G.R. No. L-34382 July 20, 1983
,
THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and/or ANGEL JOSE
TRANSPORTATION, INC. and HON. A. MELENCIO-
HERRERA, Presiding Judge of the Manila Court of
First Instance, Branch XVII, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34383 July 20, 1983
THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
N. V. NEDLLOYD LIJNEN; COLUMBIAN PHILIPPINES,
INC., and/or GUACODS, INC., and HON. A.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, Presiding Judge of the Manila
Court of First Instance, Branch XVII, respondents.
No. L-34382.
Zapa Law Office for petitioner.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for respondents.
No. L-34383.
Zapa Law Office for petitioner.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa Law office for
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Questioned in these consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari are the decisions of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing the
complaints in Civil Case No. 71923 and in Civil Case
No. 71694, on the ground that plaintiff therein, now
appellant, had failed to prove its capacity to sue.
There is no dispute over the facts of these cases for
recovery of maritime damages. In L-34382, the facts
are found in the decision of the respondent court
which stated:
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On or about January 13, 1967, S. Kajita & Co.
on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining &
Development Corporation, shipped on board
the SS "Eastern Jupiter' from Osaka, Japan,
2,361 coils of "Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire
Rods." The said VESSEL is owned and
operated by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines
(CARRIER). The shipment was covered by Bill
of Lading No. O-MA-9, with arrival notice to
Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of
the Philippines (CONSIGNEE) at Manila. The
shipment was insured with plaintiff against all
risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06 under its
Insurance Policy No. AS-73633.
xxx xxx xxx
The coils discharged from the VESSEL
numbered 2,361, of which 53 were in bad
order. What the CONSIGNEE ultimately
received at its warehouse was the same
number of 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and
partly cut, and 28 coils entangled, partly cut,
and which had to be considered as scrap.
Upon weighing at CONSIGNEE's warehouse,
the 2,361 coils were found to weight
263,940.85 kilos as against its invoiced weight
of 264,534.00 kilos or a net loss/shortage of
593.15 kilos, according to Exhibit "A", or
1,209,56 lbs., according to the claims
presented by the consignee against the
plaintiff (Exhibit "D-1"), the CARRIER (Exhibit
"J-1"), and the TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
(Exhibit "K- l").
For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo,
plaintiff paid the consignee under its
insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by
virtue of which plaintiff became subrogated
to the rights and actions of the CONSIGNEE.
Plaintiff made demands for payment against
the CARRIER and the TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY for reimbursement of the
aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the
same. ...
The facts of L-34383 are found in the decision of the
lower court as follows:
On or about December 22, 1966, the Hansa
Transport Kontor shipped from Bremen,
Germany, 30 packages of Service Parts of
Farm Equipment and Implements on board
the VESSEL, SS "NEDER RIJN" owned by the
defendant, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, and
represented in the Philippines by its local
agent, the defendant Columbian Philippines,
Inc. (CARRIER). The shipment was covered by
Bill of Lading No. 22 for transportation to, and
delivery at, Manila, in favor of the consignee,
international Harvester Macleod, Inc.
(CONSIGNEE). The shipment was insured with
plaintiff company under its Cargo Policy No.
AS-73735 "with average terms" for
P98,567.79.
xxx xxx xxx
The packages discharged from the VESSEL
numbered 29, of which seven packages were
found to be in bad order. What the
CONSIGNEE ultimately received at its
warehouse was the same number of 29
packages with 9 packages in bad order. Out of
these 9 packages, 1 package was accepted by
the CONSIGNEE in good order due to the
negligible damages sustained. Upon
inspection at the consignee's warehouse, the
contents of 3 out of the 8 cases were also
found to be complete and intact, leaving 5
cases in bad order. The contents of these 5
packages showed several items missing in the
total amount of $131.14; while the contents
of the undelivered 1 package were valued at
$394.66, or a total of $525.80 or P2,426.98.
For the short-delivery of 1 package and the
missing items in 5 other packages, plaintiff
paid the CONSIGNEE under its Insurance
Cargo Policy the amount of P2,426.98, by
virtue of which plaintiff became subrogated
to the rights and actions of the CONSIGNEE.
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Demands were made on defendants CARRIER
and CONSIGNEE for reimbursement thereof
but they failed and refused to pay the same.
In both cases, the petitioner-appellant made the
following averment regarding its capacity to sue:
The plaintiff is a foreign insurance company duly
authorized to do business in the Philippines through
its agent, Mr. VICTOR H. BELLO, of legal age and with
office address at Oledan Building, Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal.
In L-34382, the respondent-appellee Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc., filed its answer and alleged that it:
Denies the allegations of Paragraph I which refer to
plaintiff's capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.
Respondent-appellee, Angel Jose Transportation, Inc.,
in turn filed its answer admitting the allegations of
the complaint, regarding the capacity of plaintiff-
appellant. The pertinent paragraph of this answer
reads as follows:
Angel Jose Admits the jurisdictional averments in
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the heading Parties.
In L-34383, the respondents-appellees N. V. Nedlloyd
Lijhen, Columbian Philippines, Inc. and Guacods, Inc.,
filed their answers. They denied the petitioner-
appellant's capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.
As earlier stated, the respondent court dismissed the
complaints in the two cases on the same ground, that
the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue. The
court reasoned as follows:
In the opinion of the Court, if plaintiff had the
capacity to sue, the Court should hold that a)
defendant Eastern Shipping Lines should pay
plaintiff the sum of P1,630.22 with interest at
 the legal rate from January 5, 1968, the date of
the institution of the Complaint, until fully
paid; b) defendant Angel Jose Transportation,
Inc. should pay plaintiff the sum of P1,630.22
also with interest at the legal rate from
January 5, 1968 until fully paid; c) the
counterclaim of defendant Angel Jose
transportation, Inc. should be ordered
dismissed; and d) each defendant to pay one-
half of the costs.
The Court is of the opinion that Section 68 of
the Corporation Law reflects a policy designed
to protect the public interest. Hence, although
defendants have not raised the question of
plaintiff's compliance with that provision of
law, the Court has resolved to take the matter
into account.
A suing foreign corporation, like plaintiff, has
to plead affirmatively and prove either that
the transaction upon which it bases its
complaint is an isolated one, or that it is
licensed to transact business in this country,
failing which, it will be deemed that it has no
valid cause of action (Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co.
vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037).
In view of the number of cases filed by
plaintiff before this Court, of which judicial
cognizance can be taken, and under the ruling
in Far East International Import and Export
Corporation vs. Hankai Koayo Co., 6 SCRA
725, it has to be held that plaintiff is doing
business in the Philippines. Consequently, it
must have a license under Section 68 of the
Corporation Law before it can be allowed to
sue.
The situation of plaintiff under said Section 68
has been described as follows in Civil Case No.
71923 of this Court, entitled 'Home Insurance
Co. vs. N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, of which judicial
cognizance can also be taken:
Exhibit "R",presented by plaintiff is a
certified copy of a license, dated July
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1, 1967, issued by the Office of the
Insurance Commissioner authorizing
plaintiff to transact insurance
business in this country. By virtue of
Section 176 of the Insurance Law, it
has to be presumed that a license to
transact business under Section 68 of
the Corporation Law had previously
been issued to plaintiff. No copy
thereof, however, was submitted for a
reason unknown. The date of that
license must not have been much
anterior to July 1, 1967. The
preponderance of the evidence would
therefore call for the finding that the
insurance contract involved in this
case, which was executed at Makati,
Rizal, on February 8, 1967, was
contracted before plaintiff was
licensed to transact business in the
Philippines.
This Court views Section 68 of the
Corporation Law as reflective of a
basic public policy. Hence, it is of the
opinion that, in the eyes of Philippine
law, the insurance contract involved
in this case must be held void under
the provisions of Article 1409 (1) of
the Civil Code, and could not be
validated by subsequent procurement
of the license. That view of the Court
finds support in the following citation:
According to many authorities,
a constitutional or statutory
prohibition against a foreign
corporation doing business in
the state, unless such
corporation has complied with
conditions prescribed, is
effective to make the
contracts of such corporation
void, or at least
unenforceable, and prevents
the maintenance by the
 corporation of any action on
such contracts. Although the
usual construction is to the
contrary, and to the effect
that only the remedy for
enforcement is affected
thereby, a statute prohibiting
a non-complying corporation
from suing in the state courts
on any contract has been held
by some courts to render the
contract void and
unenforceable by the
corporation, even after its has
complied with the statute."
(36 Am. Jur. 2d 299-300).
xxx xxx xxx
The said Civil Case No. 71923 was dismissed
by this Court. As the insurance contract
involved herein was executed on January 20,
1967, the instant case should also be
dismissed.
We resolved to consolidate the two cases when we
gave due course to the petition.
The petitioner raised the following assignments of
errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING AS AN ISSUE THE LEGAL
EXISTENCE OR CAPACITY OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT.
Second Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO
CAPACITY TO SUE.
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On the basis of factual and equitable considerations,
there is no question that the private respondents
should pay the obligations found by the trial court as
owing to the petitioner. Only the question of validity
of the contracts in relation to lack of capacity to sue
stands in the way of the petitioner being given the
affirmative relief it seeks. Whether or not the
petitioner was engaged in single acts or solitary
transactions and not engaged in business is likewise
not in issue. The petitioner was engaged in business
without a license. The private respondents' obligation
to pay under the terms of the contracts has been
proved.
When the complaints in these two cases were filed,
the petitioner had already secured the necessary
license to conduct its insurance business in the
Philippines. It could already filed suits.
Petitioner was, therefore, telling the truth when it
averred in its complaints that it was a foreign
insurance company duly authorized to do business in
the Philippines through its agent Mr. Victor H. Bello.
However, when the insurance contracts which
formed the basis of these cases were executed, the
petitioner had not yet secured the necessary licenses
and authority. The lower court, therefore, declared
that pursuant to the basic public policy reflected in
the Corporation Law, the insurance contracts
executed before a license was secured must be held
null and void. The court ruled that the contracts could
not be validated by the subsequent procurement of
the license.
The applicable provisions of the old Corporation Law,
Act 1459, as amended are:
Sec. 68. No foreign corporation or
corporations formed, organized, or existing
under any laws other than those of the
Philippine Islands shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippine Islands
until after it shall have obtained a license for
that purpose from the chief of the Mercantile
Register of the Bureau of Commerce and
Industry, (Now Securities and Exchange
 Commission. See RA 5455) upon order of the
Secretary of Finance (Now Monetary Board)
in case of banks, savings, and loan banks,
trust corporations, and banking institutions of
all kinds, and upon order of the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications (Now
Secretary of Trade. See 5455, section 4 for
other requirements) in case of all other
foreign corporations. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 69. No foreign corporation or
corporation formed, organized, or existing
under any laws other than those of the
Philippine Islands shall be permitted to
transact business in the Philippine Islands or
maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the
recovery of any debt, claim, or demand
whatever, unless it shall have the license
prescribed in the section immediately
preceding. Any officer, director, or agent of
the corporation or any person transacting
business for any foreign corporation not
having the license prescribed shag be
punished by imprisonment for not less than
six months nor more than two years or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor
more than one thousand pesos, or by both
such imprisonment and fine, in the discretion
of the court.
As early as 1924, this Court ruled in the leading case
of Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co. (46 Phil.
70) that the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the
Corporation Law was to subject the foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Marshall Wells Co.
decision referred to a litigation over an isolated act
for the unpaid balance on a bill of goods but the
philosophy behind the law applies to the factual
circumstances of these cases. The Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
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Defendant isolates a portion of one sentence
of section 69 of the Corporation Law and asks
the court to give it a literal meaning Counsel
would have the law read thus: "No foreign
corporation shall be permitted to maintain by
itself or assignee any suit for the recovery of
any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless
it shall have the license prescribed in section
68 of the law." Plaintiff, on the contrary,
desires for the court to consider the particular
point under discussion with reference to all
the law, and thereafter to give the law a
common sense interpretation.
The object of the statute was to subject the
foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts.
The object of the statute was not to prevent
the foreign corporation from performing
single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose of business without
taking the steps necessary to render it
amenable to suit in the local courts. The
implication of the law is that it was never the
purpose of the Legislature to exclude a
foreign corporation which happens to obtain
an isolated order for business from the
Philippines, from securing redress in the
Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to
permit persons to avoid their contracts made
with such foreign corporations. The effect of
the statute preventing foreign corporations
from doing business and from bringing
actions in the local courts, except on
compliance with elaborate requirements,
must not be unduly extended or improperly
applied. It should not be construed to extend
beyond the plain meaning of its terms,
considered in connection with its object, and
in connection with the spirit of the entire law.
(State vs. American Book Co. [1904], 69 Kan,
1; American De Forest Wireless Telegraph
Co. vs. Superior Court of City & Country of San
Francisco and Hebbard [1908], 153 Cal., 533;
5 Thompson on Corporations, 2d ed., chap.
184.)
 Confronted with the option of giving to the
Corporation Law a harsh interpretation,
which would disastrously embarrass trade, or
of giving to the law a reasonable
interpretation, which would markedly help in
the development of trade; confronted with
the option of barring from the courts foreign
litigants with good causes of action or of
assuming jurisdiction of their cases;
confronted with the option of construing the
law to mean that any corporation in the
United States, which might want to sell to a
person in the Philippines must send some
representative to the Islands before the sale,
and go through the complicated formulae
provided by the Corporation Law with regard
to the obtaining of the license, before the sale
was made, in order to avoid being swindled
by Philippine citizens, or of construing the law
to mean that no foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines can maintain any
suit until it shall possess the necessary
license;-confronted with these options, can
anyone doubt what our decision will be? The
law simply means that no foreign corporation
shall be permitted "to transact business in the
Philippine Islands," as this phrase is known in
corporation law, unless it shall have the
license required by law, and, until it complies
with the law, shall not be permitted to
maintain any suit in the local courts. A
contrary holding would bring the law to the
verge of unconstitutionality, a result which
should be and can be easily avoided. (Sioux
Remedy Co. vs. Cope and
Cope, supra; Perkins, Philippine Business Law,
p. 264.)
To repeat, the objective of the law was to subject the
foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not
an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not
hamper the development of trade relations and
which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among
countries.
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The objectives enunciated in the 1924 decision are
even more relevant today when we view commercial
relations in terms of a world economy, when the
tendency is to re-examine the political boundaries
separating one nation from another insofar as they
define business requirements or restrict marketing
conditions.
We distinguish between the denial of a right to take
remedial action and the penal sanction for non-
registration.
Insofar as transacting business without a license is
concerned, Section 69 of the Corporation Law
imposed a penal sanction-imprisonment for not less
than six months nor more than two years or payment
of a fine not less than P200.00 nor more than
P1,000.00 or both in the discretion of the court.
There is a penalty for transacting business without
registration.
And insofar as litigation is concerned, the foreign
corporation or its assignee may not maintain any suit
for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand
whatever. The Corporation Law is silent on whether
or not the contract executed by a foreign corporation
with no capacity to sue is null and void ab initio.
We are not unaware of the conflicting schools of
thought both here and abroad which are divided on
whether such contracts are void or merely voidable.
Professor Sulpicio Guevarra in his book Corporation
Law (Philippine Jurisprudence Series, U.P. Law
Center, pp. 233-234) cites an Illinois decision which
holds the contracts void and a Michigan statute and
decision declaring them merely voidable:
xxx xxx xxx
Where a contract which is entered into by a
foreign corporation without complying with
the local requirements of doing business is
rendered void either by the express terms of
a statute or by statutory construction, a
subsequent compliance with the statute by
the corporation will not enable it to maintain
 an action on the contract. (Perkins Mfg. Co. v.
Clinton Const. Co., 295 P. 1 [1930]. See also
Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S. Glue Co., supra see
note 18.) But where the statute merely
prohibits the maintenance of a suit on such
contract (without expressly declaring the
contract "void"), it was held that a failure to
comply with the statute rendered the
contract voidable and not void, and
compliance at any time before suit was
sufficient. (Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Const.
Co., supra.) Notwithstanding the above
decision, the Illinois statute provides, among
other things that a foreign corporation that
fails to comply with the conditions of doing
business in that state cannot maintain a suit
or action, etc. The court said: 'The contract
upon which this suit was brought, having
been entered into in this state when
appellant was not permitted to transact
business in this state, is in violation of the
plain provisions of the statute, and is
therefore null and void, and no action can be
maintained thereon at any time, even if the
corporation shall, at some time after the
making of the contract, qualify itself to
transact business in this state by a compliance
with our laws in reference to foreign
corporations that desire to engage in business
here. (United Lead Co. v. J.M. Ready Elevator
Mfg. Co., 222 Ill. 199, 73 N.N. 567 [1906].)
A Michigan statute provides: "No foreign
corporation subject to the provisions of this
Act, shall maintain any action in this state
upon any contract made by it in this state
after the taking effect of this Act, until it shall
have fully complied with the requirement of
this Act, and procured a certificate to that
effect from the Secretary of State," It was
held that the above statute does not render
contracts of a foreign corporation that fails to
comply with the statute void, but they may be
enforced only after compliance therewith.
(Hastings Industrial Co. v. Moral, 143 Mich.
679,107 N.E. 706 [1906]; Kuennan v. U.S.
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Fidelity & G. Co., Mich. 122; 123 N.W. 799
[1909]; Despres, Bridges & Noel v. Zierleyn,
163 Mich. 399, 128 N.W. 769 [1910]).
It has also been held that where the law
provided that a corporation which has not
complied with the statutory requirements
"shall not maintain an action until such
compliance". "At the commencement of this
action the plaintiff had not filed the certified
copy with the country clerk of Madera
County, but it did file with the officer several
months before the defendant filed his
amended answer, setting up this defense, as
that at the time this defense was pleaded by
the defendant the plaintiff had complied with
the statute. The defense pleaded by the
defendant was therefore unavailable to him
to prevent the plaintiff from thereafter
maintaining the action. Section 299 does not
declare that the plaintiff shall not commence
an action in any county unless it has filed a
certified copy in the office of the county clerk,
but merely declares that it shall
not maintain an action until it has filled it. To
maintain an action is not the same as to
commence an action, but implies that the
action has already beencommenced." (See
also Kendrick & Roberts Inc. v. Warren Bros.
Co., 110 Md. 47, 72 A. 461 [1909]).
In another case, the court said: "The very fact
that the prohibition against maintaining an
action in the courts of the state was inserted
in the statute ought to be conclusive proof
that the legislature did not intend or
understand that contracts made without
compliance with the law were void. The
statute does not fix any time within which
foreign corporations shall comply with the
Act. If such contracts were void, no suits
could be prosecuted on them in any court. ...
The primary purpose of our statute is to
compel a foreign corporation desiring to do
business within the state to submit itself to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. The
 statute was not intended to exclude foreign
corporations from the state. It does not, in
terms, render invalid contracts made in this
state by non-complying corporations. The
better reason, the wiser and fairer policy, and
the greater weight lie with those decisions
which hold that where, as here, there is a
prohibition with a penalty, with no express or
implied declarations respecting the validity of
enforceability of contracts made by qualified
foreign corporations, the contracts ... are
enforceable ... upon compliance with the
law." (Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper,
172 N.E. 319 [1930].)
Our jurisprudence leans towards the later view. Apart
from the objectives earlier cited from Marshall Wells
Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co (supra), it has long been
the rule that a foreign corporation actually doing
business in the Philippines without license to do so
may be sued in our courts. The defendant American
corporation in General Corporation of the Philippines
v. Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd et al. (87
Phil. 313) entered into insurance contracts without
the necessary license or authority. When summons
was served on the agent, the defendant had not yet
been registered and authorized to do business. The
registration and authority came a little less than two
months later. This Court ruled:
Counsel for appellant contends that at the
time of the service of summons, the appellant
had not yet been authorized to do business.
But, as already stated, section 14, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court makes no distinction as to
corporations with or without authority to do
business in the Philippines. The test is
whether a foreign corporation was actually
doing business here. Otherwise, a foreign
corporation illegally doing business here
because of its refusal or neglect to obtain the
corresponding license and authority to do
business may successfully though unfairly
plead such neglect or illegal act so as to avoid
service and thereby impugn the jurisdiction of
the local courts. It would indeed be
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anomalous and quite prejudicial, even
disastrous, to the citizens in this jurisdiction
who in all good faith and in the regular course
of business accept and pay for shipments of
goods from America, relying for their
protection on duly executed foreign marine
insurance policies made payable in Manila
and duly endorsed and delivered to them,
that when they go to court to enforce said
policies, the insurer who all along has been
engaging in this business of issuing similar
marine policies, serenely pleads immunity to
local jurisdiction because of its refusal or
neglect to obtain the corresponding license to
do business here thereby compelling the
consignees or purchasers of the goods
insured to go to America and sue in its courts
for redress.
There is no question that the contracts are
enforceable. The requirement of registration affects
only the remedy.
Significantly, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, the
Corporation Code of the Philippines has corrected the
ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69 of the
old Corporation Law.
Section 133 of the present Corporation Code
provides:
SEC. 133. Doing business without a license.-
No foreign corporation transacting business in
the Philippines without a license, or its
successors or assigns, shag be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative
agency in the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded
against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of
action recognized under Philippine laws.
The old Section 69 has been reworded in terms of
non-access to courts and administrative agencies in
order to maintain or intervene in any action or
proceeding.
The prohibition against doing business without first
securing a license is now given penal sanction which
is also applicable to other violations of the
Corporation Code under the general provisions of
Section 144 of the Code.
It is, therefore, not necessary to declare the contract
nun and void even as against the erring foreign
corporation. The penal sanction for the violation and
the denial of access to our courts and administrative
bodies are sufficient from the viewpoint of legislative
policy.
Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the
execution of the contracts was cured by the
subsequent registration is also strengthened by the
procedural aspects of these cases.
The petitioner averred in its complaints that it is a
foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do
business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor
H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan
Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati. These are all the
averments required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner sufficiently alleged its
capacity to sue. The private respondents countered
either with an admission of the plaintiff's
jurisdictional averments or with a general denial
based on lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the averments.
We find the general denials inadequate to attack the
foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the
light of its positive averment that it is authorized to
do so. Section 4, Rule 8 requires that "a party desiring
to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party
or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity shall do so by specific denial,
which shag include such supporting particulars as are
particularly within the pleader's knowledge. At the
very least, the private respondents should have
stated particulars in their answers upon which a
specific denial of the petitioner's capacity to sue
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could have been based or which could have
supported its denial for lack of knowledge. And yet,
even if the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue was not
properly raised as an issue by the answers, the
petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it
had the authority to engage in the insurance business
at the time it filed the complaints.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby granted. The
decisions of the respondent court are reversed and
set aside.
In L-34382, respondent Eastern Shipping Lines is
ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,630.22
with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968
until fully paid and respondent Angel Jose
Transportation Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner
the sum of P1,630.22 also with interest at the legal
rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid. Each
respondent shall pay one-half of the costs. The
counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is
dismissed.
In L-34383, respondent N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, or its
agent Columbian Phil. Inc. is ordered to pay the
petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the
legal rate from February 1, 1968 until fully paid, the
sum of P500.00 attorney's fees, and costs, The
complaint against Guacods, Inc. is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. L-44570 May 30, 1986
MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA
GUERRERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and APOLINARIO
BENITEZ, respondents.
A.D. Guerrero for petitioners.
Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between
the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and Apolinario
Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights
and obligations to one another is the issue in this
petition to review the decision of the then Court of
Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court,
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 6793-NE (SA-Q)
'73, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(1) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and
Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff
Apolinario Benitez to the 10-hectare portion
of the 16-hectare coconut holding in
question, located at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria
Aurora Sub-province Quezon and to maintain
said plaintiff in the peaceful possession and
cultivation thereof, with all the rights
accorded and obligations imposed upon him
by law;
(2) ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio
both surnamed Latigay to vacate the said ten-
hectare portion and deliver possession
thereof to plaintiff Apolinario Benitez;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and
Maria Guerrero to pay damages to plaintiffs
in the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from
July, 1973 and to pay the same amount every
year thereafter until plaintiff is effectively
reinstated to the ten-hectare portion;
(4) denying plaintiff-tenants' prayer for
reconstruction of the copra cottage: and
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
(5) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and
Maria Guerrero to pay plaintiff the amount of
P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.
All other claims of the parties are denied.
With costs against defendants-spouses.
The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings
of fact excepting, however, to its conclusion that
tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and
the respondents, thus:
In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken
by defendants- spouses Manuel and Maria
Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of
cows which were grazing within their 21-
hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo.
San Joaquin, Maria Aurora, Subprovince of
Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that
purpose to put up a hut within the plantation
where he and his family stayed. In addition to
attending to the cows, he was made to clean
the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn
dried leaves and grass and to do such other
similar chores. During harvest time which
usually comes every three months, he was
also made to pick coconuts and gather the
fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the
21-hectare plantation. He had to husk and
split the nuts and then process its meat into
copra in defendants' copra kiln. For his work
related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the
proceeds from the copra he processed and
sold in the market. For attending to the cows
he was paid P500 a year.
Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff
was refrained from gathering nuts from the
10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of
the plantation from where he used to gather
nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of
defendants and he brought the matter to the
attention of the Office of Special Unit in the
Office of the President in Malacanang,
Manila. This led to an execution of an
agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby
 defendants agreed, among others, to let
plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of
the plantation as tenant thereon and that
their relationship will be guided by the
provisions of republic Act No. 1199. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained
from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare
portion of the plantation with threats of
bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits
therefrom. Defendant spouses, the
Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio
and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the
nuts and the processing thereof into copra.
Defendants Guerreros also caused to be
demolished a part of the cottage where
plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making
plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant
business. Hence, this case for reinstatement
with damages.
The lower court formulated four (4) issues by
which it was guided in the resolution of the
questions raised by the pleadings and
evidence and we pertinently quote as follows:
(1) whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on
the coconut landholding in question
consisting of sixteen (16) hectares;
(2) In The affirmative, whether or not he was
unlawfully dispossessed of ten (10) hectare
thereof;
(3) Whether or not the parties are entitled to
actual and moral damages, attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
This petition for review poses the following questions
of law:
I the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter
Whether or not with the passage of
Presidential Decree 1038 only last October
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21, 1976, Republic Act 6389 otherwise known
as the Code of Agrarian Reforms has repealed
in their entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act 1199) and the Agricultural
Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) abrogating
or nullifying therefore all agricultural share
tenancy agreements over all kinds of lands, as
the one involved in the case at bar-over
coconut plantation-and hence, the complaint
below as well as the challenged decision by
the courts below, based as they are on such
share tenancy agreements, have lost their
validity cessante ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex.
II
Assuming arguendo that said laws have not
thus been repealed, is respondent Benitez
hereunder the undisputed fact of the case as
found by the courts below a share tenant
within the purview of the said laws, i.e.,
Republic Acts 1199 and 3844, or a mere
farmhand or farm worker as such relationship
were extensively discussed in Delos Reyes vs.
Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574. (Copied verbatim from
Petition, p. 31- rollo)
Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a
mere farmhand or laborer who was dismissed as an
employee from the landholding in question and not
ousted therefrom as tenant. Whether a person is a
tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the
findings of the respondent court and the trial court
are, generally, entitled to respect and non-
disturbance.
The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by
another for the purpose of production through the
labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which
or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in
produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic
Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)
With petitioner reference to this case, "share
tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a
joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein
one party furnishes the land and the other his labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the
land with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and
the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any
agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited
to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless
this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute
or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained
a substantially equivalent and regular employment"
(Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code).
The petitioners contend that the two courts below
applied erroneous definitions of "tenancy" found in
repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural
Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code
have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian
Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial court and the
Court of Appeals failed to cite and apply.
There is no question that the latest law on land and
tenancy reforms seeks to abolish agricultural share
tenancy as the basic relationship governing farmers
and landowners in the country.
On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and
outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. On September 10,
1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844
declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to
public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the
petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the
case at bar and the lower court's committed grave
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
error in upholding the respondent's status as share
tenant in the petitioners' landholding.
The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if
followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian
reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the
movement not only towards the leasehold system
but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers.
The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended
to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands
or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy
Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the
Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same
have been substantially modified by the latter.
However, even assuming such an abrogation of the
law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all
actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere
general principle. Among the established exceptions
are when vested rights are affected and obligations
of contract are impaired. (Aisporna vs. Court of
Appeals, 108 SCRA 481).
The records establish the private respondents' status
as agricultural tenants under the legal definitions.
Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the
landholding continuously from 1969 until he was
ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding is an
essential distinction between a mere agricultural
laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the
tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary,
1972 Edition), a tenant being one who, has the
temporary use and occupation of land or tenements
belonging to another (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol.
II, p. 3254) for the purpose of production (Sec. 3,
Republic Act 1199; delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA
574). Respondent Benitez lives on the landholding.
He built his house as an annex to the petitioner's
copra kiln. A hired laborer would not build his own
house at his expense at the risk of losing the same
upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such
conduct is more consistent with that of an
agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure
under the law.
Cultivation is another important factor in determining
the existence of tenancy relationships. It is admitted
that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others,
who had originally cleared the land in question and
planted the coconut trees, with the respondent
coming to work in the landholding only after the
same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it
was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded
the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the
land. The definition of cultivation is not limited
merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the
land. It includes the promotion of growth and the
care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to
forward the products of the earth by general
industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of
coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and
plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of
sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in
the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil.
Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a
hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts
begins when the coconut trees are already
fruitbearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or
smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut
trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering,
thereby increasing the produce. The fact that
respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles
all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding
to the processing of copra, although at times with the
aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land,
shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.
(delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, supra Marcelo vs. de Leon,
105 Phil. 1175).
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy
relationship between petitioners and respondent is
their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a
"tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of
the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive
indication of the existence of tenancy
relations perse the sharing of harvest taken together
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to
be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim
of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant. The case
of delos Reyes vs. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the
matter thus:
The agricultural laborer works for the
employer, and for his labor he receives a
salary or wage, regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit. On the other hand,
the share tenant par ticipates in the
agricultural produce. His share is necessarily
dependent on the amount of harvest.
Hence, the lower court's computation of damages in
favor of respondent based on the number of normal
harvests. In most cases, we have considered the
system of sharing produce as convincing evidence of
tenancy relations.
The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2,
1973 which in clear and categorical terms establishes
respondent as a tenant, to wit:
AGREEMENT
This agreement entered into by and between
Manuel Guerrero hereinafter referred to as
the landowner and Apolinario Benitez
hereinafter referred to as tenant.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners, however, contend that the word
"tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to
mean a hired laborer farm employee as understood
agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their
relationship would be guided by the provisions of
Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
the Philippines militates against such an assertion. It
would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to
govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the
petitioners insist a meaning other than its general
acceptation had been given the word "tenant", the
instrument should have so stated '. Aided by a
lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could not
be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and
categorical terms, the private respondent appears to
be nothing else but a tenant:
Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners'
counsel of the respondent's status as tenant:
ATTY. ESTEBAN:
Q You said you are living at San
Joaquin, who cause the sowing of the
lumber you made as annex in the
house?
ATTY. NALUNDASAN
Please remember that under the law,
tenant is given the right to live in the
holding in question. We admit him as
tenant.
xxxxxxxxx
(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN,
June 25, 1974, pp. 4950).
The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should
be without question.
Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant
has the right to continue working until such
relationship is extinguished according to law.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act
1199), the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963
(Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms
(Republic Act 6389) and Presidential Decree 1038
(Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant
Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands)
all provide for the security of tenure of agricultural
tenants. Ejectment may be effected only for causes
provided by law, to wit:
l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply
with any of the terms and conditions of the
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
tenancy contract or any of the provisions of
the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed
rental or to deliver the landholder's share
unless the tenant's failure is caused by a
fortuitous event or force majeure;
3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes
other than that specified by the agreement of
the parties;
4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm
practices:
5) Serious injury to the land caused by the
negligence of the tenant;
6) Conviction by a competent court of a
tenant or any member of his immediate
family or farm household of a crime against
the landholder or a member of his immediate
family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar.
The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of his
right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian
Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of
respondent as tenant and granting him damages
therefor.
Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate
that the respondent's right as share tenant do not
end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law
seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance
and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant,
strong and responsible citizens ... active participants
in nation-building", agricultural share tenants are
given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step
towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a
goal sought to be achieved by the government
program of land reform.
It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and
sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy
makers of government are still studying the feasibility
of its application and the consequences of its
implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted.
Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the
eventual goal of having strong and independent
farmers working on lands which they own remains.
The petitioners' arguments which would use the
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis
for setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of
the tenant have no merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The decision of the appellate court is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Paras and Cruz, * JJ., concur.
Feria, J., took no part.
Footnotes
* Cruz, J., was designated to sit in the
Second Division under Special Order
No. 10 dated April 23, 1986.
_______________________________________
G.R. No. L-14322 February 25, 1960
In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE OF
PETRONILA TAMPOY, deceased,
vs.
DIOSDADA ALBERASTINE, petitioner-appellant.
Agustin Y. Kintanar for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This concerns the probate of a document which
purports to be the last will and testament of one
Petronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in
accordance with law and petitioner had presented oral
and documentaryevidence, the trial court denied the
petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the
first of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling but the
Court of Appeals certified the case to us because it
involves purely a question of law.
The facts of this case as found by the trial court as
follows:
De las pruebas resulta que Petronila Tampoy,
ya viuda y sin hijos, rogo a Bonigfacio Mioza
que la leyera el testamento Exhibito A y la
expicara su contenido en su casa en al calle
San Miguel, del municipio de Argao, provincia
de Cebu, en 19 de noviember de 1939, y lasi
lo hizo Bonifacio Mioza en presencia de los
tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan,
Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, y
despues de conformarse con el contendido
del testamento, ella rogo a Bonifacio Mioza,
que escribiera su nombre al pie del
testamento, en la pagina segunda, y asi lo
hizo Bonifacio Mioza, y despues ella
estampo su marca digital entra su nombre y
apelido en presencia de todos y cada uno de
los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K.
Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy y
de Bonifacio Mioza, y despues, Bonifacio
Mioza firmo tambien al pie del todos y cada
uno de lo tres testigos arriba nombrados. La
testadora asi como Bonifacio Mioza parte de
la primera pagina del testamento qeu se halla
compuesto de dos paginas. Todos y cada uno
de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K.
Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy,
firmaron al pie de la clausula de
atestiguamiento que esta escrita en la pagina
segunda del testamento y en la margen
izquierda de la misma pagina 2 y de la pagina
primera en presencia de la testadora, de
Bonifacio Mioza, del abogado Kintanar y de
todos y cada uno de ellos. El testamento fue
otorgado por la testadora libre y
expontaneament, sin haber sido amenazada,
forzada o intimidada, y sin haberse ejercido
sobre ella influencia indebida, estando la
misma en pleno uso de sus facultades
mentales y disfrutando de buena salud. La
testadore fallecio en su case en Argao en 22
de febrero de 1957 (Vease certificado de
defuncion Exhibito B). La heredera instituida
en el testamento, Carmen Alberastine, murio
dos semanas despues que la testadora, o sea
en 7 de Marzo de 1957, dejando a su madre,
la solicitante Diosdada Alberastine.
The above facts are not controverted, there being no
opposition to the probate of the will. However, the trial
court denied the petition on the ground that the first
page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix. Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set
aside for the reason that, although the first page of
the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix,
the same however expresses her true intention to
givethe property to her whose claims remains
undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has
filed any to the opposition to the probate of the will
and that while the first page does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears
her thumbmark and both pages were signed by the
three testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the
fact that the petition for probate is unoppossed, the
three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to
the court that the document expresses the true and
voluntary will of the deceased.
This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter
to the express provision of the law. Thus, Section 618
of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator
sign the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the
will and each and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator and of each other, which requirement
should be expressed in the attestation clause. This
requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it
is fatal to the validity of the will (Rodriguez vs. Alcala,
55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes
prescribing the formalities to be observed in the
execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated
in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will must be executed in
accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise
it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of
equal importance and must be observed, and courts
cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No
power or discretion is vested in them, either to
superadd other conditions or dispence with those
enumerated in the statutes" (Uy Coque vs. Navas L.
Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Sao vs.
Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50
Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481).
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect
that it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on
its first page even if it bears the signature of the three
instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape the
conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law
and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera and
Gutierrez, David, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985
CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES,
QUEZON, VIVENCIO G. LIRIO respondents.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1
(which dismissed his petition to set aside respondent
Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July 31,
1980 denying his petition for annulment of the
proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and for his proclamation
instead as such elected vice-mayor for having received
the clear majority of the votes cast), the comments of
public and private respondents and petitioner's
consolidated reply and manifestation and motion of June
25, 1985 (stating that respondent abandoned his claim
to the office and accepted and assumed on June 10,
1985, the position of municipal trial judge of Lucban and
Sampaloc, Quezon, as verified from the records of the
Office of the Court Administrator), the Court Resolved to
RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision
and to GRANT the petition at bar.
The undisputed facts show that one Narciso
Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy in the
January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate
of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-
mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But
later on the very same day, Mendoza filed an
unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his
said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons."
Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo
Villanueva, upon learning of his companion
Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate
of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the
said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent
ticket. ... The results showed petitioner to be the clear
winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes
(3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent
Lirio's 2,660 votes). But the Municipal Board of
Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of
petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial
Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since
petitioner's name does not appear in the Comelec's
certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could
be presumed that his candidacy was not duly
approved by the Comelec so that his votes could not
be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly
proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only
unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice
mayor of the municipality of Dolores.
Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution
on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two
grounds after citing the pertinent legal provisions, as
follows:
The 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly
filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless
the candidate files with the office which
received the certificate ... or with the
Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal
...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing
certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a
certificate of candidacy duly filed should ...
withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office
may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office for which ... the candidate who has
withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before
midday of election ...
Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have
substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the
strength of Section 28 of the 1978 Election
Code which he invokes, For one thing,
Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not
under oath, as required under Section 27 of
the Code; hence it produces no legal effect.
For another, said withdrawal was made not
after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing
certificates of candidacy, as contemplated
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
under Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that very
same day. (Emphasis copies)
Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in
the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect
the will of the electorate instead of defeating the same
through the invocation of formal or technical defects.
(De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211
[1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208
(1918) Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969]; Yra
vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs.
Comelec, 107 Phil. 607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara,
9 SCRA 522 [1963], Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43
SCRA 11 [19721; and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72
SCRA 170 [19761).
The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for
denying due course to petitioner's substitute
certificate of candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's
withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not
"under oath," should be rejected. It is not seriously
contended by respondent nor by the Comelec that
Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a
reality, so much so that no votes were cast for him at
all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even though his
candidacy was filed on the last day within the
deadline, was not in the Comelec's certified list of
candidates. His unsworn withdrawal filed later on the
same day had been accepted by the election registrar
without protest nor objection, On the other hand,
since there was no time to include petitioner's name in
the Comelec list of registered candidates, because
the election was only four days away, petitioner as
substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his
candidacy to all chairmen and members of the
citizens election committees in compliance with the
suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo
Gomez.
The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is
but a technicality which should not be used to
frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the
substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of
Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis
mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people
cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the
certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn
to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-
compliance therewith before the election would be
fatal to the status of the candidate before the
electorate, but after the people have expressed their
will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by
the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his
certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court
of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by
this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607,
the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath
will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's
failure to observe the requirement should be
"considered a harmless irregularity."
As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his
certificate of candidacy right on the very same day
that he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4,
1980 which was the very last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy shows that he was not
serious about his certificate of candidacy. But this
could not be done to would be bonafide candidates,
like petitioner who had not filed his candidacy in
deference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of
his " co-planners " with "some concerned citizens ...
(who) held causes to put up a slate that will run
against the erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."
The Comelec's post-election act of denying
petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not
seem to be in consonance with the substance and
spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code
provides for such substitute candidates in case of
death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of
the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal
was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular
filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he
had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and
purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be
considered as having been made substantially and in
truth after the last day, even going by the literal
reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the
statement of former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of
petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a
substitute candidate cannot, (in his opinion), be
successfully assailed. It follows that the votes cast in
his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there
is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation
as Vice Mayor...
ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the
questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and
annuls the proclamation of respondent Lirio as
elected
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares
petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said
office, take the oath of office and discharge its
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
functions. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and
Patajo, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was
the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon
Province in the election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L.
Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on
January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day,
Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a
handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under
oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of
Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980,
Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy
for vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On
January 26 the election registrar transmitted
Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's
withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar
who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on
Elections. These papers were received by the
Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980
or after the election and after the proclamation of Lirio
as the duly elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list
of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or
on January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen
and members of the board of election inspectors of
Dolores wherein he informed them of his candidacy in
substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count
the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial
election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's
candidacy. On election day, the provincial election
registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not
included in the official list of candidates it could be
legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve
his certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice
mayor. The votes cast for Villanueva were not
counted because he was not an official candidate.
They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be
assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against
2,600 votes for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's
proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the
grounds (1) that Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal
effect because it was not under oath as required in
section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even
assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute
candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the
Election Code since Mendoza did not withdraw after
January 4 but on that very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under
section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be
said that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a
reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law
which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not
know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court.
Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to
deny said motion.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was
the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon
Province in the election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L.
Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on
January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day,
Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a
handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under
oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of
Dolores.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980,
Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy
for vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On
January 26 the election registrar transmitted
Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's
withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar
who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on
Elections. These papers were received by the
Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980
or after the election and after the proclamation of Lirio
as the duly elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list
of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or
on January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen
and members of the board of election inspectors of
Dolores wherein he informed them of his candidacy in
substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count
the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial
election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's
candidacy. On election day, the provincial election
registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not
included in the official list of candidates it could be
legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve
his certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice
mayor. The votes cast for Villanueva were not
counted because he was not an official candidate.
They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be
assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against
2,600 votes for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's
proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the
grounds (1) that Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal
effect because it was not under oath as required in
section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even
assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute
candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the
Election Code since Mendoza did not withdraw after
January 4 but on that very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under
section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be
said that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a
reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law
which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not
know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court.
Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to
deny said motion.
Footnotes
1 Reported in 122 SCRA 636.
__________________________________________
G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974
JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS,
as Judge of Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Martinez and Martinez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for
respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court holds that the court of first instance of
Pasay City in an appeal erroneously taken to it from
the city court's judgment convicting petitioners-
accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of said courts should grant
petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court
rather than peremptorily grant the prosecution's
motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the
remand of the case to the city court for execution of
judgment. The appellate court's decision denying the
relief sought by petitioners of compelling the elevation
of their appeal to it as the proper court simply
because of the non-impleader of the court of first
instance as a nominal party notwithstanding that it
was duly represented by the respondent People as
the real party in interest through the Solicitor General
who expressed no objection to the setting aside of the
court of first instance's dismissal order is set aside as
sacrificing substance to form and subordinating
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural
technicality.
Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25,
1970 for estafa before the City Court of Pasay 1 for
allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a
value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis.
After trial, they were convicted and sentenced under
respondent city court's decision of February 26, 1971 to
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P1,000.00 with costs of suit.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse
judgment to the Court of First Instance of Pasay City,
but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal"
on the ground that since the case was within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the court
of first instance and the trial in the city court had been
duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section
87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as
amended. 2
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal
motion and invoking the analogous provision of Rule
50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in
cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the
appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court,
with a specific and clear statement of the grounds
therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it
should find the appeal to have been wrongly brought
before it, to certify the same "to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court." 3
The court of first instance per its order of October 29,
1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the
dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to
the city court "for execution of judgment." 4
Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the
order of dismissal of their appeal and learned of it
only when they were called by the Pasay city court for
execution of the judgment of conviction. Hence, they
filed with the city court their "motion to elevate appeal
to Court of Appeals" of December 7, 1971 stating that
"through inadvertence and/or excusable neglect" they
had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to the court of
first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the
proper court and prayed that the city court, following
precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it
to the proper court instead of dismissing appeals,
"elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for
proper review." 5
Respondent city court per its order of December 11,
1971 denied petitioners' motion "for having been
erroneously addressed to this court" instead of to the
court of first instance 6 ignoring petitioners' predicament
that the court of first instance had already turned them
down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without
notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised
to execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972
their petition for prohibition and mandamus against
the People and respondent city court to prohibit the
execution of the judgment and to compel respondent
city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of
Appeals. 7
The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the
petition manifesting that "we shall not interpose any
objection whichever view point is adopted by this
Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently
conflicting or clashing principles of law finality of
judicial decision or equity in judicial decision," after
observing that "(F)rom the view point of equity
considering that petitioners' right to appeal lapsed or
was lost through the fault, though not excusable, of
their counsel, and compounded by the alleged error of
judgment committed by the Court of First Instance to
which the appeal was erroneously brought, we
sympathize with petitioners' plight."
The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of
December 17, 1973 dismissed the petition, after
finding that the city court's judgment was directly
appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI
instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the
exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be
endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since
petitioners did not implead the court of first instance
as "principal party respondent" it could not "grant any
relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners
can be said to deserve some equities," as follows:
... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that
was procedurally wrong; of course, CFI
instead of dismissing appeal, could have in
the exercise of its inherent powers, directed
appeal to be endorsed to this Court of
Appeals, but when instead of doing so, it
dismissed, it also had power to do so, and
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
correction of it is difficult to see to be
remediable by mandamus, but ignoring this
altogether, what this Court finds is that since it
was CFI that dismissed the appeal and
according to petitioners, wrongly, it must
follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea for
mandamus to compel it to act "correctly"
should have been directed against said CFI, it
should have been the CFI, Hon. Francisco de
la Rosa, who should have been made under
Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party
respondent, but he was not, this being the
situation, this Court can not see how it can
grant any relief at all even on the assumption
that petitioners can be said to deserve some
equities.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2,
1974 8 and for elevation of their appeal to the Court of
Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal and of their
defense to the charge, viz, that the offended party Atty.
de Guzman had represented their son who was a
suspect with two others for robbery before the Pasay city
fiscal's office and upon dismissal of the charge
demanded payment from them as parents the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they had no
money to pay him required them to sign the receipt
dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an imaginary lady's
ring to sell "on commission basis" for P1,000.00 (their
"commission" to be any overprice) to assure payment of
the sum by the stated deadline of July 9, 1970 under
penalty, of criminal prosecution for estafa; and that they
had then newly met Atty. de Guzman, whose services
had been secured not by them but by the family of one
of the other suspects, implying the incredibility of his
entrusting a lady's ring to both of them (husband and
wife) for sale on commission basis when his only
association with them was his demand of payment of his
P1,000-attorney's fee for having represented their son-
suspect.
Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court "for lack of sufficient merit," petitioners filed the
present petition for review. 9 The Court required the
Solicitor General's comment on behalf of the People of
the Philippines, and upon receipt thereof resolved to
consider the case as a special civil action with such
comment as answer and the case submitted for decision
in the interest of justice and speedy adjudication.
The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that
the court of first instance acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal
which was erroneously brought to it and ordering
remand of the records to the city court for execution of
judgment instead of certifying and endorsing the
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as
timely prayed for by petitioners-accused in their
opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss
appeal. We find that the Court of Appeals also acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
petition instead of setting aside the challenged order
of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing
the appeal pursuant to which respondent city court
was poised to execute its judgment of conviction
simply because the court of first instance which is but
a nominal party had not been impleaded as party
respondent in disregard of the substantive fact that
the People as plaintiff and the real party in interest
was duly impleaded as principal party respondent and
was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor
General.
The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners'
appeal taken to the court of first instance was
"procedurally wrong" and that the court of first
instance "in the exercise of its inherent powers could
have certified the appeal to it as the proper court
instead of dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in
holding that it could not "correct" the court of first
instance's "wrong action" and grant the relief sought
of having the appeal elevated to it since said court's
presiding judge "who should have been-made under
Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but
he was not." The Court has always stressed as in Torre
vs. Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal
party" in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and that he "is not a person "in interest"
within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5 12)" and
"accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal
from or seek a review on certiorari" of an adverse
decision of the appellate court setting aside his dismissal
of a party's appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for
him to allow the appeal.
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of
first instance or presiding judge who issued the
challenged order or decision is but a nominal party,
the real parties in interest being "the person or
persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court" and who are charged with the duty of
appearing and defending the challenged act both "in
their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge
affected by the proceedings." Hence, the formal
impleading of the court of first instance which issued
the challenged order of dismissal was not
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
indispensable and could be "overlooked in the interest
of speedy adjudication." 13
Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff
in the criminal proceeding against petitioners-accused
was duly impleaded and represented by the Solicitor
General to defend the proceedings in the court of first
instance and had expressed no objection to the
appellate court's setting aside of the court of first
instance's dismissal order, in the interest of justice
and equity the appellate court's act of dismissing the
petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the
appeal to the proper court simply because of the non
impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal
party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form
and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere
matter of procedural technicality. The procedural
infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal to the
court of first instance rather than to the Court of
Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in
the court of first instance itself by asking that court to
certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the
proper court, should not be over-magnified as to
totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal
and leave them without any remedy.
The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by
respondent appellate court of mandamus to compel
respondent city court to elevate petitioners' appeal to
the Court of Appeals as the proper court as being
within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3,
providing for certification to the proper court by the
Court of Appeals of appealed cases erroneously
brought to it, 14 particularly where petitioners-accused
have shown prima facie (and without this Court
prejudging the merits of their appeal) that they have a
valid cause for pursuing in good faith their appeal (as
against a manifestly dilatory or frivolous appeal) and to
have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support
of their defense that they were prosecuted and
sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure to pay
a purely civil indebtedness (the attorney's fee owed by
their son to the complainant).
Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their
appeal to the court of first instance, confronted with
the thorny question (which has confused many a
practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction of city
courts and municipal courts of provincial and sub-
provincial capitals with courts of first instance under
sections 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act where the
appeal from the municipal or city court's judgment
should be taken directly to the Court of Appeals as held
in Esperat vs. Avila 16 as distinguished however from
judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar cases
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of first
instance where as held by this Court in People vs.
Valencia 17 the appeal should nevertheless be brought to
the court of first instance which retains its appellate
jurisdiction under section 45 of the Judiciary Act.
It certainly was within the inherent power of the court
of first instance in exercise of its power to "control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justice" 18 to grant petitioners-accused's
timely plea to endorse their appeal to the Court of
Appeals as the proper court and within the context and
spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In a mis-directed appeal to
the Court of Appeals of a case that pertains to the court
of first instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly
provides that the Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the
appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court" viz,
the court of first instance in the given example. There is
no logical reason why in all fairness and justice the court
of first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not
be likewise bound by the same rule and therefore
enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but to certify the case
to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The paucity
of the language of the Rule and its failure to expressly
provide for such cases of misdirected appeals to the
court of first instance (owing possibly to the fact that at
the time of the revision of the Rules of Court in 1963
section 87 (c) had been newly amended under Republic
Act 2613 approved on June 22, 1963 to enlarge the
jurisdiction of city courts and municipal courts of
provincial capitals and provide for their concurrent
jurisdiction with the courts of first instance and direct
appeal from their judgments in such cases to the Court
of Appeals) should not be a cause for unjustly depriving
petitioners of their substantial right of appeal.
This Court has in many cases involving the
construction of statutes always cautioned against
"narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the
purpose of the legislator" " 19 and stressed that "it is of
the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to
avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)"
20 and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results". 21
In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is
all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid
injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the
void that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of
the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency
by holding as it does now that courts of first instance are
equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss
misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to
the proper appellate court.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition is hereby set aside and in lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
petition for prohibition against respondent city court
which is hereby enjoined from executing its judgment
of conviction against petitioners-accused and further
commanding said city court to elevate petitioners'
appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals for
the latter's disposition on the merits. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:
I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by
analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive
portion of the draft decision commands the City Court
to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under
Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No.
296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the
proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had
originally been brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50
provides that "when the appealed case has been
erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall
not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the
proper court, with a specific and clear statement of
the grounds therefor." These are the only legal
provisions governing the handling and disposition of
erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the
Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous
appeal to the Court of First Instance from the
judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a
provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling
within their concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court,
by judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it
formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or
certification of cases erroneously appealed to the
Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior
courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification by
the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in
such cases.
We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and
Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We have to
compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case
to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also compel the
City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the
case was not appealed to it as it was its decision
which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First
Instance. The proper court to certify and to be
commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of
First Instance, but this Court is not a party to this case
and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered
herein.
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as
a party and represented by the Solicitor General is of
no significance to me. The People is not the one to be
compelled to perform the act but the Judge of First
Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said
Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in
these proceedings.
The petitioners here should have known, through their
counsel, that the People of the Philippines and the
Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and
the same entity, and that the former may not be
compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to
the Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The
respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing
the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment
and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should have known
that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable
party to these proceedings. For their counsel's fatal
error, they should pay the price of having the
judgment of conviction become final.
Separate Opinions
ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:
I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by
analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive
portion of the draft decision commands the City Court
to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under
Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No.
296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the
proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had
originally been brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50
provides that "when the appealed case has been
erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall
not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the
proper court, with a specific and clear statement of
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
the grounds therefor." These are the only legal
provisions governing the handling and disposition of
erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the
Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous
appeal to the Court of First Instance from the
judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a
provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling
within their concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court,
by judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it
formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or
certification of cases erroneously appealed to the
Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior
courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification by
the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in
such cases.
We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and
Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We have to
compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case
to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also compel the
City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the
case was not appealed to it as it was its decision
which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First
Instance. The proper court to certify and to be
commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of
First Instance, but this Court is not a party to this case
and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered
herein.
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as
a party and represented by the Solicitor General is of
no significance to me. The People is not the one to be
compelled to perform the act but the Judge of First
Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said
Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in
these proceedings.
The petitioners here should have known, through their
counsel, that the People of the Philippines and the
Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and
the same entity, and that the former may not be
compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to
the Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The
respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing
the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment
and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should have known
that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable
party to these proceedings. For their counsel's fatal
error, they should pay the price of having the
judgment of conviction become final.
Footnotes
* Third Division composed of Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Guillermo S. Santos and Ricardo
C. Puno, JJ.
1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 60761.
2 Annex D, petition. See Esperat vs. Avila, 20
SCRA 596 (1967) and People vs. Tapayan,
30 SCRA 529 (1969) and cases cited.
3 Annex E, idem.
4 Annex F, idem.
5 Annex G, idem.
6 Annex H, idem.
7 Annex I, idem.
8 Annex L, idem, emphasis supplied.
9 The petition was filed on February 14, 1974
within the extended ten-day period from
expiration of reglementary period on February
4, 1974, granted per the Court's resolution of
February 7, 1974.
10 This Rule provides for petitions for
mandamus.
11 38 SCRA 296, 315 (1971), per
Concepcion, C.J.
12 "SEC. 5. Defendants and costs in certain
cases. When the petition filed relates to the
acts or omissions of a court or judge, the
petitioner shall join, as parties defendant with
such court or judge, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the
court. and it shall be the duty of such person
or persons to appear and defend, both in his
or their own behalf and in behalf of the court
or judge affected by the proceedings, and
costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of
the petitioner shall be against the person or
persons in interest only, and not against the
court or judge." (Rule 65)
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
13 See Valenzuela vs. CFI of La Union, 91
Phil. 906 (1952).
14 See also section 31, R.A. 296 providing
that "Transfer of cases from Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals to proper court. All
cases which may be erroneously brought to
the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals
shall be sent to the proper court, which shall
hear the same, as if it has originally been
brought before it." (Judiciary Act).
15 See "a dozen cases" cited in People vs.
Tapayan, 30 SCRA 529 (1969).
16 20 SCRA 596 (1967).
17 29 SCRA 252 (1969), per Castro, J. which
expressly distinguished the ruling from that in
Esperat vs. Avila, supra.
18 Rule 135, section 5 (g).
19 Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal
Co., 32 SCRA 553, 558 (1970), per Fernando,
J.
20 Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. v.
Lingad, 30 SCRA 248, 256, (1969), per
Fernando, J.; notes in parenthesis and
emphasis supplied.
21 Idem, at p. 255, emphasis supplied.
___________________________________________
G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier and Sycip,
Delgado and Delgado, Filemon Sotto, and Ramon
Salinas for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In
expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may
the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the
necessity of the expropriation?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of
said city, praying that certain lands, therein
particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose
of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner,
in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:
That for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff
to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain
parcels of land situated in the district of
Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said
district, and within the jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila
[Chinese Community of Manila], answering the
petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a
corporation organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for
its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the
Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was
the owner of parcels one and two of the land
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it
denied that it was either necessary or expedient that
the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes;
that existing street and roads furnished ample means
of communication for the public in the district covered
by such proposed expropriation; that if the
construction of the street or road should be
considered a public necessity, other routes were
available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's
purposes, at much less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a
Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in
question had been used by the defendant for
cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese
were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation
be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting
places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a
large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the
bodies to some other place or site and in the
purchase of such new sites, would involve the
destruction of existing monuments and the erection of
new monuments in their stead, and would create
irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
those persons owning and interested in the graves
and monuments which would have to be destroyed;
that the plaintiff was without right or authority to
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion
thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation,
in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the
petition, denied each and every allegation of the
complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not
a public improvement; that it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to acquire the parcels of land in question;
that a portion of the lands in question was used as a
cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors;
that monuments and tombstones of great value were
found thereon; that the land had become quasi-public
property of a benevolent association, dedicated and
used for the burial of the dead and that many dead
were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it
necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered
and still offers to grant a right of way for the said
extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff,
in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of
his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so
offered, free of charge, would answer every public
necessity on the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with
her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the
other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by
the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso
Tambunting above referred to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the
defendants have been inserted in order to show the
general character of the defenses presented by each
of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the
expropriation was necessary. The defendants each
alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a
cemetery, which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street for public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the
various answers, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario,
judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear
and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of
authorities, decided that there was no necessity for
the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all of the defendants
from all liability under the complaint, without any
finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and
presented the above question as its principal ground
of appeal.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has
established the fact, under the law, that it has
authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any
land it may desire; that the only function of the court in
such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land
in question; that neither the court nor the owners of
the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of
purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts
are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the
land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to
render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate
private lands for public purposes, is not denied.
Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of
Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may
condemn private property for public use."
The Charter of the city of Manila contains no
procedure by which the said authority may be carried
into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure
marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said
authority may be exercised. From an examination of
Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right
of eminent domain may be exercised. Said section
241 provides that, "The Government of the Philippine
Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or
of any municipality, and any person, or public or
private corporation having, by law, the right to
condemn private property for public use, shall
exercise that right in the manner hereinafter
prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation
proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint
shall state with certainty the right of condemnation,
with a description of the property sought to be
condemned together with the interest of each
defendant separately.
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Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon
trial that the right to expropriate the land in question
exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of
procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section
248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said
section 248 gives the Supreme Court authority to
inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the
plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall
determine that no right of expropriation existed, it
shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance
with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the
possession of the property and that he recover
whatever damages he may have sustained by reason
of the possession of the plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the
phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find the
right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the
court finds that there is some law authorizing the
plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other
function than to authorize the expropriation and to
proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved;
that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative
and not a judicial question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a
legislative function exclusively, and that the courts
cannot intervene except for the purpose of
determining the value of the land in question, there is
much legal legislature. Much has been written upon
both sides of that question. A careful examination of
the discussions pro and con will disclose the fact that
the decisions depend largely upon particular
constitutional or statutory provisions. It cannot be
denied, if the legislature under proper authority should
grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel
of land for some specified public purpose, that the
courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the
purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature
should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public
purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in
this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to
make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue
properly presented, concerning whether or not the
lands were private and whether the purpose was, in
fact, public. In other words, have no the courts in this
jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions
relating to expropriation must be referred to them
(sec. 241, Act No. 190) for final decision, to ask
whether or not the law has been complied with?
Suppose in a particular case, it should be denied that
the property is not private property but public, may not
the courts hear proof upon that question? Or,
suppose the defense is, that the purpose of the
expropriation is not public but private, or that there
exists no public purpose at all, may not the courts
make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate
private lands for public purposes. Can it be possible
that said authority confers the right to determine for
itself that the land is private and that the purpose is
public, and that the people of the city of Manila who
pay the taxes for its support, especially those who are
directly affected, may not question one or the other, or
both, of these questions? Can it be successfully
contended that the phrase used in Act No. 190, "and if
the court upon trial shall find that such right exists,"
means simply that the court shall examine the
statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to
exercise the right of eminent domain? Or, when the
case arrives in the Supreme Court, can it be possible
that the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall determine
that no right of expropriation exists," that that simply
means that the Supreme Court shall also examine the
enactments of the legislature for the purpose of
determining whether or not a law exists permitting the
plaintiff to expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is
not limited to that question. The right of expropriation
is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation,
and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts
come to determine the question, they must only find
(a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the
law. In the present case there are two conditions
imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second,
the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial,
finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be
contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is public, is a question of fact.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and,
in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon
the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to
ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the
courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those
questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable
land in this jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute
while his land is being expropriated for a use not
public, with the right simply to beg the city of Manila to
pay him the value of his land? Does the law in this
jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate lands,
without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying
the aesthetic sense of those who happen for the time
being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands
usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are
called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners of
land question the public use or the public necessity?
As was said above, there is a wide divergence of
opinion upon the authority of the court to question the
necessity or advisability of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain. The divergence is usually found to
depend upon particular statutory or constitutional
provisions.
It has been contended and many cases are cited in
support of that contention, and section 158 of volume
10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive that
the necessity for taking property under the right of
eminent domain is not a judicial question. But those
who cited said section evidently overlooked the
section immediately following (sec. 159), which adds:
"But it is obvious that if the property is taken in the
ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can
never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a
use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights
call for protection by the courts. While many courts
have used sweeping expression in the decisions in
which they have disclaimed the power of supervising
the power of supervising the selection of the sites of
public improvements, it may be safely said that the
courts of the various states would feel bound to
interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion
delegated by the legislature, by an attempted
appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible
necessity of its use, or when the alleged purpose was
a cloak to some sinister scheme." (Norwich City vs.
Johnson, 86 Conn., 151; Bell vs. Mattoon
Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R.
R. Co. vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State
vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as
conclusive authority in support of the contention of the
appellant, says:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating
private property for a particular improvement
for public use, and it may select the exact
location of the improvement. In such a case, it
is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public
necessity for its construction, the expediency
of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its
site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have
no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for those of the representatives of
the people.
Practically every case cited in support of the above
doctrine has been examined, and we are justified in
making the statement that in each case the legislature
directly determined the necessity for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain in the particular case. It is
not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain is presented to the legislative
department of the government and that department
decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise
of the right in a particular case, that then and in that
case, the courts will not go behind the action of the
legislature and make inquiry concerning the
necessity. But, in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co.
vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am.
St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the
doctrine laid down in section 158 above quoted, the
court said:
But when the statute does not designate the
property to be taken nor how may be taken,
then the necessity of taking particular property
is a question for the courts. Where the
application to condemn or appropriate is made
directly to the court, the question (of
necessity) should be raised and decided in
limene.
The legislative department of the government was
rarely undertakes to designate the precise property
which should be taken for public use. It has generally,
like in the present case, merely conferred general
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
authority to take land for public use when a necessity
exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently
asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the
necessity for the appropriation is an issuable
allegation which it is competent for the courts to
decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42 Am.
St. Rep., 402, 407].)
There is a wide distinction between a legislative
declaration that a municipality is given authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain, and a decision
by the municipality that there exist a necessity for the
exercise of that right in a particular case. The first is a
declaration simply that there exist reasons why the
right should be conferred upon municipal corporation,
while the second is the application of the right to a
particular case. Certainly, the legislative declaration
relating to the advisability of granting the power
cannot be converted into a declaration that a
necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case,
and especially so when, perhaps, the land in question
was not within the territorial authority was granted.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to
confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain, is a question with which the
courts are not concerned. But when that right or
authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving
citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in
this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof
upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the
general authority.
Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure
(Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a further conclusive
authority upon the question that the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is a legislative
and not a judicial question. Cyclopedia, at the page
stated, says:
In the absence of some constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the
right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their
character. The determination of those
questions (the necessity and the expediency)
belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative
department is final and conclusive, and the
courts have no power to review it (the
necessity and the expediency) . . . . It (the
legislature) may designate the particular
property to be condemned, and its
 determination in this respect cannot be
reviewed by the courts.
The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites
many cases in support of the doctrine quoted. While
time has not permitted an examination of all of said
citations, many of them have been examined, and it
can be confidently asserted that said cases which are
cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity
and expediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially political and not
judicial," show clearly and invariably that in each case
the legislature itself usually, by a special law,
designated the particular case in which the right of
eminent domain might be exercised by the particular
municipal corporation or entity within the state.
(Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass.,
125 [15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs vs.
Armstrong, 45 N.Y., 234 [6 Am. Rep., 70]; Hairston
vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati
vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S., 390; U.S. vs.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53;
U.S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668; Traction
Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs. City of
Akron, 246 U.S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242 U.S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U.S.,
239), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It
is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond
the control of the courts in exercising the power of
eminent domain, either as to the nature of the use or
the necessity to the use of any particular property. For
if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking
exists, the legislature cannot authorize the taking of
private property against the will of the owner,
notwithstanding compensation may be required."
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa
(14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we find the Supreme Court
of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary,
quoting approvingly the following, upon the question
which we are discussing: "It is well settled that
although the legislature must necessarily determine in
the first instance whether the use for which they
(municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is
a public one or not, their (municipalities, etc.)
determination is not final, but is subject to correction
by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the
statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that
the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking
of private property is in reality not public but private."
Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme
Court of Porto Rico says: "At any rate, the rule is quite
well settled that in the cases under consideration the
determination of the necessity of taking a particular
piece or a certain amount of land rests ultimately with
the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo,
etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) .
In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs.
Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R. A., N. S., 1024]),
the Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted
the following doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain
(3d ed.), section 599: "In all such cases the necessity
of public utility of the proposed work or improvement
is a judicial question. In all such cases, where the
authority is to take property necessary for the
purpose, the necessity of taking particular property for
a particular purpose is a judicial one, upon which the
owner is entitled to be heard." (Riley vs. Charleston,
etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579];
Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not
required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise
of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power
of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion,
106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co.,
222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc.
Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc.
Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the Supreme Court of the
State of Maryland, discussing the question before us,
said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power
(eminent domain) where the legislature has left it to
depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist,
in order to accomplish the purpose of the
incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the
right to the exercise of the power should be required
to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for
its exercise. Any rule less strict than this, with the
large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the right
to corporations, would likely lead to oppression and
the sacrifice of private right to corporate power."
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill.,
426, 433), the court said: "Its right to condemn
property is not a general power of condemnation, but
is limited to cases where a necessity for resort to
private property is shown to exist. Such necessity
must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn.
If the necessary is denied the burden is upon the
company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland, etc.
Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs.
Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind., 252, 257 ; Bell
vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137
Am. St. Rep. 338].)
It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting
that what is a public use is a legislative question, and
many other decisions declaring with equal emphasis
that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a
constitutional or statutory provision denying the right
to take land for any use other than a public use, it
occurs to us that the question whether any particular
use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a
judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in
effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under
the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will
not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a
case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the
courts will certainly sustain the action of the
legislature unless it appears that the particular use is
clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be
understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court
of last resort will be willing to declare that any and
every purpose which the legislative might happen to
designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to
be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of
its manifestly private character Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the English Law remarks that, so
great is the regard of the law for private property that
it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the
public good, unless there exists a very great necessity
therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U.S.],
657), the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"That government can scarcely be deemed free
where the rights of property are left solely defendant
on the legislative body, without restraint. The
fundamental maxims of free government seem to
require that the rights of personal liberty and private
property should be held sacred. At least no court of
justice in this country would be warranted in assuming
that the power to violate and disregard them a
power so repugnant to the common principles of
justice and civil liberty lurked in any general grant
of legislature authority, or ought to be implied from
any general expression of the people. The people
ought no to be presumed to part with rights so vital to
their security and well-being without very strong and
direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on
Eminent Domain, sec. 603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20
La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann., 182.)
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law
said that the right to own and possess land a place
to live separate and apart from others to retain it as
a home for the family in a way not to be molested by
others is one of the most sacred rights that men
are heirs to. That right has been written into the
organic law of every civilized nation. The Acts of
Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29, 1916,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted in the
Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of
his property without due process of law," are but a
restatement of the time-honored protection of the
absolute right of the individual to his property. Neither
did said Acts of Congress add anything to the law
already existing in the Philippine Islands. The
Spaniard fully recognized the principle and
adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands against the encroachment upon the private
property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code
provides that: "No one may be deprived of his
property unless it be by competent authority, for some
purpose of proven public utility, and after payment of
the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven
public utility and payment) has been complied with, it
shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of
such property in its possession or to restore its
possession to him , as the case may be."
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether
directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the
rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded
by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than
the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
(Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306
and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner
without his consent is one of the most delicate
exercise of government authority. It is to be watched
with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be
to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all
free constitutions attach to the right of property of the
citizens, constrains the strict observance of the
substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed
as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect
it from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal
corporations to take property be expressly conferred
and the use for which it is taken specified, but the
power, with all constitutional limitation and directions
for its exercise, must be strictly pursued. (Dillon on
Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and
cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil.,
411.)
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would
be permitted to take property for some public use
unless some public necessity existed therefor. The
right to take private property for public use originates
in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by
such necessity. The appellant contends that
inasmuch as the legislature has given it general
authority to take private property for public use, that
the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of
the necessity in every case and that the courts are
closed to the owners of the property upon that
question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature
adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711, that it thereby
declared that it was necessary to appropriate the
property of Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps,
was not within the city limits at the time the law was
adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared
the necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended
that a municipality should be the sole judge of the
necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the
face of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find
that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and
hear proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in
a particular case?
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking
of private property for public use. Suppose the owner
of the property denies and successfully proves that
the taking of his property serves no public use: Would
the courts not be justified in inquiring into that
question and in finally denying the petition if no public
purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts
have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts
can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly
presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that
tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into the
necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public
use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no
necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use
can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the
question whether a public use exists or not, then it
seems that it must follow that they can examine into
the question of the necessity.
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The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of
the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs.
Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs.
Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.
Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent
domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general authority of
municipalities or entities must not be confused with
the right to exercise it in particular instances. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts
to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire
into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question
whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial,
arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the
legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of
eminent domain instead of in the question of the right
to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the
power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to
the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for
the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City
of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
And, moreover, the record does not show
conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided
that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of
the particular land described in the complaint. Exhibits
4, 5, 7, and E clearly indicate that the municipal board
believed at one time that other land might be used for
the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the
necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the
dead.
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for
the alleged improvements, the defendants further
contend that the street in question should not be
opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants
alleges that said cemetery is public property. If that
allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila
cannot appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila
can only expropriate private property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public
or private. The former is a cemetery used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church, while
the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of
the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)
Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use
and no part of the ground can be taken for other
public uses under a general authority. And this
immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied
parts which are held in good faith for future use.
(Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases
cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been
established under governmental authority. The
Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the
same, used the following language:
The cemetery and general hospital for
indigent Chinese having been founded and
maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal
contribution of their protector, merchants and
industrials, benefactors of mankind, in
consideration of their services to the
Government of the Islands its internal
administration, government and regime must
necessarily be adjusted to the taste and
traditional practices of those born and
educated in China in order that the sentiments
which animated the founders may be
perpetually effectuated.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in
question may be used by the general community of
Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the
cemetery in question public property. If that is true,
then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no
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authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private
property, its appropriation for the uses of a public
street, especially during the lifetime of those specially
interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should
be a question of great concern, and its appropriation
should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.
While we do not contend that the dead must not give
place to the living, and while it is a matter of public
knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres may
become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by
streets and daily trod by the feet of millions of men,
yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the
places of the dead should not be made unless and
until it is fully established that there exists an eminent
necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres
and the places of the burial of the dead are still within
the memory and command of the active care of the
living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and
sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the
legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that
such places, under such circumstances, should be
violated.
In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be
the measure of damages at law, for the wounded
sensibilities of the living, in having the graves of
kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by
a common highway or street for public travel? The
impossibility of measuring the damage and
inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to
admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of
those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the
sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of
necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the
grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be
maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts
should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company
vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen
Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven, 43
Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744;
Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)
In the present case, even granting that a necessity
exists for the opening of the street in question, the
record contains no proof of the necessity of opening
the same through the cemetery. The record shows
that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered
to the city free of charge, which will answer every
purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that
the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
The Government of the Philippine Islands is
authorized by the Philippine Bill to acquire real estate
for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, sec. 63.) A
portion of this power has been delegated by the
Philippine Legislature to the city of Manila, which is
permitted to "condemn private property for public
use." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 2429.) The
Code of Civil Procedure, in prescribing how the right
of eminent domain may be exercised, also limits the
condemnation to "private property for public use."
(Sec. 241.) As under the facts actually presented,
there can be no question that a public street
constitutes a public use, the only remaining question
is whether or not the Chinese Cemetery and the other
property here sought to be taken by the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is "private property."
As narrowing our inquiry still further, let it be noted
that cemeteries are of two classes, public and private.
A public cemetery is one used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church; while a
private cemetery is one used only by a family, or
small portion of a community. (Lay vs. State, 12 Ind.
App., 362; Cemetery Association vs. Meninger [1875],
14 Kan., 312.) Our specific question, then, is, whether
the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public,
or a private graveyard. If it be found to be the former,
it is not subject to condemnation by the city of Manila;
if it be found to be the latter, it is subject to
condemnation.
The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established
during the Spanish administration in the Philippines
by public spirited Chinese. The order of the Governor-
General giving governmental recognition to the
cemetery reads as follows: "The cemetery and
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general hospital for indigent Chinese having been
founded and maintained by the spontaneous and
fraternal contribution of their protectors, merchants
and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in
consideration of their services to the Government of
the Islands, its internal administration, government
and regime, must necessarily be adjusted to the taste
and traditional practices of those born and educated
in China in order that the sentiments which animated
the founders may be perpetually effectuated."
Sometimes after the inauguration of the new regime
in the Philippines, a corporation was organized to
control the cemetery, and a Torrens title for the lands
in question was obtained.
From the time of its creation until the present the
cemetery has been used by the Chinese community
for the burial of their dead. It is said that not less than
four hundred graves, many of them with handsome
monuments, would be destroyed by the proposed
street. This desecration is attempted as to the las t
resting places of the dead of a people who, because
of their peculiar and ingrained ancestral workship,
retain more than the usual reverence for the departed.
These facts lead us straight to the conclusion that the
Chinese Cemetery is not used by a family or a small
portion of a community but by a particular race long
existing in the country and of considerable numbers.
The case, then, is one of where the city of Manila,
under a general authority permitting it to condemn
private property for public use, is attempting to
convert a property already dedicated to a public use
to an entirely different public use; and this, not directly
pursuant to legislative authority, but primarily through
the sole advice of the consulting architect.
Two well considered decisions coming from the
American state courts on almost identical facts are
worthy of our consideration. The first is the case of
The Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of
New Haven ([1875], 43 Conn., 234), of cited by other
courts. Here the City of New Haven, Connecticut,
under the general power conferred upon it to lay out,
construct, and maintain all necessary highways within
its limits, proceeded to widen and straighten one of its
streets and in so doing took a small piece of land
belonging to the Evergreen Cemetery Association.
This association was incorporated under the general
statute. The city had no special power to take any part
of the cemetery for such purposes. It was found that
the land taken was needed for the purposes of the
cemetery and was not needed for the purpose of
widening and straightening the avenue. The court
said that it is unquestionable that the Legislature has
the power to authorize the taking of land already
applied to one public use and devote it to another.
When the power is granted to municipal or private
corporations in express words, no question can arise.
But, it was added, "The same land cannot properly be
used for burial lots and for a public highway at the
same time. . . . Land therefore applied to one use
should not be taken for the other except in cases on
necessity. . . . There is no difficulty in effecting the
desired improvement by taking land on the other side
of the street. . . . The idea of running a public street,
regardless of graves, monuments, and the feelings of
the living, through one of our public cemeteries, would
be shocking to the moral sense of the community, and
would not be tolerated except upon the direst
necessity." It was then held that land already devoted
to a public use cannot be taken by the public for
another use which is inconsistent with the first,
without special authority from the Legislature, or
authority granted by necessary and reasonable
implication.
The second decision is that of Memphis State Line
Railroad Company vs. Forest Hill Cemetery Co.
([1906], 116 Tenn., 400.) Here the purpose of the
proceedings was to condemn a right of way for the
railway company through the Forest Hill Cemetery.
The railroad proposed to run through the southeast
corner of the cemetery where no bodies were
interred. The cemetery had been in use for about
eight years, and during this period thirteen hundred
bodies had been buried therein. The cemetery was
under the control of a corporation which, by its
character, held itself out as being willing to sell lots to
any one who applies therefor and pays the price
demanded, except to members of the Negro race. 1awph!l.net
It was found that there were two other routes along
which the railroad might be located without touching
the cemetery, while the present line might be pursued
without interfering with Forest Hill Cemetery by
making a curve around it. In the court below the
railroad was granted the right of condemnation
through the cemetery and damages were assessed.
On appeal, the certiorari applied for was granted, and
the supersedeas awarded. The court, in effect, found
that the land of the Cemetery Company was devoted
to a public purpose, and that under the general
language of the Tennessee statute of eminent domain
it could not be taken for another public purpose. The
court said that in process of time the sepulchres of the
dead "are made the seats of cities, and are traversed
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by streets, and daily trodden by the feet of man. This
is inevitable in the course of ages. But while these
places are yet within the memory and under the active
care of the living, while they are still devoted to pious
uses, they are sacred, and we cannot suppose that
the legislature intended that they should be violated,
in the absence of special provisions upon the subject
authorizing such invasion, and indicating a method for
the disinterment, removal, and reinterment of the
bodies buried, and directing how the expense thereof
shall be borne." Two members of the court, delivering
a separate concurring opinion, concluded with this
significant and eloquent sentence: "The wheels of
commerce must stop at the grave."
For the foregoing reasons, and for others which are
stated in the principal decision, I am of the opinion
that the judgment of the lower court should be
affirmed.
STREET, J., dissenting:
It may be admitted that, upon the evidence before us,
the projected condemnation of the Chinese Cemetery
is unnecessary and perhaps ill-considered.
Nevertheless I concur with Justice Moir in the view
that the authorities of the city of Manila are the proper
judges of the propriety of the condemnation and that
this Court should have nothing to do with the question
of the necessity of the taking.
MOIR, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case, which
has not yet been written, and because of the
importance of the question involved, present my
dissent for the record.
This is an action by the city of Manila for the
expropriation of land for an extension of Rizal Avenue
north. The petition for condemnation was opposed by
the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" and Ildefonso
Tambunting and various other who obtained
permission of the trial court to intervene in the case.
All of the defendants allege in their opposition that the
proposed extension of Rizal Avenue cuts through a
part of the Chinese Cemetery, North of Manila, and
necessitates the destruction of many monuments and
the removal of many graves.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Honorable S.
del Rosario, judge after hearing the parties, decided
that there was no need for constructing the street as
and where proposed by the city, and dismissed the
petition.
The plaintiff appealed and sets up the following
errors:
1. The court erred in deciding that the
determination of the necessity and
convenience of the expropriation of the lands
of the defendants lies with the court and not
with the Municipal Board of the city of Manila.
2. The court erred in permitting the
presentation of proofs over the objection and
exception of the plaintiff tending to
demonstrate the lack of necessity of the
projected street and the need of the lands in
question.
3. The court erred in declaring that the plaintiff
had no right to expropriate the lands in
question.
4. The court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The right of the plaintiff to expropriate property for
public use cannot be denied. The "right of eminent
domain is inherent in all sovereignties and therefore
would exist without any constitutional recognition . . . .
The right of eminent domain antedates constitutions .
. . . The right can only be denied or restricted by
fundamental law and is right inherent in society." (15
Cyc., pp. 557-8.) .
This general right was recognized in the Philippine
Code of Civil Procedure effective October 1st, 1901,
which prescribed the manner of exercising the right.
(Sections 241 et seq.)
It was further recognized in the Organic Act of July
1st, 1902, which provides in section 74 "that the
Government of the Philippine Islands may grant
franchises . . . including the authority to exercise the
right of eminent domain for the construction and
operation of works of public utility and service, and
may authorize said works to be constructed and
maintained over and across the public property of the
United States including . . . reservations." This
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provisions is repeated in the Jones Law of August,
1916.
The legislature of the Islands conferred the right on
the city of Manila. (Section 2429, Administrative Code
of 1917; section 2402, Administrative Code of 1916.)
Clearly having the right of expropriation, the city of
Manila selected the line of its street and asked the
court by proper order to place the plaintiff in
possession of the land described in the complaint,
and to appoint Commissioners to inspect the property,
appraise the value, and assess the damages. Instead
of doing so, the court entered upon the question of
the right of the city to take the property and the
necessity for the taking.
The court says:
The controversy relates to whether or not the
Chinese Cemetery, where a great majority of
this race is buried and other persons
belonging to other nationalities have been
formerly inhumed, is private or public; whether
or not said cemetery, in case it is public,
would be susceptible to expropriation for the
purpose of public improvements proposed by
the city of Manila; whether or not the latter is
justified of the necessity and expediency of
similar expropriation before its right to the
same would be upheld by the courts of justice;
and whether or not the appreciation of said
necessity pertains to the legislative or the
judicial department before which the
expropriation proceedings have been brought.
Relative to the first point, it is not necessary
for the court to pass upon its consideration, in
view of the conclusion it has arrived at the
appreciation of the other points connected
with each other.
From the testimony of two reputable
engineers produced by some of the
defendants, it appears that the land chosen by
the plaintiff for the extension of Rizal Avenue
to the municipality of Caloocan is not the best
or the less expensive, although upon it there
may be constructed a straight road, without
curves or winding; but that in order to
construct said road upon said land, the city of
Manila would have to remove and transfer to
 other places about four hundred graves and
monuments, make some grubbings, undergo
some leveling and build some bridges the
works thereon, together with the construction
of the road and the value of the lands
expropriated, would mean an expenditure
which will not be less than P180,000.
Beside that considerable amount, the road
would have a declivity of 3 per cent which, in
order to cover a distance of one kilometer,
would require an energy equivalent to that
which would be expanded in covering a
distance of two and one-half kilometers upon
a level road.
On the other hand, if the road would be
constructed with the deviation proposed by
Ildefonso Tambunting, one of the defendants,
who even offered to donate gratuitously to the
city of Manila part of the land upon which said
road will have to be constructed, the plaintiff
entity would be able to save more than
hundreds of thousand of pesos, which can be
invested in other improvements of greater
pressure and necessity for the benefit of the
taxpayers; and it will not have to employ more
time and incur greater expenditures in the
removal and transfer of the remains buried in
the land of the Chinese Community and of Sr.
Tambunting, although with the insignificant
disadvantage that the road would be little
longer by a still more insignificant extension of
426 meters and 55 centimeters less than one-
half kilometer, according to the plan included
in the records; but it would offer a better
panorama to those who would use it, and who
would not have to traverse in their necessary
or pleasure-making trips or walks any
cemetery which, on account of its nature,
always deserves the respect of the travellers.
It should be observed that the proposed
straight road over the cemetery, which the city
of Manila is proposing to expropriate, does not
lead to any commercial, industrial, or
agricultural center, and if with said road it is
endeavored to benefit some community or
created interest, the same object may be
obtained by the proposed deviation of the
road by the defendants. The road traced by
the plaintiffs has the disadvantage that the
lands on both sides thereof would not serve
for residential purposes, for the reason that no
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one has the pleasure to construct buildings
upon cemeteries, unless it be in very
overcrowded cities, so exhausted of land that
every inch thereof represents a dwelling
house.
And it is against the ruling, that it lies with the court to
determine the necessity of the proposed street and
not with the municipal board, that the appellant directs
its first assignment of error.
It is a right of the city government to determine
whether or not it will construct streets and where, and
the court's sole duty was to see that the value of the
property was paid the owners after proper legal
proceedings ascertaining the value.
The law gives the city the right to take private property
for public use. It is assumed it is unnecessary to
argue that a public road is a public use.
But it is argued that plaintiff must show that it is
necessary to take this land for a public improvement.
The law does not so read, and it is believed that the
great weight of authority, including the United States
Supreme Court, is against the contention.
The question of necessity is distinct from the
question of public use, and former question is
exclusively for the legislature, except that if
the constitution or statute authorizes the
taking of property only in cases of necessity,
then the necessity becomes a judicial
question. (McQuillen Municipal Corporations,
Vol. IV, pp. 3090-3091.)
In the absence of some constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the
right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their
character. The determination of those
questions belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative determination is final and
conclusive, and the courts have no power to
review it. It rests with the legislature not only
to determine when the power of eminent
domain may be exercised, but also the
character, quality, method, and extent of such
exercise. And this power is unqualified, other
than by the necessity of providing that
compensation shall be made. Nevertheless,
 under the express provisions of the
constitution of some states the question of
necessity is made a judicial one, to be
determined by the courts and not by the
legislature.
While the legislature may itself exercise the
right of determining the necessity for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, it
may, unless prohibited by the constitution,
delegate this power to public officers or to
private corporations established to carry on
enterprises in which the public are interested,
and their determination that a necessity for the
exercise of the power exists is conclusive.
There is no restraint upon the power except
that requiring compensation to be made. And
when the power has been so delegated it is a
subject of legislative discretion to determine
what prudential regulations shall be
established to secure a discreet and judicious
exercise of the authority. It has been held that
in the absence of any statutory provision
submitting the matter to a court or jury the
decision of the question of necessity lies with
the body of individuals to whom the state has
delegated the authority to take, and the
legislature may be express provision confer
this power on a corporation to whom the
power of eminent domain is delegated unless
prohibited by the constitution. It is of course
competent for the legislature to declare that
the question shall be a judicial one, in which
case the court and not the corporation
determines the question of necessity. (15
Cyc., pp. 629-632.)
To the same effect is Lewis on Eminen Domain (3d
Edition, section 597).
I quote from the notes to Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of
United States Supreme Court Reports, p. 762, as
follows:
Neither can it be said that there is any
fundamental right secured by the constitution
of the United States to have the questions of
compensation and necessity both passed
upon by one and the same jury. In many
states the question of necessity is never
submitted to the jury which passes upon the
question of compensation. It is either settled
affirmatively by the legislature, or left to the
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judgment of the corporation invested with the
right to take property by condemnation. The
question of necessity is not one of a judicial
character, but rather one for determination by
the lawmaking branch of the government.
(Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403, 406
[25 L. ed., 206]; United States vs. Jones, 109
U.S., 513 [27 L. ed., 1015]; Backus vs. Fort
Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S., 557, 568
[42 L. ed., 853].)
Speaking generally, it is for the state primarily
and exclusively, to declare for what local
public purposes private property, within its
limits may be taken upon compensation to the
owner, as well as to prescribe a mode in
which it may be condemned and taken.
(Madisonville Tract. Co. vs. St. Bernard Min.
Co., 196 U.S., 239, 252 [49 L. ed., 462].)
Courts have no power to control the legislative
authority in the exercise of their right to
determine when it is necessary or expedient
to condemn a specific piece of property for
public purposes. (Adirondack R. Co. vs. New
York States, 176 U.S., 335 [44 L. ed., 492].)
10 R. C. L. (p. 183), states the law as follows:
158. Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial
question. The legislature, in providing for
the exercise the power of eminent domain,
may directly determine the necessity for
appropriating private property for a particular
improvement or public use, and it may select
the exact location of the improvement. In such
a case, it is well settled that the utility of the
proposed improvement, the extent of the
public necessity for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the suitableness
of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its
site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have
no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for these of the representatives of
the people. Similarly, when the legislature has
delegated the power of eminent domain to
municipal or public service corporation or
other tribunals or bodies, and has given them
discretion as to when the power is to be called
into exercise and to what extent, the court will
 not inquire into the necessity or propriety of
the taking.
The United States Supreme Court recently said:
The uses to which this land are to be put are
undeniably public uses. When that is the case
the propriety or expediency of the
appropriation cannot be called in question by
any other authority. (Cinnati vs. S. & N. R. R.
Co., 223 U.S., 390, quoting U.S. vs. Jones,
109, U.S., 519.)
And in Sears vs. City of Akron (246 U.S., 242),
decided March 4th, 1918, it said:
Plaintiff contends that the ordinance is void
because the general statute which authorized
the appropriation violates both Article 1,
paragraph 10, of the Federal Constitution, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it
authorizes the municipality to determine the
necessity for the taking of private property
without the owners having an opportunity to
be hear as to such necessity; that in fact no
necessity existed for any taking which would
interfere with the company's project; since the
city might have taken water from the Little
Cuyahoga or the Tuscarawas rivers; and
furthermore, that it has taken ten times as
much water as it can legitimately use. It is well
settled that while the question whether the
purpose of a taking is a public one is judicial
(Hairston vs. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S.
598 [52 L. ed., 637; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 331; 13
Ann. Cas., 1008]), the necessity and the
proper extent of a taking is a legislative
question. (Shoemaker vs. United States, 147
U.S., 282, 298 [57 L. ed., 170, 184; 13 Supt.
Ct. Rep., 361]; United States vs. Gettysburg
Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 685 [40 L. ed.,
576, 582; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 427]; United
States vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
229 U.S., 53, 65 [57 L. ed., 1063, 1076; 33
Sup. Ct. Rep., 667].)
I think the case should be decided in accordance with
foregoing citations, but one other point has been
argued so extensively that it ought to be considered.
It is contended for the defense that this Chinese
Cemetery is a public cemetery and that it cannot
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
therefore be taken for public use. In its answer the
"Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a
corporation organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it
owns the land which plaintiff seeks to acquire. The
facts that it is private corporation owning land would
seem of necessity to make the land it owns private
land. The fact that it belongs to the Chinese
community deprives it of any public character.
But admitting that it is a public cemetery, although
limited in its use to the Chinese Community of the city
of Manila, can it not be taken for public use? Must we
let the reverence we feel for the dead and the sanctity
of their final resting-place obstruct the progress of the
living? It will be instructive to inquire what other
jurisdictions have held on that point.
On the Application of Board of Street Openings of
New York City to acquire St. Johns Cemetery (133
N.Y., 329) the court of appeal said:
. . . The board instituted this proceeding under
the act to acquire for park purposes the title to
land below One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street
known as St. John's cemetery which belonged
to a religious corporation in the city of New
York, commonly called Trinity Church. It was
established as a cemetery as early as 1801,
and used for that purpose until 1839, during
which time about ten thousand human bodies
had been buried therein. In 1839 an ordinance
was passed by the city of New York forbidding
interments south of Eighty-sixth street, and
since that time no interments have been made
in the cemetery, but Trinity Church has
preserved and kept it in order and prevented
any disturbance thereof.
It is contended on behalf of Trinity Church that
under the general authority given by statute of
1887, this land which had been devoted to
cemetery purposes could not be taken for a
park. The authority conferred upon the board
by the act is broad and general. It is
authorized to take for park purposes any land
south of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street. . .
..
The fact that lands have previously been
devoted to cemetery purposes does not place
them beyond the reach of the power of
 eminent domain. That is an absolute
transcendent power belonging to the
sovereign which can be exercised for the
public welfare whenever the sovereign
authority shall determine that a necessity for
its exercise exists. By its existence the homes
and the dwellings of the living, and the resting-
places of the dead may be alike condemned.
It seems always to have been recognized in
the laws of this state, that under the general
laws streets and highways could be laid out
through cemeteries, in the absence of special
limitation or prohibition. . . .
In Re Opening of Twenty-second Street (102 Penn.
State Reports, 108) the Supreme Court of the State
said:
This was an action for the opening of a street
through a cemetery in the City of Philadelphia.
It was contended for the United American
Mechanics and United Daughters of America
Cemetery Association that by an act of the
legislature of the State approved March 20th,
1849, they were forever exempt from the
taking of any their property for streets, roads
or alleys and this Act was formally accepted
by the Cemetery Company on April 9th, 1849,
and there was, therefore, a contract between
the Cemetery Company and the State of
Pennsylvania, which would be violated by the
taking of any part of their property for street
purposes. It was further contended that there
were 11,000 persons buried in the cemetery.
The court held that property and contracts of
all kinds must yield to the demand of the
sovereign and that under the power of
eminent domain all properties could be taken,
and that if there was a contract between the
State of Pennsylvania and the Cemetery
Association, the contract itself could be taken
for public use, and ordered the opening of the
street through the cemetery.
In Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme
Court Reports (p. 759), it is said:
Although it has been held, that where a state
has delegated the power of eminent domain to
a person or corporation and where by its
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
exercise lands have been subject to a public
use, they cannot be applied to another public
use without specific authority expressed or
implied to that effect, yet, the general rule
seems to be that the fact that property is
already devoted to a public use, does not
exempt it from being appropriated under the
right of eminent domain but it may be so taken
for a use which is clearly superior or
paramount to the one to which it is already
devoted. (Citing many United States Supreme
Court decisions.)
A few cases have been cited where the courts
refused to allow the opening of streets through
cemeteries, but in my opinion they are not as well
considered as the cases and authorities relied upon
herein.
The holding of this court in this case reverses well
settled principles of law of long standing and almost
universal acceptance.
The other assignments of error need not be
considered as they are involved in the foregoing.
The decision should be reversed and the record
returned to the Court of First Instance with
instructions to proceed with the case in accordance
with this decision.
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON
OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G.
3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is,
in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
our ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de
consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore
invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks
greater influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already
pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1),
it would not be just that such donations should subsist
lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should
turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of
validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She
is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code,
she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
A question of first impression is before this Court in
this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether
the ban on a donation between the spouses during a
marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The
plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister
to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a
donation made while he was living maritally without
benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would
uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it
was made at a time before defendant was married to
the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character,
this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of
ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response that
should be given. The conclusion reached therein is
that a donation between common-law spouses falls
within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary
to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be
reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower
court, after stating that in plaintiffs complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question,
she specifically raised the question that the donation
made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid
article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the
other hand did assert ownership precisely because
such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage
to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted
that when the case was called for trial on November
19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it
quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant
assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree
and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena
owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos
in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the
parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956,
which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3)
That the donation of the land to the defendant which
took effect immediately was made during the common
law relationship as husband and wife between the
defendant-done and the now deceased donor and
later said donor and done were married on March 28,
1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died
intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff
claims the property by reason of being the only sister
and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by
virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name
and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts
was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were
not yet married. At that time they were not spouses.
They became spouses only when they married on
March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of
the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954
Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista,
7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el
uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according
to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating
the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur
of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum
et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it
is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence
of one party over the other, so that the danger that the
law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib.
32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such
donations should subsist, lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So
long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the
absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would
be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure
to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its
essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at
all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and
what is right would be nullified if such irregular
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal
norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If
there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this
is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such
codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely
literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of
Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser
la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin
de sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the
deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to
the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March
28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for
in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to
the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November
23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void,
with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized.
The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Endnotes:
1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation
between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void. This prohibition does not apply when the
donation takes effect after the death of the donor.
Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).
3. Ibid., p. 3686.
4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
6. Ibid, p. 21.
7. 50 O.G. 3679.
8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly
worded: "All donations between the spouses made
during the marriage shall be void."cralaw virtua1aw
library
9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686
(1954).
10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans.
Workers Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil.
833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretacin de
la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley
debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la
aplicacin de sus dispociones. No deben atenerse a
la letra de la ley cuando la interpretacin literal se
separa de la intencin de la legislatura especialmente
cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con objeto
manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la
interpretacin literal y la interpretacin fundada en el
proposito de la ley, la ltima debe prevalecer." Cf.
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil, 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105;
Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970,
35 SCRA 279.
11. According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should
brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children the other half. (953, 837a)."
G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-
appellant.
Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial Attorney
Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found
guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the
costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February
19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed
as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela,
Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum
Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the
accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one
(1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an
undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was
an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to
him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and
that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in
the performance of his official duty and for his personal
protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found
in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described
pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a
license to possess them. An investigation was
conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint
was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial
after which the accused was convicted of the crime
charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case
was appealed to US and the accused assigned three
errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing
of this case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed
are whether or not the present subject matter falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or
not the appointment of the appellant as special agent
of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry
and posses firearms exempts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt
that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over
cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally
the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took
cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the
offense charged because under Section 44 of
Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred
pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the
information is punishable by imprisonment for a
period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day
nor more than five (5) years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more
than six (6) months or fine of not more than two
hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment
and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But
considering that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms with which the appellant was charged is
penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less
than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five
(5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not
less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more
than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act
No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court.
The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction
over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no
question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret
agent with the authority to carry and possess
firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the
performance of his official duties and for his personal
protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed
by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to
apply for a license or to register the said firearm because
it was government property and therefore could not
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6
Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received
the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to
carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already
appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine
then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs.
Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment
of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes
sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace
officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of
People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the
Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no
criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant
Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The
bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and
Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Exhibit 1, p. 52, Rollo.
2 Exhibit 2, p. 53, Rollo.
3 Exhibit 3, p. 54, Rollo.
4 Exhibit 1 reads:
You are hereby accredited as Special
Agent without regular compensation. This
designation does not confer upon you
police powers and authority to make
investigations provided by Section 848 of
the Revised Administrative Code nor does
it entitled you to (possess and carry
firearms or) take free rides in any public
 conveyances. ..." (The parentheses are
ours and the words within were crossed
out and initialed by Col. Jose C. Maristela,
Chief, CIS, who signed appellant's
appointment.)
5 Exhibit 2 reads:
I akcnowledged to have received
from Captain Adolfo M. Bringas,
Inf (PC) ASO, CIS, HPC, the
following property for which I am
responsible, subject to the
provisions of the Accounting Law,
and will be used in the office of
CIS, HPC: 1 Pistol Melior SN-
122137 with one (1) mag & stock
Total value P40.00 Note: For the
use of Agt. Jesus E. Santayana
while in the performance of his
official duties. Approved: t/s/ Jose
C. Maristela, Colonel, Inf (GSC)
Chief, CIS, HPC. ...
6 T.S.N., p. 4, July 30, 1963.
7 L-12088, December 23,
1959, 106 Phil. 713. See also
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA
607.
8 L-22301, August 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 1164.
___________________________________________
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner
Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action
for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of
respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the
use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not
in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded
absence of any express power granted to respondent
by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and
the bar to any such implication arising from any
provision found therein, if deference be paid to the
principle that a statute is to be construed consistently
with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost
priority to freedom of expression, much more so when
utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970,
the very same day the case was orally argued, five
days after its filing, with the election barely a week
away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ
of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to
explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on
October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent
Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him
five days previously, informed him that his certificate
of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with
sound systems and loud speakers, an order which,
according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional
right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner,
he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time
praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next
day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer
not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time
setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3,
1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was
no denial in the answer filed by respondent on
November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in
the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was
premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and
the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." 3It was its
contention that the jingle proposed to be used by
petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and
therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the
above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the
petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was
argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing
in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing
in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account
the need for urgency, the election being barely a
week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day,
a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition,
setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the
part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of
the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the
principle that the construction placed on the statute by
respondent Commission on Elections would raise
serious doubts about its validity, considering the
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner.
Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly,
as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is
permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing
or implementing or demanding compliance with its
aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by
candidates. This resolution is immediately executory."
4 abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3,
1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called
upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted
by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend,
however, that one of its provisions referred to above
makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the
like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words
sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter
differently. What was done cannot merit our approval
under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the
general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that
what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of
respondent Commission was its failure to manifest
fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain
Administrative Code provisions were given a
"construction which should be more in harmony with the
tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of
removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional
infirmity from legislative enactments has always
commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the
ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between
what a statute provides and what the Constitution
requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the
controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a
cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the
above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act
were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped
jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of
unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in
unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an
our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls
all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to
impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which
this constitutional right is directed. Nor could
respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to
taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or
through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers.
Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his
say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this
Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then
the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a
previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It
would negate indirectly what the Constitution in
express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as
the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the
highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate
of our system of government. That is to manifest
fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that
which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. The three departments of government in
the discharge of the functions with which it is
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its
commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must
ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority,
whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore
or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the
law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is
decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of
judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of
the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication
is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to
respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the
present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of
the executive department although independent of
the President to which the Constitution has given
the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has
been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not
have been otherwise, that respondent Commission
cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside
of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its
powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only
thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to
insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately
fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending
approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent
Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so
vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's
case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on
solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of
November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is
permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing
or implementing or demanding compliance with its
aforesaid order banning the use of political taped
jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1
on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the
views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that
"there could be no justification .... for lending approval to
any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission,
the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the
following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the
constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally,
respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed
summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile
unit roaming around and announcing a meeting
and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is
used only for a certain place for a meeting and he
uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is
no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application,
however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of
a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not
whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act"
but imposed the condition "provided that there are no
jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the
use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election
propaganda, is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement
fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A.
6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle'
has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by
the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12
of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be
easily and inexpensively disseminated through a
mobile sound system throughout the candidate's
district, respondent Commission would outlaw
"recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the
candidate that he make use of the mobile sound
system only by personal transmission and repeatedly
personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken
message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the
process or employ another person to do so personally
even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate,
therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and
expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test
of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a
reasonable relation to the proper governmental object
and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and
arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers"
or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned,
respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the
same falls within the prohibition of section 12,
paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by
petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's
premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different
from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these
both represent forms of election advertisements to
make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy
known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is
not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through
the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the
Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges
unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the
candidate's right of free expression, even though such
"jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears,
the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on
the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which
"streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense
of sight should likewise be held to be an
unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of
the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as
invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it
may be, should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit
of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and
effective implementation of the Act's limitation in
section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be
made by a candidate or by another person with his
knowledge and consent.
# Separate Opinions
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1
on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the
views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that
"there could be no justification .... for lending approval to
any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission,
the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the
following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the
constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally,
respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed
summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile
unit roaming around and announcing a meeting
and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is
used only for a certain place for a meeting and he
uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is
no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application,
however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of
a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not
whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act"
but imposed the condition "provided that there are no
jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the
use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election
propaganda, is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement
fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A.
6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle'
has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by
the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12
of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be
easily and inexpensively disseminated through a
mobile sound system throughout the candidate's
district, respondent Commission would outlaw
"recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the
candidate that he make use of the mobile sound
system only by personal transmission and repeatedly
personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken
message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the
process or employ another person to do so personally
even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate,
therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and
expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test
of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a
reasonable relation to the proper governmental object
and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and
arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers"
or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned,
respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the
same falls within the prohibition of section 12,
paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by
petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's
premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different
from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these
both represent forms of election advertisements to
make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy
known to the voters is correct, but its conclusion is
not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through
the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the
Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges
unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the
candidate's right of free expression, even though such
"jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears,
the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on
the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which
"streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense
of sight should likewise be held to be an
unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of
the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as
invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it
may be, should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit
of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and
effective implementation of the Act's limitation in
section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be
made by a candidate or by another person with his
knowledge and consent.
# Footnotes
1 Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.
2 Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).
3 Section 12 (E), Ibid.
4 Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
5 Section 12(E), Constitutional Convention Act.
6 Cf. United States v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141
(1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union
Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919);
People vs. Kottinger 45 Phil. 352 (1923);
Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil. 605 (1956);
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social
Security Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1
SCRA 10.
7 Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil.
634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil.
409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress
Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of
Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil.
663 (1950); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil.
50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86
Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons
Construction, Inc., 87 Phil. 532 (1950);
American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
101 Phil. 386 (1957); Gonzales v.
Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9
SCRA 230; Automotive Parts and
Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406,
Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason
and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31
SCRA 413.
8 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429
(1950).
9 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US
373 (1933).
10 Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New
York, 334 US 558 (1948).
11 Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136
(1958). The portion of the opinion from
which the above excerpt is taken reads in
full: 'Lastly, as the branch of the executive
department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has
given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,' the
power of decision of the Commission is
 limited to purely 'administrative questions.'
(Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the
Philippines) It has no authority to decide
matters 'involving the right to vote.' It may
not even pass upon the legality of a given
vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections, 47 Off. Gaz., [6], 2851). We do
not see, therefore, how it could assert the
greater and more far-reaching authority to
determine who among those possessing
the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution, who have complied with the
procedural requirements, relative to the
filing of certificate of candidacy should
be allowed to enjoy the full benefits
intended by law therefore. The question
whether in order to enjoy those benefits
a candidate must be capable of
'understanding the full meaning of his acts
and the true significance of election,' and
must have over a month prior to the
elections (when the resolution complained
of was issued) 'the tiniest chance to obtain
the favorable indorsement of a substantial
portion of the electorate, is a matter of
policy, not of administration and
enforcement of the law which policy must
be determined by Congress in the exercise
of its legislative functions. Apart from the
absence of specific statutory grant of such
general, broad power as the Commission
claims to have, it is dubious whether, if so
granted in the vague, abstract,
indeterminate and undefined manner
necessary in order that it could pass upon
the factors relied upon in said resolution
(and such grant must not be deemed
made, in the absence of clear and positive
provision to such effect, which is absent in
the case at bar) the legislative
enactment would not amount to undue
delegation of legislative power. (Schechter
vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)" pp.
141-142.
12 Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections,
79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149
(1949); Guevara v. Commission on
Elections, 104 Phil. 268 (1958);
Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, L-
13827, Sept. 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 27; Lawsin
StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016
v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11
SCRA 643; Ututalum v. Commission on
Elections,
L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465;
Janairo v. Commission on Elections, L-
28315, Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173; Abes
v. Commission on Elections, L-28348, Dec.
15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v.
Commission on Elections,
L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457;
Binging Ho v. Mun. Board of Canvassers,
L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829.
13 Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections,
L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
The other cases are Espino v. Zaldivar, L-
22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204; Ong
v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan.
29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, L-28517, Feb.
21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido v.
Commission on Elections, L-28539, March
30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v.
Commission on Elections, L-28955, May
28, 1968, 23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, L-28869, June
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v.
Commission on Elections, L-29026, Sept.
28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v.
Commission on Elections, L-31380, Jan.
21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v.
Commission on Elections, L-31374, Jan.
21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v.
Commission on Elections, L-31394, Jan.
23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde v.
Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan.
23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72; Sinsuat v.
Pendatun,
L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re:
sections 8(A) and 12(F) and other related
provisions.
2 Petition, page 9.
___________________________________________
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO,
EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA,
JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A.
BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO
LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE
LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of
Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.

Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII,

StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016

presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao
M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below
an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element
of the crime.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue
which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.

A The Information filed by the People

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y

DURAN, accused.

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph

3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-
inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11- inches, which the
said accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,

accused.

CRIM. CASE
NO. 29677

VIOL. OF PAR.
3,

PD 9 IN REL.
TO LOI

StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016

 No. 266 of the
Chief

Executive
dated April 1,
1975

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF

PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266
of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 inches, the
same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used
in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

CRIM. CASE
NO. 933

For:

ILLEGAL
POSSESSION
OF

DEADLY
WEAPON

(VIOLATION
OF PD NO. 9)

INFORMATION

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO

REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or
VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz,
Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument
which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to

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 earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B. The Orders of dismissal

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one
essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like
outside residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must
specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of
abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness,
public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as
justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense
contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration suffer from
this defect.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings
of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under
P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the
terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before
martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and
even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik.

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its
necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the
hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and
the conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is
prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-
66)

2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It
is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed,
pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable
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 by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions.
This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also
made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly
or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing
clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in
one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be
not unlawful and punishable by law.

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through
Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this
act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of
the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita".
If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on
his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just
bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the
meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as
imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said
knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by
his cook in preparing his meals.

This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and
applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of
the President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President
intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-
46229-32)

3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before
him, thus:

... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same
should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder.
Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was
issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and
anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the
people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying
firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under
the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the
penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision
of the said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

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 It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of
status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a
crime nor as their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would
arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal
case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash
the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate
release unless held on other charges.

C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED

SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines
has been placed under a state of martial law;

WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September
22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by
me;

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and

public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and
abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation
No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator
shall, upon conviction suffer:

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed
and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their
agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons,
property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General
Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any
public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
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 allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to
be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and
other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs,"
"fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion,
quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or
by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of
producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a
person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from
ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as
"fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such
articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being
used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.

4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the
particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-two.

(SGD) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

D. The arguments of the People

In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and
the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument
advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized
for reasons of public policy. 1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits
the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and
condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the
like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law
days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2

E. Our Ruling on the matter

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. 3
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Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or
information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is
imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling
reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a
Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:

Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions
of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a
fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4,
1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both,
at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its
deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is
necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute
and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of
the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by
P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This
principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the
state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.

Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or
a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the
right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of
the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent
or misguided official action a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial
functions are daily exposed to such dangers.

2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the
presidential decree in question?

We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying
the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of
the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.

Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D.
9(3).

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3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his
residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose,
converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial
task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal
statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the
words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice
and contradictions. 8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).

First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled
out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.

The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is
not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120,
rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the
decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason
which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)

We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D.
9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs
which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of
the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and
Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in
itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294,
cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")

In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions. 9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.

In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:

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 NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation
No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

xxx xxx xxx

From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired
result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7
refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed
weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance
are quoted hereunder:

WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted
government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of
armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private
buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of
which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety
and the security of the nation, ...

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness,
chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war
between the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their
satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults,
violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations,
treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed
by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not
stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary
and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by
overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on
the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp.
13-39)

It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to
the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to
be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)

When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the
statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory
Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)

5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a

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It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work
a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings
of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under
P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the
terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before
martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and
even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)

And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times.
To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his
house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while
crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him
under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to
produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?

6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:

Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made
clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to
be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5
SCRA 684, 692)

F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is
in order.

Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or
information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered
knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14

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In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the
Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a
public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available
remedies below.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is
sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the
defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is
not made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in
the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the
defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some
other charge.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:

First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the
second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780,
quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if
not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.

Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f)
and (h) of this rule.

Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability
had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid.,
[h])

As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases
should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.

H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to
the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3)
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face
of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.

On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on
October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
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 In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly
constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D.
No. 9. 17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial
task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental
rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have
to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their
faith in their government.

WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding
pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended
Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city
ordinance as the facts may warrant.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.

Aquino, J, took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring.

I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending
the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.

Makasiar, J, concurs.

CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:

I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring.

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I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending
the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.

Makasiar, J, concurs.

CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:

I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.

StatCon Cases | 20 August 2016