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Richard Mulgan
To cite this article: Richard Mulgan (1999) The role of friendship in Aristotle's political
theory, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2:4, 15-32, DOI:
10.1080/13698239908403289
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2
RICHARD MULGAN
Degrees of Friendship
The importance of friendship in Aristotle's theory of politics is
indicated by its presence in every koinonia. Koinonia, ie 'joint
THE ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 17
all koinoniai share certain features. They all involve a common object
or purpose shared by all members (Pol 1328a 25-27). The members of
a koinonia must also be equals (either absolute or proportionally, in
Aristotle's terminology), thus laying a basis for relationships of justice
in their mutual dealings (EN 1159b 34-1160a 8). Most important for
present purposes, every koinonia includes not only justice but also
friendship (EN 1159b 27-8; EN 1161b 11). Friendship is thus, for
Aristotle, an integral part of any social group with a common purpose.
However, the presence of friendship in every koinonia does not
entail that all social groups involve the same extent of friendly
affection and concern. Different types of koinonia exhibit different
types and degrees of friendship. Indeed, the most important
characteristic of the concept of friendship as understood by Aristotle is
not so much its pervasiveness as its variety. In the Ethics, Aristotle
identifies three main types of friendship (EN VIII.2-3; EE VII.2),
depending on whether they are based on virtue, pleasure or advantage
(sometimes translated as 'utility'). The friendship based on virtue, in
which good people love each other for their virtuous characters, is
'complete both in respect of duration and in all other respects' (EN
1156b33) and is the first and defining sense of friendship (EN 1157a
30-31; EE 1236b 20-26, 1238a 30). Such friendship is found most
fully among truly virtuous people who love the virtue in each other's
character. It can also occur, however, whenever people love each other
for the sake of each other's character. Thus, though it is initially
described as 'friendship on account of virtue', it is also referred to as
'friendship on account of character' (eg EN 1164a 12), a phrase which
perhaps more accurately captures its meaning in the context of
Aristotle's general social theory (Cooper 1977, 629).
In contrast with friendships based on virtue and character,
friendships based on pleasure and advantage are called such 'by
comparison' or 'derivatively' (EN 1157a 31-35; EE 1236b 21). The
precise logical relationship between the main sense of friendship and
18 THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY
the other senses varies between the two Ethics and is itself a matter of
scholarly dispute (Price 1989, 131^18). For the present, however, it is
sufficient to note that virtue-friendship is the truest form of friendship
and that the other varieties of friendship are so called because they
approximate virtue-friendship to a certain extent. Examples of
friendships based on pleasure are purely sexual relationships (EN 1156b
2-5), while the most common advantage-friendships are business
relationships, though, significantly, the friendship of fellow citizens is
also said to be a type of advantage-friendship (EE 1242a 6-7).
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the Greek polis had with one another as individuals, beyond the circle
of family and personal friends, were largely commercial and legal in
character. It also fits with the picture of the good life which can be
gleaned from the Ethics where the ethical virtues are exercised
primarily in close personal relationships or in business dealings and
where political participation is an optional extra (eg EN 1179a 5-7;
Mulgan 1990). The koinonia of the polis, providing all the necessities
of living and good living (Pol 1252b 28-30), was a complex and
diverse society in which one could know only a few people really well
and, for the rest, one would need to rely on more distant market
relationships underpinned by the reciprocity of justice (EN 1132b 32;
Pol 1261a 30).
Thus Aristotle's theory of friendship provides an argument for the
greater intensity and superior value of close personal relationships
compared with those which can exist between large numbers of fellow
citizens. He rejects any political theory, such as Plato's, which attempts
to build its foundations on sentiments of supposed 'fraternity' or
'camaraderie' extending throughout a whole political community. Such
theories are likely to founder on the unwillingness and inability of
human beings to extend intense sympathy and affection beyond their
nearest and dearest. Fraternity and camaraderie are necessarily
sentiments of intimacy which are not available for the world of politics.
Conversely, and more positively, political theory should recognise and
cater for the fact that people belong to a variety of social groups for a
variety of reasons, ranging from the intimate and comparatively selfless
relationships of family and friends to the more distant and instrumental
relationships with neighbours and fellow citizens. People may not be
able to care for all their fellow citizens with the same intensity of
concern that they show towards their immediate circle. By the same
token, however, they should not be expected to treat family, friends
and neighbours with the same degree of detachment that they exhibit
towards the mass of fellow citizens.
THE ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 21
partners rely more on discretion and trust, the 'moral' type (EN 1162b
21-35; EE 1242b 31-1243b 14). In the Nicomachean Ethics, a further
distinction is made within the former, 'legal' relationships between a
'purely commercial' variety where immediate payment is required and,
a 'more liberal' variety which allows time for repayment and thus 'in
the postponement provides an element of friendship' (EN 1162b 29).
The latter, more liberal version of the 'legal' relationship thus comes
closer to the 'moral' type, where the initial contribution is made
without specification, 'a gift, or whatever, as if to a friend' with no
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into these relationships for their own selfish purposes and abandon
them once their selfish interests cease to be met. Thus, though Aristotle
could be taken to mean that any koinonia, that is any social group with
a common purpose, must involve some genuinely co-operative, non-
selfish behaviour between members; he is not claiming, and is indeed
denying, that the rationale for all such social groups, the reason why
they exist in the first place, is similarly unselfish. The main thrust of
Aristotle's theory of friendship, that the relationships between fellow
citizens are less intense and less valuable than those between close
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justice (EN 1155a 22-26). Citizens will not deal justly with one
another unless they agree on how disputes are to be resolved. Public
agreement or consensus on constitutional fundamentals and on the
legitimacy of legal and political institutions is indeed the essential basis
for political stability. In this respect, political friendship, though
unnamed as such, is a central topic of the Politics. The avoidance of
faction and revolution (stasis), that is the achievement of unanimity, is
the most important political objective for everyday politics and
provides the main theme of Books IV-VI. As the main source of stasis
is disagreement about which concept of justice should determine the
constitution of the polis (Pol 1301a 35-8), it follows that agreement on
such matters is a prerequisite for political stability. Many of the steps
which Aristotle recommends for statesmen and constitution-makers are
designed to create agreement among the citizens about basic
institutional questions, such as who should belong to the supreme
deliberative body or how officials are to be selected, that is the types
of issue associated with unanimity in the Ethics. Indeed, Aristotle
adopts what may be called a 'maxim of unanimity' as one of the
guiding principles of constitution building (Miller 1996, 269-74): if a
constitution is to survive, all parts ought to wish that it continue (Pol
1270b 21-22; 1294b 34-40).
That Aristotle values political agreement among the citizen body is
undisputed and uncontroversial. But what is added to this position by
his identification of political agreement with political friendship? Does
he mean to imply that collective political agreement arises out of the
multiplicity of friendly relations which fellow citizens have with one
another? Or is he simply describing such agreement as friendship
without implying that it rests on any other sentiments of friendship
between citizens? A number of commentators have attempted to
interpret the friendship of fellow citizens as involving feelings of
mutual concern sufficient to sustain political consent and joint political
action, even though such friendship is more distant and more selfish
26 THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY
than the true friendship between close friends and family members.
Thus Cooper argues that each individual citizen in a political
community will recognise the benefits that he draws from the law and
legal institutions and, though not knowing most other citizens
personally, will see that they too share a similar appreciation of the
benefits of their joint institutions. Each will therefore be willing to act
in a spirit of co-operation and forbearance to one another, thus
providing consent and active support for these institutions (Cooper
1977: 646-8; 1990: 235). Cooper notes that Aristotle uses the human
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rather than any further feeling between citizens. In Book 111.9, in the
passage emphasised by Cooper (Pol 1280b 30-128la 2), Aristotle
certainly connects friendship with the human desire for living together
for its own sake, a desire which is used to refute the contractarian view
of the state as an alliance of self-interested individuals. But the
institutions explicitly linked to friendship are not the city itself but the
smaller associations, such as brotherhoods and cults, where people may
enjoy personal relations with one another in a way which is not
possible, on Aristotle's own admission, within the larger community of
the city (Annas 1990: 242-3). As indicated by Aristotle's account of the
good life in the Ethics, the communal living together which people
particularly value for its own sake is that involved in their more
immediate relationships of family and friends while the more distant
relationships are looked on more instrumentally. The polis is certainly
valued because the good life is impossible without its social diversity
and legally enforced order. But this does not mean that all relationships
within the polis, including that of fellow citizens, are equally important
or equally valued for their own sake.
Thus, Aristotle certainly recognises the importance of civic consent
and solidarity and equates it with political friendship. But he does not
unambiguously base it in any sentiments of mutual goodwill arising out
of the relationships of fellow citizens, sentiments which he recognises
to be weak, especially when compared with the intensity of true
friendship. Still less, though civic consent is described as 'friendship', is
it the expression of any mutual goodwill or concern beyond that
entailed by the consent itself. Rather, consent appears to be an
independent attribute of shared citizenship, necessary for the
maintenance of political order, and requiring its own independent
means of inculcation and reinforcement. As such, it does not arise out
of the friendship of fellow citizens, so much as complement the
deficiencies of such friendship (Yack 1993: 114).
Such an account of political friendship may seem to downplay the
28 THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY
from which collective deliberation can proceed in just the same way as
a virtuous person requires an ethical disposition before he or she can
reason virtuously. A capacity for deliberation and argument does not in
itself provide a starting point for moral justification, either for
individuals or communities. In each case, debate presupposes prior
indoctrination and habituation, through parents and education in the
case of individuals, through statesmen and laws in the case of cities.
Political consent thus depends on the inculcation of political values
through the legal system and the political culture of the political
community. Consent does not develop spontaneously either from the
fellow feelings of individual citizens or from their capacity for
reasoned speech and political participation. The naturalness of the city
provides a rationale for such inculcation on the grounds that people
need the city in order to live the good life but cannot be trusted to live
justly without coercion from the city's system of justice (Pol 1.2, esp
1253a 29-34). Ensuring that all citizens, or as many as possible, accept
the justice of the regime is one of the most pressing tasks of
statesmanship, for the very reason that citizens cannot be relied on to
do so for themselves. No laws are needed to make parents love their
children or close friends look after each other. But fellow citizens,
whose personal dealings are distant and largely instrumental, will
neglect their common interests and resort to faction and violence
without the coercive power of the state.
Modern Lessons?
Where, then, does Aristotle's theory of friendship stand in relation to
debates between liberal individualists and communitarians over the
basis of political society? (The use of these terms may be justified as a
convenient shorthand, though it overlooks the considerable variations
within each camp [Mulhall and Swift 1996]). Not untypically, Aristotle
occupies a middle position. On the one hand, he clearly rejects the
30 THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY
REFERENCES
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Miller, F. R. 1995. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Mulgan, R. 1990. 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation', Political Theory, 18,
195-215.
Mulgan, R. 1999. 'Aristotle, Ethical Diversity and Political Argument', Journal of Political
Philosophy, pp.7, 191-207.
Mulhall, S. and Swift, S. 1996. Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford: Blackwel.
Price, A. W. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schwarzenbach, S. A. 1996. 'On Civic Friendship', Ethics 107, 97-128.
Yack, B. 1993. The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in
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