SECOND DIVISION
[3]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
-versus-
IGNACIO TONOG, JR., also known as ABDUL
TONOG, JR., ALVIN ROLANDO SOLAMILLO, also
known as ALLAN SOLAMILLO, JOHN DOE, and
PETER DOE, Accused.
ALVIN ROLANDO SOLAMILLO also known as
ALLAN SOLAMILLO, Appellant
G.R. No. 144497
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 34, Dumaguete
City, finding the appellant, Alvin Rolando Solamillo
alias Allan Solamillo, guilty of murder in Criminal Case
No. 8123.
The appellant, along with accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr.
and two others, was charged in an Amended
Information[2] which reads, thus:
The undersigned Fiscals accuses [sic] IGNACIO
TONOG, JR. alias ABDUL TONOG, ALVIN ROLANDO
SALAMILLO alyas [sic] ALLAN SALAMILLO, JOHN DOE
and PETER DOE of the crime of MURDER, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 24th day of April, 1988, in the
City of Dumaguete, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring and mutually aiding one another, with the
use of a motorvehicle [sic] in which they brought said
EFREN FLORES to an uninhabited place, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and with intent to
kill said EFREN FLORES, and armed with a deadly
weapon, to wit: a Batangas knife, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and wound
therewith said EFREN FLORES during nighttime,
inflicting upon said EFREN FLORES the following
injuries to wit:
which injuries directly caused the death of said EFREN
FLORES.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying
circumstances of use of a motorvehicle [sic], taking
advantage of superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited
place and cruelty.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr. moved for a separate
trial, because his co-accused were still at large.[4] The
court granted the motion. The case as against the
appellant was archived. After trial, the court rendered
judgment convicting Tonog, Jr. of murder and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr. alias
Abdul Tonog is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and the Court hereby
imposes on him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased victim the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.
The case filed against his co-accused Allan Solamillo
and two other unidentified individuals are hereby
ordered archived, without prejudice to their further
prosecution, considering that until this time they have
not yet been apprehended and still remain at large.[5]
The ruling of the trial court was affirmed by this Court
in G.R. No. 94533[6] on February 4, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, except with respect to the indemnity, which
is hereby increased to P50,000.00. Costs against
accused-appellant, Ignacio Tonog, Jr.[7]
More than six years later, or on April 8, 1998, the
appellant was arrested in Cabato Road, Tetuan,
Zamboanga City.[8] Upon motion[9] of the Assistant
City Prosecutor, Criminal Case No. 8123 was revived.
The appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge against him.[10] Trial
commenced as to the appellant.
The Case for the Prosecution[11]
Thirty-eight-year-old Liberato Solamillo, Jr., the
appellants first cousin, was a fish vendor in Tinago,
Dumaguete City. In the year 1988, he worked as a
driver of his fathers motorcab. He was also a part-time
driver of Jun Salabante, and drove the motorcab
owned by the latter, bearing sidecar number 0164. The
appellant was its regular driver.
On April 24, 1988, Liberato started plying his route at
around 6:00 a.m. and was still driving until about 5:30
p.m. Liberatos uncle and the appellants father,
Teodoro Solamillo, arrived from Zamboanga and asked
to be accompanied to look for his son. Liberato and
Page 1 of 40
Teodoro searched for the appellant using the motorcab
with sidecar no. 0164, and found the appellant
sleeping at the house of his grandmother, Felisa
Solamillo. Teodoro awakened his son and the two of
them conversed. Liberato was told to wait, so he stood
by the motorcab and did as he was told. Thereafter,
the appellant, Teodoro and Liberato boarded the
motorcab and left. Teodoro alighted at the house of his
father, Paulo Solamillo, in Lawisid, Sitio Bacong. The
appellant was then wearing a plain white shirt and
maong pants.[12]
At around 7:00 p.m., Liberato and the appellant then
went to Noras Store located at Sitio Bacong. Ignacio
Tonog, Jr. was also at the store. Liberato drank soft
drinks, while the appellant and Tonog, Jr. drank beer.
At around 7:30 p.m., the appellant requested Liberato
to bring a certain Emil to the cockpit in Dumaguete
City. Liberato did as he was told, and no longer
collected the fare because the passenger was a friend
of the appellants. The trip from Bacong to Dumaguete
and back took about forty-five minutes.[13]
At around this time, Patrolman Remigio Biyok was
watching a movie at the house of Charlie Yee with
many others. The place was about one hundred fifty
meters from Noras Store.[14] At 8:00 pm., Julian
Valencia approached Pat. Biyok and informed the latter
that the appellant had fired a gun somewhere within
the vicinity of the store. Pat. Biyok went to the police
station which was about a hundred meters away from
Noras Store, before proceeding to the place.[15] His
companions, Patrolman Mendoza, Patrolman Tao and
Patrolman Tuballa had already gone ahead to
investigate the matter. Pat. Biyok saw the appellant
within the vicinity of the Noras Store. He also saw
Tonog, Jr., who asked to be conveyed to Tinago,
Dumaguete City, to the house his brother was renting.
Pat. Biyok obliged, since Tonog, Jr. also happened to
be the brother of then Chief of Police Lt. Isaias
Tonog.[16] Tonog, Jr. then left with Pat. Biyok on
board the latters Yamaha 80 motorcycle. It was about
9:30 p.m.[17]
When Liberato went back to Sitio Bacong, Dumaguete
City, he saw the appellant and Tonog, Jr. standing
outside Noras Store. Divina, the store owners
daughter, was also there. Three policemen were within
the vicinity. Liberator heard that one of them, either
Tonog, Jr. or the appellant, had caused a commotion
by firing a gun.[18] He also saw Tonog, Jr. leave with
Pat. Biyok.
At about 9:30 p.m., Liberato and the appellant went
looking for Tonog, Jr. using the motorcab bearing
sidecar no. 0164. They passed by Pat. Biyoks house in
Banilad, Dumaguete City, which was about five
kilometers from Sitio Bacong. Efren Flores, the son of
former Philippine National Police Chief Nick Flores, was
then at Pat. Biyoks house, drinking beer with
friends.[19] Pat. Biyok arrived from the trip to Tinago,
Dumaguete City, which was about five to six
kilometers away[20] and saw Efren at his house.
Liberato and the appellant arrived and inquired on the
whereabouts of Tonog, Jr. The appellant asked Pat.
Biyok where Tonog, Jr. had gone, and Pat. Biyok
replied that he had already brought the latter to Sitio
Tinago.[21]
In the meantime, Efren Flores came near Liberato and
the appellant, and said, I would like to ride with you to
Dumaguete. The appellant told Liberato to stay at Pat.
Biyoks residence as he (the appellant) would be the
one to take Efren Flores to Dumaguete City. Stay here,
the appellant told Liberato.[22] The appellant promised
that he would be back within five minutes.[23] Pat.
Biyok saw Efren Flores on board the motorcab driven
by the appellant.[24] The motorcab was about ten to
fifteen meters away, and Pat. Biyok saw them as he
was sitting on the porch of his house. The place was lit
by a Meralco lamp post, about twenty to twenty-five
meters away.[25]
Liberato waited in vain for the appellant to return. He
watched an on-going amateur contest and decided to
leave the place about thirty minutes later.[26]
Liberato then waited for a ride and saw his friend,
Gorio, pass by in a motorcab. He requested Gorio to
accompany him to look for the appellant in Sitio
Tinago. They went around Dumaguete City, but did not
find the appellant. They then decided to go home.
Along the way, they passed by the store owned by
Liberatos aunt, Francisca Bueno, which was located
along the national highway at Sitio Bacong, Banilad,
Dumaguete City. They saw the motorcab bearing
sidecar no. 0164 and approached the vehicle. Liberato
saw Tonog, Jr. inside.
Liberato then went into his aunts house. He saw the
appellant buying sardines and one family-sized soft
drink. He asked the appellant why he showed up only
now, and the latter told him to keep quiet and to let
Gorio go ahead.[27] Thereafter, he saw the appellant
and his other cousin, Elvis Bueno, conversing. They
were about one meter away from each other.[28]
Liberato then overheard the appellant say Nakuha na
gyod, Bes (Already taken Bes).[29] As the appellant
uttered those words, Liberato noticed that the latters
fatigue shirt had plenty of red stains. He then
remembered that the appellant was wearing a white
shirt while they were still at the store. He did not ask
Page 2 of 40
the appellant about the red stains, because the latter
seemed fearful at the time. Nothing was said of the
incident. It was by then past 11:00 p.m.[30]
Later, the group went back to the house of Liberatos
grandfather, Paulo Solamillo. Paulo was angry at
Liberato for going home so late. Tonog, Jr. and the
appellant ate and conversed, while Liberato slept.
Liberato woke up at 6:00 a.m. and started plying his
usual route, using the motorcab owned by Jun
Salabante.
At about 6:00 a.m. on April 25, 1988, the Dumaguete
Police Station received reports that a lifeless body had
been found at the crossing of Cantil-e, Dumaguete
City.[31] Upon receiving the report, SPO1 Walter R.
Leguarda immediately went to the place where the
body was reported found and conducted an
investigation. He learned that the Flores family, who
lived near the place where the body of the victim was
found, spotted the motorcab bearing sidecar number
0164 within the vicinity. After learning that the vehicle
belonged to Jun Salabante, SPO1 Leguarda proceeded
to the latters house where he was informed that the
drivers of the vehicle were Liberato Solamillo and the
appellant. SPO1 Leguarda then went to Liberatos place
to investigate the matter further. Liberato told him
that the appellant borrowed the motorcab that day.
Thus, the police operatives went to Sitio Bacong to
arrest Tonog, Jr., but did not find the suspect there.
Afterwards, however, Tonog, Jr. voluntarily went with
the police authorities to the police station for
questioning. After the investigation, SPO1 Leguarda
saw Tonog, Jr. seated on a bench, and appeared to be
crying. SPO1 Leguarda approached him and asked why
his pants had so many blood stains. Tonog, Jr. looked
surprised and asked where the station commander
was. He then politely confessed to Police Captain Pedro
Centeno that he was one of the killers of Efren Flores
and that he used a Batangas knife, which, however, he
gave to the appellant.[32]
SPO1 Leguarda also testified that he saw the appellant
talking with Captain Nick Flores, the father of the
victim, near the kampanaryo at the Quezon Park,
Dumaguete City, at the corner of Perdices and Colon
Streets. According to Leguarda, he saw the two of
them talking early in the morning, after their formation
before reporting to their respective duties, on three or
four occasions. He did not think much about it at the
time.[33]
SPO1 Leguarda also recounted that he was able to talk
to the late Captain Flores before the latter died. It was
the first week of January, 1995. Captain Flores
requested him to appear in court if ever the appellant
would be arrested. He was told that the appellant was
an informer or asset, and that in connection with a tire
he helped to recover, the appellant was promised
reward money in the amount of P5,000.00. However,
Captain Flores was unable to give the money to the
appellant. Captain Flores narrated that the appellant
threatened to kill him because of the incident.[34]
SPO1 Leguarda also recounted that Tonog, Jr. had a
grudge on the victim, and learned of the motive behind
the killing from Tonog, Jr.s girlfriend. Efren Flores and
Tonog apparently had an argument while both were
drunk, which led the victim to strangle the latter with
his hands.
Liberato found out about the killing from some of his
passengers, as he was plying his usual route. He was
then invited for questioning by the police in the
afternoon of April 25, 1988. When the police asked him
were he was the night before, he replied that he and
the appellant were together.
SPO3 Vilma Beltran testified she was on duty at the
Police Station of Dumaguete City. At around 11:00
a.m. of April 25, 1988, Sgt. Patricio brought Tonog, Jr.
to the station. The suspect was made to remove his
pants, which Sgt. Patricio handed to her. Tonog, Jr.
also turned over a stainless knife. Both items were
placed in a transparent plastic pack and labeled. The
bag containing the items was then forwarded to
Forensic Chemist Myrna Areola.[35]
City Health Officer Urbano E. Diga examined the
cadaver of the victim and documented the following
findings in his medico-legal report:
1. Wound at the pre-auricular area 2 cm. from the
right ear measuring 0.2 cm x 1.5 cm. non-penetrating;
2. Wound 3 cm. above wound no. 1 measuring 0.2
cm. x 1 cm. non-penetrating;
3. Wound at the angle of the right mandible
measuring 1 cm. x 2.8 cm. x 9 c.m.;
4. Wound above wound no. 3 measuring 0.3 cm. x
1 cm. non-penetrating;
5. Wound at the right lateral neck measuring 0.3
cm. x 1 cm. x 6.5 cm.;
6. Wound below wound no. 5 (4 cm. distance)
measuring 0.5 cm. x 1 cm. x 6 cm.;
7. Wound 6 cm. below right middle portion of the
clavicle measuring 1 cm. x 2 cm. x 13.5 cm.;
Page 3 of 40
8. Wound 4 cm. below medial 3rd of the right
clavicle measuring 1 cm. x 2 cm. x 13.6 cm.;
9. Wound 4 cm. above the right nipple measuring
0.5 cm. x 1.4 cm. non-penetrating;
10. Wound 2 cm. from the level of the right nipple
measuring 1 cm. x 1.5 cm. The direction of the wound
is upward measuring 14 cm. deep.
11. Wound at the third medial portion of the left
clavicle measuring 1 cm. x 3 cm. x 13.7 cm.
12. Wound 1 cm. below wound no. 11 measuring 0.3
cm. x 1 cm.
13. Wound 2 cm. below wound no. 12 measuring 0.3
cm. x 1.5 cm. non-penetrating;
14. Wound 1 cm. below wound no. 13 measuring 0.3
cm. x 7.5 cm.;
15. Wound 7 cm. above the left nipple measuring 1
cm. x 1.5 cm x 14.5 cm.;
16. Wound 1 cm. below wound no. 15 measuring 1
cm. x 1.5 cm. x 14.5 cm.;
17. Wound 1.8 cm. above and to the right of the left
nipple measuring 0.5 cm. x 0.2 cm. x 2 cm. x 13.5 cm.
18. Wound just below the left nipple horizontally
directed measuring 0.2 cm. x 2 cm. x 13.5 cm.;
19. Wound 2 cm. to the right of wound no. 18
measuring 0.6 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 15 cm.;
20. Wound just above the right subcostal region
measuring 1.3 cm. x 4 cm. The wound is directed
upward measuring 15 cm. deep;
21. Wound 3 cm. below the right subcostal region
among (sic) nipple line measuring 1 cm. x 2 cm. The
wound is directed upward measuring 10.5 cm. deep;
22. Wound along right midaxillary line (lumbar region)
measuring 1 cm. x 2 cm. x 2 cm.;
23. Wound at the right 11th posterior rib measuring
0.8 cm. x 7.9 cm. non[-]penetrating directed
horizontally;
24. Wound 1.5 cm. above wound no. 23 directed
obliquely 0.8 cm. x 1.5 cm.;
25. Wound right posterior lumbar measuring 0.5 cm.
x 2 cm. directed horizontally. The wound is 15 cm.
deep;
26. Wound 7 cm. above wound no. 25 measuring 0.5
cm. x 1.5 cm. x 4.5 cm.;
27. Hematoma and swelling of both lips.[36]
The doctor also testified that of the twenty-six (26)
wounds inflicted on the victim, fourteen (14) were
fatal,[37] and that the weapon used by the assailant
could have been a long, sharp, bladed instrument.[38]
The doctor also executed the victims certificate of
death.[39] He testified that the victim was his nephew
by affinity, as his wife was the cousin of the victims
father. The victim also happened to be their neighbor
in Banilad.[40]
Wilna Portugaleza, the custodian of the medical
records at the Holy Child Hospital, testified that the
records of the victim Efren Flores were no longer
available as of 1996. The blood type of the victim as
indicated in the certified true copy of the records of the
hospital was Type O.[41]
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant, for his part, filed a Manifestation[42]
submitting the attached Demurrer to Evidence,[43]
with a reservation that in the event an adverse
decision would be rendered, such decision would be
appealed to this Court. The appellant, through counsel,
prayed that judgment be rendered acquitting him for
insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The court thereafter rendered judgment convicting the
appellant of murder in its decision dated May 17, 2000,
thus:
WHEREFORE, accused ALVIN ROLANDO SOLAMILLO,
alias ALLAN SOLAMILLO, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and the court
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), and to pay the costs.
There is no more need to pronounce judgment against
co-accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr. alias Abdul, considering
the fact that in this case, he was earlier convicted by
this Court of the crime of Murder and meted the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, which conviction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, the City Warden of
Page 4 of 40
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Dumaguete City, is hereby directed to immediately
transmit the living body of accused Alvin Rolando
Solamillo, alias Allan Solamillo, to the New Bilibid
Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, where he may
remain to be detained.
SO ORDERED.[44]
The Present Appeal
The appellant now appeals the decision of the trial
court, contending as follows:
A) THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT HAS ERRED
IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
B) THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT WAS
MANIFESTLY BIASED AGAINST AND/OR HAS
PREJUDGED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED EVEN
BEFORE [THE] PROSECUTION PRESENTED ITS
EVIDENCE WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS;
C) THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE DURING THE HEARING APPEARS
TO BE UNETHICAL, UNPLEASANT AND UNCALLED
FOR.[45]
According to the appellant, the prosecution miserably
failed to prove the existence of circumstantial evidence
to establish his participation in the crime. He avers
that no bloodstain was found in the motorcab bearing
sidecar no. 0164, precisely because it was never
inspected, verified, nor examined by the police
authorities. Furthermore, prosecution witness SPO1
Walter Leguarda testified that a certain Flores, the
owner of the house near the place where the victim
was found, told him that the said motorcab was seen
that evening within the vicinity of the crime scene.
However, the said Flores was not presented as a
witness.
The appellant also points out that that there are
inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness
Police Inspector Orlando Patricio, who testified that he
found the knife in the morning of April 25, 1988, but
admitted that the knife presented in open court was
not the Batangas knife recovered at the crime scene.
He also testified that he merely placed the said knife
inside the tools compartment of the jeep, and never
confronted the appellant with such knife.
The appellant also questions the trial courts reliance on
the testimony of Medical Record Custodian Wilna
Portugaleza, as she candidly admitted in open court
that she could not remember the blood type of the
victim as his medical records in the Holy Child Hospital
in Dumaguete City were already destroyed as of 1996.
The appellant also points out that there is serious
doubt as to whether the witness Liberato Solamillo, Jr.
actually heard the appellant utter the words Nakuha na
gyod bes to Elvis Bueno, considering that his testimony
remained uncorroborated.
According to the appellant, the fact that he left
Dumaguete City for Zamboanga City after the
commission of the crime is not evidence of his flight.
He was never in hiding in Zamboanga City. As a matter
of fact, the appellants father, Teodoro Solamillo,
arrived in Dumaguete City in the afternoon of April 24,
1988 for the purpose of fetching his son (the
appellant) to help in the management and operation of
their motorized tricycle transportation business in
Zamboanga City. Liberato further testified that he even
accompanied his uncle, Teodoro Solamillo, to look for
the appellant that afternoon of April 24, 1988, and
found the latter sleeping in their grandmothers house.
The appellant also posits that he had no motive to kill
Efren Flores, which, in this case, is relevant,
considering that the identity of the assailant is in
serious doubt. The motive presented by the
prosecution, that the appellant killed the victim
because he was not given his share of the reward
money of P5,000, is incredible and farfetched. The
prosecution witnesses failure to testify that the
appellant was in fact an asset of the late Capt. Nick
Flores (the victims father) when they testified in 1989
raises doubts as to their veracity. Thus, such
testimony was a mere afterthought on the part of the
prosecution witnesses.
In fine, the appellant questions the veracity of the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. As
such, the appellant asserts that the prosecution failed
to prove conspiracy and the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part,
contends that the appellants guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by interlocking circumstantial
evidence. Furthermore, the flight of the appellant from
Negros Oriental immediately after the incident, until he
was finally arrested ten years later in Mindanao, is an
indication of his guilt. The OSG concludes that the
obtaining circumstantial evidence against the appellant
serves as sufficient basis to convict the appellant of the
crime charged, as his participation in the crime
charged had already been established in Ignacio
Tonog, Jr.s conviction.
Page 5 of 40
The Ruling of the Court
The appellants contentions are without merit.
It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial courts
findings of facts, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the
probative weight of the evidence of the parties, as well
as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are
accorded great weight, and even conclusive effect,
unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the
outcome of the case. This is because of the unique
advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range,
the conduct, demeanor and the deportment of the
witnesses as they testify.[46] Upon a careful review of
the records of the instant case, the Court finds no
cogent reason to overrule the trial courts finding that
the appellant stabbed the victim in cold blood.
The Circumstantial Evidence
Against the Appellant is
Sufficient to Sustain a
Conviction
The counsel for the appellant filed a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, which, under Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, constitutes a waiver of the right to present
evidence. The case is then considered submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. In fact, in his demurrer before the trial
court, the appellant specifically prayed that judgment
be rendered in the case, and manifested that he was
no longer presenting evidence on his behalf, on the
ground that the evidence for the prosecution was
insufficient to convict him.
Contrary to the appellants contention, the prosecution
was able to prove his motive to commit the crime,
albeit belatedly. SPO1 Leguarda testified as follows:
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court, when did
you learn from the late Captain Flores that accused
Allan Solamillo was his informer or asset?
A Before [the] first week of January sir. Before he
died, January 1995.
Q Now, Captain Nick Flores is the father of Efren
Flores, isnt it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And, Efren Flores was murdered sometime in the
evening of April 24, 1998, is it not?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And per your investigation, Allan Solamillo has
something to do in (sic) the killing of Efren Flores, isnt
it?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Lets clarify this.
Q In your investigation, was Allan Solamillo involved in
the killing of the victim Efren Flores?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes sir, because that was [what] Liberato Solamillo
told me that he saw Allan Solamillo bought some
sardines and pepsi cola at the store of Francisca Buena
with some blood stains on his T-shirt Sir.
ATTY. EDDING:
Q But did you not reduce in writing about (sic) this
important informations (sic) that you learned from
Liberato Solamillo?
A I did not.
Q So, to your best knowledge, the late Captain Flores
also knew that Allan Solamillo has involvement (sic) in
the killing of his son Efren Flores as early as April 25,
1988?
A After his son was murdered Sir.
Q So he has knowledge already?
A After his son was murdered Sir, he has knowledge
already Sir.
Q About the alleged involvement of Allan Solamillo?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And of course, even if you were not so closed (sic)
with the late Captain Flores, you were always seeing
each other because you were at the same station?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So, you would like to tell us that from 1988, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94 up to sometime January 1995 or for the
Page 6 of 40
period of eight (8) years, only [a] few days before
Captain Flores died, that they revealed to you that
Allan Solamillo was his former asset or informer?
A Because I was relieved in the Dumaguete Police
Station Sir and was assigned in Canlaon Sir.
Q The late Captain Flores told you that Allan Solamillo
was his asset or informer, isnt it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And that, he also told you at one time [that] the
police was able to recover lost article[s] like [a] tire,
and it was recovered because of the assistance
provided by Allan Solamillo?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And, he also told you that Allan Solamillo was
supposed to be entitled to Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), a (sic) reward money, isnt it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And also Captain Flores told you that he failed to
give the Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Allan
Solamillo?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And he also told you that he was able to make use
of the Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)?
A Yes, Sir.[47]
SPO1 Leguarda could not be faulted for not having
disclosed the matter earlier. The victims father,
Captain Nick Flores, revealed that the appellant was an
asset, and threatened to kill him upon his failure to
pay the reward money of five thousand pesos (P5,000)
only after eight years. Captain Flores was probably
unsure whether he would reveal such information, as it
would incriminate him, having himself used the reward
money intended for the appellant.
Furthermore, SPO1 Leguardas account of the
investigation corroborates that of Liberato Solamillos
version of the incident. Even during the trial of the
case for Tonog, Jr., SPO1 Leguarda testified, thus:
Q And where did you gather information that Abdul
Tonog was one of the suspected killers? From whom?
A When I asked Jun Salabante who the driver of the
pedicab was, he told me that the driver of that
motorcab on that day, April 24, was Liberato Solamillo
but the regular driver was Allan Solamillo. So I went to
the house of Liberato Solamillo and asked him if he
was the driver of that motorcab that day; and this
Liberato Solamillo told me that in the early day of April
24, 1988, this Allan Solamillo borrowed his motorcab.
On the same date, April 24, about twelve oclock in the
evening, Liberato Solamillo told me that he saw his
motorcab parked in front of the store of Francisca
Bueno and he saw this Abdul Tonog sitting inside his
motorcab while Allan Solamillo bought some sardines
and Pepsi-cola at the store of Francisca Bueno, with
some blood stains in (sic) his t-shirt.
Q So it was Liberato Solamillo that you questioned[,]
and [you] identified one suspect as one Mr. Ignacio
Tonog, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And by information you identified Allan Solamillo as
one of the suspects?
A Yes.
Q Inasmuch as Allan Solamillo was supposed to be
identified as one of the suspects, did you effect an
arrest against Allan Solamillo?
A We were not able to locate Allan Solamillo.
Q How about Liberato Solamillo, did you not effect an
arrest against him?
A We invited him for investigation.
Q You invited him?
A Yes.[48]
A comparison of the testimonies of SPO1 Leguarda
taken during the trial for Tonog, Jr., and for the
appellant, reveals that there was no substantial
variance between both accounts. Such consistency
lends veracity to the testimony of SPO1 Leguarda,
considering the ten-year interval of time between the
testimonies.
Liberatos account of the events on that fateful night
seemed, likewise, to have been etched in his mind. His
unwavering testimony, in both trials, was that the
appellant took motorcab bearing sidecar no. 0164, and
volunteered to convey the victim to Dumaguete City.
The appellant told Liberato that he would be back
shortly, and instructed the latter to stay put and wait
for him at the house of Pat. Biyok. His testimony
during the trial of Tonog, Jr. was almost identical to his
account during the trial for the appellant.
Page 7 of 40
ESCOREAL: A Here in Tinago and at the pier.

Q Upon arrival at the house of Patrolman Remegio
Biyok at Banilad, Dumaguete City, Allan Solamillo
asked Patrolman Biyok where Abdul was; can you
remember what was your answer?
A Patrolman Biyok answered that he conveyed Abdul
Tonog to Tinago.
Q Then after that, what transpired next?
Q And were you able to locate Allan?
A No, Sir.
Q Then after you went inside the house of your aunt
Francisca Bueno, what did you observe inside?
A I heard Allan said (sic): Kuha na gyod Vis. (He is
already taken, vis.)

A Efren Flores went near Allan, and Efren Flores Q To whom was he addressing that statement?
requested that he be conveyed here in Dumaguete
A Elvis Bueno.
City.
Q And who is this Elvis Bueno?
Q Did Allan heed the request of Efren Flores?
A My cousin, the son of Francisca Bueno.
A Allan said You stay behind Jun because I will first
convey Efren Flores.[]
Q Was Elvis Bueno around when Allan Solamillo
uttered that statement addressed to Elvis Bueno?
Q Who is this June (sic) whom Allan is referring to?
A Yes, Sir.
A Myself.
Q What about this Francisca Bueno, was she also
Q Where was this Patrolman Biyok when Allan told you
around?
to stay behind?
A She was upstairs.
A He was at the gate of their (Biyoks) fence.
Q When Allan Solamillo uttered these words, did you
Q How far was this fence of Patrolman Biyok from
see Allan Solamillo?
where you were situated?
A Yes.
A Less than one meter.
Q Who were around when Allan Solamillo uttered these
Q And after the request made by Efren Flores that he
words Kuha na gyod vis?
be conveyed to Dumaguete City proper, what
transpired next?
A The three of us, Elvis, Allan and myself.
A When Allan conveyed Efren Flores here in
Q What did you notice in Allan Solamillo?
Dumaguete City, Efren remained in conversation with
Patrolman Biyok at their place. It was already about A I noticed or observed that the t-shirt he was wearing
11:45 in the evening, Allan Solamillo had not returned before was no longer the same.
yet. And so, Patrolamn Biyok told me to go home.
Q Why, what was the t-shirt that was worn by Allan
Q Did you heed the advice of Patrolman Remegio Solamillo on that early evening?
Biyok?
A It was a white t-shirt.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Was it a printed t-shirt?
Q And what did you do next upon hearing the advice of
Patrolman Biyok? A Plain white.

A We waited for a pedicab and fortunately Gorio Q And on that particular place and time, what did you
happened to pass by, and so, I road (sic) on his observe? What was the t-shirt or what was Allan
pedicab and made a search for Allan Solamillo. wearing during that time?

Q And where did you search for Allan Solamillo? SEDILLO:

Page 8 of 40
Which particular time and place?
ESCOREAL:
At the time when Allan was already, when Allan and
you were inside the house of Francisca Bueno?
A It was a fatigue t-shirt.
Q What did you observe on the fatigue t-shirt of Allan
Solamillo?
A I noticed that there were many blood stains.
ESCOREAL:
Q Why did you notice that the fatigue t-shirt that was
used by Allan Solamillo has plenty of blood stains?
SEDILLO:
We will object to that, there was still no basis of (sic)
the word plenty. The witness did not testify yet that
there was plenty of blood stains.
ESCOREAL:
I will omit that word plenty, your Honor, and let the
witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Because it seemed that there were many red spots.
Q And after that, what happened next?
A Allan bought a family size coke and sardines and
then we went home to Banilad, Bacong.
Q And what happened to Abdul Tonog?
A The three of us including Abdul went home together.
Q And did it not occur to your mind the whereabouts of
your motorcab?
A No, Sir.
Q Did you not inquire from Allan or Abdul?
A I asked Allan but he got angry with me.
Q Why did you say that Allan got angry with you?
A Because I asked him why there seemed to be red
spots on his t-shirt.
Q How are you related to Francisca Bueno when you
said she is your aunt?
A My father and Francisca Bueno are brothers (sic) and
sisters (sic).[49]
Thus, the appellant failed to discredit the testimony of
prosecution witness Liberato Solamillo who saw him
wearing blood-stained clothes. Neither did he succeed
in discrediting the testimony of SPO1 Leguarda, who
saw him drive off with the victim in the motorcab
bearing sidecar number 0164 owned by Jun Salabante.
In fact, even the late Elvis Bueno testified,
during the hearing of the case for Tonog, Jr., that the
appellant told him thus:
Q Aside from that, were there other statements
uttered by Allan Solamillo when you were conversing
with each other?
A Only that he said, KUHA NA VIS, meaning it was
already taken, VIS.
Q Do you know what he mean[t] by those words. Kuha
na Vis?
A I do not know.[50]
Doubtless, it is not only by direct evidence that an
accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. There is, in fact, consensus that resort to the
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on
direct evidence would, in many cases, result in setting
felons free and deny proper protection to the
community.[51] However, for the accused to be
convicted based on circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must concur: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[52]
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain a
conviction: the victim was last seen in the company of
the appellant; not long thereafter, the victim was
found dead; and, the appellant was nowhere to be
found within the vicinity of the killing.[53]
The Appellants Flight From Dumaguete
To Zamboanga, Where He Was Arrested
Page 9 of 40
Ten (10) Years Later, Is Evidence Of His
Guilt For The Crime Charged
Indeed, flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of
guilt.[54] However, the flight of an accused, in the
absence of a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be
established, for a truly innocent person would normally
grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself
and assert his innocence.[55] Although the appellants
silence and refusal to testify, let alone refusal to
present evidence, cannot be construed as evidence of
guilt, this Court has consistently held that the fact that
an accused never testified in his defense even in the
face of accusations against him goes against the
principle that the first impulse of an innocent man
when accused of wrongdoing is to express his
innocence at the first opportune time.[56] In this case,
the appellant has not even attempted to explain his
absence, nor presented evidence to corroborate his
claim that he went with his father to help in the latters
tricycle business in Zamboanga. His bare claim, as
against the evidence supporting his conviction, cannot
be given credence by this Court.
The Appellant was Correctly
Convicted Of Murder, Qualified
By Abuse Of Superior Strength
We agree with the trial court that the appellant is
guilty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, qualified by abuse of superior strength.[57] In
this case, the appellant and Tonog, Jr., armed with a
knife, attacked the victim, and took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the
offense, considering that the victim sustained no less
than twenty-seven (27) stab wounds, fourteen (14) of
which were fatal.
Conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or
circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as
the commission of the offense itself.[58] The
prosecution in this case, was able to show that the
appellant conspired with Ignacio Tonog, Jr. to kill the
victim.
Although alleged in the Information, the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime cannot be considered
against the appellant, since there is no proof that the
appellant purposely sought the period to facilitate the
commission of the crime, or to prevent its discovery,
or to evade capture.[59] Neither can the aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle be appreciated,
as there is, likewise, no evidence that it facilitated the
killing of the victim, whether directly or indirectly.[60]
Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained
numerous stab wounds does not necessarily mean that
cruelty attended the killing. The test in appreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the
accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the
wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its
commission and inhumanely caused the victims
suffering or outraged or scoffed at the victims
corpse.[61]
The crime was committed in 1988, when murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was punishable
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime, the appellant
was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
conformably to paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appellant Alvin Rolando Solamillo alias
Allan Solamillo is found GUILTY of murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the
crime, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. In line with current
jurisprudence,[62] the appellant is ORDERED to pay to
the heirs
of the victim, Efren Flores, the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN
ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED
THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. The policemen arrested
Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead
in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of
Page 10 of 40
the crime, they found the instruments of death: a
piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the
killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If
they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN
WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT
TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. The search
conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful
because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12.
Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's
Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled
that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the
arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his
person, or within his immediate control may be
seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF
CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. There is no
merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred
in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated
with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite
the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture
on the back of the victim's skull could have been
inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated
was a mere possibility that only one person dropped
the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim,
smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of
Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a
crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The
conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of
Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant
and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting
in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of
wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When
there is no evidence indicating that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper
motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit"
(People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the
trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna
Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH;
INCREASED TO P50,000.00. The Solicitor General
correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the
award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189
SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,
which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section
8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as
maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for
which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the
appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds
the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No.
10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years
as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the
accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no
aggravating circumstances nor mitigating
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the
amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be
credited with the full term of his preventive
imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Page 11 of 40
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with
Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The
Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without justification, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession and control dried flowering tops
wrapped in foil with markings and place in a
transparent plastic bag which are considered
prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo
Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with
Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an
information of the same date and signed by the same
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused together with two (2) others
who are still at large and against whom the preliminary
investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic)
block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault
and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block
the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious
physical injuries which directly caused the death of the
said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of
April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together
with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started
drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of
the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from
the house of the prosecution witness who was in her
house on that day. She overheard the three men
talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She
testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying,
"Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy
Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion
saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant
allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya."
(pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out
their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the
same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo
Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace,
followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who
hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and
when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block
on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men
dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a
report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District
Hospital where the victim was brought. He was
informed by the hospital officials that the victim died
on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of
the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right
away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal
Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to
Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place.
There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a
hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were
informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to
Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed
Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant
who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of
the house and they introduced themselves as
policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried
leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were
sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be
marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended
by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed
by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig
against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A.
6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the
two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial
court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of
Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are
ascribed to the trial court:
Page 12 of 40
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the
marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the
absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation
of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal
search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves
were seized from him in the course of a warrantless
arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the
marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because
they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon
him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers.
Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and
of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had
killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they
could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as
his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the
accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day
after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The
arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale
stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221,
228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested
and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating
their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was
likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's
Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled
that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the
arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his
person, or within his immediate control may be
seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial
court erred in convicting him of having conspired and
cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill
Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales
that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could
have been inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that
only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on
the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance,
even if true, does not absolve the other two co-
conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a
conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven
by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes,
that she overheard the appellant and his companions
conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they
attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow
block and caused his death. "When there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his
Page 13 of 40
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did
not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very
drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the
appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling
in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which
is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA
GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio
Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @
"Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in
the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping and aiding one another and without having
been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and
give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of
suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08
grams in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed
as follows: In November 1995, members of the North
Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP)
Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information
from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun"
was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong
City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest
"Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of
the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and
"Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E.
Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI
went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The
Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of
P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso
Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other
policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3
Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his
back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter
security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the
North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team
P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this
sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one
thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso
bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The
market price of one kilo of marijuana was then
P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his
initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for
the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the
CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying
one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun"
the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw
Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the
marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun"
appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit,
the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun"
took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and
gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked
bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left
the money at the house of his associate named
"Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's"
house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and
a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the
P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's"
house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of
the box's flaps was open and inside the box was
something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and
its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
"sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3
Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of
Page 14 of 40
the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it
contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried
marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua
recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."[8] The
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and
"Jun," together with the box, its contents and the
marked bills and turned them over to the investigator
at headquarters. It was only then that the police
learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while
"Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1)
brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun"
plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's"
house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[9]
The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried
marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling
7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-
appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao.
Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that
on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was
at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper.
Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain
"Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and
as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-
appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took
accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of
being a pusher in their community. When accused-
appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their
car outside and ordered him to point out the house of
"Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed
in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to
"Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no
one answered. One of the men, later identified as PO3
Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his
companions entered and looked around the house for
about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left
standing at the door. The policemen came out of the
house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water
from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but
she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and
kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When
Violeta entered her house, three men were already
inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door,
overheard one of the men say that they found a carton
box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of
the table. The box was open and had something inside.
PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside
the house and board the car. They were brought to
police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-
accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and
Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not
extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice
vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at
her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where
she lived with her husband and five (5) children,
namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins
Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3.
That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the
morning and bought pan de sal for her children's
breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had
left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her
children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for
school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her
youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to
school. She left the twins at home leaving the door
open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained
standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for
about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home.
Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch
water. She was pumping water when a man clad in
short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and
grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took
her to her house. She found out later that the man
was PO3 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three
(3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top
of the table. This was the first time she saw the box.
The box was closed and tied with a piece of green
straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about
the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her
co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her
husband, and that her husband never returned to their
house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the
charge against her and Doria and the allegation that
marked bills were found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig
City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court
found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime
group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to
death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA
y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA
@ "Neneth" having been established beyond
Page 15 of 40
reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the
present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4
of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively
discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the
penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration,
however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic
Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense
was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group
of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or
mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.'
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby
sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"
and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to
DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams)
shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board,
NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of
accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for
accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional
Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded
immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED."[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two
errors, thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR
THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE
SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND
THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE
THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED
THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT
COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE
VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
AS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE
BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH
INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE
THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES
IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY
WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS
RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE
RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER
OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING
TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY
FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT."[15]
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1)
the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the
validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained
therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-
bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective
Page 16 of 40
way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has
received judicial sanction when undertaken with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a
judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine
that evolved from the increasing use of informers and
undercover agents in the detection of crimes,
particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.[18]
Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and
the public interest in the formulation and application of
decent standards in the enforcement of criminal
law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral
revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that
they might otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment"
has a generally negative meaning because it is
understood as the inducement of one to commit a
crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose
of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[21]
The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated
by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the
first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the
concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning
of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the
officer."[23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of
persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law
enforcement officers or the agents to induce a
defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the
criminal design in the minds of the government
officials rather than that of the innocent defendant,
such that the crime is the product of the creative
activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain
amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons
violating or about to violate the law. Not every
deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law,
the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a
criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the entrapping person and
the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment
and no conviction may be had.[26] Where, however,
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact
that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public
officials furnished the accused an opportunity for
commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided
in the commission of the crime in order to secure the
evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
entrapment and the accused must be convicted.[27]
The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices
to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that
can be raised by an accused and partakes of the
nature of a confession and avoidance.[29] It is a
positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden
of providing sufficient evidence that the government
induced him to commit the offense. Once established,
the burden shifts to the government to show
otherwise.[30] When entrapment is raised as a
defense, American federal courts and a majority of
state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent"
test laid down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to
determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The
focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition
to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to government
agents.[32] All relevant facts such as the accused's
mental and character traits, his past offenses,
activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his
reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of
mind before the crime.[33] The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct[34] and
reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for
the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have been
ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail
even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive
inducement.[36] Some states, however, have adopted
the "objective" test.[37] This test was first
authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v.
State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska.
Several other states have subsequently adopted the
test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the
court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct.[39] The
inquiry is focused on the inducements used by
government agents, on police conduct, not on the
accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.
For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct.[40] The test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to
induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one
who is ready and willing, to commit the offense;[41]
for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-
abiding person would normally resist the temptation to
commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that
merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but
Page 17 of 40
overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or
importuning,[43] or appeals to sentiments such as
pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness,
are not.[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts
must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not
because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but
rather because, even if his guilt has been established,
the methods employed on behalf of the government to
bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To
some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts
should not become tainted by condoning law
enforcement improprieties.[45] Hence, the
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction
between the accused and law enforcement officer and
the accused's response to the officer's inducements,
the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting
instances of its commission are considered in judging
what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a
normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have
been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the
"subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e.,
if the court determines that an accused was
predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of
police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices
will be deemed impermissible.[47] Delving into the
accused's character and predisposition obscures the
more important task of judging police behavior and
prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and
general disposition were, the accused might not have
committed the particular crime unless confronted with
inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme, the
purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for
considering a particular accused's predisposition. His
predisposition, at least if known by the police, may
have an important bearing upon the question of
whether the conduct of the police and their agents was
proper.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was
a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a
shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at
the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid
approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United
States now combine both the "subjective" and
"objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida
Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of
police conduct must first be determined. If this
objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to
whether the accused was predisposed to commit the
crime.[53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New Mexico
Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment
analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may
successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by
showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for
which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the
standards of proper investigation.[55] The hybrid
approaches combine and apply the "objective" and
"subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct
of law enforcers while apprehending the accused
caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v.
Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense
of smoking opium after finding that the government
employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to
commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith,
the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he
liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance
to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused
three times to convince him to look for an opium den
where both of them could smoke this drug.[57] The
conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we
acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives
after examining the testimony of the apprehending
police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The
police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high
one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We
found that there was inducement, "direct, persistent
and effective" by the police officer and that outside of
his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to
convict the accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy
Se Tieng,[61] we convicted the accused after finding
that there was no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs
secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the
accused had already planned its importation and
ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending
officer did not induce the accused to import opium but
merely entrapped him by pretending to have an
understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to
better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and
the arrest of the surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and
Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction
between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or
inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we held:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been
said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime
for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to
be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished
from mere entrapment, has often been condemned
Page 18 of 40
and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from
being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it
is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in
his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the
act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the
detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him, free from the influence or
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of
an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is
no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently
of such agent; and where a person approached by the
thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so,
assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is
no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor
that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective,
or hired informer; but there are cases holding the
contrary."[65]
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2)
decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is
a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.[67] In
People v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals further
declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution
and conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People
v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu
Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to
public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary
to public policy and illegal.[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in
the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or
inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in
the Philippines is not a defense available to the
accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is
considered an absolutory cause.[72] To determine
whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts
have mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the
accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first
applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in
a series of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless, adopting
the "objective" approach has not precluded us from
likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v.
Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by examining the
conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation
and admitting evidence of the accused's membership
with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik
Gang. We also considered accused's previous
convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his
opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded
gang strengthened the state's evidence against him.
Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell
or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal
record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76]
thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation
has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common
practice for law enforcement officers and agents to
engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment
procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-
narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory
statutes.[77] They are rules of convenience designed
to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of
society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of
criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft,
arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those
inherently wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining
crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not
against particular individuals, but against public
order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society
as a whole and is generally unattended with any
particular harm to a definite person.[81] These
offenses are carried on in secret and the violators
resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid
detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no
matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita,
to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It
is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting
and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon
the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon
the diligence of its own officials. This means that the
police must be present at the time the offenses are
committed either in an undercover capacity or through
informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing
vice legislation, the confidential informant system
breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who
Page 19 of 40
accepts payment from the police in the apprehension
of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment
from these persons who deceive the police. The
informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket,
pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble
purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is
secretly mated with the underworld and uses
underworld characters to help maintain law and order
is not an inspiring one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter
reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and
exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant,
unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion--
harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a
desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors.
This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality
in a number of cases[84] where we observed that it is
a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to
prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly
unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady
underworld characters as informants, the relative ease
with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or
property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the
imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals
have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in
deciding drug cases.[86] Criminal activity is such that
stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in
the arsenal of the police officer, become as
objectionable police methods as the coerced confession
and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme
Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along
with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false
arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a
type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from
common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful
and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the
sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with
known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the
employment of illegal means."[88]
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris
tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor
General be applied with studied restraint. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the
presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-
protected rights of the individual.[89] It is the duty of
courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from
the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow themselves
to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest
an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for drug offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-
bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately
shown. This must start from the initial contact between
the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration
until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal drug subject of the sale.[92] The manner by
which the initial contact was made, whether or not
through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug,
the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant
alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict
scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the
same time, however, examining the conduct of the
police should not disable courts into ignoring the
accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there
is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must
also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to
determine the predisposition of an accused to commit
an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine
the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the
confidential informant who initially contacted accused-
appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the
informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who
posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit
handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria
as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana.
Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he
later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to
PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous,
straighforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by
defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's testimony
was corroborated on its material points by SPO1
Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of
the confidential informant is not fatal to the
prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in
court because of the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police.[93] It is
well-settled that except when the appellant
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there
are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers,[94] or there are reasons to believe
that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely
against the appellant,[95] or that only the informant
was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction,[96] the testimony of the informant
Page 20 of 40
may be dispensed with as it will merely be
corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness
testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the
informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution
witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1
Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the
veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The
source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not
a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the
prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-
appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and
delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one
kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was
actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the
trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom
agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana
recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box
lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This
is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of
marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one
(1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of
the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and
marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell
the court, how were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory
which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick
we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning
considering the fact that we are now dealing with
eleven items when the question posed to the witness
was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the
witness is pulling out item after item from the box
showed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are
the eleven bricks?
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and
pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the
inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what
was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by
this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite
reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave
the appreciation of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the
suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are
you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the
Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the
PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me
by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before
giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to
the PCCL, your Honor.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on
this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit
"D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Page 21 of 40
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit
"A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the
date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just
entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A,"
I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one
that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries
included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95,
also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by
the witness. I want to make it of record that there are
other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece
of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of
paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970
grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the
wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to
recover?
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our
follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I
gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we
proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the
brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at
the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick,
including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping
were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and
described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970)
grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that
PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one
hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of
marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity.
Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that
the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did
not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system.
There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-
bust" operations there must be a simultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited
drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[101]
Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer
received the marijuana from the accused-
appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may
be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-
bust operation, the police are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search
of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box
of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without
a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without
Page 22 of 40
such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[105] The rule is, however, not absolute.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant
and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest;[107] (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle;[108] (3) search in violation of
customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was
arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search
and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked
bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is
claimed, however, that the warrants were not
necessary because the arrest was made in "hot
pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful
arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant
Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct
testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer,
however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will
be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the
wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to
recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your
Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our
follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I
gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we
proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw
Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked
him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the
marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify
regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of
Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the
house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her
house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house
of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house, she
was not committing any crime, she was just outside
the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she
was just outside the house doing her daily chores. Am
I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to
arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
Page 23 of 40
A Yes, sir. of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling
Neneth. That's right?
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct,
according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her? A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.

A PO3 Manlangit, sir. Q What you are now saying for certain and for the
record is the fact that you were not the one who
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was
approached her? Manlangit maybe?

A Yes, sir. A I saw it, sir.

Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or
whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you
were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling
Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house
of Aling Neneth, sir.

Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not
was doing, because precisely according to you your from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you are
role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up? trying to tell the Court?

A Yes, sir. A No, sir.

Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your
of Mrs. Neneth? Honor."[113]

A PO3 Manlangit, sir. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed

during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the
A Yes, sir.
trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant
Q And the money from Aling Neneth? Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest
in "hot pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her
A I don't know, sir. daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

Q You did not even know who got the money from Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be
Aling Neneth? justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without
PROSECUTOR: warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money,
or reasonable grounds of suspicion."[115] The grounds
there's no testimony on that.
of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
ATTY. VALDEZ:
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
I was asking him precisely. committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
PROSECUTOR: themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested.[116] A reasonable suspicion
No basis. therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers
COURT:
making the arrest.[117]
Sustained.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an basis of the alleged identification made by her co-
honest answer. According to the records, the amount accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his
direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-

Page 24 of 40
accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain
to where the marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria view and may be seized.[127] In other words, if the
did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in package is such that an experienced observer could
the drug business, but as the person with whom he left infer from its appearance that it contains the
the marked bills. This identification does not prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant view.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the
Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing police that the items that they observe may be
drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
house,[119] with or without her knowledge, with or to seizure.[129]
without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box,
grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug testified on cross-examination as follows:
pushing. If there is no showing that the person who
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling
the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is
Neneth was inside the house?
legally objectionable.[120]
A Yes, sir.
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the money?
marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as
an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question A Yes, sir.
of whether the trial court correctly found that the box
of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
seizure valid.
A Yes, sir.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
A Yes, sir, dining table.
introduced in evidence.[121] The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position A Yes, sir.
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the closed?
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[122] The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial COURT
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area.[123] In the course of such Go down there. Show to the court.
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused.[124] The object INTERPRETER
must be open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery
inadvertent.[126] Witness went down the witness stand and approached
a carton box.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object
itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises A Like this, sir.
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the
PROSECUTOR
object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be Can we describe it?
seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive ATTY. VALDEZ
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are

Page 25 of 40
Yes. Q You did not have any search warrant?

PROSECUTOR A Yes, sir.

One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and
with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this...
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling
Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth
regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo
galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust
money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by
alias Jun?
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were
concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in
possession of the buy-bust money because according
to you, you did not know whether Badua already
retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in
plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw
it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, with plastic.

Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton,
Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by
Badua, sir.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?

Q Who got hold of this? A Yes, sir.

A I was the one, sir. Q That is all that you saw?

Q You were the one who got this? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. PROSECUTOR

Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if For the record, your Honor...
the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
Badua?
PROSECUTOR
A Yes, sir.
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a
Q You went inside the house?
piece of plastic. By reading it...
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ

Page 26 of 40
That's a piece of plastic. Continue. Next question.

PROSECUTOR PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant

Gaddao's house because they were led there by
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they
plastic. had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant
Doria named her and led them to her.[131] Standing
ATTY. VALDEZ
by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3
Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking
and a half meters away was the dining table and
you?
underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially
PROSECUTOR open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.

With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he
size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana
small one, for record purposes. because he himself checked and marked the said
contents.[132] On cross-examination, however, he
COURT admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as
Leave that to the court. the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the
records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not
PROSECUTOR
colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its
contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of
Leave that to the court.
marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old
Q The only reason according to you, you were able newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink
to... Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw or blue in color.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted
that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell on cross-examination that the contents of the box
the contents here. And according to the Court, it could could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
be "tikoy," is it not [sic]? exactly what the box contained that he had to ask
appellant Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not
A Yes, sir. immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the
content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was
Q Siopao? not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite
search warrant was in violation of the law and the
A Yes, sir.
Constitution.[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree
Q Canned goods? and should have been excluded and never considered
by the trial court.[136]
A Yes, sir.
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice marijuana[137] was found in the house of accused-
Pop? appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she
herself is guilty of the crime charged.[138] Apropos is
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ... our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:

Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are.
I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you
voluntarily saying the information. Let the prosecutor
do that for you.
COURT
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those
who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as
this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
the liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with
the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty
alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Page 27 of 40
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the right of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the
loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it
a less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part.' It is
simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law
to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself."[140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale,
administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that
the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The
prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
consideration of P1,600.00 which he received,
accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine
hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3
Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution,
however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant
Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the
sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua must be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court
in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified
as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is
acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for
defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling
watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and
found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The
trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to
put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment
plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly
after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that
same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali
on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting
officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had
earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited
for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank
after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained
him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
Page 28 of 40
examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on
them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of
pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying
the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece
of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the
blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he
did not even know what marijuana looked like and that
his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he
was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several bundles
kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own
examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two
watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention
his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt
but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was
bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also
said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave
away the other, although the watches belonged not to
him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name
he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also
rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing
that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual
findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the
witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and
dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the
lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the
trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the
truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the
trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was
not really beaten up because he did not complain
about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is
possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he
was at that time under detention by the PC authorities
and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has
been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination,
however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the
marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of
Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after
an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin
was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section
6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This
made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful
arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC
officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had
no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized
the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was
the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and
regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin
was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip,
one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20
another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June
25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration
of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol,
Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you
mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on
June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was
supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9
and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that
date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we
received this information from that particular informer,
prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the
particular operation which was being participated by
Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two
days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming
of Wilcon 9?
Page 29 of 40
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from
this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not
pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance,
report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you
said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also
receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel
Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on
the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required
sheet of information, maybe for security reason and
we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less
sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's
coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you
many days before you received the intelligence report
in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin
but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984
two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not
know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know
that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the
time when I received the information that he was
coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we
have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under
surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel
Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official
report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was
coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for
the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your
intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our
operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield
positive result you do not need a search warrant
anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement,
especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a
statement. This is still a government of laws and not of
men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
Page 30 of 40
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or
search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed
under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of
the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are
subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles
may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear
that they had at least two days within which they could
have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon
9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause,
indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the
law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting
team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, it has always been shown that they were caught
red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called
"buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule
113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time
of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at
the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in
our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will,
detained without charges and punished without trial,
we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of
arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt
its disdain of the Constitution and the individual
liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is
innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding
that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his
defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized
from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never
have been considered by the trial court for the simple
fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the
fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes'
felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest
and the warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the
warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those
who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as
this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
the liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with
the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty
alike against any manner of high- handedness from
the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the
loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law
Page 31 of 40
to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized
marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant,
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
and he must therefore be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is
REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 188794, September 02, 2015
HONESTO OGAYON Y DIAZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Decision2 dated March 31, 2009, and the
Resolution3 dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154. The appealed
decision affirmed the joint judgment4 dated
September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Ligao City, Albay, which convicted
petitioner Honesto Ogayon of violating Sections 11 and
12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.5
The Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed
against Ogayon for the crimes allegedly committed as
follows:
That at about 5:20 o'clock (sic) in the morning of
October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control four (4) pcs. of small aluminum foil, four (4)
pcs. of disposable lighter in different colors, one (1)
blade trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll aluminum
foil, instruments used or intended to be used for
smoking or consuming shabu, without authority of law,
to the damage and prejudice of the public interest and
welfare.6
That at about 5:20 o'clock (sic) in the morning of
October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the
law, and without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing 0.040 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with full
knowledge that in his possession and control is a
dangerous drug, to the damage and prejudice of the
public interest and welfare.7
During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and
4739 on January 21, 2004, and March 17, 2004,
respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and pleaded
"not guilty." The joint pre-trial held on May 5, 2004
yielded only one factual admission on the identity of
the accused.8 A joint trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution Version
On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief
Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together with the other
members of the Albay Provincial Police Office,
proceeded to Ogayon's house in Barangay Iraya,
Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant No. AEK
29-2003.9 The warrant was for the seizure of shabu
and drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in
the premises of Ogayon's house. Barangay Tanod Jose
Lagana (Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro Tampocao
assisted the police team in conducting the search.10
Upon reaching Ogayon's house, the police team
noticed several persons inside a nipa hut located
nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be
held, the police team restrained two of the five persons
and immediately proceeded to Ogayon's house. After
introducing themselves as police officers, Senior Police
Officer Herminigildo Caritos (SPO4 Caritos) informed
Ogayon that they had a warrant to search his place.
SPO4 Caritos handed a copy of the warrant to Ogayon,
who allowed the police team to conduct the search.11
Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police
team went to the comfort room located about five
meters away from Ogayon's house. When they
searched the area, they found an object (wrapped in a
piece of paper with blue prints) that fell from the
wooden braces of the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos'
inspection, the paper contained two (2) small, heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets that the police team
suspected to contain shabu. The search of the comfort
room also uncovered four (4) disposable lighters, one
(1) knife measuring six inches long, used aluminum
foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil, and a "Dorco"
blade.12 SPO4 Caritos then placed his initials on the
two (2) plastic sachets before joining the rest of the
police officers who were conducting a search in
Ogayon's house. The police officers who searched
Page 32 of 40
Ogayon's house found live ammunition for an M-16
rifle.
After conducting the search, the police team prepared
a Receipt of Property Seized.13 The receipt was signed
by the seizing officers, representatives from the
Department of Justice and the media, and two (2)
barangay officials who were present during the entire
operation.14
The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the
two (2) other persons who had earlier been restrained,
and brought them to Camp Simeon Ola for booking.
The seized items were likewise brought to the camp for
laboratory examination. In his Chemistry Report,15
Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo (forensic chemist
of the Philippine National Police Regional Crime
Laboratory) reported that the two (2) plastic sachets
seized from Ogayon's place tested positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.16
The Defense Version
The defense presented a different version of the
events.
Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any
knowledge of the prohibited drugs and claimed that he
saw the seized items for the first time only when they
were being inventoried. His statements were
corroborated by the testimony of his wife, Zenaida
Ogayon.
Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was
asleep in his house. His wife Zenaida woke him up
because several policemen and barangay officials came
to his house. He claimed that the police team did not
present any search warrant before conducting the
search, and it was only during trial that he saw a copy
of the warrant.
He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two
groups, conducted a simultaneous search of his house
and the comfort room located nearby. He noticed that
SPO4 Caritos, who was part of the group that searched
the comfort room, came out and went to the Barangay
Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos returned,
accompanied by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again
went inside the comfort room, leaving Tanod Lagana
waiting outside. SPO4 Caritos thereafter came out
from the comfort room and ran towards Ogayon's
house while shouting "positive, positive."17
The RTC Ruling
On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint
judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal
charges against him. Relying on the presumption of
regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon's frame-up
defense. The dispositive portion of the joint judgment
reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, under the above considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:cralawlawlibrary
In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused, Honesto Ogayon y
Diaz is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 12, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165,
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002," for his unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, namely: four (4) pcs. small aluminum
foil, one (1) roll aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. disposable
lighters, and one (1) pc. blade; thereby sentencing him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and to
pay a FINE often thousand pesos
(P10,000.00);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused, Honesto Ogayon y
Diaz is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 11, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165,
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002," for his unlawful possession of two (2) pcs. small
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," with total
net weight of 0.0400 gram; thereby, sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and to pay a FINE of three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00).18
Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned
the validity of the search warrant, claiming it was
improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant
was defective for lack of transcript showing that the
issuing judge conducted an examination of the
applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
The CA Ruling
In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, a judge must examine under oath and in writing
an applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
Although the CA found no evidence in the records
showing compliance with this requirement, it
nevertheless upheld the search warrant's validity due
to Ogayon's failure to make a timely objection against
the warrant during the trial.
Page 33 of 40
That Ogayon objected to the prosecution's formal offer
of exhibits, which included the search warrant, was not
sufficient for the CA. Ogayon merely claimed that the
chemistry report was not executed under oath, the
items were not illegal per se, and that he did not sign
the Receipt of Property Seized since he was not
present when the seized items were confiscated. The
CA noted that the objections were not based on
constitutional grounds, and for this reason, concluded
that Ogayon is deemed to have waived the right to
question the legality of the search warrant.19
Based on the search warrant's validity, the CA affirmed
Ogayon's conviction for possession of drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was located
outside Ogayon's house, the CA declared that he
exercised exclusive control over it and should rightly
be held responsible for the prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia found there.
As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of
regularity of the police team's operation and found
Ogayon's claim of frame-up to be unsupported. The
CA thus ruled that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Ogayon was liable for the crimes
charged.
The Issues
In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following
assignment of errors:cralawlawlibrary
I.
The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his
right to question the legality of the search warrant.
II.
Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had
already waived his right to question the legality of the
search warrant, the search conducted was still highly
irregular, thereby rendering the seized articles as
inadmissible in evidence.chanrobleslaw
Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of
his constitutional right to be secure in his person,
house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. He denies waiving the right
through his supposed failure to assail the search
warrant's validity during the trial. On the contrary, he
claims to have objected to the prosecution's formal
offer of the search warrant.
Even assuming that he questioned the search
warrant's validity only during appeal, Ogayon contends
that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his
right. Since an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review, any objection made on
appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should
still be considered.
Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the
police team on his premises, pursuant to an already
defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and
his spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos
allegedly discovered the shabu in the comfort room
located outside their house, so they were not able to
witness the search. Moreover, he claimed that there
were other persons near the premises of his house
(and the comfort room) when the search was
conducted. Hence, it could not indubitably be
concluded that the seized items were under his actual
and effective control and possession.
The Court's Ruling
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures
is one of the fundamental constitutional rights. Section
2, Article III of the Constitution, reads:cralawlawlibrary
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized, [emphasis
ours]chanrobleslaw
This right has been included in our Constitution since
1899 through the Malolos Constitution20 and has been
incorporated in the various organic laws governing the
Philippines during the American colonization,21 the
1935 Constitution,22 and the 1973 Constitution.23
The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its
recognition as a fundamental human right under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 to both
of which the Philippines is a signatory.25 Both the
Covenant and the Declaration recognize a person's
right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with
one's privacy and property.26
Given the significance of this right, the courts must be
vigilant in preventing its stealthy encroachment or
gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards
put in place for its protection are observed.
Page 34 of 40
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely
depends on the finding of the judge conducting the
examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable
cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that -
cralawlawlibrary
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record.
- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]chanrobleslaw
Ogayon's appeal of his conviction essentially rests on
his claim that the search warrant was defective
because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes
of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had
allegedly propounded the required searching questions
and answers in order to determine the existence of
probable cause."28We find that the failure to attach to
the records the depositions of the complainant and his
witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge's
examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by
itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is
merely a procedural rule and not a component of the
right. Rules of procedure or statutory requirements,
however salutary they may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.29
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge
to conduct an "examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce," after which he determines the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The
examination requirement was originally a procedural
rule found in Section 98 of General Order No. 58,30
but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right
under the 1935 Constitution.31 The intent was to
ensure that a warrant is issued not merely on the basis
of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
but only after examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses. As the same
examination requirement was adopted in the present
Constitution, we declared that affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to
establish the factual basis for probable cause.32
Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and
his witnesses is indispensable, and the examination
should be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.33
The Solicitor General argues that the lack of
depositions and transcript does not necessarily indicate
that no examination was made by the judge who
issued the warrant in compliance with the
constitutional requirement. True, since in People v.
Tee,34 we declared that -cralawlawlibrary
[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to
be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to
the existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does
not make it an imperative necessity that depositions
be attached to the records of an application for a
search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily
fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record
showing what testimony was
presented.35chanrobleslaw
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement
is shown by the depositions and the transcript. In their
absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if
there is evidence in the records that the requisite
examination was made and probable cause was based
thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts
and circumstances that were considered by the judge
as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the
existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of
the search warrant.36
The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the
absence of depositions and transcripts, the records
indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a
statement in the search warrant itself attests to
this:cralawlawlibrary
Search Warrant
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned
after examination under oath of the applicant and his
witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that
respondent, without authority of law, has under his
possession and control the following articles to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and
paraphernalia
which are kept and concealed in the premises of his
house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR outside
his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as
described in the sketch attached to the Application for
Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan,
Albay.37 (emphasis and underscore
ours)chanrobleslaw
Generally, a judge's determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great
Page 35 of 40
deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.38 "Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in
the place sought to be
searched."39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself,
we find nothing in the records of this case indicating
that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly
examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence
of depositions and transcripts of the examination was
already admitted; the application for the search
warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by
Ogayon himself,40 could not be found in the records.
Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial
revealed that an extensive examination of the
applicant's witness was made by the judge issuing the
warrant, the testimonies given during Ogayon's trial
made no reference to the application for the search
warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among
those who conducted the surveillance before the
application for a search warrant was made. However,
he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in
fact, he testified that he did not know who applied for
it.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which
we can infer that the requisite examination was made,
and from which the factual basis for probable cause to
issue the search warrant was derived. A search
warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional
requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void.
Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the
search warrant was issued after the requisite
examination of the complainant and his witnesses was
made, the Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-
2003 a nullity.
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court
from considering Ogayon's belated objections thereto.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the
protection of his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures due to his failure to make a timely
objection against the search warrant's validity before
the trial court. It based its ruling on the procedural
rule that any objections to the legality of the search
warrant should be made during the trial of the case.
Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides the
manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby:cralawlawlibrary
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash
a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the
court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be
filed in and resolved by the court that issued the
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve
the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in
another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court, [emphasis ours]chanrobleslaw
We find the CA's casual treatment of a fundamental
right distressing. It prioritized compliance with a
procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards
for a constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither
diminish nor modify substantial rights;42their non-
compliance should therefore not serve to validate a
warrant that was issued in disregard of the
constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the
existence of probable cause determined after
examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are
better served if the supremacy of the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
preserved over technical rules of procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights; we should not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.43 In
People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that
"[wjhenever a protection given by the Constitution is
waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver." The
relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid
out convincingly.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his
constitutional right was his failure to make a timely
motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to
suppress the presentation of the seized items as
evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is not a
sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically,
knowingly, and intelligently made a waiver.45 He
cannot reasonably be expected to know the warrant's
defect for lack of data in the records suggesting that
defect existed. It would thus be unfair to construe
Ogayon's failure to object as a waiver of his
constitutional right. In People v. Bodoso,46 the Court
noted that "[i]n criminal cases where life, liberty and
property are all at stake... The standard of waiver
requires that it 'not only must be voluntary, but must
be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
Page 36 of 40
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.'"
At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of
Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court - a
relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(effective December 1, 2000). The provision was
derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the
Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals47 to resolve the
main issue of where motions to quash search warrants
should be filed. In other words, the provision was
"intended to resolve what is perceived as conflicting
decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue
thereof... ,"48 It was certainly not intended to preclude
belated objections against the search warrant's
validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not
immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that
"all grounds and objections then available, existent or
known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise
they shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to
quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for
the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress."
A closer reading of the cases where the Court
supposedly brushed aside belated objections would
reveal that the objections were disregarded because
they had been cured or addressed based on the
records.
In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused
asserted that the search warrant was never produced
in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court,
however, noted that "there were supposed testimonies
of its existence."
In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the
issuing judge failed to exhaustively examine the
complainant and his witnesses, and that the
complainant's witness (a National Bureau of
Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of
the facts comprising probable cause, but the Court
brushed these claims aside. It found that the witness'
knowledge of the facts supporting probable case was
not based on hearsay as he himself assisted the
accused in handling the contraband, and that the
issuing judge extensively questioned this witness.
In People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the validity
of the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant
as it was supposedly made without the presence of at
least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise,
citing the testimonies taken during the trial
contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made
by the accused in People v. Nuez52, but the Court
noted the testimony of the officer conducting the
search who stated that it was made in the presence of
the accused himself and two barangay officials.
The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53People v.
Court of Appeals,54 and People v. Correa55 are
without significance to the present case. As mentioned,
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question of
where motions to quash search warrants should be
filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in
People v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the
other hand, involved a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.
We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections
against search warrants during trial is a procedural
rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or
noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any
way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a
search warrant should be issued upon a finding of
probable cause. Ogayon's failure to make a timely
objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of
the warrant. To uphold the validity of the void warrant
would be to disregard one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution.
In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK
29-2003, the search conducted on its authority is
likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any
evidence obtained in violation of a person's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.56
With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from
Ogayon's home, there is no more evidence to support
his conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further
discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision
dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July
10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31154 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
judgment of conviction, as stated in the joint judgment
dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Ligao City, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos.
4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner HONESTO OGAYON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of
the criminal charges against him for violation of
Republic Act No. 9165.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 106288-89 May 17, 1994
Page 37 of 40
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y
DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES, appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Two passengers who were apprehended after they
supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger
jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to court,
not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of
the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from
them which were instrumental in the commission of
the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed
an appeal from the trial court's judgment (p. 23, Rollo)
inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from
incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p.
60, Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability
for the misdeed.
The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint
trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the
morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan
was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle
in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the two
wayfarers, together with two other companions,
announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to
proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where the
other passengers were divested of their personal
belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene
Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell
Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center
after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to
Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team
was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim
Rene Araneta who went with the responding police
officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was
wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards
Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said
persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced
themselves, the four men scampered to different
directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio
Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso
Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of
an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After
the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort
Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the
passengers who ganged up on the accused.
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of
firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit
I) issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating
that the accused are not licensed firearm holders.
On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded
innocent to the charges levelled against them,
proferring a general denial.
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness
stand that after establishing his residence at Pasay
City for about six months, he engaged in the business
of vending "balut". During the incident in question, he
recalled that while so engaged in his trade, three
persons allegedly acosted him, took his money, "balut"
and "penoy", and that he was thereafter brought to a
cell where he was forced to confess ownership of one
gun which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied
participation in the hold up.
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time
having resided in Metro Manila for about two months,
recollected that he spent the night at his cousin's
house in Paraaque on September 28, 1990, and that
he left Paraaque at around 5 in the morning of
September 29, 1990. According to him, the jeepney he
was then riding developed engine trouble, and
alighting therefrom he was arrested for no apparent
reason. When he was brought to the cell, he was
allegedly coerced into admiting possession of the other
gun. Just like his co-accused, he too, denied
knowledge of the hold up.
The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general
denials, observing:
As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of
the accused, the line of defense they have adopted is
one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms
and ammunition in question were found in their
persons in the early morning of September 29, 1989.
They also denied the truth of the testimonies of Sgt.
Faltado, Percival Tan, and Rene Araneta. The defense
however did not cite any valid reasons for the Court
not to give credence to the testimonies. In the
circumstance, the Court is constrained to consider the
testimonies of the accused to be self-serving. In the
face of the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the Court can only take their denials with
the proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is simply hard for
the Court to believe that the accused are simple
provincial who are lost in the big city; that accused Pio
Boses who is a resident of Pasay City, does not know
well-known places in Metro Manila such as the South
Super Highway and the Fort Bonifacio-Nichols
interchange; that he did not know the streets where he
Page 38 of 40
plied his trade as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this
be true when he himself admitted that from 7:00 p.m.
of September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in
the street in the area and yet he never claimed he had
ever lost his way.
The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is
convinced that he lied on the witness stand. He
claimed that he was in the place where he was
arrested because he had just come from the residence
of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the passenger jeepney
he had boarded on his way home just happened to
break down at that place. In the mind of the Court this
alibi of the accused is too much of a coincidence, and
too convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In
this connection, the Court notes his testimony on cross
examination that he was unable to get in touch with
his relatives, including Genny Acol, for possible
assistance and to get Genny Acol to corroborate his
testimony, because the latter had already left for the
province and that none of his other relatives knew that
he had been charged in this case. But when queried
how he was able to say this, he testified that he had
written to his uncle and that he received a reply letter
from him and that it was from this reply letter of his
uncle that he learned that Genny Acol had already left
for the province. This testimony of accused Tirso Acol,
if it accomplished anything, helped convinced the Court
that he is given to lying. For sure, if he had written to
his uncle and that the latter had replied to him, it is
plain that he must have informed his uncle about the
case and that the latter knew about the case and the
fact that he was in jail and needed help. In any event,
established jurisprudence dictates that between the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the
denials of the accused the Court must place its reliance
on the former. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence also
indicates that greater weight must be given to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when they
are officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124
SCRA 906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from
detention during the trial below, thus obviating any
review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had
appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be
considered as having abandoned his appeal (People vs.
Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8, Rule 124,
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).
With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his
protestation of innocence by claiming that the trial
court below erred:
I
. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT
MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO BOSES TO REOPEN THE
CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS
WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE
BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE THEREBY
AMOUNTING TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
II
. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO BOSES AND TIRSO ACOL;
INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES.
III
. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE
CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS "E", "F", "F-1" TO "F-5",
"G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT ARMED WITH A
WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A SEARCH WARRANT
WHEN THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST THEM.
IV
. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS
NOT CLEAR SHOWING THAT EXHIBITS "F", "F-1" TO
"F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES USED BY
THE ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY/HOLD UP.
(p. 1, Appellant's Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)
But the appeal leaves much to be desired.
It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that
herein accused- appellant can not feign denial of due
process where he had the opportunity to present his
defense, through his own narration on the witness
stand (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Gonzales vs. Court
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]. Withal, and as
correctly pointed out by the People, the omission of a
party to present witnesses to corroborate the principal
basis for exculpation, on account of the witnesses'
admitted tardiness in arriving in court, is a puerile
proposition to support re-opening of the case.
In regard to the second ascription aired by the
accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the
court a quo should have relied more on the
explanation offered by the defense rather than giving
credence to the testimony of the People's witnesses.
For one thing, accused- appellant asseverates that
Page 39 of 40
they could not have been positively identified by firearms were found when the police team
Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering that it was apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for
then still dark when the accused boarded the jeep, up illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (People
to the time they were apprehended. But counsel for vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle
accused-appellant concedes that the jeep was lighted imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the
subject to the caveat that it was not well lighted (p. ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil.
12, Brief for Accused-Appellant) which does not 771 [1948]) that:
entirely foreclose positive identification of the culprits
who admittedly shared a ride with their victims and . . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the
were thus seated within the closed quarters of the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police
jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
prosecution that Rene Araneta's jacket was one of the being committed by any person, they are not
items which was asported, that it was worn by one of precluded from performing their duties as police
the felons, and that the jacket was recognized by Rene officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and
Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief the taking of the corpus delicti.
for Accused-Appellant). To lessen the impact of the
Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life
affirmative statements uttered against accused-
imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the lower
appellant, it is argued that the immediate propensity of
court must be modified to read only as reclusion
a criminal is to move out from the scene of the locus
perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of Presidential
criminis and not merely to walk casually within the
Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life
vicinity. We said in People vs. Ocampo (G.R. No.
imprisonment.
80262, September 1, 1993) that indeed, there can be
no legal dispute to the legal proposition that flight from
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
the scene of the felony is one of the indicia of a guilty
affirmed with the slight modification that the proper
conscience, but it is equally true, we proceeded to say,
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further,
that culprits, in exceptional cases, have become bolder
the court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and
by returning to the scene of the crime to feign
other incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine
innocence. At any rate, it has been repeatedly stressed
National Police to be disposed of in accordance with
by this Court that the factual findings of the trial court
law.
and the conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded
utmost respect since the magistrate at the court of No pronouncement is made as to costs.SO ORDERED
origin had the first hand impression of the demeanor
and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206
SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of

accused--appellant, we are of the view that the search
falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113
which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant
prior to arrest:

When an offense has in fact been committed, and the

has

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person

to be arrested has committed it;

inasmuch as the police team was formed and

dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival
Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed
(People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs.
Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since accused-
appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search
made incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon,
221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed
Page 40 of 40