Title: Article 9 (A) Section 5 Macalintal v.

COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration
that certain provisions of R.A. no 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are
unconstitutional. Under Sec. 25 of the said R.A., it moves to make a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee, that will review, revise, amend, and approve the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) promulgated by the commission. The Court upholds petitioners right to file
the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented
an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to
be used and appropriated for the implementation of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. 9 (A) Sec. 1 of the
Constitution

Ruling: Yes. Some parts of the R.A. were deemed by the Court as unconstitutional. It deprives
the COMELEC of its independence as expressed in sec. 1 of Art 9 (A). Moreover, it is also
supported in Art. 9 (A) section 6 that the COMELECs rules shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.

Main point: The case at bar expresses the independence of Commissions as explicitly stated in
the Constitution. Their independence cannot be encroached through their rules being diminished
by R.A.s. The Court partially granted the petition, with other sections of the provision deemed
acceptable.
Title: Article 9 (A) - Section 1 Ombudsman v. Civil Service

Facts:

Melchor Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente, and Jose Tereso De Jesus, Jr., were appointed
Graft investigation officers III of the office of the Ombudsman. The CSC appoved the
appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must
first obtain a (CES) Career Executive Service. The ombudsman requested to the CSC for the
change of status from temporary to permanent of the appointments of the three, emphasizing that
the office of the Ombudsman is not governed by the Career Executive Service Board, so security
of tenure can be granted despite the absence of CES eligibility.

CSC changed the status of Carandang and Clemente, but not De Jesus, Jr., since he has
not met the eligibility requirements. A petition for certiorari was filed by the office of the
Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment will not be subject to Civil service law and rules.

Ruling: No. Since all matters pertaining to appointments are within the realm of expertise to the
CSC, all laws, rules, and regulations it issues on appointments must be complied with.
Title: Article 9 (A) - Section 5 Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and
Management

Facts:

The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil
Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released
by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving
an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally
withheld by DBM on the ground of their no report, no release policy. Hence, CSC filed a
petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal
year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

Issue: Whether or not DBMs policy, no report, no release is constitutional

Ruling: No. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested
with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which
provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
 Romeo M. Estrella vs. COMELEC et al

Facts:
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. Romeo Estrella,
opponent filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled
Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of
execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but
a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and
designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed
with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time;
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc.
He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when
the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may
participate in its En Banc deliberation

Ruling:
No. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary little
by little inhibition cannot be countenanced. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when
he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially
unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus
leaving three members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four or majority of the members of the
COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order.
Main point; The provision is reiterated that each commission shall decide by majority vote of all its
members in any case of matter brought before it.
MISON VS COA

Facts:

Commissioner of Customs ordered the release of a Japanese vessel to the claimants because it was
illegally seized by the Philippine navy. However the ship was not returned as it sank prior to its release to
its claimants. Claimants then filed a claim with COA for the payment of vessel amounting to S50K but
the claim was denied by Rogelio Espiritu, Manager of Technical Support Office of COA by authority of
the Acting COA Chairman. Claimants now questioned the authority of the TSO Mgr and COA Chairman
alleging that the decision was void due to the fact that the matter could validly be acted upon only by the
Commission on Audit duly constituted by the appointment and qualification of its chairman and two
commissioners.

Issue:

Whether or not claimants contention is correct?

Ruling:

Yes. As affirmed in the 1987 Constitution it was the Commission composed of Chairman and 2
Commissioners, as a Collegial Body had the jurisdiction. TSO Mgr had no authority to make any
decision. In fact, even the Chairman alone had no jurisdiction. Further, the ratification is also
inconsequential. It cannot validate the act void ab inito due to it was done lacking authority. Moreover,
even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification or validation could have been effected by the Acting
Chairman since he was not the Commission, and he himself had no power to decide any case brought
before the Commission, that power, to repeat, being lodged only in the Commission itself, as a collegial
body.
Paredes vs. COMELEC

Facts:

The petitioners petition seeks the disqualification of respondents Jose Guyguyun et al, as candidates for the position of
Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of Sanguniang Bayan in the Municipality of the province of Ifugao in January 1, 1980
local election on the ground of Turncoatism. Petitioner makes capital of the fact that the names of respondents Guyguyon
et al appeared on the list of those elected to serve in the precinct and barangay committees submitted by the Barangay
Captain to the governing bodies of the KBL. Petitioner filed a petition on January 25, 1980 but before the resolution thereof
by this Commission, the local election was held on January 30, 1980 and the respondents garnered the majority of the votes
cast for the positions for which they respectively ran. respondents were proclaimed by the Kiangan Board of Canvassers,
'without prejudice, however, to the hearing and ruling involving the question of respondents' disqualification,' pursuant to
Item No. 9309 of the Minutes of the Session of the Commission held on February 26, 1980. The decision under review was
considered by respondent Commission imperative, that in all the aforementioned meetings, the respondents did not take an
oath of affiliation as members of the KBL. Respondents Guyguyon, et al. did not perform any affirmative act clearly
establishing their affiliation with the KBL as bona fide members. Petition must fail.

Issue:

Whether or not such decisions of Commission on Elections are subject to review by the Supreme Court?

Ruling:

No. the Court cannot, therefore, review the decisions or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections as In accordance
with the provision of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657. Such rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on
Elections must be lacking in arbitrariness to be conclusive on this Court. Thus, accordingly, private respondents testified
that, although they admittedly attended certain meetings of the KBL, they did so on the belief that these were intended for
the organization of civic committees that would disseminate information regarding future plebiscites and elections. There
is no reason to think otherwise.
 ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 611
FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS
CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution
was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez
Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to
make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President
and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed
that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count
of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. Two days before the elections, the Court issued the
Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The COMELEC was directed to
cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining
order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by
media without any difficulty or problem. This case was brought to the SC via certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether it is proper to immediately resort to certiorari

RULING: Generally, motion for reconsideration is a requisite before resorting to certiorari. In the
case at bar, however, the Court dispensed with the need for reconsideration because the elections
were very close and there was not enough time to resort to another speedy remedy.
 Salva v. Makalintal, GR 132603, September 18, 2000

FACTS: The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger
with Barangay Dacanlao, Municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct
the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the
veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Governor of Batangas for being
ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or
certifications of several government agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987,
providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February
28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act,
resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that
when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its
acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial
duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite,
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply
ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its
Resolution No. 2987 which provided for the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite to decide on the
abolition of Brgy. San Rafael and its merger with Brgy. Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas, pending the determination
of civil case no. 3442 for the annulment of ordinance no. 05, resolution no. 345 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2987.

RULING: Section 7, Article IX A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court
ruled that What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of
the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not
be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

MAIN POINT: What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory (or quasi-
judicial) powers.
 Garces v. CA, GR. No. 114 795, July 17, 1996

FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace
respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Both appointments
were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was
directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a
Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office
as the same is not vacant. Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check
to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del
Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying
the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy. Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus
with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the
COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the
appointments of Garces be cancelled. Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered
moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and
not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases
or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court

RULING: No. The case is cognizable in the RTC. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs
resolution that triggered this Controversy. The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the
COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELECs
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative
duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Dumayas vs COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were candidates for the position in Mayor of Iloilo. During the
canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts for alleged acts of terrorism,
intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioners
objections. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and
directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the
winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division
with the COMELEC en banc. The MBC proclaimed petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an
urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent
Bernal filed an action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo.

Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion to declare void
petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he
filed quo warranto action. The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the petitioner
Dumayas proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly- constituted MBC
as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en
banc resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion?

RULING: No, Commission did not err, much less abuse its discretion, when it refused to consider as abandoned Bernals
motion for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare petitioners proclamation as void ab initio. Note that under the
allegations cited above, the determination of Betitas right would ultimately hinge on the validity of petitioners proclamation
in the first place. To repeat, the quo warranto petition brought by Vice-Mayor Betita is a petition to annul petitioners
proclamation over which COMELEC exercises original exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, it could not be deemed as a
proper remedy in favor of respondent Bernal, Jr. even if his name was included in the title of said petition.
In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind
the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which
would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is
a regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.
In sum, we hold that the COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the ruling of its Second
Division. The appeal brought by petitioner from the order of inclusion issued by the MBC should have been dismissed by
that Division right away, since the grounds for exclusion relied upon by petitioner are not proper in a pre- proclamation
case, which is summary in nature.
Aguilar v. COMELEC

FACTS: In this case, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal was
not resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in obvious violation
of the provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Stated differently,
the division, after dismissing petitioners appeal arrogated unto itself the en bancs function of
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing the petitioners appeal?

RULING: The Court finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order dismissing petitioners appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the
P1, 000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte on April 21, 2008. On that date, the petitioners appeal was deemed perfected. Considering
that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioners
appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. The COMELEC
First Division should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere
technicality of non-payment of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest
involved in election cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the
contending parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted
and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrates, the will of the electorate.
Cayetano v Comelec
nd
Facts: A petition for certiorari assailing the orders of COMELEC 2 division. Petitioner and Private
respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor. Petitioner was the proclaimed winner.
Private respondent protested election frauds and irregularities committed by petitioner which
made her win. Petitioner raised the insufficiency in form and content of the election protest and
prayed for its dismissal. COMELEC denied petitioners affirmative defenses.

Issue: W/N COEMELC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner?

Ruling: No. The court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even
a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. The court can only review via certiorari a decision
of COMELEC en banc in accordance with section 7, Art 9A of the Constitution. The protest filed
by Private Respondent and the counter protest filed by the petitioner remain pending before the
COMELEC, which should afford petitioner opportunity to ventilate her grievances. COMELEC
should declare the cases with dispatch.
nd
The final order of the COMELEC 2 division denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot
be questioned before this court even via petition for certiorari.
 DELA LLANA VS COA

GR 180989 FEB 7, 2012

Facts: Petitioner dela Llana (a taxpayer) wrote to the Commission on Audit (COA)
regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that
the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. The COA replied
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299, which provides that
whenever the circumstances permits it, the COA may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such
other control measures as necessary and appropriate to protect the funds and property
of an agency. The petitioner filed the petition for Certiorari. He alleges that the pre-audit
is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. He claimed that the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in
government transactions have been committed. Respondents, filed their Comment on
the petition and argued that the petition must be dismissed because it is not proper for a
petition for certiorari because: 1. there is no allegation showing that COA exercised
judicial or quasi- judicial functions when it promulgated Circular No. 89-299 2. there is
no convincing explanation showing the promulgation of the circular was done with grave
abuse of discretion. Respondents claim that the circular is valid, as COA has the power
under the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: W/n the petition for certiorari will prosper

Held: Petition denied. A petition for Certiorari is not proper in this case because
there is no induction that the writ is directed against a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions, as required in certiorari proceedings.
Decisions and orders of COA are reviewable via a petition for certiorari if it refers
to decisions and orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasijudicial
 DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P.
BAUTISTA

663 SCRA 644

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an

election protest may not directly assail the order before the Supreme Court
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of said
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.

FACTS: Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the
gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Bautista, his
rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote
buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was
raffled to the COMELEC First Division. In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued
that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista
did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The
COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defenses. Thus, Cagas
prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered
that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas
motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC

HELD:

Petition DENIED. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers

on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it
limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
 Germinde vs. COA, GR 14035, 13 December 2000

In a case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start

of the term and the actual qualification of the appointment must be counted
against the latter. Hence, 7years term of office of CSC Commission Gaminde, who
was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February, 1999.

Facts: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma
P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the However, on
February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to
the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel, in a letter opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02,
2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in
office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman de Leon, wrote the
Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. General Counsel, Commission
on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on
February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment.

Issue:

Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02,
1999, as stated in the appointment paper.

Ruling:

The court adjudge that the term of office of Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, has expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto
officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and
other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit
erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-
terminous staff.
 Mathay Jr. v Court of Appeals
GR NO. 124374
Facts: PD 51 created certain offices and they were promptly filled. However, PD 51 was
declared never have been published and therefore it is not a law. To save the workers
appointed within PD 51, the sanggunian passed on ordinance declaring the personnel
absorbed in the department of public order and safety. But since there was not enough
position, Mayor Simon of QC made the contractual employees. Then when Mathay Jr. became
mayor, he also renewed the contract once but refused to renew them thereafter. The CSC
ordered Mathay Jr. to take them saying that their appointment was automatic pursuant to the
ordinance.
Issue: whether or not the ordinance declaring the personnel is absorbed in the Dept. of Public
Order and Safety was valid.
Ruling: Negative. Ordering the absorption of the personnel is an act of appointment. The city
council has no power to appoint.
 Cuevas v Bacal
GR NO. 139382

Facts: Respondent Josefina Bacal was appointed to Regional Director of the Public Attorneys
Office. Sometimes later, she was appointed by former president Ramos to the rank of CESO 3
and designated as acting chief public attorney. (1995). on 1998, one of the petitioner
(Demaisip) was appointed by former president Estrada as chief public defender. Apparently, the
position was held by respondent but the president designate respondent as regional director,
public defenders office. Respondent now question her subsequent transfer being made
without her consent.
Issue: whether or not respondents transfer is valid?
Ruling: Positive. Respondent as CESO, can be reassigned from one CES position to another. In
the instant case, respondent, who hold a CES rank 3 was correctly and properly appointed by
appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which has a corresponding
CES Rank Level III. Furthermore, as respondent herself does not have the requisite qualification
for the position of Chief Public Attorney, she cannot raise the lack of qualification of petitioner.
 MWSS v Hernandez
Facts: Petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks Sewage System was hauled before NLRC on charges
of willful failure to pay wage differentials, allowances and other monetary benefits to its
contractual employees. Petitioner assessed that it is a governmentowned and controlled
corporation and therefore the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case, and the terms and
conditions of the complainants who are all contractual employees are governed by their
respective contracts.
Issue: whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction on GOCC& whether or not contractual employees
are still within the scope of CSC
Held: Negative. The Civil Service Law governs employment in the MWSS in all aspect except
"monetary claims".
On the issue of the contractual employees, Supreme Court pointed thatthe Civil Service are
classified into career and noncareer service, which the noncareer service includesContractual
personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skin not available in
the employing agency
NSC v. NLRC

Facts:

Eugenia Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally
dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order
her reinstatement. NASECO is a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), which is wholly owned by the Phil.
National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are
governed by the Civil Service Law.

Issue: Whether employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service
Law.

Ruling: No. The civil service does not include Government owned or controlled corporations (GOCC)
which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.

UP v. Regino

Facts:

Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the UP, was dismissed, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination questions. His appeal was denied by the
UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek relief from the Merit Systems Board. But UP stated that
administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees properly fall under the Jurisdiction of
the state university and the UP Board of Regents. MSB then ordered pamplinas reinstatement with back
wages. UP, moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.

UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which sustained the MSBS decision. Pamplina filed a
"Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the Commission, copy of which was received
by the Office of the Solicitor General. Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that
the resolutions of the Commission had not yet become final and executory. Judge Regino of the RTC
granted the petition.

Issue: Whether the UP is a part of the civil service.

Ruling: Yes. As a mere governmentowned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil
Service. As a component of the Civil Service, UPs administrative cases involving the discipline of its
employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Mateo v. CA

Facts:

Upon complaint of Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of
MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent then General Manager. Later on, private
respondent was placed under preventive suspension and he was later dismissed. Respondent then filed
an action challenging his dismissal by petitioners. Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is
vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission. It was dimissed.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal of an employee of a quasipublic
corporation.

Ruling: No. The RTC have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees
covered by the Civil Service Law.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. NLRC
[ GR No. 113212, Dec 29, 1995 ]

321 Phil. 1096

Facts:
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the Department of Health in behalf of the Dr.
Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH) and its Director, Cesar J. Viardo, seeking to
review and set aside the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission.Private
respondent Ceferino R. Laur was an employee of Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital as a
Patient-assistant Police Force.But was dismissed due to the complaint made by Jake Bondoc, as
Laur got involved in the mauling incident of one of the Young boys on July
15,1990.Consequently, on September 26, 1990, private respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal with additional claims for payment of
wage differentials, holiday pay, overtime pay and 13th month pay, as well as payment of moral
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation and with prayer for
reinstatement.On January 2, 1993, Labor Arbiter Cornelio Linsangan rendered his Decision in
private respondent's favor.But later on,the decision was appealed ,then dismissed by the
NLRC.The petitioners mainly contend that since the DJRMH is a government hospital, its
employees are covered by Civil Service rules and regulations and not by the Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents NLRC and Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan committed serious
error in their decisions and acted without jurisdiction when they took cognizance of the complaint
filed by private respondent Ceferino R. Laur before the NLRC instead of the Civil Service
Commission?

Held: Yes, they acted without jurisdiction.The DJRMH exercises strictly governmental functions
relating to the management and control of the dreaded communicable Hansen's disease,
commonly known as leprosy. As it is clearly an agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well
within the scope and/or coverage of the Civil Service Law in accordance with paragraph 1., Section
2, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution.As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil
Service Commission administers the Civil Service Law. The decision of a tribunal not vested with
appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.Respondent labor arbiter's order of payment of private
respondent's monetary claims is likewise null and should not be given effect.
Therefore, it is, indeed, the Civil Service Commission which has jurisdiction over this
controversy, falls under the Civil Service Law and not the Labor Code.
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL
HOUSING CORPORATION.

G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of
Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco
was dismissed from service as a Project Manager of National Housing Corporation for having
been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.He filed a complaint with
NLRC but the complaint was dismissed on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the
case on Sept, 1977. On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction, then ,complaint dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction as well. On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC
and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor
Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not NHC is under the scope of civil service?

Held: No, NHC is not within the jurisdiction of CSC.

Under Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government,
including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of
the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state
that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987.
The National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in
accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one
hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the
former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government
Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines,
the National Investment and Development Corporation and the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation.Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated
under act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned
or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This
observation is reiterated in recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation, where we held that the NHA is now within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or
employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees
organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them
as they are covered by the Labor Code.Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioners complaint
for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.Having been incorporated under the
Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO, in his capacity as General Manager of the Leyte
Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), Tacloban City, Petitioner, NAPOLEON G. ARANEZ, in his
capacity as President and Chairman of "No Tax, No Impairment of Contracts Coalition, Inc.,"
Petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. CORNELIO C. GISON, Undersecretary, Department of Finance, Respondent.
G.R. No. 165641 August 25, 2010

Facts:The petition arose from the tax case initiated by LMWD after it filed with the Department of
Finance (DOF) a petition requesting that certain water supply equipment and a motor vehicle,
particularly a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck, be exempted from tax.These properties were given to
LMWD through a grant by the Japanese Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon-
damaged water supply system. The DOF granted the tax exemption on the water supply
equipment but not the Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck.The DOF, through then Undersecretary
Cornelio C. Gison, denied LMWDs request for reconsideration because the tax exemption
privileges of government agencies and government owned and controlled corporations
(GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 93.An appeal was made to the
CTA, where they found LMWD to be a GOCC with an original charter. For this reason, the CTA
resolved to dismiss LMWDs appeal for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.It was
raised to CA as well,but affirmed the CTAs ruling.

Issue: Whether or not LWD incorporated under P.D 198 is a GOCC with original
charter,therefore,under the jurisdiction of CSC?

Held: Yes,it is under CSC, court ruled LWD are government owned and controlled corporations
created by special law and not under the corporation code of the Philippines.P.D. 198 is a
special law.

The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations

through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are
government-owned or controlled. Obviously, LWDs [referring to local water districts] are not
private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code
states that "[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of incorporation,
no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to
elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of
LWDs for a fixed term of office.
BLISS v. Calleja
237 SCRA 231

Facts: Petitioner, a duly registered labor union, filed with the Department of Labor, National
Capital Region, a petition for certification election of private respondent Bliss Development
Corporation (BDC).

Petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC's stocks is owned
by the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-owned government
corporation. Therefore, BDC is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations. Its employees
therefore, are prohibited to join or form labor organization.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with Bureau of Relations (BLR). In the meantime, President
Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 180, extending to government employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively. Respondent Director Calleja issued dismissing the appeal, ruling
that BDC is a government owned and controlled corporation where workers are prohibited from
organizing and joining labor unions. However, with EO 180, the BLR enjoins the petitioner from
registering in accordance with the provisions of said executive order.

Issue: Whether or not Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is a government-owned controlled

corporation subject to Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations.
Ruling: No. To determine whether a corporation created under the Corporation Code is
government owned or controlled or not, the ownership test is used whereby a corporation will be
deemed owned by the government if the majority of its voting stocks are owned by the government.
Since majority of its stocks is owned by HSDC, then BDC is a government-owned
corporation created under the Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the
Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law. Article 9 (B), section 2(1) states that: The civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. EO 180 also does
not apply to it since Section 1 of EO 180 expressly limits its application only to government owned
and controlled corporations with original charters. Public respondents order requiring petitioner
to register in accordance with section 9 of executive Order No. 180 is without legal basis. A
government owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. Conceivably, all
government owned or controlled corporations could be created, no longer by special charters, but
through incorporations under the general law.
A corporation is created by operation of law. It acquires a judicial personality either by special law
or a general law. The general law under which a private corporation may be formed or organized
is the Corporation Code, the requirements of which must be complied with by those wishing to
incorporate. BDC is created under the general law. On the other hand, a government corporation
is normally created by special law, referred to often as a charter.
Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society
479 SCRA 628

Facts: Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular employees of the respondent Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI). They retired on various dates from 1996 to 1998. Upon
retirement from service, some of the petitioners who were compulsory members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) obtained retirement benefits from the GSIS.
At the time the petitioners retired, Article 287 of the Labor Code had been amended by Republic
Act No. 7641 (Retirement Pay Law), which granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the
private sector, in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with the company. As the
respondent did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside from its contribution to the
GSIS, petitioners claimed from the respondent their retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641.
The respondent denied their claims on the ground that the accommodation extended by the GSIS
to the petitioners removed them from the coverage of the law.

The petitioners then sought the opinion of the Department of Labor and Employment regarding
their entitlement to the retirement benefits provided in RA 7641. The department confirmed their
entitlement. Despite this, respondent PTSI refused to pay the petitioners their retirement benefits.
The petitioners then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter declared petitioners
entitled to retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641.

PTSI appealed to the NLRC. PTSI counters that as an employer in the public sector, it is not
covered by Rep. Act No. 7641 which applies only to employees in the private sector. It relies on
Section 3, Rule I of the Amended Rules Implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, An
employer shall belong to either: (1) The public sector covered by the GSIS (2) The private sector
covered by the SSS

Respondent Motion to Reduce Bond on the ground that the amount awarded by the Labor Arbiter
was erroneous. NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to post the required cash or surety bond.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the NLRCs decision, stating
that the legal requirement of posting an appeal bond has been substantially satisfied. The
petitioners assail the Resolution of the Court of Appeals setting aside the decision of National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), who ordered the payment of retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 7641 to petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners are entitled to the benefits of the Retirement Pay Law.

Ruling: Yes. The respondent was incorporated on March 11, 1960 as a non-profit, benevolent
and non-stock corporation under the Corporation Code. Having been created under the
general corporation law instead of a special charter, the court held that the respondent is a
private and not a governmental corporation. More so, Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987
Constitution provides: SECTION 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
Extant on the records is the respondents admission that although its employees are
compulsory members of the GSIS, said employees are not governed by the Civil Service Law.
If the respondent is truly a government-owned or controlled corporation, and petitioners are
employees in the public sector, then, they should have been covered by said law. The truth,
however, is that, the respondent is a non-profit but private corporation organized under the
Corporation Code, and the petitioners are covered by the Labor Code and not by the Civil
Service Law.

From the foregoing, it is clear to us that the petitioners are employees in the private sector,
hence entitled to the benefits of Rep. Act No. 7641.

RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all employees in the private sector, regardless
of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are
paid. They shall include part-time employees, employees of service and other job contractors and
domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of another.

Respondents reliance on the mentioned rules is unfounded. The definition of a public sector
employer as quoted above is relevant only for purposes of coverage under the Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund. Instead, it is the implementing rules of Title II, Book VI
of the Labor Code, which provides for the coverage and exemptions of retirement benefits. Thus:
Sec 1: This Rule shall apply to all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position,
designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, except to those
specifically exempted under Section 2 hereof Sec 2: Exemption. This Rule shall not apply to the
following employees: Employees of the National Government and its political subdivisions,
including Government-owned and/or controlled corporations, if they are covered by the Civil
Service Law and its regulations
LRTA v. Venus
485 SCRA 301

Facts: Petitioners Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(METRO), seek the reversal of the Decision of the CA directing them to reinstate private
respondent workers to their former positions without loss of seniority and other rights and
privileges, and ordering them to jointly and severally pay the latter their full back wages, benefits,
and moral damages.
LRTA, a government-owned and controlled corporation, constructed a light rail transit system
from Monumento in Kalookan City to Baclaran in Paraaque, Metro Manila. LRTA entered into
a ten (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail
Transit System with METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., a qualified
transportation corporation duly organized in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation
Code, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and existing under Philippine
laws.
Pursuant to the Agreement, METRO hired its own employees, including private respondents, and
thereafter entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa
sa METRO, Inc. National Federation of Labor (PIGLAS-METRO, INC. NFL KMU (Union)),
the certified exclusive collective bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
METRO. LRTA and METRO executed a Deed of Sale where LRTA purchased the shares of stocks
in METRO. However, LRTA and METRO continued with their distinct and separate juridical
personalities. Hence, when the above ten (10)-year Agreement expired, they renewed the same,
initially on a yearly basis, and subsequently on a monthly basis.
July 2000, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region against METRO on
account of a deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiation. On the same day, the Union struck.
As the strike adversely affected the mobility of the commuting public, then Secretary of Labor
Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued on that same day an assumption of jurisdiction order directing all
the striking employees "to return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the
Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing
prior to the strike.
Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the assumption of jurisdiction and return to work
order, the Union officers and members, including herein private respondent workers, failed to
return to work. Private respondents, Perfecto Venus, Jr., et al. were considered dismissed from
employment. Meanwhile the agreement between LRTA and METRO expired and was not renewed.
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC (National Labor
Relations Commission).
Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a judgment in favor of the respondent workers declaring
that the complainants were illegally dismissed from employment and ordering their reinstatement
to their former positions without loss of seniority and other rights and privileges.
On appeal, the NLRC found that the striking workers failed to heed the return to work order and
reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit against LRTA was dismissed
since "LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 603 with an original charter" and "it had no participation whatsoever
with the termination of complainants employment." In fine, the cases against the LRTA and
METRO were dismissed, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of merit.
Respondents moved for review.
Respondent workers submit that METRO was not only fully-owned by LRTA, but all aspects of
its operations and administration were also strictly controlled, conducted and directed by LRTA.
And since METRO is a mere adjunct, business conduit, and alter ego of LRTA, their respective
corporate veils must be pierced to satisfy the money claims of the illegally dismissed private
respondent employees.
LRTA argues that respondent workers were hired by METRO alone. LRTA further contends that
it is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive Order No.
603, Series of 1980, as amended, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction only of the Civil Service
Commission, not the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over LRTA.
Ruling: No. Section 2 (1), Article IX (B), 1987 Constitution, expressly provides that "[t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." Corporations with
original charters are those which have been created by special law and not through the general
corporation law.
In contrast, petitioner METRO is covered by the Labor Code despite its later acquisition by
petitioner LRTA, SC holds that the employees of petitioner METRO cannot be considered as
employees of petitioner LRTA. The employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code
and are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, whereas the employees
of petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, are
covered by civil service rules. Herein private respondent workers cannot be considered
government employees of petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under our
labor laws. LRTA cannot be held liable to the employees of METRO.
HIGC vs CSC

Facts:

Private respondent was the Vice President, of Finance and Administrative Group of the Home
Financing Corporation, now known as the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), from 1
June 1986, to 8 July 1988, when he was not reappointed as a result of the reorganization of petitioner
firm.

Sometime in 1987, Cruz was found responsible by an investigating committee for simple neglect
of duty arising from his inefficient supervision over his subordinates arising from the loss six (6) Land
Bank checks.

In July 1988, HIGC underwent a reorganization which resulted among others in the reduction of
the number of Vice President positions from (6) to three (3). Respondent Cruz was one of those not
reappointed as he was found to have no civil service eligibility.

On appeal to the HIGC Reorganization Appeals Board, Cruz invoked his permanent appointment and
insisted that the question of his eligibility should be left for determination by the COMMISSION.

Issue:

Whether or not Cruz is eligible for reappointment without Civil Service Commission eiligiblity.

Ruling:

No. Clearly, eligibility then is a sine qua non to acquiring a permanent appointment, except
those positions which are not required by law to be filled with civil service eligible. A permanent
appointment is defined as one issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.

Main point: No permanent appointment can be extended where appointee has no civil service
eligibility where such is required.
Mauna vs CSC

Facts:

Private respondent Cristeto J. Limbaco claims that the appointment of Mauna to the position of
Chief Election Officer of the Precincts and voting Centers Division of the Election Barangay Affairs
Department (EBAD) is unjust and unfair due to the fact that:

1. He is more qualified

2. He is next in rank as Assistant Chief Election Officer

3. He is more senior than Petitioner, having been employed by COMELEC since 1979.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner undermines Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article
9B of the Constitution.

Ruling:

No. The power of appointment is essentially discretionary and the CSC cannot constitute its
judgement for that of the appointing power. Neither does it have the power to overrule such discretion
even it finds that there are other persons are more qualified to the contested position.
Rimonte vs CSC

Facts:

Petitioner assailed the validity of the appointment of private respondent Henrieta F. Roque. For
the position as Recent Officer V, Central Division. Petitioner contends that his qualifications are better
than Roque that the Ombudsman erred in appoint for the said position.

Issue:

Whether or not Roque is qualified to be appointed to the said position.

Ruling:

Yes. Since there is no doubt that Roque possesses the minimum qualifications for the position,
respondent CSC acted well within its discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction in attesting to the
appoint.

Main Point:

As along as appointee is qualified the CSC has no choice but to attest to and respect the
appointment even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials.
Gloria vs. De Guzman
249 SCRA 126

FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) by
virtue of temporary appointments.

Cerillo, one of the respondents, was appointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However, she was removed
from the position by reason of loss of confidence.

Subsequently, she was designated as "Coordinator for Extension Services".

Said appointments expired when the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA (Philippine State
College of Aeronautics).

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus for reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay.

Respondent Judge De Guzman rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator for
extension services. Thus, Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the position of
Coordinator for Extension Services.

RULING: No. Private respondents assignment as Coordinator for Extension Services was a mere
designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a
case for reinstatement.The judgment of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., which orders the
reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of Coordinator for Extension Services is patently
improper because it finds no support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily
extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of confidence. This
dismissal was neither contested nor appealed from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that her
dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition for mandamus and
reinstatement filed before respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondents assignment as
Coordinator for Extension Services was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the
designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.

MAINPOINT: Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the
Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority. Thus the order of the lower court for the
reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the exercise of a
discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.
Sana vs Career Executive Service Board
G.R. No. 192926
November 15, 2011

FACTS:

On 28 May 2010, President Arroyo issued EO 883 which granted Career Executive Service Office rank to
eligible lawyers in the executive branch.

On 2 June 2010, the CESB issued Resolution No. 870 finding no legal impediment for the President to
vest CESO rank to executive officials during the periods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight
appointment and statutory ban on pre-election appointment. The CESB subsequently endorsed to
President Arroyo its recommendation to vest CESO rank to 13 officials from various departments and
agencies.

On 30 July 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883 (Section 1).
As basis for the repeal, EO 3 provides that EO 883 encroaches upon the power of the CESB to
promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of members of the Career Executive service vested by law with the CESB.

On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana assails the validity of EO 883 and the
appointment of 13 officials to CESO rank for violating the constitutional ban on midnight appointment.

CESB prayed for the dismissal of the petition for mootness. Alternatively, the CESB defends the vesting
of CESO rank to the 13 officials that the appointment to a CESO rank is not equivalent to an appointment
to an office since the latter entails the conferment of an authority to exercise the functions of an office
whereas the former is merely a completion of a previous appointment." Further, they said that such
vesting of CESO rank is valid because it does not contemplate any hiring or appointment since it involves
only the conferment of a rank rather than a selection for a position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should dismiss the petition.

RULING: Yes. The Court dismissed the petition on the threshold ground of mootness.

The question whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive official amounts to an

"appointment" for purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially
recurring, holds no certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the
appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.

Petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO 883. He was
not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking by President Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that "no
conferment of CESO rank was ever made by President Arroyo in relation to EO 883."
MAINPOINT:

A position pertains to selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office.

Appointment to a CES rank cannot properly be deemed synonymous to an appointment to a position in

the legal sense for it is merely a completion of a previous appointment and does not entail the conferment
of an authority to exercise the functions of an office.

In the CES concept, the word appoint means a step in the bestowal of a CES rank, to which one is
entitled after having complied with all the requirements prescribed by the CESB
Samson vs. Court of Appeals
145 SCRA 654
November 25, 1986

Facts:

Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan. The newly-elected mayor,
Marcial Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifying the services of Talens as non-
competitive and terminating his employment on the ground of lack and loss of confidence.

He appointed Liwas as replacement. Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary, like the
Secretary, renders non-competitive service which is primarily confidential and highly technical
in nature where termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence. However,
respondent contends that he is competitive employee and thus, can only be removed for cause
and after due process has been observed. Thus, he filed with the Court of First Instance of
Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative order. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor
of Talens. Hence, the petition.

Petitioner contends that the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor should be considered as
in the non-competitive service and that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts only as long as the
Mayor's confidence in him remains. Petitioners' submission is that the assistant secretary is no
less a secretary to the mayor.

Issue: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to the mayor is a non-competitive
service.

Ruling: No. The Court affirmed the lower courts decision. The position of Assistant Secretary
to the Mayor is deemed to belong to the competitive service. Only secretaries to governors
and mayors are expressly enumerated as non-competitive. The position of Secretary to the
Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and distinct
positions.

Mainpoint the bold letters in the ruling.

Astraquillo v Manglapus October 3, 1990
Facts:

Petitioner was appointed by the President on July 22 1986 as Ambassador Extraordinary

and Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission to the United Arab Emirates.
He occupied the post for two years before he was accused, along with his wife and cousinin
law of improper interference with the Philippine Labor Attachs functions.
An investigation was made, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recommended to the President
the termination of petitioners services as ambassador. The recommendation was APPROVED
by authority of the President
He was then notified of the termination of his services effective immediately, and
the designation of Counsellor
Donato Felicio as Charges DAffaires.
He challenged his removal from the post, citing that the Foreign Affairs Secretary had no
power as department head and without prior authorization of the President, to terminate his
services, he being a presidential appointee; he claims that under the Foreign Service Code of
1983, his removal could only be predicated upon good cause duly established at a hearing of
which he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend.
Issue: WON a cause must be explicitly stated pursuant to the Foreign Service Act or the Civil
Service Law?
Held: No.
The Civil Service Law, PD 807, classified employment in the Government into career and non
career service.

Section 5 Career Service

1. Entrance based on merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications
2. Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions
3. Security of tenure
1. Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualifications in an
appropriate examination is required;
2. Closed Career positions which are scientific or highly technical in nature; these includes
the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities and scientific and technical
positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own
merit systems;
3. Positions in the Career Executive Service, namely: Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Particular Positions falling under said classification
Section 6 NonCareer Service
1. Entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and
 2. Tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is Coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasures, or which is limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purposes employment was made.
1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. Department Heads and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency.
MAIN POINT:
The petitioner was an appointed ambassador extraordinary to UAE but such
appointment will only be at the pleasure of the President whether satisfaction is reach or not.
Security of tenure cannot be invoke for which the nature of employment is based on non
career entry that is coterminous with that of the appointing authority of the President.
Office of the President v Buenaobra
Facts: This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2005 in CAG.R. SP No. 78279, which reversed and set aside
petitioners Resolutions dated April 11, 2003 and June 26, 2003 dismissing respondent Nita P.
Buenaobra from the service. Also assailed is the Resolution dated October 3, 2005, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Office of the Ombudsmans Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against
respondent Nita P. Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino (KWP), with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 for allegedly causing
undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the
unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26918 (the Sandiganbayan case).
Upon respondents motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation. Thereafter, then
Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo approved the recommendation for the reversal of the probable
cause finding and the withdrawal of the information filed against respondent. Thus, a motion to
withdraw the information was filed which the Sandiganbayan granted in its Resolution
dated April 30, 2003.
While reinvestigation of the Sandiganbayan case was ongoing, the Presidential AntiGraft
Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation (the PAGC case) against
respondent charging her with the same acts and omissions subject of the Sandiganbayan
case. Respondent was charged with causing undue injury to the government and giving
unwarranted benefits to Merylvin Publishing House, Inc.,
Instead of filing her counteraffidavit/verified answer, respondent moved to dismiss the
administrative case on grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping in view of the pending
Sandiganbayan case. The PAGC denied respondents motion to dismiss and recommended
respondents dismissal from the service, forfeiture of financial benefits, and disqualification
from joining the government.
On April 11, 2003, petitioner adopted PAGCs recommendation and dismissed respondent from
office. It held as inapplicable the doctrines of litis pendentia and forum shopping because the
Sandiganbayan case was criminal, while the PAGC case was administrative, in nature. It also
ruled that respondent was deemed to have admitted the material averments of PAGCs
complaint when she did not specifically deny them, despite an opportunity to do so.
Issue: WON the presidential appointee with a noncareer service position can be remove
from the service at the pleasure of the President?
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
dated April [11], 2003 and June 26, 2003 are SET ASIDE. The charge/complaint against
petitioner Nita P. Buenaobra is hereby ordered DISMISSED for complete lack of evidence
against the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals granted respondents petition in its assailed Decision dated May 27, 2005
holding that the proceedings before the PAGC were procedurally and substantially flawed
because after denying respondents motion to dismiss, the PAGC did not give respondent the
opportunity to present evidence. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the merits of the case. The
Court of Appeals also found no evidence to prove respondents administrative liability in not
collecting the 15% royalty fee.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the instant petition.
MAIN POINT:
The respondent of this case was the chairman of the Komunikasyon ng Wikang
Pilipino and thereby charge for gross inexcusable negligence for causing injury to the
government in connection to the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyonaryo ng Wikang
Pilipino. The PAGC conducted parallel administrative investigation which resulted separate
filling of complaint and recommending the dismissal of the herein respondent. The action made
by the PAGC was not in accordance with the Civil Service Law that such decision cannot
supplant with its own rule to decide. Career or NonCareer employee of the government before
removal from the position must be taken into account of due process. It cannot be given merit
on its competition for luck of merit.
G.R. No. L-36845 August 21, 1987
CITY MAYOR EULOGIO E. BORRES, CITY OF CEBU, CITY COUNCIL OF CEBU, CEBU CITY TREASURER and
CEBU CITY AUDITOR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERMAN O. LUMAPAC and BARTOLOME ELIZONDO, respondents.

FACTS: Respondents Lumapac and Elizondo were appointed by then Cebu City Mayor Quison as Senior
Security and Security Guard in the office of the Vice Mayor. After the 1967 election Osmena Jr. and
Petitioner Borres won but Osmena did not assume office, hence petitioner became acting mayor of Cebu
City. Upon assuming office, petitioner Borres terminated the services of respondents due to lack of
confidence. Respondents filed with CFI of Cebu Branch III a petition for mandamus with damages against
petitioners, docketed therein as Civil Case No. R-10848 and praying among others that judgment be
rendered (a) declaring their removal unlawful and void; (b) ordering their reinstatement to their former
positions, with right to receive back salaries from the date of removal up to actual reinstatement; (c) directing
payment of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of
P2,500.00; and (d) adjudging costs against City Mayor Eulogio E. Borres.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the termination was constitutional

RULING: Yes, Primarily Confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office
lasts only as long as confidence in them edures.

NOTE: Primarily confidential refers to primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrasment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of State or one declared to
be so, by the President upon recommendation of CSC.
R. No. 91602 February 26, 1991
HONORABLE SIMPLICIO C. GRIO, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, SANTOS B. AGUADERA, MANUEL B. TRAVIA and
MANUEL M. CASUMPANG, petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TEOTIMO ARANDELA, CIRILO GELVEZON, TEODULFO DATO-ON, and
NELSON GEDUSPAN, respondents.

FACTS: On Feb 1988, Petitioner Grino assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo, he later
informed respondent Arandela the then provincial attorney and all legal officers at the Provincial
Attorneys office about his decision to terminate their services.

Arandela appealed the action taken by Grino to the Merit System Protection board of the CSC in
which they declared the termination illegal and ordered Arandela and other to be immediately restored
to their positions.

ISSUE: W/N the termination of the positions of Provincial Attorney and legal officer is valid

Ruling: Yes, the positions of provincial attorney is confidential in nature and termination is valid, tenure
of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence, he was dismissed or
removed from office his term merely expired.

NOTE: The position of the legal officer is highly technical in nature and not confidential, they are
permanent employees and they belong to the category of Classified employees under the Civil Service
Law.
G.R. No 94070 April 10, 1992
ROSALINDA DE PERIO SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG and SECRETARY RAUL MANGLAPUS,
respondent

FACTS: Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted
ticket which provided that she could bring someon with her, she brought along her adopted daughter.
Her coworkers complained because they thought that Santos used government funds to finance her
daughters fare. But the ticket was actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos for
expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she
was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the office of the President and after review, then
President Cory Aquino issued AO no. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then
removed from her post and was replaced.

ISSUE: W/N the termination is valid

RULING : Yes, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential and lasts upon the pleasure of the
president when the pleasure turns to displeasure, she is not actually removed from her position but her
term merely expires. Her position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The
assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her exercise as
the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dicatate.
Nescito Hilario (City atty) vs.

CSC

Facts:

1986, Hilario was appointed as city attorney by the OIC of the Office of Mayor ( OIC Mayor Simon) in
Quezon City (under the Freedom Constitution of 1986).

In 1992, newly elected Mayor Mathay issued a letter to Hilario informing him that in the absence of a
resignation letter frrom Hilario, he is considered resigned as of June 30 1992. Accordingly, his position as
city legal officer coterminus with the appointing authority.

Vice Mayor Planas filed a complain with the CSC against Hilario that he is liable for usurpation , grave
misconduct, being notoriously undesirable to the best interest of service. CSC issued resolution to hold
disciplinary action. Atty. Hillario should not br allowed to continue to hold the position of city atty. Of
QC.

Hilario filed a motion for reconsideration CSC denied and ordered payment of salaries to be stopped,
otherwuse, he needs to refund whatever he will receive.

Hillario alleges that when he was appointed, the applicable law was BP337, and therefore, his position
should not be considered confidential (coterminus). He argued that position was confidential under
RA5185, and PB337 impliedly repealed the confidential nature of the position.

Note: BP337 Not confidential Feb 10, 1983

RA5185 Act of 1967 Confidential

Issue:

W/N the position is Not Confidential?

Ruling:

No, the position is CONFIDENTIAL. Examination of BP3367 reveals that no intention by the legislature to
remove the confidential nature of the position of city legal officer. BP 337 merely specifies the various
qualification, powers and duties not enumerated in RA5185.

The City Atty position is coterminus as stated in RA5185 that to avail full time and trusted services, legal
services should be appointed.
Reino Rosete (Doctor) vs.CA, Richard Gordon

Facts:

Rosete was appointed as the Chief of the Olonggapo City General Hospital in 1971. In 1985, Gordon filed
a formal charge against him for grave misconduct and being notoriously undesirable. In 1986, he was
found guilty and was dismissed. Rosete filed a petition for certiorari questioning that there is no due
process then EDSA Revolution happened which changed the government.

After, OIC Mayor MAcapagal reversed the dismissal and petitioner Doctor Rosete was ordered to resume
office. Court dismissed the case for being moot and academic.

Then in 1988, Gordon became the Mayor of Olonggapo City and appointed another as the Chief of the
Olonggapo City General Hospital, approved by the CSC.

After many petitions and motions, Gordon raised the issue of loss of confidence to the court.

Issue:

W/N loss of confidence was a valid ground on the termination of Reino Rosete?

Ruling:

No. The position of the Chief of the Olonggapo City General Hospital is primarily confidential, policy
determining and/or highly confidential. When he was dismissed by Mayor Gordon, he was not actually
removed but his tenure of office expired due to loss of trust and confidence. However, the claim of Mayor
Gordon that Rosete was occupying a primarily confidential position was not actually invoked in the
dismissal in 1988.
 CSC vs. Rafael Salas (ISS Internal Security Staff)

Facts:

Salas was appointed as Internal Security Staff (ISS) by PAGCOR Chairman assigned to Manila Pavilon
Hotel.

His employment was terminated for loss of confidence after a covert investigation of the intelligence of
PAGCOR:

2 customers were used as gunners for proxy betting

2 polygraph test show unfavorable results

Salas submitted letter requesting for reinvestigation but was denied.

The appeal with the merit systems protection board was denied on the ground that as a confidential
employee, respondent was not dismissed from service but his term of office expired, CSC Affirmed.

Issue:

W/N Salas is a confidential employee.

Ruling:

No. Salas is not a Confidential Employee; he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence
based on PROXIMITY RULE because his position is remote from that of the appointing authority. The
position does not involve close intimacy, ISS do not directly report to the Chairman in the performance
of their duties. ISS is a bottom level scale.

2 instances when duty is primarily confidential:

1. When the President, upon recommendation of CSC, declared position to be confidential

2. In the absence of declaration, when by nature of functions of the office there exists CLOSE
INTIMACY between appointee and appointing power.
Acahacoso v. Macaraig (Executive Secretary of DOLE) 195 SCRA 235 [1991]

FACTS:
Petitioner, Tomas Achacoso, was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines, he filed a
courtesy resignation, and this was accepted by the President with deep regrets. The Secretary of Labor
requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. He protested his
replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary but
filed only in obedience to the President's directive. Nonetheless, respondent Jose Sarmiento was appointed
administrator of the POEA. Thus, Achacoso filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied hence,
this petition for prohibition and mandamus.

Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security
of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career
Service. His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the officials (provided in the Civil
Service Decree), it was beyond the prerogatives of the President to require them to submit courtesy
resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if files, should be disregarded for having been submitted
under duress, as otherwise the President would have the power to remove career officials at pleasure,
even for a capricious reasons.

On the other hand, respondents assert that the petitioner is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not
a career official. They contend that as the petitioner was not a career executive service eligible at the time
of his appointment, he came under the exception to the rule and so was subject to the provision that he
shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be
promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination. Not having taken that examination, he
could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his position.

Issue:

W/N the resignation of the primarily confidential position is within the discretion of the appointing authority?

Ruling

Yes. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in
the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles as in the case of Achacoso.

The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. The
person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the
office once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority. There is also a long line of cases affirming
the rule that One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can
be terminated at the pleasure or loss of confidence of the appointing power, there being no need to show
that the termination is for cause

MAIN POINT: One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his
employment can be terminated at the pleasure or loss of confidence of the appointing power, there
being no need to show that the termination is for cause
FELIX v BUENASEDA

ALFREDO B. FELIX vs. DR. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA, in her capacity as Director, and ISABELO BAEZ,
JR., in his capacity as Administrator, both of the National Center for Mental Health, and the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 109704 January 17, 1995

A direct appeal seeking to annul the Resolution issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which Felix
claims to be in violation of his constitutional right to security of tenure.

FACTS:
Felix worked as Medical Specialist I for the government National Center of Mental Health (NCMH). He
started as a Resident Physician with an annual salary. Later he got promoted to Senior Resident Physician
[permanent], which he held for some time, and thereafter accepted the appointment as Medical Specialist
I [temporary] which Felix held for three years without remonstrations. Pursuant to an Executive Order [EO
No. 119] a general reorganization in the government ensued. In view of this, DoH effected a reorganization,
and one of the guidelines [DoH DO No. 478] made Felix unfit for the position [he was not yet accredited by
the Psychiatry Specialty Board]. His appointment was extended pending review of the Medical Committee
[of NCMH], which eventually recommended non-renewal of Felixs appointment and informed him of the
same. Nevertheless, Felix was still allowed to continue his service even after he was informed of his
termination.
The Chief of Service of NCMH conducted an emergency to discuss, inter alia, Felixs performance. The
overall consensus expressed nonrenewal of Felixs contract [due to poor performance, frequent tardiness
and inflexibility]. The matter was referred to CSC which ruled that appointment of Felix can be terminated
at any time and that renewal was within the discretion of the appointing authority [NCMH] by virtue of the
incidental power of the power to appoint [the power to renew a temporary appointment] and further. The
removal of Felix has thus been affirmed by CSC. Felixs appeal was dismissed and his subsequent motion
for reconsideration has been denied by CSC. Petitioner now questions the validity of such removal. Hence,
this direct appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N the primarily confidential position is valid for removal?

RULING:
YES. Felixs position as an appointed Senior Resident Physician has no fixed term and his tenure is based
on the confidence reposed upon him, and not by the qualification imposed by the civil service law, but by
the appointing officer. If the appointing officer loses his confidence upon the appointee, the latter may be
removed from his position.

In the case at bar, the appointing authoritys loss of confidence to the appointee stemmed from his
unimpressive performance as deemed by the appointing authority [NCMH]. Moreover, he was seen unfit
without an accreditation by the Psychiatry Specialty Board. To specialize on a medical field [be it Psychiatry
or Cardiology], one has to go through a stringent process. This process is to guarantee the specialists
minimum standards and skills which is an assurance to the community that a specialist is not set loose
without the basic knowledge and skills of his specialty as lives are ultimately at stake. The purpose is thus
geared towards training the resident physician.

MAIN POINT:
An appointment can be terminated at any time and that renewal was within the discretion of the
appointing authority by virtue of the incidental power of the power to appoint [the power to renew
a temporary appointment].
PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA v CSC
G.R. No. 107590

February 21, 1995

Facts:

This petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice filed
with Civil Service Commission (CSC) by 16 private respondents who are full-time instructors of
Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila (PLM), through Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila Faculty
Organization (PLMFO), against petitioner PLM and its officers.

Uniform notices of termination, all dated 24 April 1990, were individually sent to private respondents
informing them of "the expiration of their temporary appointments at the close of office hours on 31 May
1990" and the non-renewal of their appointments for the school year (SY) 1990-1991.

In its defense, PLM interposed (1) the temporary nature of private respondents' contracts of employment
and (2) reasons that could justify the non- renewal of the contracts.

Public respondent CSC referred the case to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC).
PSLMC found PLM guilty of "Unfair Labor Practice" and held that private respondents "should be
reinstated. Denying PLMs reconsideration, the PSLMC transmitted the case to the CSC for appropriate
action. The CSC directed the reinstatement, with payment of back salaries, of private respondents.

Petitioner insists that when CSC has ruled on the matter of illegal dismissal without conducting any
further hearing of its own, relying only on PSLMC's finding of unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner,
the latter has thereby been denied due process.

Had complainants not been among those active officers and/or members of the PLMFO, and had their
qualifications, training, experience and performance rating not been impressive, CSC would have agreed
that the termination or non-renewal of the contracts of complainants does not constitute unfair labor
practice. But the records reveal otherwise.

When the exercise of this privilege is alleged to be the means by which management hinders unionism or
outrightly bust unions and such allegation is supported by evidence, the act needs to be examined and
studied. It then becomes incumbent upon Management to show that its intentions are otherwise.

ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of primarily confidential position if valid in this case?

RULING:

NO. Even temporary employees enjoy that basic right to form organization or association for purposes not
contrary to law. PLMFO is that organization. Thus, its members cannot be separated from the service for
the simple reason of membership in the said organization. And when the appointment status of these
members happens to be temporary in nature, such becomes merely incidental and the doctrine that
temporary employees have no security of tenure must yield or is not applicable.

When the clear intent therefore of PLM Management in terminating the services of these employees is to
abridge their constitutional right to self-organization, the Commission has the duty to give them protection
and uphold their basic right. This constitutional right of employees is superior to the right of management
not to renew the temporary appointment of its employees. When the exercise of discretion by the
management is calculated to bust the union as what PLM Management had done, the Commission has
no choice but to declare it as a grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the appealed resolutions of the CSC are affirmed.

MAIN POINT: The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term is ordinarily a valid mode of
removal at the end of each period. This rule, however, must yield to the superior constitutional
right of employees, permanent or temporary, to self-organization. While, a temporary employment
may be ended with or without cause, it certainly may not, however, be terminated for an illegal
cause.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. CA
246 SCRA 231 [1995]

Facts:
Private respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then governor
of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza on January 1, 1960. On October 12, 1972, he was
promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial warden by then Governor Felix Alfelor,
Sr. Because he had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, private
respondent Tito Dato could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. Hence, what
was extended to him was only a temporary appointment. Thereafter, the temporary
appointment was renewed annually.

On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment

status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil
service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was
not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato
did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His
appointment therefore remained temporary.

On March 16, 1976, private respondent Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by
Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for
allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners
who escaped from confinement.

On March 19, 1976, or two years after the request for change of status was made,
Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote
the Governor of Camarines Sur a letter informing him that the status of private respondent
Tito Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the
examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made
retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.

In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for

the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from
the petitioner's plantilla.

Private respondent Tito Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against
him. Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement and backwages.When his
request for reinstatement and backwages was not heeded, private respondent Tito Dato
filed an action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 31.

Issue:
Whether or not the position of Assistant Provincial warden is classified as
primarily confidential.
Held:
No. Based on Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 2011 of the Civil Service
Commission, positions that are to be declared as primarily confidential in the office of
Provincial Governor, Provincial vice Governor. City/Municipal Mayor/Vice Mayor,
Sangguniang Panglalawigan/Panglungsod/Bayan are as follows:
Executive Assistant I, II, III, IV,V
Private Secretary I and II
Security Agent I and II
Security Officer I, II, III, IV and V
Personal Driver/Chauffer
Thus, the position of Assistant Provincial Warden is not considered as primarily
Confidential.

Main point:
Lack of civil service eligibility made an appointment temporary. Thus, the appointment is
revocable at anytime (without a fixed and definite term) or dependent upon the pleasure of
the appointing power. Obtaining the civil service legibility later on does not ipso facto
convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. CA
246 SCRA 231 [1995]

Facts:
Private respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then governor
of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza on January 1, 1960. On October 12, 1972, he was
promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial warden by then Governor Felix Alfelor,
Sr. Because he had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, private
respondent Tito Dato could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. Hence, what
was extended to him was only a temporary appointment. Thereafter, the temporary
appointment was renewed annually.

On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment

status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil
service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was
not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato
did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His
appointment therefore remained temporary.

On March 16, 1976, private respondent Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by
Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for
allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners
who escaped from confinement.

On March 19, 1976, or two years after the request for change of status was made,
Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote
the Governor of Camarines Sur a letter informing him that the status of private respondent
Tito Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the
examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made
retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.

In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for

the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from
the petitioner's plantilla.

Private respondent Tito Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against
him. Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement and backwages.When his
request for reinstatement and backwages was not heeded, private respondent Tito Dato
filed an action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 31.

Issue:
Whether or not the position of Assistant Provincial warden is classified as
primarily confidential.
 Held:
No. Based on Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 2011 of the Civil Service
Commission, positions that are to be declared as primarily confidential in the office of
Provincial Governor, Provincial vice Governor. City/Municipal Mayor/Vice Mayor,
Sangguniang Panglalawigan/Panglungsod/Bayan are as follows:
Executive Assistant I, II, III, IV,V
Private Secretary I and II
Security Agent I and II
Security Officer I, II, III, IV and V
Personal Driver/Chauffer
Thus, the position of Assistant Provincial Warden is not considered as primarily
Confidential.

Main point:
Lack of civil service eligibility made an appointment temporary. Thus, the appointment is
revocable at anytime (without a fixed and definite term) or dependent upon the pleasure of
the appointing power. Obtaining the civil service legibility later on does not ipso facto
convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one.
Peza v. Mercado
614 SCRA 683 (2010)

Facts:
The petitioners, Philippine Economic Zone Authority Board Members and Lilia
B, De Lima assailed the 1) Decision of Court of Appeals dated December 14, 2005 which
reversed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 108, 2) Amended
Decision dated March 31, 2006 by awarding back salaries to Gloria J. Mercado
(respondent) computed from the time of her alleged dismissal until her reinstatement as
Philippine Economic
On September 16, 1998, respondent was appointed as Group Manager for Policy
and Planning of PEZA. Her appointment was temporary in nature. On 1999, respondent
was promoted to the position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning. Her
appointment indicated the same as on permanent basis, but with the following annotation:
NO SECURITY OF TENURE UNLESS HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO (career
executive service officer) OR CSEE (career service executive eligibility) ELIGIBILITY.
But on June 1, 2000, she was terminated by the petitioner Lilia B. de Lima in her
capacity as PEZA Director General. Wilhelm G. Ortaliz, a CESO eligible was appointed
as Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning effective immediately.

Respondent thereupon filed on June 7, 2000 with the RTC of Pasay City a petition
for prohibition, quo warranto and damages with preliminary prohibitory /mandatory
injunction and/or temporary restraining order against herein petitioners.

In the main, respondent alleged in her complaint that her degree in Master in
National Security Administration (MNSA) automatically conferred upon her Career
Executive Service (CES) eligibility; that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8748, which amended
R.A. 7916 or the PEZA Charter, did away with the CES eligibility requirement for the
position of Deputy Director General; and that the termination of her appointment was
actuated with bad faith to entitle her to moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether or not the position of Deputy Director General requires CES eligibility

Held:
Yes. The Civil Service Commission CESB in fact has certified that the position
requires the appropriate CES eligibility. It is settled that the construction given to a statute
by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute
is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts.

Respondents subsequent passing in late 2000 of the CES examinations did not
retroact to consider her a CESO at the time her appointment was terminated on June 1,
2000.
Peza v. Mercado
614 SCRA 683 (2010)

Facts:
The petitioners, Philippine Economic Zone Authority Board Members and Lilia
B, De Lima assailed the 1) Decision of Court of Appeals dated December 14, 2005 which
reversed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 108, 2) Amended
Decision dated March 31, 2006 by awarding back salaries to Gloria J. Mercado
(respondent) computed from the time of her alleged dismissal until her reinstatement as
Philippine Economic
On September 16, 1998, respondent was appointed as Group Manager for Policy
and Planning of PEZA. Her appointment was temporary in nature. On 1999, respondent
was promoted to the position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning. Her
appointment indicated the same as on permanent basis, but with the following annotation:
NO SECURITY OF TENURE UNLESS HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO (career
executive service officer) OR CSEE (career service executive eligibility) ELIGIBILITY.
But on June 1, 2000, she was terminated by the petitioner Lilia B. de Lima in her
capacity as PEZA Director General. Wilhelm G. Ortaliz, a CESO eligible was appointed
as Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning effective immediately.

Respondent thereupon filed on June 7, 2000 with the RTC of Pasay City a petition
for prohibition, quo warranto and damages with preliminary prohibitory /mandatory
injunction and/or temporary restraining order against herein petitioners.

In the main, respondent alleged in her complaint that her degree in Master in
National Security Administration (MNSA) automatically conferred upon her Career
Executive Service (CES) eligibility; that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8748, which amended
R.A. 7916 or the PEZA Charter, did away with the CES eligibility requirement for the
position of Deputy Director General; and that the termination of her appointment was
actuated with bad faith to entitle her to moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether or not the position of Deputy Director General requires CES eligibility

Held:
Yes. The Civil Service Commission CESB in fact has certified that the position
requires the appropriate CES eligibility. It is settled that the construction given to a statute
by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute
is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts.

Respondents subsequent passing in late 2000 of the CES examinations did not
retroact to consider her a CESO at the time her appointment was terminated on June 1,
2000.
CSC v. CA
635 SCRA 749 (2010)

Facts:

In GR No. 185766, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint Josefina

Sarsonas as Asst. Department Manager II of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of
PCSO under temporary status. Thus, on the same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario
Uriarte issued a temporary appointment to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II.

Civil Service Commission Field Office Office of the President (CSCFO-OP)

disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to meet the eligibility
requirement for the position. CSCFO-OP certified that there were qualified individuals
who signified their interest to be appointed to the position, namely, Mercedes Hinayon
and Reynaldo Martin.

PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-NCR but the latter affirmed the disapproval.
PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC but the same was dismissed. PCSO elevated the case
to the CA, which reversed the CSC resolution. CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied.

In GR No. 185767, PCSO Board of Directors resolved to appoint Lemuel G.

Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II of its Planning and Production Department.
The same events transpired as in G.R. No. 185766.

In both petitions to the CA, it was ruled that CSC erred in finding that the position
of Assistant Department Manager II requires CSE eligibility, rendering improper the
temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega, respectively. In G.R. No. 185766, the CA
held that the resolution of the PCSO Board to appoint Sarsonas as Assistant Department
Manager II was a policy decision and an exercise of management prerogative over which
the CSC has no power of review. In G.R. No. 185767, the CA similarly ruled that the
Career Executive Service does not cover the position of Assistant Department Manager II
in the Planning and Production Department of the PCSO.

Issue:

CES. Whether or not the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls under the

Held:

No. Positions in the CES under the Administrative Code include those of
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
the President. Simply put, third-level positions in the Civil Service are only those belonging
to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the President of
the Philippines. This was the same ruling handed down by the Court in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, wherein the Court declared that the CES covers
presidential appointees only.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department
Manager II is not one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There
is also no question that the CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those
enumerated in the said Administrative Code . Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of the
position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager,
and not by the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant
Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not
require CSE eligibility.
CSC v. CA
635 SCRA 749 (2010)

Facts:

In GR No. 185766, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint Josefina

Sarsonas as Asst. Department Manager II of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of
PCSO under temporary status. Thus, on the same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario
Uriarte issued a temporary appointment to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II.

Civil Service Commission Field Office Office of the President (CSCFO-OP)

disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to meet the eligibility
requirement for the position. CSCFO-OP certified that there were qualified individuals
who signified their interest to be appointed to the position, namely, Mercedes Hinayon
and Reynaldo Martin.

PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-NCR but the latter affirmed the disapproval.
PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC but the same was dismissed. PCSO elevated the case
to the CA, which reversed the CSC resolution. CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied.

In GR No. 185767, PCSO Board of Directors resolved to appoint Lemuel G.

Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II of its Planning and Production Department.
The same events transpired as in G.R. No. 185766.

In both petitions to the CA, it was ruled that CSC erred in finding that the position
of Assistant Department Manager II requires CSE eligibility, rendering improper the
temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega, respectively. In G.R. No. 185766, the CA
held that the resolution of the PCSO Board to appoint Sarsonas as Assistant Department
Manager II was a policy decision and an exercise of management prerogative over which
the CSC has no power of review. In G.R. No. 185767, the CA similarly ruled that the
Career Executive Service does not cover the position of Assistant Department Manager II
in the Planning and Production Department of the PCSO.

Issue:

CES. Whether or not the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls under the

Held:

No. Positions in the CES under the Administrative Code include those of
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
the President. Simply put, third-level positions in the Civil Service are only those belonging
to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the President of
the Philippines. This was the same ruling handed down by the Court in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, wherein the Court declared that the CES covers
presidential appointees only.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department
Manager II is not one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There
is also no question that the CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those
enumerated in the said Administrative Code . Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of the
position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager,
and not by the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant
Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not
require CSE eligibility.
58Luego v Csc

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as permanent but the Civil
Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found
the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly
directed herein private respondent in place of petitioners position. The private respondent was so
appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking
his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order and the
private respondents title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission can approve a permanent appointment into a
temporary one, on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD: No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The sole function of the commission is to
attest to the qualification of the appointee.
59Pangilinan v Maglaya

The petitioner complains that he has been removed from office without due process and just
cause in disregard of his constitutional security of tenure.

Teodoro B. Pangilinan joined the government service on July 18, 1966, when he was appointed
agent in the National Bureau of Investigation, a position for which he had the appropriate civil
service eligibility. He had risen to Supervising Agent when he resigned to accept appointment
as Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office on July 8, 1987. He assumed office on
July 16, 1987.

On September 27, 1991, the petitioner called a press conference expose what the media later
described as "the license plate mess." He also announced his intention to file graft charges
with the Ombudsman against Prado, Sabalza and Undersecretary Jose Valdecaas, also of the
DOTC.

The following day, Secretary Prado relieved Pangilinan as Executive Director of the LTO and
replaced him with Guillermo Maglaya as officerincharge. However, the petitioner continued
receiving his salary (although his allowances were withheld) until December 31, 1991. When he
asked why his pay had been discontinued, he was informed by Asst.
Secretary Juan V. Borra, Jr. that Maglaya had already been designated as Acting Executive
Director of the LTO.

In this petition, Pangilinan prays for reinstatement on the ground that no charge has been filed
or proved against him to justify his removal.

the Solicitor General argues that Pangilinan was validly separated because he was appointed to
the disputed position in an acting capacity only. He does not possess the qualifications
prescribed for the office of Executive Director of the LTO, which is a career executive service
position for which only a career executive service official is eligible. The petitioner is not a
career executive service official. Hence, he could not be, and was not extended a permanent
appointment.

Issue: W/N an acting appointee can claim security of tenure just like a permanent appointment.

Ruling: No. Pangilinan was only an acting appointee because he did not have the requisite
qualifications; as such, he could not claim security of tenure. This Court has repeatedly held that
this guaranty is available only to permanent appointees. The fact that Pangilinan was qualified
for his initial appointment as agent in the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all other
positions he might later occupy in the civil service.
60Santiago v csc

Facts: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector of Customs I to
Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems
Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was nextin
rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board decided to revoke Santiago's appointment and
directed that Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the Board
Resolution. The Commission ruled that respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of
educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken. It added
that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as mandated by the
Constitution and to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service. Thus, Santiago appealed.

Issue: W/N reorganization in the means of promotion will always be followed

Rulling: No. One who is nextinrank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher
vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither
grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
promote such person to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion.
ASELA B. MONTECILLO, MARILOU JOAN V. ORTEGA and CHARRISHE DOSDOS v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
GR No. 131954, June 28, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioners Montecillo, Ortega, and Dosdos employees of Metropolitan Cebu Water District
were reclassified to conform to the positions, descriptions and corresponding salary grades of
Civil Service Commission. They applied for promotional appointment to the position of Secretary
to the Assistant General Manager but the CSC refused to approve appointments as permanent
because the position was primarily confidential and coterminus position based on CSC Memo
Circular No. 22. The petitioners argued that the Memo was unduly amended and expanded the
scope of the noncareer service. Further, they contend that the respondents abused its power to
promulgate rules and regulations because the grant of rulemaking power to CSC didnt authorize
it to amend the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents refusal to approve the appointment based on the amended
Order constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULING:
No. There was no clear end persuasive showing that the respondent grossly abused its discretion
or exceeded its power when it issued the Order. It was issued pursuant to a power expressly
vested by law upon the respondent. The Court respects it as a valid issuance of a constitutionally
independent body.
RUDIGARIO C. GATMAITAN v. DR. RICARDO B. GONZALES, Office of the Ombudsman and Court
of Appeals
492 SCRA 591, June 26, 2006

FACTS:

The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure
challenging the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of Office of Ombudsman in dismissing
the administrative complaint of Rudigario C. Gatmaitan against Dr. Ricardo B. Gonzales for lack
of substantial evidence. Petitioner, assigned as hospital housekeeper of Dr. Jose Fabella
Memorial Hospital was reassigned to Operating RoomDelivery Room complex to perform
janitorial task. This violated his constitutional rights to security of job tenure and alleged
demotion though there was no demotion in his salaries. There was a demotion in his status
pointing to a clear case of illegal reassignment which constitute grave misconduct of officer. He
insisted that demotion is tantamount to a constructive dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reassignment from the lobby to the Operating RoomDelivery Room of the
Hospital ordered by respondent was valid.

RULING:
Yes. The Court clearly established the meaning of reassignment and demotion. Reassignment
is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department
or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment. Demotion is defined as the movement from one position to another
involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or
rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. If the services of public servant is needed
in another section of the hospital, then a reassignment in accordance with CS rules and
regulations is proper. A public servant must not place his own personal convenience above that
of the needs of the public he serves.
RUSSEL ULYSSES I. NIEVES v. JOCELYN BLANCO
673 SCRA 638 (2012)

FACTS:
Russel Ulysses I. Nieves is a Trade and Industry Development Specialist of DTI. Nieves was
formerly assigned in the DTIs Office in Sorsogon but was reassigned to the DTI Provincial Office
in Albay. A year after his reassignment to DTIAlbay, Nieves requested DTI Regional V Director
Jocelyn Blanco for his reassignment back to DTISorsogon but this was denied. Nieves appealed
his reassignment to CSC asserting that under Sec. 6(a) of the CSC Omnibus Revised Rules on
Reassignment, he is a stationspecific employees and is allowed only to be reassigned for a
maximum period of 1 year. CSC however pointed out that Nieves appointment is not station
specific but this does not mean that Nieves could be reassigned to DTIAlbay indefinitely. The CSC
ruled that under the Revised Rules on Reassignment, a reassignment outside the geographical
location, if without the consent of the employee concerned should not exceed the maximum
period of 1 year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reassignment of Nieves is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The CA held that the reassignment is not affected by 1 year limitation since it is within the
same regional office. Even if without his consent, it is valid as long as there is no reduction in rank
status and salary. A reassignment from one provincial office to another provincial office within
the same region is not considered as a reassignment outside geographical location.
RAMON P. BINAMIRA vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.
188 SCRA 154
JULY 30, 1990

FACTS: Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in
violation of his security of tenure. Binamira was appointed by the Minister of Tourism and
Chariman of PTA Board, Jose Gonzales.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager
and ViceChairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various
government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains that on January 2, 1990,
his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho who was appointed as new Secretary of
Tourism. Binamiras demurrer led to an unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a complaint
against the Secretary with the Commission on Human Rights.
Section 23A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23A. General ManagerAppointment and Tenure. The General Manager shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years
unless sooner removed for cause; provided, that upon the expiration of his term, he shall
serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by
P.D. 1400)
ISSUE: W/N Binamira was appointed as General Manager of PTA or merely designated.
RULING: Designated. The decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any
other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot
be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise
of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The designation of the petitioner was not a
merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he
happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet. The petitioner never acquired valid title
to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the PTA.
Main Point: Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority.
Nota Bene: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Upon confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely
the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
JAIME HERNANDEZ vs. EPIFANIO T. VILLEGAS
14 SCRA 544
JUNE 30, 1965

FACTS: Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security
of the Bureau of Customs. He was sent to the United States to study. Upon Villegas return to
the Philippines, he was temporarily designated as Arrastre Superintendent while James Keefe
was designated Acting Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs.
Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent
appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his letter that this (the proposed
appointment) involves a change of designation and status from Director for Security which is
confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a classified position. A few days later, the
appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director for Security was likewise proposed.
The President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and Keefe. However,
Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefes.
He served notice that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for
Security and asking for the disapproval of the promotional appointment of Keefe.
Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court
ruled in favor of Villegas and the CA affirmed the CFIs ruling.
The petitioners contended that since the work of the Directorwhich has been delegated to
him by the Customs Commissionerhave been declared by Executive Order to be primarily
confidential, then the Office of the Director for Security must itself be considered primarily
confidential. They then justify the transfer of Villegas to the Arrastre Service on the basis of the
effect that positions which are primarily confidential, policydetermining and highly technical
are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N Villegas removal from the Office of Director for Security constitutes loss of
confidence.
RULING: No. Even officers and employees of the civil service occupying primarily confidential
positions are subject to the constitutional safeguard against removal or suspension except for
cause. It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily
confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination
of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case
their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers. Since it has not been shown that there had been loss of confidence, Villegas removal
from the office of Director for Security is therefore illegal.
CONCEPCION G. BRIONES vs SERGIO OSMEA, JR.
104 PHIL 588
G.R. No. L12536
September 24, 1958

FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible. She was appointed
clerkstenographer, and with permanent status. Since then she remained in service
continuously, receiving repeated promotions and increases in salary. Another petitioner,
Faustino Rosagaran, on the other hand, is a second grade civil service eligible. He was employed
in the Office of the City Mayor and was promoted to Administrative Officer.
On January 5, 1956, upon the passing of Resolution No. 21, series of 1956, 35 positions were
created in the City Mayors Office. Subsequently, the Municipal Board in its Resolution No. 187,
series of 1956, approved Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 15 positions in the City Mayor's Office
and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board. Among the positions abolished in the
Office of the City Mayor were those occupied by the Petitioners.
The City Mayor wrote separate letters to petitioners notifying them of the abolition of
their positions and advising them of the termination of their services. In reply thereto, the
petitioners objected to the abolition of their positions, and, informed him that they will
not relinquish their positions until otherwise determined by higher competent authorities or
courts. The CFI of Cebu decided in favor of the petitioners and declared the abolition of their
offices null and void for lack of approval of the Department Head, as required by the Circular of
April 3, 1954 and by Executive Order No. 506, series of 1934. The respondents appealed.
ISSUE: WON the abolition of positions was valid.
RULING: NO. It violates the reasons given for the abolition of the positions of the appellees are
untrue, and constitute a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the said appellees,
in violation of the security of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution. A decent
respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, like
petitioners herein who have rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in
favor of noneligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of
political changes.
Main Point: While abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only
where the abolition is made in good faith; the right to abolish cannot be used to cover the discharge of
employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.
EUGENIO v. CSC

Facts:

Eugenio was given a Career Executive Service Eligibility and was recommended to the President for a
CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

Civil Service Commission (CSC) passed a resolution which abolished the CESB relying on the Admin Code
conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need
arises.

Finding herself bereft of further admin relief as the CESB which recommended her CESO Rank has been
abolished, the petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul the said resolution.

Issue:

WON CSC can validly abolish the office of CESB.

Ruling:

NO. The CESB was created by law (PD 1), it can only be abolished by the legislature. The legislature has
not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.

Main Point:

Office created by law can only be abolished by law.

ROMUALDEZ YAP v. CSC

Facts:

Petitioner Conchita Romualdez Yap was appointed in 1983 as a Senior Vice President assigned in the
Fund Transfer Department of PNB.

Starting April 1 to February 1987, petitioner filed several applications for leave which was duly
approved. While she was on leave on December 3, 1986, EO No. 80 was approved which authorized the
restructure/ reorganization of PNB due to financial distress. The Fund Transfer Department was
abolished and its functions were transfer to International Department. The petitioner was notified of
her separation from the service in a letter dated January 30, 1987.

Petitioner assailed the validity of the Resolution No. 92 201 promulgated by CSC which upheld the
petitioners separation from the PNB in light of EO No. 80 contending that there is an existence of bad
faith in its reorganization considering that her termination on February 16, 1986 was made effective
prior to the effectivity of EO No. 80. In addition, the bad faith in her separation from service was evident
from the recent restoration of the Fund Transfer Department as a separate and distinct unit from the
International Department.

Issue 1:

WON the CSC can validly reorganize GOCC performing a ministrant function like PNB.

Ruling 1:

YES, as long as they are done in good faith.

Issue 2:

WON the reorganization of PNB is done in good faith.

Ruling 2:

YES, PNBs reorganization was by virtue of a valid law. The PNB was in financial distress and
reorganization would help the PNB to achieve greater efficiency and economy.

As to the allegation of the petitioner that her termination was done in bad faith because he was
separated from service before the effectivity of EO No. 80, the court said that the antedating of the
termination date, aside from being clearly a typographical error, is a periphernal issue. The real issue is
existence of bad faith consisting of tangible bureaucratic/ management pressures exerted to ease her
out of office. As to the restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, it was due to the banks growth
after reorganization, thereby negating malice or bad faith in that reorganization.

Main Point:

The CSC can validly reorganize GOCC performing ministrant function as long as it is done in good faith.
FERNANDEZ v. STO. TOMASe

Facts:

Petitioners, Salvador Fernandez, serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA),
and Anicia De Lima, serving as Director of Personnel Relation (OPR), both at the Central Office of CSC,
assailed the validity of Resolution No. 943710 promulgated by the CSC, which merged the Office of Carer
System Standards (OCSS), OPIA, and OPR to form the Research Development Office (RDO). In pursuant to
the reorganization, Fernandez was assigned to Region V at Legaspi City and De Lima to Region III at San
Fernando, Pampanga.

Issue 1:

WON the CSC had legal authority to issue Resolution No943710 which merged the OCSS, OPIA, and OPR.

Ruling 1:

YES, because these offices constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Legislative authority have
validly delegated to CSC by Section 17 of 1997 Revised Admin Code.

Issue 2:

WON the said resolution violated the petitioners constitutional right to security of tenure.

Ruling 2:

NO,because they retained their their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy, the same rank,
status, and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the
Commission.

Main point:

The CSC can validly reorganize its Admin Subdivision because the Commission only knows the ever
changing needs with the call of times or demand of times, as long as this will not involve any reduction in
rank or status, nor neither the salaries of such employees and it is not amounting to removal nor
constructive dismissal.
 Chato v Natividad
244 SCRA 787 June 2, 1995
J. Mendoza

Main Points: An employees transfer as a result of reorganization in a government

agency may be justified if it is in accordance with the law; An employee who believes his
transfer to be unjustified must appeal to the Civil Service Commission.

FACTS:

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway Vinzons Chato issued Revised

Administrative Order No 593, redefining the area of jurisdiction and renumbering of regional
district offices. In addition to said order, Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 80 93 was
issued, directing ninety revenue district officers to report to new assignments in the
redesignated and renumbered revenue district offices nationwide.

As a result of such reorganization, respondent Salvador Nori Blas, was transferred

from the revenue district in San Fernando, to the revenue district in Tuguegarao. Petitioner
Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas former post. Blas wrote to the
Commissioner for reconsideration, stating that he was among the top ten examiners, a model
employee, and added that since he was a diabetic, he could not endure long travels.
Aggrieved, he filed for a petition for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order against the Commissioner and Alcantara.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Blas transfer is without just cause.

RULING:

No, private respondent's transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or reassignment of

revenue district officers designed to improve revenue collection. The objective of the
reassignment, as stated in Revenue Administrative Order No. 593, is "to strengthen the
decentralization of the Bureau's setup for the purpose of maximizing tax assessments and
revenue collections, intensifying enforcement of revenue laws and regulations and bringing
the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public."

Moreover , under the Civil Service Code, any employee who questions the validity of
his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
 Divinagracia v Sto. Tomas
244 SCRA 595 May 31, 1995
J. Bellosillo

Main Points: To lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done
without the employees consent, for that would constitute removal from office.

FACTS:

Filomena R. Mancita was appointed Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) of

Pili, Camarines Sur, in a permanent capacity. When the Local Government Code took effect,
the office was renamed Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC).

The Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration approved the

reorganization plan and staffing pattern of the Municipality of Pili. Mayor Anastacio M. Prila
notified Mancita that her services were being terminated on the ground that the Office of
MDC was abolished as a result of the reorganization of the local government of Pili.

Respondent Prescilla B. Nacario, who was then Municipal Budget Officer was
appointed Municipal Planning Development Coordinator. Mancita appealed her termination
to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), which declared her separation from the
service illegal, holding that the Office of the Municipal Development Coordinator was
abolished by the Local Government Code of 1991 and not by the reorganization of the
Municipality of Pili

Mayor Divinagracia informed private respondent Nacario that she was being relieved
of her position as MPDC in order to comply with the MSPB decision to reinstate Mancita.
Nacario asked the Civil Service Commission regarding her status as a private employee,
which said that Mancitas reinstatement is not a valid cause for Nacarios termination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Nacario may be reinstated to her former position.

RULING:

Yes, her transfer to MPDC amounted to removal from her position as MBO. Her
security of tenure which she acquired as MBO was violated. A permanent transfer can take
place only when the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then
appointed to another position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by
statute, but also by the Constitution and cannot be taken away from her either by removal,
transfer or by revocation of appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice. The
unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was
arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause hence, invalid as it is anathema to
security of tenure.
 VinzonChato v Zenorosa
GR No 120539 October 20, 2000
J. Buena

Main Point: To subordinate government projects, along with the great resources and
efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees,
would negate the principle that a public office is a public trust and that it is not the
private preserve of any person.

FACTS:

Petitioner Liwayway VinzonsChato, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued

Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 895. As a result, private respondent Estrella V.
Martinez was reassigned from Assistant Revenue District Officer of Revenue District Office
No. 34 Paco Pandacan, San Andres, Sta. Ana area to Assistant Division Chief, Collection
Programs Division, National Office in Quezon City.

Petitioner contends that the reassignment of revenue district officers was made
pursuant to Executive Order No. 132 (Approving the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue) for the purpose of improving revenue collection.

Respondent claims that prior to the questioned RTAO 895, the retiring Revenue
Officer of RDO No. 34 Jose T. Jacalan, wrote to the BIR Commissioner endorsing and strongly
recommending the private respondents promotion as Revenue Officer of said RDO. She
further claims that RTAO 895 is tantamount to a demotion since the position she was
transferred to is totally alien to her past experiences and skills.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RTAO 895 is invalid for violating security of tenure by demoting
employees

Whether or not Martinez should be assigned as a Revenue Officer instead of

Assistant Division Chief

RULING:

No, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or reassign internal

revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies of the service may require,
without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with the Civil Service Rules and
Regulation. Moreover, the reassignment of Martinez was not a demotion for there is no
diminution in rank, salary, status, and responsibilities.

No, Martinez failed to establish a valid claim or a vested right to the post. To sustain
his contention that his transfer constitutes a demotion simply because the new assignment
is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects, along with the great
resources and efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions of civil service
employees. Such contention would negate the principle that a public office is a public trust
and that it is not the private preserve of any person.
De Guzman, Agripino, et. al. vs Comelec

G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000

Facts:

A petition is filed assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known
as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" where Section 44 thereof provides:

"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of
this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality
shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district."

Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or
Municipal Election Officers, to different stations. Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189
undermines The Constitutional Independence Of Comelec And Comelecs Constitutional Authority To
Name, Designate And Appoint And Then Reassign And Transfer Its Very Own Officials And Employees.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis
for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power
to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the
questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power
to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the
implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws
passed by Congress.
Cuavis vs Bacal

G.O. No. 139382 December 6, 2000

Fact:

This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs). More
specifically, it concerns the appointment made by President Ramos of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who
holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office, which
has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the
Regional Director of the PAO.
In its decision rendered on March 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals declared respondent Josefina G.
Bacal entitled to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office. Petitioners moved
for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the appeals court in its resolution dated July 22,
1999. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend that the transfer of respondent to
the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO is appropriate considering her rank as CESO III.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents transfer to the position of Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office,
which was made without her consent, is permanent and amounts to a removal without cause.

Ruling:

No, respondents appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and that,
consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same office, which
corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of
tenure guarantee of the Constitution.

A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in
the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity
in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated. . . .
Mayor, Jovencio vs Macaraig, Catalino

194 SCRA 672 , 1991

Facts:

5 civil actions were filed and being decided jointly regarding the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6715.
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 6715 declaring all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor
Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commissions vacant because of the
need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions,
and upgrade their qualifications, ranks and salaries or emoluments. The said positions were that of the
petitioners who were removed from office because of the RA.

Issue:

Whether or not the removal of the petitioners from their positions is valid.

Ruling:

No. Incumbent officials deemed qualified under the old law are still deemed qualified under the new law
if there is a law increasing their qualification.

Additional Notes:

The law here for the cause or removal or termination of employment is the abolition by law of his office
as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy functions.

Abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate is a recognized cause for such
termination of employment. But, abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that
that office is vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it
cannot be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove
the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service.

The RA effected no express abolition of the positions, neither an implied abolition i.e., that resulting
from an irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices
under the old rules and those corresponding thereof under the new law.
Canonizado
vs
Aguirre

Facts:
Respondents are seeking a reconsideration of the Courts 25 January
2000 decision wherein it declares Section 8 of R.A 8551 to be violative of
petitioners constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure. The Court holds
the petitioners removal as NAPOLCOMs commissioners and the appointment
of a new commissioners in their stead were nullities, and ordering their
reinstatement and payment of full back wages. Respondents point out that
Canonizado was appointed by the Pres. Estrada to the position of Inspector
General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS)of the PNP in the interim. According to
the respondents, by virtue of the fact, Canonizado is deemed to have
abandoned his claim for reinstatement, since the offices of the NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and the Inspector General of IAS are incompatible.

Issue: W/N Canonizado is entitled to be reinstated to office

Ruling: Yes. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government

employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under th law
and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made
in order to replace petitioners are not valid.
Salvador
vs
CA

Facts:
Petitioner Salvador had been a permanent employee of the DENR when
it was reorganized under EO 192. This resulted in the conversion of the positions
of several employees who were offered coterminous. The petitioner was one of
the employees who were offered coterminous position. Petitioner later filed a
complaint along with other employees. The Court decided in their favor, and
ordered the reinstatement of the employees. DENR failed to comply with this
order. Meanwhile, petitioner applied for a new opening in the company but was
ignored.

Issue: W/N the petitioner was covered by the decision of the Court and thus
entitled to reinstatement

Ruling:
Yes. It was thus error for respondent Court of Appeals to exclude petitioner
from the coverage of the decision simply because he accepted employment
while said case was still pending. Petitioner had the right to live during the
pendency of the case and naturally the right to accept any form of
employment.
Enrique
vs
CA

Facts:
Employees Pacheco, Basilio, Valencia, Enrique of the Civil Service
Commission together were charged with conspiring and confederating with PBET
(Professional Board Examination for Teachers); bribery of room examiners and
proctors.
CSC suspended Pacheco, Basilio, Valencia and Enrique. The 4 appealed
to Intermediate Appellate Court. Pacheco and Valencia were reinstated while
Basilio and Enrique were still suspended.
Basilio and Enrique filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied due
to lack of merit.

Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the petitioners from the service through a summary
proceeding by the CSC was prosper

Ruling:
Yes. It was valid/proper so long as said employees were duly informed of
the charges against them and were given the opportunity to present their side.
In the case at bench, petitioners were informed of the charges against them and
are given the opportunity to present their defenses.
G.R. NO. 183337 : April 23, 2010

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:

This is a case involving a dismissal of the utility worker named Magnaye. In March 2001, Mayor Roman
H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic
Enterprise Operation of Market (OEE). On July 11, 2001, Benda also placed him on detail at the
Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the implementation of a Survey on the Integrated
Rural Accessibility Planning Project. On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of
termination from employment effective the following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity.
Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Benda was not
in a position to effectively evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half
months after his (Mayor Bendas) assumption to office.He added that his termination was without basis
and was politically motivated. The CSC head office dismissed, without prejudice, Magnaye's complaint
because he failed to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping. Thereafter, Magnaye filed a complaint
with the regional office of the Civil Service(CSCRO-IV).

The CSCRO-IV dismissed Magnayes complaint for lack of merit. Magnaye sought recourse through a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in Magnaye's favor, mainly on the ground that
he was denied due process since he was not informed of what constituted the alleged unsatisfactory
conduct and want of capacity that led to his termination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the termination of Magnaye was in accordance with the pertinent laws and the rules?

RULING:

NO. Mayor Benda dismissed Magnaye for lack of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct. While unsatisfactory
conduct and want of capacity are valid causes that may be invoked for dismissal from the service, the CA
observed that the Memorandum issued by Mayor Benda terminating Magnayes employment did not specify
the acts constituting his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct.It merely stated that the character
investigation conducted during his probationary period showed that his employment need not be necessary
to be permanent in status. Mayor Bendas own assessment of Magnaye's performance could not have
served as a sufficient basis to dismiss him because said mayor was not his immediate superior and did not
have daily contacts with him. Additionally, Mayor Benda terminated his employment less than one and
one-half months after his assumption to office.

Moreover, Magnaye was denied procedural due process when he received his notice of termination only a
day before he was dismissed from the service. Evidently, he was effectively deprived of the opportunity to
defend himself from the charge that he lacked the capacity to do his work and that his conduct was
unsatisfactory. As well, during his appeal to the CSCRO-IV, he was not furnished with the submissions of
Mayor Benda that he could have opposed.He was also denied substantive due process because he was
dismissed from the service without a valid cause for lack of any factual or legal basis for his want of capacity
and unsatisfactory conduct.
Rubenecia vs. CSC

244 SCRA 640

FACTS:

Petitioner Ruble Rubenecia assails Civil Service Commission ("CSC" or "Commission")

Resolution No. 94-0533, dated 25 January 1994, acquitting him of a charge of
insubordination but finding him guilty of several other administrative charges(dishonesty
, nepotism, oppression and violation of Civil Service Rules) and imposing upon him the
penalty of dismissal from the service. He also questions the validity of CSC Resolution
No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993, which allegedly abolished the Merit System Protection
Board ("MSPB") and authorized the elevation of cases pending before that body to the
CommissionTeachers of Catarman National HS filed before MSPB administrative
complaint against petitioner Rubenecia, the School Principal.

Regional Director submitted to MSPB the investigation report but before MSPB could
render a decision, CSC issued RESOLUTION 93-2387 which provided, among other
things, that cases then pending before the MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission
for decision. In accordance with the Resolution, Rubenecias case was elevated to CSC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition
of CSC Resolution No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the
service.

RULING:

Yes. He was accorded with due process. ON THE NONFURNISH OF SUPPORTING

DOCUMENTS: he was given the opportunity to obtain those documents but he did not
avail of it + he sent a formal letter-answer to CSC Chair controverting the charges against
him and submitted voluminous documents in support of his claim of innocence.

ON FINDINGS OF THE CSC: The settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the finding of fact
of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as such findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court, like this Court, to weigh once
more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence. In
the present case, in any event, after examination of the record of this case, we conclude
that the decision of the Civil Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the
administrative charges prepared against him, is supported by substantial evidence.
CASE DIGEST: PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
and REYNALDO P. MARTIN v. MARIE JEAN C. LAPID

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed against the Respondent for allegedly confronting,
badmouthing and shouting invectives at Mr. Guemo, in the presence of other employees and
seeking assistance from the PSCO. The PCSO Board of Directors found her guilty of discourtesy
in the course of official duties and grave misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of
dismissal from service.

On appeal with the CSC, the Commission dismissed the respondents appeal for being moot and
academic. Moreover, they ruled that the respondent is a casual employee which means that she
is not entitled to security of tenure. However, the CA reversed the decision of the Commission by
reinstating the respondent in the service until the expiration of her casual employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely err in granting the respondents petition, in effect, reversing the
CSCs resolutions?

HELD: Yes. A new ruling recognizes that casual employees are covered by the security of tenure
and cannot be terminated within the period of his employment except for cause. Despite this new
ruling, it is not the intention of the Court to make the status of a casual employee at par with that
of a regular employee, who enjoys permanence of employment. The rule is still that casual
employment will cease automatically at the end of the period unless renewed as stated in the
Plantilla of Casual Employment. Casual employees may also be terminated anytime though
subject to certain conditions or qualifications. Thus, they may be laid-off anytime before the
expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occurs:(1) when their services
are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been
completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par.

Equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more
serious causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No. 001. The reason
for this is that their termination from the service could carry a penalty affecting their rights
and future employment in the government.

In the case at bench, the CSC itself found that Lapid was denied due process as she was never
formally charged with the administrative offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties
and Grave Misconduct, for which she was dismissed from the service. To somehow remedy the
situation, the petitioners mentioned in their Memorandum before the CA that there was no reason
anymore to pursue the administrative charge against Lapid and to investigate further as this was
superseded by Memorandum dated September 14, 2005 recommending the termination of
respondent Lapids casual employment. They pointed out that this was precisely the reason why
no Formal Charge was issued. Clearly, the action of petitioners clearly violated
Lapids basic rights as a casual employee.

Therefore, the petition is denied and the respondent is allowed to continue rendering services
as teller of PCSO and is also entitled to payment of backwages.
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 88979
February 7, 1992

Facts:
Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation
due to reorganization. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual
and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years of government service as of the date of separation.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed
an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative result on the ground that she is coterminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature.

Issue:
Whether or not coterminous employees whose security of tenure is limited only to specific
period
are entitled for the benefits under RA 6643.

Ruling:
Yes. A coterminous employee is a noncareer civil servant, like casual and emergency employees,
R.A. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees. Coterminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of
continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file
their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose.
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L. GARCIA
221 SCRA 145, G.R. No. 84301
April 7, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission to reinstate private respondent Garcia to her former position as Deputy Register of
Deeds II. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in
the LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate new offices created by said Executive Order,
which newly created offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders. Verily,
Executive Order No. 649 applies to Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated.

Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of Civil Service to reinstate Garcia is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Without the need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an
implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed nonexistent.
This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for the
reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. After
abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
CORAZON L. CABAGNOT in her capacity as Provincial Governor of Aklan, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and RENATO R. BAUTISTA, PEDRO R. SAYON, EUFEMIA I. MAQUINICA,
ARLYN G. BUENSALIDO, TITA A. LUMIO, REBA B. CONCEPCION, PRISCILLA D. BRIONES, JOYCE C.
MARTIREZ, ANNIE T. DALA, VIVIAN J. RUIZ, ELLEN I. TOLENTINO, EVES B. POBLACION, ANITA S.
MEREN, MARGARETH V. NATAL, MUJANE BEGONIA C. MIROY, ESTELITO C. SILVA, and EXPEDITO W.
OCZON, respondents.
223 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 93511
June 3, 1993

Facts:
There was a reorganization in the provincial government of Aklan which all provincial officials and
employees were invited to apply for positions. Out of these applicants, sixteen were demoted from their
position. They appealed to Civil Service Commission for reinstatement to their former position or positions
of comparable or equivalent rank which was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner violated the constitutional provision on security of tenure.

Ruling:
Yes. A demotion without valid cause is a removal. As a result of the reorganization of the
provincial
government of Aklan, these sixteen private respondents have been demoted by their assignment to
positions which are lower than those they previously held, or which, though of equivalent salary grade
and step, drastically changes the nature of their work without a showing by petitioner of the existence of
a valid cause for such demotion, which in effect is a removal, determined after due notice and hearing.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRAULIO DE VENECIA FACTS:

Braulio de Venecia distributed election handbills to win votes for NP candidate for Municipal
Mayor of Binalonan Felipe Oda and was therefore prosecuted for electioneering.

The court dismissed the case, holding that sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code had been
repealed by sec. 29 of RA 2260. Hence, this appeal, the Government insisting that sec. 54
has not been repealed, and that De Venecia's conduct violated it.

The result is that although sec. 54 prohibits a classified civil service employee from aiding
any candidate, sec. 29 allows such classified employee to express his views on current
political problems or issues, or to mention the name of his candidate for public office, even if
such expression of views or mention of names may result in aiding one particular candidate.
In other words, the last sentence of sec. 29 is an exception to sec. 54.

ISSUE: W/N de Venecia aided in the campaign of Felipe Oda.

HELD: Yes.

From the interpretation of the words used in the hanbill, it is undoubtedly "aiding" candidate
Felipe Oda. It is not merely mentioning the candidate whom De Venecia supported, nor mere
expression of his opinion on current political problems. It is solicitation of the elector's vote in
favor of Oda. It is an indorsement of the request for his support by gubernatorial candidate
Conrado F. Estrella.

To all party-men of Binalonan.

You should vote for Mayor Felipe Oda for the office of Mayor because he is our party's official
candidate. I want him to win so that we will succeed in our undertakings.

If you are true party-men do not vote for independent candidate Atty. Roque Tonrelda because he is
destroying our party. Write the Straight Nacionalista Ticket.

Mabuhay Nacionalista Conrado

F. Estrella
SSS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.
No. 85279July 28, 1989

Facts:

SSS alleged that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work
and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to thePublic
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers
refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.

SSS prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that
the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular
and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the childrens allowance of P30.00, and after the
SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue: W/N employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held: No.

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law".

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of
these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike
BANGALISAN vs CA
G.R. No. 124678 FACTS:

Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions to
dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government to implement
measures intended for their benefit. The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order
but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence, they were charged by the Secretary with several
administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.

ISSUE: W/N Government employees can engage in a strike.

HELD: No.

As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition, public employees are
denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public employer.

In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike,

recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public
service may not engage in strike, walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the
private sector.
281 SCRA 557 (1997)
Merlinda Jacinto, et al., petitioners, v. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila. Between the period
of Sept. 17-21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions
then staged. Then Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary Isidro Cario
issued a return-to-work order on Sept. 17, 1990, which ordered public school teachers engaged in
strikes, unauthorized mass leaves and other forms of mass actions, to return to work within 24
hours from their walkout, otherwise they will be dismissed. Petitioners ignored the directive.
Secretary Cario issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them on separate
days. Sec. Cario created an investigation committee, however, since petitioners did not deny the
charges against them, they were found guilty.
The decisions were appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which dismissed it
for lack of merit and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which set aside the Orders of
the MSPB in the contested resolutions and found petitioners, with the exception of Merlinda
Jacinto, guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Petitioners then
appealed to the respondent Court, who denied the petition on the grounds that the right to strike
did not extend to civil service employees.
ISSUE:
WON the right to self-organization of government employees also includes the right to strike.
RULING:
No. The Constitution itself qualifies the exercise of the right to strike with the condition that it is
in accordance with law. This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use
of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. EO 180 which provided the guidelines for
the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC
circular which prohibits under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary disruption of public service.
Petitioners did not seek to establish that they have a right to strike, instead they insisted that their
absences during certain dates in Sept. 1990 is valid as it was not a strike. A strike is defined as
any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial
or labor dispute. The mass action staged by petitioners constitutes as a strike as it resulted in the
non-holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period, which is a
disruption of public service.
305 SCRA 303
Luzviminda de la Cruz, et al., petitioners, v. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in Oct. 1990 by then
DECS Secretary Isidro D. Cario for taking part in the illegal strike on Sept. 19-21, 1990.
Petitioners were required explain within a period of not less than 72 hours but not more than 5
days from receipt of the complaint, however, they failed to submit an answer within the given
time. Which is considered a waiver on their part of their right to answer the charges and to deny
the same.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which dismissed it for lack
of merit and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which found the petitioners guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, after taking into consideration
the length of time the petitioners had been out of the service by reason of the immediate
implementation of the dismissal orders of Sec. Cario, the CSC likewise ordered for their
reinstatement without back wages.
Petitioners then appealed to the respondent Court, who denied the petition on the grounds that
the petitioners perceived grievances were no excuse for them to not conduct classes and defy the
return-to-work orders of their superiors.
ISSUE:
WON the mass actions of Sept./Oct. 1990 does not constitute as a strike since there was no
actual disruption of classes.
RULING:
No. The public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their
constitutional rights within reasonable limits. They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest
of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. If the teachers availed of their free
time - recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue
with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, they would have not been held liable for the
participating in the mass actions.
510 SCRA 622
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner, v. Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa ng GSIS (KMG), respondent.
FACTS:
A mass action took place in front of the GSIS main building in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City on
Oct. 4-7, 2004. Majority of its participants were GSIS personnel, among them were herein
respondent KMG, a public sector union. On Oct. 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS
Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. Atty.
Manuel Molina, as counsel of KMG, sought for the reconsideration of said directive on the
ground that the employees resumed work on Oct. 8 in obedience to the return-to-work order
issued, but was denied. KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges,
CA granted their petition.
CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike.
ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by GSIS employees is valid.
RULING:
No. Sec. 2(5) of Art. 9-B grants government personnel the right to self-organization to
complement the provision according workers the right to perform peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike, in accordance with law. The strike conducted by petitioners is
invalid as it was not performed in accordance with law. EO. 180 enjoined government officers
and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of mass action.
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES
GLORIA VS CA
FACTS:
Sometime in June 1989, respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed as Schools
Division Superintendent (note- permanent position), Division of City Schools, QC, by Corazon
Aquino. Sometime in October 1994, upon the recommendation of petitioner Secretary Gloria,
respondent was reassigned as Superintendent of Marikina Institute of Science and Technology
(note- another permanent position). This was granted.

Dr. Icasiano then filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining the
implementation of his reassignment. The CA granted this holding that his reassignment for an
indefinite period is violative of his right to security of tenure.

Petitioners are now before the SC seeking relief from the decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment of respondent is violative of his right to security of
tenure?

HELD (main point yung nakabold ah? :D ):

Yes. While temporary assignments are permissible even without consent, permanent
assignments without consent are not. Thus the SC, after careful study, upheld the findings
of the CA that the reassignment was for an indefinite period and that there was nothing to
show that it was only temporary in nature or up until only a permanent replacement is found
as THERE IS NO DEFINITE PERIOD SPECIFIED OR FIXED; which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent without a definite period
or duration (kumbaga betsung nila permanent yung pagreassign sknya). Such feature of
reassignment is definitely violative of his right to security of tenure.

HAVING FOUND THAT THE REASSIGNMENT OF RESPONDENT IS

VIOLATIVE OF HIS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE, THE ORDER FOR HIS
REASSIGNMENT CANNOT BE COUNTENANCED.
SECTION 3. PURPOSE OF A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM
LAZO VS CSC
FACTS:
Sometime in November 1988, the CSC received a letter that the petitioner Dennis Lazo
had bought his career service from the CSC for p7000, p4.5k was paid to the examiner and the
programmers of the Manila office, and p2k to the Regional Office of Tugegarao. Because of this,
the CSC ordered the examination answer sheets of the petitioner be retrieved and hand-checked.
After doing so, they found out that the actual rating of the petitioner is only 34.48% and not 76.46%
as indicated in his Certificate of Eligibility.

The CSC then filed administrative charges (dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interests of the service) against him but dismissed them later on upon the
recommendation of the Regional Office of Tugegarao. However, they revoked his eligibility for
being null and void.

Petitioner filed for reconsideration on the ground that his right to due process was violated
and that the CSC did not show any support to the claim that they found the petitioner to have failed
the exam. The CSC dismissed this on the ground of his actual rating (obviously he failed) and that
the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government mandated to safeguard the sanctity of
the Civil Service Examination. Thus the CSC had to revoke such grant of eligibility which was
issued erroneously. Petitioner then filed a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the CSC acted with
grave abuse of discretion and that they violated his right to due process when they unilaterally
revoked his eligibility without giving him the opportunity to go over his exam answer sheet.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when his certificate of
eligibility was revoked without notice or hearing?

HELD (main point yung nakabold hehe):

No. Under the Constitution, the CSC is charged with the duty of determining
questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the Civil Service. Its
power to issue Certificate of Eligibility carries with it the power to revoke the same for being
null and void.

While it is true that as a general proposition the CSC cannot motu propio (on impulse)
revoke a civil service examination without notice and hearing to the examinees concerned, in the
context of this case, which simply involves the rechecking of examination papers, notice and
hearing was not required. Instead what applied was the rule of res ipsa loquitur(the thing speaks
for itself).

The certificate being null and void, it did not confer upon him any vested right to be
appointed to a position in the government service.
Section 6. Prohibition of appointment of lame ducks
People vs Sandiganbyan
FACTS:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, the respondent Alejandro Villapando ran for municipal
mayor of San Vicente Palawan. Orlando Tiape ran for municipal mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan Del
Norte. Villapando won while Tipae lost. Sometime in July 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
municipal administrator of the municipality of San Vicente Palawan.

Sometime in February 2000, Villapando and Tiape were charged for violation under Article
244 of the RPC. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape. However, upon
arraignment Villapando pleaded not guilty and the case against Tiape was dismissed because he
was confirmed to be dead. Villapando filed a demurrer to evidence which the Sandiganbayan found
with merit and acquitted him.

The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a
petition.

ISSUE (the bolded part here is part of the main point): WON the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in interpreting that the
legal disqualification in Article 244 of the RPC does not include the one prohibition imposed
on losing candidates as enunciated in the Constitution and the LGC.

HELD (bold part continuation of main point):

Yes. According to the Supreme Court their interpretation has no basis in law. The
legal disqualification mentioned in Articlen 244 of the RPC talks about disqualifications in
law. Hence, it is clear that Section 6 of Article 9 of the Consti and Section 94(b) of the LGC
of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any
office in the government or GOCCs or its subsidiaries.

Having found the Sandiganbayan to have acted with grave abuse of discretion by
disregarding the basic rule of StatCon as it granted the demurrer to evidence and acquittal
of Villapando, the Supreme Court said they can do no less but to declare Sandiganbayans
decision as null and void.
97. G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO,
DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J.
GORDON, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City
(Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority. Petitioners contend that the directive on the President to appoint the mayor
as the Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is contrary to
Sec. 7, Art. IX-B of the constitution or the dual employment prohibition.

ISSUE:
WON the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.

HELD:
YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will
work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.

Main Point: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in

any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
98. Re: Gross Violation of Civil Service Law on the Prohibition Against Dual
Employment and Double Compensation in the Government Service Committed
by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division,
Office of Administrative Services.

FACTS:
Respondent was appointed by the Court as SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security
Division, OAS. His application papers show he has experience and training as a police
officer, having been employed as Chief Inspector of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Aviation Security Group at the time of his appointment in the Supreme Court.
During the course of his employment, an anonymous letter reached the OAS reporting
the respondents gross violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual
employment and double compensation in the government service. The letter alleged that
respondent accepted employment, and thus received salaries and other benefits, from the
Court and also from the PNP of which he remained an active member. The OAS
inquiries on this allegation confirmed that prior to his employment at the Court,
respondent was an active member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security
Group 2nd Police Center for Aviation Security at the Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay
City, with a permanent status and rank of Police Chief Inspector.
Taking the chance to explore his opportunities and skills outside of the police service,
he applied for the position of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, OAS.
While employed in the Court and receiving his regular compensation, he continued to be
a bonafide member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group with the same
status and rank of Police Chief Inspector until the date when he optionally retired on
September 2009. Respondent submitted to the findings of the OAS but humbly implore
your magnanimity not to charge him with gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and claimed that the dishonesty was not intentional.

ISSUE:
WON respondent violated Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits dual employment?

HELD:
YES. Contrary to respondents claim of good faith, his delay in returning the benefits
accrued by him for 2 years when employed by both government agencies and him not
disclosing to the court the fact that he was still employed by the PNP until the court
questioned him, clearly constitutes gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. His continued holding of two government offices at the
same time implies a deliberate intent to give unwarranted benefit to himself and undue
prejudice to the government.

Main point: The continued holding of two government offices at the same time by
an appointive or elective official implies a deliberate intent to give unwarranted
benefit to himself and undue prejudice to the government
 99. LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, represented by its Mayor,
HON. JEFFREY P. FERER,* and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF LA
CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, represented by its
Vice-Mayor, HON. DEMIE JOHN C. HONRADO,**
Petitioners,
v
ATTY. REX G. ROJO,
Respondent.

FACTS:
Vice-Mayor Rex R. Jalandoon of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental appointed Atty.
Rex G. Rojo who had just tendered his resignation as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod the day preceding such appointment, as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary.
The status of the appointment was permanent. The next day, the
Vice-Mayor submitted Rojos appointment papers to the Civil Service Commission
Negros Occidental Field Office (CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for attestation. In a
Letter, the said CSCFO wrote Jalandoon to inform him of the infirmities the office
found on the appointment documents, i.e. the Chairman of the Personnel Selection
Board and the Human Resource Management Officer did not sign the certifications, the
latter relative to the completeness of the documents as well as to the publication
requirement. In view of the failure of the appointing authority to comply with the
directive, the said CSCFO considered the appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or
withdrawn. Jalandoon appealed to CSC regional office which was granted.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC but was denied. Petitioners sought relief with the CA and
was denied, Hence this Petition for review. Petitioners allege that respondents
appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary is void. Petitioners maintain that
respondents irrevocable resignation as a Sangguniang Panlungsod member was not
deemed accepted when it was presented during the scheduled regular session of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental for lack of quorum.
Consequently, respondent was still an incumbent regular Sangguniang Panlungsod
member when then Vice Mayor Jalandoon appointed him as Sangguniang Panlungsod
Secretary on 18 March 2004, which contravenes Section 7, Article IX-B of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the appointment undermines Section 7, Article IX-B of the commission which prohibits
dual employment

HELD:
NO. Petitioners in their contention that respondent was still a member of the
sangguniang panglungsod and that his resignation was not accepted due to lack of
quorum is erroneous. Petitioners chose not to include vice-mayor Jalandoon as a
member of the quorum due to him being the presiding officer of the sanggunian which is
incorrect. The presiding officer is also a member of the sanggunian, in fact, they are
mandated to vote in case a tie happens. Under RA 7160, the city vice-mayor, as
presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. On the issue of the lack
of signature of the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City on
respondents appointment papers, the Court of Appeals held that such refusal of the
officer to affix his signature should not affect the validity of the appointment.
Otherwise, it would be tantamount to putting the appointing power under the mercy of a
department head who may without reason refuse to perform a ministerial function, as
what happened in the instant case

Main point: The refusal of the officer to affix his signature should not affect the
validity of the appointment. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to putting the
appointing power under the mercy of a department head who may without reason
refuse to perform a ministerial function, as what happened in the instant case
Zacarias Sadueste
V
Municipality of Surigao
72 PHIL 182

Facts: Petitioner received an additional compesnsation of not more than P 60.00 per month when he
was designated by Director of Public works as sanitary and waterworks engineer of Surigao, which was
approved by the provincial unit, as what was stated in the Revised Administration CCode. He contends
that he is entitled of said benefits as provided in secition 1916 pf the Revised Administration Code, as he
was not compensated by herein respondent, as they claim that the said raise was not in their
appropriation.

Issue: W/N petitioner was right in his claims.

Held: No. The said provision in the Revised Administrative Code is a general authority given to all district
engineers. The Article 9(B), Section 8 of the Constitution provides that additional compensation should
be specifically authorized by law.
Pedro Peralta
v.
Ismael Mathay

Facts: Petitioner, a trustee of Government Service Insurance System, claims, upon retirement, that he is
entitled of the items :cost of living allowances, incentive bonus and Christmas bonus. Respondent,
being the Auditor General, did no approve of it, so he did not award the. He, the respondent claims that
such items are additional compesations that would violate Article 9(B), Section 8 of the Constitution, as
there was no specific law to provide said bonuses.

Issue: W/N the contention of respondent is valid.

Held: Yes. For an additional compensation to be awarded to public officers or officials, a specific law
should provide for it. Missing the said specific law will render the bonuses subject for violation and
trouble.
Antonio Santos
V
CA
GR. No. 139792

Facts: Petitioner, optionally retired from Metropolitan Trial Court as judge, received monthly pension
and received retirement gratuity, reentered the government service as a Director III of Traffic
Operation Center of the Metropolitan Manila Authority. MMA was reorganized and petitioner opted
out, entitling him of the separation benefits offered in said reorganization. He claims that his retirement
gratuity is not an additional compensation, his years in the judiciary should be included in the
computation of his separation benefits.

Issue: W/N his claim is valid.

Held: No. His stay in the judiciary was appreciate by the government that he was awarded for
retirement benefits. He should not take refuge under Article 9(B), Section 8 of the Constitution,
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.. It
means that even if he reenter the government, you can still receive the retirement benefits. Also, he is
only authorized by said law to receive the separation pay during his stay in the MMA, excluding the stay
in the judiciary.
Cabili
V
Civil Service Commission
GR. No. 156503

Facts: Local Water Utilities Administration Employees Association for Progress filed a complaint against
herein petitioner for violating RA 6713, also known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, as the petitioners received allegedly extra income or compensation from
the Olongapo City Water District, for being a Board Member of the said organization while being a
LWUA officer. Said additional compensation is a violation of Article 9(B), Section 8 of the Constitution of
the Civil Service Commission, prohibiting public officers from receiving additional compensation unless
specifically provided by law.

Issue: W/N petitioners violated said provision

Held: Yes. They are only allowed to receive per diems which is provided by law any other compensation
received by these officers that was not included in the law that provides their compensation shall
constitute a violation thereof.
Benguet State University
V
Colting
GR. No. 169637

Facts: The rice subsidy and health care allowance was disallowed by COA, as it was not provided in RA
8292 ( Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997), which gave said benefits to BSUs employees, and
that it violates Section 8, Article 9(B) of the Constitution against additional compensations. The said
amounts were derived from the operations of BSU. The BSU contends that the benefits were specifically
identified in the said law under Section 4, powers and Duties of Governing Boards. The Lower court
ruled the statuses mentioned in Section 4 does not embrace the purpose or character of the benefits.

Issue: W/N the benefits of rice subsidy and healthcare allowances to BSU employees constitutes as
additional compensation that is being disallowed by Article 9(B), Section 9 of the Constitution.

Held: Yes. The justification given by petitioner is not valid. Said benefits does not, in any way, constitute
the said qualification, like research and other purposes. The board cannot be made liable for
misinterpretation of the law. The benefits is therefore not specifically provided in the RA 8292, Section
4.
Herrera, et al.
V
NPC
GR. No. 166570

Facts: RA 9136, Reorganization and privatization of NPCs assets and liabilities, provided a separation
package for those affected under section 63. The petitioners were separated from service and were
granted of the separation benefit (1 month salary per year of service), as well as retirement benefits
for those who qualifies. The NPC contends that such benefits is a violation of Article 9(B), Section 8 of
the Constitution. Petitioners claim that retirement pay and separation pay, upon award, does not
constitute as additional compensation, but the respondent claims in the said provision, the affected
ones are given the option to choose only, and that it actually constitutes as an additional compensation.

Issue: W/N the respondents contention is valid.

Held: Yes. For an additional compensation to be valid, it should be specifically provided by law. In this
case, Section 63 specifically states that affected employees shall be entitled to EITHER a separation pay
or be entitled to avail of the privileges provided under separation plan.
G.R. No. 149497 January 25, 2010

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PEDRO RAMOS, Respondents.

Facts:

Civil Service Commission (CSC) passed Resolution No. 88-830 recalling the designation of NEA
officials and employees to positions other than Acting General Manager and/or Project Supervisor of
electric cooperatives which are private entities under NEAs control and supervision, for an indefinite
period of time and allowing these personnel to receive allowances in addition to their regular
compensation and allowances from their mother agency (NEA) is prejudicial to the public interest.

On February 22, 1991, private respondent Pedro Ramos, a retired employee of Batangas I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I) filed with public respondent a letter-complaint bringing to the latter's
attention, the case of two of petitioner's personnel, namely Moreno P. Vista and Regario R. Breta, who
since December 1988, had been designated by petitioner to BATELEC I as Project Supervisor and Acting
General Manager and Technical Assistant to the Project Supervisor, respectively, and were allegedly
receiving allowances from the cooperative in addition to their regular compensation and allowances from
petitioner, in violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, or The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. CSC directed NEA to recall and desist from issuing designations in
favor of its employees.

On May 11, 2000, after considering the parties' respective pleadings, the CA rendered its assailed
decision, which denied petitioner's petition for certiorari. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated August 2, 2001. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the receipt of the designees/appointees of additional allowances from the electric
cooperatives justified the issuance of the recall order?

Yes. We agree with the CA when it affirmed public respondent's finding that payment to NEA personnel
designated to cooperatives of allowances and other benefits on top of their regular salaries from petitioner
becomes violative of their own charter which does not provide for such payment and, thus, inimical to the
best interest of public service. It also violates the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation, to wit: No elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law.
G.R. No. 158562 April 23, 2010

RAMON R. YAP, Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

Facts:

Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National Development
Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was
appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as Vice-
President for Finance effective June 14, 1991 while remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The
additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at
NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate
Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the
ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as Department Manager
III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former
directly contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the
Constitution.

Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all
approved by the MGC Board of Directors.

Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors findings that
the allowances and reimbursements at issue were given in violation of Sections 7(2) and 8, Article IX-b of
the 1987 Constitution. Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from
respondent COA via a Letter addressed to the COA Chairman wherein he argued that his assignment to
MGC was required by the primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law, namely
Executive Order No. 284

In turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213. It
upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as
prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, it also ruled that the said allowances and reimbursements
claimed by petitioner "failed to pass the test of public purpose requirement of the law" and further
emphasized that "it is not enough that payments made to petitioner be authorized by the Board of
Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not contravene the principles
provided for under Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No.] 1445 on the use of government funds," more
specifically on the public purpose requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the allowances of the
petitioner.
Ruling:

No. To reiterate, the public purpose requirement for the disbursement of public funds is a valid limitation
on the types of allowances and benefits that may be granted to public officers. It was incumbent upon
petitioner to show that his allowances and benefits were authorized by law and that there was a direct and
substantial relationship between the performance of his public functions and the grant of the disputed
allowances to him. That certain allowances are enjoyed by corporate officers in the private sector does not
justify the grant of the same benefits to similarly designated public officers, even if they are officers of
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), which perform purely proprietary functions.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the funds of GOCCs are still public funds and that is precisely
the reason such funds are subject to audit by the COA. Thus, there is a valid distinction between the
officers of public corporations and those of private corporations. In order to demonstrate the legality of
the grant of his benefits, it was insufficient for the petitioner to assert that the disputed allowances and
benefits were approved by the board of directors of the MGC. Such board action should in itself be
authorized by law or regulation or have valid legal basis. Otherwise, it becomes an illegal corporate
act that is void and cannot be validated. In this case, the MGC board action that permitted the
disallowed disbursements was not shown to have complied with Section 15(d) of both Republic Act No.
8522 and Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998 and the
General Appropriations Act of 1999, respectively, which provide:

Sec. 15. Restrictions on the Use of Government Funds. No government funds shall be utilized for the
following purposes:

d. To pay honoraria, allowances or other forms of compensation to any government official or employee,
except those specifically authorized by law.
R. No. 193247 September 14, 2011

SERGIO I. CARBONILLA, EMILIO Y. LEGASPI IV, and ADONAIS Y. REJUSO, Petitioners,

vs.

BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES

Facts:

The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 1-2005) amending
CAO 7-92. The Department of Finance approved CAO 1-2005 on 9 February 2006. CAO 7-92 and CAO
1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to Section 3506 in relation to Section 6089 of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines (TCCP).

Petitioners Office of the President, et al. alleged that prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC
created on 23 April 2002 a committee to review the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and to propose its adjustment from the exchange rate of 25 to US$1 to the
then exchange rate of 55 to US$1. The Office of the President, et al. alleged that for a period of more
than two years from the creation of the committee, several meetings were conducted with the agencies
concerned, including respondent Board of Airlines Representatives (BAR), to discuss the proposed rate
adjustment that would be embodied in an Amendatory Customs Administrative Order.

BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. The
Acting District Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance already approved CAO 1-
2005 on 9 February 2005. As such, the increase in the overtime rates became effective. The Office of the
President denied the appeal of BAR and affirmed the Decision of the Department of Finance.

BAR filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled
that Section 8, Article IX(B) of the Constitution prohibits an appointive public officer or employee from
receiving additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Section 3506 of the TCCP only authorized payment of additional compensation for
overtime work, and thus, the payment of traveling and meal allowances under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-
2005 are unconstitutional and could not be enforced against BAR members.

Issue: Whether or not CAO 7-92 , CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP are unenforceable against
BAR members?

Ruling:

No. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, BOC employees rendering overtime services are not
receiving double compensation for the overtime pay, travel and meal allowances provided for under CAO
7-92 and CAO 1-2005. Section 3506 provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to
be paid to employees of private enterprise. The overtime pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for
additional work rendered after regular office hours and do not constitute double compensation prohibited
under Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution as they are in fact authorized by law or Section
3506 of the TCCP.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT VS. BOARD OF AIRLINES G.R. No. 194276

Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 were
promulgated pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). That
entitled BOC employees overtime pay in Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
and to propose its adjustment from the exchange rate of P25 to US$1 to the then
exchange rate of P55 to US$1. The Office of the President, et al. alleged that for a period
of more than two years from the creation of the committee, several meetings were
conducted with the agencies concerned, including respondent Board of Airlines
Representatives (BAR), to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that would be embodied
in an Amendatory Customs Administrative Order.

The Office of the President, et al. also filed a motion for reconsideration Decision of the
Court of Appeals that the CA rendered the BOC AO be unenforceable against the Board
of Airlines because

1. CAO No. 1-2005 is invalid as the increased overtime pay rates and meal and
transportation allowances fixed therein are unreasonable and confiscatory; and
2. . The act of the Bureau of Customs charging and/or collecting from BARs
member airlines the cost of the overtime pay and meal and transportation allowances of
Bureau of Customs (BOC) personnel in connection with the discharge of their
government duties, functions and responsibilities is legally impermissible and, therefore,
invalid.

Issue: Whether or not the BOC employees are entitled to the per diems without being
double compensated

Ruling: Yes. The overtime pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for additional
work rendered after service hours and do not constitute double compensation prohibited
under Section 8 of Article 9 of the constitution and such entitlements are authorized by
law of Section 3506 of the TCCP.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. COA, G.R. No. 189767,
July 3, 2012 (Per Diem; Good Faith)

Facts: The PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13 members which include the
Undersecretaries of the Department of Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment,
the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Energy. Said
Undersecretaries serve in ex officio capacity and were granted per diems by PEZA for every
attendance in a board meeting.

On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Espao issued Notice of
Disallowance Nos. 2006-001-101 (02-06) to 2006-021-101 (01-03) on the payments of per
diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board for the period 2001-2006

The PEZA Director General of Finance contested that the board members received their
per diems were in good faith.

The disallowance was based on this Courts April 4, 2006 En Banc Resolution dismissing
the petition for certiorari in Cyril del Callar, et al., Members of the Board of Directors,
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. COA and Guillermo N. Carague, Chairman, COA
which assailed COA Decision No. 2006-009 dated January 31, 2006 affirming the March
29, 2002 decision of the Director, then Corporate Audit Office II, disallowing the payment
of per diems of ex officio members of the PEZA Board of Directors. Said disallowance was
based on COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate
Committee Report No. 509 and this Courts ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not Board members acting in an ex officio capacity would receive the
per diem without violating Sec.8 Art.4
Ruling: No. The position of undersecretaries of the Cabinet as members of the Board, is
in an ex officio capacity and is part of their respective departments, and they are already
paid/salaried in such departments. To allow them of per diems by PEZA would amount to
double compensation.
DIMAGIBA V ESPARTERO
FACTS
Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza), and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were
employees of The Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled corporation
created under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba was the Group Manager, LIVECOR and the
Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), now known as Strategic Investment and
Development Corporation (SIDCOR), also a government-owned and controlled corporation, entered into a
Trust Agreement whereby the former would undertake the task of managing, administering, disposing and
liquidating the corporate assets, projects and accounts of HSDC. In an HSDC Board Resolution was
provided that in order to carry out the trust agreement, LIVECOR personnel must be designated
concurrently to operate certain basic HSDC/SIDCOR functions, thus, LIVECOR personnel, namely,
petitioners Dimagiba and Mendoza were designated as Assistant General Manager for Operations and Head,
Inter-Agency Committee on Assets Disposal and as Treasurer and Controller, respectively. The same
resolution provided for the designees' monthly honoraria and commutable reimbursable representation
allowances (CRRA).
Department of Budget and Management informed LIVECOR of the approval of its organization/staffing
pattern modifications which resulted in the abolition of petitioners' positions. As a result, petitioners were
separated from the service which entitled them to separation pay which includes granting gratuity pay
But Administrator Manuel Portes, it was stated that any payment of gratuities by the HSDC/SIDCOR to
LIVECOR officers concurrently performing HSDC functions shall not be processed without prior clearance
from him as the same shall be first cleared with the COA to avoid any legal problem. Portes then sought
the opinion of LIVECORs Resident COA Auditor, Alejandro Fumar, regarding petitioners' claim for
additional gratuity, who opined that such gratuity payment would amount to double compensation.
Issue: Whether or not amounts paid constitute double compensation and in violation of Section 8, Article
9 of the constitution.
Ruling: Yes, the additional grant of gratuity pay to the petitioners amounted to additional compensation
prohibited in the above provision. Only when the employee allowed by law to receive extra compensation
for services rendered in another position which is an extension or is connected with his basic work.