1

PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 40. FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ART. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE)
Article 46. FRAUDULENT CONSENT delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which
documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960 before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent. denied.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred
petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory,
Conchita Delizo. however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had
sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even
on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate
Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from
the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be
April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be
In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff
wedlock between her and the plaintiff. attached as annexes thereof the following documents:

At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo
ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the
only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between
the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite
the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a
later date.
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and
plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met,
courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more
children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting
that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that
he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's
marriage to defendant;

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was
presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged
by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage
dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception
of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her
pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from
plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;

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3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino
and defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27,
1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing
her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of
defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of
Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to
as late as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show
defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the
time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant
Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing
the Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred
action on the prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both
the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does
not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the
Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the
plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari. The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely
complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time
of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4)
in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19)
2
cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did
not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say
that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally
plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even
on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is
still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower
part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only
on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If,
as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be
expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the
time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal
the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the
woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms,
can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50%
at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and
conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial,
taken together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion,
be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply

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MARRIAGE)
because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the
defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a
provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to
prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In
the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial
were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to
the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.
Article 48. COLLUSION
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA
L. TUASON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision defense, he claimed that he and private respondent were a normal married
dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying
petitioner's appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149,
Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her
complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married
on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of
the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and
resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their
3
fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which
impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that
petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and
sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated;
that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and
cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he presented to the
public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave
minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of
their children compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-
outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a
spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by
alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks,
credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private
respondent's consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all
failed because of petitioner's refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for
annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. 1
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative
couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two
children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have
serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and
dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that
due to the "extreme animosities " between them, he temporarily left the
conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private respondent
who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another
man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television
station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in
media and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced
financial reverses in his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of
his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and
country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the
conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.

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MARRIAGE)
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private
respondent presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a
Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and
petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F. defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein judgment of
Racela IV, private respondent's counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her
husband's relationship with other women, his apprehension by the
authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior a church
annulment decree. 2 The parties' marriage was clerically annulled by the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. 3
During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18,
1990, filed his Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment
as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the
reception of petitioner's evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal
counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. 4
The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990. 5
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private
respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present
evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the
children to private respondent. The court ruled:
4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma.
Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
annulment be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where
the marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila
where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the
defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other
effects of annulment as provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. 6
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No
appeal was taken from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties." 7 Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990. 8
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel,
filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29,
1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991. 9
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court
denying his petition for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. 10
Hence this petition.
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The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is admitted for treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center
warranted under the circumstances of the case. at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14 The records, however, show that
We rule in the negative. the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this
confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and
Revised Rules of Court which provides: executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. 15

Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other
proceeding thereof. When a judgment or order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse
judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not
excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting
in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment
valid and regular on its face. 16

Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial
Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has
a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. 11 If the
petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as
if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. 12
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private
respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed
to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the
decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due
process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear
on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his
right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the
ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reason."
13 In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a certification
by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug
Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial
court of petitioner's confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his
non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any
reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not
inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's counsel, the
order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He
may have lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in
court. As the record show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated
in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined
private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private
respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. 17
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only
in exception cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available or adequate remedy. When a

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MARRIAGE)
party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for
new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise
the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
lost thru inexcusable negligence. 19
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites
the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or
legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state
because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of
annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for
his non-appearance. 20
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to
it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment.
6
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 21
with the danger of collusion. 22 Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration
of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. 23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. 24 Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. 25 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested.
The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles
48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default
by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent.
He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings
and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear
that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred
contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or

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fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is
no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated
by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses,
particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and
hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he
could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years, he
and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and
happy family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the
conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio and
television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good
subject for malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts,
according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his
marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non- On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued
existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage
is final and binding on us. 26 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the
trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous. 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
7
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G.
OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE,
respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.,
On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the
verified Complaint1 of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs. Macias) dated May 11,
2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte, of bias,
partiality and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition
of Civil Case No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage, entitled "Mariano
Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias."
The antecedents follow.
On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias ("Mr.
Macias"), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11,
Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the respondent's court.2
Summons to Mrs. Macias.3 However, the Summons was not served on Mrs.
Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.4
Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication.
The respondent granted the motion in his Order5 dated March 7, 2001, with
the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after
notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the
local weekly newspaper, "Tingog Peninsula," based in Dipolog City in its
March 11-17, 2001 issue.6
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons
during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within
the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she
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set for hearing on April 20, 2001.7 However, instead of first acting upon the The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias' right to due process.
motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject He argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to be heard but chose
case on April 19, 2001, or one day before. not to give her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the trial despite
prior notice. Furthermore, he points out that the records of the case would
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set show that the proceedings was done in good faith and based on law and
the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001.8 After the scheduled jurisprudence.
hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the
case submitted for decision.9 Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may have
committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of judicial remedies
In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions and and not by resorting to the filing of an administrative action. He argues that
manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the counsel it is only after the Supreme Court finds that a judge had committed malice or
of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the gross ignorance that he should be administratively sanctioned. Moreover,
respondent judge.10 One was denied while the rest were ignored. As respondent claims that a Petition14 dated May 11, 2001, containing similar
previously stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30, allegations as the instant complaint, was filed before the Court of Appeals, a
2001 without resolving the other motions and manifestations. copy of which he received on May 21, 2001.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent
judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias
and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint
containing the above-cited facts before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA).11 Also in the Complaint is her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte
directing the respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the
subject case and imposing an administrative sanction against him.
Without waiting for the OCA's Indorsement, the respondent judge submitted
his Comment/Answer12 on May 25, 2001.13
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective
because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have knowledge
of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein.
Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass
and humiliate him had motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision15 is valid and prays for the
dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
In her Reply16 which she filed on July 19, 2001, Mrs. Macias admits having
filed a petition for certiorari17 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64733
entitled "Margie Corpus Macias v. Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena" on May 18,
2001.18
In addition, Mrs. Macias claims that the Court of Appeals decided the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in her favor on
July 13, 2001, finding respondent judge blatantly transgressing her right to
due process and ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure. She notes
that the Decision19 nullified the assailed proceedings and the Decision20
rendered by the respondent judge on May 15, 2001 in Civil Case No. S-695.21
And finally, Mrs. Macias stresses that the instant charge against respondent
judge may simply be verified by checking the records of the case.
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On June 4, 2001, the respondent judge retired from the service. However, The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs.
pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated 22 Macias' Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias'
October 2001, the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter,
(P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits, to answer for whatever considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias' filing of a
administrative sanction the Court may impose in relation to the instant Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In
case.22 holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had
acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent
judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court,
judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period
the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a
procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default
Court should sanction him. proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.23

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which
states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due
process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case
completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed
within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has
been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move
ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that the last pleading
was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case
for pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example of "railroading" or
"procedural short-cut." Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the
respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the
merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias' evidence ex-parte.
In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of
his investigation.24
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public
Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the
case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed
a Certification dated May 04, 200125 with the respondent judge's court,
stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General
during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining
the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he
had no objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory

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requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor
whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made
by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the
case had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the
respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated
Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent
rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always
abreast with law and jurisprudence.26 When the law or procedure is so
elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance.27
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty
of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension
from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months
or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus,
dismissal or suspension from the service is no longer possible. Nonetheless,
a penalty of fine may still be imposed upon him considering that under the
Resolution of the First Division in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated October 22,
2001,28 the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever administrative sanction
the Court may impose upon him with regard to this case. Considering that
this is the first time the respondent judge will be meted a penalty,29 the
Court finds a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
10
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the
OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the
aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further
retention. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on
the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3
for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16
December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a
result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered,
a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then
being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with

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MARRIAGE)
whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines
with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he
might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely
returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of
their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with
her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was
named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had
been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there
was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus
finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor
to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was
now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously
married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted
the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and
she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it
was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had
enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial
reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as
the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their
family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she
11
continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except
for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did
file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a
letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely
also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the
brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void;
and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5
the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence.
Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of
his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he
essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;7 (2) the Certification,
dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording
of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register
of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and
(3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely
openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.9
Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and

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Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her
of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to
exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05
October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her
evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio,
on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that
the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he
is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest
before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of
the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her
very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is
12
the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite
evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply
with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of
marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven.
The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely
Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds
that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her
excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability.
That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And
for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff
Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even
offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried,
and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee
categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of
nullity of their marriage
 13
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Article 26 of the Family Code provides: After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied
its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. constitute psychological incapacity.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY,
THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is
to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case
at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why
the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen
whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes
herself an alien.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed
serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys
psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and
that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was
indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the
latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family
Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State,
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff
would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity
to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain
shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this
Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff
be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.16
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family
Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

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marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity.
In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its
existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was
defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family "protected" by the state.
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.22
14
of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by
its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was

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existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
15
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the
RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-
serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with
the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used
her American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by
Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a
grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.

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It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper,
nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause
for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not
identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in
Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the
root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that
its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
16
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.32
II Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein
one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner
at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation,
the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in
her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that
she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce,
Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound
by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III

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The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus
argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may
intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar
him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is
tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and,
bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
17
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized
to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this
Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control
over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta
v. Ancheta36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court
laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the
Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
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MARRIAGE)
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] Sec. 19. Decision.
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State37
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the
became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the general circulation.
instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of
the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for (3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
reproduced below prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit (2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal
to the court proof of such service within the same period. from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice
of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file
their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of
the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds
to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for
being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage,

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MARRIAGE)
this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents
specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the
Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains
valid and subsisting. SO ORDERED.
Article 49. SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA
CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners, vs. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and
CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the
person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5 October
1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing of 12 October 1987 at 8:30 a.m.
Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his report and
recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig
submitted to the Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3
December 1987.
19
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and
brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was
barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29
April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by
herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a
decision 2 granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne
Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority
of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to
them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known
as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of
inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners
Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get
back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the
respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners'
residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by
her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in
Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Gina
Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for
adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed
was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will,
however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of
P150,000.00.
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Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
in the adoption case, testified on 27 October 1987 before the Executive among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in connection with the present petition. adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
She declared that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon on 24 June parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted
1987 in connection with the contemplated adoption of the child. During the shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the
interview, said respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental
the child adopted by the petitioners. 4 authority and responsibility over him. 9

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,
the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the
Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral,
physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the
latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation
with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-
minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth
to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost
three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her
true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor
and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein
respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit
relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody
and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to
petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if
they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon
notice hereof This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went
sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon
this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of who,
between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in
helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy
young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met
sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local
hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse.
She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,

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MARRIAGE)
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16,
1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while
they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got
married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices
this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate
sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was
always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand,
contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and
antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by
Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the
She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance
telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-
petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of
being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually
rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou,
Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222, Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to
return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over
the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It
suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
21
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights
of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court.
de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It
gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main
contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the
trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and
conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the children
should be given to respondent Teresita.
children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of
Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property
of the children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall
be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission
which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the loving,
tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a father
cannot give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of the Code

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MARRIAGE)
Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook
on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a
child below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the
latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the theory that
moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action.
(Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law
rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply
to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be
awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the
welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration.
In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in
all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA
502 [1969]), where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as
against the mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable
Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall
be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from
the mother (do). This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac
necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring
was virtually a chattel of his parents into a radically different institution, due whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory
to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is
22
now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty,
but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children
is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the
children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic
training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that
the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over
seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that
choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the
circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of
age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while
Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in
of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live.
Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to
investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and
custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the
records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying
presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common

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MARRIAGE)
situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp.
cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption. 199-205, Rollo).
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her
counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of
her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and
future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds
between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the
other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial
court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and
considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child
psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting
her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests
were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses
of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to
delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind
was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man
who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk
to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally
emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and
her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live with her mother. The
5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety
arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to compensate
by having fantasy activities. All of the 8 recommendations of the child
psychologist show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private
23
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the
purpose of securing the travel clearance required before minors may go
abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child
Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her
mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her
Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering
from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for
travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the
law applies to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed,
not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at
the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of
custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given
custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of
custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra,
at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the
good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is
chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7
years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent
choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in
the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to
prevent the father from taking them away from her. We are more inclined to
believe the father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in court
because such an emotional display as described by Teresita in her pleadings
could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court
of Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the
children and their mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is
 24
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MARRIAGE)
diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it.
had this to say on the matter. The persons who effected such examinations were presented in the capacity
of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective knowledge
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light, or and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of
with more understanding, especially as her conduct and demeanor in the Sali vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the
presence of the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain
temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical contested documents, at the request, not of a public officer or agency of the
punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) Government, but of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the
and emotional instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
deference and respect to the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle
Decision) correctly the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private
individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his knowledge
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the which may help, the court in the determination of said issue. Such
expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private
have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner individual, does not, certainly become null and void when the examiner is an
Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of bias and
unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were (pp. 991-992.)
not substantiated.
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and
unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain uncontroverted. . . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may
We also note that the examinations made by the experts were conducted in place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance
late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of the habeas corpus with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
intended to support petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
not even an impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
utilized in the case a quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
in which they were first obtained. testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study
and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be matters which reserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert
construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of
 25
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MARRIAGE)
all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., to render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to
1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In this
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but the school authorities who
ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a professional of her potential
discretion. and stature would compromise her professional standing.

(p. 359) Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:

It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess
the witnesses' character and to observe their respective demeanor that the
trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that the trial court
was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated
that Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-
loaded because there was no required clearance. They were referred to her
office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and interviewed. One
of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the
interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons.
The interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had
nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social
Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her
mother was based on the disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much
less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and
the public trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing her
job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in
Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis
graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of
the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the
interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption
College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at
the time she had a subsisting marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one
of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and
conveniences commensurate to their social standing because she does not
even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling
reasons under the law which would justify depriving her of custody over the
children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have not
been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child
under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother, without
considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or
relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier
mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding
custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed
from the obviously unwholesome, not

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to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed
herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who was much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who
in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7
years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong,
ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better
served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he
has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care
which the mother is not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported
by the records. The findings of the trial court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on
December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238,
Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already driven
across the continental United States to commence living with another man,
petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987.
Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture
Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her
marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo.
Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such
tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts
from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious
crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior
marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse appears to have become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).
to the act. The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not
for the prior marriage.
26
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only
had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight to
the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who
immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is
marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various
witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner
Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the
National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was
staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record
shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by
the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in
their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal
home and the children, bound for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was
reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his
company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking breakfast together.
More significant is that letters and written messages from Teresita to
Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to
another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor
applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and
their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to
mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the
role of a sole parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United
States while the children will be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines
 27
PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 40. FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ART. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE)
is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA
and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO. Petitioner, vs. HON.
Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs Judge, RTC-Makati, Branch 149, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C.
this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent DELGADO, Respondents.
return to the Philippines (ff. DECISION
p. 263, Rollo). CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children
are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom
they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is
a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph
of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second
paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven
years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for
children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in
the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to
grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil
Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald
Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996, affirming the Order, dated 12
September 19952 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 149, Makati,
granting support pendente lite to Rebecca Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel
(Rina), both surnamed Delgado.
The generative facts leading to the filing of the present petition are as follows:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy
and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC
Makati.3 In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner
and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court
Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only
21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage
was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil
Code,4 it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.5
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about
to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner,

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MARRIAGE)
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New
England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina Petitioner likewise averred that demands7 were made upon Federico and the
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education
because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year, broken down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina
ii) Additionally, Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the that under these provisions, in case of default on the part of the parents, the
amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year.
iii) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely
US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give general support to Rica and
Rina, much less their required college educational support.
iv) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to share in the
general support and college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own
son with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to.
28
v) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected
by the U.S. Department of Education.6
latters father, Francisco,8 for general support and for the payment of the
required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted
efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent
Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be
financially well-off.9 These demands, however, remained unheeded.
Considering the impending deadline for admission to college and the opening
of classes, petitioner and her then minor children had no choice but to file
the petition before the trial court.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters by
respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born within seven months
from the date of the annulment of her marriage to respondent Federico.
However, as respondent Federico failed to sign the birth certificates of Rica
and Rina, it was imperative that their status as legitimate children of
respondent Federico, and as granddaughters of respondent Francisco, be
judicially declared pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code.10
As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are entitled to general
and educational support under Articles 17411 and 195(b)12 in relation to
Articles 194(1 and 2)13 and 199(c)14 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged
obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children;
thus, respondent Federico, or in his default, respondent Francisco should be
ordered to provide general and educational support for Rica and Rina in the
amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.
Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek support pendente
lite from private respondents - who are millionaires with extensive assets
both here and abroad - in view of the imminent opening of classes, the

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MARRIAGE)
possibility of a protracted litigation, and Rica and Rinas lack of financial Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent Federico, the trial
means to pursue their college education in the USA. court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994 and admitted his Answer.21
In his Answer,15 respondent Francisco stated that as the birth certificates of
Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent Federico, it is essential
that their legitimacy be first established as "there is no basis to claim support
until a final and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil
status of the children."16 Whatever good deeds he may have done to Rica
and Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was founded on pure acts of
Christian charity. He, likewise, averred that the order of liability for support
under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent such that the
obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the recipient. In
this case, he maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulders of
petitioner and her second husband, the latter having voluntarily assumed the
duties and responsibilities of a natural father. Even assuming that he is
responsible for support, respondent Francisco contends that he could not be
made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could afford.
On 24 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant (respondent
herein) Federico in Default.17 This was favorably acted upon by the trial court
in the Order dated 16 June 1994.18
On 5 August 1994, respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default
alleging that the summons and a copy of the petition were not served in his
correct address.19 Attached thereto was his Answer20 where he claimed that
petitioner had no cause of action against him. According to him, he left for
abroad and stayed there for a long time "[w]ithin the first one hundred
twenty (120) days of the three hundred days immediately preceding March
25, 1976" and that he only came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina
when the twins introduced themselves to him seventeen years later. In order
not to antagonize the two, respondent Federico claimed he did not tell them
that he could not be their father. Even assuming that Rica and Rina are,
indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the support
they were demanding as he was only making P40,000.00 a month.
29
In the meantime, on 25 April 1994, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing because Rica and Rina both
badly needed immediate financial resources for their education.22 This
Motion was opposed by respondent Francisco.23 After both parties
submitted supplemental pleadings to bolster their respective positions, the
trial court resolved the motion in an Order dated 12 September 1995 in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, respondents are
hereby directed to provide a monthly support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00
each or a total of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and Regina
Isabel Delgado to be delivered within the first five days of each month
without need of demand.24
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the holding of the trial court and disposed the petition in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Order of
the lower court dated September 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.25
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996.26
Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals was tainted with the following errors:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

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MARRIAGE)
FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE GRANTED TO
PETITIONERS CHILDREN AT A MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.
I. RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL
INCAPACITY OF RICA AND RINAS PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE
OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE GRANDFATHER.
II. IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT
GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE
AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING
AN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE
TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.27
At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged that Rica had be held liable for support, he has the option to fulfill the obligation either by
already entered Rutgers University in New Jersey with a budget of
US$12,500.00 for academic year 1994-1995. She was able to obtain a tuition
fee grant of US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from the US government
in the amount of US$2,615.00.28 In order to defray the remaining balance of
Ricas education for said school year, petitioner claims that she had to secure provisions on support as "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
a loan under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program.
Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University, where she was
expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the school year 1994-1995. She was
given a financial grant of US$6,000.00, federal work study assistance of
US$2,000.00, and a Federal Stafford loan of US$2,625.00.29 Again, petitioner
obtained a loan to cover the remainder of Rinas school budget for the year.
Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish support to
Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their parents. She contends,
however, that the records of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent
Federicos inability to give the support needed for Rica and Rinas college
education. Consequently, the obligation to provide support devolves upon
respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica and Rina.
30
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to help defray the cost of Rica and Rinas schooling, the Court of
Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial courts Order directing respondent
Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of award P5,000.00 each as
monthly support pendente lite.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court correctly
declared that petitioner and respondent Federico should be the ones to
provide the support needed by their twin daughters pursuant to Article 199
of the Family Code. He also maintains that aside from the financial package
availed of by Rica and Rina in the form of state tuition aid grant, work study
program and federal student loan program, petitioner herself was eligible for,
and had availed herself of, the federal parent loan program based on her
income and properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists that assuming he could
paying the support or receiving and maintaining in the dwelling here in the
Philippines the person claiming support.30 As an additional point to be
considered by this Court, he posits the argument that because petitioner and
her twin daughters are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad."31
Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having sired Rica and
Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously raised before the trial court.
Like his father, respondent Federico argues that assuming he is indeed the
father of the twin sisters, he has the option under the law as to how he would
provide support. Lastly, he assents with the declaration of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that the parents of a child should primarily bear the
burden of providing support to their offspring.
The petition is meritorious.

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MARRIAGE)
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the essence
of support pendente lite. The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the
matter provides:
Rule 61
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified
application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the
grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in
support thereof.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts,
and shall render such orders as justice and equity may require, having due
regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as
may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application
is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or
such other forms of support as should be provided, taking into account the
necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party,
and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the
application is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as should be made liable for said award.
possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite
prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional
nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before
it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is provided:
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to
justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by
31
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record.32lavvphi1.net
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence
presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof,
the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins
entitlement to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court
By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied.
They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather
Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote
several letters to Rica and Rina (Exhs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, G-1 to G-30). In the
said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof, respondent Francisco wrote
the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that
they bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters
as either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco." In his letter of October 13, 1989 (Exh.
G-21), he said "as the grandfather, am extending a financial help of
US$1,000.00." On top of this, respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat
to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed, respondents, by
their actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins are the children of
Federico.33
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant of
support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is who
The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
(1) The spouse;
 32
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MARRIAGE)
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
(4) The brothers and sisters. Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support conclusion."35 The case at bar falls within the seventh and eleventh
rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the exceptions.
more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the
claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federicos allegation in his
have the means to do so.34 Answer36 and his testimony37 as to the amount of his income. We have,
however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held respondent evidence to support his assertions regarding his employment and his earning.
Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in the total amount Notably, he was even required by petitioners counsel to present to the court
of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of his income tax return and yet the records of this case do not bear a copy of
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month. We are, however, unconvinced as to said document.38 This, to our mind, severely undermines the truthfulness of
the veracity of this ground relied upon by the trial court and the Court of respondent Federicos assertion with respect to his financial status and
Appeals. capacity to provide support to Rica and Rina.

It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be the proper In addition, respondent Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that as
subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil far as he knew, his son, respondent Federico did not own anything
Procedure. The rule finds a more stringent application where the Court of
Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial court; in such a situation, "Atty. Lopez:
this Court, as the final arbiter, is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the appellate and the lower courts. This rule, however, is not I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. & Mrs. Dany
ironclad as it admits of the following recognized exceptions: "(1) when the Mangonon, dated October 19, 1991 addressed to Mr. Francisco Delgado
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) signed by "sincerely, Danny Mangonon, can you remember."
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a xxxx
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of WITNESS:
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on

PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 40. FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ART. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE)
A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated me so much that I threw A: I am driving a lancer, sir.
it away in a waste basket. It is a very demanding letter, that is what I do not
like at all.
ATTY. LOPEZ:
Q: It is stated in this letter that "I am making this request to you and not to
your son, Rico, for reasons we both are aware of." Do you know what reason
that is?
A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix employment and do not have
fix salary and income and they want to depend on the lolo.
x x x xlavvphi1.net
Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house and lot?
A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.
Q: How about a car?
A: Well, his car is owned by my company.39
Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had no property of his
own, thus:
Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at Mayflower Building and you
further earlier testified that this building belongs to Citadel Corporation. Do
you confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What car are you driving, Mr. Witness?
33
Q: What car, that registered in the name of the corporation?
A: In the corporation, sir.
Q: What corporation is that?
A: Citadel Commercial, Inc., sir.
Q: What properties, if any, are registered in your name, do you have any
properties, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir."40 (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner possessed the
capacity to give support to her twin daughters as she has gainful employment
in the USA. He even went as far as to state that petitioners income abroad,
when converted to Philippine peso, was much higher than that received by a
trial court judge here in the Philippines. In addition, he claims that as she
qualified for the federal parent loan program, she could very well support the
college studies of her daughters.
We are unconvinced. Respondent Franciscos assertion that petitioner had
the means to support her daughters education is belied by the fact that
petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the
loan from the federal government. If petitioner were really making enough
money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for said
loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough
indication that she did not have enough money to enable her to send her
daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves
were forced by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans
under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.

PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 40. FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ART. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE)
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent
Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico
are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view
however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be
borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code,
respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is
tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It
bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated,
which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate,
and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the
majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he
also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in
different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel
Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad.41 It having
been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to
support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and
respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option
under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica
and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here
to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities
of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA.
The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides:
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.
34
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he
could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to
stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case
there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail
himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the
commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent
Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other,
was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers
well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits
presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these,
however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the
parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina
must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family
denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could
not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from
the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be
of the recipient.42 Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco
liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as
support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has
the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business
endeavors.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with
their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it
 35
PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 40. FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE ART. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE)
proper to award support pendente lite in arrears43 to be computed from the
time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.

The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and
her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the
resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica
and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order
the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of
actual payment.44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996 and Resolution dated
16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated 12 September 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, fixing the amount of support pendente lite
to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in
that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente
lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this
Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for the
determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite for Rebecca
Angela and Regina Isabel as well as the arrearages due them in accordance
with this Decision within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Concomitantly,
the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the main case and the
immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge,
Branch 149, Makati, is further directed to submit a report of his compliance
with the directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days
from compliance thereof.

SO ORDERED.