Multihazard Exposure Risk and Resilience Monitoring

9 Multihazard Exposure, Risk,
and Resilience Monitoring
9.1 INTRODUCTION
9.1.1 overvIeW
This chapter defined hazards (or threats) in a very broad sense, that is, they can degrade perfor-
mance of a single infrastructure asset or community (network) of infrastructure assets. However,
one of the common attributes of those hazards and the resulting performance or response of the
assets to them is that both the hazards as well as the performances change with time. Thus, a
single snapshot reaction by the stakeholders (whether this reaction is an assessment, acceptance,
treatment, or some combination of the same) might be necessary, but definitely not sufficient. The
infrastructure stakeholders have to react dynamically, as needed, in response to hazards. In order
to facilitate such dynamism, a system of monitoring may be implemented. This chapter addresses
some of the MH attributes of single assets and networks of assets both from a snapshot and time
marching viewpoints.
If we consider some of the recent considerations of MH monitoring (MHM), we start by noting
that several potential hazards, which might be related to earthmoving and/or surface mining, can
be monitored via image-based technologies. Specifically, construction operations associated with
earthmoving and surface mining activities are generally associated with higher risk evidenced by the
U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) reports. According to MSHA (2009), more
than 30% of the total fatalities in coal and metal/nonmetal mining from 2004 to 2008 were caused
by heavy machinery. Manual inspections and internal controls, such as checklists, are predomi-
nantly used for minimizing risk. These procedures are not only expensive and time-consuming, but
success of these procedures depends on competency of the personnel deployed (Ahmad and Gibb
2004). With recent advances, spatial-based technologies have been gaining attention to reduce these
risk factors. Hence, Chi and Caldas (2012) investigated the use of an automated, image-based safety
assessment method for earthmoving and surface mining activities. Based on a literature review, they
focused on three risk factors associated with operator errors: excessive operation speeds, danger-
ous access to the unsafe areas, and close proximity between objects such as heavy machinery and
workers. Then they identified best practices and spatial data needs for safety assessment in relation
to these risk factors to investigate image-based data collection devices and algorithms for spatial
safety assessment. The analyzed algorithms were designed to systematically collect and interpret
safety-related data. Based on a case study, they conclude that the applied safety rules enabled auto-
mated violation detection.
Another monitoring activity that involves several hazards can be found in the wastewater infra-
structure community. Sewer or wastewater pipes are a significant portion of wastewater systems
forming the pathway between points of wastewater generation and treatment plants or outfalls.
More than 1 million miles of these pipes are supposed to exist in the United States and require
considerable resources to maintain them in operating condition. Given constrained resources, pri-
oritization is required and risk-based methodologies are gaining attention.
Salman and Salem (2012) note that even though identifying probability of failure for sewer pipes
through deterioration models has attracted the attention of several researchers, determining the con-
sequences of failure and incorporating this information to prioritize sewers has not been fully exam-
ined. Hence, authors attempted to generate a risk assessment tool to prioritize sewer pipes considering
401
402 Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure
consequences-of-failure values using a weighted scoring system. Authors used the data sets from the
Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati that serves approximately 230,000 residential and
commercial users by managing a sewer network that has an approximate total length of 3,000 miles.
Each pipe was evaluated with respect to a set of factors and a weighted sum of the performance of
the pipe was calculated. ArcGIS software was used to obtain the required information for each fac-
tor and to geographically represent the consequence of failure values for the overall sewer network.
Thus, one limitation of the proposed methodology is availability of high-quality data sets that can be
imported into a GIS software package. Three different risk assessment prioritization methods were
used: multiplication of probability and consequences of failure, risk matrices, and fuzzy inference
systems. They report that the use of fuzzy inference systems resulted in a more flexible method to
combine probability and consequences of failure, as it allowed modeling of the fuzziness around
boundary values for different levels of probability. One interesting aspect identified by the authors is
the lack of data sets to include other utility lines such as water pipes, power lines, and gas pipes in the
proximity of sewer pipes to consider interaction in estimating consequences of failure.
9.1.2 thIs chapter

We start this chapter by providing a discussion of different types of MHM, categorized in three
types based on their objectives. We also note that MHM methods vary depending on the manage-
ment metric (exposure, risk, or resilience) used. Finally, we show that MHM systems as well as
objective considerations and formalities can be different if the stakeholder is interested only in a
snapshot in time or a time marching monitoring system. In all of the considerations, we will always
point to the specific attributes and needs of the MH environment. Figure 9.1 shows the outline of
this chapter.
Types of MH monitoring
Snap shot (current states)

BN
MN
Exposure monitoring Risk monitoring LCA monitoring
CG
Single monitoring Multiple monitoring

method methods
Time marching (DGN):

Forecasting (predicting)
Backward projection (smoothing)
Case study provided

Case study not provided
FIGURE 9.1 Contents of this chapter: temporal categorizations of MH monitoring.

Multihazard Exposure, Risk, and Resilience Monitoring 403
9.2 TYPES OF MH MONITORING

9.2.1 categorIzIng MhM accordIng to theIr objectIves
MHM can be categorized into the following three basic types, according to the objectives of the
monitoring efforts:
1. Type I MHM: The system will have specific monitoring components where each compo-
nent can monitor a specific individual hazard. More often than not, however, this type of
monitoring will produce information that has compound effects of more than one hazard.
Currently, this is the most prevalent type of monitoring. This type of MHM is a generaliza-
tion of the serendipity principle; see Ettouney and Alampalli (2012).
2. Type II MHM: A particular measurement of a component or system degradation can
isolate the contributions of different hazards that result in the measured degradation.
Formally, the Type II MHM is initiated by observing a particular behavior of the system
or component of interest, u. This component or system has been subjected to a set of haz-
ards Hi, where i = 1,2,NH and NH is the number of hazards. The objective in this type
of MHM is to quantify the relative contributions of each of the hazards in the observed
behavior u.
3. Type III MHM: A carefully designed monitoring system with several types of monitoring
methods (visual, nondestructive testing [NDT], or structural health monitoring [S.H.M.])
that can identify the degradation effects of more than one hazard. It is more costly, but it
can result, if designed properly, in more accurate and beneficial information.
We note that Type II is the inverse of Type I. Whereas Type III is always a superset of Type I. It can
also be designed so as to use its built-in versatility to be a superset of Type II.
There are practical benefits for each of the three types of MHM as shown in Table 9.1.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the differences between the three MHM types. We explore different types
of MHM via practical case studies later in this chapter.
9.2.2 categorIzIng oF MhM accordIng to ManageMent MetrIcs

We identified several management metrics for civil infrastructures throughout this chapter. We would
like to concentrate in this MHM part of this chapter on three metrics: exposure, risk, and resilience.
TABLE 9.1
Types of MHM
MHM Types Objectives/Benefits
Type I Measures extent of degradation
Cost savings (lesser number of systems)
Additional system safety (due to monitoring of more hazards by single system)
Simplicity of operations (lesser number of systems)
Type II Measures extent of degradation
Measures/infers/isolates cause of degradation
Targeted maintenance, rehabilitation, and replacement decisions (identifying which hazard caused which
degradation)
Operational and maintenance cost savings
Type III More accurate than other types in isolating causes of degradations
More accurate than other types in estimating extent of degradations
Types of MH monitoring
Only one of the Use combination of

Single monitoring mode three monitoring two or three of the Multimode monitoring
methods monitoring methods
Monitoring methods are

Visual inspection (V.I.)
Structural Health Monitoring (S.H.M.)
Nondestructive testing (NDT)
Type I Type II Type III
FIGURE 9.2 Types of multihazard monitoring and their objectives.
9.2.2.1 Exposure MHM

Recalling that we identified exposure, E, a subjective or objective function of hazards and vulner-
ability in the form
E = f (Hazard, Vulnerability) (9.1)
As such, E can be a measure of visual inspection V.I. since V.I. includes a subjective estimate of
both. Similarly, condition ratings, CR, whether it is for a component or system, is an estimator of
exposure. We consider V.I. or CR as a form of exposure MHM system since both aim at monitoring
performance of the system under consideration to multitudes of hazards. Other exposure monitor-
ing techniques are S.H.M. and NDT methods. See Ettouney and Alampalli (2012a and 2012b) for
comprehensive discussions of those popular techniques.
9.2.2.2 Risk MHM

As risk, Ri, is a superset of exposure, E in the form
Ri = g( E, C ) (9.2)
where C is a measure of consequences.

MHM of Ri involves monitoring exposure or its components as well as consequences or its
components. Since many forms of consequences involve parameters that are outside the immediate
domain of the system under consideration, such as social and or economic considerations, meth-
odologies of monitoring consequences can be fairly different from methodologies that pertain to
monitoring exposure. MHM of risk may involve both methodologies in order to achieve the desired
accuracy. Several case studies will show objective MHM of risk.
To further illustrate the differences between MHM for exposure (MHEM) and risk (MHRM),
we present Figure 9.3. The objective difference between the two is in MHM risk monitoring where
consequences are included in the process, while in exposure MHM the process stops at monitoring
exposure.
Hazards
Short-term hazards Long-term hazards
Flood Seismic Other Live load Corrosion Other
Visual NDT/S.H.M. Consequence monitoring
Structural Health Management

Monitoring (S.H.M.) decisions
Maintenance
Nondestructive Rehabilitation
Inspection Other
testing (NDT) Replacement
System: capacity/
Hazards/demands Consequences
vulnerability
(as function of time) (as function of time)
(as function of time)
Temporal monitoring activity

Natural or manmade events
Risk component
Type I/III MH monitoring
Exposure as a function of time: Risk as a function of time: Type II MH monitoring
Exposure monitoring Risk monitoring Risk/exposure

computational flow
FIGURE 9.3 Schematics of risk and exposure monitoring (MHRM/MHEM).
9.2.2.3 Resilience MHM

While discussing the MHM resilience issue in Chapters 6 through 8, we made two major points:
1. Resilience is a subset of risk with the main difference being that it studies the quality
or efficiency of continued operation (OE) and time of recovery (T) after major hazards.
Formally,
Re = Re(OE, T ) (9.3)
2. Resilience is a function of the 4Rs (Robustness R1, Resourcefulness R2, Recovery R3, and
Redundancy R4). Formally,
Re = Re(R1, R2, R3, R 4) (9.4)
Thus, for resilience MHM we have to monitor the MH attributes of either OE and T, or R1, R2, R3,
and R4.
9.2.3 tIMe categorIzatIons oF MhM

There are two time categories of MHM: snapshot and time marching. Snapshot MHM monitors
issues at one particular time instant. Time marching involves forecasting behavior in the future,
while using current and previous monitoring results as the basis for forecasting. Life-cycle analysis
(LCA) is one form of time marching monitoring. Section 9.3 explores objective situations of snap-
shot MHM situations while Section 9.4 illustrates time marching MHM situations.
9.3 MH MONITORING: SNAPSHOTS IN TIME

9.3.1 case study 9.1: vIsual InspectIon oF MultIhazard
9.3.1.1 Overview
Conditional dependence and interactions, as exemplified by probabilistic graphical networks (see
Chapter 5), between issues is the heart of this method. In particular, the capability of probabilistic
graphical networks (GNs) to offer back propagation of probabilities using conditional inference after an
observation or more in the values of its nodes will generate the desired relative hazards contributions to
probabilities of occurrences of different variables at different nodes in the network. The advantages of
using a Bayesian network (BN) approach for evaluating MHEM are as follows: (1) it is scalable (vari-
ables can be added to the network easily), (2) offers more realism than the analytical approach, (3) can
easily accommodate subjective and objective hazards, and (4) can easily accommodate subjective (such
as visual inspection) and objective (such as S.H.M. and/or NDE) observations. The main disadvantage
includes the difficulties in acquiring a conditional probabilities table (CPT). We use several simple exam-
ples to illustrate this particular utilization of probabilistic graphical networks in an MH environment.
9.3.1.2 Model
In this example, we assume that there are three specific hazards that can affect the condition rating
(see Ettouney and Alampalli 2012b) of a structural system (we use a post-tensioned bridge girder
as an example): (1) corrosion of tendons (COR), (2) wear and tear of tendons (WT), and (3) tem-
perature constraints at ends of the girders (TMP). When the inspector visually observes deteriora-
tion of the girder (V.I.), it is not obvious as to the cause of the deterioration. Given the fact that a
retrofit for each of these can be different from the others, it is essential to accurately estimate the
cause of the deterioration in order to embark on an appropriate retrofit measure (see Ettouney and
Alampalli 2012a and 2012b). Figure 9.4 shows the BN schematics of this situation. Table 9.2 shows
BN model for MH monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring method
TMP COR WT
V.I.
FIGURE 9.4 MH monitoring.
TABLE 9.2
States of Nodal Variables
Variable Number of States State
TMP 3 High, medium, low
COR 2 Damaged, pristine
WT 2 Damaged, pristine
V.I. 4 Service, poor, fair, good
the states of nodal variables of the model while Table 9.9 (Appendix 9A) contains the definitions
of the nodal variables of the model.
9.3.1.3 CPTs
The different CPTs of the network shown in Figure 9.4 are shown in Appendix 9B. These CPTs will
govern the uncertain behavior of different variables of the BN. We used our best judgment in filling
the different tables in a realistic manner for illustration purposes. For more on different methods of
developing CPTs, see Chapter 5.
9.3.1.4 Results
The prior (historical) marginal probabilities for the BN model are shown in Figure 9.5. The V.I.
observations indicate, in general, poor performance for the bridge. They also show that the prob-
abilities of damage due to COR or WT are about the same (71% vs. 77%, respectively). Of course,
historical performance can only be utilized as a guide, more specific and current information is
needed in order to make appropriate management decisions.
9.3.1.4.1 Hard and Soft Evidences/Observations

In order to update the historical observations, let us assume that a V.I. effort shows that the current
rating is poor. This is a hard evidence (see Chapter 5 for definitions of hard and soft evidences/
observations) situation with the resulting probabilities shown in Figure 9.6. We see here, by using
the inference processes of BN (see Chapter 5), that such an observation indicates that the prob-
ability of damage due to WT is more than the probability of damage due to COR (86% vs. 74%,
respectively). The decision-maker may conclude that mitigating WT is more urgent than mitigating
COR. Note that the data here are still not that conclusive and illustrate the current state of condition
monitoring with respect to a concrete structure.
Sometimes observations/evidence cant be detected in a definitive manner (soft evidence). Let us
assume that the V.I. estimates resulted in probabilities of 30% poor and 70% fair conditions. If we
analyzed the BN model for this soft evidence, the resulting probabilities are shown in Figure 9.7.
Now the probabilities of damage due to both WT and COR are about the same at 60% and 61%. The
decision of mitigation options is difficult in this situation. More information is needed before mak-
ing such a decision. One way out of this situation is to use additional monitoring methods (we will
provide an example of a multimonitoring model in Section 9.3.2).
BN model for S.H.M. monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodPrior
FIGURE 9.5 Prior (historical) probabilities of the Bayesian network variables.

BN model for MH monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodPoor V.I. observation
FIGURE 9.6 Hard evidence of V.I. state of Poor condition (hard evidence).
Type II monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodSoft V.I. observation
FIGURE 9.7 Soft evidence results.
9.3.2 case study 9.3: Mh MonItorIng usIng dIFFerent MonItorIng technIques

9.3.2.1 Overview
This case study extends Case Study 9.1 by addressing combinations of monitoring methods and their
effectiveness in handling multiple hazards. On the one hand, it might be more costly to use more
than one monitoring technique even though it has the potential to produce more versatility and accu-
racy. We note that using a combination of monitoring methods is a manifestation of the triangulation
principle that was introduced by Ettouney and Alampalli (2012a). The main objective here is to
identify the relative contributions of the monitored hazards in the behavior of the observed system.
9.3.2.2 Model
We expand the model shown in Figure 9.4 with only a single monitoring method, V.I., into three
general monitoring methods: V.I., S.H.M., and NDT. The utilization of the three methods potentially
MH monitoringThree hazardsThree monitoring methods
TMP COR WT
S.H.M. V.I. NDT
FIGURE 9.8 MH monitoring using several monitoring methods.
TABLE 9.3
V.I., S.H.M., NDT 4 Pristine, damaged
should produce more accurate inferences of the contributions of different hazards under consider-
ations. In this example, we retain the same three hazards (TMP, COR, and WT) to demonstrate one
of the advantages of graph networks: scalability. For we can reuse the same CPTs as before, but just
add new CPTs to accommodate the new variables and links. The model we will be using for this
problem is shown in Figure 9.8. Since all links in the graph are directional links, the model is a BN
model. We assume in this model that V.I. will observe the combined effects of the three hazards. But
S.H.M., being a bit more discriminating, we assume that it can detect the combined effects of TMP
and COR. The NDT process cant measure TMP effects, but it can measure the combined effects of
COR and WT. These assumptions are only for illustration purposes, and their actual ability depends
on the type of NDT and S.H.M. utilized. The states of nodal variables are shown in Table 9.3 while
the definitions of those variables are shown in Table 9.9.
9.3.2.3 CPTs
The different CPTs of the network shown in Figure 9.8 are shown in Appendix 9C. We used our best
judgment in filling the different tables in a realistic manner for illustration purposes. For more on
different methods of developing CPTs, see Chapter 5.
9.3.2.4 Results
Upon executing the model with its CPTs, we obtain the historical (prior) marginal probabilities as
shown in Figure 9.9. We see that historically, based on previous experiences and observations, the
probability of COR damage is expected to be 44% while WT damage is expected to be 41%. Overall,
this is in line with historical observations (of the site under study) of the three monitoring methods
that expect damage probabilities at 44%, 47%, and 44%, for V.I., S.H.M., and NDT, respectively.
FIGURE 9.9 MH monitoring using several monitoring methods: prior (historical) results.
Type III monitoringThree hazardsThree monitoring methods
FIGURE 9.10 MH monitoring using several monitoring methods: visual inspection only.
Let us assume that a current V.I. observation indicates a damaged bridge. The updated marginal
probabilities of BN based on this observation are shown in Figure 9.10. We can infer from this
observation that the COR damage probability is about 67%, while that of WT is about 58%. Thus,
the bridge manager has isolated the potential relative contributions of the different hazards slightly
better. The COR is more probable to have caused more damage than WT. An appropriate decision
for mitigation may be made under this circumstance (combined observation and inference).
The previous results that are based on only V.I. observations show an increase in potential dam-
age from both V.I. and WT sources. So if the decision-maker needs more verification, then he/she
might decide to embark on another monitoring method, say, S.H.M. The resulting observation pro-
duces soft evidence with probability of damage of 85% versus pristine probability of 15%. We can
now recompute the BN model with this S.H.M. soft evidence combined with the hard evidence
FIGURE 9.11 MH monitoring using several monitoring methods: combined visual inspection and structural
health monitoring observations.
obtained by the V.I. monitoring method. The results are shown in Figure 9.11. Now, the COR dam-
age probability has increased to 79%, while a WT damage probability has decreased slightly to 54%.
The combined monitoring methods helped in clarifying the source of the damage and confirmed the
damage to be COR rather than WT. The decision to mitigate the COR effects can now proceed with
a relatively greater degree of confidence.
9.3.3 case study 9.4: Mh rIsk MonItorIng

9.3.3.1 Overview
So far, in the examples earlier, we only monitored exposure (as represented by different inspection/
observations methods). In this case study, we recognize that consequences, which form an integral
part of risk, also need to be monitored in order to gain information regarding risk.
9.3.3.2 Model
In this case study, we consider the situation of a pin-hanger (PIN) steel girder bridge that can be sub-
jected to two hazards: corrosion (COR) and fatigue (FAT). The COR hazard can be monitored visu-
ally by traditional inspection (V.I.). For the purpose of this example, we focus on the remaining FAT
life that cant be observed visually. S.H.M. strain monitoring can be used to estimate the remaining
FAT life (see Alampalli and Lund 2006). We note that both COR and FAT can result in the fail-
ure of the PIN. Specifically, FAT can cause failure in the PIN through crack initiation, which can
result in the sudden fracture of the PIN. COR will result in the rusting of the PIN, which will cause
loss in the structural cross-sectional area. This loss of area will result in an increase of internal
stresses, which will ultimately cause the failure of PIN. Ettouney and Alampalli (2012) explained
this process at length. The COR of the PIN cross section is related to the visual inspection of the
steel girder and PIN (V.I.). We use BN to represent this particular problem as shown in Figure9.12.
In order to reduce the size of the CPT of the exposure, E, we added an intermediate variable called
observation. The observation variable will be conditional on the two other observation variables:
S.H.M. and V.I. Then, it will be one of the parents of the exposure, in addition to FAT and COR
variables. We will include two consequence variables in this model, C_1 and C_2. These will rep-
resent system-related consequences and system-independent consequences, respectively. The two
MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methods
FAT COR
S.H.M. Observations V.I.
C_1 E
C_2 C
Ri
FIGURE 9.12 MH risk monitoring.
consequence variables will control a single consequence variable, C. Finally, the model risk, Ri, is
controlled by exposure and consequences, E and C. Table 9.4 shows the states of nodal variables of
this model while Table 9.9 defines the random variables of the model.
9.3.3.3 CPTs
The different CPTs of the network of Figure 9.12 are shown in Appendix 9D. We used our best
9.3.3.4 Results
The historical probabilities are shown in Figure 9.13. It is clear that the monitored bridge has some
problems. This is reflected in the damage probabilities for both hazards, COR and FAT, which show
TABLE 9.4
FAT 2 Damaged, pristine
S.H.M. 4 Service, poor, fair, good
Observations 4 Service, poor, fair, good
C_1, C_2 2 High con., low con
E 4 Service, poor, fair, good
C 3 High C, med. C., low C
Ri 3 High, med., low
76% and 69% damage probabilities, respectively. The historical results also show a high-risk prob-
ability of 60% compared with a low-risk probability of 12%. Clearly, the bridge needs attention,
especially given the computed high consequences probability at 67%.
9.3.3.5 Observations and Updating

In the MH environment of this case study and before making any mitigation decisions, the manager
has to clarify three issues:
1. Upon improving the observed state, how much would that affect the state of damage of
each of the hazards?
2. What are the relative improvements of the damages of each hazard?
3. How much the overall high-risk state will be improved?
Assuming that a mitigation project will improve the V.I. observation to Good, the BN model is
recalculated. The results are shown in Figure 9.14. The results indicate that a Good rating from V.I.
monitoring would reduce the high-risk probability to 17% while improving the low-risk probability
to 44%. In addition, both FAT and COR hazards effects will improve to pristine conditions with
probabilities of 94% and 97%, respectively.
The dramatic increases of conditions of both hazards effects would render performing an
S.H.M. monitoring effort as not necessary since they seem to be clear cut (unlike the situation in
CaseStudy9.3). Of course, an S.H.M. observation of Good, in addition to the Good V.I. observation,
might slightly improve the overall picture, as shown in Figure 9.15. However, the small improve-
ment in the additional gained information might not warrant expending the S.H.M. effort.
9.4 MH MONITORING: TIME MARCHING

9.4.1 case study 9.2: tIMe MarchIng Mh MonItorIng (type II MheM)
9.4.1.1 Overview
One of the common practices in infrastructure management is to forecast the behavior of the
infrastructure in the future for planning and budgeting purposes. It is of interest to the stakehold-
ers to use as accurate forecasting methods as possible for prudent cost expenditures. Usually,
the forecasted metric is based on visual inspection results, which is a subjective descriptor
of bridge exposure to deterioration. We argued in Case Study 8.1 that since deterioration of
MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methodsHistorical (prior) probabilities
FIGURE 9.13 Prior (historical) probabilities of a two-hazards model with two monitoring methods.
infrastructure can result from multitudes of hazards, the process can be considered as a rep-
resentative MH situation. In that case study, we used inference to assign potential sources of
deterioration (as represented by visual inspection ratings). Sometimes, for planning purposes,
the manager is interested in forecasting the future influence of individual hazards based on
current observations. Given the complex interactions between different variables, we have to
utilize the capability of the dynamic graph network (DGN) technique that is capable of model-
ing such interactions in as much resolution as the manager deems suitable. DGN modeling also
enables us not only to project potential condition ratings (as represented by visual inspection)
but also to infer future exposures to individual hazards that collectively result in deterioration.
MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methodsV.I. observations
FIGURE 9.14 Improved state of damage and risk upon visual inspection observations.
By forecasting the exposure to individual hazards, the manager is better equipped to optimize
future maintenance and rehabilitation efforts.
9.4.1.2 Model
For DGN modeling, the first step is to define the time slice, which are the discrete times at which
the probabilities of the variables need to be estimated (see Chapter 5). For this problem, we start
at a time slice of t = t 0 that represents the current time. We will forecast the behavior into two
MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methodsV.I. + S.H.M. observations
FIGURE 9.15 Improved state of damage and risk upon visual inspection and structural health monitoring
observations.
future time slices, which are separated by an equal time interval. The second component of DGN
is to identify the template, which is a graph network that governs the behavior of the variables and
their links at each time slice. For our immediate purpose, we consider the BN model of Figure
9.4 as a DGN (dynamic Bayesian network [DBN] in this case, since the template is a BN model)
template. We will use the visual inspection ratings as the interface variables, which link one
time slice to another. The overall DBN scheme is illustrated in Figure 9.16. The states of nodal
variables of the model are shown in Table 9.5 while the definitions of the variables are shown in
Table 9.9.
Time slice t = t 0
Past time: Smoothing
TMP COR WT
V.I.
Time slice t = t 1
Current time: Filtering
TMP COR WT
V.I.
Future time: Prediction (forecasting)
Time slice t = t 2
TMP COR WT
Temporal links V.I.

Observation layer
FIGURE 9.16 DBN model for MH inference of future hazards effects.
TABLE 9.5
The final component that needs development in any DBN (or CGN) project is the temporal links.
In this case, we establish a temporal link of the V.I. variable, which is essentially a transfer matrix
between time slices, defined as matrix T, such that
0.6 0 0 0

0.3 0.55 0 0
[T ] = (9.5)
0.08 0.35 0.6 0

0.02 0.1 0.4 1
Note that the proposed matrix allows for only reduced condition ratings as time marches forward.
9.4.1.3 CPTs
The different CPTs of the network of Figure 9.4, which is the same as the template of the current
model, are shown in Appendix 9B.
9.4.1.4 Results
Since the BN model of Section 9.3.1 is the same as the BN of the template of this example, the prior
(historical) probabilities of the two models should be identical; the results are shown in Figure 9.5. Let
us assume that the initial observation at time t = t0 of V.I. to be a fair rating, that is, the state vector is
0

0
{V .I .} = (9.6)
1
0
We assume that the initial V.I. observations are as in Equation 9.6. Executing the BN template model
will result in the initial inferred hazard marginal probabilities as shown in Figure 9.17. Note that the
probability of COR damage is inferred to be higher than the probability of the WT damage at 56%
compared with 49%.
Type II monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodt = 0
FIGURE 9.17 Initial marginal probabilities of Bayesian network model at t = t0.

We now apply the transition matrices to V.I. to estimate probabilities of V.I. in time slices t = t1
and t = t2. Thus,
0

0.55
{V .I .}t = t1 = (9.7)
0.35
0.1
and
0

0.3025
{V .I .}t = t2 = (9.8)
0.4025
0.295
We can apply the marginals from Equations 9.7 and 9.8 as soft evidence (observations); we can solve
the DBN problem at both time slices. The resultant marginal probabilities are shown in Figures 9.18
and 9.19 for time slices t = t1 and t = t2, respectively.
We note that the probability of damage due to WT is higher than COR in both time periods
t=t1 and t = t2. This is an important MH inference, since it will enable the decision-maker to allo-
cate mitigation budgets more accurately. The DBN modeling enabled the decision-maker to isolate
future potential damages of different hazards using current observations/evidence.
Figures 9.18 and 9.19 now show estimations of expected hazards effects in future time slices. The
asset manager can use these estimates for better planning.
9.4.1.5 Remarks
This case study explored the forecasting potential in an MH environment. We can easily use the
same technique for back projection (usually called smoothing). Say the manager is interested in
identifying the most probable hazard source of the current condition rating (as observed in a visual
inspection process). In such a situation, we might need to introduce a soft evidence to describe the
V.I. observation at t = t0 instead of the hard evidence (V.I. = Fair) we used. We leave this study to
the reader as an exercise.
FIGURE 9.18 Marginal probabilities at time slice t = t1.

FIGURE 9.19 Marginal probabilities at time slice t = t2.
9.4.2 case study 9.5: Mh eFFects on lIFe-cycle analysIs

9.4.2.1 Overview
Generally speaking, LCA methods usually consider hazards effects (costs and/or benefits) inde-
pendently, then add those effects in a serial/linear fashion. Ettouney etal. (2005) and Ettouney and
Alampalli (2012) argued that such an approach might lead to erroneous LCA results. They argued
that LCA can be affected by incorporating hazards effects during the life span of the infrastruc-
ture. They used a simple analytical model to follow the life cycle of a bridge that was subjected to
two hazards. The method they followed was simple, yet would be fairly difficult to implement for
complex systems or several hazards. So far, throughout this book, we showed that using a network
modeling can account for different types of interactions between variables in an intuitive and simple
manner; MH effects during LCA considerations are no exception. Using DBN should make it easy
to develop MH effects in LCA of complex systems. In this section, we use DBN as a vehicle to
model formally the MH effects during the life cycle of a given infrastructure.
LCA has some special features that will require changing the process of DBN we have followed
so far. The most obvious requirement of LCA is that its main metric needs to be a cumulative met-
ric as time marches. For now, we will concentrate on cost as the LCA metric. This will point out
another probable requirement: the LCA metric might also need to be absolute, for example, a mone-
tary metric. Thus, if we are to consider a DBN modeling for MH life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA), we
need to use an absolute risk metric with monetary units to represent the risk. This risk, in this case,
will need to be cumulative as time slices of DBN progress. Whether the risk in this case is computed
in current value or future value is a trivial matter since we can always convert from one to the other.
Generalizing the process from LCCA to life-cycle benefit analysis (LCBA) for MH conditions can
be approached in a similar fashion. Of course, in case of LCBA, we have to use rewards as the metric
instead of risk. Using a relative metric, whether it is cost or benefit, is also possible using similar
techniques as in absolute LCCA although the physical meaning of the results might be less obvious.
9.4.2.2 Model
One of the basic foundations of MHM/LCCA is visual inspection at regular time slices as shown in
Figure 9.20. Based on this, we explore the LCCA process in an MH environment by offering a simple
example. As usual, DBN is based on a time slice template. The nth generic time slice of the problem at
hand is shown in Figure 9.21. The system under consideration is subjected to two hazards: combined
FIGURE 9.20 An inspector observing a truss bridge for inferring life-cycle cost analysis.
effects of corrosion and fatigue, CorrFat, and an abnormal hazard, Abn. H. The objective is to compute
life-cycle cost (LCC) as represented by the absolute (monetary) risk for the system. For this example,
we consider three temporal links between nodes V.I., C_2, and a link between Rin -1 END and Rin START
as shown in Figure 9.22, which shows four time slices. This implies that we will use, for estimating the
LCC forecasts, an assumed or known transfer matrices of visual inspection, and consequences that are
independent of the structural condition of the bridge structure (such as traffic volume, detour length, or
management costs). The transfer matrices of V.I. and C_2 are, as usual, assumed to be time-independent.
However, note that we are now using three risk variables in the nth generic single time such that
1. LCC at start of nth generic time slice is Rin START .

2. LCC at end of nth generic time slice is Rin END.
3. Added risk during nth generic time slice is Rin.
All risk variables Rin START , Rin END, and Rin change as time slices change. The required LCC after
N time slices is described by the marginal probability of RiN END.
The variables of the model of Figure 9.21 have been all discussed in previous examples. However,
both risk variables, Rin START and Rin END, are now used in a different context; it is meant to be the
cumulative LCC/risk at end of time slice n; as such, it exhibits a few properties that need additional
considerations. These are the following:
The states of both Rin START and Rin END need to encompass all possible values (in this case
monetary values) of the variable in the time span of the LCA.
Since there is a temporal link between Rin -1 END and Rin START , the states of both need to be
identifiable in each time slice. For example, if Rin -1 END and Rin START are chosen so as to be
LCA of MH systemsRecurring time template
Corr-Fat Abn.H.
V.I.
C_1 E
C_2 C Ri
Ri|START Ri|END
FIGURE 9.21 Template for DBN of life-cycle analysis including MH effects.
discrete, its rank needs to be equal to N, which is the number of time slices. If N is large, this
may present difficulties during the preparation of the CPT of Rin. To avoid such difficulty,
a reasonable solution would be to define both Rin -1 END and Rin START as continuous random
variables. Methodologies for solving BN with continuous random variables are discussed in
details by Fenton and Neil (2013). In our example, we choose both Rin START and Rin END to be
discreet with a rank of 4. This will allow us to use three time slices, plus the initial conditions.
Description of the variables and their ranks and states are shown in Table 9.6. The definitions of
these variables are shown in Table 9.9.
9.4.2.2.1 Transfer Matrices
As before, the transfer matrices are used to relate the probabilities of states of pertinent variables,
{X}, from time slice n to time slice n + 1, such that
{X}t = n +1 = [T ]{X}t = n (9.9)
We use a transfer matrix for V.I. (assuming a rank of 2 for the node, as in Table 9.6) as
0.7 0
[T ] = (9.10)
0.3 1
Future time: Prediction (forecasting) Current time: Filtering Past time: Smoothing
Time slice t = t0 Time slice t = t1 Time slice t = t2
Corr-Fat Abn.H. Corr-fat Abn.H. Corr-Fat Abn.H.
V.I. V.I. V.I.
C_1 E C_1 E C_1 E

Multihazard Exposure, Risk, and Resilience Monitoring
C_2 C Ri C_2 C Ri C_2 C Ri
Ri|START Ri|END Ri|START Ri|END Ri|START Ri|END
Temporal links Observation layer
FIGURE 9.22 Three time slices of DBN model of life-cycle analysis including MH effects.
423
TABLE 9.6
Corr-Fat 2 Damaged, pristine
Abn.H. 2 H. level, L. level
V.I. 2 Damaged, pristine
E 3 H. level, M. level, L. level
C_1, C_2 2 High con., low con.
C 3 High C, med. C. low C
ri 3 High, med., low
Ri|START 4 $5.00E+07, $1.50E+07, $5.00E+06, $1.00E+06
Ri|END 4 $5.00E+07, $1.50E+07, $5.00E+06, $1.00E+06
while a transfer matrix for consequences, C_2 (assuming a rank of 2), is

0.55 0.15
[T ] = (9.11)
0.45 0.85
The transfer matrix relating LCC (risk) variables from one slice to another is also governed by
Equation 9.9. However, the expression needs to accommodate the length of the time slice and the
discount rate. It needs also to describe the degree of uncertainty, which will govern the marginal
probabilities of costs marching from one time slice to another. If there is complete certainty, the
temporal link equation would be
0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0
{Rin -1 END} = {Rin START } (9.12)
0 1 0 0

0 0 1 0
Of course, there is always uncertainty, especially when we are involved in projecting future events.
In addition, one of the advantages of using DBN is to be able to easily specify uncertainty in a
simple manner. For this problem we induce some uncertainty in the temporal link such that
0.01 0 0 0

0.85 0.10 0.05 0
{Rin -1 END} = {Rin START } (9.13)
0.14 0.80 0.15 0.05

0 0.10 0.80 0.95
9.4.2.3 CPTs
The different CPTs of the network of Figure 9.21 are shown in Appendix 9E. We used our best
9.4.2.4 Results
9.4.2.4.1 Historical (Prior) and Initial Time Slice/Period Probabilities
For this problem, we are initially interested in two sets of results: historical probability of the network
and the initial (current) probabilities. We obtain the historical (prior) probabilities by simply execut-
ing the network template using the CPTs of Appendix 9E. The results are shown in Figure9.23.
LCA of MH systemsRecurring time templatePrior/historical
FIGURE 9.23 Prior (historical) probabilities of network variables.

LCA of MH systemsInitial observations, t = t0
FIGURE 9.24 Observations and probabilities at start of initial period.

TABLE 9.7
Initial and Historical Risk, Ri|END
(
p Ri END )
State Historical Initial, t = t0
$1,000,000.00 60.00% 68.00%
$5,000,000.00 30.00% 27.00%
$15,000,000.00 8.00% 5.00%
$50,000,000.00 2.00% 0.00%
Average Ri|END $4,300,000 $2,780,000
We then execute the current (initial) state (t = t0 ) by introducing the initial consequences state
C_2=Low_Cons. We also assume that the initial condition of the system is V.I. = Pristine. The
results are shown in Figure 9.24. Note that the absolute risk Ri|END is reduced from its historical aver-
age from an average of $4,300,000 to an average of $2,780,000 as computed from Table 9.7. This is
an expected reduction due to the observation of lower C_2 than its historical values.
9.4.2.4.2 Future Time Slices/Periods

The life cycle cost LCC|i at end of period t = ti is computed by
j = N STATE
LCC i = j =1
pij Cost j (9.14)
where pj is the probability of Ri|END at state Costj at end of period t = ti. Note that the LCC|i is merely
the risk Ri|END at each time slice.
As an example, we compute the needed LCC|i by executing the DBN for three time slices. The
results are shown in Figures 9.25 through 9.27. The resulting LCC|i are shown in Table 9.8 and
illustrated in Figure 9.28.
LCA of MH systemsRecurring time templateEnd of period at t = t1
FIGURE 9.25 Observations and probabilities at end of first period.

FIGURE 9.26 Observations and probabilities at end of second period.

FIGURE 9.27 Observations and probabilities at end of third period.

TABLE 9.8
Life-Cycle Costs, LCC|i in an MH Environment
(
p Ri END )
State Historical Initial, t = t0 t = t1 t = t2 t = t3
$1,000,000.00 60.00% 68.00% 30.81% 4.68% 2.26%
$5,000,000.00 30.00% 27.00% 35.99% 17.10% 8.12%
$15,000,000.00 8.00% 5.00% 23.47% 42.13% 30.66%
$50,000,000.00 2.00% 0.00% 9.73% 36.09% 58.96%
Average Ri|END, also LCC|i $4,300,000 $2,780,000 $10,492,085 $25,265,637 $34,508,239
LCA projections
40,000,000.00
35,000,000.00
30,000,000.00
25,000,000.00
LCA ($)
20,000,000.00
15,000,000.00
10,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
$-
t0 t1 t2 t3
Time slice
FIGURE 9.28 Life-cycle analysis chart.

APPENDIX 9A DEFINITIONS OF NETWORK NODAL VARIABLES
TABLE 9.9
Definitions of Nodal Variables
Used in Case
Variable Study Number Definition
Abn.H. 9.5 Subjective estimate of an abnormal hazard that might affect the system. An abnormal
hazard can be earthquake, flood, high wind, or bomb blast.
C 9.4, 9.5 Measure of consequences of exposure level as well as different social and economic
factors. In this example, consequences are estimated subjectively. Obviously,
consequences are higher when the exposure of the system is higher. Similarly,
different social and economic factors can affect levels of consequences.
C_1, C_2 9.4, 9.5 C_i is the total consequences due to the ith hazard. Since exposures to hazards are
different, so it is reasonable to assume that consequences to each hazard are also
different.
COR 9.19.4 Probability of level of corrosion-related loss of area for the type and age of bridges.
Corr-Fat 9.5 This variable estimates the deterioration of the system (or component) resulting from
both corrosion and fatigue.
E 9.4, 9.5 Estimate of the exposure of the system.
FAT 9.4 Probability of fatigue crack severity level for the type and age of structures.
NDT 9.3 Estimate of what an NDT monitoring would reveal in regard to the systems health.
Observations 9.4 Combined estimate of observations of two monitoring methods: visual inspection
(V.I.) and structural health monitoring (S.H.M.).
Ri 9.4 In this example, Risk, Ri, is a function of consequences and exposure.
Ri|END 9.5 Absolute risk estimate at the end of the time slice.
Ri|START 9.5 Absolute risk estimate at the start of the time slice.
S.H.M. 9.3, 9.4 Estimate of what an S.H.M. monitoring would reveal in regard to the systems health.
TMP 9.19.3 Probability of deterioration due to temperature effects for the type and age of
structure.
V.I. 9.19.5 Probability of particular condition rating.
WT 9.19.3 Probability of degradation due to normal wear and tear effects for that type and age
of bridges
ri 9.5 Estimate of change in risk within the time slice.
APPENDIX 9B CPTs FOR CASE STUDIES 9.1 AND 9.2
TABLE 9.10
CPT of COR
Pristine 0.2918
COR
Damaged 0.7082
Histograms for conditional

probabilities
TABLE 9.11
CPT of TMP
Low 0.0921
TMP Medium 0.5527
High 0.3553

probabilities
434
TABLE 9.12
CPT of V.I.
WT Pristine Damaged
COR Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged
TMP Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Good 0.5935 0.4207 0.2089 0.3585 0.2342 0.1392 0.1709 0.0774 0.0042 0.0397 0.0014 0.0000
Fair 0.3815 0.4861 0.4763 0.4717 0.4068 0.3058 0.3291 0.2816 0.1203 0.2751 0.0920 0.0014
V.I.
Poor 0.0249 0.0908 0.2751 0.1570 0.2816 0.3486 0.3291 0.4068 0.5160 0.4763 0.5519 0.3143
Service 0.0001 0.0025 0.0397 0.0129 0.0774 0.2064 0.1709 0.2342 0.3595 0.2089 0.3548 0.6843

probabilities
Multihazard Considerations in Civil Infrastructure
TABLE 9.13
CPT of WT
Pristine 0.2372
WT
Damaged 0.7628

probabilities
APPENDIX 9C CPTs FOR CASE STUDY 9.3
TABLE 9.14
CPT of COR
Pristine 0.5625
COR
Damaged 0.4375

probabilities
TABLE 9.15
CPT of NDT
WT Pristine Damaged
Pristine 0.8127 0.5550 0.4147 0.2918
NDT
Damaged 0.1873 0.4450 0.5853 0.7082

probabilities
TABLE 9.16
CPT of S.H.M.
COR Pristine Damaged
TMP Low Medium High Low Medium High
Pristine 0.9206 0.7628 0.6087 0.3913 0.2372 0.0794
S.H.M.
Damaged 0.0794 0.2372 0.3913 0.6087 0.7628 0.9206

probabilities
TABLE 9.17
CPT of TMP
Low 0.3621
TMP Medium 0.4525
High 0.1854

probabilities
TABLE 9.18
CPT of V.I.
WT Pristine Damaged
TMP Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Pristine 0.9671 0.8547 0.7082 0.6087 0.3148 0.1873 0.6601 0.4450 0.2918 0.2372 0.0794 0.0051
V.I.
Damaged 0.0329 0.1453 0.2918 0.3913 0.6852 0.8127 0.3399 0.5550 0.7082 0.7628 0.9206 0.9949

probabilities
437
TABLE 9.19
CPT of WT
Pristine 0.5910
WT
Damaged 0.4090

probabilities
APPENDIX 9D CPTs FOR CASE STUDY 9.4
TABLE 9.20
CPT of C
C_2 Low Con. High Con.
C_1 Low Con. High Con. Low Con. High Con.
Low C 0.9067 0.3553 0.0921 0.0000
C Med. C 0.0933 0.5527 0.5527 0.0933
High C 0.0000 0.0921 0.3553 0.9067

probabilities
TABLE 9.21
CPT of C_1
E Good Fair Poor Service
Low Con. 0.9750 0.6087 0.2948 0.0051
C_1
High Con. 0.0250 0.3913 0.7052 0.9949

probabilities
TABLE 9.22
CPT of C_2
Low Con. 0.1698
C_2
High Con. 0.8302

probabilities
TABLE 9.23
CPT of COR
Pristine 0.2372
COR
Damaged 0.7628

probabilities
440
TABLE 9.24
CPT of E
Observations Good Fair Poor Service
COR Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged
FAT Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged
Good 0.6723 0.4989 0.3521 0.2453 0.3309 0.2342 0.2089 0.0266 0.2064 0.0774 0.0397 0.0003 0.0258 0.0035 0.0168 0.0000
Fair 0.2949 0.3957 0.4362 0.3634 0.3772 0.4068 0.4763 0.1851 0.3486 0.2816 0.2751 0.0624 0.2670 0.0759 0.1285 0.0000
E
Poor 0.0321 0.0979 0.1851 0.2796 0.2233 0.2816 0.2751 0.4362 0.3058 0.4068 0.4763 0.5940 0.5154 0.3976 0.3882 0.0794
Service 0.0008 0.0074 0.0266 0.1116 0.0685 0.0774 0.0397 0.3521 0.1392 0.2342 0.2089 0.3434 0.1918 0.5231 0.4666 0.9206

probabilities
TABLE 9.25
CPT of FAT
Pristine 0.3148
FAT
Damaged 0.6852

probabilities
442
TABLE 9.26
CPT of Observations
V.I. Good Fair Poor Service
S.H.M. Good Fair Poor Service Good Fair Poor Service Good Fair Poor Service Good Fair Poor Service
Good 0.9206 0.4749 0.2799 0.2342 0.3585 0.2041 0.1207 0.1116 0.1116 0.0289 0.0042 0.0002 0.0397 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000
Observations
Fair 0.0794 0.4749 0.4845 0.4068 0.4717 0.4229 0.3149 0.2796 0.2796 0.2369 0.1203 0.0383 0.2751 0.1334 0.0112 0.0000
Poor 0.0000 0.0497 0.2125 0.2816 0.1570 0.3002 0.3694 0.3634 0.3634 0.4839 0.5160 0.4807 0.4763 0.5001 0.3622 0.0794
Service 0.0000 0.0005 0.0231 0.0774 0.0129 0.0727 0.1950 0.2453 0.2453 0.2504 0.3595 0.4807 0.2089 0.3600 0.6266 0.9206

probabilities
TABLE 9.27
CPT of Ri
C Low C Med. C High C
E Good Fair Poor Service Good Fair Poor Service Good Fair Poor Service
Low 0.9017 0.5842 0.4026 0.3060 0.5879 0.2851 0.1138 0.0553 0.5359 0.3600 0.0161 0.0001
Ri Med 0.0981 0.3758 0.4765 0.4896 0.3863 0.5545 0.5262 0.3829 0.4005 0.5262 0.4232 0.0800
High 0.0002 0.0400 0.1209 0.2043 0.0258 0.1604 0.3600 0.5618 0.0636 0.1138 0.5607 0.9199

probabilities
443
TABLE 9.28
CPT of S.H.M.
FAT Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged
Good 0.3063 0.0039 0.0018 0.0000
Fair 0.2939 0.1564 0.0743 0.0000
S.H.M.
Poor 0.2377 0.5947 0.4620 0.0551
Service 0.1620 0.2451 0.4620 0.9449

probabilities
TABLE 9.29
CPT of V.I.
FAT Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged
Good 0.7176 0.0231 0.0068 0.0000
Fair 0.2814 0.2125 0.1112 0.0005
V.I.
Poor 0.0010 0.4845 0.4410 0.1319
Service 0.0000 0.2799 0.4410 0.8676

probabilities
APPENDIX 9E CPTs FOR CASE STUDY 9.5
TABLE 9.30
CPT of Abn.H
L. Level 0.6000
Abn.H.
H. Level 0.4000

probabilities
TABLE 9.31
CPT of C
C_2 Low Con. High Con.
C_1 Low Con. High Con. Low Con. High Con.
Low C 0.9067 0.3553 0.0921 0.0000
C Med. C 0.0933 0.5527 0.5527 0.0933
High C 0.0000 0.0921 0.3553 0.9067

probabilities
TABLE 9.32
CPT of C_1
E L. Level M. Level H. Level
Low con. 0.7082 0.4319 0.2082
C_1
High con. 0.2918 0.5681 0.7918

probabilities
TABLE 9.33
CPT of C_2
Low Con. 0.3148
C_2
High Con. 0.6852

probabilities
TABLE 9.34
CPT of Corr-Fat
Pristine 0.5500
Corr-Fat
Damaged 0.4500

probabilities
TABLE 9.35
CPT of Ri
C Low C Med. C High C
E L. Level M. Level H. Level L. Level M. Level H. Level L. Level M. Level H. Level
Low 0.7677 0.4562 0.3621 0.4562 0.1986 0.1071 0.4024 0.1071 0.0063
Ri Med. 0.2260 0.4493 0.4525 0.4493 0.6028 0.4635 0.4399 0.4635 0.2260
High 0.0063 0.0945 0.1854 0.0945 0.1986 0.4293 0.1576 0.4293 0.7677

probabilities
447
448
TABLE 9.36
CPT of E
V.I. Pristine Damaged
Abn. H. L. Level H. Level L. Level H. Level
Corr-Fat Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged Pristine Damaged
L. Level 0.8240 0.0355 0.0029 0.0001 0.7942 0.0116 0.0010 0.0000
E M. Level 0.1726 0.4292 0.3009 0.0800 0.2048 0.2885 0.2048 0.0117
H. Level 0.0033 0.5353 0.6962 0.9199 0.0010 0.6999 0.7942 0.9883

probabilities
TABLE 9.37
CPT of Ri|END
Ri Low Med High
Ri|START _1.00E+06 _5.00E+06 _1.50E+07 _5.00E+07 _1.00E+06 _5.00E+06 _1.50E+07 _5.00E+07 _1.00E+06 _5.00E+06 _1.50E+07 _5.00E+07
_1.00E+06 0.7878 0.4620 0.0039 0.0297 0.6723 0.3761 0.0231 0.0017 0.4218 0.2870 0.0129 0.0000
_5.00E+06 0.2071 0.4620 0.1564 0.1435 0.2949 0.3761 0.2125 0.0501 0.3700 0.3731 0.1570 0.0002
Ri|END
_1.50E+07 0.0051 0.0743 0.5947 0.3595 0.0321 0.1953 0.4845 0.3472 0.1685 0.2518 0.4717 0.1698
_5.00E+07 0.0000 0.0018 0.2451 0.4673 0.0008 0.0525 0.2799 0.6011 0.0397 0.0881 0.3585 0.8300

probabilities
449
TABLE 9.38
CPT of Ri|START
_1.00E+06 0.9999
_5.00E+06 0.0001
Ri|START
_1.50E+07 0.0001
_5.00E+07 0.0001

probabilities
TABLE 9.39
CPT of V.I.
Corr-Fat Pristine Damaged
Pristine 0.9998 0.3148
V.I.
Damaged 0.0002 0.6852

probabilities
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9 Multihazard Exposure, Risk,

and Resilience Monitoring

9.1.2 thIs chapter

Snap shot (current states)

Single monitoring Multiple monitoring

Time marching (DGN):

Case study provided

FIGURE 9.1 Contents of this chapter: temporal categorizations of MH monitoring.

9.2 TYPES OF MH MONITORING

9.2.2 categorIzIng oF MhM accordIng to ManageMent MetrIcs

Only one of the Use combination of

Monitoring methods are

Type I Type II Type III

FIGURE 9.2 Types of multihazard monitoring and their objectives.

9.2.2.1 Exposure MHM

E = f (Hazard, Vulnerability) (9.1)

9.2.2.2 Risk MHM

where C is a measure of consequences.

Flood Seismic Other Live load Corrosion Other

Visual NDT/S.H.M. Consequence monitoring

Structural Health Management

Temporal monitoring activity

Exposure as a function of time: Risk as a function of time: Type II MH monitoring

Exposure monitoring Risk monitoring Risk/exposure

FIGURE 9.3 Schematics of risk and exposure monitoring (MHRM/MHEM).

9.2.2.3 Resilience MHM

Re = Re(R1, R2, R3, R 4) (9.4)

9.2.3 tIMe categorIzatIons oF MhM

9.3 MH MONITORING: SNAPSHOTS IN TIME

BN model for MH monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring method

FIGURE 9.4 MH monitoring.

9.3.1.4.1 Hard and Soft Evidences/Observations

BN model for S.H.M. monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodPrior

FIGURE 9.5 Prior (historical) probabilities of the Bayesian network variables.

BN model for MH monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodPoor V.I. observation

Type II monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodSoft V.I. observation

FIGURE 9.7 Soft evidence results.

9.3.2 case study 9.3: Mh MonItorIng usIng dIFFerent MonItorIng technIques

MH monitoringThree hazardsThree monitoring methods

S.H.M. V.I. NDT

FIGURE 9.8 MH monitoring using several monitoring methods.

MH monitoringThree hazardsThree monitoring methods

Type III monitoringThree hazardsThree monitoring methods

MH monitoringThree hazardsThree monitoring methods

9.3.3 case study 9.4: Mh rIsk MonItorIng

MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methods

S.H.M. Observations V.I.

FIGURE 9.12 MH risk monitoring.

9.3.3.5 Observations and Updating

9.4 MH MONITORING: TIME MARCHING

MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methodsHistorical (prior) probabilities

MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methodsV.I. observations

MH risk and inference monitoringTwo hazardsTwo monitoring methodsV.I. + S.H.M. observations

Temporal links V.I.

FIGURE 9.16 DBN model for MH inference of future hazards effects.

Type II monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodt = 0

FIGURE 9.17 Initial marginal probabilities of Bayesian network model at t = t0.

Type II monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodt = 1

FIGURE 9.18 Marginal probabilities at time slice t = t1.

Type II monitoringThree hazardsSingle monitoring methodt = 2

FIGURE 9.19 Marginal probabilities at time slice t = t2.

9.4.2 case study 9.5: Mh eFFects on lIFe-cycle analysIs

1. LCC at start of nth generic time slice is Rin START .

LCA of MH systemsRecurring time template