of mouvoir. Such a switch of proto-
typical reading does not occur in the case of mouvoir, for which spatial
movement remains the dominant meaning throughout the four time
periods.
The picture is confirmed in Table 3.3, in which we implement an
onomasiological transformation of the raw data. For each reading and
each time period, the table shows the proportion of each verb in the
expression of that reading. Throughout the evolution, mouvoir is
the dominant choice for expressing spatial movement, and mouvoir
is the dominant choice for referring to emotions. This preference for
either verb rises over time, i.e. the onomasiological specialization of the
verbs increases. (Notice that this is not a mathematical consequence
of the semasiological specialization observed earlier, but a separate
development.)
Table 3.3 Onomasiological proportions for mouvoir and mouvoir across periods
and senses
Ancien Franais mouvoir 69.6% 34.4% 25.4% 58.1%

mouvoir 30.4% 65.6% 74.6% 41.9%
Moyen Franais mouvoir 90.8% 57.0% 23.1% 37.2%
mouvoir 9.2% 43.0% 76.9% 62.8%
Renaissance mouvoir 80% 33.3% 12.3% 32.1%
mouvoir 20% 66.7% 86.7% 67.9%
Classique mouvoir 93.4% 44.0% 3.7% 86
mouvoir 6.6% 56.0% 96.3% 151
The divergence of the verbs raises two questions: why should they go
through a process of specialization at all, and why would it be mouvoir
rather than mouvoir that specializes for the emotive reading?
Why there should be a growing differentiation of both verbs is dif-
ficult to answer on the basis of the present data alone. A structural
explanation might refer to a principle of isomorphic efficiency, which
in this case would imply a ban on superfluous synonymy. The general
validity of such a principle is however debatable: see the discussion in
Geeraerts (1997: 123156). A functional explanation, by contrast, might
assume that there is a diachronically growing need for concepts refer-
ring exclusively to psychological phenomena, i.e. for words that pro-
vide an independent lexicalization for individual mental experiences
like feelings (and the generic notion of feeling). In the terminology
of Geeraerts, Grondelaers, & Bakema (1994), the conceptual onomasio-
logical salience or entrenchment of a concept rises to the extent that
the things that could possibly be identified by that concept are actu-
ally being identified by it. For instance (Geeraerts 1997: 3247), when
leggings became fashionable in the early 1990s, the entrenchment in
Dutch of the concept leggingwhich could be expressed by the syno-
nyms legging, leggings, and caleonrose dramatically at the expense of
other terms (like simply trousers) that could also be used to refer to the
items of clothing involved. The rise, then, of a specialized, dedicated
term for the concept to feel, in a psychological sense can be seen as a
structural analogy of growing conceptual onomasiological salience. The
growing entrenchment of a concept is reflected, on the level of usage, in
the increased frequency of words exclusively referring to that concept,
and on the level of vocabulary structure, in the emergence of words
specialized for that concept.
To support the functional thesis, it should be established that the

specialization of mouvoir, interpreted as a reflection of the growing
entrenchment of the concept of emotion as an individual, psychologi-
cal phenomenon, is not an isolated event. It is obviously beyond the
scope of this short chapter to elaborate systematically on the idea, but
it may be noted that there are various indications that this is indeed
a thesis with sufficient initial plausibility to be investigated further.
First, the increasing structural independence of the concept of emo-
tion is also reflected in the word motion itself, which is added much
later to the vocabulary than the verb mouvoir, but whose appearance
as such contributes to the growing entrenchment of the concept of
emotion in the structure of the lexicon. In addition, since its emer-
gence in the late 15th century motion enjoys a growing success at the
expense of the verb (see also Bloem 2012). In the context of Cognitive
Linguistics, the heightened nominal rather than verbal construal could
again be seen as signaling the strengthened recognition of emotion as
a thing in its own right.
Second, similar developments may be discerned elsewhere in the lexi-
con. Diller (1994) for instance suggested that the rise of the word anger,
which gained prominence at the expense of the older forms ire and
wrath, reflects a change in conceptualization of the emotion in ques-
tion: whereas ire and wrath refer to a hierarchically structured social and
to some extent public event, anger seems to have signaled an individual
private feeling. The hypothesis formulated by Diller was corroborated
statistically in Geeraerts, Gevaert, & Speelman (2012). Crucially from
our current perspective, it fits the image of an underlying change in the
vocabulary towards concepts expressing personal mental experiences
a change, in other words, towards a modern self-awareness of the
individual. Of course, mouvoir and anger are just two cases pointing in a
certain direction: only a more systematic investigation into the histori-
cal development of the emotional and psychological vocabulary could
determine whether this is indeed a pervasive change.
Third, the functional thesis squares well with the received view
of the post-medieval cultural history of the Western world, which is
commonly seen, from the Renaissance and the Reformation over the
Enlightenment to the spread of industrial capitalism, in terms of the rise
of individualism. If this perspective is correct, then it is no surprise to
see the growth of individual consciousness and self-awareness reflected
in the emergence of a specialized language to talk about individual
experiences.
Overall, then, there is some initial cultural-historical plausibility to
a functional motivation behind the dissolution of the synonymy of
mouvoir and mouvoir. With regard to the question why it is mouvoir

and not mouvoir that undergoes the psychological specialization, the
morphosemantics of the verbs may be invoked, in the sense that the
prefix - in mouvoir highlights the strength of the psychological tur-
moil in a way that the basic verb mouvoir does not.
Following the Trsor de la Langue Franaise, we note that in Latin the
prefix ex-, from which - derives, expresses roughly four meanings: a pro-
cess of exiting and distancing (excurrere to run out, to leave running); a
process of removal (excerpere to extract, expurgere to cleanse, to purify,
to exculpate); a process of raising (exaltare to elevate, to praise); and
the completion or achievement of a process (ebibere to drink completely,
to drink to the end, to drink up). In Old French, we find examples of
exiting and removal, but also cases where the sense of achievement and
completion has developed into a causative reading: esboillir to boil, to
make something boil, esclaver to enslave, to turn someone into a slave,
esmier to crumble, to fragment, to turn something into small pieces.
Both basic readings can be found in the same verb: estrangier means to
remove, to expel but also to make different. In an example of the esboil-
lir type, the distinction between the transitive reading of the simplex verb
boillir to boil (which occurs both transitively and intransitively) and the
causative esboillir is minimal, but if anything, the causative construction
would seem to emphasize the change of state more than the base verb. In
this sense, the verbs with - can sometimes also be paraphrased with an
inchoative reading: mouvoir then equals to set in motion.
If this interpretation is correct, the onomasiological preference for
mouvoir (esmovoir) over mouvoir for referring to the inner turmoil of
strong feelings makes good sense, given that the transition from a state
of equilibrium to a state of agitation is a dominant feature of the emo-
tional experience. As a nuance, it should be taken into account that
mouvoir does not only have transitive readings. The constructions in
which the verbs appear may be classified into four syntactically defined
categories: (active) transitives, passives, reflexives, and intransitives.
Semantically speaking, the first three construction types derive from a
transitive action schema, so that only intransitive cases do not mesh
well with the causative overtones of -. Although such intransitive uses
are not absent from the oldest attestations of mouvoir, Table 3.4 (based
on Bloem 2008: 183, 186, 188, 190, 195, 202) reveals that they consti-
tute a much smaller subgroup in the range of application of mouvoir
than in that of mouvoir: 10.7 percent in the former case versus 42.5 per-
cent in the latter. In other words, the distribution in Table 3.4 supports
the suggestion of a stronger force-dynamic interpretation of mouvoir
in comparison to mouvoir.
Table 3.4 Syntactic patterns for mouvoir and mouvoir in Old French
Transitive Passive Reflexive Intransitive
Ancien mouvoir 101 46 132 206

Franais mouvoir 87 72 133 35
3.3 Deliteralization and the dialectics of culture and

cognition
Even though the foregoing discussion is relatively succinct, three cru-

cial conclusions can be derived from it. In the first place, the impact of
the humoral theory that was brought to the attention of the Cognitive
Linguistics community in Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995) appears to be
remarkably pervasive: even the word emotion itself may have acquired
its psychological reading through the intermediary of the humoral
framework. This implies that the standard metaphor-based etymol-
ogy of emotion needs to be amended. The Oxford English Dictionary, for
instance, explains the reading any strong mental or instinctive feeling,
as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc. as an extension of a reading an agita-
tion of mind; an excited mental state, which itself seems to be analyzed
as a metaphorical interpretation of the general literal meaning move-
ment; disturbance, perturbation. This story needs to be nuanced by the
possibility that the transition from movement to mental agitation
and feeling was facilitated, if not triggered, by the psychophysiological
framework of the theory of humors.
In the second place, the diachronic differentiation of mouvoir and
mouvoir (and hence, motion) seems to fit into a longitudinal cultural
development towards psychologization and interiorization of mental
life, similar to Dillers (1994) hypothesis about the success of anger in
contrast with older terms. The need for a dedicated term for the emo-
tions, as inner mental experiences, increases; or, to put it in a slightly
different terminology, the conceptual onomasiological salience of
mouvoir and motion in their psychological reading rises. Given our
traditional view of seeing post-medieval cultural history in the West
as a shift towards individualism, such an interpretation makes perfect
senseexcept, of course, that we will need more examples of parallel
lexical developments to make the case with any degree of plausibility.
In the third place, on a more theoretical level, the origin of motion
(if it is indeed of a humoral nature) establishes the importance of del-
iteralization as a mechanism of metaphoricity. If emotion is currently
perceived as metaphorically linked to the concept of movement, then

that metaphor comes about in a different way from what we normally
consider to be the process of metaphorical speech. Let us assume that
our current metaphorical interpretation of emotion is a reinterpretation
of what was originally a literal (or at least metonymical) term referring
to a spatial movement. In reality, a metaphorical and a metonymical
interpretation may have co-existed, but to get a clear theoretical focus
on the process of deliteralization, let us consider the situation in which
the metaphorical interpretation arises as a later reinterpretation of the
original literal and metonymical reading. How should the metaphoriza-
tion process then be characterized?
In the regular type of creative metaphor, an expression with refer-
ence A and sense is applied with reference B and with an extended,
figurative sense . Surely, this is a simplified picture of the relationship
between and (very often, the precise nature of is not as easy to
determine as this simple variable suggests), but it helps to contrast the
regular form of metaphor with deliteralization. In the latter, an expres-
sion with reference A and sense is interpreted with the same reference
A but with an extended, figurative sense . Comparing two examples
may bring out the differences more clearly. A lover who addresses his
beloved as sparkles triggers the implication that he sees her as lively,
dynamic, vigorous and invigorating. In this kind of metaphor, which
may be said to be based on figuration, the reference of sparkles shifts
from small burning fragments and glittering points of lights to a person;
at the same time, the sense of the word shifts from the material or opti-
cal field to a psychological one: the beloved person does not literally
sparkle. The shift occurs, by and large, because there is a unique and
forceful experience that calls for a singular and pithy expression. In
comparison, thinking that emotion is a non-literal kind of motion does
not change the reference of emotion, but merely reinterprets the link
between the word and its referent. This reinterpretation is triggered by
the fact that the original, literal motivation for the word is no longer
available. In that sense we can say (with a little exaggeration) that meta-
phor based on figuration involves making sense of the worldwhat is
this overwhelming experience that she invokes in me, and how shall I
call it?whereas metaphor based on deliteralization involves making
sense of the languagewhy is this thing called as it is?
In the larger scheme of things, deliteralization as defined here is part
of a broad class of reinterpretation process in which existing expres-
sions are semantically reinterpreted when the original motivation of the
expression is no longer available to the languages user. Further examples
(specifically in the field of idomatic expressions and compound nouns)

can be found in Geeraerts (2002). Deliteralization is a prime example of
the integrated nature of culture and cognition in the realm of language:
language users do not invent language from scratch, but they receive it
as part of their cultural environment; at the same time, they cognitively
process what is relayed to them, and that mental absorption may imply
a partial reinvention of what is being reproduced. The relationship
between culture and cognition is a dialectic one: language is a culturally
transmitted and hence intrinsically historical phenomenon, but at each
point in time, the transmission process requires cognitive reproduction.
References
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esmoeuvent. Lvolution smantico-syntaxique des verbes mouvoir et mouvoir.
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Bloem, Annelies. 2012. (E)motion in the XVIIth century. A closer look at the
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4
Overthrowing Yesterdays ICM:
(Re)focusing of Meaning in a
Hong Kong Chinese (Cantonese)
Constructional Idiom
Kam-yiu S. Pang
4.1 Idiomatic expressions and idealized cognitive models
A quick Google search for A rolling stone gathers no moss on the Internet
reveals at least two apparently contradictory uses/meanings of the prov-
erb. One has a basically admonitory use: someone who is unsettled, and
who keeps changing their job, home, and so on, will not accumulate
things such as friends, status, and wealth, for example, (1)
(1) A rolling stone gathers no moss ... and a roiling Presidency gath-
ers little support.
(http://www.pjtv.com/?cmd=mpgandmpid=105andload=4201)
The other, in contrast, has two slightly different meanings, but none-
theless a basically cautionary use: (i) a person should avoid settling into
inaction, to avoid stagnation, for example, (2); or (ii) a person who does
not settle down avoids accumulating commitments and responsibilities.
(2) A rolling stone gathers no moss: prevent your strategic plan from
stagnating.
(http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=17030700)
In fact, both the Oxford English Dictionary and Reference.com

acknowledge these two (or three) meanings as alternative explanations
of the proverb:
a person who does not settle in one place will not accumulate wealth,
status, friends, etc., or (alternatively, and now freq.) responsibilities
and commitments. (www.oed.com)
68
Overthrowing Yesterdays ICM 69
and
people always moving, with no roots in one place avoid responsibili-

ties and cares. [...] It appears that the original intent of the proverb
saw the growth of moss as desirable, and that the intent was to
condemn mobility as unprofitable. The contemporary interpreta-
tion has turned the traditional understanding on its head. (www.
reference.com)
Idiomatic expressions such as proverbs, idioms, and adages like A

rolling stone gathers no moss are generally held to reflect various aspects
of the worldview of a linguistic-cultural community: a languaculture
(Agar, 1994). As such, they are repositories of a languacultures ethos,
which, in Cognitive-Linguistic terms, is often embodied in the langua-
cultures idealized cognitive models (ICMs) (Lakoff, 1987; inter alia) or
frames (Holland and Quinn, 1987; Lakoff and The Rockridge Institute,
2006; inter alia).
ICMs are normative sociocultural beliefs which a languaculture holds
about certain concepts: what (prototypical) instances of those concepts
(ought to) consist of, or how they (ought to) behave (Holland and
Quinn, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and The Rockridge Institute, 2006;
inter alia). For instance, in an English-speaking culture, the ICM for
the prototypical mother includes attributes beyond being the female
biological parent of a child; attributes such as married, adult, loving
and caring, and so on. In other words, the English-speaking culture in
question would conversely view an unmarried teenage girl who has a
child, for example, as somehow deviant from the norm and thus an
atypical mother (Lakoff, 1987: 7476). Crucially, however, such nor-
mative ICMs are only what a languaculture holds to be true of certain
concepts; they may or may not line up with reality. It is in this sense
that they are idealized.
As normative models, ICMs are inextricably tied to the linguistic
behaviours and language use of the community concerned. Being con-
cise, pithy linguisitc expressions, idiomatic expressions are therefore
seen to reflect their underlying ICMs especially saliently (Goddard,
2009; Lakoff and Turner, 1989; White, 1987). And when their meanings
or uses change in the course of time, there is reason to believe that their
changing meanings or uses in turn reflect a change in the languacul-
tures sociocultural beliefs as well.
This chapter investigates one such idiomatic expression from Hong
Kong Chinese (Cantonese),1 for example, (3),
(3) gam1 jat6 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5
today POSS PRON:1SG hit-fall yesterday POSS PRON:1SG
the me of today overthrows/-threw/-throwing the me of
yesterday2
Based on attested Internet data, I argue that it is currently undergo-

ing a (re)focusing of meaning. By this I mean that a meaning which
was only implicit, if not completely unavailable, in earlier usage of the
expression at the turn of the 20th century has become the explicit,
predominant meaning in its current (post-2000) usage. This refocused
meaning is emerging as the expressions prototypical meaning, as a
result of a shift in focus on its underlying ICM(s). The domain of dis-
course in which the expression is most frequently found has also shifted,
in turn leading to further consolidation of the new discursive meaning
and stance. In contrast to its earlier, largely laudatory use/meaning about
self-improvement, in the current (post-2000) usage of the expression,
the meaning is a censuring one about self-contradiction and inconsist-
ency, and the discursive stance one of judgement and criticism.
4.2 Constructional idioms
Actually, (3) above is only a typical example of the form which the idi-
omatic expression can take, as some of the items in the expression can
vary. It is therefore more accurate to characterize it as a constructional
idiom (Taylor, 2002: 566577, 2012: 3740, 6999).
A constructional idiom (CI) is a linguistic string which exhibits char-
acteristics of both a construction and an idiom. Like constructions,
constructional idioms exhibit schematicity and productivity, albeit to a
limited extent. Unlike constructions, however, a constructional idiom is
comparatively constrained as to the linguistic items which can partici-
pate in it. In this regard, it resembles idioms with their low productivity,
highly non-compositional character, and more or less non-substitutable
constituent items (for example, Kvecses & Szab, 1996; Taylor, 2002:
566577). As well, like idioms, constructional idioms also have their
highly typical pragma-semantics and characteristic intonation contours.
For instance, Taylor (2002: 568570) discusses the incredulity response
construction in English as an example of a CI, exemplified by expressions
such as Him write a novel?! and Me worry?! The CI has the schematic form
of [NOMsbj Vinf (NP)?!]. When written, it is often punctuated with an inter-
robang (?! or ?!). When spoken, the subject nominal and the rest of the
expression have to be in separate intonation units, and both spoken
with a rising sneering intonation. In terms of meaning/use, it typically

expresses a feeling of incredulity in response to some given proposition
(whether explicitly presented or implied), so that the truth or validity of
the given proposition is dismissed as absurd (Taylor, 2002: 569).
Thus, although this structure is schematic and productive, it is also
constrained as to what lexical material can participate in it, and how.
For example, when the subject nominal is a pronoun, it has to be in the
oblique form; the verb (phrase) has to be ungrounded and unmarked
for tense, aspect, modality, person, or number. More importantly, the
structure has the distinctive meaning of incredulity and dismissal, as its
name indicates, and cannot be used to express other meanings. These
characteristics together make the structure a constructional idiom hav-
ing attributes of both constructions and idioms.
In this way, (3) is thus only one realization of a CI having the sche-
matic form of (4).
(4) [(X) [NOMt POSS NOM1i] (X) daa2 dou2 (X) [NOMt-n POSS NOM2i]]
where NOM = nominal, t = time, POSS = possessive, i = coreferential, and

(X) = any additional optional element such as adverbials, modals, and
aspect markers. The structure represents the idea that an entity at time
t (typically a person or a group of persons) overthrows themselves at
an earlier time t-n, or more accurately, their self at an earlier time t-n.
That is to say, its basic meaning is that the overthrowing of a persons
self of an earlier time t-n by the persons self of time t is a metaphor for
a drastic change of heart by the person.
4.3 The structure as a constructional idiom
4.3.1 The data

Evidence that this is indeed a productive CI has come from attested
Internet data collected using the Google search engine. The search was
made using the search string (5) in Chinese traditional orthography.
The asterisk denotes a wild card.
(5)

gam1 jat6 dik1 daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1
today POSS hit-fall yesterday POSS
the * of today overthrows/-threw/-throwing the * of yesterday
Sampling consisted of the first one hundred non-duplicate hits (N =

100). The search was conducted once every month in January, February,
and March 2012. The repeated searches did not indicate any notable or
significant change in the CIs usage during that period, and the data
finally used for analysis consists of those from the search of March
2012. Moreover, the reason for considering this structure as a CI in
Hong Kong (Cantonese) Chinese rather than Modern Standard Chinese
in general is also the fact that the Google searches overwhelmingly
returned instances from Hong Kong websites, with some isolated ones
from sites in Macao, Taiwan, and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
The data were independently coded by me and another researcher.
The agreement rate when calculated crudely by simply counting all
cases of agreement was 90 percent. When the results were looked at
more closely, however, they indicated that most of the differences were
in the categorization of the less clearcut cases; cases which I term con-
ceding, and which share characteristics of both censuring and prais-
ing (see Section 4.3.2). When these and other cases of disagreement
were resolved, the agreement rate rose to 98 percent.
To look for comparable corpus data from the era when the CI, or
more precisely its sentiment, was putatively first expressed by Liang
Qichao, searches were also made in three newspapers from that era,
viz. Shen Bao (), issues 1755417635 from JanuaryMarch 1922 and
issues 1808418144 from JulyAugust 1923; Shi Wu Bao (), issues
124 (August 1896April 1897); and Zhi Xin Bao (), issues 71133
(November 1898January 1901). Of these, Shi Wu Bao and Zhi Xin Bao
were closely associated with Liang. No instances have, however, been
found. This could suggest that the expression may still not have been
widely used or entrenched during Liangs era. Be that as it may, its early
meaning and usage can nonetheless still be gathered from Liangs own
writings, and from the writings of his commentators and biographers
(see Section 4.6). These data, though limited, provide important insight
into the early meaning potentials of the CI, from which the current CI
is argued to have emerged.
4.3.2 Distribution of use by speech act function

The Internet data show that the CI as it appears in current (post-2000)
discourse can be used in three basic ways, to perform the three broad
speech acts of censuring, praising, and approving by conceding. The
censuring use expresses a critical or disapproving stance towards the
referential target by the addresser,3 for example, (6)
(6) tong4 tong4 jat1 go3 zing3 fu2 gam1 jat6 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2
dignified one CLF government today POSS 1SG hit-fall
zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5 zik1 si6 zok6 jat6 dik1 zing3 caak3
yesterday POSS 1SG mean yesterday POSS policy
bui3 hau6 dik1 lei5 geoi3 dou1 si6 co3 dik1 maa1
behind POSS reason all COP wrong POSS PART:question
For a [supposedly] self-respecting government to overturn its
own policy, does it mean all the reasoning behind the policy was
wrong?
(www.kurskhk.net/742506278/6000/)
The praising use expresses an endorsing stance towards the referential

target by the addresser, for example, (7)
(7) mui5 jat6 dou1 jiu3 bei2 zok6 jat6 zeon3 bou6
everyday all need compare yesterday advance-step
gam1 tin1 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5
today POSS 1SG hit-fall yesterday POSS 1SG
Everyday has to be better than the day before; the me of today
overthrowing the me of yesterday
(www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ubeat_past/010545/media.htm)
And the conceding use expresses an approving and sympathetic stance

towards the referential target against the presupposition and with an
awareness that the CI is inherently reproachful, for example, (8). That
is to say, the addresser concedes that the act of changing ones mind
designated by the CI is inherently undesirable, but thinks that such
mind-changing has resulted in a better situation for the matter at hand.
(8) taa1 gin1 ci4 teoi1 can4 ceot1 san1 jin4 faat3 san1
3SG solid-hold push old emerge new research-develop new
caan2 ban2 sam6 zi3 bat1 sik1 ji gam1 jat6 dik1 ngo5
produce-thing even-to NEG spare INS today POSS 1SG
daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5
hit-fall yesterday POSS 1SG
he insisted on innovative product development; so much so he
thought nothing of overturning his own earlier ideas
(news.hk.msn.com/local/article.aspx?cp-documentid=5493530)
Of these, censuring is the most frequent at 74 out of 100 instances

or 74 percent. This far outnumbers either conceding (13/100; 13%),
or praising (11/100; 11%). There are two uncategorized instances
because their respective pair of NOMt and NOMt-n are reversed. My
suspicion with one of them, judging from its context, is that it was
intended to have been an instance of the CI. However, to err on the
safe side, I have decided to leave it inconclusive (see www.youtube.
com/watch?v=6i4oP_qqf1I). With the other, its website explicitly
says that there is no mistake. Given that, and the fact that even after
having consulted the rest of the site, I failed to come up with an
interpretation of the expression, I have therefore chosen to leave it
uncategorized as well.4 Figure 4.1 summarizes the CIs distribution of
speech act function in percentages.
The earliest instance of censuring in the data was posted on
30 October 2002, and the latest on 7 February 2012. The earliest
instance of conceding in the data was posted on 8 July 2007, and
the latest on 11 January 2012. The earliest instance of praising
in the data was posted on 22 November 2006, and the latest on 9
December 2011.
Based on this distribution pattern: an overwhelming majority of cen-
suring instances, I argue that although its discursive function/meaning
of praising is still available, the main discursive function/meaning of
the CI is now predominantly that of censuring.
Figure 4.1 Distribution of use by speech act function in percentages

4.3.3 Lexico-grammatical characteristics

Although the search string specified NOMt and NOMt-n as gam1 jat6 and
zok6 jat6 respectively, it was found that variants of those terms can
also participate in the CI, for example, gam1 tin1 (today) and zok6
tin1 (yesterday). Although not attested in my data, presumably the
more colloquial forms for yesterday, cam4 jat6 and kam4 jat6, are also
possible.
Moreover, looking at the co-texts of the instances, it was found that
temporal nominals other than today and yesterday are also permis-
sible. For instance, one example (9) consists of an anaphoric structure (in
the poetic/rhetoric sense), in which NOMt in the first clause of the pair
(gam1 tin1 today) becomes NOMt-n in the second, while NOMt in the
second clause of the pair is in turn realized by ming4 tin1 (tomorrow).
(9) gam1 tin1 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2 zok6 tin1 dik1 ngo5,
today POSS 1SG hit-fall yesterday POSS 1SG
ming4 tin1 dik1 ngo5 yau6 daa2 dou2 gam1 tin1 dik1 ngo5
tomorrow POSS 1SG again hit-fall today POSS 1SG
the me of today overthrows/-threw/-throwing the me of yesterday,
[and] the me of tomorrow in turn overthrows/-threw/-throwing
the me of today
(plus.google.com/107577687456231515386/.../HNL3f11qDtb)
To find out what other temporal nominals are possible, a further

search was made by holding NOM1 and NOM2 constant as ngo5 (PRON:1SG)
while allowing NOMt and NOMt-n to vary. The results indicate that
although the temporal nominals are predominantly today and yes-
terday for NOMt and NOMt-n respectively, other temporal nominals do
appear also, for example, (1011),
(10) haa6 ng5 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2 soeng6 ng5 dik1 ngo5
afternoon POSS 1SG hit-fall morning POSS 1SG
the me in the afternoon overthrows/-threw/-throwing the me
in the morning
(www.discuss.com.hk/archiver/?tid-11296347.html)
(11) zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2 cin4 jat6 dik1 ngo5
yesterday POSS 1SG hit-fall day-before-yesterday POSS 1SG
the me of yesterday overthrows/-threw/-throwing the me of the
day before yesterday
(www.woopie.jp/video/watch/5a779c0f11119b10)
NOM1 and NOM2 are coreferential. In addition to ngo5 (PRON:1SG)

specified in the search string, the data show that other nominals can
also come into these slots. These can be other personal pronouns (12),
nouns (13), or proper names (14).
(12) daan6 gam1 jat6 dik1 taa1 ci3 fu4 daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1 taa1
but today POSS 3SG seem hit-fall yesterday POSS 3SG
but the him of today seems/ed to overthrow/be overthrowing/
have overthrown the him of yesterday
(mediamobserver.blogspot.com/2012/01/07022012.html)
(13) gam1 jat6 dik1 coi4 je4 daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1 coi4 je4
today POSS money-lord hit-fall yesterday POSS money-lord
the Financial Secretary of today overthrows/-throwing/-threw
the Financial Secretary of yesterday
(www.civicparty.hk/?q=node/275)
(14) gam1 tin1 dik1 bin2 daa2 dou2 zok6 tin1 dik1 bin2
today POSS Bian hit-fall yesterday POSS Bian
the [Chen Shui] Bian of today overthrows/-throwing/-threw the
[Chen Shui] Bian of yesterday
(www.zhgpl.com/doc/1005/5/4/9/100554923.html?coluid=7
andkindid=0anddocid=100554923)
Note, however, that the most frequent form by far is still ngo5
(PRON:1SG). In fact, in many cases, even examples in which the refer-
ential targets are persons other than the addresser use ngo5 to refer
to the target, for example, (15)
(15) zang1 zeon3 waa4 si6 gam1 jat6 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2
John Tsang COP today POSS 1SG hit-fall
zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5
yesterday POSS 1SG
[with] John Tsang, it is/was the me of today overthrowing the
me of yesterday
(big5.soundofhope.org/programs/162/182831-1.asp)
This calls attention to two things about this CI. First, it indicates
that it is possible for deictic projection by the addresser to occur; for
the addresser to take the perspective of the referential target. Second,
and more importantly, it further affirms the idiomaticity of this CI,
so that the expression in its prototypical form with ngo5 realizing

NOM1 and NOM2 is used as an unanalysed chunk, even when the
addresser is referring to someone other than themselves. Having said
that, however, since ngo5 in Classical/formal Chinese can designate
1SG, 1PL, and self (Ministry of Education, R.O.C., 1994), its mean-
ing may be ambiguous in the CI. It is thus possible for the addresser
to use it in the CI since the non-person-specific meaning of self is
available. However, since the unmarked term for self in Modern
Hong Kong Cantonese is zi6 gei2, while ngo5 has primarily come to
designate 1SG, it can still be argued that when a user of present-day
Hong Kong Cantonese uses the CI with the term ngo5 to refer to
someone other than themselves, they are using it as something of a
fossilized, idiomatic expression.
As for POSS in both [NOMt POSS NOM1] and [NOMt-n POSS NOM2], the data
show that it is realizable by both dik1 (the form specified in the search
string) and zi1, a more formal/literary form for POSS, although the for-
mer is still by far the more frequent in the results. Also, the more collo-
quial form for POSS, ge3, is also presumably possible, albeit not attested
in my searches.
Finally, the predicator daa2 dou2 ( overthrow) can theoretically
be substituted by other predicators designating similar meanings, such
as zin3 sing3 (battle-win; defeat) and teoi1 faan1 (push-flip;
topple). When used with zin3 sing3, the CI mainly expresses a positive,
approving meaning. When used with teoi1 faan1, it expresses a largely
negative, disapproving meaning. This suggests that the CI can actually
be even further schematized as (16) (cf. (4)),
(16) [(X) [NOMt POSS NOM1i] (X) Poverpower (X) [NOMt-n POSS NOM2i]]
where Poverpower denotes a predicator having the general meaning of to

overpower, which subsumes the various predicators found in this CI:
daa2 dou2, teoi1 faan1, and zin3 sing3.
Nevertheless, the CI with daa2 dou2 is the most frequent with
approximately 83,000 hits. This far outnumbers the 3820 results of
teoi1 faan1 and the 73 results of zin3 sing3. Its frequency and the
fact that it is attested for both positive and negative uses suggest
that daa2 dou2 may be the most prototypical and entrenched
predicator of its kind to participate in this CI. It is the pivotal ele-
ment which gives the CI the meaning of complete obliteration of a
persons past self.
4.4 Discourse domains
4.4.1 Distribution of use by discourse domain

The data indicate that the CI in the current era can cover a wide range
of domains, albeit with a definite bias for the cluster of domains broadly
pertaining to political, governmental, and current affairs. These account
for 59 of the 100 Internet instances sampled (59%). Of these, 53 are
censuring (53/59 or 89.84%), three are praising (3/59 or 5.08%), and
three are conceding (3/59 or 5.08%).
The second most frequent use is in the discourse domain of financial
and economic affairs, with 13 out of 100 instances sampled (13%). Of
these, nine are censuring (9/13 or 69.24%), two are praising (2/13 or
15.38%), and two are conceding (2/13 or 15.38%).
Two domains share the position of the third most frequent. One
is the domain of computer and information technology with six out
of 100 instances sampled (6%). Of these, five are censuring (5/6
or 83.33%), one is conceding (1/6 or 16.67%), and no praising
instance is found. The other is the domain of personal development
or philosophy about personal development, also with six out of 100
instances sampled (6%). Of these, no censuring instance is found.
Instead, there are four praising (4/6 or 66.67%) and two conceding
(2/6 or 33.33%) instances.
The fourth most frequent use is in the discourse domain of arts and
entertainment, numbering five out of 100 instances sampled (5%). Of
these, two are censuring (2/5 or 40%), two are praising (2/5 or 40%),
and one conceding (1/5 or 20%).
This is followed by the discourse domain of consumer products, with
four out of 100 instances sampled (4%). Of these, there are two censur-
ing (2/4 or 50%), two conceding (2/4 or 50%), and no praising.
The next is the broad domain of cultural issues, such as comments
on the putative current trend of changeability in peoples personalities.
This numbers two out of 100 instances sampled (2%), and are all cen-
suring (2/2 or 100%).
Three discourse domainseducation, religion, and tourismreturn
only one instance each (1/100 or 1%). The speech act function is cen-
suring, praising, and conceding respectively.
Lastly, as noted above, two out of the 100 instances (2%) sampled are
uncategorized.
Figure 4.2 summarizes the CIs incidences by discourse domains.
In terms of topics within the discourse domains, issues which domi-
nate are those about policies and decisions, standpoints and strategies,
Figure 4.2 Incidence by discourse domains
and opinions and analyses. These fall mainly under the discourse
domains of political, government, and current affairs and finance and
economic affairs. Table 4.1 shows a breakdown of the topics within the
discourse domains and their incidences. Table 4.2 shows the incidences
of the topics against the total number of Internet samples.
As shown by Tables 4.1 and 4.2, most of the current uses of the CI
concern issues which are seen to be outcomes of an entitys judge-
ment, decision, evaluation, and beliefs. If we take the three topics of
policies and decisions, standpoints and strategies, and opinions
and analyses together, they account for 76 of the 100 samples. This
contrasts sharply with the mere 15 instances representing the topics of
personal development and knowledge and design and creativity. This
indicates that there is a clear preference for the CIs primary discourse
domains: those of public, political, and governmental affairs and their
relevant topics, over those of scholarship and personal development.
Having said that, a caveat needs to be made that this asymmetry may
be artifactual: public affairs would by nature attract more attention
from more people than matters of scholarship. However, researchers in
Internet text-mining have argued that because of the vast amount of
data and texts collected on the Internet, any potential biases are very
likely neutralized. Therefore, albeit not controlled for genre, register,
or topic, the currency of the Internets content does provide us with a
vista of the state of the language in question and the behaviours of its
users at the time of sampling (Kilgarriff and Grefenstette, 2003; Taylor
and Pang, 2008: 105).
Table 4.1 Topics within discourse domains and their incidences
Table 4.2 Incidences of topics against total number of samples

Furthermore, and importantly, this asymmetry in discourse domain

correlates with a bias in the CIs speech act function: to censure rather
than to praise. For example, of the 59 politics and public affairs
instances, 53 of these are censuring and three are conceding (94.92%),
leaving only three that are praising. Conversely, of the combined total
of 87 censuring and conceding instances foundthose expressing
or presupposing a negative stance towards the referential target of the
CI56 are under political, government, and current affairs, and 11 are
under finance and economic affairs. That is to say, 67 out of the 87
(83.91%) come from just these two domains.
4.5 Its meaning
The CI is clearly metaphorical, in that the notion of rendering knowl-

edge or thinking which a person has demonstrated at an earlier time
obsolete by replacing it with knowledge or thinking which a person
espouses at a later time is metaphorically construed as daa2 dou2, a
predicator comprising the morphemes daa2 hit and dou2 fall mean-
ing overthrow. This is prototypically an agentive transitive process
involving a certain degree of violence: the Agent daa2 (hits) so that
the Patient dou2 (falls). When the Patient falls, they are out of power
or control (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 1516), and the Agent assumes
a state of power and control in their stead. Predicating this of the
referential target in the CI means that the entity is construed as two
individuals, despite the coreference of NOM1 and NOM2. That is to say,
non-identity, the reverse of the vital relation of identity (Fauconnier,
1994; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 9596), obtains between the refer-
ential target at time t (self at time t) and the referential target at time
t-n (self at time t-n) (Figure 4.3).
The CI then triggers a conceptual integration (Fauconnier and
Turner, 2002, inter alia) of the two selves in a blended space where
the two can act on each other. The act which they carry out in this
blended space is construed as an instance of the act of daa2 dou2,
with (i) the implication that the Overthrower does this decisively
and with conviction, (ii) the strong expectation for the Overthrower
to supplant the Overthrown consequently, as well as (iii) the entail-
ment that the Overthrown is now completely obliterated. Figure 4.4
represents this diagrammatically. The dashed arrow indicates the
implied entailment that the persons self remains singular, but is
revised/improved after the daa2 dou2 process, as symbolized by the
enlarged dot.
Figure 4.3 The person split into non-identical self at time t and self at time t-n
Figure 4.4 Self at time t daa2 dou2 self at time t-n
The positive, approving interpretation of the CI (CIpos) is based on the

idealized cognitive model that when things develop, they develop for
the better. That is to say, their current manifestations and realizations
are better than their past ones, and their future manifestations and
realizations are in turn better than both their past and current ones. In
short, things progress in the direction of the future. I shall call this the
progress ICM. This implies that things that are more current, being
things lying further along the timeline in the direction of the future,
are preferable to those that are less so. Self at time t is thus necessarily
preferable to self at time t-n.
However, despite the reality of the partitioned self or multiple selves
(depending on how one wishes to construe the ontology of the self/
selves), there is another ICM underlying the progress ICM: for each
person, there is only one singular and unified self. This can be called
the single self ICM. Because of this ICM, the earlier/later-self concep-
tualization of progress becomes an anomaly which needs to be resolved.
The way out suggested by CIpos is to conceptualize progress as an oblit-
eration (daa2 dou2) of the earlier self by the later/current self, thereby
retaining the singularity of the persons self at the time of reference.
Progress and its related notions of self-improvement and accumulation
of knowledge are thus conceptualized as the beneficial act of supplan-
tation of self at time t-n by self at time t. This forms the basis of the
praising function/meaning of the CI.
Note, however, that despite the metaphorical nature of the CI, such
an intrapsychological split of a persons self per se is not metaphori-
cal. Partitioning the self into multiple selves is a regular human func-
tion which has cognitive, social, psychological, and developmental
underpinnings (see Pang, 2005, 2006, 2010). The metaphoricity lies in
construing a persons act of revising their knowledge or thinking as a
socio-physical (violent) act of daa2 dou2.
4.6 Meaning shift resulting from ICM and discourse

domain changes
Liang Qichao (18761929) was a scholar who advocated learning from

the West as a means to political, cultural, and economic reform in
Imperial China during late 19th and early 20th centuries (Jin, 2005;
Liang, 1921[1996]). Against the historical context where traditional
Chinese scholarship was viewed by the progressive-minded as no longer
able to provide Qing Dynasty China with the necessary knowledge,
technology, and outlook to withstand threats and impacts from the
West, Liang called for a utilitarian adaptation of European knowledge
and thinking. In contrast to the late-Qing zeitgeist of almost obsti-
nate adherence to tradition, and of viewing anything innovative and
Western with xenophobic suspicion, Liang called for and exemplified a
critical, reflexive, and vigilant attitude towards knowledge and scholar-

ship (Liang, 1921[1996]: 212; Tang and Tang, 2000: 7880).
In describing his own predilections as a scholar, Liang (1921[1996]:
195) reports having said (17) about himself.
(17) bat1 sik1 ji5 gam1 jat6 zi1 ngo5 naan6 zok6 jat6 zi1 ngo5
NEG spare INS today POSS 1SG challenge yesterday POSS 1SG
[I] think nothing of having the me of today challenge the me
of yesterday
As the putative original expression of the sentiment of overpower-

ing ones self of yesterday, this utterance can arguably be considered
the proto-CI from which the subsequent full-fledged CI has emerged.
It was a figure of speech to characterize Liangs attitude toward
self-improvement and reflectiveness. Having said that, however, it
should also be noted that his use of the proto-CI is also somewhat
ambivalent, as he also discusses his emotional conflict regarding such
changeability: what he saw as a general character flaw. For example,
he wrote of his heart constantly becoming the battlefield between
his conservatism and progressiveness, and how what he subscribed
to at different times might indeed turn out to be contradictory (Liang,
1921[1996]: 195). This suggests that the proto-CI may already have had
an inherent ambivalence in meaning at this early stage, and Liangs use
of it may already have foreshadowed the conceding use of the cur-
rent full-fledged CI. Note also that the predicator Liang used was naan6
(challenge or pose difficulty for), which profiles the initial phase of
the scenario underlying the metaphor: two combatants challenging
each other, (and one of them eventually prevailing and vanquishing the
other). As such, the current full-fledged CI has also shifted the profile
onto the end phase of the scenario.
Some subsequent commentators on Liang, however, have taken
Liangs self-description with the proto-CI as affirmation of Liangs
self-critical and reflective quality as a scholar/political thinker (e.g.,
Dong, 1996: 362; Jin, 2005: 228; Xia, 2009: 346). Their use of the
CI, which by the time of their writings, has emerged in its current,
full-fledged form with the prototypical daa2 dou2 predicate, is un-
equivocally approving. Thus, what seems to have happened is this.
In its proto-form as uttered by Liang, the CI was ambivalent: the act
of the me of today overthrowing the me of yesterday was implicitly
considered a dispreferred one, but it was done for the ultimate good
of critical thinking and responsible scholarship (Liang, 1921[1996]:

212). This made available two opposite meaning potentials for sub-
sequent users of the (eventual) CI: an implicit, presupposed censur-
ing meaning, which has since become explicitized; and an intended
praising meaning. In the current era, it is the explicit censuring use
that predominates. The praising use has become more rare, while the
conceding use can be considered a continuation from the proto-CI.5
It is in this shift-in-preference sense that I argue the CI is undergoing a
meaning and discourse domain shift.
This bias in use and meaning reflects a difference in the belief and
reasoning behind the CI: a difference between good scholarship and
self-improvement entail replacing past/outdated knowledge/thinking
with new or different knowledge and thinking in CIpos and being con-
sistent and responsible entails not replacing past knowledge, thinking,
and standpoints with something new or different in its disapproving
version (CIneg).
As with CIpos, CIneg is also predicated on a split of the entitys self: self
at t and self at t-n. Similarly, CIneg also triggers a conceptual integration
of the two selves in a blended space where self at t can daa2 dou2 self
at t-n. The difference, however, is that instead of non-identity, the vital
relation of identity is assumed to obtain between the two. This is consist-
ent with the coreferential reading of NOM1 and NOM2 in the CI. Thus,
although self at t and self at t-n exist at different points in time, the
person remains the same person throughout (Figure 4.5). Note that, as
such, this construal is in line with the single self ICM discussed above;
again, despite the reality of split/multiple selves. This is in stark contrast
with CIpos (cf. Figure 4.3).
Unlike CIpos, the ICM that underlies CIneg and that motivates its nega-
tive, censuring meaning is not the progress ICM, but an ICM which
entails directly from the single self ICM: a persons self persists through
time, so that the persons self at a certain point in time should be con-
sistent with the persons self at any other point in time, past or future.
That is to say, self at t is the same as self at tn. I shall call this the
consistency ICM. Given the consistency ICM, something different
emerges from the conceptual integration network triggered by CIneg.
Since self at t is now construed as identical to self at t-n, when they
coexist in the blended space, and self at t is said to daa2 dou2 self at
t-n, it implies that self at t-n can also daa2 dou2 self at t. If that is the
case, the predication becomes not only reflexive, but also reciprocal,
meaning that self at t itself also becomes supplanted together with
Figure 4.5 The person split into identical self at time t and self at time t-n
self at t-n. This is again an anomaly: if self at t and self at t-n are
both supplanted by each other, then there is no self left! Figure 4.6 is a
diagrammatic representation of this conceptualization.
Rather than offering obliteration of self at t-n and thereby retain-
ing a single self at time t as a resolution, as is the case with CIpos, what
CIneg does is to not offer any resolution at all. Instead, what it does is
call attention to the incongruity and incoherence of the predicated
scenario. Given the consistency ICM, self at t-n should be the same
(read: consistent with) as self at t. Thus, for the referential target to
engage in the act of daa2 dou2 their own self at t-n is something not
to be countenanced.
This is the basis for the largely negative, censuring speech act
function of CIneg and its overtone of ridicule. When scholarship or
self-improvement is the concern, it is good to daa2 dou2 the self of
yesterday because this constitutes progress. But when consistency is at
issue, especially in political, governmental, public, and financial affairs,
it is considered bad and ridiculous to do so, because of the undesirabil-
ity of the act and the incoherence in the idea of the act itself.
Furthermore, the critical stance towards inconsistency in policy-making
and political discourse foregrounds the role of the targets of criticism as
policy-makers and advocates of political standpoints. As policy-makers
and advocates of political standpoints, they are expected to not change
their views, their decisions, and what they stand for from day to day. In
the eyes of the public, consistency is paramount to political, economic,
Figure 4.6 Self at time t daa2 dou2 self at time t-n; where the two are identical,
resulting in the anomaly of self supplanting self, and hence no self left
and social stability and fairness. Moving goalposts are not accept-
able. At the same time, the criticism against inconsistency also back-
grounds the critical targets roles as politicians. One of the attendant
social-stereotype-driven inferences about politicians is that politicians
often lie (DAgostino, 2000; Dunning and Sherman, 1997). So being
mendacious, inconsistent, and opportunistic are expected of them
under this social stereotype. Given this, then, the use of CIneg may seem
paradoxical at first blush. However, as with all linguistic structures, CIneg
selectively foregrounds a pertinent part of the concepts domain-matrix
(Langacker, 1987: 147f.) for the discursive purpose at hand, to the
obfuscation of the rest. Part of the conceptualization which goes into
the meaning of CIneg is thus the backgrounding of the foxlike aspect
of the politicians stereotype, in the process of foregrounding the roles
policy-making and ideological aspects (Pang, 2010).
4.6.1 Bat1 sik1: intensification of the censuring meaning

The critical stance is made even more salient when the constructional
idiom is preceded by the expression bat1 sik1 (NEG spare), a predicate
which means be prepared to even V or think nothing of V-ing, for
example, (18)
(18) bat1 sik1 si2 ceot1 [CI] kei4 ziu1

NEG spare use-out [CI] unusual move
thought nothing of deploying the strange move of [CI] [...]

(forum.cyberctm.com/forum/forum.php?mod=viewthreadand
tid=327052)
This can be further intensified with the adverbial sam6 zi3 (even-to),
meaning even as far as or so much so that, for example, (8), repeated
here as (19).
(19) taa1 gin1 ci4 teoi1 can4 ceot1 san1 jin4 faat3 san1
3SG solid-hold push old emerge new research-develop new
caan2 ban2 sam6 zi3 bat1 sik1 ji5 gam1 jat6 dik1 ngo5
produce-thing even-to NEG spare INS today POSS 1SG
daa2 dou2 zok6 jat6 dik1 ngo5
hit-fall yesterday POSS 1SG
he insisted on innovative product development; so much so he
thought nothing of overturning his own earlier ideas
Bat1 sik1 implies that the action at issue is carried out by the Agent
at a cost, or at the expense of something else, but the Agent decides to
carry it out nonetheless, regardless of the cost. In this CI, the cost is,
of course, the act of overthrowing the Agents past self, at the expense
of appearing inconsistent and changeable. As expected, bat1 sik1 is
attested in both the censuring and conceding samples, these being
instances which presuppose the incongruity of the idea of self at t sup-
planting self at t-n. Bat1 sik1 serves to highlight the censurability of the
act predicated by the CI in the censuring example (18), while it serves
to obliquely call attention to the presupposed and implicit undesirabil-
ity of the act in the conceding examples of (19) and (20).
(20) pou5 jau5 bat1 sik1 ji5 [CI] dik1 hoi1 fong3 zing1 san4
embrace-have NEG spare INS [CI] POSS open-let essence-spirit
possessing the open-mindedness to think nothing of or be
prepared to [CI]
(www.ln.edu.hk/ihss/crd/ls-plus-unit/LS-Plus-1.2.html)
Thus, in summary, although both CIpos and CIneg are underlain by

the single self ICM, they are thence differently motivated by different
ICMs: CIpos by the progress ICM, and CIneg by the consistency ICM.
As a result, their meaning potentials and therefore the discursive stances
that they express diverge.
4.7 Discussion
4.7.1 Reciprocity between ICM and discourse domain

It is not entirely clear that there is a causal relation in either direction
between the CIs changing bias in discourse domain and the shift in its
underlying ICM. Rather, I would argue that the changes correlate with
each other and are mutually reinforcing.
As noted above, both meaning potentials were arguably available
even at its early proto-stage, although the censuring one was only
largely presupposed. Therefore, a corollary would be that both the
progress ICM and the consistency ICM were operative. The cur-
rent predominance of CIneg can be understood as a shift in focus from
the progress ICM to the consistency ICM. Such a shift in focus
would entail a re-evaluation of the idea of change: whereas change
is considered a merit under the notion of progress, it is not under
consistency. In other words, change is construed as equivalent to
progress in the case of the former, but as equivalent to inconsistency
in the case of the latter. When talking about political standpoints,
governmental policies, and the like, using the CI while underpinning
it with an ICM which discredits rather than credits change makes it
possible to endow the CI with a critical tone, and hence to express the
addressers critical stance.
Conversely, different discourse domains also necessitate a differ-
ence in the CIs underlying ICM. When talking about issues where
change is considered not desirable, an ICM which sees change as
meritorious such as the progress ICM cannot perform the desired
discursive function of criticism. Thus, if the addresser wants to
deploy the CI for a critical speech act, the underlying ICM needs to
be a different one: one which sees change as undesirable such as
the consistency ICM. Change here is, of course, understood in a
constrained way to refer to a reversal of position, contradiction in
opinion, and the like.
4.7.2 CIneg and its politico-social environment

As Section 4.4.1 shows, 56 out of the 87 CIneg samples (64.37 percent)
belong to the discourse domain of political and current affairs. Of
these, 48 have to do with policies, decisions, standpoints, opinions,
and strategies, i.e., 85.71 percent of the total number of political and
current affairs samples, or 48 percent of the total number of samples.
This indicates that the majority of the sampled uses of CIneg target
politicians, government officials, and policy-makers; specifically, what

they think and what they want to do (or not do) in their capacities as
public office-bearers. This can be seen as an expression of the post-2000
politico-social sentiment of the Hong Kong public, which is one of dis-
trust and dissatisfaction towards their politicians and bureaucrats. This
can be seen in the findings of public opinion polls.
According to a poll taken between 1316 December, 2010 as part of
the ongoing Public Opinion Programme conducted by the University
of Hong Kong (POP),
(i) 30.5 percent of those polled thought that the regions eco-
nomic conditions would likely worsen in three years time: the
highest since the 2008 global financial crisis (POP, 2010a).
(ii) 31.7 percent thought the regions political conditions would
likely worsen in three years time: the highest as well as the first
time the numbers had exceeded 30 percent since March, 2001
(POP, 2010b).
(iii) 32.5 percent thought that the regions social conditions would
likely worsen in three years time: the highest since 2007 (POP,
2010c).
The numbers paint a picture of discontent and lack of confidence

in the political, social, and economic outlook of the region. This lack
of confidence and discontent can translate to dissatisfaction in and
distrust of the politicians and the bureaucrats: the people who are per-
ceived to be most directly responsible for the issues concerned or most
able to address them.
In terms of trust, a recent POP poll on the Hong Kong publics degree
of trust in their government indicates that during the period 412 June,
2012, the mean value was 3 out of 5 (POP, 2012b).
Part of the distrust and discontent can be attributed to the pub-
lics perception that the government and some of the politicians are
biased towards big businesses, with policies favouring big business
interests at the expense of the general publics welfare. They perceive
their society as a virtual plutocracy (Lee, 2012), and their govern-
ment as not taking measures to ameliorate widening wealth disparity
(Oxfam, 2012).
Another contributing factor is the perceived implicit acquiescence
on the part of the Hong Kong government to Beijing, even in domes-
tic matters concerning the regions governance, political system, and
democratic process. In the publics mind, this flies in the face of the
high degree of autonomy supposedly guaranteed the region under the
one country, two systems model when the region reverted to PRC sov-
ereignty in 1997. A POP poll on the implementation of the model dur-
ing JanuaryJune 2010 shows the level of lack of public confidence at
37.6 percent: the highest to date since JanuaryJune 2003 (POP, 2012a).
Against this general milieu of distrust and lack of confidence, actions
and policies which the government would put forward, and which
what is generally known as the pro-establishment camp of politicians
would endorse and advocate, would thus often be seen as having been
influenced or even implicitly dictated by Beijing. On the other hand,
when revisions in policies or delays in policy implementation happen,
especially those concerned with social welfare and political reforms,
these would be seen as vacillation or back-pedalling resulting from the
governments bowing to implicit wishes from Beijing. Discourse criti-
cal of these ensues.
4.8 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, constructional idioms, as concise summarizations of a

languacultures ethos, embody and are underlain by the languacultures
ICMs. When the focal ICMs change, often in response to and/or in cor-
relation with changes in issues and concerns in the politico-social envi-
ronment of the languaculture, the uses and meanings of the linguistic
expressions which the ICMs underlie will inevitably also change. The
CI investigated in this chapter is a case in point. The basic meaning
of the CI is about a drastic change of mind in the referential target,
for example, new knowledge acquired, a new opinion formulated,
or a new position advocated. When the politico-social environment/
climate is one where improvement and progress is valued and encour-
aged, change is something to be embraced (the progress ICM). The
CI is thus able to be used to express praise and endorsement, and
to enact an approving stance on the part of the addresser. But when
the politico-social environment/climate is one where consistency in
policy-making and political standpoints are deemed important, change
is conceived instead as manifestation of inconsistency, reneging, and
mendacity (the consistency ICM). The CI can thus become an expres-
sion of censure and criticism, and represent a disapproving stance on
the part of the addresser.
Appendix 1 Cantonese romanization adapted from The Linguistic Society of

Hong Kong
Notes
1. Although I describe the language here as Hong Kong Chinese (Cantonese), it
is also the primary language of the Chinese-speaking communities of neigh-
bouring Macao, the Guangdong Province of the Peoples Republic of China,
and many Chinese diaspora communities. In fact, some of the data used in
this analysis have come from Macao websites.
2. The romanization convention adopted is based on that of the Linguistic
Society of Hong Kong (LSHK). See Appendix 1 for a list of the alphabets and
their IPA equivalents.
3. Although all the samples are written ones collected from the Internet, some
of them exhibit characteristics of spoken Cantonese. This practice of cross-
ing between spoken and written genres is not uncommon in not-so-formal
Cantonese writing. It is thus not entirely clear that these samples can be
straightforwardly classified as written examples. For this reason, I have
avoided the more specific terms of speaker and writer, and have opted for
the less specific term of addresser to denote the author of the sample.
4. It would be interesting to investigate further if this sample in the form zok6
tin1 dik1 ngo5 daa2 dou2 gam1 tin1 dik1 ngo5 (the me of yesterday overthrow-
ing the me of today) actually represents a reverse version of the CI. That is
to say, is it a different but related CI which designates regress as opposed to
progress (see Section 4.5)?
5. According to an informant, the CI was used in politics-related discourse in a
censuring manner in the Peoples Republic of China during the 1970s, and
such use was by far the more prevalent. Albeit only anecdotal, this seems to
suggest that the refocusing in meaning and bias for the discourse domain
of politics were already in place to a certain extent by the 1970s. However,
my Internet search only returned a handful of hits from PRC-based sites.
So it appears thatat least in the post-2000 erathe CI has become
not as entrenched in PRC linguistic communities as it is in Hong Kong
communities.
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Part II
Cultural Linguistic Approaches
to Language and Culture
5
Advances in Cultural Linguistics
Farzad Sharifian
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an account of the development of Cultural

Linguistics as a multidisciplinary area exploring the relationship
between language, culture, and conceptualisation. Cultural Linguistics
grew out of an interest in integrating cognitive linguistics with the
three traditions within linguistic anthropology of Boasian linguistics,
ethnosemantics, and the ethnography of speaking. In the last decade,
Cultural Linguistics has also found strong common ground with cogni-
tive anthropology, since both explore cultural models that characterise
cultural groups. For Cultural Linguistics, many features of human lan-
guages are entrenched in cultural conceptualisations, including cultural
models. In recent years, Cultural Linguistics has drawn on several dis-
ciplines and sub-disciplines, such as complexity science and distributed
cognition, to enrich its theoretical understanding of the notion of cul-
tural cognition. Applications of Cultural Linguistics have enabled fruitful
investigations of the cultural grounding of language in several applied
domains such as World Englishes, intercultural communication, and
political discourse analysis. This chapter elaborates on these observa-
tions and provides illustrative examples of linguistic research from the
perspective of Cultural Linguistics.
5.2 What is Cultural Linguistics?
Cultural Linguistics is a sub-discipline of linguistics with a multi-

disciplinary origin which explores the interface between language,
culture, and conceptualisation (Palmer, 1996, this volume; Sharifian,
2011). While cultural linguistics (without capitalisation) may be
99
used to refer to a broad, general area of interest in the relation-

ship between language and culture, Cultural Linguistics explores,
in explicit terms, conceptualisations that have a cultural basis and
are encoded in and communicated through features of human lan-
guages. The pivotal focus on conceptualisation in Cultural Linguistics
owes its centrality to cognitive linguistics, a discipline that Cultural
Linguistics drew on at its inception.
The term cultural linguistics was perhaps first used by a pioneer
of cognitive linguistics, Ronald Langacker, in an argument emphasis-
ing the relationship between cultural knowledge and grammar. He
maintained that the advent of cognitive linguistics can be heralded
as a return to cultural linguistics. Cognitive linguistic theories recognise
cultural knowledge as the foundation not just of lexicon, but central
facets of grammar as well (Langacker, 1994, p. 31, original emphasis).
Langacker (this volume) maintains that while meaning is identified as
conceptualisation, cognition at all levels is both embodied and cultur-
ally embedded. In practice, however, the role of culture in shaping
language and the influence of culture on all levels of language was not
adequately and explicitly dealt with until the publication of Toward
a Theory of Cultural Linguistics (1996) by Gary B. Palmer, a linguistic
anthropologist from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. In this book,
Palmer argued that cognitive linguistics can be directly applied to the
study of language and culture. Central to Palmers proposal is the idea
that language is the play of verbal symbols that are based in imagery
(Palmer, 1996, p. 3, emphasis added), and that this imagery is cultur-
ally constructed. Palmer argued that culturally defined imagery governs
narrative, figurative language, semantics, grammar, discourse, and even
phonology.
Palmers notion of imagery is not limited to visual imagery. As he
puts it, [i]magery is what we see in our minds eye, but it is also the
taste of mango, the feel of walking in a tropical downpour, the music of
Mississippi Masala (Palmer, 1996, p. 3). He adds, phonemes are heard
as verbal images arranged in complex categories; words acquire mean-
ings that are relative to image schemas, scenes, and scenarios; clauses
are image-based constructions; discourse emerges as a process governed
by reflexive imagery of itself; and world view subsumes it all (Palmer,
1996, p. 4). Since for Palmer the notion of imagery captures conceptual
units such as cognitive categories and schemas, my terminological pref-
erence is the term conceptualisation rather than imagery. I elaborate on
my use of this term later in this chapter.
Advances in Cultural Linguistics 101
Palmers proposal called for close links between three traditions in

anthropological linguistics and cognitive linguistics, as follows:
Cognitive linguistics can be tied into three traditional approaches

that are central to anthropological linguistics: Boasian linguistics,
ethnosemantics (ethno science), and the ethnography of speaking.
To the synthesis that results I have given the name cultural linguistics.
(Palmer, 1996, p. 5, original emphasis)
Palmers proposal can be diagrammatically represented in Figure 5.1

below:
Boasian linguistics, named after the German-American anthropologist
Franz Boas, saw language as reflecting peoples mental life and culture.
Boas observed that languages classify experiences differently and that these
linguistic categories tend to influence the thought patterns of their speakers
(Blount, 1995[1974]; Lucy, 1992). The latter theme formed the basis of later
work by scholars such as Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. The views of
the relationship between language and culture that have been attributed
to this school of thought range from the theoretical position that language
and culture shape human thought to one that regards human thought as
influenced by language and culture. It is worth noting that although the
former is often attributed to scholars such as Sapir and Whorf, in recent
decades others have presented much more sophisticated accounts of the
views held by these scholars (see Leavitt, forthcoming).
Figure 5.1 A diagrammatic representation of Palmers (1996) proposal for

cultural linguistics
A related subfield is that of ethnosemantics, which is the study of

the ways in which different cultures organise and categorise domains
of knowledge, such as those of plants, animals, and kin (Palmer, 1996,
p. 19). For example, several ethnosemanticists have extensively studied
kinship classifications in Aboriginal languages of Australia and noted
their complexity, relative to the kinship system classifications in vari-
eties of English such as American English or Australian English (for
example, Tonkinson, 1998). An important field of inquiry that is closely
related to ethnosemantics is ethnobiology, which is the study of how
plants and animals are categorised and used across different cultures
(Berlin, 1992).
The ethnography of speaking, or the ethnography of communica-
tion, largely associated with the work of Dell Hymes (for example,
1974) and John Gumperz (for example, Gumperz and Hymes, 1972)
explores culturally distinctive means and modes of speaking or com-
munication in general. Hymes emphasised the role of socio-cultural
context in the ways in which speakers perform communicatively.
He argued that the competence that is required for the conduct of
social life includes more than just the type of linguistic competence
Chomskyan linguists studied. He proposed that a discussion of these
factors be placed under the notion of communicative competence, which
includes competence in appropriate norms of language use in various
socio-cultural contexts. Generally the three linguistic-anthropological
traditions discussed so far share an interest in the natives point
of view (Palmer, 1996, p. 26), and an interest in the socio-cultural
grounding of language, although a number of anthropological linguists
have simply focused on documenting lesser known languages (see
Duranti, 2003 for a historical review).
Cognitive linguistics utilises several analytical tools from within the
broad field of cognitive science, notably the notion of schema (see also
Blount, this volume). The concept of schema has been very widely
used in several disciplines and under different rubrics, and this has
led to different understandings and definitions of the term. For cogni-
tive linguists such as Langacker, schemas are abstract representations.
For example, for him, a noun instantiates the schema of [[THING]/[X]],
whereas a verb instantiates the schema of [[PROCESS]/[X]]. In classical
paradigms of cognitive psychology, however, schemas are considered
more broadly as building blocks of cognition used for storing, organis-
ing, and interpreting information (for example, Bartlett, 1932; Bobrow
and Norman, 1975; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1980). Image schemas,
on the other hand, are regarded as recurring cognitive structures which
establish patterns of understanding and reasoning, often elaborated by

extension from our knowledge of our bodies as well as our experience
of social interactions (for example, Johnson, 1987). An example of this
would be to understand the body or parts of the body as containers.
Such an understanding is reflected in expressions like: with a heart full
of happiness. Another analytical tool used in cognitive linguistics is
the conceptual metaphor, which is closely associated with the work of
Lakoff, and to a lesser extent Johnson (for example, Lakoff and Johnson,
1980). Conceptual metaphors are defined as cognitive structures that
allow us to conceptualise and understand one conceptual domain in
terms of another. For instance, the English metaphorical expressions:
heavy-hearted and light-hearted, reflect the conceptual metaphor of
HEART AS THE SEAT OF EMOTION. In proposing the framework of cultural
linguistics, Palmer persuasively argued that it is likely that all these con-
ceptual structures have a cultural basis.1 His own work has been based
on the analysis of cases from such diverse languages as Tagalog, Coeur
dAlene, and Shona (for example, Palmer 1996, 2003).
Although Palmer believed that the link with cognitive linguistics could
provide Cultural Linguistics with a solid cognitive perspective cognitive
linguistics has received criticism for not having a strong cognitive base,
in the areas of cognitive representations, structure, and processes (for
example, Peeters, 2001). The ambiguity here lies in different interpreta-
tions of the term cognitive. What makes studies associated with main-
stream cognitive linguistics cognitive is their emphasis on cognitive
conceptualisation, whereas studies of cognitive processing in the subfield
of psycholinguistics are more likely to emphasise non-conceptual phe-
nomena, such as response time and strength of response.
In recent years, Cultural Linguistics has drawn on several other disci-
plines and sub-disciplines towards developing a theoretical framework
that would offer an integrated understanding of the notions of cogni-
tion and culture, as they relate to language. This framework that may
be referred to as cultural cognition and language (Sharifian, 2008b, 2009b,
2011) proposes a view of cognition that has life at the level of culture,
under the concept of cultural cognition.
Cultural cognition draws on a multidisciplinary understanding of
the collective cognition that characterises a cultural group. Several
cognitive scientists have moved beyond the level of the individual,
working on cognition as a collective entity (for example, Clark and
Chalmers, 1998; Sutton, 2005, 2006; Wilson, 2005). Other schol-
ars, working in the area of complex science often under the rubric
of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), have been seeking to explain
how relationships between parts, or agents, give rise to the collective

behaviours of a system or group (for example, Holland, 1995; Waldrop,
1992). A number of scholars, notably Hutchins (1994), have explored
the notion of distributed cognition, including factors external to the
human organism, such as technology and the environment, in their
definition of cognition (see also Borofsky, 1994 and Palmer, 2006 for
the notion of distributed knowledge in relation to language). Drawing
on all this work, Sharifian (2008b, 2009b, 2011) offers a model of
cultural cognition that establishes criteria for distinguishing between
what is cognitive and what is cultural and the relationship between
the two in the domain of Cultural Linguistics.
Cultural cognition embraces the cultural knowledge that emerges
from the interactions between members of a cultural group across time
and space. Apart from the ordinary sense of emergence here, cultural
cognition is emergent in the technical sense of the term (for example,
Goldstein, 1999). In other words, cultural cognition is the cognition
that results from the interactions between parts of the system (the
members of a group) which is more than the sum of its parts (more
than the sum of the cognitions of the individual members). Like all
emergent systems, cultural cognition is dynamic in that it is constantly
being negotiated and renegotiated within and across the generations of
the relevant cultural group, as well as through the contact that members
of that group have with other cultures.
Language is a central aspect of cultural cognition as it serves, to use
the term used by wa Thiongo (1986), as a collective memory bank of
the cultural cognition of a group. Many aspects of language are shaped
by the cultural cognition that prevailed at earlier stages in the history
of a speech community. Historical cultural practices leave traces in cur-
rent linguistic practice, some of which are in fossilised forms that may
no longer be analysable. In this sense language can be viewed as storing
and communicating cultural cognition. In other words language acts
both as a memory bank and a fluid vehicle for the (re-)transmission of
cultural cognition and its component parts or cultural conceptualisations,
a term elaborated upon in the following section.
5.3 Cultural conceptualisations
The analytical tools that have proved useful in examining aspects of cultural
cognition and its instantiation in language are cultural schema, cultural
category (including cultural prototype), and cultural metaphor. I refer to
these collectively as cultural conceptualisations (Sharifian, 2011). Consistent
with the view of cultural cognition discussed earlier in this chapter, these
analytical tools are seen as existing at the collective level of cultural cogni-
tion, as well as that of the individual. Cultural conceptualisations and their
entrenchment in language are intrinsic to cultural cognition.
The notions of schema and conceptual metaphor were discussed ear-
lier in this chapter. The following section elaborates on the notion of
cultural schema and discusses how it relates to language.
5.3.1 Cultural schemas and language

Cultural schemas are a culturally constructed sub-class of schemas; that is,
they are abstracted from a cultural groups cultural, and therefore to some
extent shared, experiences, as opposed to being abstracted from an individ-
uals idiosyncratic experiences. They enable individuals to communicate
cultural meanings. In terms of their development and their representation,
at the macro level, cultural schemas emerge from interactions between the
members of a cultural group, while they are constantly negotiated and
renegotiated across time and space. At the micro level, each individual has
internalised their own share of these macro-level schemas, albeit in a het-
erogeneously distributed fashion. That is, individuals who belong to the
same cultural group may share some, but not all, components of a cultural
schema. In other words, each persons internalisation of a macro-level cul-
tural schema is to some extent collective and to some extent idiosyncratic.
This pattern may be diagrammatically presented in Figure 5.2:
Figure 5.2 Diagrammatic representation of a cultural schema (adapted from

Sharifian, 2011)
Figure 5.2 shows how a cultural schema may be represented in a

heterogeneously distributed fashion across the minds of individuals.
It schematically represents how members may have internalised some
but not all components of a macro-level cultural schema. It also shows
how individuals may share some of, but not all, the elements of a cul-
tural schema with each other. It is to be noted that the individuals who
internalise aspects of a cultural schema may not only be those who are
viewed as the insiders by the cultural group. Outsiders who have some-
how had contact and interaction with the group can also internalise
aspects of these cultural schemas.
Besides its pivotal use in Cultural Linguistics, the notion of cultural
schema has also been adopted as a key analytical tool in cognitive
anthropology (for example, DAndrade, 1995; Shore, 1996; Strauss and
Quinn, 1997; see also Blount, 2011, this volume). For cognitive anthro-
pologists culture is a cognitive system, and thus the notion of cultural
schema provides a useful tool to explore cognitive schemas that are cul-
turally constructed across different societies and cultural groups. A term
that closely overlaps with cultural schema and has again received major
attention in cognitive anthropology is that of the cultural model (for
example, DAndrade, 1995; DAndrade and Strauss, 1992; Holland and
Quinn, 1987). This term, which was initially intended to displace the
term folk models (Keesing, 1987), has also been employed in the sense
of a cognitive schema that is intersubjectively shared by a social group
(DAndrade, 1987, p. 112). DAndrade constantly refers to the notion of
schema in his explication of the term cultural model (ibid.) and he
regards models as complex cognitive schemas. Strauss and Quinn (1997,
p. 49) also maintain that another term for cultural schemas (especially
of the more complex sort) is cultural model. Polzenhagen and Wolf
(2007), however, have used the notion of cultural model to represent
more general, overarching conceptualisations encompassing metaphors
and schemas which are minimally complex.
An example of the use of cultural models in cognitive anthropol-
ogy is the exploration of the cultural model of American marriage. For
example, Quinn (1987) observes that the American cultural model of
marriage is based on metaphors such as MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING JOURNEY,
reflected in statements such as this marriage is at a dead end.
From the outset, the notion of cultural schema proved to be pivotal
to Cultural Linguistics. In Toward a Theory of Cultural Linguistics, Palmer
(1996, p. 63) maintained that [i]t is likely that all native knowledge
of language and culture belongs to cultural schemas and the living of
culture and the speaking of language consist of schemas in action.

Cultural schemas capture encyclopaedic meaning that is culturally con-
structed for many lexical items of human languages. Take an example
of the word privacy in a variety of English such as American English.
The pool of knowledge that forms a web of concepts that define pri-
vacy in relation to various contexts and factors is best described as the
cultural schema of PRIVACY. The cultural construction of this schema is
partly reflected in complaints that some speakers make about members
of some other cultural groups, such as they dont understand the mean-
ing of privacy.
Cultural schemas may also provide a basis for pragmatic meanings,
in the sense that, knowledge which underlies the enactment and
uptake of speech acts and that is assumed to be culturally shared is
largely captured in cultural schemas. In some languages, for example,
the speech act of greeting is closely associated with cultural schemas
of eating and food, whereas in some other languages it is associated
with cultural schemas that relate to the health of the interlocutors and
their family members. The available literature in the area of pragmatics
makes very frequent references to inference and shared assumptions
as the basis for the communication of pragmatic meanings. It goes with-
out saying that making assumptions about the knowledge of listeners
are technically based on the general assumption that shared cultural
schemas are necessary for making sense of speech acts. In short, cultural
schemas capture pools of knowledge that provide a basis for a signifi-
cant portion of semantic and pragmatic meanings in human languages.
5.3.2 Cultural categories and language

Another class of cultural conceptualisation is that of the cultural cat-
egory. Categorisation is one of the most fundamental human cognitive
activities. It begins, albeit in an idiosyncratic way, early in life. Many
studies have investigated how children engage in categorising objects
and events early in life (Mareschal, Powell, and Volein, 2003). Children
usually begin by setting up their own categories but as they grow up,
as part of their cognitive development, they explore and discover how
their language and culture categorise events, objects, and experiences.
As Glushko et al. (2008, p. 129) put it:
Categorisation research focuses on the acquisition and use of catego-

ries shared by a culture and associated with languagewhat we will
call cultural categorisation.
Cultural categories exist for objects, events, settings, mental states,

properties, relations and other components of experience (e.g. birds,
weddings, parks, serenity, blue and above). Typically, these categories
are acquired through normal exposure to caregivers and culture with
little explicit instruction.
The categorisation of many objects, events and experiences, such as

food, vegetables, fruit, and so on, and their prototype instances, are
culturally constructed. It is to be noted that the reference to wedding
as a category in the above quotation is distinct from the use of this word
in relation to cultural schemas. The wedding as a cultural category
refers to the type of event that is opposed to engagement or dining
out, for example. Wedding as a cultural schema includes all the other
aspects of the event, such as the procedures that need to be followed,
the sequence of events, the roles played by various participants and
expectations associated with those roles.
As for the relationship between cultural categories and language,
many lexical items of human languages act as labels for the categories
and their instances. As mentioned above, in English the word food
refers to a category, and a word such as: steak is an instance of that
category. Usually categories form networks and hierarchies, in that
instances of a category can themselves serve as categories with their
own instances. For example, pasta is an instance of the category of
food with its own instances, such as penne or rigatoni.
Apart from lexical items, in some languages cultural categories are
marked by noun classifiers. For example, Murrinh-Patha, an Australian
Aboriginal language, uses ten noun classes, which are reflective of
Murrinh-Patha cultural categorisation (Street, 1987; Walsh, 1993).
These categories are identified through noun class markers that appear
before the noun. The following list from Walsh (1993, p. 110) includes
the class markers and the definition of each category:
1. Kardu: Aboriginal people and human spirits

2. Ku: Non-Aboriginal people and all other animates and their products.
3. Kura: Potable fluid (i.e., fresh water) and collective terms for fresh
water (i.e., rain, river).
4. mi: Flowers and fruits of plants and any vegetable foods. Also faeces.
5. thamul: Spears.
6. thu: Offensive weapons (defensive weapons belong to nanthi), thun-
der and lightning, playing cards.
7. thungku: Fire and things associated with fire.
8. da: Place and season (i.e. dry grass time).

9. murrinh: Speech and language and associated concepts such as song
and news.
10. nanthi: A residual category including whatever does not fit into the
other nine categories.
The above categorisation also allows for multiple membership in the

sense that depending on its function, a noun may be categorised into
one class at one time and another class at another. For instance, a boo-
merang may be categorised as nanthi when it is used as a back-scratcher
and thu when it is used as an offensive weapon (Walsh, 1993). Also in
the Dreamtime Creation stories, when the Ancestor beings turned into
animals while engaged in their journey of creating the natural world,
this change is signalled by a switch from one noun class into another.
This system of noun classification is entrenched in Murrinh-Patha
cultural categorisation, which in turn is based on the Murrinh-Patha
worldview. For instance, as Walsh argues, the fact that fresh water, fire,
and language are classified separately indicates that each holds a promi-
nent place in the culture of the Murrinh-Patha.
Apart from noun classifiers, there are pronouns in many Aboriginal
languages that reflect cultural categories, through marking moiety, gen-
eration level, and relationship. In Arabana, as an example, the pronoun
arnanthara, which may be glossed into English as kinship-we, captures
the following complex category:
Arnanthara = we, who belong to the same matrilineal moiety, adja-

cent generation levels, and who are in the basic relationship of
mother, or mothers brother and child. (Hercus, 1994, p. 117)
In Arabana, this cultural categorisation of kin groups is also marked

on the second plural kinship pronoun aranthara and the third-person
plural kinship pronoun karananthara. These examples clearly reveal
how some cultural categories are encoded in the grammatical system of
a language (see also Lakoff, 1987).
5.3.3 Cultural-conceptual metaphors and language

As mentioned earlier, conceptual metaphor refers to the cognitive
conceptualisation of one domain in terms of another (for example,
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Extensive research in cognitive linguistics
has shown how even our basic understanding of ourselves and our
surroundings is mediated by conceptual metaphors. For example, in
clock-and-calendar, industrial cultures, time is commonly understood

in terms of a commodity, money, a limited resource, and so on. This is
reflected in expressions such as buying time, saving time, and the like.
More importantly our understanding of ourselves is achieved through
conceptual metaphors. For example we can conceptualise our thoughts,
feelings, personality traits, and so on in terms of our body parts.
Research in Cultural Linguistics is interested in exploring conceptual
metaphors that are culturally constructed (for example, Palmer, 1996;
Sharifian, 2011), which I refer to as cultural metaphors. Several studies
have explored cultural schemas and models that give rise to concep-
tual metaphors, for example through ethnomedical or other cultural
traditions (Sharifian et al., 2008; Yu, 2009a, 2009b). For example, in
Indonesian it is hati the liver that is associated with love, rather than
the heart (Siahaan, 2008). Siahaan traces back such conceptualisations
to the ritual of animal sacrifice, especially the interpretation of liver
organ known as liver divination, which was practised in ancient
Indonesia. In some languages, such as Tok Pisin (Muhlhausler, Dutton,
and Romaine, 2003), the belly is the seat of emotions. Yu (2009b)
observes that many linguistic expressions in Chinese reflect the con-
ceptualisation of THE HEART IS THE RULER OF THE BODY. He maintains that
the target-domain concept here is an important one because the heart
is regarded as the central faculty of cognition and the site of both affec-
tive and cognitive activities in ancient Chinese philosophy (Yu, 2007,
p. 27). Studies of such cultural conceptualisations are currently gather-
ing further momentum (for example, Idstrm and Piirainen, 2012).
It should be noted here that the cognitive processing of conceptual
metaphor is rather a complex issue to explore. While the use of the term
metaphor here highlights the involvement of two distinct domains of
experience (that is: source and target) it does not follow that every use
of an expression that is associated with a conceptual metaphor involves
the on-line cognitive process of mapping from one domain to another.
Some cases of conceptual metaphors are simply fossilised conceptuali-
sations that represented active insight at some stage in the history of
the cultural cognition of a group. Such metaphors do not imply current
speakers of the language have any conscious awareness of their cultural
roots, or are engaged in any conceptual mapping when they use them.
In such cases, the conceptual metaphors may rather serve as a cultural
schema which guides thinking about and helps with understanding
domains of experience. In some other cases, the expressions that are
associated with such cultural conceptualisations may be considered
simply as figures of speech.
As for the relationship between cultural-conceptual metaphors and

language, it is clear from the above discussion that many aspects of
human languages are closely linked with cultural metaphors. In fact,
Cultural Linguistics and cognitive linguistics rely heavily on linguistic
data for the exploration of conceptual metaphor. As mentioned above,
the language of emotion (for example, you broke my heart) largely reflects
culturally mediated conceptualisations of emotions and feelings in
terms of body parts.
In short, Cultural Linguistics explores human languages and language
varieties to examine features that draw on cultural conceptualisations
such as cultural schemas, cultural categories, and cultural-conceptual
metaphors, from the perspective of the theoretical framework of cultural
cognition. While the ultimate aim of Cultural Linguistics is to examine
the relationship between language, culture, and conceptualisations
thus far, Cultural Linguistics perspective has been used in several areas
of applied linguistics. The following sections present brief summaries
of a Cultural Linguistics framework that has been applied to World
Englishes, intercultural communication, and political discourse analysis.
5.4 Cultural Linguistics and research into varieties

of English
Cultural Linguistics has offered a ground breaking approach to the

exploration of varieties of English, based on the premise that varie-
ties of English may be distinct from each other at the level of cultural
conceptualisations (Sharifian, 2005, 2006). Malcolm and Rochecouste
(2000) identified a number of distinctive cultural schemas in the dis-
course produced by a number of speakers of Australian Aboriginal
English. These schemas included: Travel, Hunting, Observing, Scary
Things, Gathering, Problem Solving, Social Relationships, and Smash
(an Aboriginal English word for a fight). The first four schemas were
found to occur most frequently in the data.
Wolf and Polzenhagen (Polzenhagen and Wolf, 2007; Wolf, 2008; Wolf
and Polzenhagen, 2009) have explored conceptualisations of the African
cultural model of community in African varieties of English. Wolf
(2008, p. 368) maintains that this cultural model involves a cosmology
and relates to such notions as the continuation of the community, the
members of the community, witchcraft, the acquisition of wealth, and
corruption, which find expression in African English. For example, by
examining a number of expressions in Cameroon English (for example:
they took bribes from their less fortunate brothers), Wolf observes that
the central conceptual metaphors in that variety of English are KINSHIP IS

COMMUNITY and COMMUNITY IS KINSHIP (Wolf, 2008, p. 370).
Sharifian (2005, 2008a) examined cultural conceptualisations in
English spoken by a group of Aboriginal students who, because they
sounded like speakers of Australian English, were not identified by their
teachers as Aboriginal English speakers. Through a study of word asso-
ciation, however, he found that English words such as family, home,
shame evoked cultural conceptualisations in these students that were
predominantly those that are associated with Aboriginal English rather
than Australian English. For example, for Aboriginal students the word
family appeared to be associated with categories in Aboriginal English
that extend far beyond what is described as the nuclear family, which
is the central notion in Anglo-Australian culture. Consider the follow-
ing table of data (Table 5.1) from Sharifian (2005):
Table 5.1 A comparison of Aboriginal and Anglo-Australian meanings for

family
Aboriginal Anglo-Australian
Stimulus word: Family Stimulus word: Family
Love your pop, love your nan, love our You got brothers and sisters in your
mums, love our dads. family and your mum and dad, and
Brothers, sisters, auntie, uncles, nan, you have fun with your family, have
pops, father, nephew and nieces. dinner with your family, you go out
Theyre there for you, when you need with your family.
m they look after you, you call m Dad, mum, brother, dog.
auntie and uncle an cousins. Mum, and dad, brother and sister.
People, mums, dads, brother, group Fathers, sisters, parents, caring.
of families, like aunties and uncles, People, your mum and dad, and your
nanas and pops. sister and brother.
Ive got lots of people in my family, got All my family, my brothers and
a big family, got lots of family. sisters, my mum and my dad.
My family, you know how many family Kids, mums, dads, sisters, brothers.
I got? One thousand millions, hundred Mother, sister, brother, life.
ninety-nine million thousand thousand Mum, dad, my brother.
nine nine sixty-one million million, I think of all the people in my family
uncle, Joe, Stacy, cousins, uncles, [F: Who are they? I: My mum, my
sisters, brothers, girlfriends and my dad, and my sister].
million sixty-one thousand family. They have a house, they have a car,
I like my family, all of my family, my they have their kitchen, their room,
aunties an uncles and cousins, and I their toilet, their backyard, their
like Dryandra. carport, they have a dog and a cat.
Just having family that is Nyungar
[an Aboriginal cultural group] and
meeting each other.
The responses given by Aboriginal participants instantiate the Aboriginal

cultural schema of family as they refer to members of their extended fam-
ily, such as aunts and uncles. The responses from the Anglo-Australian
participants suggest that the word family is, in most cases, restricted to
the nuclear family, while sometimes house pets are also included.
Responses such as theyre there for you, when you need m they look after
you by Aboriginal participants reflect the responsibilities of care that
are very alive between the members of an extended Aboriginal family.
Uncles and aunties often play a large role in an individuals upbringing.
The closeness of an Aboriginal person to a range of people in his or her
extended family members is also reflected in the patterns of responses
where the primary responses refer to uncles and aunties or nana and
pop instead of father and mother. Responses such as my million sixty-one
thousand family and Ive got lots of people in my family reflect the extended
coverage of the concept of family in the Aboriginal conceptualisation.
The word home appeared to be mainly associated with family rela-
tionships rather than an attitude to a building used as a dwelling by a
nuclear family.
Cultural Linguistics has also been recently used in compiling a dic-
tionary of Hong Kong English. In a very innovative project, Cummings
and Wolf (2011) have identified and included underlying cultural con-
ceptualisations for many of the words included in the dictionary. The
following is an example of an entry in the dictionary:
Spirit money (also paper money, hell money, hell bank notes)
Fixes expressions, n.
Definition. Fake money burned in a ritual offering to the dead
Text example: An offering of oranges may be peeled and placed on
the grave, together with paper money. Finally, crackers are let off.
Underlying conceptualisations: A SUPERNATURAL BEING IS A HUMAN
BEING, A PAPER MODEL IS A REAL OBJECT IN THE SUPERNATURAL WORLD [TARGET
DOMAIN > SUPERNATURAL BEING, PAPER MODEL] [SOURCE DOMAIN > HUMAN
BEING, OBJECT IN THE SUPERNATURAL WORLD].
(Ibid., pp. 16364)
This groundbreaking step in the tradition of dictionary compilation

allows readers to become familiar with the cultural conceptualisations
that underlie certain expressions in the given language or the language
variety. But, of course, in many cases the underlying conceptualisations
themselves have their roots in certain cultural traditions, including that
of religion and spirituality.
5.5 Cultural Linguistics and intercultural communication
Intercultural communication has in the past been extensively studied

from the perspective of linguistic anthropology. Gumperz (for example,
1982, 1991) introduced the notion of contextualisation cues as an
analytical tool for exploring intercultural communication/miscommu-
nication. He defines these cues as verbal and non-verbal metalinguistic
signs that serve to retrieve the context-bound presuppositions in terms
of which component messages are interpreted (Gumperz, 1996, p. 379).
Central to this notion is the importance of the indirect inferences
speakers make during intercultural communication as they rely on lin-
guistic and non-linguistic cues.
From the perspective of Cultural Linguistics, making indirect infer-
ences during intercultural communication is largely facilitated by
shared cultural conceptualisations on the part of interlocutors. Cultural
conceptualisations provide a basis for constructing, interpreting, and
negotiating intercultural meanings. These conceptualisations may be
the ones that are associated with their L1, or they may be others indi-
viduals have access to as result of living in a particular cultural environ-
ment, or even new ones developed from interacting with speakers from
other cultures.
Several studies in recent years have shown that in certain contexts
intercultural communication, and in particular miscommunication,
reflect differences in the ways in which different groups of speakers
conceptualise their experiences as they draw on their different cultural
schemas, categories, and metaphors. Wolf and Polzenhagen (2009)
observe that cross-cultural variation at the conceptual level calls for a
strongly meaning-oriented and interpretive approach to the study of
intercultural communication and that is what Cultural Linguistics has
to offer.
As an example of studies of intercultural communication from the
perspective of Cultural Linguistics, Sharifian (2010) explored miscom-
munication between speakers of Aboriginal English and non-Aboriginal
English that mainly arose from non-Aboriginal speakers unfamiliarity
with Aboriginal cultural spiritual conceptualisations. Many lexical items
and linguistic expressions in Aboriginal English are associated with
spiritual conceptualisations that characterise the Aboriginal worldview.
These include words such as sing and smoke. Take the following
example from a conversation between a speaker of Aboriginal English
and a non-Aboriginal English speaker:
A: My sister said, when you go to that country, you [are] not allowed to let
em take your photo, they can sing you.
According to the Aboriginal cultural schema of singing, to sing

someone is the ritual to cast a charm on someone with potential fatal
consequences. For example, if a man falls in love with a girl he might
try to obtain strands of her hair, her photo, or some such thing in order
to sing her. This would make the girl turn to him or in the case of her
refusal to do so it may bring her a serious or even fatal illness (Luealla
Eggington, pc). It is clear that unfamiliarity with the cultural concep-
tualisations that underlie the use of words such as singing could well
lead to miscommunication.
Another Aboriginal cultural schema associated with an English word
in Aboriginal English is medicine in the sense of spiritual power
(Arthur, 1996, p. 46). The following is an example of the use of the
medicine in this sense, from a conversation between the author of this
chapter and an Aboriginal English speaker:
That when ... my mum was real crook and she ..., she said, I woke
up an it was still in my mouth ... the taste of all the medicine cause
they come an give me some medicine last night an she always tells
us that you cant move ... an you wanna sing out an say just ... sorta
try an relax. That happened to me lotta times I was about twelve.
In the above recount, the speaker remembers that once her mother was
ill and that she mentioned the next morning that they went to her and
gave her some medicine that she could still taste. She also describes
her reaction to the medicine as wanting to shout and then forcing
oneself to relax. Without having the requisite schema, the audience of
the above recount would be likely to think that they refers to medical
professionals who visited the mother after hours and gave her syrup or
a tablet. However, further discussion with the speaker revealed that her
mother was referring to ancestor beings using their healing power to
treat her illness. It is clear from these examples how unfamiliarity with
Aboriginal cultural schemas that inform Aboriginal English can lead to
miscommunication.
Another example of cultural schemas underlying intercultural com-
munication comes from Sharifian and Jamarani (2011). The study
examined how the cultural schema, called sharmandegi being ashamed,
can lead to miscommunication between Persian and non-Persian
speakers. This cultural schema is commonly instantiated in Persian

through expressions such as sharmand-am (short for sharmandeh-am
ashamed-be.1SG) meaning I am ashamed, or sharmandeh-am mikonin
ashamed-ISG do.2SG meaning you make me ashamed. Such expres-
sions are usually used in association with several speech acts, such as
expressions of gratitude, offering goods and services, requesting goods
and services, apologising, accepting offers and making refusals. The
following is an example of such usage, from a conversation between a
student and a lecturer where the student is expressing gratitude to the
lecturer for writing a recommendation letter for her:
Speaker A (the lecturer): in ham name-yi ke mikhstin

This too letter-ART that requested.2PL2
Here is the letter that you asked for
Speaker B (the student): sharmandeh-am, vghean mamnoon
Ashamed-BE.1SG really grateful
I am ashamed, I am really thankful
Here the use of sharmandegi is intended as an expression of aware-

ness that the other person has spent some time/energy in providing the
speaker with goods and services they were under no obligation to sup-
ply. The speaker acknowledges this by uttering a shame statement, as if
guilty because of this awareness. Although the cultural schema of shar-
mandegi is very widespread and commonly drawn upon among speak-
ers of Persian, it can lead to miscommunication during intercultural
communication between speakers of Persian and non-Persian speakers.
Consider the following example from Sharifian and Jamarani (2011):
Taras (Iranian) neighbour Lara (Australian) offered to do pick up
some groceries for her, when she was doing her own shopping. Tara
happily accepted the offer and told Lara what she needed. When Lara
brought the groceries back, Tara wanted to pay her straight away:
Lara: It is okay, you can pay me later.

Tara: No, you have made me enough ashamed already.
Lara: But why do you say so?! Id offered to do the shopping myself,
and I had to do my own shopping anyway.
It is evident here that Lara is surprised to hear the expression, or

accusation, of shame on the part of Tara, as she had willingly offered
to do the shopping for her. However, from the perspective of the Persian
cultural schema of sharmandegi, Taras response is entirely appropriate,
simply reflecting Taras gratefulness to Lara. Examples such as this reveal

how the process of intercultural communication involves a meeting
place for cultural conceptualisations, where successful communication
entails the negotiation of intercultural meanings.
5.6 Cultural Linguistics and political discourse analysis
A number of recent studies in political discourse analysis have adopted

the approaches of cognitive linguistics and Cultural Linguistics. In
general, these studies have endorsed the long-standing observation
that political discourse relies heavily on conceptual metaphor and that
political metaphors are often rooted in certain underlying ideologies
and cultural models (Dirven, Frank, and Ilie, 2001; Dirven, Frank, and
Ptz, 2003). These conceptual devices are by no means incidental to
political discourse but rather serve to establish or legitimise a given
perspective (Sharifian and Jamarani, 2013).
George Bush, for example, repeatedly used either novel or conven-
tional metaphors, in his speeches about the Iranian governments
nuclear technology. In one of his press conferences, Bush used the
metaphorical expression of house cleaning in relation to Irans nuclear
program and stated that these people need to keep their house clean. In this
metaphor, nuclear technology is conceptualised as dirt, which needs
to be removed from the house, the house here being the country. It is
difficult to disagree with the statement that ones house needs to be kept
clean and the use of the clean house metaphor appears to present the US
president in the legitimate position, of exhorting others to perform a
socially desirable act. In other words, Bushs statement positions Iran
very negatively, as associated with dirt [dirty house], while positioning
himself, or the US government, very positively, as moralising (in the
positive sense of the word) and putting pressure on the Iranian govern-
ment to clean Irans house. However, Iran construed its nuclear program
not in the negative sense of dirt but as technology and energy, both
of which have positive connotations.
From the perspective of Cultural Linguistics, political discourse is not
free from cultural influence and is in fact heavily entrenched in cultural
conceptualisations (Sharifian, 2007, 2009a). For example, when people
attempt to translate from one language into another, such as for the
purpose of international negotiation (see also Baker, 2006; Cohen, 1997;
Hatim and Mason, 1990), they are very likely to need to render cultural
conceptualisations associated with one language into cultural conceptu-
alisations associated with the other. In other words, if languages encode
the largely culturally differentiated ways in which their speakers con-

ceptualise their experiences, then the process of translation will make
it hard to avoid rendering sets of words in ways that capture different
conceptualisations of experience (see Avruch and Wang, 2005).
Sharifian (2007) analyses the cases of words such as concession and
compromise, which are pivotal to international political discourse,
and argues that the meanings of these words lend themselves to certain
culturally constructed conceptualisations. For example, the positive
connotations of compromise, that is arriving at a settlement by making
concessions hearken back to the secular foundations of Western democ-
racies, linking to beliefs promulgated by 19th century classical liberal-
ism, a view that elevated the status of the individual and promoted
the notion of contractual relations between free agents in commerce,
and so on. This conceptualisation is far from a universal one, and some
languages do even not have a word for this concept. Also, a historical
analysis of the dictionary entries for this concept reveals a tendency
towards attributing positive meanings to the concept rather than
attributing more negative ones. In general, the approach of Cultural
Linguistics can help unpack aspects of political discourse that largely
draw on cultural conceptualisations. Given the importance of politi-
cal discourse, and the possible consequences when misunderstandings
arise, the contribution of Cultural Linguistics to this area of inquiry is
undoubtedly very valuable.
One of the most important, and at the same time challenging, ques-
tions facing anthropological linguists has been the relationship between
language, culture, and thought. Theoretical stances regarding this
theme have ranged from a view that language shapes human thought
and worldview to one that considers the three to be separate systems.
Cultural Linguistics, with its multidisciplinary origin, engages with this
theme by exploring features of human languages that encode cultur-
ally constructed conceptualisations of human experience. One of the
basic premises in this line of inquiry is that language is a repository
of cultural conceptualisations that have prevailed at different stages in
the history of a speech community and these can leave traces in cur-
rent linguistic practice. Also, while placing emphasis on the culturally
constructed nature of conceptualisations, Cultural Linguistics shares
with cognitive linguistics the view that meaning is conceptualisation.
This chapter explains how Cultural Linguistics has thus far proved to
be both highly beneficial to and has benefited from, several areas of

applied linguistics. Overall, due to the multidisciplinary nature of the
analytical tools and theoretical frameworks that Cultural Linguistics
draws upon, it has significant potential to continue to shed substantial
light on the nature of the relationship between language, culture, and
conceptualisation.
Notes
I would like to thank the reviewers, the editors of this volume, and Professor
Gary B. Palmer for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this chapter.
I received financial support from Australian Research Council twice through-
out the conduct of the research that forms part of this chapter (ARC DP and
Australian Postdoctoral Fellowship [project number DP0343282], and ARC DP
[project number DP0877310]).
1. The reader is also referred to a discussion of the cultural basis of metaphors

(see Quinn, 1991), where the cognitive anthropological perspective (i.e., met-
aphors reflect cultural models) challenges the traditional cognitive linguistic
perspective (i.e., metaphors constitute cultural models).
2. The use of the plural in this example marks politeness/social distance.
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6
Sloppy Selfhood: Metaphor,
Embodiment, Animism, and
Anthropomorphization in Japanese
Language and Culture
Debra J. Occhi
6.1 Introduction
Imagery of natural phenomena has been deliberately used in Japan

in aesthetic representations for humans and social relations, at least
since the introduction of Chinese poetry, Buddhism, and the writing
system (ca. 7th c.) and into the current day (Eisenstadt, 1997; Kalland,
1995; LaMarre, 2000; Occhi, 2009; Thomas, 2001). Humans and nature
occupy a common category in this philosophy, contrasting to the
separation and elevation of humans seen in much Western thought.
Cognitive linguistics and linguistic anthropology have already proven
useful in understanding such non-Cartesian aspects of Japanese cul-
tural expressions. Investigation of metaphors in Japanese language and
culture has yielded interesting results. Ohnuki-Tierney has explored
the historically grounded relationships of monkeys and monkey
imagery to special status persons, the relationship of rice to national-
ized Japanese identity, and that of cherry blossoms with kamikaze pilots
(Ohnuki-Tierney, 1990, 1993, 2002). Occhi (1996a) discovered meta-
phoric links between characterizations of foxes and badgers in folklore,
womens facial shapes and ascribed personality characteristics. These
metaphoric links between humans and animals or other entities have
been labeled a basic-level metaphor, HUMANS ARE NATURE/NATURE
IS HUMAN, by Hiraga (1999). Hiraga focuses on cognitive mechanisms
which underlie human/nature metaphors in the haiku poetry of Matsuo
Basho and are based on the entwining of grammatical constructions
and culturally based implications. Through these mechanisms, she
argues, poetic effects are achieved. For example in the phrase futami
ni wakare there lies a pun, since the meaning can be inferred as either
separating at Futami (a place name) or opening a bivalves shell and
124
Sloppy Selfhood 125
removing the meat. Futami is the name of the place by the sea where
Basho said farewell to his companions on his way north along the oku
no hosomichi narrow inside road. The bivalve imagery alludes to the
closeness he felt to his companions and pain he suffered on leaving
them (1999). It is also poetically appropriate that he used the imagery
of a sea creature to index a coastal place.
Such metaphors are evident in the very earliest Japanese writings cre-
ated in the Heian era (CE 7941185), not only in written documents,
but in the drawings called the worlds first manga, the Chojjinbutsugiga
Caricature of Animal-human figures. In this scroll, a national treasure,
monkeys, frogs, and rabbits take on human guise and activity, includ-
ing the performance of Buddhist rituals. In the contemporaneous
Tsukumogami emaki (Picture scroll of 99 gods) animated tools set out at
night to wreak havoc on their former owners.
Understanding the ideological basis for Japanese human-nature
metaphor is crucial to understanding its force and endurance. Ki no
Tsurayuki (872945), the compiler of the Kokinwakashu poetry collec-
tion, wrote the first critical assessment of its waka poetry. He charac-
terized words, which in Japanese are kotoba, etymologically koto no fa,
leaves of words as originating in heart-seeds. So sentiments culminat-
ing in poetry originate as seeds, which sprout into words arranged into
verse (Takeuchi, 1999). This in turn reflects the Heian political ethos
that envisioned the domestication of the natural as a fitting image for
state efforts (LaMarre, 2000:161). That is, naturenot wild space, but
cultivated gardens and bonsaicould be used as an example for human
action.
Another rich source for this imagery is found in musical lyrics.
Flowers and blossoms in Japanese, in Maynards analysis of popular
songs, provide what she calls a macro-metaphor, basic, overarching,
and at the same time, elusive, deeply emotive, and difficult to specify
(2007:171). Such metaphorization has clearly reached the level of an
integration network involving metaphor as well as other kinds of cog-
nitive mapping, which include conventional and innovative parts and
are transmitted over generations (Fauconnier and Turner, 2006:2). Not
surprisingly, differences between Japanese conceptualizations of emo-
tion and those found in other languages readily emerge. The generic
notion that Japanese have a special love for nature, considered an
essential aspect of national identity, is instantiated in these metaphors
as they appear in songs, including (though not limited to) the genre
called enka, which is known as nihonjin no kokoro the heart/soul of
Japanese people.
In examining the lyrics of enka (overtly sensual/dramatic song)

music, a genre similar to blues or so-called country music in the US,
there is pervasive thread of this type of representation that in earlier
research I dubbed sloppy selfhood. In the case of enka, sloppy selfhood
subsumes the gendered ideology of heteronormative romance within
descriptions of flowers, ocean waves, and northward travel, rendering
a neat division of lyrics into the categories of discourse vs. narrative
impossible (Occhi, 2000). Other manifestations of this sloppy selfhood
phenomenon are evident in visual culture as well, as detailed below.
Another major arena of cultural behavior where human-nature meta-
phors historically emerge is religion.
6.2 Anthropomorphization and divinity
Both Shinto and Buddhism, the major contemporary faiths in Japan,

include animism, anthropomorphization, and human-nature meta-
phors in their basic conceptualizations of deity. They support a gen-
eralized belief system in which all things potentially have a soul, even
humanmade objects, whether that soul is defined as a Buddha-nature or
some other supernatural power (Kalland, 1995:246247). This tendency
for metaphorically and metonymically prompted emergence fits neatly
with the Durkheimian description of metaphors role in religion:
In this way, religion acquires a sense and a reasonableness that the most
militant rationalist cannot fail to recognize. The main object of religion
is not to give man a representation of the natural universe, for if that had
been its essential task, how it could have held on would be incomprehen-
sible. In this respect, it is barely more than a fabric of errors. But religion is
first and foremost a system of ideas by means of which individuals imag-
ine the society of which they are members and the obscure yet intimate
relations they have with it. Such is its paramount role. And although this
representation is symbolic and metaphorical, it is not unfaithful. It fully
translates the essence of the relations be accounted for. It is true with a
truth that is eternal that there exists outside us something greater than
we and with which we commune (Durkheim, 1995:225).
It is certainly appropriate to consider Shinto and Buddhism as com-

prising the common religion of Japan, embracing the customs, beliefs
and practices that are broadly accepted within a cultureincluding the
scriptural influences and liturgical traditions, as well as the artistic and
iconographic ones, that have shaped these customs, beliefs and practices
(Reader and Tanabe, 1998:29). As such, their common tendencies of
Sloppy Selfhood 127
animism, anthropomorphism, and metaphor are reflected in the wide-

spread ways that they appear in public discourses designed to encourage
ideologically appropriate behavior. For example, the Earth Conscious
Japan messages on Tokyo FM radio sponsored by the Cosmo gasoline
company include platitudes such as the claim that because Japanese family
names contain nature terms, this underlies an innate sympathy with the
earth (http://www.tfm.co.jp/earth/concept/english.html). Various public
service broadcasts by the Japanese Ad Council have contained similar mes-
sages reflecting a purportedly shared belief system accruing to the com-
mon religion and supporting the love of nature essentialist argument.
One of the messages composed in the wake of the March 11 earthquake
in nuclear disaster included animism, iconicity, and visual wordplay in
a brief music video with the themes of thoughtfulness and caring. The
lyric and image depicted a long stick and a short stick possessed of ani-
mated faces who, by supporting each other, create the ideographic kanji
character meaning human (). As the lyric repeats the video, human
actors are depicted interacting warmly and thus becoming more human
themselves (http://www.ad-c.or.jp/campaign/work/2011/) (Figure 6.1).
The depiction of the kanji character as two anthropomorphized sticks
leaning together represents two people in the asymmetrical relationship
and emotional state known as ai, a type of love that unites depend-
ency with the desire and ability to fulfill the others needs (Shibamoto
Figure 6.1 AC advert for ai, print version

Source: AC Japan.
Smith, 1999:183). Both parties to the relationship are humanized by

this interaction in the text:
[1] sasaeru kara, hito nan da.

support from person COP-GEN COP
human from supporting [someone]
sasaerareru kara, hito nan da.
be supported from person COP-GEN COP
human because of being supported [by someone]
The parts are also represented as humanlike, a style of visual com-

munication which echoes a genre of animism and anthropomorphism
having roots in historical religious imagery as well as contemporary
advertisement (Occhi, 2012). The ideal situation referred to in [1] as ai
has also been encoded via human-nature metaphor in song lyrics, as the
following section discusses.
6.3 Anata, Omae yonde yobarete yorisotte, yasashiku

watashi o itawatte1
This section shows how the sloppy selfhood concept emerged in analyz-
ing the scenarios of sentiment that comprise selfhood, social actions,
speech, and feeling states, and underlie performance in public discourse
through an empirical examination of enka music. The variety of emo-
tional experience and expression in enka includes various sentiments
related to that which we call love in English. For example, in the verse:
[2] Koi no nukegara doko e sutere -ba ii

love2 GEN shell where DIR discard -if good
no anata ni age -ta kono inochi
SFP you DAT give-PAST this life
Umare-kawat -te m ichi-do meguri ae
Born -change-GER again one -time revolve-POT
-tara sono toki wa yase-ta bun dake ai shi-te
-if that time TOP thin-PAST part only love1 do -GER
hoshii
want
Where should I discard this cast-off shell of love2this life I gave to you
If I were to be reborn and we met again by chance, that time Id want
you to love1 only the remnant of me (i.e., having cast off the prior
shell) (SC5).
Sloppy Selfhood 129
The concepts marked as love1 and love2 (ai and koi, respectively)
describe different models of love experience for which we use the term
love. The singer describes herself as a creature somewhat like a hermit
crab, able to shed her shell, which is also metaphorically possessed by
her lost love (koi no nukegara). As Abu-Lughod discovered in her study of
Bedouin love songs, examination of love-related musical lyrics in their
context of use can revealif not literal meanings of love termsthe
ideology governing emotional expression (Abu-Lughod, 1986). In this
case, the images of casting off of one kind of love in hopes of receiving
another can tell us about how schemata (as well as governing ideolo-
gies) of gender and emotion as well as selfhood are represented in enka.
The following analysis will forefront conceptualizations of self as
determined by pronouns and metaphors, relative to gender and love
terms. By comparing data containing pronouns that index a person with
data where persons are referred to by metaphor of nature imagery we can
see the emergence of sloppy selfhood phenomena. The major distinc-
tion in the lyric corpus relevant to the analysis of self versus non-self was
posited to be that of dialogue (when the speaker is speaking to someone)
versus narrative, following the strategy employed in Friedrichs (1991)
study of polytropy with a focus on image and modal tropes.
Image tropes are aligned by Friedrich to Peircean Firstness: these
tropes depend on the experience or feeling of qualities that are in some
sense primary or irreducible (1991:27). They lean towards objectivism
and iconicity, and are interdependent with metaphor, metonymy, and
the modal tropes (1991:2829). Explication of the image tropes in my
data certainly forms the basis for discussion in interdependence with
the modal tropes, which Friedrich defines thus:
A second group of tropes includes expressions of mood that run from

emphatic assertion to passivity to outrage to joy to command to sar-
casm to threat to pathos to assertion to question to perhaps the most
intriguing of all, irony. All these moods can interact and combine
with each other, and each one is distinct only as a matter of degree
(Friedrich, 1991:30).
The most pervasive emotional mood found in enka is heartbreak situ-

ated in heteronormative context; however, the linguistic moods in this
genre are various. Some of those Friedrich mentions directly are less
easily found in this corpus than others. Expletives and interjections
are absent save sighing, mimetics are rare in enka though a rich aspect
of Japanese language generally. Invocation, however, is common. As
part of the syntactic part of the modal trope, discourse versus narrative
seemed like a logical way to separate data, yet the difficulty resulting has
led to the findings reported here.
The songs chosen for the data corpus derive from two separate
sources. Womens songs, which are sung by female singers and which
represent feminine voices through pronominal use, are those which
the author sang in group enka lessons during 19981999 fieldwork in
Sendai, Japan. Mens songs are taken from a prepackaged collection
of 80 songs (Enka ketteiban [The] Definitive Enka Collection, Pijon,
1998). The collection was deemed representative of the genre by
consultants.
The range of indexical strategies includes: overt address (indexing
the addressee with anata you [female calling male] or omae you
[male calling female]); conversational tone (lacking direct reference
to addressee but including SFPs and other phenomena which index
conversation); self-reference (including watashi I/me [fem], ore I/me
[masc] and less direct variants wagami oneself onna woman, otoko
man, hito person, and hitori one person); and narration (which
constitutes the other category). In none of the songs are specific indi-
viduals addressed by either family or personal names. This tendency, I
believe, adds to the genericity and coherence of the discourse of enka.
The findings are as follows.
6.3.1 Overt address: the voices of love

For the womens songs, this category of lyrics addresses a masculine fig-
ure, specifically the beloved, with anata you (sometimes glossed with
pragmatic inference as darling). There is much evoked by this term
as well as by its male speaker to female addressee counterpart, omae.
Dictionary definitions describe anata as a polite pronoun; its association
with a generically male referent is reinforced by the convention that
when it indexes a female you in writing one of its two kanji characters
is written with the one that means woman. Omae is defined as a rough
term with which to address ones interlocutor. Both pronouns have his-
torical origins in the Japanese deictic system; anata emerges from you
+ that direction, and omae glosses as HON + in front. The prototypical
anata-omae addressing pair are a wife and husband of middle age; con-
sultants below 30 tend to find the use of omae by a man addressing a
woman problematic since it indexes the display of male dominance. In
the pop music of the younger generation, the paired referents are anata
and the less hierarchically loaded kimi, respectively.
Sloppy Selfhood 131
The 11 utterances in my sung corpus (i.e., the womens songs)

containing anata subcategorize into the syntactic moods as follows:
seven statements, three commands, and one question. For the com-
mands and the question, anata is superfluous, constituting a clear case
of addition. Pragmatically, anata also serves as a focusing mechanism,
elaborating the emotional content of the song by linking it overtly
to the beloved. Within the subcategory of statements, the character
indexed by anata is a sentential subject only once and an active agent
twice.
[3] tsukushi-te mo tsukushi-te mo tsukushi-tari -nai

exhaust -GER even exhaust -GER even exhaust -insufficient-NEG
tsukushi-te mo sonna anata ni kira -ware-ta
exhaust -GER even that kind of you DAT dislike-PASS-PAST
I gave my all, I gave my all and even that wasnt enough, I gave my
all and was rejected by such a man as you (SC12)
[4] anata ga ai ni kore-nai toki wa watashi ga iku wa anata

you SUBJ meet DAT come-NEG time TOP I SUBJ go SFP you
no machi e
GEN town to
When you cant come to meet me, Ill go to your town (SC13)
In the first case, anata the agent rejects the patient/singer, a situation
whose gravity is further embellished by her use of the suffering passive
construction, demoting the agent anata out of the subject position.
Consider, however, that her passivity is not absolute, in that she takes
the active agent slot, giving her all for the majority of the passage.
In the second case, the singers assertion that she will go to her lovers
town, reinforced by the postposed phrase which contains anata in the
genitive possessor slot (anata no machi e), implies, based on our under-
standing that for this corpus travel implies sadness for the woman, that
she is setting herself up for heartbreak. The second anata in [4] is the
no-marked possessor of the goal the woman will seek. Taken together,
the lines depict a man as part of a situation resulting in the womans
action.
Anata is also commanded by the singer to perform specific actions
in three instances, but these commands are framed by context as des-
perate and doubtful endeavors on the womans part to shape a lovers
behavior. Two commands are from the same song, whose lines exhibit
formal parallelism.
[5] Anata gutto gutto nomihoshi-te

you gulp gulp drink-dry -GER
Gulp it, gulp it, drink it dry (SC6)
[6] Anata kitto kitto kaet -te yo

you surely surely return-GER SFP
Surely, surely, come back (to me) (SC6)
In the first, less problematic instance, she wants him to drink, give
way to his drunkenness, forget about his past, and spend a dreamlike
night with her. This command seems to have been heeded, since the
second command takes place the following morning. She describes the
sparkling sea of impending springtime, and exhorts him to return, using
the verb kaeru, which indicates return to ones own homealthough it
is implied elsewhere in the song that as yet the womans place is not
actually his, and the feeling that he is giving her empty promises brings
her to tears. The third command is again addressed to a lover at parting:
[7] Wasure-cha iya Mat -te te anata2

forget-completely hateful Wait-GER GER1 you
I cant stand it if you forget! Please wait, darling! (SC13)
This is the same woman who, in [4], extends the promise to go visit
the man in his town. Postposing, as in the earlier extract from this song,
appears again, also with anata included. That pronominal address in this
case as well as the entire anata no machi e passage above is superfluous
to the elements necessary to the utterance point to their forefronting
of the term anata as a potential device for emphasizing her expression
of emotions towards him, the beloved. The song as a cohesive unit of
discourse gives the strong impression of female desperation and unwill-
ingness in the face of a breakup. Here she expresses the possibility that
he may forget her, which she hates. Apparently, in this corpus women
who command men are desperate creatures indeed. The sole question
posed to anata expresses her concern:
[8] Anata d shi-te imasu ka

you how do -GER are Q
Darling, how are you doing? (SC10)
In the womens corpus, therefore, anata serves as a marker of rela-

tionship, as does omae. Their relative overuse (in comparison to their
Sloppy Selfhood 133
grammatical necessity or natural rates of occurrence in conversation)

highlights this marking capacity. Women are experiencers of emo-
tion which motivates their behavior, due in some cases to the activity
of the man, although his behavior is often de-agentified grammati-
cally. Commands are ineffective; their occurrence indexes the failure
of women to achieve a successful pairbond. We see the converse of
anata-omae addressing in the single case of reported speech:
[9] Ore to issyo jya itsu ka fuk ni naru to

me with together as-for sometime Q unhappy DAT become QUOT
sugaru watashi ni se o muke-ta
cling me DAT back OBJ turn-PAST
Saying If you were together with me, well, wed someday be
unhappy [he] turned his back on a clinging me (SC5).
In this example, unlike the second-person set anata-omae, the pro-

nouns used are less obviously marked indexicals of heterosexual rela-
tionship. As first-person pronouns, ore and watashi are statements about
the self, rather than the other. Because of this chief difference, both ore
and watashi appear more commonly in other circumstances of use, with
ore the more rough, and therefore masculine, of the pair. When anata
or omae are used outside the bounds of intimate familiarityand even
within them, with omae in the case of the younger generationthey
take on notions of derogation that can cause strong negative emotional
reactions. Since the man in this example is denying the possibility of a
happy relationship with the woman, it seems obvious that he would use
firstrather than second-person referents.
In the mens corpus, the same set of second-person pronouns (anata,
omae) are used, but to different ends. Omae you, here, the feminine
beloved, is the genitive no-marked possessor of something quite emo-
tionally evocative, be it her tears, her face, her life, or her voice calling
to him in the wind at his back:
[10] Sonna omae no namida ame musebinaku yo

that kind you GEN tear rain sob SFP
That kind of rain, like your tears, is sobbing (QC20)
[11] Sabishisa korae -ta omae no yoko-gao

sadness endure -PAST you GEN side-face
Your profile reflects loneliness youve endured (QC25)
[12] Sabishii senaka ga omae no jinsei

lonely back SUBJ you GEN human life
Your sad back reveals your loneliness (QC25)
[13] Itoshii omae no yobu-koe ga ore no senaka de kaze ni naru

dear you GEN call-voice SUBJ me GEN back at wind DAT become
Your dear voice calling [me] becomes the wind at my back (QC30)
The male self-referent, ore, occurs in [13], and in two other verses. Ore
no senaka my back appears twice, as in the prior example, and again:
[14] Ore no senaka o nurashi-ta ame ga itsu ka tsumetai yuki

me GEN back OBJ dampen -PAST rain SUBJ when Q chilly snow
ni naru
DAT become
The rain that dampens my back will sometime turn to chilling snow
(QC20)
In both songs his back is the recipient of inclement weather, be it

wind, rain, or snow. The third appearance of ore links him to an elder
brother:
[15] Ore to aniki no yo yume no yurikago sa

me with big brother NOM SFP dream GEN cradle SFP
Me and big brother, its our cradle of dreams (QC33)
Reported speech in the mens lyrics occurs twice, in the voice of the
beloved promising her commitment and addressing the male singer as
anata:
[16] Anata no tame ni chi no hate made mo tsui -te iku wa

you GEN sake DAT earth GEN end until even follow-GER go SFP
to sugaru me ga hanare -nai no sa
QUOT cling eye SUBJ separate-NEG NOM SFP
I cant break away from [the memory of] your clinging eyes saying
For your sake Id follow you to the ends of the earth (QC20)
[17] Ima de mo anata o matte -ru to itoshii omae no yobu-koe ga

now even you OBJ wait-GER-PROG QUOT dear you GEN call-voice
SUBJ
Even now I wait for you your dear voice calling me (QC30)
Sloppy Selfhood 135
As when women speak to men in womens songs, there is a move

towards additional and overt address of the man as anata by the woman
when a male singer reports his beloveds speech. But the content of the
reports differs. In the case of reported speech in the womens corpus, as
shown in [10], the man rejects her saying theyd be unhappy together
although she still wants him to love her. When men report womens
speech, however, the woman pledges to the man her faith. Engaging in
pursuit of a man, or exhausting oneself on his behalf are unsuccessful
strategies for pairbond-seeking women.
6.3.2 ONNAgokoro ga Uzukimasu3

The second set of clauses contains references to persons whose iden-
tity is more diffuse than in the preceding references to self. Of 19
instances in the womens corpus, only four index the singer directly
with watashi I/me. In the other cases, rather than specific first- per-
son address, other terms for persons are used: onna woman appears
11 times, hito person is used twice, and singly, we see wagami one-
self and hitori one person. Let us now examine what roles these
persons serve when they are indexed by such generalized references
to self.
Onna woman, the most frequently occurring generalized self-referent,
appears in three kinds of constructions: eight cases of no-marked geni-
tive (e.g., the metaphorical onna no haru a womans springtime), one
instance of noun-noun compounding in which the ga-marked subject
is onnagokoro a womans heart, is the profiled agent/experiencer (onna-
gokoro ga uzukimasu a womans heart aches) and two stative construc-
tions with the copula desu (e.g., shiawase kakete kuinai onna desu a woman
who bets [her] happiness and has no regrets. Hito person appears in
the context of two more nature metaphors, once as the singer with a
no-ellipted genitive (viz. hito koishigure [a] persons lovedrizzle) and once
as the absent beloved (itoshii hito to aa saku inochi a life that willaah
bloom with my sweetheart). Wagami oneself is again the singer, as the
possessed member of a no-marked genitive construction (kegare o shiranu
hana no wagami my unstained flowerbody). Hitori one person, also the
singer, is a ga-marked experiencer of loneliness (hitori ga sabishii I am/to
be alone is lonely).
In the mens songs, as we saw in the case of onna woman, otoko man
also serves as an index of self, in the following examples. Otoko appears
once as the dative recipient of the womans love, and once each as active
agent/experiencer in subject or topic slot.
[18] nagare no fuchi de ikiru otoko ni naze hore-ta

flow GEN pool at live man DAT why love-PAST
Why did [you] fall in love with a man who lives in the flowing pools?
(QC20)
[19] kita e, kita e, otoko ga hitori

north to north to man SUBJ alone
To the north, to the north, a man alone (QC28)
[20] kita e, kita e, otoko wa kaeru

north to north to man TOP return
To the north, to the north, a man returns (QC28)
In its other instances of occurrence, otoko is the genitive head of a

phrase that again serves as agent/experiencer. The last of these is an
extended phrase ending in a synecdochal body-part reference to the
man (otoko naki suru setsunai mune a painful heart that wont stop cry-
ing a mans tears) although we do not see concatenated forms such as
onnagokoro a womans heart in the mens corpus.
[21] otoko no kur wa wakaru kedo dare ga mukae ni it-te

man GEN hardship TOP understand but who SUBJ meet DAT go-GER
yaru mon ka
give NOM Q
[I] understand the hardships of men, but who will come to meet him
[on his return]? (QC28)
[22] shosen otoko no jinsei wa hitoribocchi no yume -nobori

after all man GEN human life TOP all alone GEN dream-climbing
after all a mans life is a lonely climb up a dream (QC73)
[23] otoko naki suru setsu-nai mune ga kono mi o tsutsumu

man cry do end -NOT chest SUBJ this body OBJ wrap
nukumori naraba ai ja -naku-te mo shinji -aeru
warmth if love as for-NEG -GER even believe-POT
if there is human warmth to embrace this body, a painful heart
that wont stop crying a mans tears can believe, even it is not love
(QC25)
Against the pattern of hito as self appearing in the womens songs, we

see hito person used in mens songs once as the woman and three times
as generic persons, as well as three instances of hitori as self.
Sloppy Selfhood 137
[24] hito no yasashisa koishii yoru wa.

person GEN kindness loveable night TOP
the nights when I yearn for a persons (e.g., the womans) kindness
(QC25)
[25] shagamikon -dara sono sena o hito wa muj ni

sit with head down-if that back OBJ person TOP ruthless DAT
fumi-tsubusu
step-crush
When you (generic) sit down with your head down people will step
on your back [and ruin you] ruthlessly (QC73)
[26] yume ga chigire-te hitori de ite mo

dream SUBJ be torn-GER alone as be-GER even
even alone, with my dreams torn to bits (QC25)
Further mention of persons appears in lyrics. Couples are indicated in

the corpus by futari twosome. Couples in womens songs share particu-
lar traits (e.g., being flowers, having scars) or activities such as the piling
up of tiny dreams, or potentially, travel:
[27] futari wa nirin -s
twosome TOP two-flower-plant
we are a two-stemmed flower (SC2)
[28] heta na futari ga sasayaka na yume o kasaneru

unskilled GEN twosome SUBJ tiny GEN dream OBJ pile up
we two, unskilled [at love], pile up tiny dreams (SC2)
The mens corpus used futari only once, as the genitive possessor of
hearts that allude to their respective bodies coupling:
[29] futari no kokoro atatameat-te non -de akashi -ta

twosome GEN heart warm -GER drink-GER spend the night-PAST
meeting and warming each others hearts, drinking and spending the
night together (QC20)
This type of genitive possession involves a kind of synecdoche which is

rife throughout the data corpus, that is, part-whole relations in which the
body-part refers to its possessor. The womens songs contain a plethora
of references to self through the mention of body part terms (specifically,
the head, e.g., face, cheeks, and hair; and upper body region, e.g., chest,
heart, and shoulders), in addition to the concatenated forms such as

onnagokoro discussed earlier. Coldness and pain, especially stinging pain,
are common sensations of the womans body as described in these songs.
Literal and figurative dishevelment is also mentioned. Hearts, specifi-
cally, are scattered, seeking, deciding (i.e., not to remember the beloved)
or being thrown away. The synecdochal agency attributed to the heart,
i.e., HEART AS SELF, is well attested in Japanese generally (Occhi, 2008).
[30] shiroi fubuki ga me ni shimu

white blowing snow SUBJ eye DAT sting
the cold, white, blowing snow stings my eyes (SC10)
[31] samui kokoro midare -te

cold heart scatter-GER
my cold heart in a mess (SC10)
[32] yubi de okurege nadetsuke-te beni mo hito-hake

finger with stray hair smooth -GER lipstick even one -stroke
smoothing my hair with my fingers, adding a swipe of lipstick (SC6)
[33] tsumetai kaze ga kri tsuku y ni mune o sasu

chilly wind SUBJ ice freeze way DAT chest OBJ stab
the cold wind stabs my chest as if to freeze it into ice (SC5)
Body parts are also productively used in womens songs to index the
beloved. He is indexed by his mouth, shoulders, back, and chest, none
of which suffer. Rather, his words are attended to by the woman, and
he provides potential, yet not actual, understanding and refuge for her.
[34] kata ni amae -te ano koro

shoulder DAT snuggle-GER that time
that time I snuggled up to your shoulder (SC10)
[35] kuchi wa arai ga yasashiku-te

mouth TOP rough but kind -GER
your mouth [i.e., speech] is rough but kind (SC6)
[36] anata no senaka ni kakure-te koeru

you GEN back DAT hide -GER surpass
Ill get by hiding behind your back (SC3)
Sloppy Selfhood 139
[37] anata no mune ni saku

you GEN chest DAT bloom
[I] will bloom in your chest (SC3)
One of the most interesting cases of synecdoche occurs in the wom-

ens corpus as cited in [9] above, wherein we see mention of a male body
part referencing the beloved in this example of reported speech from a
man to the woman singer, focusing on his back:
[38] ore to issho jya itsu ka fuk ni naru to

me with together as-for sometime Q unhappy DAT become QUOT
sugaru watashi ni se o muke-ta
cling me DAT back OBJ turn-PAST
Saying Together with me, well, wed someday be unhappy [he]
turned his back on a clinging me (SC5)
The polyphony of this segment is striking; the singer utters the words
of an emotively and situationally particularized self, which in turn
report speech and evoke a definite image of anothers behavior, turn-
ing his back to her even as she clings to him. Reported speech appears
more frequently in the mens songs, as we saw detailed above. And, as
in the examples of futari, the couple is indexed through synecdochal
mention of their body parts, and the meeting thereof, which is consist-
ently mentioned. Among these parts is the eye, another part commonly
representing SELF in Japanese (Occhi, 2010).
[39] mitsume-au me to me
seek -meet eye with eye
seeking, we meet eye to eye (SC13)
[40] kokoro yose-ai samui yoru wa

heart lean-meet cold night SFP
our hearts lean together on a cold night (SC3)
[41] senaka awase no nukumori

back together GEN warmth
the warmth of our backs together (SC2)
Men are also indexed in mens songs through particular body parts
including hands, blood, and the back.
[42] shagamikon -dara sono sena o hito wa muj ni

sit with head down-if that back OBJ person TOP ruthless DAT
fumi-tsubusu
step-crush
When you sit down with your head down people will step on your
back [and ruin you] ruthlessly (QC73)
[43] ichi-do wa kono te ni dakishimete naka-sete yari-tai

one -time TOP these arms DAT embrace cry -CAUS-GER give-WANT
omoi -kiri
thought-cut
once I want to embrace you with these arms and make you cry
uncontrollably (QC30)
[44] atsui kono chi wa yo

hot this blood SFP SFP
this blood is hot! (QC33)
In looking for other body-part references in the womens corpus, we

begin to see where the dialogue versus narrative paradigm shows weak-
ness, viz., in the combination of synecdoche and metaphor:
[45] nami no kokoro tsumetai ya

wave GEN heart chilly SFP
the heart of an ocean wave is cold (SC11)
[46] koi no nukegara doko de sutere-ba ii anata ni age -ta kono

love GEN shell where at dump -if good you DAT give-PAST this
inochi
life where shall I throw away this shell of lovethis life I gave to
you (SC5)
[47] yase-ta bun dake ai shi-te hoshii

thin-PAST part only love do -GER want
I want you to love only the slender remains (SC5)
These examples are potentially problematic to our analytic paradigm

separating dialogue from narrative because human, that is, self, and
other images are mixed. We could argue that the lyric in [45] repre-
sents an omniscient narrator thus allowing unmarked evidentiality in
describing the feelings of the wave, i.e., that its heart is cold. This use
of kokoro heart/soul in its attribute to an ocean wave is intriguing. We
Sloppy Selfhood 141
could argue that the heart of a wave is a separate entity from that of the
singer, but that seems unlikely given the overall thematic and emotive
cohesion of the narrative. Saying, therefore, that the heart of a wave is
indeed that of the singer causes a breakdown in our neat classification
of discourse versus narrative at the juncture of the self. That is, she
says that her heart is cold without recourse to discursive or grammati-
cal markings indexing herself. A similar sentiment is expressed in [48],
although in a different grammatical pattern lacking the overt blend of
human and environmental phenomena:
[48] Onna hitori no kanashisa o korae -kire-zu ni nake-te

woman alone GEN sadness OBJ surpass-cut -NEG DAT cryGER
kuru yoru no hatoba no tsumetai kaze ga kri tsuku y ni
come night GEN harbor GEN chilly wind SUBJ ice stick way DAT
mune o sasu
chest OBJ stab
[the] sadness of a woman alone which cannot be overcome returns in
tearsthe cold harbor wind at night stabs [my] chest as if to freeze
it (SC5)
This song, although it separates the womans heart from the environ-
ment more neatly than does [47], also provides the hermit crab exam-
ple seen in [2]. Those images in context describe an imaginary process
of the woman at the seashore discarding the shell of koi love and with
it, the life she gave to the beloved, being reborn, meeting him once
more, and wanting him to love (ai) only the slender remains, evocative
of the image of a hermit crabs molting and seeking a new refuge.
6.3.3 Rejecting analytic divisions: sloppy but resilient selfhood

So although the earlier division of dialogue versus narrative has given us
some interesting results, we see ultimately that it cannot be taken as an
analytic necessity, in that it disregards the metaphorical characteristics of
the data. This move to accept statements about nature as representative
of self could also be seen as an analytic imposition upon the data, but
I argue that doing so brings us closer to native metapragmatics. Native
speaker analysts of Japanese (e.g., Hiraga, Maynard, Ohnuki-Tierney) have
attributed qualities to historic and contemporary Japanese that provide
helpful evidence for the metaphoric application of nature to humans and
vice versa. This clearly helps obviate the concerns discussed by Becker
and Mannheim (1995) regarding the tendency for non-native speaker
analysts to see metaphors in languages where native speakers may not.
Furthermore, what this data does do, in terms of cognitive embodiment
as well as Friedrichean polytropics, is to complicate issues of voice by

subsuming the self into another natural object, if we accept that the self
is symbolized by the heart of a wave, or if indeed the self can shed a shell
and retain just a small part, like a hermit crab, which must then seek the
protection potentially offered by ai. Apparently, not just any part will do;
there exist gendered differences in synecdochal representation of selves
by body parts in the data. This survey of how selves are represented via
spoken language in song lyrics provides the background for understand-
ing another contemporary expression of selfhood via human-nature
metaphorization appearing also in visual media.
6.4 Conclusion
This research describes various threads of cultural linguistic research

that shows how a world schema incorporating human and natural
phenomena (i.e. different from Cartesian separation) is evident in
visual and textual realms of Japanese communication, a schema termed
sloppy selfhood. Though in popular culture texts in the US (the
authors native milieu), anthropomorphization might be character-
ized as a linguistic strategy directed at children and gratuitously cute
if not silly, or associated with the behavior of lesser beings in a nega-
tive sense,4 it is much more integrated into various aspects of Japanese
popular culture. It is deeply rooted in history and religious practice
and is rampant in contemporary music lyrics, including the enka data
analyzed here. It also appears in Japanese adverts and in the kyara genre
of representation more broadly (Occhi, 2012). These strategies reflect a
pervasive metaphorical association of humans with the natural world.
In contemporary expressions of this human-nature metaphor, we see
the subsumption of the self and identity into the behavior of natural
phenomenaand conversely, animism and anthropomorphism of
non-humansaccomplished through a variety of linguistic and visual
strategies. In each example, the human and natural worlds are blended,
viz. sloppy selfhood to achieve particular cognitive and cultural effects.
Notes
I would like to thank the reviewers, editors, Gary B. Palmer and Janet S. Shibamoto
Smith, my consultants, the Ad Council of Japan for permission to use Figure 1,
the US National Science Foundation for their support of the research on enka
(Dissertation Improvement Grant #SBR 9729002) and Miyazaki International
College for subsequent research support. The usual disclaimer applies.
Sloppy Selfhood 143
1. Lit. you (fem), you (masc) calling and being called (i.e., by those terms),
snuggling up to each other; kindly take good care of me. This lyric crystallizes
neatly the gender roles indexed by the occurring pronouns and idealized in
love novels by ai (cf. [Shibamoto] Smith, 1999) whose subversion constitutes
the core of enka-style heartbreak. It may be envisioned as the image in Figure
6.1 with the long stick as male and the shorter as female.
2. The full form underlying this utterance is matte ite kudasai anata (wait-GER
PROG-GER please darling).
3. Lit. [a] womans heart aches.
4. Nb. The movie I am Sam contrasts the title characters apology (Sorry,
Mr. Egg) to an egg he is about to crack with the disdainful reaction of his
daughters seven-year-old classmate as poignant evidence of Sams mental
retardation (2001). We also see anthropomorphization in the discourse of
pre-homo sapiens groups in the English-language novels Clan of the Cave Bear
(Auel, 1981) and The Inheritors (Golding, 1955).
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7
The Ceremonial Origins
of Language
Gary B. Palmer, Jennifer Thompson, Jeffrey Parkin, and
Elizabeth Harmon
7.1 Introduction1
This chapter presents the hypothesis that verbal language originated

in prehistoric ceremonials. The hypothesis is an application of cultural
linguistics, a theory which synthesizes linguistic anthropology and
cognitive linguistics (Palmer 1996; Sharifian 2011 and this volume).
Duranti (2003, p. 342) has noted that the evolution of language is one
of two topics, the other being the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that are a
must in introductory books on language and culture. Hence a cultural
linguistic hypothesis for the emergence of verbal language should come
as no surprise. The hypothesis is relatively elaborate compared to most
other such proposals as befits the complexity and uniqueness of human
speech by comparison to the verbal communications of non-human
primates. As we present our origin story, we write in the declarative
mood and simple past tense, as though it were a known fact that verbal
language emerged as we theorize it did. Just as historians have their his-
torical present, we have our hypothetical past. The device will avoid
a great many instances of would have, could have, might have,
and similar hedges. The reader should remain aware that our story is
a hypothesis, but one that takes into account current archaeology and
linguistic science.
Beginning with cognitive considerations, we propose that the first
words and phrases to emerge in human language evoked mental
imagery depicting the routines of daily life and the life crises of proto
speakers living in Middle Pleistocene times between 600K ya and 130K
ya.2 The proto speakers belonged to a species of transitional humans
known to science as Homo heidelbergensis. Their proto language or lan-
guages accompanied the rhythms, dances, gestures, postures and facial
145
expressions of ceremonial narratives that acted out imagery of events

and fantasies in the Middle Pleistocene. Ceremony provided a social
setting in which intersubjectivity was intensified with the result that
vocalizations and subsegments of vocalizations acquired shared mean-
ings and became conventionalized as verbal symbols and constructions.
These events fed into a positive feedback loop involving language, cul-
ture, and biology.
In spite of vast differences between the culture of heidelbergensis
and extant human cultures, recent findings in cultural and cognitive
linguistics may shed light on language genesis and the nature of proto
language. As a foundation for the linguistic argument, we cite evi-
dence that proto speakers were capable of a range of quasi-grammatical
vocalizations, as are contemporary primates, and we outline a possible
proto phonology and morphology. From the evidence of archaeology,
we reason that the conceptual world of heidelbergensis was sufficiently
complex to support a way of life involving foraging, kinship relations,
economic exchanges, and ceremonial activities. Then we explain how
concepts that were salient in foraging proto cultures became linked to
reproducible variants of vocalizations. The assemblage of all such verbal
symbolic linkages constituted proto speech, which was blended with
gesture into proto language. As language emerged concurrently across
multiple cognitive and cultural domains, it conferred overwhelming
selective advantages on individual speakers and small groups of kins-
men, with the eventual result that hominine bodies and brains evolved
to support fully human language and culture.
We propose that the genesis of verbal symbols in Middle Pleistocene
proto language took place in dramaturgical settings such as collective
ceremonies, which amplified communications by encouraging vocal
and gestural displays and mimesis. In ceremonial settings, perform-
ers and observers enhanced their intersubjective understandings of
the ceremonial imagery by pointing, gesturing, and posing, and by
monitoring the communications and emotions of others. The inter-
subjectivity of ceremonial communications and enactments conferred
collective meaning on vocalizations and gestures. By repetition in the
ceremonial context, emergent symbols became entrenched and widely
shared. The most adept participants acquired enhanced understandings
of their environments and social lives, constituting a Middle Pleistocene
worldview, which was gradually elaborated by successive generations.
As their languacultures (Agar 1994) evolved in performances and vocal
exchanges, interlocutors acquired conceptual models that were more
detailed, accurate, general, or brightly profiled. The new models, at
The Ceremonial Origins of Language 147
once both cognitive and cultural, seen, for example, in the conceptual
metaphor MATING IS FORAGING (Section 4.1) and in schemas of moving and
stopping and hunting (Section 4.3), conferred selective advantages on
individuals and foraging bands across a range of social and utilitarian
activities.
The salient cultural experiences that motivated dramaturgical per-
formances in the Middle Pleistocene included the making of tools and
using them in scavaging, gathering, and hunting. There is surprisingly
cogent evidence that Archaic humans visited kin in neighboring bands
and exchanged foods and materials for tool-making (Marwick 2003).
They formed task groups, and allocated tasks by sex, age, and abil-
ity. They made fire, but did little cooking, at least in the early Middle
Pleistocene. Like other primates, they engaged in prestige-seeking
behavior and mutual grooming, which improved their chances of
forming alliances and coalitions, succeeding in economic exchanges,
and mating. They fell sick and, we theorize, they practiced ritual and
ceremonial healing. They cared for infants and demonstrated skills to
juveniles.3 Juveniles played with their siblings and cohort mates and
pestered the adults. The proto speakers fought with other bands of
hominines and they avoided or fended off such formidable predators
as saber-tooth cats, leopards, lions, and giant hyenas. With lifes daily
challenges and activities came fatigue and rest, dreams and nightmares,
and irritations, joys, rages, jealousies and many other universal human
sensations and emotions, all of which were shaped by heidelbergensis
cultures in Europe and Africa. Their life experiences, memories, and
fantasies furnished the source material for ceremonial mimetic perfor-
mances, what Knight (1998, p. 87) has called fantasy-sharing represen-
tational activity.
This hypothesis regarding the genesis of speech explains how and
why symbolic differentiation occurred and how verbal constructions
were readily entrenched, grammaticalized, and passed on to succeeding
generations. It should also apply in some measure to gestural and sign
language, which we mention only tangentially. It fills in gaps of cause
and motivation missing from scenarios such as the song theories of
Jespersen (1922) and Livingstone (1973); the naming theory of Haldane
(1955); the call blending and play theory of Hockett and Ascher (1964);
the gesture theories of Hewes (1973, 1994), Yao (1989), Armstrong,
Stokoe and Wilcox (1995), and King (1996); the catastrophic theory
of Bickerton (1995) and similar crystallization theory of Li (n.d.) and
hierarchical step theory of Johansson (n.d.); the social grooming
theories of Dunbar (1998), Power (1998), and Locke (1998); the rule of
law theory of Knight (1998, 2009); the mirror-neuron theory of Arbib

(2005), the mimetic theories of Zlatev (2002, 2008), and Knight (1998),
the adolescent performative theory of Locke and Bodin (2006), and the
sound-symbolic theory of Kita (2008).4 And it explains why emergent
proto language conferred selective advantages on speakers.5
Sinha (2004) theorized that the central problem in language origins
is the genesis of symbols, which is founded on intersubjectivity and
normativity. We hold the same view. This chapter can be viewed as an
attempt to apply cognitive and cultural linguistic theory to understand
the genesis of language as a system of symbols.
Falk (2004) theorized that early hominin mothers were forced by the
biology of bipedal locomotion to place their relatively helpless infants
on the ground while foraging and preparing foods, thereby creating
mutual separation anxiety, which stimulated infants to call out and
mothers to produce soothing vocalizations. Thus, the motherese of
early hominins provided the scaffolding for the genesis of speech.
Falks theory offers a plausible explanation of selection for increas-
ing frequency of affective communications. It may also explain how
early hominins gained intersubjective abilities sufficient to enable the
subsequent development of speech, but it does not specify the condi-
tions that enabled and drove the evolution of symbolism and grammar,
which we construe broadly to include constrastive phonology, mor-
phology, phrase and sentence constructions, and genres of speech such
as narratives and jokes. Our story begins where Falks leaves off.
7.2 Homo heidelbergensis
Since we hold that proto language emerged from the attachment of

vocalizations to elements of mental imagery, it will be useful to sketch
what is known of the bodies, lives and cultures of proto speakers so that
we can imagine what they imagined and reenacted in ceremonies. The
scientific name Homo heidelbergensis designates a proposed hominine
species that lived in Africa, Europe, and Asia during a period beginning
at 800K to 600K ya and ending at 130K to 97K ya (Figure 7.1 and Table
7.1).6 The group has also been called archaic Homo sapiens and advanced
Homo erectus (Klein 2009). It is thought that they evolved from H. erectus
or H. ergaster and that they are ancestral to both Neanderthals and mod-
ern humans (Klein 2009; Campbell and Loy 2002).7 The heidelbergensis
ancestors of H. sapiens are believed to have lived in Africa, while those of
neanderthalensis were in Europe, where the climate became much more
Table 7.1 Dates of some African Homo heidelbergensis
Specimen Years ago
Bodo, Ethiopia 600K

Kathu Pan, South Africa 600K
Lake Ndutu, Tanzania 400K to 200K
Elandsfontein, South Africa 350K to 130K
Kabwe, Zambia 250K to 130K
Singa, Sudan 100K
Source: Campbell and Loy (2002, p. 264), rounded to nearest 5K
after adding 2K to time BP.
severe from about 200K ya. Heidelbergensis populations throughout the

Old World apparently underwent a demographic explosion after 500K
ya (Aguirre and Carbonell 2001, p. 15; see also Aiello 1998).
Heidelbergensis is distinguished from previous hominines by large
cranial capacities averaging 1,283 cc, which is about 30 percent larger
than H. erectus. The cranial capacity of Bodo was 1300 cc, which falls
well within the range of contemporary adult humans. In Kabwe, the
flexure of the base of the cranium approached the modern angle, which
suggests the possibility of speech (Figure 7.2). Heidelbergensis teeth were
smaller than those of H. erectus, but most heidelbergensis still lacked any
sign of a chin. The African forms had large noses and broad faces, which
were more protruding than those of H. sapiens.
Heidelbergensis approached the height and weight of contemporary
humans: up to six feet one inch tall (185 cm) and 165 lb (75 kg), but
they were much more physically robust and powerful. The large brain
size and robust physique point to a diet rich in meat and fat obtained
by scavenging or hunting large animals such as elephants and giant
gelada baboons (Campbell and Loy 2002). At Bodo, Ethiopia at about
600K ya, butchering and hunting tools were found with remains of
hippos, baboons, and antelopes (Kreger 2000). European bones and
tools from about 500K ya indicate scavaging or hunting of elephants,
rhinos, hippos, and smaller animals. By 250K ya, they left evidence of
hunting mountain gazelle, fallow deer, aurochs, and horses, selectively
harvesting the prime adults (Aguirre and Carbonell 2001; Stiner 2002).
Wear of the anterior teeth indicates a hard, abrasive diet that probably
included roots, stems and seeds (deCastro et al. 2003). Patterns of tooth
wear suggest that females were eating more variable and different foods
than males and food processing was minimal (Perez-Perez et al. 1999).
150
Figure 7.1 Homo heidelbergensis sites

Figure 7.2 Homo heidelbergensis from Broken Hill, Kabwe, Zambia

Source: Klein 1989, p. 230, figure 5.5; 2009, p. 343, figure 5.29.
It is unclear whether heidelbergensis was prey for large carnivores, but

cut marks on the Bodo cranium show that it might have been defleshed
with stone tools such as those in Figure 7.3, so cannibalism might have
occurred (White 1985, 1986).8 Most of the Middle Pleistocene African
sites with stone tools derive from the Acheulian tradition, which was
known for spectacular bifaced hand axes up to two feet in length. They
are pear-shaped with a cutting edge carefully flaked on both sides using
a piece of bone, wood, or antler (Figure 7.3(a), and Davidson 2002,
p. 183). The African Acheulians also made cleavers (Figure 7.3b) which
are shaped like a modern ax head and were possibly used for dismem-
bering carcasses (Campbell and Loy 2002). Some African sites include
artifacts from the Lavallois tradition including scrapers, choppers, and
tools with toothed or notched edges. Kabweans made long, narrow
stone picks. Spears have been found in European sites. Heidelbergensis
almost certainly used fire for cooking, warmth, and protection from
predators (Campbell and Loy 2002; Goren-Inbar et al. 2004). Tools and
fire must have figured prominently in Middle Pleistocene narratives.
Over the time span of heidelbergensis, there occurred two remark-
able cultual changes, as shown by evidence from six sites in East
Africa (Marwick 2003). The distances that raw materials for tools were
transported increased from 15 to 100 km about 1 million years ago
and increased again up to 340 km after 250K ya., even when closer
sources were at hand. Marwick theorized that the early increase indi-
cates expanded home ranges, but the later one argues for exchanges of
stone materials between neighboring groups of kinsmen. Larger home
Figure 7.3(a) Late Acheulian hand axe from Kathu Pan, 600K ya
Source: Klein 2009, p. 380, figure 5.49.
Figure 7.3(b) Late Acheulian cleaver from Elandsfontein, South Africa

Klein 2009, p. 381, figure 5.50.
ranges would have required a simple topic-comment protolanguage and

face-to face negotiations (p. 68), while long distance transfers presup-
pose more elaborate symbolic communications.
7.3 Skeletal evidence for heidelbergensis language
The weight of the evidence supports, if still somewhat weakly, the

hypothesis that crucial parts of the physical apparatus needed for
speech emerged during the time of heidelbergensis. The larynx had
already descended in some common hominin ancestor, thereby pro-
viding one of the prerequisites for the subsequent development of the
pharynx and lowered base of the tongue. Much later, quite possibly
in the Middle Pleistocene, the base of the cranium became flexed, the
hyoid descended and its structure became modern, the base of the
tongue descended, and the two-chambered, right-angled, supralaryn-
geal vocal tract developed. Sometime between 600K ya and 100K ya,
the vertebral canal enlarged to accommodate the neurons that support
Figure 7.4 Time line for development of vocal apparatus

Source: Adapted from Klein 1999, p. 257, figure 5/1; 2009, p. 280, figure 5.1.
fine control over modulations of air pressure in the vocal tract (Laitman
1985, p. 283; MacLarnon and Hewitt 1999; Nishimura et al. 2003; Ross
et al. 2004; Martinez et al. 2008). It appears that heidelbergensis was
acquiring the vocal apparatus necessary for language (Figure 7.4).
Most germane to the question of speech capabilities is the study by
Martinez et al. (2004) of the anatomy of the inner and outer ears of five
skulls from Sima de los Huesos, dated prior to 350K ya. The anatomy
suggests that heidelbergensis heard a range of frequencies similar to those
in the speech range of contemporary humans.
7.4 Prelinguistic vocalization and the transition

to protolanguage
Proto speakers did not simply wake up one fine Thursday morning in
the Middle Pleistocene and find themselves possessed of vowels and
consonants, syllables, morphemes, and proto words.9 To understand the
emergence of speech, we need some idea of the sound and organization
of proto speech. Since we retain elements of the primate call system in
our screams, grunts and laughter, we can be sure the proto speakers had
a primate repertoire of calls (Burling 1993). They made other sounds as
well, such as lipsmacks, tongue smacks and teeth chatters (MacNeilage
1998b; MacNeilage and Davis 2000). Burling (1993) argued that speech
is so different from the call system that it could not be derived from
it. Deacon (n.d., 1992) has suggested that the primate call system was
somehow released from selective pressure so that over many genera-
tions it partially degenerated. Freed of tight constraints, the vocaliza-
tions of proto humans became more flexible, varied, and increasingly
subject to cortical control.10 Something similar might have occurred at
about the same time with gesture, accounting for the fact that infants
produce symbolic gestures prior to speaking (Tomasello 2003).
7.4.1 Vocal symbolization and protosyntax in primates

For evidence of both proto syntax and vocal symbolism, we can con-
sider primate call systems.11 jhelyi (1998), and jhelyi and Buk (2001)
observed that the long calls of monogamous territorial primates, that
is gibbons, and of chimpanzees and bonobos, contain meaningful
sub-units that can be varied in sequence. It is not clear whether differ-
ent sequences have different meanings. Describing the elaborate calls
of gibbons, she noted that acoustically different songs can be created
by changing number, type and position of elements (notes) (jhelyi
1998, p. 179). All produce coordinated calls, sychronizing (gibbons
and bonobos), calling in chorus (chimpanzees), and engaging in

male-female duets (bonobos).
What is the meaning of such calls? Apparently, gibbon song vari-
ants mark individual identity, while chimpanzee pant-hoots mark the
status of the caller (jhelyi 1998, p. 185). However, when chimpanzee
males call together there is a tendency to match the calls of the partner,
so if there is meaning it may be the affection and comfort experienced
in good company. jhelyi concluded that chorusing and dueting spread
call variants and standardized them, creating a call pool containing a
large number of variants available for and usable by other group mem-
bers (1998, p. 186).
It seems likely that hominin proto speakers, like chimpanzees and
bonobos, called in chorus and in duets, leading to conventionalization
of vocalizations. We cannot conclude that the meanings of long calls
were sharply defined, but it seems likely that early heidelbergensis arrived
already possessed of a rudimentary grammar. While early humans were
developing the speech system, the primate call system persisted, though
perhaps in reduced form (Burling 1993).12
A parsimonious explanation of proto grammar in human language
would be derived from primate syntax and/or grammar by proto gram-
maticalization, the use of shorter, perhaps syllabic, forms obtained
by reduction and the assignment of new meanings to some of these.
It is likely that proto syntax recruited elements of the long call sys-
tem. An alternative theory, contested by MacNeilage (1998a, 1998b,
pp. 231232), recruits syntax from the region that supported the man-
ual dexterity, sequencing, and analysis needed for tool-making.
7.4.2 Proto frames

Some researchers look to consonants and vowels or to syllables as
elemental frames and debate the importance of various precursors and
neurological factors in producing them (MacNeilage 1998a; Greenburg
1998; Jrgens 1998; Menn 1998). Ohala (1998) argued that the primary
acoustic parameters are amplitude, periodicity, spectrum, and pitch,
upon which were later imposed syllables. Our interest in the topic
begins when proto consonants, vowels, and syllables acquired mean-
ings or became combined and assimilated into meaningful assemblages
as morphemes.
One place to begin is to ask what the syllables of proto speech
might have sounded like. Would they be the most common sylla-
ble patterns found cross-linguistically in infant babbling, or in the
first words of developing infants, or in the larger vocabulary of adult
speakers? MacNeilage and Davis (2000) determined the frequency of

CV (consonant-vowel) patterns in the babbling of six infants, the first
words of ten infants, and in the words of ten languages from six dif-
ferent language families.13 They found that three CV patterns and one
CVC pattern occurred in all three categories of speakers with greater fre-
quency than expected by chance. The CV patterns were (1) labial stop
consonant or labial nasal ([p], [b], [m]), followed by a central vowel,
(2) coronal stop consonant or coronal nasal ([t], [d], [n]) followed by a
front vowel ([]), and (3) dorsal stop consonant ([k], [g]), followed by a
back vowel ([o]). The CVC pattern consisted of a labial stop consonant
followed by a vowel and terminating in a coronal stop consonant. They
characterized this fourth pattern as expressing a fronting tendency
(2000, p. 528).
The findings of MacNeilage and Davis suggest that humans are born
with motor schemas for four types of syllables. They conjectured that
these types originated in proto language, because they occur in the
proto language proposed by Bengtson and Ruhlen based on syllable
distributions found in recorded languages (1994). While the evidence is
weak, the conjecture itself seems reasonable. The earliest forms might
have acquired meanings while still embedded in longer, unreduced,
calls.
This small set of constraints can be used to create a surprising number
of distinct utterances. The rules generate eight CV and 12 CVC syl-
lables, as in (1) and (2), which we write as though preparing a reader
in Heidelbergensian, omitting square brackets and unfamiliar charac-
ters: a is a central vowel; e is a mid-front vowel; o is a back vowel.
Allowing the CV set to be affixes of a single type (prefix or suffix) yields
a lexicon of 8 12 = 96 words. Allowing the CV and CVC sets to be
words, the total lexicon reaches 116. Allowing two-word utterances
without repetition or fixed word order, produces an astounding pho-
nological pool of 13,340 possible one and two-word utterances, even
without tapping the possibilities of word order, syllable reduplication,
syllable as prefix in one construction and suffix in another, vowel
length, compounding, stress, tone, or larger constructions. The number
of conventional meanings conveyed would be reduced by synonymy
but expanded by polysemy, metonymy, and metaphor.
(1) CV syllables
ba, ma, pa, te, de, ne, ko, go
(2) CVC syllables
pet, ped, pat, pad, pot, pod, bet, bed, bat, bad, bot, bod
(3) CV-CVC terms

ba-pet, de-ped, do-ped, ma-pat, ne-pad, pa-pot, te-pod, ma-bod, ...
It appears that when proto speakers began to attach meaning to such

utterances, an adequate matrix of phonological variants was readily
available for the expansion of proto vocabularies.
7.5 Proto semantics
Given that development of hominin material culture proceeded with gla-

cial slowness over most of the past 2 million years, it is likely that contem-
porary brains operate very much like ancestral ones in many respects. It is
only in the past 60K years that evidence of rapid cultural change appears
in the archaeological record. So it is likely that heidelbergensis thought in
some of the same ways that humans do today. Reasoning from cognitive
linguistics, we would expect image schemas, cognitive models, conceptual
metaphors, conceptual metonymies, and conceptual blending (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987; Palmer 1996, Fauconnier
and Turner 2002).14 These thought processes operate in all fields of mean-
ing (Tomasello 2003) with pervasive influences on grammar.
The positive feedback loop is clear. As biological evolution enhanced
the speed and precision of proto languages, there was an acceleration of
language-driven conventional thought, which fostered the elaboration
of adaptive cultural models and of grammar, which conferred adaptive
advantages on speakers, thereby channeling further biological evolution.
In an effort to discern the semantic scaffolding available to heidelbergensis
in the genesis of speech, we will examine a few key concepts and explain
why each is helpful in understanding the emergence of language. The
concepts are: Conceptual metaphors; Polycentric conceptual networks;
Spatial orientation; Action chains and scenarios; Polysemy, morphology,
and grammaticalization; Iconicity and phonological networks.
7.5.1 Conceptual metaphors: MATING IS FORAGING (hunting

or gathering)
In societies with hunting and gathering economies, such as the !Kung San
of the Kalahari desert, it is common for young men to do years of bride
service hunting game for the family of the bride both before and after
the couple begins cohabitation. It is no coincidence that !Kung folklore
depicts women as game animals hunted by men (Biesele 1986). In the
myths of hunter-gatherers in North America, it is common to find that
heroes marry large game animals such as deer, elk, and buffalo, while
female characters in myth marry edible roots or salmon. In Ute mythol-

ogy, carnivores are typically male and their wives are typically herbivores
or other edible creatures. In the marriage ceremonies of the Nez Perce,
the family of the groom brings game for the family of the bride, and
the brides family brings edible roots for the family of the groom. This is
all consistent with the theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff
(1987) that much of language is governed by conceptual metaphors that
reflect bodily experiences and cultural models. Based on these considera-
tions as well as Marwicks (2003) archaeological evidence for exchange in
the Middle Pleistocene and Quiatts (2001) arguments for a dual economy,
we suggest that proto linguistic heidelbergensis might have already pos-
sessed a cultural model of exchange in which males provided game and
females provided plant foods. Therefore, they might have had some intui-
tion of the conceptual metaphor MATING IS FORAGING, which awaited only
the genesis of speech for its verbal expression in myths and metaphors.
7.5.2 Polycentric conceptual networks

Lakoff (1987) demonstrated that a noun classifier is a complex category
that includes mainly terms that belong to a common domain of experi-
ence. The balan noun classifier of the Australian language Dyirbal applies
to the term for woman, for characters in the myth of the sun (a female),
and for other entities regarded as similarly hot, dangerous, or prickly.
Palmer and Woodman (1999) elaborated the theory, showing that a clas-
sifier may have multiple central concepts linked to one another and to less
central terms by similarity, elaboration, or metonymy. They also made
it explicit that the domain of experience which governs the classifier
is a cultural model, usually consisting of a small set of salient scenarios.
For example, the Shona noun classifier 3/4 centers around ancestors,
rain making, medicine, and the domestic activity of pounding grain in
a mortar with a pestle. From just the pounding scenario, one finds links
to terms for long thin things (like the mortar pole), pounding, ground
grain, repetition, irritation, and noise, all of which take the same classifier
prefix. Since classifiers are common in the worlds languages, we think it
likely that proto speakers had something similar. They linked concepts to
their central scenarios in networks of conceptual metonymy and meta-
phor, which served as the semantic scaffolding for proto language.
7.5.3 Spatial orientation

Foragers may conceptualize orientational frames in terms of absolute
coordinates, that is in terms of macro scale cognitive maps of the land-
scape (Hallowell 1955; Haviland 1993, 1996; Levinson 1996; Palmer
2007).15 One result is that a narrated event is always placed in the

same orientation relative to the landscape rather than being dragged
and rotated with the changing position of the narrator, even when the
orientation is communicated by gestures! This command of orienta-
tion with macro maps is essential to narrative mimetic presentations,
which may involve acting out the movements and orientations of
animals, hunters, and deities. Given the importance of spatial orienta-
tion in finding camp sites, useful plants, and raw materials for tools,
and in finding and following game, it is likely that a proto language
of orientation and geography was employed in ceremonials depicting
hunting and gathering.
Spatial cognitive maps are often tightly meshed with other cultural
models. The Chemehuevi Indians of the southern Colorado River had
song cycles that narrated the travels of mythical animals, such as Fox
and Deer, to spiritual places in band territories (Laird 1976). A similar
pattern is found in Aboriginal cultures of Australia, where, accord-
ing to Malcolm (1994, p. 159) the moving and stopping narrative is
a deep-seated cultural organizing principle. Movements from site to
site, activity to activity, and event to event structure songs, creation
myths, and campfire stories told by both sexes. A cycle may include
a departure, a stay in a new place, and a return to the starting point.
In Aboriginal English, the schema surfaces in such seemingly elliptical
expressions as went out, driving along, out in the bush, and coming
back (Malcolm and Sharifian 2002). It meshes with the hunting schema,
which is narrated with terms such as chasing, catching, killing, and
having a feed. One may imagine heidelbergensis as wandering continu-
ally to new territories, but most movement probably took place in cycles
within known territories, which became invested with social memory
and, perhaps, mythical imagery. Spatial knowledge, whether schematic
or rich in detail, is acquired in a socio-cultural context. The interweav-
ing of spatial and social knowledge produces a field of social metonymy
(Schieffelin 1976; Basso 1990; Palmer 2007). The conceptual metonymy
of space was readily available to heidelbergensis for use in proto speech,
because their territories were laden with memories and mimetic history.
7.5.4 Action chains and scenarios

A clause such as he killed the elephant with a spear predicates
what Langacker (2000, p. 30) calls a schematic action chain of AGENT>
INSTRUMENT> THEME (OBJECT).16 Processes caused by an explicit agent,
force, or transfer of energy are said to receive an energetic construal. Other
clauses, such as the elephant died or the ice melted, construe a participant
as undergoing an autonomous thematic process in which there is no

explicit causation or transfer of energy from an agent to an instrument
or theme. These processes are said to receive an absolute construal. The
distinction between energetic and absolute construals corresponds
roughly to the grammatical distinction between ergative and absolutive
cases that are found in many languages. It also corresponds roughly to
the Navajo hierarchy of energetic and mental potency (Witherspoon
1977; reanalyzed in Palmer 1996) and to hierarchies of empathy and
animacy that organize the roles of nominal participants (Comrie 1989,
p. 185; Langacker 1991, pp. 306307).
It seems safe to assume that for heidelbergensis, energetic and autono-
mous processes were salient concepts which competed for grammatical
status in proto language. Furthermore, many of the events uppermost
in the mind of any social animal are scenarios of interaction. We can
therefore assume that the distinction between energetic and absolutive
was social as well as mechanical. To the extent that heidelbergensis had
intersubjective awareness and a theory of mind, the concepts would
be extended over motives and intentions. Here we can agree with
Bickerton (1998, p. 351), who theorized that the thematic roles of event
participants may have pre-existed language by several million years.
Aiello (1998) and Armstrong, Stokoe, and Wilcox (1995) relate the struc-
ture of language to the structure of social interactions.
7.5.5 Morphology, polysemy, and grammaticalization

Studies of grammaticalization have revealed that nouns, verbs, or
adjectives, i.e. substantives, may evolve into adpositions (prepositions
or postpositions) or affixes (prefixes or suffixes) (Hopper and Traugott
1993; Heine 1997). By grammaticalization, a verb meaning want can
evolve to a prefix marking future tense, as happened in Swahili; a
verb meaning get can become a possession marker and ultimately an
existential, as happened in Chinese; and a noun meaning person can
evolve to mean we, as happened in the Khoisan language !Xun (Heine
and Kuteva 2002). The changes occur with repeated usages in contexts
where the substantives contribute only contextually salient elements of
their fully specified meanings. Thus, the word for head has evolved in
many languages to mean an extremity such as the top of a vertical entity,
the most anterior point on a moving entity, or the end-point of a path
schema. Most often, several abstract senses are simultaneously available
in a semantic network as related but alternative meanings, and we say
that the adposition or affix is polysemous (Lakoff 1987; Brugman 1988;
Langacker 1991; Sandra and Rice 1995; Rice 2003). Grammaticalized
forms often acquire evaluative senses, probably through the process of

subjectification (Langacker 1990).
In theories of language genesis, it is common to posit a period of
protolanguage during which an utterance consisted of only a very small
number of substantive termstwo or three in topic-comment relation
according to Marwick (2003), three to five with no interdependence
beyond random linear concatenation according to Bickerton (1998).
We propose that even a simple two-word proto expression would have
quickly grammaticalized with frequent use. A simple morphology
might have emerged within a single generation. Perhaps it was the ear-
liest phonologically reduced speech environment with relational forms
that selected for the ability to hear and produce consonants, vowels,
and syllables, thus accelerating the pace of speech. We should point out
here that our conclusions differ in one important respect from those
of Heine and Kuteva (2002), who proposed that protolanguage had no
morphology. We also doubt that proto language had only two-word
typesnouns and verbsunless verbs include attributives and other
relational forms. We can agree with them that proto language had a
small vocabulary and that context played a central role in interpreta-
tion, as it does still. We also agree that suprasegmental phenomena,
such as tone, stress, and intonation should also be considered as part of
the evolving heidelbergensis communications package.
7.5.6 Iconicity and phonological networks

If ko were a heidelbergensis proto word for some entity or action, then
one could evoke more of the entity or more intensive action by repeat-
ing it, or some portion of it, saying koko, or even kko. Similarly, one
could lengthen the vowel. Any simple iconic reduplicative or aug-
mentative morphology has the potential to double the vocabulary at a
stroke. Reduplication is an important morphological process in many of
the worlds languages. It commonly predicates plurality, size (augmenta-
tive or diminutive), repetition, distribution, or intensity. For examples
of the latter, see Moshi (1993). Because augmentation and repetition
are often experienced as good or bad, reduplication often predicates
evaluation. Some languages utilize several kinds of reduplication, and
these are interwoven in somewhat irregular and complex phonological
and semantic networks. Tuggy (2003) described the elaborate symbolic
network of reduplication in Nahuatl, showing how such simple phono-
logical transformations can multiply vocabulary. Proto speakers would
very likely have quickly begun using reduplication and building up a
network of terms sparsely networked by phonological similarities and
by conceptual similarities and metonymies.17 Going beyond reduplica-

tion, Kita (2008) argued for a sound-symbolic proto language.
We have argued that important semantic and phonological capa-
bilities were developing or well developed by heidelbergensis times.
We now consider the process by which the symbols of proto speech
emerged from ceremonials that featured mimetic performances and
vocalizations.
7.6 Mimesis
Knight (1998, pp. 8788) theorized that mimetic performance exerts

selection pressures on volitional control over emotionally expressive
vocalizations. Zlatev (2008, p. 18) proposed that language has its ori-
gins in mimesis during a key stage of declarative pointing and iconic
gestures (pantomime). Zlatev (2002) finds grounds in mimesis for inter-
subjectivity, a fundamental prerequisite of language. While not neces-
sarily wrong, neither argument goes directly to the question of symbol
origins. Both Knight and Zlatev were applying the framework proposed
by Donald (1991).
Donald (1991, p. 168) defined mimetic skill or mimesis as the ability
to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are inten-
tional but not linguistic. Mimesis is rooted in kinematic imagination
and the ability to model the whole body, including its voluntary action
systems (Donald 1998, p. 49).18 He included in the concept of mimesis
tones of voice, facial expressions, eye movements, manual signs and
gestures, postural attitudes, [and] patterned whole-body movements
(1991, p. 169). These are deployed in representational forms, including
pantomime, re-enactment, gesture, and ritualized group enactment. He
noted that long sequences of these elements can express many aspects
of the perceived world (1991, p. 169), including the communication of
emotional states through facial and vocal mimesis. He recognized the
dependence of mimesis on what are now called joint attentional frames
such as is seen in a childs ability to find the target of its mothers gaze
and in pointing. Mimesis must depend on intersubjective skills in gen-
eral, which include the ability to participate in joint attention frames
and to read intentions, which Tomasello (1999, 2003) has proposed as
the ability that distinguishes humans from other primates. Children
begin reading intentions at about one year of age.
In essence, mimesis is the enactment of mental imagery. When per-
formed by a group, ritualized mimesis becomes ceremonial in which
actors play various roles. For example, historic hunter-gatherer societies
enact scenes of hunting and celebrating a kill, girls and boys coming
of age, supernatural curing in childbirth, visitations by mythical ani-
mal deities, and shamanistic journeys. Donald observed that mimesis
works on the metaphorical principle of perceptual resemblance, and
that event classes became differentiated with repetition (1991, p. 192).
Hence, mimetic representations of social events presented idealized
templates (1991, p. 197). While Donald emphasized metaphor, we
note the importance of metonymy, because an enactment evokes the
imagery of a background scene and the elements within it. Donald the-
orized that the originator of mimetic culture was H. erectus, but it was
H. sapiens who made the transformation to the succeeding stage of
mythic culture supported by language. Curiously, he failed to apply
memesis theory directly to the genesis of linguistic symbols. But a
connection had been made a quarter century earlier by Earl Count in
a comment on Hockett and Ascher (1964, p. 157). Count wrote I am
suggesting that phasia [i.e. language] reflects, on its motor side, some
coalescence of two communication-systems: vocalic and mimetic [brack-
ets added; emphasis in original].
7.7 Ceremonies and the genesis of verbal symbols
In an essay on gossip and language genesis, Power (1998) asked How

does the listener know that the information is valuable? In our hypoth-
esis, the question becomes, How does the listener know that a particular
vocalization evokes a particular concept? or How does she recognize a
verbal symbol when she hears it? A symbolic connection can only be
made if image and vocalization occur concurrently in evocative con-
nection with a way to affirm mutual recognition of a new symbol, such
as affirmation with mutually followed and directed gazes (Sinha 2004).
Audiences of multiple persons amplify the frequency of affirmations
by gaze, vocalization, or gesture and increase the number of people
apprehending the same symbols. Vocalizations may be uttered by one
or more performers, or by onlookers, though the distinction may be
artificial. New symbols may be understood as representations, exaggera-
tions, metaphors, metonymies, or conceptual blends, depending on the
context of presentation.
The human activity that gathered together all the necessary elements
for this emergence of symbolic speech was ceremonial, or perhaps proto
ceremonial. Hypothetically, there was dance and mimesis of animals.
There was acting out of foraging trips, annual cycles of migration,
mock captures between the sexes, and narrow escapes from predators.
There was rhythmic foot-stamping, percussion on wood, bone, horn or

hoof, chanting, humming, and hooting. Mimetic performances in cer-
emonials displayed panoplies of emotion laden images and presented
spectrums of vocalizations. Within the shared field of observation, the
participants and their spatial arrangements provided motivation for
terms of address, deictics, and terms for visible body parts of humans
and animal characters (cf. Occhi, this volume). Particular representa-
tions evoked specific vocalizations, and vice versa, so that there was
symbolic differentiation.
The connections that made the first verbal symbols meaningful
might have been iconic, onomatopoetic, emotional, or postural. In
general, they were probably initially sound symbolic, though not nec-
essarily obviously so (Kita 2008). Armstrong, Stokoe and Wilcox (1995)
made iconic gestures an intermediate stage in their gestural theory of
language origins.19 The first symbols produced in ceremonial contexts
might have been holophrases. They predicated all of whatever was
most salient about complex actions or scenes, but evolved to predicate
only elements of meaning abstracted from those scenes. Thus, a word
acquired at the performance of an antelope dance might first map to a
holistic concept of antelope, but eventually evolve to mean a particular
species, meat, fast runner, dancing, or even wife (Section 4.1 MATING
IS FORAGING) (cf. Tomasello 1999, p. 138; 2003, pp. 3640; Armstrong,
Stokoe and Wilcox 1995, p. 234).
The improvement of intention reading that occurred at some
unknown time in human evolution accelerated symbolic genesis
(Tomasello 2003). Monitoring of performance activates mirror neurons,
so that individuals who witness or hear mimetic performance imagine
themselves performing the same actions. Linkage of simultaneously
activated mirror neurons between visual, kinesthetic, and auditory
regions of the brain would support the emergence of symbolism in
mimetic performance. When imagery is activated simultaneously in
different modes, future similar activations in one mode evoke corre-
lated images from another mode. Rizzolatti (1998, p. 528) found differ-
ent fields of mirror neurons in F5 and Brocas area governing gestures
of the face and mouth, the larynx, and the arms. He concluded that
communication requires a mutual interplay of facial gestures, brachio-
mechanical gestures, and vocalization (sound gestures). Arbib (2005)
argued from these findings that the remarkable human ability to imitate
led to the development of proto sign, which he defined as a combi-
natorially open repertoire of manual gestures that emerged by a kind
of distillation from pantomime. Proto sign provided the scaffolding
for the emergence of protospeech (2005, p. 105). To explain the poor

correspondence between sign and speech, he proposed that the proto
sign scaffolding faded away. Of course, the theory that speech originated
in gesture is not new. It was proposed by Hewes (1973), Armstrong,
Stokoe, and Wilcox (1995) and others. Our theory suggests that proto
sign and proto speech evolved concurrently and synergetically.
Ceremonial provided a crucible for the forging of symbols. Community
members, including infants and juveniles, participated in making the
new symbolic connections. In the common symbolic environment,
participants learned patterns of vocalization and acquired shared mean-
ings. Reiterative performances given in repeated ceremonials reinforced
new vocabulary and established conventional pronunciations and
meanings necessary to intergenerational continuity. Opportunities for
wider sharing of emerging ceremonial language were provided by visit-
ing with kindred bands for economic exchanges and ceremonials. Once
established in ceremonials, new symbols would be readily understood
in non-ceremonial contexts in which listeners who were intersubjec-
tively aware would compare meanings learned in ceremonies to antici-
pated intentions of speakers and make the necessary inferences.
In modern humans, it is adults who display the most elaborate
grammar, yet it is infants and children who are the best learners.
Acquisition of language by infants seems to require that they jointly
attend to a field of reference with a more advanced speaker (Nelson
1996; Tomasello 2003; Sinha 2004). Yet if there are no speakers,
there is no model. It must be that the cultural milieu of the Middle
Pleistocene somehow selected for intersubjective skills, which were
useful in learning tool-making, tool using, ritual participation, and
other cooperative activities. Whether intersubjectivity was gained via
motherese (Falk 2004) or in some other way, those who possessed
intersubjective skills became better producers of food, clothing, and
shelter; they raised healthier, more intelligent offspring; they gave bet-
ter performances at ceremonials (which were also attended by infants)
and became more attractive mates; they provided more encourage-
ment to performers and developed closer interpersonal bonds; they
cooperated more responsively and efficiently in a variety of tasks. At
the transition to speech, infants and juveniles who inherited intersub-
jective skills could impute communicative intent to vocalizations of
others and calculate the received meanings of their own intentional
vocalizations. Once the new intersubjective skills applied to vocaliza-
tions were possessed by a sufficient segment of the population, speech
could blossom. Hence, is it interesting that Locke and Bogin (2006,
p. 17) present convincing ethnographic evidence to support their

conclusion that much of the elaboration of speech can be attributed
to the performative and creative nature of in-group verbal behavior in
juvenility and adolescence.
This hypothesis is not intended to displace all other proposals regard-
ing the origin of speech. Particularly plausible theories with causative
explanations include those that base the genesis of speech on mother-
ese (Falk 2004), on grooming replacement (Dunbar 1998), or on mime-
sis and/or performance (Zlatev 2002, 2008; Locke and Bogin 2006).
Knight (1998, pp. 8788) argued that ritual speech was used in morally
authoritative enactments that functioned to present group identities
symbolized by deities. If so, then proto speech vocabulary would deal
mainly with morals, deities, and group identities. Given our discus-
sions of subjects of probable interest to heidelbergensis (Sections 7.3,
7.4), it should be obvious that we think this is only a part of the story.
We see ceremonial as an arena that intensifies intersubjective symbol
production with meanings that touch a broad spectrum of concerns in
heidelbergensis life. Nevertheless, elements of all these theories comple-
ment the ceremonial hypothesis. Speakers likely acquired some new
symbols in non-ceremonial contexts, but we think that ceremonials
provided an evocative context in which new symbols, constructions,
and narrative conventions emerged, and symbols created elsewhere
could be shared, entrenched, and conventionalized.20
7.8 Song theories
Any sort of vocalization produced by actors or audiences in ceremonial

performances could have served as the phonological raw material for the
creation of verbal symbols. Nevertheless, our theory suggests that some
of the earliest speech emerged as lyrics or chants, so it is both instructive
and entertaining to consider previous theories along these lines. Otto
Jespersen, writing in 1922, phrased his theory of language genesis from
song in terms that caused his critics to accuse him of presenting a roman-
tic dream of a golden age, an accusation which he denied. Jespersens
writings on song might have been the swansong of 19th century cultural
evolutionary theory with its faith in human progress. He argued that his
theory was based on a progressive movement from a very raw and barba-
rous age to something better (1922, p. 434, footnote 1). Where we might
speak dryly of sexual selection, Jespersen waxed rhapsodic:
In primitive speech I hear the laughing cries of exultation when lads and
lasses vied with one another to attract the attention of the other sex, when
everybody sang his merriest and danced his bravest to lure a pair of eyes
to throw admiring glances in his directionOtto Jespersen (1922, p. 434).
He said that our remote ancestors in singing as nature prompted

them ... were paving the way for a language capable of rendering min-
ute shades of thought (1922, p. 437).
Half a century later, Livingstone (1973, p. 26) proposed that language
evolved from a learned, open signal system of territorial songs. He reasoned
that some further specific impetus would have been required for language
development. Once acquired by a few groups, language would have acted as
an isolating mechanism driving speciation. Livingstones definition of song
was vague and seemed to be based primarily on variations in pitch, not the
recitative song that Wescott (1973), in a critique of Livingstones article,
defined as melodic speech. Wescott also wrote this remarkable passage:
My own guess is that the australopithecines were whistlers as

well as practitioners of such other nonvocal sound-making as
hand-clapping, foot-stamping, and drumming on their chests or
on external objects; that the pithecanthropians added humming,
animal mimicry, and various forms of vocal play to this repertory;
that the Neandertalers further engaged in ritual chanting to placate
spirits and ensure success in hunting; and that early modern man
capped these accomplishments with the musical use of grammatical
speech .... So I accept austrolopithecine song as melodic phonota-
tion. But I doubt that hominid melodies became vocal till the time
of Peking man, syllabic till that of Mousterian man, or verbal till that
of Cro-Magnon man (Wescott 1973, p. 27).
Jespersen, Livingston and Wescott concerned themselves with the

problem of whether pre-humans had song, and whether language
originated in song. None of them saw the context in which songs were
performed as part of the puzzle. The theory that we offer here does not
argue that language evolved from the neurological patterns that support
melody, because the evidence supports the independence of lyrics and
melody (Besson, M. et al. 1998; Steinke, Cuddy, and Jakobson 2001;
Hbert et al. 2003; Peretz et al. 2004). Rather, we suggest that mimetic
performances in ceremonials provided occasions in which rhythms and
emotions could provoke coordinated rhythmic and melodic vocaliza-
tions, such as chanting and song. If repeated vocalizations were differ-
entiated and associated with particular mimetic images, proto speech
was a result. Further development involved adding new articulations of
the lips and tongue, nasalizing, expanding the range of vowels, varying
the intensity of vocalization and the length and pitch of vowels, and
coordinating all of these. Perhaps the rhythmic context of ceremonial
favored the rhythms of syllable systems over long calls. Syllable systems
enabled the development of morphology through grammaticalization.
Jespersen and Bickerton were no doubt correct that good speakers and
singers were preferred by the opposite sex. As Bickerton (1998, p. 352)
put it, females would surely have preferred mates whose communica-
tive capacities so strikingly outclassed those of other available partners.
Of course, the same could be said for male preferences in mates. On this
point, see the interesting review of the ethnography of performative
speech in Locke and Bogin (2006).
7.9 Gradualists versus catastrophists
Most scholars who study language origins profess to be either gradualist

or catastrophist. Gradualists place the genesis of language very early,
even as early as H. erectus. They see incremental change leading even-
tually to the fluency of H. sapiens. Quiatt (2001, pp. 2930) provides a
good characterization of this view.
Leaving mutational theories out of account, current views of the
transition to modern language tend to assume a correspondingly early
onset, with the implication that cultural innovations anticipating those
commonly associated with the Upper Pleistocene in Europeand like
those, reflecting a society that has begun to use language in a new
waymust be rooted in the Middle Stone Age.
Some see very early origins. Aiello (1998, pp. 3031) proposed that
the conscious control of vocalization began with H. ergaster, and
that fully developed modern human language originated with the
expansion of brain size that began about 500K ya. Nichols (1998,
p. 142) proposed that H. erectus was in all probability carrying primitive
languages which continued to diversify and diverge for over a million
years. Burling (2002, p. 308) observed If syntax can grow gradually
in children throughout all the years of childhood, it could surely have
grown gradually over many hundreds of thousands or even millions of
years of phylogeny.
Catastrophic evolution is probably more accurately, if less dramati-
cally, described as discontinuous or punctuated (Armstrong, Stokoe, and
Wilcox 1995, p. 254). Catastrophists place the main event sometime
within the past 120K years. They argue that the beginnings of language
must coincide with anatomical modernity or, after 100K ya, with the
efflorescence of material symbolic culture seen in beads and red ocher,
or after 60K ya, with figurines, cave paintings, and more sophisticated
and varied tool industries. For example, Bickerton (1998, p. 354) pro-
posed that a long period of stagnation was followed by a cognitive
explosion occurring only after the emergence of anatomically modern
humans in South Africa about 120,000 years BP. He was apparently
unaware of the physical changes that were taking place in heidelbergen-
sis as early as 300K ya. The skeletal evidence suggests that speech, or at
least some new kind of finely controlled vocalization, emerged about
that time.
7.10 Conclusions
We propose that human speech originated with African H. heidelbergen-

sis, who lived in the Middle Pleistocene between 800K ya and 130K ya.
Evidence from fossil skeletons suggests that the vocal apparatus needed
for speech was in place by about 300K ya. We propose that the cogni-
tive capabilities of H. heidelbergensis were basically similar to those of H.
sapiens in that heidelbergensis was a cultural being, capable of concep-
tual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, conceptual blending, and iconic
sound symbolism. These conceptual figures provided the cognitive
foundation for the salient scenarios and other cultural models formed
in daily activities. The scenarios and cultural models were the source
of the images presented in mimetic performances, where they were
linked with differentiating vocalizations to form the verbal symbols
of proto speech. Ceremonials provided social contexts that supported
the genesis, entrenchment and standardization of symbols. Enhanced
intersubjectivityincluding joint attention frames, intention reading,
shifting of spatial perspectives, and conceptual role substitutionswas
essential to symbol genesis. The mimetic performances involved vocali-
zation by both performers and audiences, who shared joint attentional
frames and understood communicative intent.
Vocalizations were mapped to mimetic imagery by something akin to
fast mapping that we see in language development in children (Nelson
1996). Grammaticalization quickly produced proto morphology, and
consequently, proto grammar. All participants would have benefited in
practical ways from learning the enhanced models of their way of life
that were presented in ceremonials. Heeschen (2001, p. 188) proposed
that narrative has adaptive value and that language and aesthetic forms
[i.e. narrative] probably coevolved. Symbols generated in other activi-
ties, such as care of infants and juveniles, grooming, tool-making, and
hunting, could be shared and standardized in ceremonials. Neighboring
bands might have participated in joint ceremonials where they shared

their emerging proto language with kinsmen. Something about hei-
delbergensis culture released the selective pressure favoring the old call
system, freeing the neural control of vocalization to develop longer
phrasings, syllabic rhythms, and grammatical constructions, thereby
solving Burlings (1993) paradox in which speech could not be derived
from the only vocal system available to archaic hominins, the call
system. We can now imagine the specific mechanisms by which the
genesis of language in the form of narratives and song cycles could
have taken place in the ceremonials of heidelbergensis. Our hypothesis
and the evidence for it support the position of Sinha (2004) that it is
the emergence of symbolization that is central to the problem of the
origin of speech.
Notes
1. This chapter is a revision of a paper presented to a plenary session of the
conference on Language, Culture and Mind, Portsmouth, July 1820, 2004.
Elizabeth Harmon was then Visiting Lecturer in Anthropology and Ethnic
Studies at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas while completing her Ph.D.
at Arizona State University at Tempe with a specialization in the evolution
of African hominins. Elizabeth passed away unexpectedly and tragically in
March, 2009. We wish to express our indelible sense of loss and our gratitude
for her generous participation in this project.
Thanks are due to Luz Pfister, Steve McCafferty, and Jan Oller for helpful
comments on the first draft. Special thanks to Roy Ogawa for his excellent
suggestions and for making his web site available for a slide presentation of
an early version.
2. The term language here designates an integrated complex of speech and ges-
ture. The term speech designates only the verbal or vocal part of language. It
is often referred to as vocal language. Proto speech refers to hypothetical transi-
tional forms between primate vocalizations and the speech of Homo sapiens.
3. We use the term juveniles rather than children, because it is likely that heidelber-
gensis had no stage that could properly be called childhood. This stage, which
is probably unique to modern humans, lasts from weaning at about three
years to the eruption of the first molar at about six years. During this short
stage the brain grows to about 90 precent of its adult weight. For details, see
Thompson and Nelson (2011).
4. A list of obvious objections to many of these theories appears in Johansson,
Zlatev, and Grdenfors (2006).
5. The term emergent is used throughout this chapter in the sense defined by
Sinha (2004) as the development of new properties and/or levels of organiza-
tion of behavioral and cognitive systems as a consequence of the operation
or cooperation of simpler processes.
6. 100K ya = 100,000 years ago.
7. But see Rightmire (1998) for a discussion of unresolved issues.
8. For a description of the Bodo cranium, see Rightmire (1996).

9. The irony is borrowed from Burling (2002).
10. See also the useful discussion in Foley (1997, pp. 6366).
11. By syntax, we mean only the ordered presentation of phonological forms
without regard to presence or absence of meaning. For meaningful construc-
tions consisting of symbols, we use the term grammar (Langacker 1987).
12. Together with calls and language, Burling (1993) also posited a third human
system of communication: the iconic system, which would underly such
features as stress, rate of speaking, and reduplication in language and direc-
tion, repetition, velocity, and spatial configurations in gestures.
13. The six families and ten languages (in parentheses) were Indo-European
(English, German, French, and Spanish), Uralic (Estonian), Afro-Asiatic
(Hebrew), Austronesian (New Zealand Maori), Quechuan (Quichua [sic]),
Bantu (Swahili), and Japanese (Japanese).
14. In conceptual blending, elements of concepts from two different domains
are mapped to a concept in a third domain. For example, conceptual blends
from the domains of machines and animate beings produced the concepts
of the cyborg, the computer Hal from the film 2001, and the robot dog Aibo
from Sony. It is very likely that spirits who blended and shifted between
human and animal forms were mimed in heidelbergensis ceremonies.
15. See Palmer (2007) for a discussion of types of cognitive maps used in
orientation.
16. The term theme also includes patient (They melted), experiencer (I itch),
mover (It rose), and zero (She is tall) (Langacker 2000, p. 30).
17. Other phonological symbolic networks pertaining to Spanish verbs and
Salish color terms are discussed in Bybee (1985) and Palmer (1996).
18. On the complex reflexivity of performance for an audience, see Palmer and
Jankowiak (1996). Merlins basic definition is useful, but the exclusions for
the purpose of isolating a pure mimesis are questionable. It is doubtful that
even simple imitative acts performed by a being capable of intersubjective
thoughts are entirely devoid of intention to represent images, whether to
others or to oneself.
19. Tomasello (2003, p. 35) has reported that iconicity is not useful to children
in learning symbolic gestures, but a reader of this manuscript commented
Perhaps, but differentiating symbols from icons is not easy in language
acquisition. Childrens earliest symbols may well be icons initially then
become more symbol-like. [It is] hard to see how symbols could emerge
full-blown.
20. Co-author Parkin suggested that ceremonial gatherings would function to
distribute symbols created in other contexts.
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Part III
Intersection of Cognitive
Linguistics and Linguistic
Anthropology
8
On Intersubjective Co-construction
of Virtual Space through
Multimodal Means: A Case of
Japanese Route-Finding Discourse
Kuniyoshi Kataoka
8.1 Introduction
Researchers interest in, and their areas of analysis of, space differ
according to disciplines, but largely in two major waysphysical vs
psychological. For instance, anthropological research on space has
traditionally been concerned with kinesics, place names, symbolic use
of space such as sacred or polluted places, social organization, dwell-
ing and migration patterns, spatial mapping in language use, and
habitus (a system of dispositions) (e.g., Lawrence & Low 1990; Hanks
1990; Haviland 1993, 2003; Feld & Basso 1996; Bourdieu 1977, 1990;
Bennardo 2009). These agendas are mainly, though not exclusively, rel-
evant to the outer environments surrounding the social actors.
On the other hand, although researchers interest in the inner
space had been exclusively pursued in psychology (e.g., Hart & Moore
1973 and a series of B. Tverskys work), recent linguistic anthropo-
logical endeavorsespecially those motivated by the Neo-Whorfian
framework (Lucy 1992; Levinson 2003)identified rich underlying
language-thought interfaces on spatial cognition (Levinson 1996, 2003;
Pederson et al. 1998; Bowerman & Choi 2001).1 This line of research
has generally revealed that there are many cultures that convention-
ally deploy indigenous, allocentric spatial anchors for the equivalent
spatial tasks, and it has argued that the (Kantian) egocentric thesis of
space may have been unduly emphasized in the (Western) notions of
perspective-taking, which advocate cognitive universals (e.g., Van Cleve
& Frederick 1991; Levinson & Brown 1994).
In addition to problematizing the egocentricity thesis, it is
time to reconsider the equally persistent tenet of individual cogni-
tion, and, for our interests, to seek potentials for incorporating an
181
intersubjective perspective-taking into spatial language research.

A critical awareness here is that the inner (or psychological) and
the outer (or physical) may not be so clearly separated. Rather, one
cannot escape from the influence of the other, in that they mutu-
ally ride into each other through (inter)subjective and somatic cor-
respondences (Merleau-Ponty 1962). What mediates the inner and
the outer is the body in space, which lays the groundwork for the
social, cognitive, and neurobiological underpinnings (Johnson 1990;
Van Wolputte 2004; Iacoboni 2009).
In this study, as a primordial site for discursive investigation of inter-
subjectivity and corporeality, we take up a discourse phenomenon in
which the body in space was maximally exploited through intersubjec-
tive intentions. We then seek to apply the notion of intersubjectivity to
spatial language research by tentatively defining four basic types of the
viewer-centered perspective, and thus we examine in detail the process
through which mutual understanding interactionally emerges through
trading places (Duranti 2010). Based on the analysis, we emphasize
that intersubjectivity and corporeality are two major factors that facili-
tate the current spatial construction.
To be more specific, based on linguistic and cognitive-anthropological
findings and a discourse-analytic approach, we focus on a limited set of
spatial terms (deictic motion verbs iku go and kuru come, and the
coordinate terms migi right and hidari left) and the bodily semiosis,
and we reveal the ways in which the maintenance, shift, and merger of
participants vantage points are collaboratively achieved and creatively
extended in situ. Thus, the merit of this study lies in a discursive and
holistic account of the viewers (inter)subjective perspectives that incor-
porate multimodal scaffolding.
8.2 Intersubjectivity
Many researchers are now deeply aware that the emergence and devel-
opment of human sociality is not simply a matter of maturation but
rather is fundamentally motivated by, and geared for, full-fledged
human interaction. Admittedly, one major precondition of the pro-
cess is a phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity. This notion is
broadly defined, for instance, as (t)he sharing of experiential content
(e.g., feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguistic meanings) among a
plurality of subjects. (Zlatev et al. 2008: 1). It traces back to Husserls
phenomenological philosophy and has been a widely debated issue in
many branches of the social and cognitive sciences.
On Intersubjective Co-construction of Virtual Space 183
In the social sciences, the notion has been typically traced down to, and
heavily incorporated into, ethnomethodology and sociological/sociocul-
tural studies. In fact, many sociologists and anthropologists in the 1960s
and 1970s built much of their work on the phenomenological founda-
tions in order to investigate the emerging nature of everyday interaction
(e.g., Goffman 1959; Garfinkel 1967; Cicourel 1973), and such a tradition
persistently continues in current investigations (Habermas 2001; Csordas
2008; Gillespie & Cornish 2009; Duranti 2009, 2010).2 Duranti (2010),
for instance, defines it in plain terms and argues for its renewed impor-
tance in language and communication studies as follows:
For Husserl, intersubjectivity means the condition whereby I maintain

the assumption that the world as it presents itself to me is the same
world as it presents itself to you, not because you can read my mind
but because I assume that if you were in my place you would see it
the way I see it. This is captured by the notion of Platzwechsel, that
is, trading places or place exchange, which is made possible by
empathy (Duranti 2010: 6).
Duranti also emphasizes that, although intersubjectivity has often

been regarded as something that must be achieved, it is not a prod-
uct or an effect of communication but a condition for its possibility
(Duranti 2010: 9). In this study also, we look into an achieved aspect of
interaction, but it should also be noted that the phenomenon at issue
was only made possible by the participants being then and there, in a
certain formation, with those bodily orientations, and for a common
goal. In other words, intersubjectivity concerns more of the possibility
of being in the place where the Other is (Duranti 2010: 1)i.e., a condi-
tion of what we call environmental affordances.
Intersubjectivity is also highly regarded among linguists as a major
motivation for promoting grammaticalization of mutual epistemic
stances (Traugott 1995), as typically addressed by the question how
linguistic syntagma may shift towards the expression of meanings
of which the hearer is an essential part (Davidse, Vandelanotte, &
Cuyckens 2010). However, interdisciplinary attempts to bridge the gap
with related fields such as linguistic anthropology, discourse/conversa-
tion analysis, and literary studies are still in the development stage (cf.
Palmer 2007, this volume; Stockwell 2002) despite significant awareness
of and expressed calls for collaboration with related disciplines (e.g.,
Langacker 1999: 376; Kristiansen & Dirven 2008).
In recent years, researchers have extensively applied the notion to
various branches of the cognitive sciences and language-acquisition
studies based on a premise that it serves as a cognitive foundation for

developing sociality (Rogoff 2003; Tomasello 2008), revealing that even
neonates could manifest the burgeoning features of intersubjective
intentions (Nagy 2008; Frank & Trevarthen 2012). Further, because of
the crucial property of taking others perspectives, it is thought to be a
defining feature of the human species (and possibly enculturated apes)
(Tomasello 1999; Tomasello & Carpenter 2007).
Because of the all-encompassing nature of intersubjectivity, it has
been extensively recapitulated as distributed cognition (Hutchins
1995), joint attention (Moore & Dunham 1995; Tomasello 2008),
shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007), and various
versions of the X mind, where X could be readily replaced by, say,
embodied, discursive, social, or shared (Zlatev et al. 2008). For
instance, Zlatev et al. (2008) nicely summarize the basic tenets of the
shared mind (read intersubjectivity for our purposes) as (1) primordi-
ally connected; (2) shared experience on the levels of cognitive, affec-
tive, and perceptual processes; (3) based on embodied interaction; and
(4) initially social and interactional.
All of these tenets are highly pertinent to, and are typically concerned
with, the phenomena we consider in this chapter. In fact, the phenome-
non to be analyzed below is largely equivalent to what Zlatev illustrates
as the (full) third-order mentality, which is heuristically paraphrased
as I see that you see that I see X (Zlatev 2008: 227). In a similar vein,
it is also akin to what Bredel (2002: 169) calls self-positioning du
youa polyphonic amalgamation of all occurrences of the address-
ing du, which constitute a structure that allows the speaker to perceive
himself from the perspective of others. Our assumption here is that
such mutual meta-awareness of others minds should also be achieved
not simply on linguistic levels but also through nonverbal media such
as environmentally coupled gestures (Goodwin 2003, 2007; see also
Ishino 2007).
Now the time is ripe for an interdisciplinary attempt to incorporate
these notions into an integrated analysis of language, the body, and the
environment.
8.3 Spatial deixis and frames of reference
In the current analysis, we will particularly focus on the use of the deic-
tic motion verbs (DMVs) iku/kuru go/come and the spatial coordinate
terms migi/hidari right/left because they encode and index partial
but crucial features of the Origo (origin of perception) and the spatial
configuration relative to the surrounding referents, whether real or

imaginary. Unlike the English counterpart, the Japanese kuru come
strongly encodes a deictic sense of movement to and arrival at the
speaker (the Origo), thus indexing the locus of the vantage point. (Thus,
in Japanese one would only say, Im going (to you) instead of Im
coming.3), whereas iku go represents both a deictic and a non-deictic
(i.e., not from the source) departure movement, typically with a
locative case particle kara from. Whether it is deictic or non-deictic
depends on the surrounding (linguistic, somatic, or environmental)
context.
In linguistic theories of deixis (e.g., Ohye 1975; Koizumi 1990;
Fillmore 1997[1971]), the Origo for deictic expressions is calibrated
based on the analysis (or acceptability judgment) of constructed sen-
tences, and it is expected to be freely transposable. In actual discourse,
however, the locus of the Origo may not be as flexible as has been
assumed, being literally down-to-earth and constrained by epistemic
and experiential variables related to the context. Also, the shift of per-
spectives is often gradual and needs to be interactionally negotiated
among the participants. We will examine below some discursive conse-
quences emanating from these epistemic and experiential differences.
Next, in order to specify the referent in space, determining what
frame of reference (FOR) to take is essential (Levelt 1996; Levinson
1996). To take, for example, the sentence The ball is to the right
of the lamp (from your point of view) (Levinson 1996: 137), it has
a coordinate expression right inside and is tacitly based on the
ternary,4 relative FOR (Levinson 2003). While in the cognitive lin-
guistics framework, Palmer (2007: 1055) illustrates the process with a
deconstructive procedure that comprises a more complex focus chain
with five elementsthe ball, to, the right, of, the lamp. In fact, our dis-
course data include exactly the same kind of sentences as those above
(e.g., There is Y to the right of X. or X goes right to Y.), and thus
their models offer to us an initial framework for the analysis of spatial
descriptions. However, the utterances under discussion are linguisti-
cally underspecified due to the participants shared knowledge and
contextual assumptions, which are not necessarily given and need to be
carefully identified in analysis. Further, those utterances are frequently
complemented by somatic features and environmental affordances. We
thus should employ an eclectic framework that holds in check both
verbal and gestural categories.
As just mentioned, we must be aware that spatial perspectives may
emerge not only through language but alsoor onlythrough the body.5
McNeills (1992) seminal consideration of the Character vs Observer

viewpoints (VPTs), which may be reflected upon the representational ges-
ture (Kita 2000), should be the primary criterion for analysis. For exam-
ple, if the speaker makes a gesture of holding a handlebar, saying when
she was riding her bike ..., that is a gesture based on the Character VPT
in the narrated scene, whereas a hand-sliding gesture that represents the
bikes trajectory would be the one based on the Observer VPT.
Another highly noticeable gesture in our data is pointing.
Levinson and his colleagues investigated the indigenous use of point-
ing gestures (Levinson 2003, Ch. 6; Kita 2003; Enfield et al. 2007),
and claim that distinct pointing behaviors are a reflection of two
major FOR typesi.e., the relative (egocentric) or the absolute
(allocentric) FOR. For example, Japanese speakers default gestures
are largely relative and thus egocentric in nature. It is mostly
small and in front of the individual (utilizing an imagined, flat 2-D
scratch pad with shallow depth; McNeill 1992). Also, their pointing
gesture is usually associated with gaze and is normally accompanied
by a turning of the trunk when referring to an object behind. In addi-
tion, pointing to ones chest often means the self (Levinson 2003;
Kita 2003). Although there were no absolute/allocentric pointings
observed in the current data (however, see Kita 2003 and Kataoka 2011a
for Japanese speakers absolute pointing when giving route instruc-
tions), various types of egocentric pointing still give us a glimpse
into covert intersubjective processes.
Our interest here lies in the discursive practice that was collabora-
tively achieved through the manipulation of spatial terminology and
the bodily semiosis. Because the use of DMVs and coordinate terms
basically concerns the origin of cognition (Origo), we will not consider
what Levinson (2003) calls intrinsic (object-centered) and absolute
(environment-centered) perspectives in the current analysis. We con-
centrate instead on a more restricted, viewer-centered use of spatial
perspectives, leaving a holistic treatment comprising allocentric per-
spectives beyond the scope of the current study (but see Kataoka (in
preparation) for a tentative attempt to incorporate them in analysis).
In our data, DMVs and coordinate expressions appeared at the crucial
moment of mutual understanding, and turned out to accompany lay-
ered manipulations of language and the body.
In order to classify and analyze them, the basic parameters considered
here are the Character vs Observer viewpoints (McNeill 1992) and
the Internal vs External perspectives (Linde & Labov 1975; Levinson
2003) of the viewer. Rather than regarding them as respectively
corresponding to each other, we take them to constitute four basic

modes of viewer-centered perspective in a 2 2 grid (Table 8.1). The
rationale is that, if we conceive the observed perspectives that way, the
system will coherently incorporate previous findings and validate our
intersubjective perspective in a cogent manner.
The categories marked (1) to (3) in Table 8.1 approximately cor-
respond to the three major types of perspective-taking acknowledged
in previous studies, although they are referred to differently even in
related disciplines (see Levinson 2003: Ch. 2 for a detailed classifi-
cation). The major difference between the current study and those
models is our focused attention to the fourth category, or what we call
the Character-external or intersubjective perspective (Table 8.1
(4)). Due to its synthetic nature (indicated by the grayscale sign
and discussed below), this perspective may present itself in various
Table 8.1 Viewer-oriented spatial frames of reference considered
*The central circle represents possible mergers between (1)(2), (2)(3), and (1)(3), and
we regard the type (4) as prototypes of an intersubjective (Character-external) perspective
here.
Figure 8.1 Four major types of perspective-taking considered
combinations and different degrees of synthesis. (Having said that, the

term intersubjective perspective is used in a highly restricted sense
here, and assumed to be one emergent aspect of a broader notion of
intersubjectivity, as defined by Duranti (2010).)
Figures 8.1 (I) to (III) illustrate these possibilities in a visually simpli-
fied format and account for the three types of viewers perspective
(i.e., characters (I), observers (II), and surveyors (III)). There is an
increase in scope and scale as one goes from I to II, from II to III, and so
forth. Thus, these concentric squares indicate the levels of scope/scale
of perspectivization.
These possibilities of perspective-taking, however, are not exhaustive,
and they may succumb to expansion. They constitute a multi-layered
grid in which an active viewers perspective moves in and out of pos-
sible frames of perspective (III: Figure 8.1 (IV-a)) or IIIII: Figure 8.1
(IV-b)), or leads to an extreme case in which the Characters internal
perspective may be dialectically merged with the Observers external
perspective (IIII: Figure 8.1 (IV-c)), a case specifically called inter-
subjective here. Although theoretically plausible, such a perspective is
rather rare and not readily mobilized in actual interaction, presumably
because speakers/actors have to cross multiple perspectival boundaries.
The reality is actually more dynamic and complex. For example, if

there are multiple viewers in one region, a result would also be another
case of intersubjective perspective, which requires mutual calibra-
tion of where they are in the shared space, whether real or virtual.
Such merged perspectives could be created between human- and
other-oriented entities (such as a car (driver): II in Figure 8.1) or
between a viewer and a bystander (IIII in Figure 8.1), or they could
be embedded in multiple layers of displacement (IIIIII)although
there would be limitations due to the incremental cognitive load.
Furthermore, being intersubjective may even concern the same viewer
with spatio-temporarily displaced statuses, such as between his or her
todays and yesterdays viewpointsin this very sense, narration would
inherently be an intersubjective practice.
In spontaneous discourse, processes that result in intersubjectivity
may be linguistically covert, context-embedded, interactional, and
embodied. Crucially, spatial perspectives could not simply be repre-
sented by language alone but must also be represented by the body and/
or the environmenteven to the extent that they eventually become
incongruent. Beyond the surface discrepancies, they may still attain a
higher-order dialectic merger consisting of different realities. There lies
the importance and the need for this micro-analysis of triadic (bod-
ily) mimesis (Zlatev 2008) and multimodal semiosis (Goodwin 2003,
2007).
8.3.1 Data and informants

The current analysis is based on a naturally occurring discussion by
nine Japanese rock climbers, and it heavily concerns the spatial rela-
tions and movements between salient landmarks on the routes they
climbed. Although a text-based analysis of the data was already pre-
sented in Kataoka (2004), this chapter offers an updated re-analysis for
cultivating multimodal interests (see also Kataoka 2011b). The discus-
sion, which was stimulated by a fall accident that one of the parties
experienced on the climb, spontaneously started in the basecamp tent
before supper and lasted for about 20 minutes excluding the meal
time, which interrupted the discussion. The attempt to identify the
location of the accident, however, faced enormous difficulty, mainly
because one of the routes under discussion turned out to be a wrong
one, or a variation at best. Thus, the participants voluntarily provided
the specific information from their limited spatial experience, and
they finally concluded that the location of the accident must be the
point marked X in Figure 8.2(a).6 The figure was reconstructed from
the drawing by the climber who had had the immense fall, and it was
later verified by other participants.
To begin with, it would be essential to illustrate the participants
experiential differences as to the climbs because they are heavily con-
tingent on the following analysis. Eight rock climbers (four pairs of two)
embarked on two routes on the Central Face of Peak 4 (Figure 8.2(a)):
four members (two parties of two) on the M Route, and the other four
(two parties of two) on the H-S Route. However, their trails to embark
on these routes were all different (Figure 8.2(b)). Two parties, A1-A2
and B1-B2, climbed up a gully and merged into the middle section of
the trail leading from Terrace 1 (T1) to Terrace Y (hereinafter, Ty).7 The
A1-A2 party then climbed the H-S Route, whereas the B1-B2 party tra-
versed left to a lower ledge, which we tentatively call Tx, going up on
the false M Route (to avoid confusion, I nevertheless call this line the
M Route). A short while later, the C1-C2 and D1-D2 parties embarked
on the M and H-S routes, respectively: the D1-D2 party reached Ty via
T1, while the C1-C2 party reached Tx via T1, the base of the M Route.
Figure 8.2 Central face of Peak 4 (a) and a schematic map of trails under discussion (b)
This C2 is the one who had a serious fall (approximately 20 meters)

during the climb. There was one more participant in the discussion
IMwho had just arrived at the base camp that day. IM did not par-
ticipate in any of these climbs but is an expert climber who is familiar
with the area. The thick dotted line marked by IM (Figure 8.2(b))
indicates what he claims to be the authentic passage presented in the
following discussion. He argued that this is the original trail to reach
the starting point of the M and H-S Routes, unlike those taken by the
current participants.
Table 8.2 shows the different experiential statuses of the climbers
who participated in the climbs. We can easily confirm from the table
that the speakers who used the DMVs come/go and the coordinate
terms right/left are strictly limited to those who actually passed the
segments of the routes under discussion (cf. Figure 8.2(b)). I must add,
however, that B1 and IM should be exempt from the restriction: both
of them can duly envision a large-scale spatial image based on their past
experience of climbing these routes, and thus they may rather freely
and confidently comment on any segments. Based on this, we posit
that, at least with respect to the current data, the use of DMVs and
coordinate terms and the corresponding gestural performance may be
aligned along these experiential parameters.
Previous linguistic studies on deixis and coordinate terms implic-
itly assumed that putting oneself in others shoes should be a
pan-human ability and would be automatically and instantly assured.
Table 8.2 Different experiential status as to spatial segments
* Those in parentheses are novices or a participant observer (D1), i.e., less privileged mem-
bers in the discussion. IM (bold), B1 (bold Italic), and D1 are exempt from the experiential
restriction owing to their previous experiences in the climbs.
** B1 and C1 uttered kuru at the early stage, but abandoned it.
Thus, these studies rarely addressed variable or unequal realizations of

perspective-taking reflected upon language and the body. This study sug-
gests instead that spatial perspectivization is not monolithic in practice
it is (1) at least partially experience-dependent and context-embedded,
and (2) a mutual/collaborative achievement rather than a natural
endowment. In other words, a distinct experiential basis matters, serv-
ing as a certificate to confidently participate in spatial encoding and
decoding as a qualified speaker. To confirm the assumption, we inves-
tigate the processes in which a shared mental map was individually or
collaboratively constructed by paying special attention to the discussion
of the circled sections in Figure 8.2(a).
8.3.2 Analysis
In this section, we observe that different types of verbal and gestural
representations are differentially employed depending on the partici-
pants experiential levels of understanding. At the same time, we also
look into a converging process in which trading places (Duranti
2010), both literally and metaphorically, takes place on multiple lev-
els of spatial interaction. Specifically, we examine (1) IMs verbal and
gestural practice, which is consistently based on the Observer-external
perspective; (2) A1s verbal and gestural practice, which barely suc-
ceeded in shifting the Observer-internal to the Character-internal per-
spective; and finally (3) B1s spontaneous (and A1s tentative) shift from
the Character-internal to the Intersubjective perspective made available
in the language-body-environment nexus. In this final case, B1 is not
only perceptively aware of the partners (B2s) acknowledging the selfs
(B1s) envisioning a crucial event but is also co-perceptively viewing the
imagined scene through the eyes of B2, based on the shared assumption
of being here and now in the virtual construct. This phenomenon is
conceptually equivalent to the third-order mentality (Zlatev 2008)
emerging through multiple semiotic channels. With this observation in
mind, I claim that (1) an orchestrated mobilization of language and the
body (along with the environmental affordances) is highly desirable, if
not mandatory, for facilitating shared understanding; and (2) at least
in the current discourse, intersubjective perspectivization heavily culti-
vates the availability of shared experience from limited vantage points
in terms of trading places (Duranti 2010).
In order to confirm these points, we specifically focus on the language
use that concurred with the gesture stroke (McNeill 1992), which is
transcribed with the asterisk on the second tier of the transcript.8 The
corresponding words/phrases are put in a square box and are visually
elaborated in alphabetical order in the excerpt. Also, DMVs and coordi-

nate terms are highlighted in bold letters.
8.4 Observer-external perspective (constructed

from recollection)
We first look into IMs persistent use of the Observer-external perspec-

tive, which pushed forward an objective and individual spatial descrip-
tion. As I have elsewhere shown (Kataoka 2004), IM employed a totally
different mode of spatial descriptions from other participants. That con-
clusion, in fact, is readily available from his gestural performance, with-
out delving into a minute textual analysis such as that conducted there.
Let us look at a typical case of his utterance and concurring gestures.
In Excerpt (1) and Figures (a) ~ (d), IM carefully illustrates how climb-
ers usually embark on the M Route (see Figure 8.2), which is character-
ized by the overhang section in the third pitch. Here, he clearly relies
upon a wide-range, Observer-external perspective akin to the birds-eye
view, which holds in scope the whole spatial scene viewed from afar and
above. Considering that the length of one pitch is about 40 meters,9
we can easily imagine the actual size that IMs gesture represents.
(Notice that Excerpt (1)(d) is an actional repair of Excerpt (1)(c).)
Another possibility is that, presumably because IM did not share the
climbing experience that day (he had just arrived at the basecamp), he
could only take that objective, Observer-external VPT depending upon
his previous knowledgeunlike a more subjective, experience-laden
Character VPT on which other participants relied. The choice of this
perspective seems to affect the choice of DMVs come/go, such that
he constantly opted to use iku go, which may encode a non-deictic,
objective spatial movement, rather than kuru come, which strongly
indexes a sense of arrival as well as the locus of the Origo (a sense of
being here and now in the scene). Up to that point, no one else had
relied upon such uses of iconic gesture or iku go in referring to the
virtual space under constructionnor had they specifically referred to
the segments/nodes of pitches illustrated in Figure 8.2(b). In fact, no
confirming responses were heard from the other participants at that
moment. However, once the spatial information had accumulated to a
certain amount and a transgressor (who can take an intersubjective
perspective) had come into play, they suddenly started to utilize a com-
prehensible mental map for their own depictions. After that moment,
IMs utterances drastically decreased.
Excerpt (1)
As clearly seen in IMs gesture, he consistently employed a large-scale,

Observer-external perspective through language and the body, and this
descriptive style never changed throughout the discussion. It is not
hard to imagine that this style, due to the map-like, birds-eye-view
characteristics, served as a clue to disseminate a holistic picture to the
other participants. However, at this stage, where IMs spatial image is

not shared, he inevitably had to suffer from a perspectival shift initiated
by another participant, to which we now turn.
8.5 Shift from Observer-internal to

Character-internal perspective
The next case represents a collaborative shift of language and gesture

from an Observer-internal to a Character-internal perspective. It was
covertly indexed by the choice of DMVs (kuru come to iku go) and
was overtly gesticulated by different gesture types (deictic/iconic gesture
to purely iconic gesture). This shift was articulately questioned by IM,
who did not share the on-site experience on Peak 4. Excerpt (2) shows
the relevant exchange between A1 and IM.
Even in this short exchange we can detect different types of gesture
in operation according to the maintained and shifted phases of the
Origo. The maintenance section lasts until Line 11, where A1 confirms
his comprehension with his climbing partner A2 sitting next to him.
Then, his perspectival shift suddenly occurs in Line 13. Up to this point,
A1s Origo had resided at Peak 4, but right after the shift, the end
point of the H-S Route served as the secondary Origo. Since this shift
was suddenly and tacitly executed, it prompted IM to reconfirm the
locus of Origo, as shown by his question in Lines 1819. Let us examine
in more detail A1s bodily representations leading to IMs inquiry.
At the outset, A1 depicted Peak 4 while uttering yon hoo no Peak 4s
(Line 2), making a holding gesture with both hands as if to metaphor-
ically indicate something solid or experientially stable (Excerpt (2)(a)).
This Peak-4 gesture was instantly abandoned and replaced by the
gestural reference to Peak 5, which was envisioned based on the view
from Peak 4. During the 1.0-second pause in Line 3, A1 raised his
right hand and looked to his left before he mentioned go hoo Peak 5
(Excerpt (2)(b)). This gesture obviously serves as preparation for the
upcoming gesture. In fact, when he actually mentioned go hoo gawa on
the side of Peak 5 (Line 3), he slid his hand to his left (toward Peak 5),
while at the same time turning his gaze to his right. The target of the
gaze was the starting point of the band of rock that was to be depicted
next (Excerpt (2)(d, e)).
A1 then started depicting the narrow rock band in Line 4, first utter-
ing shita no down there and setting the location with his right hand
stretched out forward (Excerpt (2)(d)). When he said bando mitaina
toko something like a rock band (Line 5; Excerpt (2)(e)), his gaze was
briefly turned to the left (Peak 5), and then was turned toward D2, who
had actually walked on the path near Peak 5 (Excerpt (2)(f)). He slid
his right hand to the left when he uttered zu::tto torabaasu traversing
all the way, and then he brought it up to his face (center of cogni-
tion, or Peak 4 in this case) with the expression agatte kita came up
(Excerpt (2)(g)). At that moment, his gaze was turned toward IM for
Excerpt (2)
confirmation because IM was an expert climber and currently the most

reliable source of information on the area under discussion.
Throughout the segment, his gaze in fact precedes his gestures and
utterances, projecting the upcoming locations and landmarks and solic-
iting confirmation from relevant participants in the tent, while simul-
taneously helping him to retain the floor during his extended turn. It
also verifies Kendons (1967) and Goodwins (1981) observation that a
narrator indicates the closing moments of his or her story and makes an
offer of the next turn by shifting the gaze back to the audience at the
end of the narration.
However, a part of his performance was in effect a prelude to his
ultimate claim. What he wanted to emphasize was that the trail A1
and A2 (his partner on the climb) took to Peak 4 was much safer and
far more comfortable than the one other members took. In order to
stress the difference, he used adverbial emphasizers bokura dake only
we and zenzen chigau totally different (Line 9), and he concur-
rently pulled both hands toward himself. A sequence of these gestures
eventually exhibited the centripetal movement toward the current
Origo (Peak 4). It should be noted that the end point of the route is
located on his right (the star sign in Excerpt (2)(h)), which is further
to the right from the starting point of the rock band (Excerpt (2)(d)).
This landmark, combined with the previous trail (Excerpt (2)(a) ~ (g)),
completes the semicircle configuration of the actual environment
(Excerpt (2)(j)). As if to ward off suspicion from the participants, he
turned to A2 and reconfirmed the legitimacy of taking the trail, saying
soko wa sugoku yokatta yone that (trail) was extremely good, wasnt
it? (Line 11).
I assume that it was not accidental that A1 used the two-handed
gesture to depict the reaching movement to Peak 4 (Excerpt (2)(i)). If
we include the preparation phase of the gesture, it overarches from
bokura dake only we to nobotte kita came climbing (Line 910),
which indicates the exclusive action restricted to A1 and A2. Remember
that at the outset of the narration he initiated but abandoned the
two-handed gesture to set up Peak 4 (Excerpt (2)(a)). We now see that
Peak 4 is repeatedly depicted by the same sort of two-handed gesture,
which indexes thematic coherence and thus serves as a catchment
(McNeill 2005) at the exact moment when he uttered kita came
(Excerpt (2)(i)). In addition, A1 and A2 arrived there first and waited
more than 30 minutes for other members to catch up. Given these facts,
it is highly plausible that in A1s mind Peak 4 (and the assent toward
it) is strongly associated with his partner A2 and is conceptualized as
something plural.10 That is starkly contrasted with his one-handed
gesture, which was used to depict other participants traverse move-
ment/assent to Peak 4.
Now that A1 has finished connecting the nodes of the semi-circular
configuration, what remains to be done, if anything, is to add more
information by changing the perspective, possibly from Peak 4 to the
end point of the H-S Route, which is the other node of the semicircle
(Excerpt (2)(j)). Interestingly enough, A1s subsequent gesture suddenly
switched to the one based on the Character-internal VPT so as to pre-
cisely emphasize the vivid experience of the actor. This assumption
can be confirmed by the onomatopoetic repetitions (Line 15), taka taka
taka taka taka taka trot trot trot trot trot trot and the accompanying
climbing gesture from the end point of the H-S Route (Excerpt (2)
(k)). This Japanese onomatopoeia represents a light and fast movement
of an agent, corroborating his essential claim that the trail was safe and
comfortable.
The abrupt shift of his embodied perspective (motivated by his, and
possibly other members, experience) was faced with the inquiry by
IM (Lines 1819), who did not participate in any of the climbs that
day. Watching A1s climbing gesture, he asked nani ato no- what, after
the-, which was suddenly truncated and self-repaired as shuuryooten
no hanashi? are you talking about the end point? To this reformula-
tion, A1 avoided answering in a Yes-No format but elaborated on his
response, saying shuuryooten made agatte(i)ku hoo climbing up to the
end point, stretching his left arm up without looking in that direc-
tion (Excerpt (2)(l)). His utterance was evidently mistaken because he
was talking about the departure movement from, not the approach-
ing movement to, the end point of the route (secondary Origo). He
noticed the misconception right away and self-repaired his utterance as
yon hoo no choojoo made agaru ho- (the direction) going up to Peak 4,
which was once again repaired as agate(i)ku michi desu the trail going
up to Peak 4. This phrase made agatte(i)ku going up to clearly indi-
cates that the Origo does not reside at Peak 4 any longerif one is at
Peak 4, there is no way going up higher. Also, the spatial case marker
made to can only encode the approach to/arrival at the destination.
His bodily representation also attests to this interpretation. His left
hand stretched out and upward evidently depicts the viewing direction
based on his Character-internal experience. Nonetheless, as was the
case with the maintained phase (Lines 112), the final destination is
invariably set at Peak 4 (primary Origo), while the spatial coherence is
established and maintained in support of the centripetal schema ema-
nating from the primary Origo.
To briefly summarize this section, we looked at the interplay of A1s
verbal and bodily performances and confirmed that they coordinately
projected co-occurring and upcoming utterances and bodily representa-
tions. Table 8.3 shows the interrelated correspondences among those
factors in terms of (1) where the gaze is directed (whether toward the
manipulable space or toward other participants), (2) the gesture type
that is used for depicting spatial entities/movement, (3) the body part
that dominantly conducts the gestural representation, and (4) whether
the referent is a participant (Self/Other) or a spatial entity (place/
path/landmark).
Based on this summary, we now see some systematized formations
in aligning and differentiating multimodal resources cultivated in this
segment of talk. As mentioned above, verbal reference was preceded
by turning the gaze to the referent, and the verbal referents (spatial
entities or movement) are clearly demarcated in terms of the recipi-
ent of the gaze (spatial regions or participants). In the maintained
phase (Lines 112), A1s Origo resides at Peak 4, and the mode of
depiction is characterized by Observer-internal VPT. There, when A1
was referring to spatial entities (place/path/landmark), his gaze was
always directed to the frontal space where hand gestures represent
Table 8.3 Representing spatial entities/movements through language/body
*Abbreviations: VPT = viewpoint; Prt = participant; BH = both hand; RH = right hand; LH = left
hand; deiconic = deixis + iconic.
various spatial entities. When the narration approached the terminal

phase, the gaze was released from the place-setting function and was
re-directed to the participants to mobilize joint attention and to index
the structural component (i.e., termination) of narration (cf. Kendon
1967; Goodwin 1981). At the same time, these different gaze orienta-
tions respectively represent the static phase of spatial entities and the
dynamic phase of participants spatial movement. Still, both of them
are consistently embodied by the synthetic, or what I tentatively call
deiconic (i.e., deictic + iconic), gesture.11 In addition, the reference
to spatial entities and other participants is always realized by a single
hand, whereas reference to the Self (including Peak 4, where A1 and his
partner reside) is invariably achieved by both hands, which serves as
a topic-maintenance catchment.
While in the shifted phase, A1s Origo is temporarily allocated to
the end of the route, which motivates a distinct depiction style based
on a Character-internal VPT. There, gesture types are basically pure (i.e.,
deictic or iconic), and in contrast to the maintained phase the gaze
plays a reversed role: the gaze directed toward the frontal space is used
to depict the Selfs movement, while the gaze toward participants occurs
with spatial reference, presumably due to the shift of the Origo. However,
spatial entities are still referred to by a single pointing (deictic) gesture,
while spatial movement (by himself) is embodied by a two-handed
iconic gesture. In addition, the goal (Peak 4) is overtly verbalized and
gesticulated, while the locus of Origo (end point of the route) is only
covertly indexed by the DMV-compound agatte(i)ku going up and an
upward-pointing gesture. Overall, we can identify parallel, centripetal
shifts toward Origo in terms of several layers of semiotic representa-
tions (Table 8.3)i.e., from Place/Other to Movement/Self; from
Observer to Character; and from an External to an Internal
perspective. This centripetal sequence is grammatically paralleled by
other indexical orientations toward the Self in the use of tense, or the
experience-laden ta-form (indexically distal) to fact-oriented ru-form
(indexically proximal; see Kataoka 2004).
Given all this, spatial embodiments are not necessarily individually
motivated but are also interactionally activated. The following excerpt
further reveals that spatial perspective-taking can emerge in somatically
more complex manners to the extent of being collaboratively extended,
and even creatively invented.
8.6 Route-finding as multimodal interaction: formation

of understanding through intersubjective perspectives
In the previous sections, we looked at an individually (and moderately

collaboratively) constructed spatial configuration. In this section, we
examine more complex processes that lead to intersubjective under-
standing during the heuristic emergence of a spatial configuration. To
begin with, we focus on the utterances by one climber who turned out
to be a transgressor due to his dual identities derived from different
experiential statuses. That climber, B1, can be epistemologically differ-
entiated from the other participants in that he was the sole participant
who had previously climbed the M Route and also climbed the route
this time. Arguably owing to the dual statusesin the sense that he
could switch and utilize different perspectives based on his past and
present experienceshe came to grasp the overall spatial configuration
earlier than the other participants (except for IM). Consequently, his
utterances helped elicit subsequent understanding among the members
through what I call an intersubjective perspective.
Interestingly, certain types of utterance and gesture had not occurred
down to a particular point of depiction, but they precipitously made their
way into the discussion, presumably prompted by this B1s contribution.
Specifically, it was through a series of B1s pointing gestures that the

intersubjective perspective was embodied, achieved, and transmitted.
They were not readily noticeable and were seemingly non-provocative,
but after a closer look they turned out to incorporate multiple per-
spectives not specified by the three types of FORs previously defined
(Table 8.1 (1) to (3)). Let us first take a look at the route discussion, fol-
lowed by a detailed multimodal analysis of the focused exchanges.
As touched upon above, the one who first grasped the overall con-
figuration was B1. This fact became public in Line 7, where he uttered
migi e to the right, overlapping and echoing IMs utterance in Line 6.
He then said, further overlapping with IMs utterance, thats what I
thought (Line 8), confirming to himself that his speculation was correct.
His next utterance and the accompanying gesture are extremely interest-
ing. Remember that the participants had been following IMs imaginary
(and arguably authentic) route up to Tx (see Figure 8.2) and that the
temporary Origo shared among the participants was thus set at Tx (Lines
14). The main speakers here are B1 and B2, who climbed the M Route
starting from Ty through Tx and onward (see Figure 8.2(b)). Thus, with
regard to this segment, the statement the opposite way we went (Line 9)
indicates the authentic spatial movement from Tx to Ty. If we exam-
ine B1s hand gesture closely, we see that he stretched his arm to B2 at
bokura ga we and retracted it to himself at itta wentan emblem con-
ventionally interpreted in Japan as referring to himself (Excerpt (3-1)(a)).
Since the shared Origo (temporary vantage point) was Tx, from which B1
was depicting the scene, this hand gesture translates into the movement
from Ty = B2 to Tx = B1 (Excerpt (3-1)(a)). This interpretation should be
attainable because B2 did not yet share the same spatial configuration with
B1 at that point (B2s fully heuristic moment had to wait until Line 19),
and thus B1 probably assumed it to be more comprehensible to temporar-
ily situate B2 at Ty, where they started traversing to the left in the climb.
However, this retracting/pulling gesture (indicating a coming
movement and self-reference) obviously contradicts the propositional
meaning of itta went, which is a phenomenon of what I call the
mind-body split. Here, let us examine B1s consecutive gestures in
more detail because the mental map to be shared between B1 and B2
gradually changed its shape and configuration as the discussion pro-
gressed. In Line 15, B1s verbal and gestural performance developed
to the next stage by relocating Ty in the frontal space of B2 (and con-
ceptualizing them as equivalent). We can assume this because at this
moment he stretched his right arm toward the camera (manipulated
by D1), not toward B2 (Excerpt (3-1)(b, d)). B1 then mentioned to B2,
Excerpt (3-1)
you remember where we traversed to the left in Lines 1516, retract-

ing his right arm to himself again and recapitulating the path they
took from Ty to Tx. He elaborates on the same path again in Line 18,
but the depicted movement is reversed, as seen in we need to go right
on that trail (Excerpt (3-1)(d)). Notice that a different starting point
was employed here, from the current vantage point Tx, as can be fig-
ured out by a DMV iku go and his stretched-out, departing gesture
toward the frontal space of B2, which is now envisioned as Ty (Excerpt
(3-1)(d)).
In other words, B1 tried to establish the imaginary mental map
(which was conveniently appropriate), positing that B2 would also
share and utilize it for mutual assessment of the now-acknowledged
spatial configuration (Excerpt (3-1)(d)). It shows that B1s pointing
direction (which is supposed to be where Ty is) is toward B2s right
(Rt), and thus his retracting movement represents a movement to the
left (Lt) as seen from B2s seating position. It is true that B1s stroke ges-
ture is rotated counterclockwise (Excerpt (3-1)(c))so it looks like a left
turnbut if it was based on B1s relative left, his pointing direction
should have been, say, to someone like D2, not to himself.
Provided with B1s reformulations of space, B2 happily exclaimed
Aa! Oh!, indicating that it was a heuristic revelation to him. He then
self-assured that atchi-gawa kara kuru kara machigaeru noka (we) make
mistakes because (we) come from the other side (Line 19), identifying
himself with B1s temporary Origo at Tx, as is clearly evidenced by his
use of kuru come (Kuru strongly indexes the arriving/reaching phase
of the motion event). Notice also that his use of atchi over there cor-
roborates our interpretation because, although the distal deictic root
a- in atchi originally refers to an object equally far afield from both
the speaker and the hearer, it also indexes a shared memory or common
knowledge because of the epistemic equality toward an entity (Kuno
1973). It is also obvious that they were not talking about Ty being
evoked with place deixisif that is the case, they must have referred
to it with ko- (proximal) or so- (medial) deictic roots here. The final
particle noka (no + ka) represents a belated (and regretful) realization
of the should-have-known fact because in the climb under discussion
B1 and B2 were the only pair that passed this portion of the trail/route
from Ty to Tx (see Figure 8.2(b)), and thus they should duly reveal the
right or wrong (or left) with the rigid experiential basis.
It is now evident that B1 was utilizing a qualitatively distinct per-
spective from either IM or B2. Assuming that IMs Observer-external
VPT is also shared by B2, B1 laminated his own Character-internal VPT
(observed from Tx) onto B2s Observer-external VPT, moving from out-
side B2 into his intrinsic/relative coordination (i.e., B2s right/left),
which is constrained by the environmental affordances inside the tent.
In other words, he successfully achieved a dialectical merger by divert-
ing into two selves, which might be called the mind-body split if we
adhere to a conservative parlance. However, it was not simply a split
but an intersubjective merger that eventually served to prompt the
grounding and creation of a novel Origo through place exchanges.
In effect, the process did not stop there. What is more interesting is
A1s following utterances stimulated by such verbal, gestural, and place
exchanges. B1s individually motivated intersubjective perspective was
now picked up by A1, who ingeniously appropriated the intersubjective
perspective to his merit.
Among other participants in the tent, A1 seemed to have more trou-
ble figuring out the overall configuration of the scenehe did not utter
a word even though he was actually the most loquacious participant.
Finally, in Line 20, A1 clapped his hands (a sign of sudden awareness
among the Japanese), abruptly exclaimed A! Oh!, and immediately
uttered gya- oppos-(ite), which was truncated before completion
(Excerpt (3-2)(e)). The reason for the cut-off is still speculative, but in
this case it seems that he did so to avoid the confusion with B1s pre-
ceding use of gyaku opposite because A1s gyaku and B1s gyaku, as it
turned out, indicate reversed directions.
After the truncation, A1 quickly repaired it as kotchi this way with
a hand gesture pointing to the space in front of B1 (Excerpt (3-2)(f)),
which was again abandoned. We see from his use of the ko- deictic root
and pointing gesture that A1 relies on place deixis to refer to the imag-
inary location previously constructed in situ by B1 (Excerpt (3-2)(f)).
At least one of the reasons for the consecutive abandonments would
be the difficulty in disambiguating the referents. The spatial movement
described by B1 as gyaku opposite (i.e., Ty => Tx: Line 9) was based
on the view from Tx, which was experientially grounded for B1 and B2
but not for A1in the sense that he had no experiential basis to visual-
ize the scene from the locationeven though it may be conceptually
available in his mental map. Also, the next phrase kotchi this way
was abandoned probably because it was constrained to A1s subjective
perception in the immediate environment. Further, the spatial relation-
ship in Excerpt (3-2)(f) is the one just made available in B1s and B2s
intersubjective space, and it was not readily generalizable to others
discretion. In fact, what A1 finally selected was the phrase that both
circumvents the risk of confusion and guarantees his experiential basis.
Excerpt (3-2)
Thus, in Line 23, A1 tried to somehow specify the trail by replacing

gyaku opposite and kotchi here/this way with a semi-technical term
ban-(do) rock band (Excerpt (3-2)(g); the term bando rock band
recurs in the following repair). As is evident from the use of the distal
a-deictic (indexing shared knowledge) in asoko, his referential field
switched from actual space (based on the proximal ko- deixis) to
virtual space (based on the distal a- deixis) by aligning with B1s and
B2s imaginary constructions. As we previously confirmed, the spatial
parallelism exits as to B1s and B2s seating positions (i.e., B1 : B2 ::
Tx : Ty). This schema was now publicly available and confirmed, so A1
jumped in to manipulate it for his own purposes.
A1 then pushed his hands forward to B2 (i.e., the imaginary Ty:
Excerpt (3-2)(g)), setting B2 as the starting point of the following slide
toward B1 (imaginary Tx) and embodying their spatial movement
from Ty to Tx with his two hands (Excerpt (3-2)(h)). In addition, A1
makes a holding gesture with his palms upward, and the shape could
encode his delicate perceptions toward B1 and B2. First, pointing with
a palm upward is a polite form of finger-pointing in Japan, and thus
this represents politeness toward B1, who is a senior member in the
club. Second, both B1 and B2 moved along the path together, which is
represented by the two-handed sliding gesture that follows. Remember
that A1 previously used a two-handed gesture to represent the action
conducted by plural significant actors.
Whether he consciously managed it or not, A1s final comments were
highly strategic because he eventually succeeded in snatching the cur-
rent Origo (Tx) and shifting it to the next (Ty), from which he could
recast the preceding spatial configuration and project a new one. In
effect, building on multiple repairs of bando rock band in Lines 23 and
24, he reiterated it as semai bando mitaina toko something like a narrow
rock band, and finally re-introduced gyaku in Line 25 (Excerpt (3-2)
(i)), saying gyaku kara kuru come from the opposite side with his left
hand staying beside B1 (i.e., Tx) and his right hand pulled to himself (a
new Origo, or Ty). This pulling gesture co-occurred with the DMV kuru
come, which served to authenticate and naturalize A1 (Ty) as the new
Origo (Excerpt (3-2)(i, j)).
In some respects, A1s sliding gesture is similar to B1s intersubjective
gesture seen above because it rode into the virtual spatial construc-
tion between B1 (Tx) and B2 (Ty). It is different, however, from B1s
intersubjective VPT in that A1s VPT is not totally merged with either
B1s or B2s, which is probably due to their different experiential bases.
Nevertheless, A1 did create a novel intersubjective space in situ among
B1, B2, and himself and utilized it to establish himself as the new Origo.
Through this process, the temporary Origo at Tx (originally brought
in by IM and confirmed by B1) was passed through B2s elaboration
(Line 19) and covertly and surreptitiously guaranteed to A1. Thus A1
was qualified to use the verb and take the perspective from Ty because
he actually passed the node in the climb. In other words, he elaborately,
though strategically, stole the Origo by resorting to an intersubjective

mechanism of trading places among the knowing participants. Now,
with the nodes Tx and Ty connected through the process, all of the par-
ticipants seemed to comprehend the holistic picture of the scene, and
the following discussion ended up being controlled by A1. However,
after a few minutes of inquiry into the discrepant descriptions in a
climbing guidebook, the discussion was abruptly terminated by A1s
announcement of recess to prepare for the next day.
In fact, another instance of an intersubjective gesture was executed
just before the abrupt termination of discussion, again by B1, who was
the transgressor persona among the participants. Compared with the
previous case (Excerpt (3-1)(d)), this one clearly attests to the context-/
perception-dependent nature of the intersubjective perspective. This
time, trying to confirm A1s passage on the H-S Route, B1 asked him
whether he climbed rightward along the dyke-like rock formation.
It should be noted that B1 used a coordinate expression migi right
again (Figure 8.3(c)), but the subsequent pointing direction turned out
to be different from the previous case (cf. Excerpt (3-1)(d)), in which
he also uttered migi right. Evidently, in either case, the pointing
gesture was not (to the) right relative to the speakers egocentric
orientation.
Seen closely, B1 first raised his right hand up to his face level, saying
koo agatte sa (You) went up like this, and ... (Figure 8.3(a)). His index
finger is rather relaxed and does not seem to point in any particular
direction, but following the utterance an intriguing bodily coordination
emerged. He uttered kanari quite while moving his right hand slightly
to his right (i.e., based on his relative FOR), but this utterance was sus-
pended at n-, which indicates a truncation with a nasalized pause of
0.3 second. Then, at the same time of his utterance migi e itta? (went)
rightward?, he focused his gaze on A1 (the designated recipient) and
stretched his right arm straight ahead in front of A1 (i.e., to A1s right;
Figure 8.3(c)). Here again, what is crucial is to the right of whom?, as
was the case before.
Although a brief moment of B1s relative consciousness was
observed around the nasalized pause n-, the resultant phrase migi
right was based on A1s, not B1s, relative orientation. However,
another question arises here. On what coordinate can we judge that
B1s pointing gesture is grounded on this intersubjective sharing of
distributed cognition in the scene. As was initially theorized by Bhler
(1982[1934]), any oriented entity, including a human body, has the
potential to project multiple coordinates with which a certain angular
Figure 8.3 Another example of intersubjective migi right
specification becomes available. For example, human body partshead

(face), hand, torso, foot, etc.may possibly project a coordinate system
(RLFB or up/down) based respectively on their intrinsic orientations,
and some body parts may even allow rotation, lamination, or bending
of the coordinate. In the above case, then, we may ask: which body part
served as the basis for the coordinate expression that B1 employed? As
can be surmised from Figure 8.3, it should be A1s torso-based coordi-
nate that contributed to B1s calibration of the pointing direction (see
also Schegloff 1998 on body torque), as is often the case with an
F-Formation for a multiparty discussion (Kendon 1990).
With respect to the cases above, it must be noted that their inter-
subjective understanding was only made possible by the participants
being then and there, with those bodily orientations in that particular
formation and environment, and with the shared goal of making sense
of their mental spaces. In other words, intersubjectivity presupposes
the possibility of being in the place where the Other is (Duranti 2010:
1), and it may not necessarily be the effect or product of interac-
tional intentions. Thus, intersubjectivity will only be adequately inves-
tigated by incorporating multiple facets of bodily and environmental
affordances, but it will provide us with a focalized porthole into the

workings of the embodied coordination of distributed cognition.
8.7 Conclusion
By focusing on the rock climbers discussion of a fall accident caused

by one of the parties, we examined in this chapter a micro process
through which the spatial relations between the nodes and landmarks
became connected in situ in a shared mental map. It was confirmed that
the deployment of verbal and gestural features was, based on different
experiential foundations, coordinately differentiated in terms of the
internal/external perspectives mediated with Character/Observer
VTPs. Admittedly, mutual understanding and the subsequent transfer of
the Origo were efficiently achieved by integrating the distributed cog-
nition among the participants through the process of trading places
(Duranti 2010).
Such practice is obviously not an exclusive feat by rock climbers but
rather an everyday practice of us all. Earlier, we identified all types of
perspective-taking, which were defined at the outset (Table 8.1), but
they did not all have equal status. At least, what we called an inter-
subjective perspective was only made available by particular partici-
pants who avidly but covertly negotiated for it. If intersubjectivity is
the precondition to objectivity (Duranti 2010), it is no wonder that
a particular participant (B1), who was able to objectively envision the
holistic picture from his previous experience, was also the initiator of
the intersubjective perspective-taking. Such an integrated and merged
perspective was not a given in our case but instead a wrought-out
construct through the triadic (bodily) mimesis (Zlatev 2008) based on
the place exchange (Duranti 2010).
In previous (mostly linguistic) theories, the speaker was conveni-
ently assumed to take others perspectives rather freely by transposing
the Origo. While we admit that this is largely true on linguistic levels, it
should be remembered that not everyone can readily entertain the priv-
ilege in ongoing discourse due to various factors leading to inequality
of perspective-taking. In this very sense, a holistic treatment of lan-
guage, the body, and the environment is yet to be rigorously pursued in
order to determine exactly what is happening online in spatial perspec-
tive management. Aligned with this spirit, I have tried to corroborate
the tenet that intersubjectivity, as the precondition to communication,
is socially and interactionally oriented and represents variable levels of
realization, and thrives on multiple levels of the semiotic import.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to the Japanese Association of Sociolinguistic Sciences for kindly
granting permission to re-use figures that originally appeared in the Japanese
Journal of Language in Society, vol. 14(1), 6181.
Notes
1. See Blount (2011) for a concise history of cognitive anthropology in general.
2. On the other hand, in conversation analysis it is posited to be an impetus
to push forward and continuously renew alignment in interaction through
such conversational moves as continuer, newsmark, assessment, formu-
lation, collaborative completion, and repair (Stokes and Hewitt, 1976;
Nofsinger, 1991; Schegloff, 1992; Mori and Hayashi, 2006).
3. As mentioned above, kuru come conventionally encodes the movement
toward or arrival at (the territory of) the speaker. However, some dialects in
the Kyushu area (South Japan) invariably behave like the English counterpart,
applying kuru to the movement toward/arrival at the hearer (see Aoki, 1990).
4. Ternary here means that the three componentsreferent, relatum, and
viewpointare essential for establishing the relative FOR.
5. Recently, Trafton et al. (2006) have shown that gestures are more likely to
occur with speeches that express (1) geometric relations, and (2) spatial trans-
formations, and that the latter is more strongly correlated with gesturing.
6. The visual data analyzed here was initially unavailable because it was mostly
filmed with low light, and thus it was not used in Kataoka, 2004. The cur-
rent analysis was made possible because of the technical development of the
editing software, although some of the plates shown here are still of marginal
quality for visual analysis.
7. The nodes and landmarks mentioned in the paper are tentative and are
not necessarily shared in the rock-climbing community. Some guidebooks
published in Japan apply different names to some nodes discussed here or
simply do not specify them. Nevertheless, it was highly important to recog-
nize and scaffold them to establish a coherent mental map (cf. Lynch, 1960).
Particularly in a landmark-scarce space like a rock-climbing route, a node
(e.g., the anchor point) and a terrace serve as important landmarks.
8. Transcription keys (based on Kendon 2004 and Du Bois et al., 1993):
~~~~~: preparation *****: pre-stroke hold
*****: stroke *****: post-stroke hold
-.-.-.-.-.: recovery BH: conducted by both hands
RH: conducted by right hand LH: conducted by left hand
| |: boundary of gesture phrase (( )): researchers comment
XXX: uncertain hearing : reduced volume of word within
[ ]: overlap [1, [2, : multiple overlaps
=: latching :: : lengthening
- : pause less than 0.2 second : pause between 0.3 and 0.6 second
(1.0) : pause of 0.7 second or > < : sped-up delivery of word(s) within
longer
- : truncated word -- : truncated intonation unit
, : prosodic contour (continuous) . : prosodic contour (terminal)
9. The length of a pitch is basically equivalent to the rope length used in a

climb. Forty-meter ropes were dominant in previous times (as in this case),
but currently 50- or 60-meter pitches are not rare, mostly because of the
technological development of the material.
10. This is a side story, but A1 and A2 got married a few years later.
11. Some gestures observed here are not easily categorized into a single type. For
example, McNeill (2005: 268) mentions that the iconic and deictic gestures
are often inseparable because any hand gesture may include a deictic feature
in that it usually consists of a movement brought to, and pointed at, a cer-
tain gesture space (see also Krauss et al., 2000).
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9
Discovering Shared Understandings
in Discourse: Prototypes
and Stereotypes
Masataka Yamaguchi
9.1 Introduction
The cognitive linguist John R. Taylor has been a source of my inspira-

tion, although my graduate training was mainly in the areas of sociolin-
guistics and linguistic anthropology (e.g., Blount, 1995[1974]; Gumperz
and Hymes, 1986[1972]; Wortham and Rymes, 2003). Taylors oeuvre
(e.g., 2002, 2003[1989], 2012) has made me seriously think about
meaningful connections among cognitive linguistics (CL), linguistic
anthropology (LA), and cognitive anthropology (CA).1 In particular,
Taylors highly acclaimed Linguistic Categorization (2003[1989]) has
influenced my thinking and subsequently changed my assumptions of
language, culture and cognition. This chapter is an attempt to external-
ize the positive changes that have been occurring in my assumptions
and thoughts. In relation to the broader academic contexts, Taylors
work has been widely read by both linguists and anthropologists. For
instance, Michael Silverstein, the eminent linguistic anthropologist,
refers to Taylor (2003) as a useful source of information in discussing
the causal theory of reference, developed by Kripke (1972) and Putnam
(1975) (Silverstein, 2005: 1012; also see Kockelman, 2005: 247249).
Inspired by Taylor, this chapter reconsiders the notions of prototype
and stereotype through the analysis of discourse taken from a research
interview. In so doing, I explore connections among CL, LA, and CA
by showing how to hypothesize cultural cognitive models (CCMs)
(Blount, this volume). By the notion of CCMs, which is a reformulation
of cultural models I refer to ... presupposed, taken-for-granted models
of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the
exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and
that play an enormous role in their understanding of the world and
217
their behavior in it (Quinn and Holland, 1987: 4). The construction of

CCMs has been an analytic goal in CA, which has also been applied in
CL (Geeraerts, 2003; Kristiansen and Dirven, 2008; see Dirven, Frank,
and Ptz, 2003 for an overview).
As a sociological background to this chapter, I observe the relative pau-
city of interactions among CL, LA, and CA. If we look at our academic
activities from a Kuhnian perspective (Geeraerts, 2007; Murray, 1998),
we find that CL, LA, and CA address, at least partly, overlapping issues
and concepts, such as prototype and stereotype, as examined below.
However, the three paradigms are institutionally separate disciplines
(linguistics and anthropology) and sub-disciplines (cognitive and
linguistic anthropology). Thus it is often the case that each is not aware
of useful theories and concepts of the others. From this perspective, the
broader aim here is, in the spirit of John R. Taylor, to promote a construc-
tive dialogue among CL, LA, and CA, all of which can be situated in the
study of language, culture, and cognition (see Blount, 1995[1974]; Blount
and Sanches, 1977; Sanches and Blount, 1975 for earlier formulations;
also see Blount, 2011, this volume; Palmer, 1996; Sharifian, this volume).
9.2 Goals and overview
Against this multidisciplinary backdrop, I argue that analytic concepts and

techniques in CL, LA, and CA should be critically examined, compared,
and utilized in empirical studies that investigate social and cultural phe-
nomena (see Wee, this volume). In this chapter, I specifically demonstrate
a way of doing empirical research that addresses the issue of the catego-
rization of human beings through the analysis of discourse, taken from
a research interview as a communicative event (Gumperz and Hymes,
1986[1972]). Through the analysis, I will find socio-empirical conceptual
knowledge (Silverstein, 2007) or cultural concepts (Silverstein, 2004)
in discourse, based on a critical discussion of the notions of prototype
and stereotype. In doing so, I argue that analytic techniques in LA are
useful to CL and CA in providing initial hypotheses in the empirical
cycle of constructing CCMs. Empirical cycle refers to the process of data
gathering based on initially formulated hypotheses, and testing/falsifying
them (which involves the interpretation of the results), which leads to
the formulation and operationalization of new hypotheses.
My argumentation is as follows: as Cognitive Sociolinguistics
(Geeraerts, 2007, 2008; Kristiansen and Dirven, 2008) argues, if social
contexts are taken seriously in CL, the analysis of communicative
Discovering Shared Understandings in Discourse 219
events should be an essential part of CL. On the other hand, if cultural

knowledge of the social universe (Silverstein, 2007) is to be revealed, CL
and CA should be recognized in LA and related fields. Finally, a recent
methodological innovation or an empirical turn in CL (Geeraerts,
2006: 24) should be transplanted into LA via CA. In short, the concepts
and techniques of these paradigms should be used in an empirical cycle,
in which CCMs are constructed.
In the sections that follow, I first clarify the notions of prototype
(Rosch, 1975) and stereotype (Putnam, 1975), mainly from cognitive
(socio)linguistic perspectives (Geeraerts, 2008; Taylor, 2003). Then, the
notion of cultural concept (Silverstein, 2004) is introduced. Through
the analysis I show how stereotypes are embodied and culturally
embedded (Langacker, this volume) as cultural concepts. For exam-
ple, we will see how stereotypes such as Maori, Pacific Islander, and
Indian are embodied in an interaction. Finally, in preliminary terms I
adumbrate a common framework by comparing different emphases and
strengths in CL, LA, and CA. I conclude by pointing out that Cognitive
Grammar (Langacker, 2001, this volume; Taylor, 2002, 2006) can
strengthen LA for further research.
9.3 Two concepts: prototypes versus stereotypes
In order to provide a conceptual basis, I define and discuss the notions

of prototype and stereotype. The notion of prototype, which was
mainly developed by cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1975), pre-
supposes the existence of perceptual salience and degrees of member-
ship in a category, in which there are central and marginal members.
Prototypes are considered to be psychologically real (cf. Rosch, 1978).
On the other hand, the concept of stereotype (Putnam, 1975) is seen as
frame-and-script based information which provides the context for a
prototype representation or a prototype seen in the context of the rel-
evant domain matrix (Taylor, 2003: 76, 90, emphasis added).2 The key-
word here is context, which implies social context in relation to relevant
cognitive domains. Simply put, the notion of stereotype is a sociocentric
one (cf. Silverstein, 2004, 2007).
By further advancing sociocentric conceptualizations, Dirk Geeraerts
strongly argues that the concepts of prototype and stereotype are
only superficially similar (2008: 24), and a facile comparison between
them should not be made, in his Prototypes, Stereotypes and Semantic
Norms in a collection entitled Cognitive Sociolinguistics (Kristiansen and
Dirven, 2008). While prototype is essentially a psychological notion,

stereotype is a sociolinguistic one, defined as a socially-determined
minimum set of data with regard to the extension of a category
(Geeraerts, 2008: 26). In this respect, Geeraerts echoes Hilary Putnam,
who states that a speaker with stereotypes is characterized as having a
minimum level of competence ... [which] depends heavily upon both
the culture and the topic (Putnam, 1975: 248249, emphasis in the
original). However, it is argued that we should not assume the homo-
geneity of a linguistic community. In his critique of the prototype
traditions, Geeraerts (2008: 29) asserts that the assumption of a com-
pletely homogeneous linguistic community is simply nave, based
on the division of linguistic labor hypothesis (Putnam, 1975: 228).
He renames the hypothesis as semantic deference because we need
experts who decide, for example, whether a given entity is truly gold
by scientific standards.
In other respects, Geeraerts usefully critiques some of Putnams argu-
ments in discussing the notion of stereotype. He argues that the idea
of rigid designation (semantic externalism) and the hypothesis of the
division of linguistic labor (semantic deference) are logically independ-
ent (2008: 33). If we totally accept the tenet of semantic externalism,
the meaning of language only exists outside the head. It can be seen
that ostensive references are made in social contexts that are not inside
the head.
However, there is no evidence for abandoning intension or cognitive
meaning. As Geeraerts argues, we need descriptive knowledge concern-
ing the intended referents (2008: 33) in order to identify them in com-
municative events. In this respect, he is in line with Silverstein, who
points out that baptisms with common-noun referring expressions
grow intensions (2005: 12) or concepts. More elaborately, we get the
ideas about what are the defining characteristics of infinite large class
of literal denotata of a term, by in effect reintensionalizing an extended
expression token so as to create an expression-type-to-denotatum-type
concept (2005: 12; also see Taylor, 2003: 84101). Finally, Geeraerts
argues for sociosemantics, in which a normative-communicative
model is proposed (2008: 3638), although I do not have space to elabo-
rate on the model here.
In sum, it is argued that a sociocentric understanding of linguistic
categories is required. Geeraerts made this point by critically compar-
ing the notions of prototype and stereotype. However, the proposed
model is empirically underexplored, and LA is helpful with culturally
embedding Geeraerts proposal in the actual analyses of embodied
social interaction.
9.4 Cultural concepts in linguistic anthropology
Having examined the notions of prototype and stereotype, I

introduce the idea of cultural concepts (Silverstein, 2004) in LA for
comparative purposes. Generally speaking, linguistic anthropology, or
an approach called semiotic pragmatism (see Mertz, 2007), is concerned
with theorizing the conceptual nexus linking language to culture,
for such study ... investigates and clarifies the nature of truly cultural
concepts (Silverstein, 2004: 621, emphasis in the original). By cultural
concepts, I refer to interactionally relevant concepts indexed (cued) by
words and expressions in text (2004: 631632), which are synonymous
with stereotypes about the world (Putnam, 1975). Note, however, that
the notion of stereotype in the traditions of CL and the philosophy
of language is posited meta-theoretically without any analysis of com-
municative events. By contrast, in LA, stereotypes are seen as cultural
concepts that emerge in discourse: the participants use of certain
expressions in particular metrical positions of a developing textual form
indexesinvokesstructures of knowledge about the world (Silverstein,
2004: 632). I clarify the term metrical positions in the analysis of data.
By positing structures of knowledge about the world, LA recognizes CAs
discoveries of conceptual schemata such as taxonomies, partonomies,
and serial structures, among others (cf. Frake, 1995[1962]; Silverstein, 2004:
633634, 2007: 3847; Sturtevant, 1974[1964]; Tyler, 1969).3 These sche-
mata are called -onomic knowledge structures (Silverstein, 2004). However,
analysts in LA find such structures in intricate pragmatic patternings,
rather than eliciting taxonomic concepts in a denotationally-explicit way.
I will come back to this point and discuss differences between LA and CA
in terms of the functions of language below.
Based on the conceptual discussion, I analyze a set of interactional
data in order to discern cultural concepts in the textual patternings of
discourse. In recognizing the primordiality of discourse, the primary
task of linguistic anthropologists is to analyze the processual, real-time,
event-bound social action ... discovering therein textual structures
(Silverstein, 2005: 7). Within this framework, I demonstrate how to
find presumptively shared understandings in discourse, which leads to
hypothesizing CCMs (Blount, this volume).
9.5 Background to data
Background is given by way of providing ethnographic information.

The audio-recorded and transcribed data to be analyzed below are
taken from a research interview in a project in 2009 entitled Discursive
Construction of New Zealand Identity, in which this sub-project Agency,

Personhood and the I of Discourse in New Zealand and beyond (cf.
Rumsey, 2000) is situated (see Yamaguchi, 2012). One of the partici-
pants, Peter (pseudonym), is under consideration. As of 2009, he is a
dual-national, racially-mixed Japanese/New Zealander at the age of
19. Chronologically he is a non-native speaker of English but now an
English-dominant bilingual, taking Japanese language courses at a uni-
versity in New Zealand. The data below are from a part in which I asked
him about his identity. The transcription conventions are found in the
Appendix. M is the interviewer, the author of this chapter.
9.5.1 Data
1. Peter: Well like when Im-when Im in Japan like
2. I dont look Japanese, so=
3. M: = You dont like?=
4. Peter: = No I dont look
5. M: Oh: you dont [look?
6. Peter: [yeah, I dont yeah like =
7. M: = Oh =
8. Peter: = Well I look a mixture so they dont, you know
9. I dont look like a typical Japanese person so (.)
10. you know um
11. M: So people dont treat you as [Japanese in Japan
12. Peter: [Yeah they speak to me
13. normally but they (.)
14. Oh I mean like they wont treat me in a negative way
15. They-like theyll just be like oh you know
16. Wherere you from nanana ((singing voice))
17. And Ill be like Oh Im from New Zealand nanana ((singing voice))
18. And like when I go to (.) Japan I (.) feel like I have-
19. Its my duty to bring (.) my identity as a New Zealander =
20. M: = Ohhh
21. Peter: And to (.) umm
22. M: So in Japan you feel like youre a New Zealander
23. Peter: Yeah like (.) you know, I like to (.) tell people about New Zealand
24. and New Zealand culture and (.) ya know, um, you know a few
25. Maori words and (.) a few Maori songs, um, um what else like (.)
26. you know [rugby =
27. M: [(hahaha)
28. Peter: = and all that sort of stuff, you know. Coz (.)
29. Obviously New Zealand is pretty big in Japan because (.) for
tourism
30. and ya know like, (.)

31. But I like, I have pride as a New Zealander
32. So I like (.) telling people about New Zealand.
33. But in-in New Zealand=
34. M: =Yeah here, how?=
35. Peter: =I get (.) sometimes people think Im Maori, sometimes people
36. think. Im Pacific Islander, sometimes people think Im Indian=
37. M: =Oh really?=
38. Peter: =Yeah just (.) I-Ive gotten all sorts of stuff. But, um (.) yeah when
39. they (.) when they tell me- when they ask me about Japan, like you
40. know, I tell them about the history, I tell them about all this, about
41. Japan and I have pride as a Japanese person here.
9.6 Data analysis
In order to find cultural concepts, which emerge in the metrical

positions of text, I identify poetic structures (Silverstein, 2004). The
structures create textual coherence and make conceptual knowledge
sharable. A poetic structure is defined as the regularity that emerges
explicitly from the repetition of lexical items (such as place-names
or ethnic labels) and syntactic parallelism. It is also created implic-
itly by the organization of deictic pronouns and adverbs (e.g. I, you,
here, there, etc.) and grammatical categories (e.g. tense and aspect) in
discourse. In the analysis I highlight the former type of poetic struc-
tures that emerge in denotationally explicit ways with stereotypes
(Putnam, 1975) or keywords (Blount, 2002). By finding stereotypes
in discourse, we can find -onomic knowledge structures, which lead to
hypothesizing CCMs.
If we look closely at the uses of indexical pronouns (such as I and they)
with co-occurring indexicals (and specifically predicates) in discourse,
we see triplets functioning as the organizing principle of discourse
(Hymes, 1996). These groups of lines are established by systematic
repetitions and syntactic parallelisms, whereby partial repetition estab-
lishes syntagmatic frames within which there is paradigmatic contrast
at equivalent positions (Rumsey, 2001: 207). These positions are thus
called metrical.
Specifically, Peter first constructs his identity in Japan (lines 132):
Lines 2, 8, and 9 form a triplet in which I [dont] look is repeated three
times. The cultural concepts that emerge in the metrical positions
are: Japanese, a mixture and a typical Japanese person. In addition,
lines 1213, 14, and 1516 form another triplet that responds to the
interviewers question So people dont treat you as Japanese in Japan
(line 11). In these lines, they as Japanese co-occur with the predicates:
speak to me normally (lines 1213), wont treat me in a negative way
(line 14), and will be just like where are you from nanana (lines
1516). These predicate phrases occur at metrical positions so that the
expressions are considered to be cultural concepts, although not lexi-
cal items.
Furthermore, between lines 23 and 26, cultural concepts emerge
in the metrical position that is followed by I like to tell people about
(line 23): New Zealand and New Zealand culture (lines 2324), a few
Maori words and a few Maori songs (line 25), and rugby and all that
sort of stuff (lines 26 and 28). Finally, lines 23, 31, and 32 constitute a
triplet in which I is used in a syntactically parallel way with the follow-
ing predicates: like to tell people about New Zealand and New Zealand
culture (lines 2324), have pride as a New Zealander (line 31), and like
telling people about New Zealand. Keywords here are: New Zealand,
New Zealand culture and New Zealander.
Similarly, in his construction of self-identity in New Zealand (lines
3341), Peter discursively creates several triplets. Mostly interestingly,
in lines 3536 he repeats the syntactically complex construction of
sometimes people think I am three times. The cultural concepts that
emerge are: Maori, Pacific Islander, and Indian. Further, lines 4041
have a triplet consisting of I and the co-occurrences with tell them
about the history, tell them about all this, about Japan and have pride
as a Japanese person here. The last phrase is also syntactically parallel
to have pride as a New Zealander (line 31), though the lines do not
form a triplet. Thus, the cultural concepts are: the [Japanese] history,
Japan and a Japanese person, the last of which contrasts with a New
Zealander.
Having systematically analyzed the data from a poetic perspective
in LA, I narrow down the focus of analysis based on my empirical goal
of illuminating the sociocultural phenomenon of the categorization of
human beings. Thus, I table the triplet of lines 2, 8, and 9 (Table 9.1)
and the triplet of lines 3536 (Table 9.2) for further consideration:
The cultural concepts found in the paradigmatic contrast (3) of
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 are pragmatically presupposed in discourse. As I
defined CCMs as presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world
that are widely shared (Quinn and Holland, 1987), these cultural
concepts constitute part of CCMs, if they are empirically widely shared,
stereotypes in society. In Table 9.1, Japanese and a typical Japanese
person are listed in contrast to a mixture. In Table 9.2, Peter presup-
poses the ethnoracial categories of Maori, Pacific Islander, and Indian
Table 9.1 Triplet of I [dont] look in Japan
Paradigmatic Paradigmatic Paradigmatic Paradigmatic

contrast () contrast (1) () contrast (2) () contrast (3) ()
Line 2 I dont look Japanese

Line 8 I look a mixture
Line 9 I dont look like a typical Japanese
person
Syntagmatic I [dont] look [like] ethno-national or
frame () racial labels
Table 9.2 Triplet of Peters ascribed identities in New Zealand
Paradigmatic Paradigmatic Paradigmatic Paradigmatic

contrast () contrast (1) () contrast (2) () contrast (3) ()
Line 35 Sometimes people think I am Maori

Lines 3536 Sometimes people think I am Pacific Islander
Line 36 Sometimes people think I am Indian
Syntagmatic [New Zealander] think I am ethnoracial labels
frame () people
in the complex construction of Sometimes people think I am [eth-

noracial labels]. Probably it is true that someone who does not know
these categories would not be considered to be a minimally competent
member of New Zealand society in the cognitive anthropological sense
(cf. Goodenough, 1957).4
Furthermore, from the token occurrences, we can create type-level
taxonomies of ethnoracial categories in New Zealand. By using CA
elicitation techniques, we can ask questions such as: Are Maori [Pacific
Islanders; Indians] a kind of New Zealander? or What kind of people
are Maori [Pacific Islanders; Indians] in New Zealand? The denotation-
ally explicit metasemantic operator X is a kind of Y is used in the
elicitation process. By using the presumptively shared notions found in
discourse, we can ask these empirically investigatable questions, in the
process of hypothesizing CCMs.
However, as we already saw, cultural concepts are invoked or indexed
as presumptively shared. From this LA perspective, how widely shared
the concepts are needs to be investigated empirically, given the division
of the linguistic labor hypothesis (Putnam, 1975). At the same time, it
should also be noted that LA does not see the structures of knowledge
consisting only of -onomic knowledge but regards such structures as

askew (Silverstein, 2004: 635). One of the crucial points is: these categor-
ical structures [bear] no transparently direct relationship to the ascribed
[properties of human categories]. If such [properties are] shared stereo-
typic knowledge, [they are] communicated indexically (2004: 635).5
In the data that I analyzed, Peter does not refer to but implicitly pre-
supposes pure race (i.e., pure Japanese) by listing the three cultural
concepts in Table 9.1. Similarly, in Table 9.2, he does not explicitly refer
to the taken-for-granted category white (or the Census category New
Zealand European) but only invokes or indexes it in the configurations
of Maori, Pacific Islander, and Indian. In the traditional CA, analysts
assumed the referential-denotational or descriptive function of lan-
guage. By descriptive function, I mean the Western commonsensical
view that the (only) function of language is to refer to and predicate
about the states of affairs (Silverstein, 1995[1976]). The consequences of
this view are that we do not recognize the implicitly invoked or indexed
categories. By taking into account the non-explicit, presupposed catego-
ries, the task of analyst is to reveal implicit encyclopedic knowledge
(Taylor, 2003) in the analysis of discourse, which is compatible with the
enriched lexicon model (Blount, this volume). If we accomplish
the task, we come to terms with a full picture of cultural knowledge
of the social universe (Silverstein, 2007).
9.7 Discussion
As John R. Taylor points out, a major driving force for anthropology

over centuries has been precisely the question whether or not human
beings fall into a discrete category (2003: 69; cf. Leach, 1983). The
discipline of anthropology is seen as an attempt to produce experts
understandings of human beings from scientific perspectives. However,
we also need to investigate the popular or folk models of the categori-
zation of human beings, as part of the everyday understandings of the
world. From this perspective, I attempted to hypothesize CCMs based
on what two socially situated individuals said in an interview (Quinn,
2005), with reference to ethnic categories in New Zealand and Japan.
I have shown that we can hypothesize CCMs by finding intricate pat-
ternings of discourse, and pragmatic presuppositions in particular.
In the process, the notion of stereotype has been useful in directing our
attention to the shared aspects of discourse.
Broadly speaking, my intention has been to move toward synthesiz-
ing the three subfields of the two disciplines, all of which are concerned
with language, culture, and cognition. LA deals with sociocentric cogni-

tion while assuming a non-homogeneous speech community (Putnam,
1975), as in Cognitive Sociolinguistics. In advancing a sociocentric
perspective, however, I do not believe that we should abandon the
prototype traditions in CL, which have been concerned with describing
linguistic systems in an idealized context. In sociocentric traditions,
the goal is to describe particular events with an eye toward generalizing
conclusions. If valid generalizations are made, stereotypical concepts
are comparable to corresponding prototypical ones, and the differences
between them are diminished or may even disappear (Blount, personal
communication). Thus, we need ideal-typical research in the prototype
traditions; specifically, experimental methods in cognitive psychology
are useful. Furthermore qualitative methods in CA (e.g., ethnographic
interviews) and quantitative methods (e.g., surveys) can be productively
combined in empirical research for constructing CCMs (see Blount, this
volume).
To recapitulate, I have argued that: if sociolinguistics is the study of
language use in society, discourse analysis of communicative events
should be an essential part of it. Discourse analysis focuses on token
instances in social interaction, while taking into account both sym-
bolic or decontextualized and indexical or situationally-contingent
aspects. One of the empirical contributions that LA can make is to
formulate hypotheses that are likely to be type-level phenomena, based
on the analysis of token occurrences (cf. Yamaguchi, 2009). From this
perspective, LA is useful in the contexts of discovery (DAndrade, 2005)
in CA and CL. By the notion of context of discovery, I mean methods
for discovering an idea, which can be tested in the contexts of verifica-
tion, in which we examine whether the idea about the world is true
or not (2005: 85). The whole process is situated in an empirical cycle
(Geeraerts, 2006).6
In sum, I reformulate the points that I have made above as a frame
of reference for further productive dialogues. For this purpose I
describe the foci, commonalities, and complementarities among LA,
CA, and CL:
(1) LA is concerned with less idealized, indexical aspects from a

sociocentric perspective. It contributes to empirical research
in the phase of the formulation of hypotheses, based on the
discourse analysis of interactional or other kinds of data. The
structures of knowledge about the world are conceptualized
in holistic and semiotic terms. Non-lexicalized, pragmatic
presuppositions or implicit assumptions are to be revealed in

the analysis of discourse. The notion of cultural concepts
organized in poetic structures is highly relevant to CCMs
in CA: cultural concepts make it possible for a speaker
to package or organize the content of CCMs in order so
that stereotypes or keywords index what the speaker aims
or wants to have indexed in discourse. (Blount, personal
communication).
(2) CA focuses on more idealized, decontextualizable or symbolic
aspects of social and cultural phenomena. It derives from
lexical semantics with ethnographic methods, and one of its
goals is to construct CCMs. Recently, it has been moving in
more context-sensitive directions (Strauss, 2005). While the
sharedness of concepts is only presumed in token-level analy-
ses in LA, CA can contribute to LA by showing the degree of
sharedness of the cultural concepts identified in discourse
analysis. More specifically, by operationalizing hypotheses in
LA, CA investigates whether the concepts indexed in interac-
tion are widely shared empirically among a socially defined
group of people. Another important goal in CA is to construct
classificatory and taxonomic systems of knowledge (e.g., eth-
nobotanical systems), that serve as resources for speakers in
discourse situations or what Blount (this volume) metaphori-
cally refers to as encyclopedic knowledge (also see Taylor,
2003, 2012).
(3) CL has been concerned with theorizing language as an ideal-
ized or symbolic system. However, its empirical scope has
been expanded, and CL is now seen as a cluster of theories of
and approaches to both language structure and language use,
which subsume both symbolic and indexical aspects (Taylor,
2012; Tay, this volume). While addressing indexical aspects
of language, its strength is still the theorization of type-level
synchronic grammatical norms (Silverstein, 2005: 10), which
is to be utilized in LA (see below). Furthermore, in the newly
emergent area of Cognitive Sociolinguistics, CL has recently
experienced an empirical turn (Geeraerts, 2006: 24), which
should be transplanted into LA. From this perspective, one of
the productive common goals that can connect LA, CA, and CL
is the construction of CCMs.
9.8 Future directions
For further research, I suggest that Cognitive Grammar (CG) be used in the
analysis of discourse in LA. It is observed that LA [takes] advantage of lin-
guists discoveries about grammatical categories but [examines] how these
categories are used in communicative practices (Wortham, 2003: 10).
However, to my knowledge, LA does not have any specific linguistic theory
for systematically conceptualizing grammatical categories in discourse. In
this respect, with the Saussurean symbolic thesis (Taylor, 2002) as a guid-
ing principle, CG will provide useful insights into theorizing grammatical
phenomena, including lexicon (Langacker, this volume) in discourse.
By assuming the grounding of language in discourse and social
interaction (Langacker, 2001: 143), CG claims that all linguistic units
are abstracted from usage events, i.e., actual instances of language use
(2001: 144). In CG, it is presupposed that conceptual structures are
acquired due to the minds ability to abstract commonalities across
usage events. The conceptual structures found in poetic structures can
be seen as abstracted commonalities across usage events and may be
analyzed from a CG perspective (Tay, personal communication).
With particular reference to the grammatical categories of tense and
aspect, it should be noted that they are analytic foci in LA because of their
indexical or situationally contingent nature in discourse. However, at
the type-level, they are symbolic devices for the grounding of processes,
which are parallel to the grounding of things by nouns, in addition
to deictic adverbs such as now and here (Taylor, 2002: 389412). Further
exploration of the intersection of CG and LA is beyond the scope of this
chapter. In short, I suggest that the use of CG in the analysis of discourse
be pursued in the future studies because CG and LA share the fundamental
assumption of the inherent and intimate relation between linguistic struc-
tures and discourse (Langacker, 2001: 143), in broadly functionalist terms.
Appendix
Transcription conventions:
- abrupt breaks or stops (if several, stammering)
? rising intonation
. falling intonation
__ (underline) stress
(1.0) silences
[ simultaneous talk by two speakers, with one utterance represented

on top of the other and the moment of overlap marked by left
brackets
= interruption or next utterance following immediately, or continu-
ous talk represented on separate lines because of need to represent
overlapping comment on intervening line
((...)) transcribers comment
: elongated vowel
, pause or breath without marked intonation
(hahaha) laughter
Notes
1. Cognitive linguistics (CL) works from the assumption that language is embed-
ded in more general cognitive abilities and processes [rather than assuming] a
language-specific module of the mind (Taylor, 2006: 569). More elaborately,
the guiding assumption is that language is an integral facet of cognition
which reflects the interaction of social, cultural, psychological, communica-
tive and functional considerations, and which can only be understood in the
context of a realistic view of acquisition, cognitive development and mental
processing (Editorial statement of Cognitive linguistic research, quoted by
Taylor, 2006: 569). On the other hand, linguistic anthropology (LA) focuses
on language use in situated contexts and can be defined as the study of how
language and other systems of human communication contribute to the
reproduction, transmission, and transformation of culture ... [including] such
aspects of society as power relations, ideology, subcultural expression, as well
as class, gender, and ethnic identity (Department of Anthropology at the
University of Toronto, cited by Mertz, 2007: 340). Finally cognitive anthro-
pology (CA) is the study of cultural knowledge and processes of cognition in
a sociocultural context (Strauss, 2006: 529). CA is closely related to LA, and
is historically connected to CL (see Blount, 2011).
2. The notion of domain is broadly defined as any conceptualization of knowl-
edge configuration [that] can serve ... for the characterization of meanings,
including simple domains such as seven-day week or day-night cycle, and
a complex domain of the set of rules that constitute a cricket game (Taylor,
2003: 88). The concept of domain matrix is required to characterize a lexical
item that consists of a number of different domains; for example, golf ball
can be characterized in terms of domains of shape, color, and size, among
others (2003: 89).
3. A taxonomy is the relationship between two entities X and Y in which X is
a kind of Y (e.g., The red oak is a kind of tree); a partonomy (or meronymy) is
the relationship between two entities X and Y in which X is a part of Y (e.g.,
The council is (a) part of the government of the country); a serial structure con-
ceptualizes the developmental relationship between X and Y as in The acorn
(X) becomes/turns into the oak tree (Y) (Silverstein, 2007: 39; see also Cruise,
1986: 136180).
4. Maori are indigenous New Zealanders while Pacific Islanders are also vis-
ible minorities. Both of them are referred to as brown in color-based racial
labeling in New Zealand. In my seven years in New Zealand, among the
generic category of Pacific Islanders, I interacted with people who identify
themselves as Tongan, Samoan, Fijian, Cook Islander, and New Caledonian.
Finally Indians in New Zealand denote both diasporic Fiji Indians and real
Indians from India. In general, it can be assumed that hypothetically proto-
typical ethnic categories are invoked (indexed) as presumptively shared and
emergent stereotypes in the interaction. From this perspective, the distinction
between prototypes and stereotypes may not be so absolute (Blount, personal
communication).
5. In Silverstein (2004) onomic knowledge on edibility in a Thai village is dis-
cussed, based on a study by Stanley Tambiah (1985). The taxonomic knowl-
edge or domain of edibility is semiotically related across two other domains:
the domain of incest taboo and that of access to the household. From this
semiotic perspective, the analyst cannot completely describe the knowledge
of edibility by using denotationally explicit techniques only. In short, we can-
not understand the whole picture of the edibility domain without consider-
ing the other related cognitive domains from a semiotic perspective.
6. Among LA approaches, Interactional Sociolinguistics has so far successfully
demonstrated replicable qualitative methods in sociolinguistic analysis by
focusing on contextualization cues in discourse (see Gumperz, 2006).
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10
Experiences as Resources: Metaphor
and Life in Late Modernity
Lionel Wee
10.1 Introduction
Life in late modernity is characterized by rapid institutional changes and

the concomitant detraditionalization of social norms. Social changes of
various sorts (technological, political, cultural, and economic) have led
to the teasing/tearing apart of traditionally held and often comfortable
constellations, such as stable congregations of language, community,
and identity, or other predictable global assemblages involving the
confluence of territory, authority and rights (Sassen 2006). As a result,
individuals find it difficult, if not impossible, to rely on institutional
structures and traditions to help make sense of social life (Beck 1992,
1994; Giddens 1991, 1992).
Because individuals are increasingly unable to rely on existing social
structures for guidance about how to live their lives, they are forced
to take on greater personal responsibility for the choices they make.
Consequently, rather than simply being socialized into the norms of a
social group whose monitoring subsequently keeps us morally in line,
we assemble ourselves from a plethora of changing options, deciding
what is right and wrong for ourselves (Rampton 2006: 12).
This need to assemble ourselves creates a reflexive awareness
(Giddens 1992: 30) of the contingent relationship that individuals
bear to their surrounding material conditions, and it also leads to an
emphasis on self-reliance as regards the processes by which decisions
about which specific options to pursue. As Kennedy (2001: 6, italics
added) puts it:
individuals are compelled to take greater control over the kinds

of social identities they wish to assume ... because once-powerful
234
Experiences as Resources 235
solidarities such as class, occupation, church, gender and family are

slowly declining in their ability to define our life experiences.
This in turn leads to the claim (cited in Adams 2006: 513) that people
have to turn to their own resources to decide what they value, to organ-
ize their priorities and to make sense of their lives (Heelas 1996: 5).
The notions of reflexivity and self-reliance are thus generally acknowl-
edged to be significant for understanding the nature of life in late moder-
nity.1 But what exactly are people reflexive about? If people turn to their
own resources, what are these resources? What kinds of resources do
they turn to, if institutional structures and traditions are increasingly
unreliable in defining our life experiences? And if the grounding pro-
vided by institutional structures and traditions is waning, is there a we
that influences the options that do get taken up? In other words, because
even self-reliance is not exercised outside of some kind of social context,
this raises the question of whether is it at all possible to still speak of a
community or social group (however ephemeral) that provides some
kind of moral grounding for the choices that are in fact exercised?
Even in the absence of any identifiable group or community, the
choices that do get taken up are often influenced by the presence of
ethical regimes. As Ong (2006: 22) points out:
An ethical regime can therefore be construed as a style of living

guided by given values for constituting oneself in line with a particu-
lar ethical goal. Religionsand, I would argue, feminism, humani-
tarianism, and other schemes of virtueare ethical regimes fostering
particular forms of self-conduct and visions of the good life.
In addition to the ethical regimes mentioned by Ong, other examples

include environmental sustainability, animal welfare, and enterprise
culture. Du Gay (1996: 56) defines enterprise culture as:
one in which certain enterprising qualitiessuch as self-reliance,

personal responsibility, boldness and a willingness to take risks in the
pursuit of goalsare regarded as human virtues and promoted as such.
And as we will see below, enterprise culture is of particular inter-

est among ethical regimes in influencing the commodification of
experiences.
Life in late modernity, then, clearly does not mean the absence of
ethical regimes. Rather, it points to the need to find ways of exercising
options that manifest a style of living that accords with particular

ethical regimes given the difficulty of being able to rely on traditions or
institutions for guidance.
Therefore, if the goal is to find some way of defining our life experi-
ences, then it would be natural to expect that people are becoming
more reflexive about experiences: about their own experiences, about
the experiences of others, and about how one set of experiences might
usefully inform/shape/influence some other set. The direction of influ-
ence depends, as we shall see below, on whether the individual in ques-
tion is seeking to inspire others or whether s/he is looking for direction
in life (i.e. seeking to be inspired). The sharing of experiences creates,
I argue, a moral grounding where sharers seek to inspire or influence
their sharees, and where, conversely, sharees seek guidance/strategies/
tips from sharers. So, while self-reliance may mean a lesser depend-
ence on institutional structures and traditions, it also means a greater
reliance on more informal social networks of individuals or groups
whose sets of earlier experiences might be brought to bear on the chal-
lenges that a particular individual is facing by providing some kind of
informed perspective about how to address these challenges.
In this chapter, then, I want to draw attention to the role of meta-
phor, specifically, a metaphor that frames (Lakoff 2004) various life
experiences as resources that can be shared with interactional others.
Such experiences can range from the relatively mundane (e.g. walk-
ing into a cactus) to the more profound (e.g. overcoming post-partum
depression). I observe that in the course of sharing experiences, it is
routinely expected that addressees will be inspired. This ideological
link between a speaker having experiences, sharing these experiences
and inspiring others is culturally salient to the point where it is in fact
common for social interactions to be metapragmatically flagged as acts
of sharing (Wee 2011). I argue that treating experiences metaphori-
cally as resources that can be shared and used to inspire represents one
important way in which actors try to cope with the uncertainties of life
in late modernity, where contingency and ambivalence become funda-
mental to our social condition (Bauman 1992: 187; see also Beck 1994;
Giddens 1991).
But because there are normative expectations about what should be
shared, not everything that an actor undergoes counts as an experi-
ence and not everything that an actor experiences can or should be
shared. This raises the question of whose experiences should count as
valuable or worthy of being shared (cf. Skeggs 2002). In this regard,
I also show that once viewed as resources, experiences can then be
commodified, and some experiences are more commodifiable than

others. The metaphor Experiences are Resources therefore provides a
useful point of departure for understanding much of the nature of social
interaction in late modernity.
10.2 Reflexivity and the sharing of experiences2
Wee (2011) shows that the sharing of experiences has acquired the sta-
tus of a culturally salient activity or activity type (Levinson 1992). For
example, consider (1) (2011: 356357).
(1) (http://www.readersdigest.com.my; accessed 24 December 2009)
Datin Paduka Sharifah Mazlina, Malaysia. First Asian woman to trek

to Arctic and Antarctica. As told to Chan Li Jin
I hope there will be many opportunities in the coming year for

Malaysias national icons to share our experiences and reach out to
people ...
Guided by the life stories of these positive role models, I hope the
young will be able to get some direction, some focus in life.
(1) is an extract from a Readers Digest article featuring inspirational

Asians. It is from an interview with the Malaysian female adventurer,
Datin Paduka Sharifah Mazlina. (1) makes clear that what is actually
shared are personal experiences, on the assumption that by making
their experiences publicly available, these inspirational Asians can
serve as role models and thus provide readers with the necessary moti-
vation to achieve similar kinds of success, mutatis mutandis, in their own
lives. (1) also shows that the activity of sharing experiences simultane-
ously constrains the kinds of roles that are attributable to both speakers
and readers, or more generally, addressees. The former are positioned
as intending to help or inspire others, and the latter are positioned as
in need of, or at the very least, capable of being so inspired or helped.
The cultural salience of sharing as an activity type is evidenced by the
existence of dedicated websites that have been set up for the sharing of
personal experiences. An example is shown in (2), which is for people
who want to share thoughts and experiences relating to a variety of
topics.
(2) (http://www.experienceproject.com/groups/Like-Sharing-Thoughts-
And-Experiences; accessed 24 November 2009)
Anonymously connect with people who share your experiences

like those who say I Like Sharing Thoughts and Experiences. Read
hundreds of true stories, share your own story anonymously, get
feedback and comments, chat in the discussion forum, help others,
meet new friends, and so much moreall free. Sign up takes just
seconds, so join us today!
Finally, consider (3a), in which the actress Brooke Shields explains
why she wanted to share her own experience with post-partum
depression. As she elaborates in (3b), her act of sharing stems from a
belief that she has an obligation to tell my story because this may
be beneficial to others who might be undergoing or have undergone
similar experiences. Thus, Shields asserts that she is trying to make
public a topic that is not discussed often enough, with the conse-
quence that many suffer in silence.
(3a) (Brooke Shields explaining why she has gone public with her own
experience with post-partum depression, Entertainment Tonight,
aired on 17 November 2009, Mediacorp Channel 5, Singapore)
Its a way for me to share an experience that hopefully other people

can identify with.
(3b) (http://parentig.ivillage.com; accessed 25 November 2009)

It did not stem so much from a desire for catharsis as it did from an
obligation to help others by shining a harsh light on the reality of PPD
in my life. My longtime friend and past agent urged me to tell my story,
and I found my own reasons for choosing to do so. This is a subject that
is too often pushed aside or rationalized away. So many are affected, and
still there is such a taboo surrounding it that many suffer in silence. I
wanted to take the mute button off.
The ability to learn from and indeed make use of ones experience so
as to provide others with strategies or tips may even be construed as a
moral obligation, that is, an obligation to help or inspire others. Such a
construal not only legitimizes, but may even compel, the act of sharing,
even if this involves a discussion of what may otherwise be considered
intensely private or taboo subjects (see (3b)) or something much less
controversial (1). But because sharing has the potential to inspire, one is
expected to be responsible about what one shares. This is because irre-
sponsible sharing may well lead others to behave in ways that might
be considered undesirable. Thus, after she shared her personal motto
(Nothing tastes as good as skinny feels) with the general public, the super-
model Kate Moss was criticized by a number of advocacy groups (4).
These advocacy groups were concerned that this motto of hers might
encourage impressionable young girls to become anorexic.
(4) (http://www.celebritydietdoctor.com; accessed 2 December 2009)
The British supermodel Kate Moss has been criticized for one of her
favorite mottos that she shared in a recent interview with the fashion
website WWD. The straightforward interview was simply revealing
Kates fashion sense and views on celebrity but when asked what was
her favorite motto she replied,
There are loads. Theres Nothing tastes as good as skinny feels.

...
Well, the poor girl stuck her foot in her mouth because that motto
had previously been adopted by pro-anorexia websites.
The kinds of experiences shared can therefore provide addressees

with ideas, tips, strategies and even justifications for how the addressees
subsequently go about dealing with their own particular problems and
challenges. Precisely because of this, not every experience is something
that should be shared since rather than serving as a positive role model,
a sharer may end up leading his/her addressees astray. Thus, sharers are
expected to be selective about which of their experiences they actually
share with the general public.
10.3 The metaphor experiences are resources
The foregoing observations have highlighted the point that experiences

are metaphorically (Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1980) viewed as
resources that can, with reflection, be turned into useful advice for
helping or inspiring others. In one sense, we can see why the activity
of conveying experiences is commonly described as one of sharing
as opposed to other logically available possibilities such as telling or
advising. This is because the verb share refers to the distribution of
resources access to which initially only one party possesses, and after
which both parties are able to enjoy or benefit from (He shared the
chocolate with his friend). But the sharing of an experience such
that it can become a resource for other individuals still requires us to
address the issue of inter-subjectivity. Unlike the sharing of chocolate
(a stable object whose existence is independent of any acts of experi-
encing or sharing), the experience undergone by one individual is in a
fundamental sense unique to that individual. So, how exactly does the
metaphor work such that the experience of one individual can also be
seen as something that is sharable, as useful or relevant to some other
individual?
To begin answering these questions, we need to first appreciate that
there are two broad models of metaphor (Wee 2005), and both these
models are relevant to our current discussion. The correspondence
model assumes that metaphor works by connecting source and target
in a structurally consistent manner so that particular relations between
objects and their properties are preserved. For example, Lakoff (1993:
223) discusses a metaphor A Purposeful Life is a Journey, and suggests
that correspondences between the source domain (of Journey) and the
target domain (of Life) include the following:
Goals in life are destinations on the journey. The actions one takes
in life are self-propelled movements, and the totality of ones actions
form a path one moves along. Choosing a means to achieve a goal is
choosing a path to a destination. Difficulties in life are impediments to
motion.
The correspondence model, then, as the name suggests, emphasizes
horizontal or lateral relationships between the source and target
domains.
In contrast to the correspondence model, the class-inclusion model
(Glucksberg et al. 1992; Glucksberg and McGlone 1999) claims that
the source domain is merely treated as a prototypical instantiation of
a newly created superordinate category, which is then seen to encom-
pass both the source and target. That is, unlike the correspondence
domain, the emphasis in the class-inclusion model is on a vertical rela-
tion, where a larger superordinate category includes within it both the
source and target. Thus, to understand an expression such as My job
is a jail, one presumably treats a jail as a prototypical member of the
category of situations that are unpleasant, confining, etc. (Glucksberg
and McGlone 1999: 1543). This is a superordinate category which then
allows both job and jail to be seen as members. Thus, the key difference
between the two models lies in whether metaphor works by establish-
ing relational correspondences or by creating a superordinate category.
Relational correspondences are relevant to the Experiences are Resources
metaphor because there are clearly cases where the particular details of a
given experiences provide an addressee with specific ideas or advice on
how to handle his/her own situation. Returning ((3a), (3b)) above for
example, it is clear that Brooke Shields was hoping that by making public
her own experience in dealing with post-partum depression, she would be
able to provide some help to others who might also be dealing with the
same problem. In this case, there are fairly clear and specific correspond-
ences between the metaphors source and target domains. Shields, the
post-partum depression sufferer in the source, corresponds to the addressee
in the target. Shields eventual success in overcoming the depression cor-
responds to the addressees possible/potential success in similarly over-
coming the same problem, and in this way, provides hope and optimism
to the addressee. Finally, the actual details of Shields experience may, to
varying degrees of similarity and with some adjustments, may also find
correspondences with the addressees own set of circumstances.
This final observation concerning the need for adjustments to an
addressees own set of circumstances leads us nicely to the relevance of
the class-inclusion model. Returning to (1), recall that the female Asian
adventurer Datin Paduka Sharifah Mazlina, the first Asian woman to
trek to Arctic and Antarctica, was hoping to serve as a role model, to
help the young will be able to get some direction, some focus in life.
Presumably, the Datin was not intending to inspire the young to actu-
ally embark on treks to the very same places as her. Thus, it seems clear
that while the young are expected to take the Datins experience as rel-
evant to their own circumstances, this has to be in fairly general terms.
The Datins experience is intended to provide an example of someone
who is willing to be a pioneer, in the course of which she took risks,
demonstrated perseverance and determination, and overcome signifi-
cant odds. The fact that these qualities of risk-taking and determination
were exemplified in the form of treks to the Arctic and Antarctica makes
them especially notable. But the key point is that the young should aim
to cultivate these qualities in their own attitudes towards their specific
life situations. In this way, the Datins experiences serve as an exemplar
to help create a superordinate category of individuals who are prepared
to overcome difficult challenges in order to achieve their goals.
This is not to deny that the Datins experience might not actually inspire
younger Asian females to embark on physically demanding expeditions. In
such cases, the metaphor assumes a relationship of correspondence rather
than class-inclusion. Thus, the more the experiences in the source closely
match the situational needs of the addressee in the target, the more the
correspondence model is likely to be involved. But in the absence of close
matches, experiences are likely to still be able to breach the gulf of intersub-
jectivity (see also Kataoka, this volume) because they can be construed as
exemplars of a superordinate category, such as overcoming obstacles and
achieving ones goals. These observations suggest that the correspondence
and class-inclusion models, rather than representing mutually exclusive
models of metaphor, are better considered as ideal discourse types (Wee
2005). While the model types are conceptually distinct, actual language
users may call one or the other, perhaps even alternating between them,
depending on their discursive requirements.
By way of closing off this section, let us consider the following
example, taken from the Experience Project (http://www.experience
project.com; accessed 3 October 2011), a website which describes itself
as largest living collection of shared experiences and at the time of
access, claimed to have in the site a total of 9,585,626 experiences.
These experiences are topically categorized in Arts and Entertainment,
Culture and Religion, Relationships and Romance, Finance, Health
and Wellness, Education, among others. At the same time, the website
also classifies the experiences in more discourse interactional terms as
Confessions, Questions and Answers, Challenges and Experience
Groups. So, the same experience can be accessed differently depend-
ing on whether a visitor to the site is looking for a specific topic or par-
ticular discourse interaction. Thus, while (5) was accessed by visiting the
section on Health and Wellness, it is not inconceivable that it might
also be accessible by clicking on Experience Groups.
(5) Dealing with Depression (from Health and Wellness)
While it has deeply affected my life in so many negative ways

missed chances, lost days to depression, etc.I also feel that it has given
me an even greater appreciation for every good thing. I feel like the
most important thing for me in dealing with depression on a day-to-
day basis is to look for the good things, no matter how small they are,
and to hold onto them and to appreciate them with every fiber of being.
This alone has saved me many times. I also find it very important to
have things to look forward to, be they big or small.
This again drives home the point that for experiences to be maxi-
mally useful, addressees need to be able to understand and interpret
these in terms that are relevant to their own specific circumstances and
needs. The Experience Project aims to accommodate this, and this raises
the interesting issue of whether and how experiencesonce seen as
resources that different people might find usefulmight be commodi-
fied in order that their value can be capitalized upon.
10.4 The commodification of experiences
The commodification of experiences need not be limited to situations

where only two parties are involved, that is, where the actual experi-
encer directly shares his/her experience with an addressee or addressees.
As the Experience Project example indicates, it is possible for a third

party, in this case, the creators of the Project to provide an avenue
where the experiences of multiple experiencers can be shared with
many different addressees. In this way, the Project facilitates the con-
sumption of experiences by allowing these to be made easily available
and accessible to a broad range of individuals.
Notwithstanding cases such as those represented by the Experience
Project, let us focus on the more direct cases, since our interest really is
in the experiences themselves and how these can be seen as commodifi-
able. We can begin by considering the following example, taken from
Wee (2011: 361). This is an extract from an interview conducted by The
Asian Parent (TAP) with Nanz Chong-Komo, who founded ONE.99shop,
which at the peak of its success had a chain of 15 stores across Singapore.
Chong-Komo was named Woman Entrepreneur of the Year 2000, but in
2003, ONE.99shop went into receivership, partly as a result of the SARS
epidemic. After that, Chong-Komo became involved in counseling indi-
viduals who were undergoing professional and personal setbacks, and
in 2006, she published a book One Business 99 Lessons. At the time
of the interview, she was setting up a website NanzInc.com, which was
intended as a talk show catering mainly to Asian women.
(6) (http://sg.theasianparent.com/, At Home with Nanz Chong-Komo

by Sangeetha Nadarajan; accessed 26 November 2009)
1. TAP: You have written a bestseller. What prompted you to

do so?
2. Chong-Komo: I never planned to write a bestseller! I just wanted to
write the truth, something that people would benefit
from. The intention was really to document my jour-
ney, the glory, the process, the mistakes, the lessons.
And it seems to work and people love it. So far, we
have sold 17,000 copies. Currently, I am writing two
more books.
3. TAP: What have you taken away from the whole ONE
99shop experience?
4. Chong-Komo: On a macro view, FAILURE IS OK ! It is not as tough as
its reputation! I have learnt that with every obstacle,
new opportunity is born. I became an author, a moti-
vational speaker and a business coach.
5. TAP: How do you see the 21st Century woman?
6. Chong-Komo: I think we are living in very exciting time. We have
access to knowledge and information like never
before. We can easily find our platform to share,

laugh and learn at our own pace. I feel that the now
woman has a lot to share about her life and experi-
ence. Also, she is capable to give a lot back to charity.
We can see from this extract some of the ideological3 considerations

that allow Chong-Komos experiences to be commodifiable. For exam-
ple, Chong-Komo is talking about an experience that she has undergone
(my journey, the glory, the process, the mistakes, the lessons), she presents
this as a truth that others would benefit from. The fact that there is a
market for her book (and presumably the two other books that are being
written as well), and opportunities for her to serve as a motivational
speaker and business coach indicate that she has managed to quite suc-
cessfully convert her experiences into economic capital.
This success is no doubt due to the fact that Chong-Komos experi-
ences represent a trajectory of someone (like the Datin in (1) above)
who has managed to overcome particular life challenges. Her mis-
takes and lessons are apparently considered by her readers and
audiences to contain useful information about how to deal with
various setbacks in both the professional and personal domains.
And this brings us back to the role of metaphor once again. As we
already noted in the previous section, both the correspondence and
class-inclusion models are relevant to the Experiences are Resources
metaphor. A reader who identifies with Chong-Komos experiences
in more specific details (such as being both female and an entrepre-
neur) might interpret her experiences more along the lines of the
correspondence model. But some other reader (who might be male
and not an entrepreneur) might still find Chong-Komos experiences
useful, simply as an example of someone who has not given up
despite having to deal with various financial failures. In such a case,
this other reader would more likely be interpreting Chong-Komos
experiences along the lines of the class-inclusion model.
Our next example is particularly interesting because it brings
together elements of (1) and (6). Like (1), which highlighted the
Datins trek as a source of inspiration, (7) highlights the experi-
ences of David Lim, who led an expedition to Mt. Everest. Like (6),
in which Chong-Komos experiences were converted into economic
capital, (7) capitalizes on the expedition experience as providing
relevant and valuable skills for building team spirit and leadership in
the corporate world.
(7) http://www.everestteambuilding.com/; accessed 4 October 2011
Everest Teambuilding (ETB) was established by leading motivational

speaker, corporate coach, and Everest expedition leader David Lim. ETB
helps people and organizations to improve their team-skills and leader-
ship; using a blend of solutions and tools. Members of our group have
been part of Mt. Everest expeditions, sailed the seas, and have decades
of corporate experience in hand.
Satisfied clients include Citibank, AXA, AIA, Jardine Matheson, Linde,
ABN Amro, TATA Steel, Siemens and many more. A special focus that
helps our clients are our tools in tracking and measuring teambuild-
ing outcomes and results, making every dollar spent measurable. Our
people have walked the talk. David and his team have delivered moti-
vational presentations and workshops to thousands of participants in
41 cities and 20 countries world-wide.
What is interesting in both (6) and (7) is how the commodification of
experiences transforms the experiencers4 (i.e. Chong-Komo and David
Lim) into motivational speakers and business/corporate coaches. This
corroborates Aghas (2011: 24) observation that commodity discourses:
make the indexical values they articulate known to a social domain

of persons (a target market, a labor force), yielding social regularities
of use and construal, or registers of conduct, in which commodity
diacritics (perceived as things, or performed as activities) are treated
as stereotypic indexicals of role and relationship by persons linked to
each other through them.
Indexicals point to, and thus index, specific states of affairs. Particular
stances can index a masculine or feminine gender. Particular forms of
clothing can index luxury or trendiness. In the case of our examples,
the commodification of their experiences allows Chong-Komo and
David Lim to reconfigure the roles they bear to their addressees (poten-
tial and actual) or target market. The experiencesnow commodified
as resources that contain valuable life lessons and skills that might
provide organizations and individuals with competitive advantages in
the workplaceno longer simply index Chong-Komo and Lim as mere
experiencers who have something to share, as is the case with the indi-
vidual contributors to the Experience Project. Rather, their roles are now
those of motivational speakers and business/corporate coaches, and
this in turn has implications the kinds of relationships they bear to their
addressees, who are as a consequence being positioned as paying clients.
Thus, in (7), Everest Teambuilding in fact assures our clients that every
dollar spent [is] measurable.
Where the metaphor Experiences are Resources is concerned, this
reconfiguration of the experiencer into a motivational speaker or busi-
ness coach indicates a subtle transformation of the source. Once again,
Aghas (2011: 26) observations are worth considering:
metasemiotic practices that imbue objects with sign-values do not

necessarily efface sign-values that objects already have. They laminate
an increment to value upon objects already having sign-values of other
kinds, including formulations of use independent of the formulation
at hand. A Wedgwood teacup is formulated as a diacritic of class
when linked to an aristocratic register of consumption. But it is like
every other teacup in another respect: It holds tea. Which among
these formulations becomes salient (or irrelevant) to some interac-
tion depends on cotextual framing by co-occurring signs (viz., One
lump or two?), not on any feature intrinsic to the object considered
in isolation.
Metasemiotic practices remove objects from their immediate con-

texts, assigning them a more generalized value. But as Agha stresses,
this removal does not mean that the values acquired from the immedi-
ate contexts thereby become irrelevant. Thus, because this lamination
only means an increment to value, it does not affect our earlier point
that both correspondence and class-inclusion models are still relevant.
However, it does add on a more specific semiotic layering, one where
the source is now given a more specific understanding that serves to
foreground the fact that some experiences may be considered particu-
larly relevant and valuable to the corporate world.
As Du Gay (1996: 60, italics in original) points out:
Excellent organizations are those that make meaning for people by

encouraging them to believe that they have control over their own
destinies; that, no matter what position they may hold in an organi-
zation, their contribution is vital, not only to the success of the com-
pany for which they work, but also to the enterprise of their own lives.
The emphasis that enterprise culture places on excellence thus

leads also to a blurring of the boundaries between the personal and the
professional spheres (Wee and Brooks 2010). Being committed to excel-
lence and being enterprising are ideologically constructed as qualities
with wide scope. That is, individuals who are truly enterprising and
focused on excellence pursue and demonstrate these values consistently
both inside and outside workplace (Scheuer 2001). It is this wide scope
that encourages organizations to look beyond the workplace for inspira-
tion about how to cultivate a culture of excellence. Thus, management
discourse has been observed to draw on the experiences of orchestra
conductors, military leaders and sports coaches, among others, for ideas
about management strategies. These are metaphors, of course (Wee
2005): the source comprises people who have overcome challenges and
are committed to success, and the target comprises people (and organi-
zations) who are facing challenges and are looking for tips on how to
achieve success.
10.5 Concluding discussion: small stories in

metaphorical discourse
We have seen that the metaphor Experiences are Resources is fairly

pervasive. It appears in informal websites where contributors share a
variety of experiences. It also appears in a more commodified form,
where motivational speakers or business coaches draw on their own
experiences in overcoming challenges to write bestsellers or conduct
teambuilding seminars. In all these cases, we have also seen that both
the correspondence and class-inclusion models of metaphor are needed
if we are to account for how it is that the experiences of some individu-
als can be intersubjectively useful.
In this concluding section, I want to comment briefly on the dis-
cursive form of the metaphor, by suggesting that the Experiences
are Resources metaphor highlights the increasing influence of small
stories in late modernity. Scholars of narratives have recently begun
to question the more traditional focus on large-scale biographies as
representative objects of analytical inquiry. Such large-scale biographies
tended to foreground the authors temporal and experiential distance
from the narrative events (Bamberg 2006: 146). That is, authors tend
to reflect on events that are temporally distant in the past, and per-
haps more significantly, tend to present these events as indicative of a
somewhat completed or at least settled identity. In contrast to such big
stories, some scholars have introduced the notion of small stories, as
an umbrella-term that covers a gamut of under-represented narrative
activities, such as tellings of ongoing events, future or hypothetical
events, shared (known) events, but also allusions to tellings, deferrals
of tellings, and refusals to tell (Georgakopoulou 2006: 123). While the
category is undoubtedly a heterogeneous one, small stories typically

are shorter snippets of talk that have a more dynamic and immedi-
ate nature (Georgakopoulou 2006: 123, 126). Thus, they are not just
smaller in length (i.e. shorter than biographies); they are also smaller
in scope or ambition (i.e. less concerned with ruminating over the
significance of a life story and what this says about the way the narrator
remembers herself or wishes to be remembered, than with reworking
slices of life (Georgakopoulou 2006: 126).
The Experiences are Resources metaphor tends to make use of small
stories rather than big stories. This is not to suggest that big stories (in
this case, an entire biography) are irrelevant. However, given what we
have seen so far, I would venture that even in the case of an individuals
life story, it is the extraction of specific events or slices of life, framed
specifically as experiences, that are extracted as resources. That is, it
is these extracted events that are seen as being particularly inspiring
or valuable to addressees. This point is worth elaborating because such
extraction and framing involves the discursive processes of decontextu-
alization and recontextualization (Bauman and Briggs 1990; Silverstein
and Urban 1996). Decontexualization and recontextualization refer,
respectively, to the lifting of experiences from their initial contexts
and their reinsertion into newer contexts. These processes require
reflexivity on the part of the speaker, who must first scan the various
goings on in his/her life before deciding what to extract, how to pre-
sent it and perhaps even explaining just why it might be particularly
valuable to addressees. In short, particular events in a persons life are
delimited as an experience before being subsequently presented for
public consumption.
To the extent that Experiences are Resources is a pervasive feature
of late modern discourse, this means that we are increasingly expected
to look back on our own lives through the lens of this particular meta-
phor. We are, in other words, obligated to metaphorically see ourselves
(see also the contributions by Occhi and by Tay, this volume) as accu-
mulating various kinds of experiences that we might then be able to
share with others and in doing so, help them. Individuals who claim
to lack sharable experiences might even be perceived as being selfish
or anti-social. Ironically, given that late modernity is often described
as being characterized by the inability to rely on traditions and insti-
tutional structures (see above), the obligation to have sharable experi-
ences might just constitute a developing tradition that is a key feature
of late modern society.
Notes
1. There are, however, disagreements about reflexivitys agentive potential. That
is, whether the presence of reflexive awareness is sufficient for individuals
to overcome prevailing social constraints and actively shape their identities
according to their desires (Adams 2006; Wee and Brooks 2010). These disa-
greements, however, have little or no direct bearing on the arguments being
developed in the present chapter. This is because the focus of the chapter is
on the metaphorical construal of experiences as resources. There is no claim
being made as to just how effective experiences actually are in helping indi-
viduals shape or attain their goals.
2. The discussion in this part draws largely on Wee (2011).
3. The ideological nature of metaphor therefore influences how discourses are
conducted, and because of this, the study of how metaphors influence social
understandings about language and communication is part of the study of
language ideologies in linguistic anthropology (Kroskrity 2000; Schieffelin et
al. 1998).
4. Psychotherapy (see Tay, this volume) may also be seen as one of the com-
modified and medically institutionalized sites in which Experiences are
Resources forms the basis for interaction.
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11
An Analysis of Metaphor Hedging
in Psychotherapeutic Talk
Dennis Tay
11.1 Introduction
Metaphor is the phenomenon where we speak, and potentially think

of something in terms of something else (Semino, 2008: 1) While
cognitive linguists focus on characterizing metaphors as abstract links
between conceptual domains (G. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), recent
works have rightly insisted on complementing this view with a consid-
eration of the concrete discursive and pragmatic characteristics of meta-
phors in real life text and talk (Cameron and Deignan, 2006; Cameron
et al., 2009; Gibbs and Cameron, 2008; Semino, 2008). One aspect
which has nonetheless not received much attention is the circum-
stances under which speakers adjust the force of their metaphoric utter-
ances with expressions variously known as discourse markers, tuning
devices, hedges, or downtoners (Cameron and Deignan, 2003; Goatly,
1997:174175). Consider the following examples (also in Tay, 2011).
(1) After spending some time with these children, I was in a way a child
again.
(2) The social bonds we have attempted to forge in the country are sort
of like glue to join the different races together.
In (1), while the speaker speaks (and potentially thinks) of her adult
self as a child, the hedging expression in a way signals that this should
be limited to her regained innocence and playfulness, and not extended
to, for example, her physical appearance. A similar hedging strategy is
used to describe social bonds as glue in (2). It is also possible that the
hedge was used in consideration of the mere fact that simply asserting
something like social bonds are glue would sound informal, or even
251
silly, in a formal speech. On the programmatic level, such examples

demonstrate how contextual factors shape the way metaphors are
used, and add nuances to the purely cognitive account of metaphor as
transferring inferences across domains. More specifically, the examples
suggest that the reasons for adjusting the force of ones metaphors (i.e.
metaphor hedging) are borne out of conventional expectations peo-
ple have of different discourse contexts, including perceptions of appro-
priateness and relevance (Cameron and Deignan, 2003; Low, 2010).
This chapter examines metaphor hedging in psychotherapeutic talk,
where there is an underexplored tension between wanting to capital-
ize on the cognitive import of metaphors for therapeutic purposes,
and avoiding the risk of pushing (metaphoric) comparisons too far
(Blenkiron, 2005: 56). I begin by defining psychotherapy, reviewing
what is known about the functions of metaphor in psychotherapy,
and commenting on how therapy professionals, not unlike cognitive
linguists in their earlier works, have tended to discuss the use and man-
agement of metaphor without overt consideration of their manifest
characteristics in actual therapeutic talk. I then show that metaphor
hedging is common in therapeutic talk, and discuss the ways in which
it is negotiated with respect to the conflicting demands of (i) indicat-
ing metaphors as approximations of the patients circumstances(ii)
mitigating therapists speculations of these circumstances, and yet (iii)
capitalizing on the inferential potential of the metaphors. I argue that,
contrary to some therapists belief that metaphors should be com-
municated as directly as possible, these conflicting but pragmatically
inherent demands can be appropriately managed, and can even prove
complementary for therapeutic purposes. I conclude by echoing the key
message of the present volume that psychotherapy represents a context
where the interests of different groups such as cognitive linguists, dis-
course analysts and linguistic anthropologists may converge.
11.2 Metaphors in psychotherapy
Psychotherapy is a verbally constituted mental health resource practised

in many contemporary societies. It has been defined as
the informed and planful application of techniques derived from

established psychological principles ... with the intention of assist-
ing individuals to modify such personal characteristics as feelings,
values, attitudes, and behaviours which are judged by the therapist
to be maladaptive or maladjustive. (Meltzoff and Kornreich, 1970: 4)
Metaphor Hedging in Psychotherapeutic Talk 253
Psychotherapists have long been interested in how metaphors might

be helpful in understanding and modifying patients conceptual
systems. Descriptive and prescriptive studies have explored various
aspects of metaphor use by patients and therapists (Angus, 1996; Long
and Lepper, 2008; McMullen, 1996), and offered recommendations
on how to communicate therapeutically useful metaphors to patients
(Blenkiron, 2010; Kopp and Craw, 1998; Sims, 2003; Stott et al., 2010).
Therapists generally agree that metaphors are helpful as a tool for
explaining concepts, thoughts, and memories which are either too
abstract or emotionally painful to express literally (Lyddon et al., 2001).
There is also evidence to suggest that metaphors help build rapport
between therapists and patients (Stine, 2005), and facilitate the recall of
key therapeutic moments (Donnelly and Dumas, 1997).
Among the many metaphor guides available, however, few have
made their recommendations on the basis of the characteristics of
actual therapeutic talk. This runs contrary to the growing number of
discourse analytic studies which highlight the properties of conversa-
tional exchanges between therapists and patients (Avdi and Georgaca,
2007; Ferrara, 1994; Muntigl and Choi, 2010; Spong, 2009), and is per-
haps symptomatic of the lack of collaboration between therapists and
linguists/discourse analysts (cf. Teasdale, 1993). Proponents of using
metaphors as a therapeutic strategy have tended instead to focus on
their cognitive import, drawing predominantly from cognitive meta-
phor theory (G. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999). in emphasizing the
conceptual and psychological reality, and overlooking the discursive
and linguistic complexities of metaphors (Kopp and Craw, 1998; Stott
et al., 2010; Wickman et al., 1999). Therapists are advised to commu-
nicate metaphors in plain and direct language which leads to clearer
and more effective communication (Wickman et al., 1999: 392). An
example of a stepwise guide for therapists is summarized in Table 11.1
below. Therapists are encouraged to notice patients metaphors (Step 1)
and guide them to visualize, explore, and change the metaphoric con-
ceptualizations they hold of their circumstances (Steps 27). Although
most of these potential metaphors would be verbally communicated,
none of the seven steps appeals explicitly to their linguistic character.
By emphasizing the conceptual level at which metaphors supposedly
operate, pragmatic and discursive phenomena which inhere in spoken
metaphors and carry potential therapeutic significance get overlooked.
A similar point has been repeatedly made in recent years by analysts of
metaphors in ordinary conversation (Cameron, 2008; Cameron et al.,
2009). One pragmatic phenomenon which needs to be addressed is the
Table 11.1 Seven step guide for exploring and transforming patient metaphors
1. Notice metaphors
2. What does the metaphor look like?
3. Explore metaphor(s) as sensory image
4. What is it like to be/what is your experience of/what are you feeling as you
[the metaphoric image]?
5. If you could change the image in any way, how would you change it?
6. What connections (parallels) do you see between [the metaphoric image] and
the original situation?
7. How might the way you changed the image apply to the current situation?
Source: Kopp and Craw, 1998.
tension between wanting to communicate metaphors in a direct man-

ner, which ostensibly maximizes their cognitive utility, and ensuring
that metaphoric comparisons are appropriately hedged and not taken
too far (Blenkiron, 2005, 2010). My upcoming analysis will attempt to
show
(i) that hedges are frequent in (both non-metaphoric and meta-

phoric) therapeutic talk, and are used to attenuate the strength of
metaphors.
(ii) that because hedging is frequent when metaphors are used, there
is a need to examine what motivates it, and the ways in which it is
negotiated alongside the purported ideal of communicating meta-
phors in a direct manner.
(iii) that, contrary to what proponents of direct metaphoric commu-
nication might assume, hedging does not impede the successful
elaboration and use of metaphors for therapeutically helpful ends.
The data used in the analysis were obtained from a copyrighted

online collection of therapy transcripts (Counselling and Psychotherapy
Transcripts, Client Narratives and Reference Works) published by Alexander
Street Press.1 A total of 252 hourly long session transcripts involving 23
therapist-patient pairs were collected. A wordlist was generated using
the Wordsmith Tools software to uncover the most frequent words and
clusters. From these, concordances were generated for those clusters
known to perform a hedging function in discourse. These concordances
were then manually examined and analysed for illustrative instances of
metaphor use. Throughout the chapter, linguistic expressions of interest
(metaphors, hedges, etc.) will be underlined in the data shown.
A key concern facing analysts who make claims about metaphors in

a particular genre of discourse is the representativeness of their data,
and the consequent generalizability of their findings. This is especially
important since one of the key motivations for analysing real life text
and talk is precisely to avoid relying on artificial examples of metaphors.
Psychotherapy with its various schools of thought and categories of dis-
orders (Prochaska and Norcross, 2009) poses a challenge in this regard.
Even if analysts choose to, for instance, focus on specific psychologi-
cal disorders (e.g. bipolar disorder, eating disorder, childhood trauma,
post-traumatic stress disorder) or schools of thought (e.g. Cognitive
behavioural therapy, Interpersonal therapy), the utility of insisting
on generalizable communicative patterns is easily challenged by the
contention that each person in therapy is, and should be, regarded as
a non-typical exception (Gale, 1991: IX). Nevertheless, the question
of what gives psychotherapeutic talk its distinctive therapeutic quality,
thus setting it apart from normal conversation, has been of interest to
conversational and discourse analysts (Ferrara, 1994; Mondada, 2010).
It should be noted that the analysed extracts in this chapter reflect a key
characteristic of psychotherapeutic talk discussed by these authors. In
contrast with normal conversation where participants have equivalent
roles and rights to introduce the topic, the therapist holds the institu-
tionalized role of helper and listener, and the patient the role of
being helped. Consequently, in the discussion of a particular problem,
the patient holds greater rights in introducing, changing, and/or add-
ing onto the topic, while the therapist is frequently observed as sum-
marizing, reformulating, and/or asking questions related to the topic
at hand. Therefore, while I will not claim that these extracts are truly
representative of the psychotherapeutic genre, they can be taken as real-
istic illustrations of communicative dynamics which bear noteworthy
implications for therapeutic practice.
11.3 Metaphor hedging as a common phenomenon
The first pertinent observation from the transcripts is the consider-

able use of word clusters such as kind of and sort of, which are well
known as hedging expressions in spoken discourse (R. Lakoff, 1975).
As an indication, a frequency list generated for two-word clusters in
the corpus (Table 11.2) includes these expressions, alongside other well
documented discourse markers such as you know and I mean (Schiffrin,
2001; Tay, 2011).
Table 11.2 Most frequent two-word clusters in the corpus
N Word Freq. %
1 YOU KNOW 10,369 0.52

2 I DONT 10,064 0.51
3 AND I 9,759 0.49
4 I WAS 6,405 0.32
5 VERILOGUE SESSION* 6,345 0.32
6 THAT I 5,925 0.30
7 KIND OF 5,689 0.29
8 I MEAN 5,461 0.27
9 I THINK 5,393 0.27
10 DONT KNOW 5,093 0.26
11 TO BE 4,895 0.25
12 GOING TO 4,377 0.22
13 IT WAS 4,369 0.22
14 I JUST 3,799 0.19
15 WANT TO 3,792 0.19
16 TO DO 3,692 0.19
17 BUT I 3,667 0.18
18 SORT OF 3,499 0.18
*the words VERILOGUE SESSION refer to the source of the data, and are not part of the
therpaist-patient talk
Subsequent concordance analyses of these expressions confirmed

their hedging function in most instances, with the exception of exam-
ples like the following, where sort of does not function adverbially like
most hedges, but is part of the clausal subject.
(3) Patient: I think thats really wrong, I mean to think that you
wouldnt have any influence on anyone. Any sort of
interaction is influence ...
In the majority of cases, however, these expressions do play a hedging

function by modifying the propositions they typically preface, whether
metaphoric or not. Below is an example of hedging which does not
involve metaphor:
(4) Therapist: You just feel kind of strong and pleased that you were
able to tell them what you felt ...
Here, the therapist hedges her interpretation of the emotional state of her
patient (i.e. being strong and pleased) in a way similar to what Prince et al.
(1982) call plausibility shields in physician discourse. The use of hedges
is also readily observable with the use of metaphors. While metaphors
themselves carry different degrees of thematic and therapeutic significance
ranging from providing a convenient shorthand for abstract concepts to
encapsulating critical perceptions of the patient (Siegelman, 1990), hedging
appears to be common across these categories. One measure of thematic
significance is the extent to which a metaphor gets repeated, and its infer-
ential potential developed across the session, or different sessions involving
a single therapist-patient pair (Angus and Korman, 2002). In (5), the patient
uses the metaphor bounce back and forth to describe his alternation between
trying to make the world better, and giving up. While the therapist partly
capitalizes on this metaphor by asking in what direction do you think its
going?, the patients original metaphor of bouncing, which might imply an
absence of control over the situation, is not subsequently developed.
(5) Patient: Oh, with just, Im fed up and disgusted and completely sure
that the worlds nothing but an absolute loss all the way
through. Theres no way it will ever get ahead and change
back. And I know it can get better, its just you have to crack
your head open trying and then turn back around and say,
Well its hopeless, theres no way of doing it. And it seems
like I just kind of bounce back and forth on that.
Therapist: Where do you see yourself now or going, in what direction
do you think its going?
Patient: Well, I dont know right now. Like I am kind of in the posi-
tion right now where Im scared to even try and get into it,
because Ive got so many other things Ive got to take care of,
just in the in case. I do want to get an education. I do want to
get a job. And I do want to get married and, etc., etc. And for
right now Im in the flux of changing jobs. And after a letter
I got last night, evidently theres something awful fucked up
between Jessica and I, and Im not sure what that is yet. But
I dont want to even bother to get myself into the depression
of trying to figure out whether its worth it to try or not. Id
rather just go ahead and try, get myself settled and then see
if its doing me some good. Its a lot easier to be depressed
when Im not starving or going into debt further.
Therapist: So like theres some sort of urgency to attend to immediate
things and its like, I dont know, putting it within some
sort of philosophical framework ...
In (6), therapist and patient are discussing the latters incessant laugh-
ing during their interaction, which the former thought was an unwel-
come defence mechanism. The patient uses the metaphor of a Geiger
counter and compares his laughter to radiation. In contrast with the
bouncing metaphor in (5), which did not become thematically signifi-
cant, this metaphor was brought up many times in subsequent sessions
as a pseudo-conventionalized way to refer to the patients uncoopera-
tive attitude both within the therapeutic setting and in other aspects of
his personal life. For instance, the therapist would sometimes remark to
the patient that your Geiger counters ticking again.
(6) Therapist: Now youre laughing again as I mention it.

Patient: I dont know what it was.
Therapist: I want to ask because I dont know either.
Patient: No, no doubt if Im lost certainlythis really is unpleasant.
Therapist: Yup. How so?
Patient: No the laughing. I mean its almost like Ive got a Geiger
counter and you dont know what the radiation is or
something.
Therapist: And you do it in spite of yourself, which is annoying.
Examples (5) and (6) differently reflect an important parameter

by which therapeutic metaphors are often characterized and classi-
fied (i.e. degree of thematic significance). The fact that the patients
in both cases attenuate the strength of their metaphors with kind
of and almost like would suggest that metaphor hedging is a robust
yet under-examined phenomenon in psychotherapy. The following
examples, while not a comprehensive and representative picture of the
psychotherapeutic discourse genre, provide an illustrative sketch of
the key dynamics of metaphor hedging. Primary among these is to bal-
ance the intention to introduce and communicate useful metaphors
with cautious recognition of the fact that they are after all non-factual
approximations of the patients circumstances. Over and above the
need to mitigate statements of metaphoricity per se, however, meta-
phor hedging is often situated within, and hence pragmatically con-
sistent with a more general need to exercise vagueness, indirectness,
and/or politeness when therapists attempt to analyse complex feelings
and issues experienced by their patients. The overarching point is that,
contrary to what proponents of direct metaphoric communication
might assume, metaphor hedging does not appear to impede the suc-
cessful elaboration and use of metaphors for therapeutically helpful
ends. I will instead suggest that adroit management of the tension

between direct and hedged communication can render these opposing
forces complementary.
11.4 Analysis
(7)
1. Patient: You know, he-he-he put a damper on the word husband
(chuckles) because he said here this-he told a story
or something about the husband who went out and
cheated on his wife and stuff.
2. Therapist: Just sort of fed right into your fears that husbands are
really bad all the time anyway, something like that.
3. Patient: Yeah, it just did something to the word.
4. Therapist: It sounds like husband is really sort of a tyranny for you,
where you dont get to be yourself at all-do your thing.
You sort of get locked in this little box with somebody
else doing everything.
5. Patient: Yeah and I think so many people though have done it
to-done it to-I think a lot of-just TV has done it and all
these stories. Im sure a lot of times that theyve done
it in good humour and stuff but its really getting to be
something. Like even womens liberation is coming up
with these things against men thats affecting them.
6. Therapist: It really seems to you like it would take an enormous
amount of control and stuff to be able to break out of
that mould.
7. Patient: Yeah, something like that. Its just-I dont know. Maybe
I have these-Im just getting bad feelings about love,
too, because all these people that I know that have been
married three and four year and the husband or the wife
will come to the other-like my friends, even, and say
they dont love each other anymore and the only reason
that theyre staying together is because of the kids.
8. Therapist It seems to me in a way, when you were talking about
what you used to think of housewives. Remember you
were saying you used to tell other women how it was
the most wonderful, creative ...
9. Patient: Yeah (chuckles).
10. Therapist: In those days, in a way, you probably really bought that
husband role, you know?
11. Patient: Yeah, like, you know, everybody-the first thing you
do when you get out of high school and college-well I
think a lot of girls do it ... I mean you say you want to
get married and have a family and everything.
12. Therapist: You sort of wanted a husband then who would lock you
in a box with your kitchen ...
13. Patient: Yeah ...
14. Therapist: ... and go out and do everything.
In Extract (7), the patient relates how her friend told a story about
a cheating husband, which made her grow more sceptical about mar-
riage. The therapists subsequent responses in Lines 2, 4, and 6 attempt
to elucidate the patients feelings to ensure mutual understanding and
subsequent discussion of the issues at hand. She employs her knowledge
of the patients personality and circumstances and offers a plausible yet
ultimately speculative account of how the story, and a prospective hus-
band, would most likely affect the patient. In doing so, she understand-
ably hedges her remarks with the expressions sort of and something like
that. This makes it easier for the patient to correct her interpretations,
or offer better ones. Her strategy of cautious analysis and invitation to
further discussion could be described as hedging and probing. Such a
dynamic is similar to what Prince et al. (1982) found in professional talk
between physicians, which is unsurprising given the premise in many
psychotherapeutic theories that therapist and patient are collaborative
partners in the treatment process (Beck, 1995).
In her analysis, the therapist also deploys several metaphors to
describe her patients feelings. The metaphoric expressions include fed
(right) into your fears, a tyranny, get locked in this little box, and break
out of that mould. While the direct communication of these vivid and
inferentially rich images can be therapeutically helpful (Kopp and
Craw, 1998), it is important to note that they are situated within the
therapists overall hedging strategy. On one hand, the hedging of meta-
phoricity which accompanies this overall strategy allows the therapist
the disclaimer that these images are after all non-factual approxima-
tions of the patients actual circumstances. Therapy researchers who
acknowledge the utility of metaphors similarly caution against carrying
metaphoric comparisons too far (Blenkiron, 2005, 2010; Stott et al.,
2010), especially in schools of thought such as Cognitive Behavioural
Therapy and Rational Emotive Therapy, which tend to emphasize rea-
soning based on facts. On the other hand, however, the hedging of
these inferentially rich metaphors may actually facilitate the therapists
subsequent probing strategy. This is because since the overall inter-

action is framed as being somewhat speculative rather than assertive,
therapist and patient would in turn be more willing to explore the infer-
ential possibilities of metaphors in ways envisioned by metaphor guides
such as Kopp and Craw (1998). We indeed see symptomatic evidence
of concurrence, mutual understanding, and elaboration in the patients
subsequent Yeahs, and the therapists revisiting of the locked in the box
metaphor in Line 12. In summary, this extract not only highlights the
overlooked pragmatic tension between direct and hedged metaphoric
communication, but proceeds to show that these opposing motivations
can prove complementary for therapeutic purposes if properly man-
aged. Moving on to the next example,
(8)
1. Patient: And you know I could see the themes running through
there as I wrote. You know like I am or when I was tak-
ing, using sort and I could see the theme there. And it
surprised me because I had never really thought of it.
2. Therapist: Um hmm. It somehow seemed to ring true.
3. Patient: Oh yeah, it did. It really did. And like I say, it was surpris-
ing to me. I think I kinda you know, compartmentalized
different segments of my life.
4. Therapist: Uh huh.
5. Patient: And I really didnt see the relationships as clearly as when
I sat down and did that.
6. Therapist: Um hmm. Yeah Im kinda getting the feeling like ok,
youre saying you saw it clearly. But how did you feel after
seeing it clearly? Because it almost sounds like are you
compartmentalizing another compartment?
7. Patient: (chuckles) Yeah, I see what you mean.
We observe a similar dynamic in this extract, with the exception

that it is the patient who initiates the metaphor, which is subsequently
developed by the therapist. Here, the patient talks about a recent writ-
ing exercise meant to help him better understand the different overlap-
ping interpersonal relationships and aspects of his life. He relates that
the exercise has helped him discover previously unnoticed themes,
including the fact that he has compartmentalized different segments of
his life (Line 3). While he appears to be certain of the validity (Oh yeah,
it did. It really did [Line 3]) and usefulness (Line 5) of this insight, the
apparent novelty of his metaphor nonetheless warrants a hedge in the
use of I kinda (Line 3). The therapist, on the other hand, is understand-
ably more cautious in his approach towards the patients self-analysis
(Line 2). However, as in the case of the previous extract, his cautious
stance does not prevent him from subsequently capitalizing upon the
inferential potential of his patients metaphor. Despite exercising care in
hedging his own analysis in Line 6 (kinda, almost sounds like), he frames
the analysis within the inferential scope of the metaphor by suggesting
that the patients present behaviour is itself a form of compartmen-
talization. The compartment metaphor was to be further elaborated
and discussed in later parts of the session. Thus, the seeming tension
between adopting a cautious stance and exploiting a non-factual meta-
phor again turns out to be unproblematic, and even helpful for estab-
lishing a mutual understandingwhat Angus and Rennie (1988) call
meaning conjunctionbetween therapist and patient, as seen in the
latters affirmative response in Line 7.
While the inferential potential of many metaphors in therapeutic
talk are usefully exploited, not every metaphor is given such extended
attention. Since hedges appear to reduce the import of proposed
metaphors, one concomitant function of hedging is that it allows
therapists to introduce new, alternative metaphors in close proxim-
ity without coming across as inconsistent or incoherent (cf. Kimmel,
2010). Extract (9) below is a discussion between therapist and patient
about the latters father, and how his tense personality is affecting
the patient. The therapist expresses her evaluation of the father, first
in literal terms in Line 1, then metaphorically in Line 3. These evalu-
ations are, as one would expect, communicated with the hedges sort
of like and sort of. The metaphor and its entailments receive some
initial attention from Lines 3 to 6, but are put aside for a very dif-
ferent metaphor in Line 11, also hedged with sort of, as the discus-
sion shifts to the fathers childhood experiences. The transience of
various metaphoric conceptualizations in spontaneous conversation
is a well documented phenomenon (Cameron, 2008; Quinn, 1991),
even though protocols such as Kopp and Craws (1998) appear to
idealize the sustained, consistent elaboration of selected metaphoric
themes. In therapeutic talk, switching between different metaphors
is often motivated by the desire to highlight different aspects of the
target topic (cf. Charteris-Black, 2012; Goatly, 1997), or simply part
of the process of therapist and patient mutually searching for the
most appropriate one. The hedging of various candidate metaphors
helps to highlight the fact that their proposed utility is tentative, and
makes the transition between different images less jarring. Similar
to what Kimmel (2010) pointed out in his analysis of metaphors in

political discourse, it would be worthwhile to validate this suggested
function of hedging by including perceptions of metaphoric incoher-
ence into routine patient feedback exercises.
(9)
1. Therapist: In a way its sort of like he really could do it so well but
he just doesnt or cant or something. Its really disap-
pointing. Its sort of different than somebody who has a
father who (inaudible).
2. Patient: Im just-I dont know. He just doesnt know how to relax
and let himself go. I mean, even on vacation he wears
a suit (laughs) I dont know what his problem ... Its
really-its sad because hes in his fifties, too and I want
my mom and dad to have a good time and to enjoy
themselves and they just dont. I dont know why.
3. Therapist: (inaudible) and like these walls sort of came in from
all three sides or something and just gradually boxed
and boxed and boxed himself in and hes sitting in this
little cube and nothing else is allowed to come in,
nothing else is there. If you come into it, he just cubes
you in, too.
4. Patient: Like he complains about people so much. He doesnt
like this or that about them. Its gotten so that even his
friends-theres no more friends, theyre just dwindling.
5. Therapist: They didnt fit inside the cube.
6. Patient: Yeah, because he always finds something he doesnt like
about them or somethings wrong. And everybody he
likes everybody else thinks is crazy.
7. Therapist: It sounds like hes really a man with a lot of unhappi-
ness in him.
8. Patient: Well, he doesnt think hes unhappy, though. But, I
dont know, I just think his life is pretty, you know,
yuck.
9. Therapist: (inaudible).
10. Patient: Its hard, though, I dont think well really know the
truth about him from his life when he was younger.
Everybody says something different, but I have a feel-
ing his parents kind of drove him really hard. Just really
made him feel bad about a lot of things and, I dont
know, I think they just made him feel ...
11. Therapist: You think something like that-he sort of went off wild
for awhile and then he felt so guilty he just snapped in
double hard into the opposite direction?
12. Patient: Possibly. I dont really know. But ...
Summarizing and drawing together the main points presented

thus far,
(1) The hedging of metaphors in psychotherapeutic talk is a consider-

ably frequent phenomenon. It is an example of a pragmatic and
discursive reality overlooked by those who idealize the direct
communication of metaphors.
(2) Hedges convey the cautious recognition that metaphors, while
useful, are after all non-factual approximations or illustrations.
The hedging of metaphors is furthermore often part of an overall
hedging strategy deployed by therapists when evaluating patients
circumstances.
(3) Since such evaluations are tentative and subject to correction and/
or further elaboration, therapists and patients would in turn be
more willing to explore the inferential potential of metaphors in
therapeutically beneficial ways. Hedging also facilitates the intro-
duction of alternative metaphors and makes the transition between
unrelated metaphors seem less jarring.
This chapter has highlighted the overlooked tension between

the desire to exploit metaphors for therapeutic ends, and the need
to hedge them in a discourse activity which is ultimately based on
rational, factually based psychological principles (cf. Meltzoff and
Kornreich, 1970: 4). But it has also shown that such tension need
not adversely affect the progress of therapy, as both imperatives can
be adroitly managed and even made complementary by discern-
ing therapists. It is hoped that the present discussion will prompt
therapy researchers and practitioners interested in specific linguistic
phenomena such as metaphor to pay greater attention to the dynam-
ics and characteristics arising from actual instances of their usea
point which brings us to the concluding section, where I discuss the
relevance of this chapter for future research in both the fields of meta-
phor and psychotherapy.
Being a verbal activity aimed at understanding and changing peo-

ples concepts and perspectives, psychotherapy is an ideal context
for the study of metaphor, cognition, and interactional discourse.
This chapter has illustrated, through the analysis of metaphors and
hedges, how psychotherapeutic discourse may shed some collective
light on issues of interest to cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis,
and linguistic anthropology. Possible avenues to extend this research
would be to further analyse how the use of hedges varies between
therapists and patients, and across different types of therapies and
socio-cultural contexts of therapy (Dwairy, 2009; Wohl, 1989).
Furthermore, a keener understanding of the cognitive, discursive, and
interactional properties of metaphor in the real world context of
psychotherapy (Low et al., 2010) may contribute towards better use
and management of metaphors for therapeutic purposes (Tay, 2012).
It has been argued that psychotherapists need to be more aware of the
relevance of theoretical advancements in the study of language and
its cognitive, socio-cultural, and discursive aspects (McMullen, 1996,
2008; Teasdale, 1993). By raising awareness of how idealized forms of
direct metaphoric communication fail to account for the pragmatic
need to exercise hedging, and proceeding to show its dynamics in
actual therapeutic talk, it is hoped that the present chapter has made
a small contribution in that regard.
Note
1. http://alexanderstreet.com/products/health-sciences/counseling-and-therapy
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Part IV
Summary and Future Directions
12
Situating Cultural Models in
History and Cognition
Benjamin Blount
12.1 Overview
Cultural cognitive models (CCMs) will be examined and described from

their earliest characterization a quarter of a century ago to accounts pro-
vided within the past few years, to provide historical context. Although
there is not a standardized procedure for describing cultural models,
agreement exists, at least tacitly, as to what the models are and how they
are to be elicited and described (Blount, 2011; Quinn, 2011). Theory and
methods, however, need to be assessed in light of recent developments
in cultural theory, lexical representation, and neuroscience. The idea
is to situate CCMs within broader contexts in order to better integrate
them with related developments in other fields of inquiry. The aim is to
produce a more integrated, synthesized perspective, as can be found in
other areas of language and cognition (Feldman, 2006; Geeraerts, 2010;
Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1993; Langacker, 1987, 1990, 2001, 2008; and
Taylor, 1989, 2002, 2012). Cognitive models developed by those schol-
ars, like CCMs, also have schematic grounding, and they are culturally
elaborated and interactionally negotiated (Hougaard, 2005). Among
cognitive models given attention in this chapter, Taylors contributions
on the mental corpus are particularly useful, and will therefore be dis-
cussed in some detail within an expanded view of CCMs.
The sections to follow focus, first, on cultural models, as they were
developed during the two decades since their inception in the mid-
1980s. Throughout that period, the term used was cultural models,
which also will be used here for that formative period. In fact, however,
the models described are actually shared cognitive models, and for more
recent work, the correct term cultural cognitive models (CCMs) will be
used. Special attention will be paid to the need to locate the discussion
271
of CCMs within a broader biological and evolutionary framework. The

impetus to position CCMs within a biocultural framework derives from
three lines of contemporary research, each of which will be discussed,
in turn.
The first of those lines is within cognitive anthropology, taking the
concept of culture as a complex area of inquiry. Central to that inquiry
will be the question of what is meant by sharing. The second line
attempts to locate CCMs within a social interactional framework, which
is where CCMs are activated and played out socially. The third line
derives from studies in neuroscience. A growing body of evidence shows
that the brains functions are mostly out-of-awareness, suggesting that
cognitive underpinnings to behavior rely on processes like experience,
event recognition, and categorization. A related line of research has
shown that human brains operate extensively as a mapping mecha-
nism, continually updating and reinforcing information both about
the internal state of the body and of the bodys interaction with the
environment. The mapping of the external environment provides an
opportunity to think about organized components of behavior, includ-
ing cultural cognitive models.
12.2 Cultural cognitive models
12.2.1 Culture-in-talk models

The seminal publication on cultural models appeared in 1987, Cultural
Models in Language & Thought, edited by Dorothy Holland and Naomi
Quinn. The book contains 15 chapters, including an Introduction
(Culture and cognition) by Quinn and Holland. The chapter in par-
ticular has been central to the emergence of interest in cultural models
within cognitive anthropology. Although this conceptual terrain is
well documented, several high points will be noted here, given that
continuity and change in the conceptualizations of cultural models is
a major aim of the chapter. Quinn and Holland define cultural models
as presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely
shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative
models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in
their understanding of the world and their behavior in it (1987, p. 4).
As is evident, cultural model research was ambitious from the outset,
no less than an effort to describe how humans think through sharing
of knowledge.
Naomi Quinn and associates have expanded their research on cultural
models during the past two decades, responding in part to criticisms
Situating Cultural Models in History and Cognition 273
made of the original work. One early criticism was that it was not clear
how the models could be drivers of behavior, a problem that came to
be called directive force. To address that problem, a second book was
published, Human Motives and Cultural Models (DAndrade and Strauss,
1992). The book contained case studies to show that cultural models
could, indeed, provide directive force, but DAndrades chapter made it
clear that additional ethnography would be necessary to document the
linkages between the ideational models and behavior (1992, p. 225).
Directive force continued to be a major issue for a decade. A third
book, A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning (Strauss and Quinn, 1997)
marshaled evidence against critics of directive force. Strauss and Quinn
showed that a false dichotomy was maintained in large part through
an argument that conflated internalized knowledge with lexical formal-
ism, an approach weak in regard to psychological reality (1997, pp.
254255). The overall aim of their book was to show that culture is a
product of interaction between minds and an external world, not some-
thing solely classificational, as critics had maintained. A fourth volume,
Finding Culture in Talk: A Collection of Methods, edited by Naomi Quinn
(2005), focused on methodological issues in deriving cultural models
from discourse.
12.2.2 Cultural models and methods: case studies

Cultural model research has developed in several additional and inno-
vative directions during the past two decades. Medical and environ-
mental anthropologists especially have used cultural models in their
research, largely as methodological tools. In medical anthropology, for
instance, William Dressler and associates (Dressler et al., 2005a) have
constructed cultural models in domains of health in Brazil and then
compared individuals against the normative model, a method that they
have labeled cultural consonance. The goal was to predict susceptibility
to health issues in relation to deviance from the norm. Dressler et al.
(2005b) used cultural consonance also within research on ethnicity and
health.
Model construction has proven useful in ecological and environmen-
tal research largely as a way to describe traditional or local ecological
knowledge, also called ethnoecology (Gragson and Blount, 1999).
When the Department of Anthropology at the University of Georgia
created a new doctoral program in ecological anthropology in the
early 1990s, the demand by students about how to construct cultural
models prompted the author to prepare a working paper on the subject
(Blount, 2002). An innovative aspect of that document was the use
of keywords, names or labels used by individuals in social groups

to focus discourse on topicality, and, simultaneously, to instantiate
the appropriate, underlying cognitive information, a cultural model.
Several dissertations at Georgia used keyword analysis to construct
cultural models (Cooley, 2003; Dailey, 1999; Garcia-Quijano, 2006; and
Gleason, 2003). In addition, Blount and colleagues pursued cultural
model research among fishers of Georgia in the South Atlantic (Blount,
2007; Blount and Kitner, 2007) and in water usage in coastal Georgia
(Blount and Gezon, 2003).
Environmental studies using cultural models included what is now
a classic study on American environmental values (Kempton et al.,
1995). Later studies by Michael Paolisso, colleagues, and students at the
University of Maryland (Paolisso, 2002; Paolisso et al., 2000) focused on
local knowledge in the Chesapeake Bay, related to fishermen, pollution,
and resource management, with cultural models serving as core compo-
nents of ethnographic content. Cultural models have been applied con-
structively in medical anthropology by Dressler and associates, as noted
(2005a, 2005b), but also Garro (1986), and in other fields, including agri-
cultural research (Silvasti, 2003), mining (Horowitz, 2008), and on spa-
tial, locational, and directional terminology in Samoan (Bennardo, 2009).
12.2.3 Summary pointsformative period of cultural model

development
Beyond the case studies, what other aspects of cultural model research
were noteworthy, especially in methodological terms? A first question
to ask is what is the nature of the data from which cultural cogni-
tive models are derived? In most instances, the data are derived from
discourse. CCMs, in fact, can be seen as a type of discourse or text
analysis. The texts tend to be from recent discourse, but they can also
be historical. Mark Dailey extended the use of models innovatively to
historical data in the settlement of the Northern Allegheny Plateau from
17501860 (1999). CCMs, however, do not have to be restricted to dis-
course analysis. Blount and Gezon derived cultural models from survey
questionnaire data, showing that the data can be analyzed according to
socioeconomic characteristics, such as occupation, and to spatial distri-
bution (2003). The viewpoint that CCMs are limited to discourse is an
inaccurate hold-over from the early period of development.
A second question to ask is What are the defining characteristics of
cultural cognitive models that have been produced? A detailed answer
to that question for all cultural model research cant be attempted here,
but in general, the identification of cultural models has been primarily
as single time and place outcomes in specific populations. Models of

marriage, the most studied topic, have produced accounts primarily of
how young Euro-American married couples in the US view the institu-
tion (Quinn, 2005). The models are not for US marriage in general,
across all age ranges and ethnic groups.
The authors work on the shrimp fishery in Georgia (US) looked
at specific groupsshrimpers, environmentalists, and governmen-
tal officialsinvestigating how each group viewed and understood,
through cultural models, environmentalism and conservation on the
coast in the 1990s. Garcia-Quijano also carried out interesting research
within a specific social group, reef fishermen on the southern coast of
Puerto Rico (2006). Also, some of the authors work, like Daileys (1999),
was historical, conducting research on the history of African American
marine fishers on the coast of Georgia (Blount and Kitner, 2007).
Additionally model production in some instances has been for applied
concerns, as in the work on cultural consonance by Dressler and associ-
ates (2005a, 2005b) and in the study of blue crab fishermens knowledge
crab biology and ecology (Cooley, 2003).
While case studies, of course, are valuable, there is a need to place
cultural model research in broader historical, social, and cultural con-
texts (Keesing, 1987). This chapter calls for efforts in that direction and
provides supportive theoretical frameworks. In the interest of time and
space, and as a baseline, a summary of what appears to be held in com-
mon in CCM research is presented below. Not all of the topics below
have been introduced in the chapter, as yet, but those discussions will
follow. Virtually all contributors to the cultural cognitive models litera-
ture appear to agree, more or less, on the following points.
Cultural models are based on underlying, abstract mental structures,

typically called schemas.
Schemas are scaled-down, simplified versions, content- and
structure-wise, of knowledge appropriate to specific domains.
Schemas are based on recognition of patterns presented in experi-
ence and thus involve internal biological phenomena, perception of
the external world, and cultural selection and conditioning.
Schemas that are filled-in with salient cultural content are cultural
models.
Cultural models are invoked or instantiated as a prerequisite for
social interaction and communication.
Cultural models in the service of social interaction are, or become,
shared informational content and structure.
Cultural models are typically out-of-awareness and thus allow inter-

locutors to exchange information as assumed or taken for granted as
given within the model.
Cultural models facilitate rapid information exchange by allowing
the assumptions about content and form to remain unspoken or
unelaborated.
The more a cultural model is shared (distributed) across a social
group, the stronger the model is in initiating and guiding behavior.
Models can be used strategically by interactive agents and tied to
other models as interaction unfolds.
12.3 Advances and new directions
12.3.1 Theoretical and methodological concerns

Several additional questions can be asked about CCMs. From what
bases are the models constructed? What are the units of construction,
the building blocks of models? If they are in the brain, how is the
information contained in the models organized? What are the roles of
keywords in the processing of information? If the models contain informa-
tion about the environment, what are the factors involved? For cognitive
models to be cultural, they have to be shared. How does sharing develop,
and how is it maintained? Also fundamentally, why do information stor-
age, retention, and utilization take the form of cognitive models in the
ways that they do? Evolutionarily, has there been natural selection for
human cognitive cultural models? These are all very difficult questions,
and answers to them are not complete and perhaps not even posed in
the correct way. Nonetheless, efforts will be made here to outline as least
what is known and to make suggestions for future research directions.
12.3.2 Schemas and cultural cognitive models

CCMs are known to be built on smaller, underlying units of experien-
tially based perceptual units. Although different terms have been used
for these units, the one that is the most common and which seems to
have won out over the others is schema. The idea of schemas was present
from the outset in the work of Quinn and Holland (1987), but it has had
a fundamental position in cognitive science in general, summarized by
Schank and Abelson a decade earlier (1977). Schemas can be defined as
cognitive frameworks associated with specific, experientially based forms
of behavior, restricted in scope and scale. They typically are situation spe-
cific and domain based. A common example is the ordering a cup of coffee
schema and another is the saying hello schema. In each of those, individu-
als have prescribed understandings and specific behavioral steps that are
needed in order for the schema to accomplish what is intended. Schemas,

ultimately, are based on the human ability to detect patterns, to recognize
commonalities in situations that are recurrent. Schemas develop from
pattern recognition of situations and phenomena that are important in
an individuals behavior situated within specific environments, in effect,
an event. Recognition depends on tacit knowledge of what is possible,
permissible, and acceptable within domains, such as greeting routines or
in calculating and using kin terms within a kinship system.
How do schemas relate, however, to CCMs? For much of cognitive
science, schemas themselves are the unit of interest and analysis. They
are seen as the fundamental interface between cognitive patterns in the
mind and instances of related behavior, or in other words, schemas are
the models (Feldman, 2006). Schemas are an essential part of the struc-
ture, but so are cultural cognitive models. Without consideration of cul-
ture, schemas are merely assumed, but not demonstrated, to be shared
or shareable. Culture, however, has a central role in the overall structure
of human knowledge. Sharing of informationcommunication
requires that individuals recognize that other individuals have similar
schemas and that the schemas can therefore be instantiated for mean-
ingful interaction. In fact, schema theorists understand each others
discussions about schemas precisely because they know that they each
have knowledge about them in common, but the cultural knowledge is
not brought to the foreground and made visible.
Awareness among interlocutors that schemas are shared can occur in
multiple ways. Schemas, once established, tend to be out-of-awareness,
as are the majority of brain functions. Speakers do not need, for exam-
ple, to bring the saying hello schema into consciousness for it to be used,
mentally computing the schema structure and content before they can
decide and manage to say hello. Individuals recognize a saying hello
event from immediate context, and then the schema can be activated.
The behavior of saying hello, however is not typically on the basis
of a schema alone but of a CCM that can be thought of as an informa-
tion scaffold constructed on a schema. Once a schema is instantiated
by recognition of context, an event, instantiation of the relevant CCM
follows, and the socially appropriate form of saying hello can occur.
The view of schema and model relationship presented here relies
heavily on an earlier proposal by DAndrade (1995) that cultural mod-
els are schemas filled-in with cultural values, typically default ones.
Individuals, again, have a schema for greeting routines, which is likely
to be a default hello, but the lexical expression actually selected varies
considerably depending on the nature of the relationship between the
speaker and recipient. Any number of lexical formulaic expressions may
be used, but in each instance, the underlying schema is filled-in with

information that is cultural.
12.3.3 Beyond schemas: keywords, models, and encyclopedic

knowledge
Questions about cultural cognitive models become especially difficult to
answer when the focus is on how information is stored and retrieved.
Little is known here, but a supportive framework for hypotheses resides
in social interaction. Social interaction is typically laced with talk, which
invariably occurs at a rate or pace that has minimal delays. In all speech
communities, talking in social interaction is expected to occur at a steady
pace, without long breaks or delays, unless it is highly formulaic or ritu-
alistic. Otherwise, repairs to the flow of conversation have to be made,
explanations provided, or time-outs have to be called. In the worst cases,
conversation falters and can fall apart altogether. A premium is placed on
discourse that moves forward without perceived undue delay. Not surpris-
ingly, the underlying cognitive systems are designed toward that end.
Discourse management involves sets of complex behavior, but addi-
tional questions need to be asked. How do participants in discourse
manage their interaction in relation to instantiation of models, and
how is the management related to rapid, efficiently paced interaction?
First, it is highly unlikely that ordinary discourse could be based sequen-
tially on an instantiation of a schema and cultural model, then another
schema and another cultural model, etc., in a single step-wise fashion.
Rapid information exchange is the consequence of nesting and embed-
ding cultural models, through combinations of embedding, sequential
tying, and hierarchical arrangements. Those constructions necessarily
occur, but discourse is more nuanced, with filling-in of information for
any particular model, sequencing of models, and extension of models
through linkage, depending on the circumstances. Management of cul-
tural information in social interaction appears to occur through internal
expansion of information relevant to a given model and through link-
age to other models that both focus and expand the discourse structure.
In effect, a higher-order model can contain lower-order models, that
is, be complex, and the complexity can derive from nesting of models,
derived instructionally from the storehouse of encyclopedic knowledge.
A first requirement for a cultural cognitive system is that the informa-
tion content and structure of any given model extend beyond simple
lexical and referential relationships. The use of keywords to label and
designate a referent is, of course, necessary, but information about
referent and meaning must be in the form of shared encyclopedic
knowledge. Event recognition, schema instantiation, and model con-

struction (filling-in of culture) are necessary steps in information
exchange, but deeper cultural knowledge is necessary for conversation.
Keywords point the way, indicating what topic is to be served by a cul-
tural cognitive model, but for information exchange to ensue, partici-
pants must have additional knowledge that can be brought to bear on
the topic under consideration. Discourse participants instantiate mod-
els of greater or lesser depth and complexity according to the amount
of information that they share encyclopedically and to the discourse
requirements at hand. In addition, interlocutors must have knowledge
of models that are conjoined with each other in some fashion, sequen-
tial, embedded, hierarchical, etc. As conservation unfolds, conjoined
models are instantiated through keywords. Topics tend to be conjoined,
and so must CCMs.
A change of topic generally necessitates notice among interlocutors
that a change is occurring or will occur, often marked by longer than
normative periods of silence or ritualistic verbal means, as in not to
change the topic, but ... The important point here is that the compara-
tively rapid-fire instantiation of models, the relative depth of informa-
tion assumed or presented within the model, and the inter-linkages of
models as discourse unfolds means that: (1) cultural cognitive models
are methodological devices that provide content and continuity to dis-
course; (2) the content is adjustable to the perceived capabilities of the
participants and the needs of the current discourse; and (3) the adjust-
ments allow discourse to flow with most of the content assumed rather
than vocalized.
In a very direct way, cultural cognitive models are devices that
use lexical items (keywords) to tie congruently whats in the mind
to whats in the world. Keywords are the focal points through
which internalized knowledge in the forms of schemas, models and
encyclopedic knowledge are externalized and then re-internalized,
back and forth in a dance of information. Encyclopedic knowledge
is far from being fully specified theoretically, but some clarity may
be emerging. Information in the mind may be stored in a variety of
ways, including in classifications and taxonomies (Kronenfeld, 2006)
and through a variety of linguistic means (Taylor, 2012), but it also
seems to be the case that retrieval of encyclopedic information is
typically in the form of CCMs. Put more directly, however informa-
tion about the world may be stored in the mental encyclopedia, use
of the information is likely to be in the form of communication and
thus through CCMs.
12.3.4 Culture
The concept of culture has been largely a theoretical black box for much
of the history of the concept within anthropology, utilized primarily
to name observed differences in behavior and beliefs across groups of
people. It has had little explanatory value except to label distinctive
differences found among societies as salient. In recent years, however,
several researchers have taken a new look at culture from a complex
system perspective, thereby opening up inquiry about what actually
constitutes culture and how the content and form relate to other
aspects of being human (Bennardo, 2009; Bennardo and Kronenfeld,
2011; Gatewood, 2011; Kronenfeld, 1996, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; and
White, 2011). The concept of culture has also been used in the con-
struction of cognitive models in linguistics (Geeraerts, 2003; Geeraerts
et al., 2010; Kristiansen and Dirven, 2008) and in psychology (Ross and
Medin, 2005), among others. Not only has inquiry in those allied dis-
ciplines expanded perspectives, it has also made similar calls for more
broadly based research. Exhortations have been made for historical and
sociocultural information to be considered and to be included in their
constructs, the same as the case here for expansion of the scope and
content of cultural cognitive models (see also Geearaerts chapter in this
volume). Empirical methods and data are seen not only as enriching
the cognitive concepts, they also help to avoid charges of circular rea-
soning that sometimes characterizes inquiry that is more introspective
(Gonzales-Marquez et al., 2007). Additional new concepts and methods
derived from recent literature in anthropology are addressed below.
12.3.5 Culture and sharing

Cultural cognitive models by definition must be shared by interlocu-
tors, but how is sharing to be characterized? Scales can differ, from
stable, widely shared, and historically long-term constructions to con-
structions that are newly emergent and not fully established. A recent
publication by John Gatewood (2011) helps to clarify the issues.
Gatewood presents three distinct domains in which knowledge differs
substantially among individuals: understandings of trees, understand-
ings of mixed drinks (bartender versus customer), and salmon seining in
Alaska. In each case, he shows that if individuals know the appropriate
names of the objects or activities, they can manage to communicate
about them, but also in each instance, they may know a name and lit-
tle else. To get a drink in a bar, for example, all one has to know is the
correct name to tell the bartender. Gatewoods observations are that (1)
people who share collective representations do not necessarily share a
great deal of personal knowledge; (2) whereas collective representations

underlie talk, personal knowledge underlies human action; and (3) the
evolutionary significance is that collective representations can reduce
what each of us must learn and at the same time provide access to a
much greater store of wisdom (2011, pp. 110111). Gatewoods general
conclusion is that it is appropriate to say a group of individuals share
a common culture if by this we mean simply they have learned similar
ways of talking aboutof re-presentingthings to each other. But shar-
ing collective representations does not imply homogeneity as regards
substantive knowledge. Personal knowledge concerning ... collective
representations is highly variable, grading from knowing of to knowing
about to knowing how (2011, p. 112).
Gatewoods dissection of culture as collective representations helps us
to realize that we need to be clear about what constitutes shared knowl-
edge. Gatewoods conclusions point us in the right direction, toward
the importance of keywords. If a person knows the name of a tree, or
an alcoholic drink, they can converse about it, even though they may
know almost nothing else about the topic. In regard to trees, if the term
oak is known, an assumption can be made that one knows something
more, that an oak is a particular kind of tree. The keyword oak names
and elicits the model of information available for a discourse to be initi-
ated. If both of the interlocutors know little else, then the conversation
may be limited, but if one has deeper encyclopedic knowledge, a con-
versation can become more involved, with one interlocutor serving to
inform the other with additional information. The same can be said of
drinks, or of steps in fishing for salmon with a purse seine, or a myriad
of other examples. In fact, Gatewood shows that what has to be known
is bare bones information to initiate or respond to a conversation
(2011, p. 109).
Two earlier publications by Bradd Shore (1991, 1996) also directly
address the issue of what is shared and how sharing occurs. His major
interest was how culture is represented in the mind, and he cast a
wide net to address that concern. Principally, he saw shared experi-
ences as the basis for recognition of symbols indicative or emblematic
referentially of associated objects. The commonality of experience and
reference was seen to reside in intersubjectivity, allowing for shared
cognitive schemata and models. Shore was concerned in particular with
the need for at least two moments of birth of cultural schemata, the
first one a public reference and the second one an individual retention
of the schemata, both for understanding and future referential use.
Together they interactively re-create the public and private nature of
the cognitive models. Shores model shows what necessarily must be

present for sharing of culture to occur, but the concept of intersubjectiv-
ity needs further deconstruction.
12.3.6 Culture as distributed cognition

David Kronenfeld has written extensively about the theoretical bases
of cultural models, especially in his book Culture, Society, and Cognition
(2008a). His contributions are summarized here. His view of culture is
that it is distributed cognition, consisting of shared information across
social groups of people, enabling effective cooperation, and his defini-
tion of cultural models is that they are devices that are used to package,
transmit, and share information (2008b, p. 3).
Kronenfeld notes that in relation to cognitive anthropology concerns
about cultural model shape, structure, boundaries, and content need to
be distinguished from other cultural conceptual systems, such as kin-
ship as illustrations of specific meaning domains (2008a, p. 31). This is
an important distinction and has ramifications for how information is
stored and retrieved in the brain. The point is that cultural models and
classificational systems are cognitively distinct.
In his review of the work of Quinn and Strauss, Kronenfeld takes issue
with the idea that cultural models are internalized, deeply entrenched
cognitively (2008a, pp. 3132). His reservations are based on the obser-
vations that individuals can easily switch cultural models, much as
speakers can switch codes. The fundamental idea is that a distinction
between individual cognitive representations (or models) and group
(cultural) models allows for switching, according to functional needs
(Kronenfeld, 2008a, p. 32). The distinction is useful in that individual
models may have implementation of different scope and ends than
cultural models. The distinction, however, and contra Kronenfeld, does
not mean that cultural models are not deeply entrenched and internal-
ized. Kronenfelds concern may be that the flexibility of models means
that they cant be deep-seated, but that isnt a necessary feature of inter-
nalized content. Deeply held cultural models can be reflective of foun-
dational culture over long periods of time, but they still are employed
flexibly in discourse, one of numerous choices that speakers may use.
A related fundamental part of Kronenfelds perspective is that men-
tal models exist only in individuals. Individuals within social groups
may have similar, and thus cultural, cognitive models, but they remain
individual in their locus. Nonetheless, one can still speak of shared
models at a different scale. Socially linked individuals can have the
same or similar models, making it possible to speak of sharing. A related

question, then, is why sharing occurs. The answer, scaled-down, is for
individuals to share information communally in order to be members
of social groups. Briefly put, culture is inherently social. Individuals
behave as if culture is real, but that is because the consequences of shar-
ing and not-sharing are socially real.
Jointly the understanding that mental structuresschemas and
modelsexist only within individuals and that models are not deeply
internalized allows Kronenfeld to conceive of cultural models as devices
that allow individuals to maneuver socially in response to interactional
demands and challenges they face. Kronenfeld also does not see cultural
models as creative of self, but that self manipulates the models towards
its own ends. Cultural models are likened to reference libraries to which
the self can turn for cognitive content (Kronenfeld, 2008a, p. 88).
Similarly, cultural models are seen as something like scenariosthat is,
action/situation units unlike cultural conception systems, e.g., kinship
systems (Kronenfeld, 2008a, p. 166). Kronenfeld proposes that cultural
models are like syntagms, except that they are not empty formal units
but have minimal substantive units (2008a, p. 167). Moreover, cultural
models can be seen as shared abstracted story lines that we use to coor-
dinate our behavior with that of others (Kronenfeld, 2008a, p. 168).
Cultural models are, in effect, application devices (Kronenfeld, 2008a,
p. 173) and the basic units of social action.
Kronenfelds conceptualization of culture is described as influenced
by computational models, specifically parallel distributed processing.
Culture is seen as shared content enabling society and organized into
a hierarchically structured array. The hierarchical organization pro-
vides the basis for differential degrees of sharing, similar to weighting
information in parallel distributed processing (Kronenfeld, 2008a,
p. 77). An entire chapter in his book is devoted to culture as dis-
tributed cognition. Viewing culture as distributed cognition means
culture need not be deeply internalized cognition, as noted above.
Culture is seen mostly as a set of shared understandings, a kind
of kit-bag of devices, essentially techniques to manipulate the
world which individuals confront (Kronenfeld, 2008a, p. 101). To
quote Kronenfeld culture can insightfully be seen as the system of
distributed cognition that enables society to function as a system
of something like parallel distributed cognition (2008a, p. 193).
Kronenfelds distributed cognition model will be contrasted later in the
chapter with what will be called the enriched lexicon model.
12.3.7 Social network analysis and cultural cognitive models

Further research needs to be carried out on social behavior and CCMs.
The ways in which models can become established within social groups
has been addressed, but the discussion has barely touched on the impor-
tance of sociality and consequential unfolding of social interaction.
A vast literature exists on social interaction, and discourse analyses, dat-
ing back almost half a century, reviewed by Blount (1974). A review here
is beyond the scope of possibility, but more research is needed, similar
to the chapters by Yamaguchi and Tay in this volume. Reference should
also be made to social network analysis, which addresses issues about
social cohesion and the role of culture (White, 2011). Equally important
is the effort to locate social behavior to internal cognitive systems and
to representations of the external world.
12.3.8 The lexicon and cultural cognitive models

Schemas and cultural models operate between information based in
the brain and in overt social behavior. The information based in the
brain, however, has never been carefully elaborated in relation to
CCMs. It is clear, however, that individuals must have information
broader than cultural models to be elicited as needed, but this topic
needs attention. One place to consider is the lexicon.
John Taylors 2012 book, entitled The Mental Corpus, is a tour de force
account of what the lexicon of a language is. Taking issue with the
account of the lexicon in contemporary linguistics, Taylor shows that
the lexical component is overly constrained. Asking the question of
what it means to know a language, he creates a strong and convincing
case that knowing a language amounts to developing an account of an
internal language (I-language) that can support the linguistic behavior of
speakers and which can be learned on the basis of exposure to linguistic
events (2012, p. 280). I-language is seen as in a dialectic relationship
with the external language (E-language), the form that people encounter
as they go about their daily lives. I-language is the language that is repre-
sented in the minds of its speakers, but its characteristics derive from the
E-language, and the E-language, in turn, is dependent on the characteris-
tics of the underlying, abstract I-language. That is the same type of rela-
tionship that exists between the realization of a cultural cognitive model
and its underlying form and schema. An abstract structure emerges from
experience, and once formed, it is the basis on which further experience
is conducted and thereby reinforces the abstract model.
In his conclusion, Taylor identified two recurrent findings in his
survey of lexical form and usage. One was that the units that make up
a language require a vast amount of specific information. Knowing a

word means that one knows about the contexts in which the word is
used (Taylor, 2012, p. 280). Context refers to both the linguistic con-
text, e.g., other words with which a given is typically used, and larger
contextual profiles in which meaning is drawn from context.
The second recurrent finding was the realization of the importance
on constructions in the description of a language (Taylor, 2012, p.
281). Constructions include the expected phrase structures, but there
were a host of commonly used minor constructions that cannot be
predicted by other linguistic categories. In other words, they have to
be learned contextually from experience. In fact, Taylor goes on to
say that a very great deal, perhaps even the totality of what occurs
in a language can be rightly said to be idiomatic (Taylor, 2012, p.
282). That is a powerful and provocative statement to be made within
linguistics, given that priority is placed on experiential acquisition
of form and meaning. Noting that speakers are highly sensitive to
usage, Taylor notes that It is almost as if speakers have been keeping
a record of what they have been exposed to, filing everything away
under various headings, cross-referencing it, and activating it in their
own linguistic performance (2012, p. 284). That is precisely what one
would expect within a schema, CCM, and knowledge encyclopedia
framework.
Lastly, Taylor notes that the units of linguistic knowledge are linked
in a network of relations, and that one of those networks is the relation
between a schema and its instances (2012, p. 284). That relation is the
one on which generalizations can be drawn from experience, which
from the point of view here would lead to CCMs. The relationship
between a schema and its instances is, as Taylor notes, recursive, pro-
viding the conditions within which generalizations can be formulated.
That would provide the conditions for a word central to the topic of
a schema, the keyword, to become the indicator that the instance is
another recurrence of shared meaning. Taylors innovative work on the
mental corpus provides an important underpinning to the understand-
ing of how the lexicon functions within larger relations of meaning,
leading up to and including schemas, and it might be added, through
generalization to CCMs.
12.4 Cognitive depth and cultural models
Although discussed earlier in this chapter, questions about internaliza-

tion of CCMs require further attention. Are CCMs relatively shallow
constructions, utilized to initiate and direct social interaction according
to the needs of the interlocutors and the dictates of conversation, or

can they also be deeply interiorized? One line of evidence comes from
the discussion about how the lexicon of speakers encodes experience in
stable constructions. CCMs are intertwined with an enriched lexicon,
not as ephemeral devices in discourse but as constitutive of the content
and structure of underlying knowledge. Additional lines of evidence
suggest that CCMs can be broad in scope, constructive of historically
long-term bases of understanding, and fundamental to how knowledge
is constituted and conveyed, all indicating deep internalization.
12.4.1 Out-of-awareness brain functions and cultural

cognitive models
Evidence in support of internalization comes from recent and rapidly
expanding literature on brain organization and processes. A funda-
mental aspect of that research is that most of the brains functions are
out-of-awareness, that the conscious, aware aspects constitute only a
small part of the brains work regarding behavior. CCMs are one part
of a framework within which information is stored, organized, and
activated. They, too, operate mostly out-of-awareness and can be seen
as one of the cognitive systems.
Only a few high points of this rapidly expanding literature can be
noted here. A pioneer and major contributor, Michael Gazzaniga, has
documented over several decades of research that overt human knowl-
edge tends to be a consequence of immediately prior brain processes
and functions (1972, 1989, 2011). His split-brain research with Joseph
LeDoux has shown that the left hemisphere is always at work, with
its interpretive mechanism seeking the meaning of events in order
and reason, even when sometimes there is none (Gazzaniga, 1998a).
Interpreted otherwise, the brain plans for behavior within contexts
in which an individual is poised for action even before the individual
realizes overtly that action is needed or will occur. Organizational
frameworks for meaningful behavior are activated within the brain
(Gazzaniga, 1998b), leading to actualization of behavior and attendant
cultural cognitive understandings.
Another account of brain functioning that might be mentioned here
is David Eaglemans book, Incognito: the Secret Lives of the Brain (2011).
The book is a far-ranging account and synthesis of recent and important
findings in neuroscience. Especially relevant to the discussion on CCMs
is the argument that the brain functions mainly out of our awareness,
collecting and organizing information from environmental experi-
ences, toward anticipation of behavior. Importantly, the brain doesnt
need a full model of the world to function; it needs information about

specific instances and events, essentially on a need to know basis
to guide behavior (Eagleman, 2011, pp. 2830). The brain continu-
ally makes assumptions about sensory data, using its best guesses to
transform limited incoming data into larger constructions. To go one
step further, Eagleman presents evidence to show that the internal data,
that is, within the brain, is not generated by external data. Instead the
external data modulates, or anchors, the internal data (Eagleman, 2011,
p. 44). As information is built up and organized within the brain,
coming originally from the external environment, a recursive feed-
back loop is established, in which a given perception of aspects of the
environment modulates the model established in the brain. This allows
individuals to make predictions about behavior and the environment
in advance of actual sensory input (Eagleman, 2011, p. 48). That is pre-
cisely what cultural cognitive models do.
12.4.2 The brain as a mapping mechanism

A related line of research in neurolinguistics addresses different ques-
tions. The interest is in the brain as a mapping mechanism. One of the
leading researchers in this line of research is Antonio Damasio, who
has produced a series of books, progressively situating cognition within
a broader physiological context (1994, 1999, 2003, 2010). The fourth
book in particular, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain
(2010), provides accounts of how the brain maps information funda-
mental to the life processes of humans. Mapping has two interrelated
sources. One is a mapping of information about the state and condition
of the body, that is, internally. If a persons hand is injured, for example,
that information is mapped within the brain in a way that buffers the
use of the hand and delimits further injury.
The second source of mapping is of the environment, the external
world within which individuals typically live their daily lives. To quote
Damasio, perception in whatever sensory modality, is the result of the
brains cartographic skills (2010, p. 70), ultimately producing through
the brains incessant and dynamic mapping an individuals self. Images
recorded by the brain represent physical properties of entities and their
temporal and spatial relationships, and images tend to be logically
interrelated in their correspondence to events in the external world.
Here we have the neurological underpinnings of the mental represen-
tations of the external world with which we have experience and the
cultural cognitive models constitutive of the experiences. Mapping of
sensory input from the external world will, of course, be on the basis
of brain structure and process, essentially neuronal, whereas cultural

cognitive modeling is represented in terms of lexical items. Whether a
direct isomorphism between mapping and cultural cognitive modeling
exists remains unknown, but the possibility has to be considered that
the interiorization of information is at least highly similar. Information
mapped about the external environment will be on the basis of gen-
eralizations about experienced sensory input from repeated instances.
Perhaps at the current state of our knowledge, we are merely using dif-
ferent terms for the same phenomena.
12.4.3 Cultural cognitive models of pre-modern Western

medicine
A third line of evidence in support of internalized CCMs comes from
historically stable models. While CCMs are situated at the near-surface
level, like the choice of code in code-switching, they also serve a deeper,
more fundamental function. CCMs have to be based on shared informa-
tion, by definition. The more widely shared the information, the more
it is broadly constitutive of culture. Through the capacity for social shar-
ing, CCMs reflect deeply ingrained, taken-for-granted foundations of
culture. Examination of long-term CCMs is useful in several ways. They
show that CCM structure and content is deeply established and widely
held. Deep historical models also allow for testing of hypotheses, such
as the more sharing occurs among societal/group members, the more
socially important the model, the more stable the model, the greater the
historical time-depth, and the more buffering there is against change.
Historical models also are complex, meaning that they typically have
nested model structure, and they show how models can be arranged
hierarchically and sequentially. Lastly, by definition, they are resistant
to change, reflective of the significance of their social embedding.
Change in models is discouraged on several grounds. Efforts to affect
change go against societal norms and can thus be costly at a personal
level. At the level of society, long-term stable models promote social
solidarity and stability. They establish common ground and typically
provide explanations of phenomena fundamentally important to soci-
ety, as for example in understanding disease causation. At yet another
level, widely shared models reinforce those aspects of the environment
that are of critical importance to a society, as for example, the natural
resource base or bases on which livelihood and survival depend.
Examples of long-term stable models can be found in widely dis-
parate areas as astrology, concept of the soul and afterlife, personal
naming systems, and humoral medicine. The predictions above can
be considered in a case study, a historical account of long-held models

about health and disease in the Western world (Blount, 2009). Given
that this is an illustration, only an outline of a time frame and associ-
ated central ideas are provided. The account is also heavily dependent
on the work of Carl Zimmer, who wrote a comprehensive history of the
transition in England from humoral to early modern medicine (2004).
12.4.3.1 The Greeks, Aristotle, cultural models of the cosmos and the soul
The ancient Greek view of the cosmos (+/- 500 BC) held that it was
constructed of air, fire, earth, water. The model of the cosmos was com-
plex, incorporating many smaller models. Air (pneumata), for example,
contained non-corporeal spirits, including the soul, yet another com-
plex model. A persons soul was thought to enter the body through
breathing, essentially the breath. The breath itself, spire, was considered
to be the life force (another stable CCM). From those foundations, we
have inspire, to breathe in, give life to, and expire, to breathe out, in final
form to die, and aspire, rise, give incentive to, etc. Spirits extant in the
cosmos were thought to be channeled through the planets and stars,
and thus the importance of astrology, and currently, horoscopes. The
soul was considered to be the spirit or spirits that inhabited the body
(Zimmer, 2004).
The earliest classification of souls was by Aristotle (+/- 325 BC), who
followed the widespread belief (model) that all living things had souls.
Human souls were considered to be responsible for rationality, and the
location of the rational souls faculties was thought to be in the heart,
conveniently given that the heart is located in the center of the body
and produces life-giving heat. Heat was equal to intelligence. The eyes
and ears were erroneously thought to be connected to blood vessels and
thus the heart, rather than the brain. At that point in history, there was
no recognition that the brain had any role in thought (Zimmer, 2004).
12.4.3.2 Galens cultural model

Galen, a Turkish doctor, synthesized ideas about medicine in approxi-
mately 150 AD), building on Aristotles classification. Galen also built
his model of medicine from experience, as he was a practicing physi-
cian, and he dissected animals more or less on a daily basis. His model
included food as the source of flesh and breath as the source of spirit.
In addition, each bodily organ had soul-like power, but among the
organs, the heart was special. The heart provided life-giving qualities to
the blood that was circulated through it. Blood was thought to be puri-
fied in the head, where the brain was thought to pulsate, driving spirits
throughout the body, including into hollow nerves. Medical treatment

thus had as its primary aim to restore flow of natural, vital, and animal
spirits. Fevers, for example, which were rampant at the time, were due
to too much blood, that is, the body was too hot. Treatment was to cool
the body, and that was done by bleeding patients, to restore the amount
of blood to a normal level.
Galens views were absorbed into doctrines of Christianity, in approx-
imately 199 AD. The heart was still seen as the seat of knowledge and
intelligence, but it also became the seat of moral conscience and of pas-
sions. In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas developed what came to be
called Natural Philosophy, which included Greek ideas about the cos-
mos and adopted Galens model of medicine. The modelspirit, soul,
and heartbecame the gospel in the fields of medicine and anatomy.
His model was relatively stable throughout Western Europe for 11 cen-
turies, from approximately 200 to 1300 AD, and it was to remain stable
for another 400 years (Zimmer, 2004).
The model of soul based on Galens ideas was actually more detailed
than has been presented to this point. Briefly, the soul contained four
humors, which governed both health and temperament. Blood, the
first humor was thought to make people bold, merry, lucky, and/or
gullible. Yellow bile, in turn, made people hasty, envious, cruel, and
unlucky, whereas black bile was responsible for melancholy in general
and sadness and detachment, in particular. The fourth humor, phlegm
could cause disease (tuberculosis in particular) if not kept balanced.
Phlegm was thought to be in the brain, which made sense, given that
it comes from the head (Zimmer, 2004). Each of these humors was a
complex CCM.
12.4.3.3 Thomas Willis and the decline of Galens model

Changes in Galens cultural model were due mainly to Thomas Willis,
an English doctor. Willis relied initially on Galens model, but he was
influenced by alchemists-healers, from whom he adopted the idea
that diseases were particular, individual things and not global in
their origins. Willis was also heavily influenced by William Harvey,
who had discovered how the heart pumps blood through the body.
Like Harvey, Willis in the 1650s relied on observation, experiments,
and dissections of animals. Dissection of humans was forbidden by
law. Willis began to reject Galen and rely on Harvey, in part due
to knowledge gained through empirical research but also because
Galens model was not helpful in treating neurological, psychological
disorders. Over time Willis eventually came to see that the brain is
the center of knowledge, thus setting the conditions to deal a mortal

blow to Galens ideas. Interestingly, however, Willis continued to use
Galens model in his treatment of patients, most likely due to the
strength of the model in their understandings of disease causation and
treatment (Zimmer, 2004).
By 1700, Galens views diminished in medicine, but aspects of Galens
cultural model of spirit, heart, soul, and humors were continued to
be present. They are found in astrology and horoscopes, as noted, and
heart continues to be a prominent metaphor of emotions. A large
number of expressions provide evidence, as for example in a bro-
ken heart, take heart, and heart and soul. Emotions also are still
described metaphorically in terms of humors, for example bloody
thief, melancholy soul and free spirit. Within Christianity, notions
of soul are not fundamentally changed. They are seen as present from
birth, characteristic of individuals, and immortal.
The discussion has focused on two historical models, what may be
called the basic model originating with the Greeksair, spirit, soul,
bloodand which was extant for approximately 5,000 years. A tree dia-
gram with an outline of the basic model is given in Figure 12.1.
The expanded model, Galens, has all of the features of the basic
model, but it also includes heart and intelligence. It was the dominant
model for approximately 1,500 years. The expanded model is given in
outline form in a tree structure in Figure 12.2.
An obvious question to ask is why these cultural models have
been widespread and stable for thousands and hundreds of years,
respectively. Several possible answers come to mind. They provide an
explanation of the fundamentals of existence, including the place of
individuals in the universe, the causes of behavior and illness, and
the basis for individual identity. In addition, they are consistent with
Figure 12.1 The basic cultural model of the soul from Aristotle and the Greeks
Figure 12.2 The expanded model of soul from Galen
perception and intuition, making them also difficult to be disproven

and thus to be replaced. Given their importance, they are conserva-
tive and serve to buffer change, and accordingly they were enforced
by authority, not only by religious and political officials but through
societal sanctions.
It seems fair to say that the models were deeply interiorized in indi-
viduals, serving as primary means to understand vital aspects of life.
The culture of the cognitive models was preserved across generations
of individuals, enabling them to practice culture although it was likely
taken-for-granted and out-of-awareness much of the time. No doubt
the models allowed individuals to share culture through discourse and
interaction, but the importance went far beyond that facilitating role.
12.5 Summary and overview
Cultural cognitive models have been used productively in research now

for almost three decades. As might be expected, the models proposed in
the formative period, approximately from 1985 to 2000, differ in vari-
ous ways from those identified and described since 2000. One difference
is that the earlier models were all extracted from discourse, whereas later
models were extended to new research arenas, using survey results, his-
torical reconstruction, experiments, hypothesis testing, and especially
in characterizing environmental knowledge. One new proposal was
that cultural models were devices to facilitate discourse and thus not
deeply internalized. The position taken in this chapter is that the two
functions, discourse facilitation and cultural representation, are merely
two aspects of cultural cognitive models and that the predominance of
one over the other is mainly a function of appropriate methodology for
the research question.
The concept of culture has remained central throughout the three
decades, but it has received additional focus and attention. A principal
concern has been the question of what sharing entails. Although mod-
els are ultimately held by individuals, the models can become or be
held in common by members of social groups, and the sharing occurs
through the models utilization in initiating and sustaining discourse.
Models become more fixed, stable and widespread, through social
interaction; as sharing increases, culture becomes more standardized
and normative. A hallmark of CCM research during the last 1015 years
has been greater interest in and sensitivity to the importance of social
matrices within which models are used. Social network analysis should
be given special attention as a way of further addressing the degree of
sharing and its related importance.
Schemas remain as the fundamental structures apparent in scene and
event recognition, but they are seen as generalizable and thus subject
to increasing culture content. While schemas have functional biological
bases that need further inquiry, they also include cultural preferences
and constraints. The boundary between a schema and a model is not
always clear, but as more cultural information is included, especially if
the schema is lexicalized, it becomes a model and subject to instantia-
tion by a keyword. As noted above, theoretical consideration of schemas
has moved in similar directions in lexical semantics in the work of
Geearaerts and in the mental corpus by Taylor.
The need for the bio-behavioral bases of schemas to become better
understood has a parallel in the need for neurological bases of informa-
tion processing to become better developed. Cultural cognitive models
operate within biological parameters, and advancement of knowledge
in both areas is desirable. Highly beneficial would be more understand-
ing of how CCMs may be situated biologically. One intriguing question
in neuroscience is how isomorphic neural models and cultural models
may be. In a direct sense, cultural cognitive models are neural models,
in terms of mental storage, retrieval, out-of-awareness, long-term and
short-term memory, and association with other forms of neurally stored
encyclopedic knowledge. Parallel developments for positioning cogni-
tive models within biology are appearing elsewhere, as in the work of
Feldman, cited earlier, indicating that integration of cognition and

neuroscience is a promising direction for new inquiry.
The merging of social, mental, and biological bases of behavior is
underway in cognitive science, but not without controversy. Different
perspectives center on the relationship between internal structure and
process, that is, in the brain, and external-derived sensory input. One of
the polar positions is that cognition is solely in the brain, and there is
no need for consideration of the external environment, a position that
is parallel to long-standing debates in syntactic theory. The opposing
point of view is that the external environment is essential in cognitive
development and functioning. The contrasting positions are currently
being played out in cognitive science, much the same as the debate in
linguistics. In a recent publication (Stainton, 2006), two researchers or
sets of cognitive scientists each presented pro and con positions on a
number of current topics in cognitive science, for example, Are Rules
and Representations Necessary to Explain Systematicity? The position
taken in this chapter is that feedback processes are necessary for cogni-
tive processes, whether they are CCMs or the development and func-
tioning of the mental corpus.
The internal-external discussion leads to an even broader concern,
the place of cultural cognitive models within evolutionary perspective,
both cultural and biological evolutionary perspectives. What are the
selective advantages of information processing through cultural cogni-
tive models? Several ideas come immediately to mind, all related to
social process. Individual adaptation within social groups is promoted
through established patterns (models) of information sharing, leading
to development of self, self-awareness, and self-promotion. Those occur
within social frameworks. As already discussed, the greater the sharing
of cultural models, the more solidarity exists and the more social groups
have common goals and purposes. Evolution of society is possible due
to culture models, and in fact, they are related aspects of the same phe-
nomenon. The point here is that CCM research would be well served if
consideration were given more systematically to results of research on
similar topics in highly related fields of inquiry.
In effect, we need neuro-cultural cognitive models. They would
help us to better understand the schema-model relationship and the
characteristics and the instantiation of encyclopedic knowledge to
frame and fill-out discourse set in motion through cultural cognitive
models. Lastly, would success in the development of neuro-cultural
cognitive models help to resolve the issue in anthropology confronted
by CCM studies at their outset? The issue, again, was whether CCMs
have behavioral directive force, but the sub-text was whether culture,
as information in the mind, has any direct bearing on behavior in the
external world. According to some critics, the answer was no, even
though cultural model research indicated otherwise. This difference in
perspective, it should be noted, is the inverse of the one discussed in
this chapter, of cognitive processes involving the external and inter-
nal environments, or as the contrary opinion would have it, only the
processes in the mind. The critics of cultural model research deny the
importance of the processes internal to the mind, placing behavioral
drivers in the external environment. As strange as that might sound,
there is a deep history in anthropology, dating to the early days of the
discipline in the late 19th century, of rejecting psychological explana-
tions of behavior as reductionist. Anthropologists who adhere to that
position likely will not find the current discussion convincing, but
those who have training in linguistics, in cognitive anthropology, and
in model construction will likely find the discussion interesting, and
hopefully, relevant to moving the discussion about CCMs forward.
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Glossary
Activity type: Any culturally constituted activity that is goal defined and
imposes constraints on what would count as suitable participants, appropriate
settings, and relevant communicative acts. Examples include job interviews and
games.
Cognitive Anthropology: A subfield in anthropology in which the relation-

ship between human society and human thought is studied by ethnographic
methods. It focuses on the system of concepts by using linguistic labels
as a heuristic in order to uncover the implicit underlying organization of
thought.
Cognitive Grammar: A subfield of linguistics that explains grammar by refer-

ence to patterns of attention and categorization, such as imagery (e.g., figure-and-
ground, profile-and-base, specificity, and shifting focus), metaphor, and
metonymy.
Cognitive Linguistics: A theoretical paradigm which assumes that the

structure and meaning of language is grounded on conceptual processes and
embodied experience. The major branches of cognitive linguistics include
cognitive grammar (see cognitive grammar), conceptual metaphor theory
(see conceptual metaphor), and cognitive semantics.
Conceptual metaphor: The cognitive phenomenon where one conceptual

domain (the target domain) is understood, or conceptualized, in terms of
another conceptual domain (the source). It is posited that this process involves
mappings, or conceptual correspondences, from the source to the target.
Conceptual metaphors are expressed in terms of A is B-type equivalences, such as
LOVE IS A JOURNEY, where LOVE is the target and JOURNEY the source.
Construal: Our capacity to conceive and portray the same situation in alterna-
tive ways.
Constructional idiom: In cognitive linguistics, a syntactic construction with

formal and semantic properties which are not derivable from general properties
of the language. Common examples include the Whats X doing Y construction,
which encodes the non-derivable meaning of wanting an explanation, as well
as negative polarity questions (Didnt he leave?), which encodes a hedged asser-
tion. An important point is that despite their specific meanings, many construc-
tional idioms can be specified with different lexical items, as seen from Whats
X doing Y.
Control cycle: A very general cognitive model (implicit in many aspects of expe-
rience) involving cyclic episodes of activity, each serving to incorporate some
element in a (locally) stable structure.
299
300 Glossary
Cultural cognition: Collective, group-level cognition that embodies cultural

and linguistic knowledge that emerges from the interactions between the mem-
bers of a cultural group across time and space.
Cultural Cognitive Model: A new name for cultural model, defined as widely
shared, largely tacit, and taken-for-granted understandings of the world. Cultural
cognitive models have been recently refined by incorporating a biological and
evolutionary theoretical framework.
Cultural conceptualizations: Conceptual units such as cultural schemas, cul-

tural categories, and cultural-conceptual metaphors that enable members of a
cultural group to make sense and organize their experiences.
Cultural Linguistics: A multidisciplinary area of research that explores the

relationship between language, culture, and conceptualization. Or a field of
language study that profiles the role of culture in shaping imagery, metaphor,
metonymy, and consequently grammar and other components of language. It
thus incorporates cognitive linguistics with a shift of emphasis from innate to
cultural determination of categories and a shift in method from elicitation to
elicitation combined with ethnography.
Embodiment: The view that cognition develops from bodily experience (nota-
bly perception and motor interaction) through general processes such as abstrac-
tion, metaphorical projection, and conceptual integration, and that it can only
be cogently characterized in these terms.
Grounding: A semantic function inherent in a nominal or a finite clause,

whereby the entity referred to is related to the interlocutors and the speech event
in regard to basic epistemic factors (such as identification and status vis--vis
reality).
Hedge: A mitigating word used to make utterances appear less assertive or force-
ful. Typical examples include sort of, perhaps, and seems to.
Hominin: The group consisting of modern humans, extinct human species

and all our immediate ancestors (including members of the genera Homo,
Australopithecus, Paranthropus and Ardipithecus), Australian Museum, http://
australianmuseum.net.au/Hominid-and-hominin-whats-the-difference, viewed
on 28 November 2012.
Hyoid bone: A U-shaped bone at the base of the tongue that supports the move-
ments of the tongue.
Iconic, iconicity: A connection between a sign and its object based on resem-
blance. Images, diagrams, and metaphors are iconic to various degrees (e.g., a
map iconically represents the territory it stands for; an onomatopoeia iconically
duplicates the sound).
Idealized Cognitive Model: In cognitive linguistics, a conceptual representa-

tion, or knowledge structure, which appears to adequately characterize the
concept at hand, but does not actually accommodate all possible real-world
situations.
Glossary 301
Indexical, indexicality: A relationship between a sign and its object based on

proximity or spatio-temporal contiguity. Among linguistic signs, personal pro-
nouns (I, you, we, they, etc.), deictic adverbs (here/there, now/then), demonstratives
(this/that), and the grammatical categories of tense and aspect are good examples.
Indexicals point to or co-exist with the objects they stand for, and the interpre-
tation of indexical signs is crucially bound up with the context in which they are
uttered. Semiotic anthropology analytically focuses on indexicality as a property
and mode of signs.
Intersubjectivity: A phenomenological concept originally proposed by

Husserl to elucidate empathic situations where one experiences oneself as
seen by the Other through, instead of individual experiences, the shared
meaning, thought, perception, emotion, etc. In cultural linguistics, it is used
to refer to the attention of multiple participants to the actions and atten-
tional focus of one another, as when one directs ones attention to an object
under observation by a companion.
Late modernity: A view of the contemporary society, which is characterized by

fragmentation, displacement, and uncertainty. Late modern people feel less cer-
tain about the continuity of the traditional values (see reflexivity).
Metonymy: The phenomenon where one thing is referred to, or identified, by

means of another thing which is closely associated to it. Traditionally, the two
things are said to be contiguous. An example is the ham sandwich wants his
cheque (in a restaurant setting), where ham sandwich refers to the customer who
ordered a ham sandwich.
Mimesis: Re-enactment or representation via mimicry or imitation (see Palmer,

this volume).
Morphology: The study of the structure of words in terms of their constituent

symbols.
Multimodality: Systematic attention to multiple channels of transmitting/

receiving information, intention, and emotion through kinetic, visual, auditory,
tactile, olfactory, and other possible means.
Poetic structure: Structural parallelism in the configuration of signs. Explicitly,

it refers to lexical repetitions and syntactic parallelisms in discourse. Implicitly,
it denotes the patterning of interaction in which indexical devices (e.g., personal
pronouns, here/there, now/then, or tense) are systematically used to create the
coherence of discourse.
Prototype: A notion developed by Eleanor Rosch; prototypes are clear mem-

bers, based on peoples judgments of goodness of membership in a category.
For example, robins and sparrows are prototypical birds while penguins and
ostriches are not prototypical ones.
Psychotherapy: A verbally constituted mental health activity where therapists

apply psychological principles to assist individuals to modify such personal
characteristics as feelings, values, attitudes, and behaviours which are judged to
be maladaptive or maladjustive.
302 Glossary
Reflexivity: In social theory, it refers to peoples meta-awareness of indeterminacy,

contingency, and instability in contemporary life, which is enhanced by, and
enhances, the feelings of uncertainty, lack of continuity, and physical and social
displacements. The reflexivity of (late) modernity encourages people to appropri-
ate new knowledge or information in their daily activities (see late modernity).
Representational gesture: A class of gesture types (e.g., deictic, iconic, and

metaphorical) which hold meaningful relationship to the semantic content of
the speech they accompany, based on an assumption that language and gesture
are inseparable and co-expressive.
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: The idea that the grammar of a language channels,

influences, or reflects the habitual thoughts of its speakers.
Schema: A cognitive framework associated with specific, experientially based

forms of behavior, restricted in scope and scale. It typically is situation specific
and domain based. A common example is the ordering a cup of coffee schema,
and another is the saying hello schema.
Semantics: Patterns of linguistic meaning or the field of study concerned with

them.
Semiotic Anthropology: A linguistic anthropological approach to signs-in-use.

It integrates Charles S. Peirces semiotics (see iconic, indexical, and symbolic)
into Roman Jakobsons concept of poetics in the analysis of verbal and other
semiotic behavior (see poetic structure).
Spatial frame of reference: A coordinate system used to describe where things

are located in space, often in terms of three types of frames of reference (FOR):
the relative, the intrinsic, and the absolute. The first two are typically (but not
exclusively) associated with such inherent specifications as right/left and front/
back, whereas the other with geographical orientations like NSEW or where
the sun rises/sets.
Stereotype: A socially basic concept that a member with a minimum level of

competence in a society needs to have, as defined by Hilary Putnam. In cognitive
(socio)linguistics, it is reformulated as a sociocentric notion while retaining its
cognitive basis. In semiotic anthropology, it is called cultural concept.
Symbolic, symbolicity: In cognitive grammar and cultural linguistics, it refers to

a connection between a unit of phonology and a concept, including morphemes,
words, and complex constructions. In semiotics, it refers to a relationship
between a sign and its object by social convention (e.g., the sound [kt] denotes
the animal cat; a red sign means stop).
Type-token (or schema-instance): In Peirces semiotics, tokens are actual

instances of the abstract types, just as utterances are instances of the underlying
sentences. In cognitive linguistics, type corresponds to schema, while token to
instance. This usage of schema should not be confused with that of schema
in the sense of cognitive framework, which is used in situation-specific and
domain-based forms of behavior (see schema).
Usage-based: The notion that linguistic units are abstracted from actual
instances of language use, that they consist in the reinforced
Index
A Australian Aboriginal languages and

Abelson, R. P., 276 cultures, 7, 108
Aboriginal cultural spiritual conceptu- Avdi, E., 253
alisations, 114 Avruch, K., 118
Aboriginal English speakers, 112
absolute, absolutive, 131, 158, 160, B
186, 231, 257 back/foregrounding, 87
Abu-Lughod, L., 129 Bakema, P., 8, 61
Acheulian, 1512 Bamberg, M., 14, 247
action chain and scenarios, 157, Bartlett, F. C., 102
15960 basic cognitive ability, 30, 34, 39
activity type, 237 basic domain, 30
Adams, M., 235, 249n1 Basso, E. B., 9
adaptive, 16, 157, 169 Basso, K. H., 159, 181
Agar, M., 9, 69, 146 Bauman, Z., 236
Agha, A., 14, 245, 246 Beck, U., 14, 234, 236
Aguirre, E., 149 Becker, A. L., 141
Aiello, L. C., 149, 160, 168 Beller, S., 1, 3, 8
anger, concept of, 8, 569, 62, 64 Bender, A., 1, 3, 8
Angus, L. E., 253, 257, 262 Bennardo, G., 1, 181, 274, 280
animism, 10, 1268, 142 Berlin, B., 3, 4, 102
anthropological linguistics, 101, 118 Bernrdez, E., 6, 7
anthropological research on space, 181 Bickerton, D., 147, 160, 161, 168, 169
anthropology, 46 blending theory, 7, 9, 1112
cognitive anthropology (CA), Blenkiron, P., 252, 253, 254, 260
see cognitive anthropology (CA) Bloem, A., 50, 51, 60, 62, 63
linguistic anthropology (LA), Blount, B. G., 13, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
see linguistic anthropology (LA) 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 101, 102,
anthropomorphism, 126, 128, 142 106, 211n1, 217, 218, 221, 223,
anti-cognitivism, 18 226, 227, 228, 230, 231n4, 271,
Aoki, H., 211n3 273, 274, 275, 284, 289
Aquinas, T., 290 Boas, Franz, 3, 101
Arbib, M., 148, 164 Bodo, 14951
Aristotle and Greek cosmos, 291 body, 183, 186, 272, 287, 290
Armstrong, D. F., 147, 160, 164, 165, holistic treatment of, 210
168 and language, 194
Arthur, J. M., 115 parts, 11, 103, 11011, 1379,
Ascher, R., 147, 163 199, 209
attention, 35, 36, 46, 293 Bourdieu, P., 181
joint attentional frame, 162, 169 brain
Auel, J. M., 143n4 as a mapping mechanism, 272,
Australian Aboriginal English, 111 2878
303
304 Index
brain - continued Cognitive Grammar (CG), 6, 8, 14,

out-of-awareness functions, 2867 278, 30, 219, 229
brain functions, 30, 272 cognitive linguistics, 12, 518, 29,
mapping mechanisms, 272, 2878 47, 50, 53, 62, 64, 69, 99,
out of awareness, 272, 2767, 1003, 109, 111, 117, 118, 124,
2867, 2923 145, 146, 157, 185, 217, 230n1,
Briggs, C. L., 9, 248 265
Brooks, A., 246, 249n1 cognitive linguistics (CL) approach,
Brown, P., 2, 5, 181 12, 7, 10, 1315, 50, 99,
Brugman, C., 160 1456, 217, 2278, 230n1
Buddhism, 124, 126 and conceptual metaphor, 111
Bhler, K., 208 mechanisms of, 12
Burling, R., 154, 155, 168, 170, social contexts, 21819
171n12 traditional approaches, 101
Bybee, J., 171n17 cognitive science, 8, 1617, 467, 102,
182, 294
C Cognitive Sociolinguistics, 21819,
call system, 1545, 170 227, 228
Cameron, L., 6, 251, 252, 253, 262 cognitive utility (of metaphor), 254
Campbell, B. G., 148, 149, 151 commodification of experiences, 14,
Cantonese, 7, 9, 6892 235, 2427
Casson, R. W. 1 commodity discourse, 245
catastrophists, 1689 communicative competence, notion
ceremonial, 14570 of, 1, 102
character-internal perspective, 188, communicative dynamics, 255
192, 195201, 2045 communicative event, 218, 220, 221,
character viewpoints (VPTs), 186, 193, 227
198, 207 Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), 1034
Observer-external, 193 Comrie, B., 160
Observer-internal, 198, 199, 200 conceptual archetypes, 31, 401
Cicourel, A., 13, 17, 183 conceptual blending, 12, 157, 169,
classifier, 401, 1089, 158 171n14
class-inclusion model, 240, 241, 244, conceptual content, 289, 34, 36,
246, 247 3740
cognition, 28, 1618, 278, 31, 646, and construal, 34
103 conceptualization
cultural, 10, 99, 1035 cognitive, 103
culturally embedded, 33 cultural, 10411, 11415, 117
distributed, 104, 2823 conceptual metaphor, 6, 10, 12, 14,
embodied, 33, 379, 42, 46 50, 534, 103, 105, 10912,
cognitive anthropology (CA), 25, 117, 147, 1578, 169
14, 16, 99, 106, 119n1, 182, conceptual metaphor theory, 6, 10,
21718, 225, 2278, 230n1, 14, 50, 53
272, 282, 295 conceptual metonymy(ies), 12, 1579,
cognitive depth, 16, 28592 169
cognitive development, 31, 107, concordance analysis, 256
294 consonants, 1546, 161
cognitive domains, 2830, 324, 36, construal phenomena, 347
219, 231n5 definition of, 34
Index 305
constructional idioms (CIs), 9, 91, and political discourse analysis,

93n5 11718
lexico-grammatical characteristics, and research into varieties of
757 English, 11113
proto-, 845 see also cultural schemas
consumption, 243, 246, 248 cultural metaphors, 10, 104, 11011
contextualization cue, notion of, 10, cultural models, 4, 910, 12, 1416,
231n6 99, 106, 111, 117, 1579, 169,
conversation analysis, 211n2 217, 27195
Cooley, D. R., 274, 275 cognitive depth and, 16
correspondence models, 2401, of the cosmos and the soul, 289
244 of Galen, 28990
Craw, M. J., 253, 254, 260, 261, 262 historical reconstruction of, 16
Croft, W., 7 and methods, case studies, 2734
cultural categorization/category(ies), as psychologically shallow, 16
10, 12, 104 see also idealized cognitive models
and language, 1079 (ICMs)
cultural cognition, notion of, 99, cultural schemas, 104, 281
1035, 11011 Aboriginal, 115
cultural cognitive models (CCMs), intercultural communication, 115
notion of, 9, 16, 99, 21718, and language, 1057
221, 2246, 271, 2789, 285, culture, 1, 13, 100, 101, 103, 106,
2945 142, 277, 280, 293
biocultural framework, 272 computational models, 283
culture-in-talk models, 2723 definition of, 5
definitions, 217, 224 distributed cognition, 13, 16, 99,
lexicon and, 2845 104, 2823
methods, 227 embodiment and, 2934
out-of-awareness brain functions in-talk models, 2723
and, 2867 and sharing, 237, 2802
of pre-modern Western medicine, Cuyckens, H., 183
28892
schemas and, 2768 D
social network analysis and, 284 Damasio, A., 287
see also idealized cognitive models DAndrade, R. G., 2, 106, 227, 273,
(ICMs) 277
cultural concept/conceptualisations, Davis, B. L., 154, 156
notion of, 10, 1045, 107, 114, decontextualization, 227, 228, 248
117, 219 deictic gesture, 201, 212n11
cultural consonance, 273, 275 deictic motion verbs (DMVs), 182,
cultural knowledge, 31, 33, 36, 38, 184, 186, 191, 193, 195, 201,
100, 104, 279 204, 207
cultural linguistics, 2, 5, 1011, 15, Deignan, A., 251, 252
106, 113, 11819, 1456 deliteralization, 5066
aim of, 111 de Munck, V., 1
applications of, 99 diachronic prototype semantics, 8
framework of, 103 dialectics of culture and cognition,
and intercultural communication, 646
11417 Diller, H.-J., 62, 64
306 Index
directive force, 273, 295 Enfield, N. J., 5, 186

direct metaphoric communication, enka lyrics (traditional Japanese love
254, 258, 261, 265 songs), 11, 1256, 12830
direct metaphorization, 52 enriched lexicon model, 16, 226,
Dirven, R., 6, 7, 183, 218, 219, 280 283
discourse markers, 251, 255 enterprise culture, 235, 246
distributed cognition model, 10, entrenchment, 9, 612, 105, 169
13, 16, 99, 104, 184, 208, environmental sustainability, 235
210, 283 epistemic control cycle, 456
distributed knowledge, notion of, 104 ergative, 160
Dixon, R. M. W., 38 ethical regimes, 2356
domain matrix, 87, 219, 230n2 ethnoecology, 273
domain(s), 8, 28, 230n2, 231n5, 240, ethnography of speaking/
273, 275, 277, 280, 282 communication, 99, 101, 102
cognitive, 289, 30, 34, 36 ethnopoetics, 5, 11
conceptual, 251 ethnosemanticists, 102
cultural, 146 ethnosemantics (ethoscience),
matrix, 219 1012
Donald, M., 162, 163 Evans, V., 6
Dougherty, J., 1 excellence, 2467
Dressler, W., 273, 274, 275 externalism, 17, 220
Du Gay, P., 235, 246 external language (E-language), 284
Dunbar, R., 147, 166
Duranti, A., 1, 2, 3, 10, 13, 17, 18n4, F
102, 145, 182, 183, 188, 192, Falk, D., 148, 165, 166
209, 210 Fauconnier, G., 9, 33, 81, 125, 157
Durkheim, E., 126 Feld, S., 181
Feldman, J. A., 271, 277, 294
E Ferrara, K. W., 253, 255
Eagleman, D., 286, 287 fictive motion, 36
E-language, 284 Fillmore, C. J., 4, 28, 185
embodied cognition, 8, 313, 34, 37, Fischer, M., 1
39, 42 focus
embodiment, 8, 10, 37, 39, 50, 12442, shift of, 70, 89
201 focusing, 1112, 18, 346, 39, 43, 46,
and culture, 2934 6892, 131, 139, 210
notion of, 7, 11, 2934, 45 Foley, W. A., 171n10
embodiment hypothesis, 50 folk models, 106, 226
emotion (mouvoir), 4, 8, 18n1, 35, see also cultural cognitive models
5066, 103, 11011, 125, 129, (CCMs)
1323, 1467, 164, 167, 291 Frake, C., 3, 221
birth of, 507 frames, see idealized cognitive models
Japanese conceptualizations of, 125 (ICMs)
metaphorical interpretation of, 65 frames of reference (FOR), 1856, 202,
psychological readings of, 57 208
specialization of, 5764 framing, 2, 246, 248
empirical cycle, 14, 21819, 227 Frank, B., 184
encyclopedic knowledge, 226, 228, Frank, R. M., 6, 7, 117, 184, 218
2789, 281, 2934 Frederick, R. E., 181
Index 307
French granularity, 34
Middle, 51, 57, 60 perceptual manifestation of, 35
Old, 8, 51, 55, 57, 634 Grondelaers, S., 6, 8, 50, 57, 61, 64
Friedrich, P., 5, 9, 11, 129 grounding in CG, 435
Gumperz, J. J., 1, 4, 7, 10, 16, 102,
G 114, 217, 218, 231n6
Galens cultural model, 28990 gyaku opposite, 205, 206
changes in, 2902
Galens model of medicine, 28992 H
Garcia-Quijano, C., 274, 275 H., see Homo
Garfinkel, H., 183 Habermas, J., 183
Garro, L. C., 274 Hanks, W. F., 18n1, 181
Gatewood, J. B., 280, 281 Haviland, J. B., 181
gaze, 13, 31, 36, 149, 1623, 186, hearts, 545, 71, 103, 138, 1402,
1957, 199200, 208 28992
Gazzaniga, M. S., 286 hedged metaphoric communication,
Geeraerts, D., 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 261
50, 57, 61, 62, 64, 66, 218, 219, hedges, 251, 254, 2567, 2602, 265
220, 227, 228, 271, 280 Heine, B., 160, 161
gender, 129, 143n1, 230n1, 235, 245 Heller, M., 5
Georgakopoulou, A., 247, 248 Hewes, G., 147, 165
gesture, 13, 1467, 154, 1645, 186, 195 Hill, J. H., 5, 7, 9, 15
Gevaert, C., 50, 62 Hiraga, M., 11, 124
Gibbs, R. W., 6, 251 Hockett, C. F., 147, 163
Giddens, A., 14, 234, 236 holding gesture, 186, 195, 207
globalization, 1415 Holland, D., 9, 69, 104, 106, 218, 224,
Glucksberg, S., 240 272, 276
Goatly, A., 251, 262 holophrases, 164
Goddard, C., 10, 69 hominine, 1112, 1469
Goffman, E., 183 Homo
Goldberg, A. E., 37 erectus, 1489, 163, 168
Goodenough, W., 5, 225 ergaster, 148, 153, 168
Goodwin, C., 184, 189, 197, 200 heidelbergensis, 1112, 14555,
Google, 15, 712 15762, 166, 16970
gradualists vs catastrophists, 1689 sapiens, 11, 1489, 153, 163, 1689,
grammar, 2, 7, 2747, 100, 148, 155, 170n2
157, 165, 169, 171n11 Hopper, P., 160
categories imposed by, 42 humoral theory, 8, 16, 50, 54, 64
cognitive linguistics (CL) approach humors, 50, 535, 58, 64, 2902
to, 12 Hunn, E., 3
evolution of, 148 Hutchins, E., 10, 13, 16, 17, 104, 184
lexicon and, 27 Hymes, D., 1, 102, 217, 218, 223
networks of constructions, 37 hyponymy, 35
usage-based theory of, 8
see also Cognitive Grammar (CG) I
grammaticalization, 157, 160, 168, iconic gesture, 162, 164, 193, 195,
169, 183 2001, 212n11
grammaticalize, 147, 1601 iconicity, 127, 129, 157, 171n19
grammatical meaning, 3742 and phonological networks, 1612
308 Index
idealized cognitive models (ICMs), 9, intersubjectivity, 12, 13, 146, 148,

28, 86, 87 162, 165, 169, 1824, 1889,
consistency, 85, 889, 91 20910, 241, 281, 282
in English-speaking culture, 69 intersubjectivity/intersubjective,
and idiomatic expressions, 6870 concept of, 148, 169
as normative sociocultural beliefs, Husserlian notion of, 13
69 mimesis for, 162
person split into identical self at Itkonen, E., 13
time t and self at time tn, 86
progress, 836, 889, 91, 93n4 J
single self, 83, 85, 88 Jackendoff, R., 38
see also cultural cognitive models Japanese human-nature metaphors,
(CCMs); constructional idioms 11, 1256, 128, 142
(CIs); cultural models Japanese language and culture, 11
ideology, 11, 18n4, 126, 129, 230n1 Japanese onomatopoeia, 198
idiomatic expressions, 6870, 77 Jespersen, O., 147, 166, 167, 168
see also constructional idioms (CIs) Jin, Y., 83, 84
Ikegami, Y., 41 Johansson, S., 147, 170n4
iku go, 182, 1845, 193, 204 Johnson, M., 6, 30, 32, 47, 81, 103,
I-language, 284 109, 157, 158, 182, 239, 251,
imagery, notion of, 100, 1245, 128 253, 271
9, 1456, 148, 159, 1624, 169 joint attention frames, 162, 169, 184
image schemas, 30, 100, 1023, 157 Jourdan, C., 5, 7
immanence, 34
immediate scope, 36 K
incredulity response construction, 70 Kabwe, 14951
indexical, 1314, 130, 133, 227, 245 Kataoka, K., 2, 7, 10, 12, 186, 189,
indexical pronouns, 223 193, 201
individual cognition perspective, 16, Kay, P., 3, 4, 5
181 Keesing, R. M., 1, 15, 18, 106, 275
inferential potential (of metaphor), Kempton, W., 274
15, 252, 257, 262, 264 Kendon, A., 197, 200, 209, 211n8
inspiration, 55, 217, 237, 244, 247 keywords, 10, 219, 2234, 228, 274,
instantiation, 55, 104, 240, 2779, 276, 2789, 281, 285, 293
2934 Kimmel, M., 262, 263
intention reading, 164, 169 kinship, 34, 41, 109
Interactional Sociolinguistics, 16, Kita, S., 148, 162, 164, 186
231n6 Kitner, K., 274, 275
interaction(s), 67, 13, 18n1, 27, 30, Klein, R. G., 148, 151, 152, 153
183 Knight, C., 147, 148, 162, 166
embodied, 184 Kockelman, P., 217
social, 103, 160, 220, 227, 229, Kopp, R. R., 253, 254, 260, 261, 262
2367, 278, 284 Kornreich, M., 252, 264
intercultural miscommunication, 10 Kvecses, Z., 6, 8, 50, 70
interdiscursivity, notion of, 10 Kripke, S., 217
internalism, 17 Kristiansen, G., 6, 183, 218, 219, 280
internalization, notion of, 18, 2856 Kronenfeld, D., 1, 3, 16, 27980,
internal language (I-language), 284 2823, 296
Internet data, 702 Kroskrity, P., 11, 249n3
Index 309
Kuno, S., 204 and cultural cognitive models,

kuru come, 182, 184 2845
and grammar, 8, 278, 37, 38, 42,
L 45
Labov, W., 186 language-specific nature of, 27
Lakoff, G., 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 28, 30, 32, meaning of, 27
47, 50, 69, 81, 103, 109, 157, networks of constructions, 37
158, 160, 236, 239, 240, 251, Li, C., 147
253, 297 Liang, Q., 72, 83, 84, 85
Lakoff, R., 15, 255 Linde, C., 186
landmark, 36, 189, 1979, 210, 211n7 linguistic anthropologists, 1718, 217,
Langacker, R. W., 2, 6, 7, 14, 16, 28, 221
30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, linguistic anthropology (LA), 118,
43, 45, 47, 87, 100, 102, 157, 99, 100, 102, 114, 124, 145,
159, 160, 161, 171n11, 183, 181, 183, 21720, 221, 2279,
219, 229, 271 230n1, 249n3, 265
languaculture, notion of, 910, 69, anti-cognitivism in, 18n4
91, 146 anti-intentionalist approach to
language(s), 27, 1415, 170n2, meaning, 18n4
230n1 connections between metaphor and
-acquisition, 171n19, 1834 ideology, 11
central aspect of cultural cognition, cultural concepts in, 221
104 marginalization of cognition
history, 15 within, 4
ideologies, 11 sociocentric cognition, 227
origin in evolutionary-biological token-level analyses in, 228
framework, 12 linguistic categorization, 217
proto-, 1112, 1456, 148, 15662, linguistic diversity, 278, 28
170 linguistic relativity hypothesis, 4, 7
as social phenomena, 3 linguistic variation, 6, 45
socio-cultural grounding of, 102 Livingstone, F. B., 147, 167
verbal, see verbal language Locke, J., 148, 165, 166, 168
late modernity, 1415, 2347, 2478 love, 11, 65, 110, 112, 115, 125,
Lawrence, D., 181 12741
Leach, E., 226 overt address, 1305
Leavitt, J., 5, 7 Low, G., 252, 265
Levinson, S. C., 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 158, Low, S., 181
181, 185, 186, 187, 237 Loy, J. D., 148, 149, 151
lexical items, 28, 36, 38 Lucy, J. A., 3, 4, 7, 40, 181
in Aboriginal English, 114
decomposition of, 34 M
lexical/lexemes meaning MacNeilage, P. F., 154, 155, 156
case study, 426 macro-metaphor, 125
conceptual content, 289 Mandler, J., 32
construal, 347 Mandler, J. M., 30, 42
embodiment and culture, 2934 Mannheim, B., 7, 9, 141
lexico-grammatical characteristics, 757 map
lexicon, 8, 16, 27, 37, 38, 44, 62, 156, cognitive, 1589, 171n15
229 macro, 159
310 Index
Marwick, B., 147, 151, 158, 161 metrical positions, 221, 223,
McGlone, M., 240 2234
McMullen, L. M., 253, 265 Middle Pleistocene period, 11, 154
McNeill, D., 186, 192, 198, 212n11 proto language of, 1456
meaning conjunction, 262 genesis of verbal symbols in, 146
medical anthropology, 2734 proto speakers living in, 145
Medin, D. L., 1, 8, 16, 17, 280 migi right, 182, 184, 202, 2089
Meltzoff, J., 252, 264 mimesis, mimetic, 12, 129, 1467,
mental corpus, 271, 285, 293, 294 159, 1624, 1667, 169, 189,
mental imagery, 145, 148, 162 210
Merleau-Ponty, M., 182 mimetic skill, see mimesis
Mertz, E., 221, 230n1 mimetic theories, 148
metaphor, 6, 7 mind-body split, 202, 205
cognitive linguistics (CL) approach modal, 6, 38, 424, 71
to, 12 modality, 44, 74
metaphorical patterns model construction, 273, 279
CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF Mondada, L., 255
LOCATION, 536 monomorphemic lexemes, 37
STATES ARE PLACES, 534 moral grounding, 2356
metaphorical solution, 55 morphemes, 154, 155
metaphoric conceptualization, 253, morphology, 146, 148, 157, 1601,
262 1689
metaphoric hedging, 15 Moshi, L., 161
metaphors/metaphorization, 67, motherese, 148, 1656
1011, 323, 52, 126, 163, 237, motion verbs, 53
23942, 244, 2468 motivation, 42, 62, 65, 147, 164, 237,
A Purposeful Life is a Journey, 240 255, 261
cognitive import of, 15 motivational speakers, 2437, 247
conceptual, see conceptual motor schemas, 156
metaphor mouvoir, 8, 5064
experiences as resources, 14 onomasiological proportions for, 61
hedging raw frequencies of, 59
analysis of, 25964 reasons for dissolution of, 623
as a common phenomenon, 2559 semasiological proportions for, 60
psychotherapeutic talk, 252, 255 movement, concept of, 645
ideological nature of, 249n3 multimodal(ity), 4, 12, 13, 181210
inferential potential of, 15 discourse analysis, 4
integration network, 125 resources, 199
in Japanese language and culture, semiosis, 189
124 Murray, S. O., 218
meaning of, 251
non-factual approximations, 15 N
psychotherapists interest in, 253 Nagy, E., 184
in psychotherapy, 2525 naming theory, 12, 147
role of, 236 narration, 130, 189, 197, 198
metasemiotic practices, 246 narratives, 14, 100, 126, 12930,
metonymy, 12, 129, 156, 1589, 163, 1401, 146, 148, 151, 159, 166,
169 16970, 247
see also conceptual metonymy Nelson, K., 165, 169
Index 311
neo-Whorfian approach/movement, perspective, 410, 12, 1517, 18n2, 31,

4, 181 34, 367, 62, 76, 99, 103, 111, 114,
networks 11617, 169, 182, 1859, 192210
conceptual, 1578 perspective-taking, 13, 1812, 1878,
semantic, 1601 192, 201, 210
neural models, 293 phonemes, 100
neuro-cultural cognitive models, 294 phonological networks, 157, 1612
neurolinguistics, research in, 287 Platzwechsel, notion of, 183
neuroscience, 2712, 286, 2934 plausibility shields, 257
Nichols, J., 168 Pleistocene, Middle, 11, 1457, 151,
non-homogeneous speech commu- 1534, 158, 165, 1689
nity, 227 poetic structures, 14, 223, 228, 229
see also linguistic anthropology (LA) pointing, 13, 62, 146, 162, 186, 202,
non-Western languages, 7 2045, 2079, 219
noun, 39 political discourse analysis, 10
classifiers, 108, 109, 158 and cultural linguistics, 11718
class markers, 1089 political metaphors, 117
polycentric conceptual networks, 157, 158
O polysemy, polysemous, 1567, 1601
observer-internal perspective, 192, post-partum depression, 238, 2401
195201 Pourcel, S., 6
observers external perspective, 188, Power, C., 147, 163
1935, 2045 pragmatic characteristics (of meta-
observer viewpoints (VPTs), 186, 193 phor), 251
Occhi, D. J., 2, 7, 10, 124, 126, 128, pragmatic tension, 15, 261
138, 139, 142 PRC linguistic communities, 93n5
Ochs, E., 5 prelinguistic vocalization
Ohnuki-Tierney, E., 124 primates, vocal symbolization and
Old French data, 8, 51, 55, 57, 634 protosyntax in, 1545
Ong, A.-H., 235 proto frames, 1557
onomasiology, 89, 601, 634 pre-modern Western medicine, cultural
-onomic knowledge, 221, 223, 226, cognitive models of, 28892
231n5 primate
Origo (origin of perception), 1845, bonobo, 1545
193, 1957, 199, 2002, 2045, chimpanzee, 1545
2078, 210 gibbon, 1545
Oxford English Dictionary, 64, 68 primate call system, 154
Prince, E., 257
P probing strategy, 261
Palmer, G. B., 2, 11, 12, 16, 47, Prochaska, J. O., 255
99104, 106, 110, 119, 145, profile, 36, 3940, 434, 84, 133, 135,
157, 158, 159, 160, 171n15, 146, 285
171n18, 183, 185, 218 propositional attitude predicate, 423,
Pang, K.-Y. S., 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 79, 83, 87 456
partonomies, 221, 230n3 proto-grammar, 155, 169
Pederson, E., 181 proto-language, 1112, 1456, 148,
performance, 1112, 125, 128, 1467, 153, 161
162, 1647, 169, 171n18, 191, prelinguistic vocalization transition
193, 197, 199, 202, 285 to, 1547
312 Index
proto-semantics, 15762 Rennie, D. L., 262

proto-sign, 1645 reported speech, 11, 1335, 139
proto-speakers, 1457, 1545, 1578, representational gesture, 186
1612 ritual speech, 166
proto-speech, 146, 155, 162, 165, 167, Rizzolatti, G., 164
169, 170n2 Rogoff, B., 184
proto-syntax, 1545 Rosaldo, M. Z., 18n4
prototype, notion of, 14, 41, 21718, Rosch, E., 4, 219
221, 231n4 Ross, C. F., 154
cultural, 104 Ross, N., 8, 16, 17, 154, 280
culturally constructed, 108 Ruhlen, M., 156
vs stereotypes, 21920 Rumsey, A., 13, 222, 223
proto-words, 154 Rymes, B., 217
proverb, 910
meaning of, 689 S
psychology, 5, 181, 280 Sacks, H., 13
psychotherapeutic discourse, 15, 258, salience, salient, 9, 29, 35, 51, 601,
265 64, 69, 87, 1467, 158, 160,
psychotherapeutic talk, 2523, 255 164, 169, 189, 219, 2367, 246,
psychotherapy, 15, 249n4, 265 275, 280
metaphor in, 2525 Sanches, M., 1, 218
see also metaphors/metaphorization Sapir, E., 3
Public Opinion Programme (Hong Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 145
Kong), 90 scenario, 11, 84, 86, 100, 128, 147,
Putnam, H., 217, 219, 220, 221, 223, 15760, 169, 283
225, 227 Schank, R., 276
Ptz, M., 218 Schegloff, E. A., 209, 211n2
schemas, concept of, 7, 1011, 30,
Q 39, 100, 102, 1058, 11011,
Quiatt, D., 158, 168 11415, 147, 1567, 2759,
Quinn, N., 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 16, 69, 106, 2835, 293
218, 224, 226, 262, 271, 272, abstract representations, 102
273, 275, 276, 282 bio-behavioral bases of, 293
as a building block of cultural cog-
R nitive models, 276
racial taxonomic structures, 14 cultural, see cultural schemas
Racine, T. P., 13 and cultural cognitive models
recontextualization, 248 (CCMs), 2768
Rampton, B., 234 image, see image schemas
recontextualization, 248 versus instance, 277
Reddy, M. J., 28 instantiation, 279
reduplication, 156, 1612, see also cultural models
171n12 Schieffelin, B., 5, 11, 249n3
reflexive modernity, 14 Schieffelin, E. L., 159
reflexivity, notion of, 171n18, 235, Schiffrin, D., 255
2379, 248, 249n1 Searle, J., 18n4
religion, metaphors role selfhood, 12442
in, 126 self-improvement, notion of, 70, 83,
Renaissance, 9, 5962 846
Index 313
self-reference, 130, 202 social network analysis and cultural

self-reliance, 2346 cognitive models, 284
semantic sociocultural situatedness, 7
deference, 220 socio-empirical conceptual knowl-
externalism, 220 edge, 218
network, 1601 sociosemantics, 220
norms, 219 song, 1112, 109, 1256, 12832,
primitives, 28 1349, 1412, 147, 1545, 159,
proto, 15762 1668, 170, 222, 224
specialization, 60 song theories, 12, 147, 1668
semantics, cognitive linguistics (CL) soul
approach to, 12 Galens expanded model of, 292
semasiology, 89, 18, 60 historical-cultural cognitive models
Semino, E., 251 of, 16, 28990
semiotic, 3, 11, 13, 192, 201, 210, space, anthropological research on, 181
221, 227, 231n6, 246 spatial cognition, 4
anthropology, 3 spatial cognitive maps, 159
pragmatism, 221 spatial deixis
Senft, G., 9 analysis of, 1923
serial structures, 221 and frames of reference, 18493
shared intentionality, 184 linguistic theories of, 185
shared mental map, 1213 spatial orientation, 12, 157, 1589
shared mind, 184 spatial perspectives, 169, 1856, 189,
Sharifian, F., 2, 5, 7, 911, 13, 16, 50, 201, 210
99119, 145, 159, 218 spatial readings, 54
sharing, culture and, 2802 specificity, 35, 378, 41
sharmandegi being ashamed, 115 speech, 109, 116, 154
Shen Bao (), 72 act of greeting, 107
Shi Wu Bao (), 72 adolescent, 148
Shona noun classifier, 158 capabilities, 154
Shore, B., 2, 106, 2812 community(ies), 104, 118, 278
sign, 147, 149, 1645, 187, 197, 205, genesis of, 1478, 158
238, 246 juvenile, 147, 165, 169
Silverstein, M., 3, 4, 7, 14, 217, 218, metaphorical, 65
219, 220, 221, 223, 226, 228, primitive, 1667
230n3, 231n5, 248 ritual, 166
Sima de los Huesos, 150, 154 sexual selection for, 166
Sinha, C., 12, 13, 32, 148, 163, 165, speech act functions, 724, 78,
170, 170n5 81, 86
Skeggs, B., 236 Sperber, D., 6, 16
sloppy selfhood, concept of, 126 stance, 8, 1213, 43, 70, 723, 81,
emergence of, 128, 129 869, 91, 118, 183, 262
small stories, 14, 2478 Steen, G. J., 6
social cognitive linguistics, 7 stereotype, notion of, 1314, 16, 87,
social identity, 2345 21730
social interactions, 31, 103, politicians, 87
160, 220, 227, 229, 2367, prototype versus, 21920
278, 284 in traditions of CL and philosophy
socially distributed cognition, 10 of language, 221
314 Index
Stokoe, W. C., 147, 160, 164, 165, Tomasello, M., 31, 154, 157, 162, 164,
168 165, 171n19, 184
Strauss, C., 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 16, 106, 228, trading places, 1823, 192, 208, 210
230n1, 273, 282 trajector, 36
Sturtevant, W. C., 221 Traugott, E., 160, 183
subjectification, 161 Trevarthen, C., 184
superordinate category, 2401 trope, 5, 12930
Sweetser, E., 44 Tuggy, D., 161
syllable, syllabic, 1546, 161, 1678, Tuite, K., 5, 7
170 Tummers, J., 8
symbol, symbolization, 12, 14, 34, 37, Turner, M., 9, 33, 69, 81, 125, 157
100, 126, 1545, 166, 16870, Tversky, B., 181
171n11, 171n19, 281 Tyler, S., 221
symbolic assembly, 37
symbolic speech, emergence of, U
163 jhelyi, M., 154, 155
symbolic thesis, 229 Urban, G., 248
symbolism, emergence of, 148, 164 usage events, 8, 2930, 229
symbolization, 12
vocal, 1545 V
symbols, genesis of, 148, 169 van Dijk, T. A., 17
synecdoche, 137, 139, 140 verb, 367, 39, 534
synonymy, 59, 613, 156 motion, 53
syntactic parallelism, 223 verbal language, 145
syntax, 1545, 168, 171n11 vital relations
identity, 81, 85
T non-identity, 81, 85
Talmy, L., 35, 37, 38, 39, 44 vocalizations, 12, 146, 148, 1547,
Tambiah, S., 231n5 16270
target-domain, 110 vowels, 1546, 161, 1678
taxonomy, 35, 221, 225, 230n3,
279 W
Tay, D., 2, 7, 10, 251, 255, 265 Waugh, L., 6
Taylor, C., 9 Wee, L., 2, 7, 10, 11, 236, 237, 240,
Taylor, J. R., 4, 9, 14, 18n2, 41, 70, 241, 246, 247, 249n1
71, 79, 217, 218, 219, 220, 226, White, D. R., 280, 284
228, 229, 230n1, 271, 279, White, G. M., 9, 69
2845, 293 Whorf, B., 3
Teasdale, J. D., 253, 265 Whorfian Hypothesis, 4
thematic roles, 160 Wierzbicka, A., 10, 28, 45
(theory of) humors, 50, 64 Wilce, J. M., 18n1
therapeutic significance (of meta- Wilcox, S. E., 147, 160, 164,
phor), 253, 257 165, 168
therapeutic talk, 2524, 262, 265 Williss model of medicine, 2902
therapist Woolard, K., 11
third-order mentality, 184, 192 word meaning, 285
Thompson, J. L., 11, 170n3 World Englishes, 10
Todd, Z., 6 Wortham, S., 217, 229
Index 315
X Z
X mind, 184 Zhi Xin Bao (), 72
Ziemke, T., 6, 7
Y Zimmer, C., 289, 290, 291
Yamaguchi, M., 2, 5, 7, 10, 222, 227 Zlatev, J., 13, 148, 162, 166, 170n4,
Yucatec Maya, 40 182, 184, 189, 192, 210

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List of Figures and Tables vii

1 Introduction: Approaches to Language, Culture,

Part III Intersection of Cognitive Linguistics and

4.1 Distribution of use by speech act function in percentages 74

We wish to thank John R. Taylor, who has been instrumental in

Benjamin Blount is the owner of SocioEcological Informatics, a

Dennis Tay is Assistant Professor at the Department of English, the

Masataka Yamaguchi is Lecturer at the University of Queensland,

Dirk Geeraerts is Professor of Linguistics at the University of Leuven,

As founding editor of the journal Cognitive Linguistics and editor of

Elizabeth Harmon, deceased, was a PhD candidate in Physical

Kuniyoshi Kataoka is Professor of English Linguistics in the Faculty of

Ronald W. Langacker was Professor in the Department of Linguistics

Debra J. Occhi is Professor of Anthropology at Miyazaki International

Gary B. Palmer is Professor Emeritus at the University of Nevada at

Emotional, Evaluative, and Ideological Subjectification in Tagalog and

Kam-yiu S. Pang is Assistant Professor of Linguistics at the University

Jeffrey Parkin was a graduate student in Physical Anthropology at the

Farzad Sharifian is Professor of Linguistics and Director of Language

Jennifer L. Thompson is an independent scholar. She taught at Durham

Lionel Wee is Professor in the Department of English Language &

1.1 Why language, culture, and cognition now?

By recognizing that the study of language, culture, and cognition

showcasing the ways in which cognitive linguistic approaches to gram-

1.2 Language, culture, and cognition: precursors

Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the vast

role; the 1950s1970s as the period of paradigm development; and

mainly written for graduate students in cultural anthropology. Technical

of cognitive linguistics such as metaphor, blending, embodiment, and

1.3 Overview and cross-references among the chapters

Part I (Cognitive Linguistic Approaches to Language and Culture) consists

a functional explanation of the birth of emotion as the conceptual

notion of interdiscursivity or connectivity across discourses, in the

paintings), and contemporary public discourses, including visual media.

et al. speculate that Homo heidelbergensis engaged in mimetic per-

mutual understanding of the accident, which emerges intersubjectively.

he hypothesizes racial taxonomic structures (x is a kind of y) in the

among cognitive scientists (Keesing, 1987). From this perspective, Wee

cultural model (or cultural cognitive model) in cognitive anthropology,

(e.g., Hutchins, 1995, 2006) explicitly deny that cognition is a property

definitions of culture and in the notion of internalization. The

DAndrade, R. (1995) The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge:

Geeraerts, D. (1997) Diachronic Prototype Semantics: A Contribution to Historical

Hunn, E. (1989) Ethnoecology: The Relevance of Cognitive Anthropology for

Levinson, S. C. (2006b) Cognition at the Heart of Human Interaction. Discoures

Silverstein, M. (2007) How Knowledge Begets Communication Begets Knowledge:

2.2 Lexical meaning

2.2.1 Conceptual content

2.2.2 Embodiment and culture

by the reinforcement of recurring commonalities (Langacker 2000).

are conceptual archetypes, by which I mean certain complex notions,

primitives (e.g. boundary, surface, verticality) and object manipula-

successively higher levels of conceptual organization. We can further

a particular graphic symbol, there is no way to segment out just those

One level of focusing consists in the selection and relative acces-

2.3 Grammatical meaning

From the CG perspective, lexicon and grammar form a continuum of

The gradient leading from general patterns to particular expressions is

of cross-linguistic investigation, his description of core spatial terms

At the first of these vaguely defined levels are grammatical elements

by virtue of the numeral classifier construction, that bounding and