Persons Full Text Cases Part 3 Prelim Final Judgment Remarriage To Grounds For Annulment

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PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 40. FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ART. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE)
Article 40. Final Judgment for Purposes of Remarriage intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her
before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise
denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
FERNANDO, J.:
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being
the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the
for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the
spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court
question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
answered in the negative. We sustain him.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the
1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first
Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative
was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages
Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the
Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even
of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the
ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage
allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third- submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
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of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the
. ." 2 petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an
decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was
of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as
action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first
Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void
second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in
action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should
of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage
the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared
valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in
decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed." the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought
almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based
As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the
prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by
which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question we further petitioner.
said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction
to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of
present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.
marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the
ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING
was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
bigamy. . . ." City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
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MARRIAGE)
GANCAYCO, J.: Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional
character.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554,
bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be
constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
negative. We sustain him.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent
the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.
an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case
the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 can proceed as scheduled.
and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan. A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing
as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case
respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an
No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for
consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already
married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one
and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in
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a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
criminal case. 5 ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome
of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore,
on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend
the hearing as sought by petitioner.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have
been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent
allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and
when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second intimidation.
marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6
may be applied to the present case. Said case states that: Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la
Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly
the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished
petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since
the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover,
At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the
fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case,
action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
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Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings
cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of
marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one sustained.
and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs. SO
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade ORDERED.
the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to
petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY
years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without PARAS, J.:
benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital
union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and
respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity. Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church
it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed
until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Leonilo Donato was already previously married. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-
trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties):
respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity
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MARRIAGE)
of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
present evidence- with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner
and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her
and the first husband; and WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the
Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already ORDERED.
married to someone else.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA
existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,
been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the respondents.
following Orders of therespondent Judge- Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled
to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and ROMERO, J.:
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no
her to present evidence in her favor. grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
We find the petition devoid of merit. separation of property.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
Code). 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
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avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void.
completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession
and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings
is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property
any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the
be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be merits. 1
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time
of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact. Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the within which to file his answer.
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added
that private respondent has no property which is in his possession. Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of
certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained: dismiss.
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It
man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for
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separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of
status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to dismissed.
avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of
marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents properties acquired during coverture.
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted
that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
Hence, this petition. petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree
is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
following. occasions stating that:
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
purposes of remarriage. that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court
belonging to her exclusively. abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing
the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own contemplates an action for that purpose."
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Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
nullity."
B. Article 39.
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied the
Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision
No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage." be modified as follows:
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at only . . .
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed.
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the provided in Article 41.
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
10
MARRIAGE)
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
still have to produce the judgment. marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that
they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say: reworded as follows:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is
void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision. judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first
a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision
is the declaration that the marriage is void. Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not
solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity
the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they
are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? ab initio.
Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
11
MARRIAGE)
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
original wording of the provision as follows: provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant
to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17 state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final
with bigamy. 18 judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same. remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
Article 40 of the Family Code provides: absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
previous marriage void. (n) purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
12
MARRIAGE)
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable? misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
"solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. Were this so, this jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. respondent's money.
For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone. properties."
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23 had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable
13
MARRIAGE)
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse; respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
donee are revoked by operation of law; MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse 139, Makati City, respondents.
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such BUENA, J.:
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
intestate succession. (n) City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran
vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
operation of law. (n) 26 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the
pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property City.1
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
14
MARRIAGE)
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of
87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
Case No. Q-97-30192.3 the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged
that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
certain woman named Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine subsequently filed a decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the
criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare
Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal
of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that
cause and ordered the filing of an Information6 against them. The case, his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1 can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on
the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments
for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that,
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a was never before a married man.
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden
Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial
was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and action may proceed. 11
December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is
Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition. latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review. prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
15
MARRIAGE)
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
would necessarily be determined. the beginning is not a defense.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides: Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna
14 where this Court held that:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous . . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
marriage void. by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal
case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
Decision read: being prosecuted for bigamy.
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before
needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in
needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that
such previous marriage void. pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for concubinage.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need
not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. SO
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof ORDERED.
of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge

of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
16
MARRIAGE)
G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000 The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment,
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. as follows: "From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute
CONSUELO TAN, respondent. that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
DECISION married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J.
PANGANIBAN, J.: Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and
signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per
"void." Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was
further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious
The Case rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out
4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo
No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows: Tan.
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. "On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
[the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, January 22, 1993.
as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided "On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
by law. lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and
Costs against accused."2 in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
The Facts
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma.
17
MARRIAGE)
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second
evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; dissolved."4
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to Hence, this Petition.5
the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites The Issues
for validity. x x x
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited
the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and "A Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order
void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of to convict petitioner.
accused.
"B Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40
Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with "C Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage reasonable doubt."6
ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that
accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with The Courts Ruling
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his
first wife."3 The Petition is not meritorious.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Main Issue: Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated: Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a "The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
18
MARRIAGE)
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then,
proceedings." the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a
The elements of this crime are as follows: person can marry for a subsequent time.
"1. That the offender has been legally married; We agree with the respondent.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized as "conflicting."10 In
according to the Civil Code; People v. Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an accused who married three
times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the
first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second
validity."7 marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first
marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its
bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the
on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,12 which
contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan involved substantially the same facts.
who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married
nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his
rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits
valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children,
deemed never to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he concludes that there is no notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And
first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries9 of with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although
former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense." declaration of such nullity."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a
19
MARRIAGE)
man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited
surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo
in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
"the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect
lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage." In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613
(Marriage Law), which provided:
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration.
In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of "Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present performance, unless:
evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been
married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x." subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v.
Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity. The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family marriages."19
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy."18
20
MARRIAGE)
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of
marriage void." the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring marriage:22
such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo
affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of "It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed: beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage,
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x
the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be
declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance,
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20 was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21 consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in
which involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to
twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as
second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against
initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into him.
statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed
that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the Damages
first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
21
MARRIAGE)
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of Article 41. BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys
fees.23 G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO,
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; respondent.
hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.24 In any event, The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
this point, which we quote hereunder: RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case
that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional
well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the
prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies. Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
xxx xxx xxx and void. 1
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General
had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second,
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man. Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was
a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was
fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he
she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during
did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
making."25 returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
22
MARRIAGE)
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he
obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October
parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
November 1983.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because
his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded
he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, belief for such declaration.
England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were
all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
they too had no news of Janet Monica. respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent
spouse had already died.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later
married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a
background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such Petition for Review where the following allegations are made:
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine 1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
government authorities. there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica
Parker was already dead; and
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She
testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to 2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration
return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 that the petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death
December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to under Article 41, Family Code. 5
leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used
to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not
had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead." 6
son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave
Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the
1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the Family Code which provides that:
missing person's present whereabouts.
23
MARRIAGE)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent is dead; and
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as requirements. 11
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
spouse. (Emphasis supplied). respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement,
i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which dead.
it superseded, 7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41,
the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that
to enable the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code she is dead.
imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code
merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in
or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was
the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. that:
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He
did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her
or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had
been absent. . . . 13
24
MARRIAGE)
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like
learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one
authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
look for her there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to any information as to her personal background even after she had married
inquire the whereabouts of your wife? respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to
A Yes, Sir. his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said
he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Court:
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion
How did you do that? that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
and I went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
supplied) rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As
noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover,
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit: acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to
the two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months
docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover,
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents
error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16 and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did
25
MARRIAGE)
not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's Code. (Emphasis supplied)
departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one. In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to
protect.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public of which the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved
is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . there is set forth the following basic state policy:
21 (Emphasis supplied)
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never
to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines
notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the in Article 149:
trial court in the same proceeding.
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are
parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
existing legal means. family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief
Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The
law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990,
Code emphasizes that. affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
26
MARRIAGE)
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000 On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
respondent. administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
VITUG, J.:
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by
his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and
against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio,
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James 1
Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and
Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was of Appeals, formulating that
presumptively dead.
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New Civil
sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Code was the law in force.
Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," 2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-
claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the
marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the 3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32
estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal
all the obligations of the estate would have been settled. property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first 4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the 5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant. 2
estate of the decedent.
27
MARRIAGE)
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus: solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code,
not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED the Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where
AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as follows: it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83
(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del of the New Civil Code which provides:
Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property with the
concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking; lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one
half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
Armas and her children, to the other half;
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
competent and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
determine who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or
become the administrator of the estate. 3 if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for null and void by a competent court.
reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner
asseverates: Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from
and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three
or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. 4 exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not
the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage good faith. 6 Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, and conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach
would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
28
MARRIAGE)
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. 7 The Court does property should rightly be divided in two equal portions one portion going
not find these circumstances to be here extant. to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary8 as estate 11 of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled
83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other
assailing the second marriage. hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed.
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.1wphi1
time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise
that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which,
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate
in Article 41 9 , in relation to Article 40, 10 of the Family Code. pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been DECISION
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of James Bounds. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1
dated June 11, 1997 and the Resolution dated October 27, 1997 of the Court
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, entitled, "Adriana Chua, Petitioner-
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains Appellee vs. Jose Lam, Respondent-Appellant."
to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
29
MARRIAGE)
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul.3 After her
declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence.
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition No evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John
that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open4 on the ground
said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were significant,
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial court granted the
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional
activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated
save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage
Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,5 showing that
separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated
February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision6 the dispositive
agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation portion of which reads as follows:
rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be
declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the marriage
child, John Paul. between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for
being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse Office of the Civil Registrar General are hereby ordered to cancel the marriage
of fifteen days after service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam celebrated on January 13, 1984 by Hon.
him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order dated April 13, 1994, directing Guillermo L. Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for
determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties and Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support
to submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P20,000.00.
filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no collusion between the
parties".2 SO ORDERED.7
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 thereof but
herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the
in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was abnormal because amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for
Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and instead kept support of the child as embodied in the decision9 dated February 28, 1994 of
asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one
30
MARRIAGE)
the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00 THE COMMON FUND FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILD, SUBJECT TO PERIODIC
each to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit: ACCOUNTING AND TO BE MANAGED BY APPELLEE.11
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with On June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the
respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall Pasay RTCs decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of
retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be the Decision but in a Resolution dated October 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals
exercised through mutual arrangements. denied the same.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Hence, Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a of the Rules of Court, likewise raising a single error of the appellate court, to
common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively wit:
for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and
administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING LEGAL QUESTIONS
son reaches majority age.10 OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WHERE THEY BOUND
had even amounted to P500,000.00. THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) TO A COMMON FUND FOR THE BENEFIT OF
On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lams THEIR CHILD DOES NOT BAR THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT CASE TO
motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered AGAIN AWARD SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF THE CHILD.
into by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was
declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled
limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court. that the amount of support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs.
Advincula,12 we held that another action for support could be filed again by
Jose then appealed the Pasay RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals, the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support
assigning only a single error of the trial court: filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We further held in said case
that:
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO GIVE A
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P20,000.00 TO HIS SON BECAUSE THIS WOULD, IN . . . Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of
EFFECT, REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE MONTHLY SUPPORT FOR such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire
HIS CHILD. BESIDES, THE LOWER COURT HAS DULY ADMITTED THE FACT THAT period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
THERE WAS A DECISION ISSUED BY ANOTHER COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF P250,000.00 AS THE LATTERS SHARE IN and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.13
31
MARRIAGE)
Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that of existence of
between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an additional claim
its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of for support of the child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the
conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by
of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase "And for respondent
their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between to support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may
herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be deem just and reasonable"15 found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition,
considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to show that
subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition of
capabilities of the parents to give support. Adriana.
Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award support Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on July
for the child in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the childs 6, 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same.
parents, this Court will now discuss the propriety of the proceedings Although copy of the motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice of hearing
conducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered, as affirmed by the on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the record does not show that he received
Court of Appeals. the notice in due time; neither does the record show that he was notified of
the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana presented the
The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the
proceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court. presence of Jose.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order
marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-
of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child. Adriana presented, Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her to present her
formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with
case for decision as of May 12, 1994.14 But on a motion to re-open filed by different women.
her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on
July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for
previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the support for John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid basis
marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the monthly amount of
is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed P20,000.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.
support for John Paul when she testified in open court.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission amended or supplemental pleadings.16 Considering that in cases of
of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be no
32
MARRIAGE)
default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court17 in Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of
relation to Article 48 of the Family Code,18 it is with more reason that his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed
petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings. with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with
us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to
Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Court in receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with other
Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates,19 to wit: woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner
Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the
has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being
pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice and bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be
void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has
prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is supervened.20
not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack. Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the
present petition for review on certiorari which is the award of support for his
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject child, John Paul.
within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any
statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of
its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied) support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code, to wit:
have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was
beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have
been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
petitioner Lam of due process. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose
for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC
could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its jurisdiction.
33
MARRIAGE)
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 19521 Q - How much support do you want?
and 196,22 shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
to the necessities of the recipient. A - P20,000.00 to P25,000.00
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be Q - Is there a prayer for support?
reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase
of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person Atty. Lorbes:
obliged to furnish the same.
A - None, Your Honor.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the
evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or Court:
resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as
provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for the support of the
incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, boy.
education and transportation of the child.
A - Yes, Your Honor.23
In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding
her claim for support of the child is her testimony, which is quoted below in Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child
verbatim: nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.
Atty. Lorbes: We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied in
the decision of the Makati RTC, portions of which read as follows:
Q - After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid marriages
prior to your marriage, how do you feel about it? 8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with
respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall
A - I felt it is unfair to my life. retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be
exercised through mutual arrangements.
Q - Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband with you,
what do you want to request to the Honorable Court? 9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First
Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a
A - I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to support my common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively
little boy. for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and
administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the
Court: son reaches majority age.
34
MARRIAGE)
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order, and not Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support
being contrary to law, morals or public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the said
spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation is established in Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to reverse the
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the decision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of
Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the support is concerned and order the remand of the case to Pasay RTC for
conditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same further proceedings as to the issue regarding support.
shall, as between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in
the matters treated in the aforesaid settlement. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, dated June
Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in the 11, 1997 and October 27, 1997, dismissing the appeal and denying the motion
proper local civil registries and registries of property at the expense of the for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar as the
herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the Family Code. award of support in favor of John Paul Chua Lam is concerned. The Decision
dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
SO ORDERED. (Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being
null and void, likewise only insofar as the matter on support is concerned.
GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila.24
Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the Regional Trial
The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trial of Civil
before the Makati RTC as it was the court that approved the Compromise Case No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of Adriana Chua against Jose Lam
Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the petition for declaration of for the support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct hearings for further
nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the interest of orderly reception of evidence for the proper determination of the proper amount of
administration of justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on support support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua Lam. SO ORDERED.
should be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the child
was initiated by Adriana. G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6, Respondent.
1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition DECISION
filed by respondent Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and CALLEJO, SR., J.:
notice upon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was
deprived of due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
a motion to re-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the
notice and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P.
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
35
MARRIAGE)
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
2001, the accusatory portion of which reads: Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress
Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
[GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had
[Gaa]. been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.8
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar
married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her
then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa,
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her
was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good
thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought
his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife
that their son was still single. because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina
1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard
the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
36
MARRIAGE)
years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
of suit.9 the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover,
the OSG maintained, the private complainants knowledge of the first
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised State and not just against the private complainant.
Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the
exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed
People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private from with modification.
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter
would still be criminally liable for bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15
that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive
for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in portion of the decision reads:
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July
court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-
support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
v. Pealosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12 months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of
good faith and reliance on the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 SO ORDERED.17
were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on
Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 certiorari, insisting that:
of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED
37
MARRIAGE)
DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial
41 OF THE FAMILY CODE. declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only
a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in
NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18 awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private
complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her
element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with
or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be a lover whom she brought to their house.
presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence
points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of
who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second
paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to The petition is denied for lack of merit.
succession.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy,
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises reads:
by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two proper proceedings.
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner
concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy. The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it
require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule
38
MARRIAGE)
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
juridical tie of marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before the incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be
that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be
death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
bigamy."21 because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of
her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is
prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she one of the essential elements of the crime.29
contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with
second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."31
Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act
celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.32
marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends
Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of
marriage is a defense. proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as
Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence
undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:
39
MARRIAGE)
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and
hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a
that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and
effectivity of the Family Code. the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded
with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging
law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. community.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing
the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
discharge his burden. contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts,
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective
spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as
and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could so dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised
be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon
mere testimony is found incredible. the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable
40
MARRIAGE)
of accurate judicial cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
death of the absent spouse. presumptive death, reads:
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
acquittal for bigamy is misplaced. previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
those of succession.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
his succession may be opened. spouse.43
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under
division of the estate among the heirs: the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four
consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without
vessel or aeroplane; prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years; In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
his existence has not been known for four years. been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger
of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a
law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for
41
MARRIAGE)
that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary,
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it
in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion
a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family with the other spouse.
Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid
second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words
provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised "proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law. which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased
person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after
judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in and Jones.
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is
at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such
his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively
celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous.
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is
had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of
only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was,
final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a
to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a
judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view
after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead
taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary
42
MARRIAGE)
according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56 presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in
trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the
amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage
only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the
spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse clause "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x
will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the
of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is
the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse bigamy.59
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy: According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent
authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive
providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of
in case he or she marries again. the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado
opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have
purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary
file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters the other spouse can remarry."
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from
a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
is already established.58
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The
Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the
of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of remarriage. The cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of
43
MARRIAGE)
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the
its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the cases.
following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para
adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64 (4) Adultery or concubinage;
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by
its ruling in People v. Rodeo. (6) Illegal search;
The Court rules against the petitioner. (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious (8) Malicious prosecution;
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.65 An award for moral damages (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an 35.
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
44
MARRIAGE)
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named. provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or
cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68 prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages circumstances of each case.71
to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and
relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought
his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage
honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her
to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For
be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before
justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The they were married.
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised
in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69 Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners
chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision
45
MARRIAGE)
lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as
it turned out was not her lawful husband.72 they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals
and the interest and general welfare of society.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even
sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled: in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do
injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be
recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a
2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by
where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1
ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721,
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was
Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry
etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that
supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently
was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but
humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the
ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship
punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious.
Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep.
not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldnt sleep" but 336.
"couldnt eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just
basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable allowance of Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action
$1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendants
Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955). misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her
part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which
damages may be assessed.
46
MARRIAGE)
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are
marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are
such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
action was induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and that she complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge
does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
herself. Such considerations Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76 dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.1
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
SO ORDERED. to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The
respondent. Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
47
MARRIAGE)
CONTRARY TO LAW. ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from disturb the assailed judgment.
1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he
and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a Bigamy are:
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office
in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he (1) that the offender has been legally married;
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
record of said marriage.9 spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as validity.12
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he
merit. (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME acquittal.14
OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and
Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of
48
MARRIAGE)
a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the
1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
and Tenebro were legally married.16 Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have
no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes,
which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is
assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
Villareyes. marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity,
all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced
Court reads as follows: against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is marriage had all the requisites for validity.
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours). Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-
existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry
contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. wife, private respondent in this case.
49
MARRIAGE)
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10,
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
ground of psychological incapacity. that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar
as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate
since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses,
crime of bigamy was not committed.21 which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
This argument is not impressed with merit. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the
petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may
psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during contract marriage.27
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
50
MARRIAGE)
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy
are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner

contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and
Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage,
and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special
contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of
the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty

Persons Full Text Cases Part 3 Prelim Final Judgment Remarriage To Grounds For Annulment

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Persons Full Text Cases Part 3 Prelim Final Judgment Remarriage To Grounds For Annulment

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With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner

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