Role of external factors in Indo-Pak relations Jamshed Khan Third party’s involvement

has always played an important role in relations between India and Pakistan from the
very beginning. The international security system Uni-polar, Bipolar, Multi-polar, create
security or insecurity for particular countries. Often there are attempts made by the great
powers to maintain asymmetries in the distribution of military and economic power and
to create technological and legal condominiums to enshrine the rights of great powers.
This has been amply manifested in US’s dual containment policy in respect of Pakistan
and India. External factors have beenreally affecting the India-Pakistan relations since
their independence. The South Asian subcontinent has been the sight of fierce historical
competition during the last half century. There have been some political developments of
serious international concern since 1950. Indo-Pak hostility became encompassed into the
larger cold war confrontation, when Pakistan facing the security dilemma, joined the US-
sponsored military pacts i.e. South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1950. India had already tilted towards the Soviet Union
because, her policy of non-Alignment fitted in the Soviet objective of checking the
growing power of the US military alliances. These alliances have a direct impact on the
Indo-Pak ties. The most important phase so far started after the 9/11 attack on the US
soil, after which the US policy makers realized the importance of South Asia once again
in their “global war on terror (GWT). Now the US administration focused its attention on
South Asia, with a key objective to find partners in their war on terrorism. US-India
strategic relationship particularly in nuclear field as a cause of concern for the regional
security. Pakistan needs to gauge and closely monitor the US objectives in this backdrop.
The US-Indian deal, through strengthening India, could further impose Indian hegemony
in South Asia. So far, Pakistan had tried to play the role of a balancer in South Asia. This
role to some extent did dilute Indian hegemony in the South Asian region. Unless the US
took into account the military, political, economic and societal nature of the region, its
strategic partnership with India could aggravate the smaller countries’ concerns vis-à-vis
the hegemonic power - India. This would imply that if it was based on Indian security
interests alone, the partnership would give a free hand to India vis-à-vis the smaller South
Asian states. Pakistan was afraid that the US-Indian partnership could disturb Pakistan’s
strategic relationship with India which would, in turn, impact on Pakistan’s role of a
balancer in South Asia. Any further increase in the strategic gap in conventional forces
between India and Pakistan therefore would disturb the balance of power in South Asia in
India’s favour. In the Pakistan-India context, for the first time external powers have
directly impacted the security dynamics between these two states, on a number of counts.
In a contradictory move, the US is upsetting the stability of the nuclear deterrence in
South Asia by committing to supplying India with Missile defense system and other state
of the art weapons technology – all of which directly undermines Pakistan’s stated policy
of minimum nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. That is why Pakistan has expressed
concerns over the Phlcon sale to India since this directly destabilizes the strategic nuclear
balance in South Asia. The US-India relationships directly impinge on the US-Pakistan
relationship because of the defence aspects whereby the transfer of certain weapons
system to India impacts on the security threat perceptions of Pakistan. With the prospects
of the transfer of the Arrow system to India, clearly the deterrence will move to higher
level of armaments being held by both sides. Pakistan and other nations of South Asia are
much more open to external influence, partly because they are smaller but also they look
at the external world as a counterweight to the overwhelming presence of India. Pakistan
is naturally inclined to resist India political dominance, by diplomacy when possible but
by force if necessary. The stage is thus set for continued rivalry between the two states.
Even though China geographically is not considered to be the part of South Asia, Beijing
is an important factor in security calculations of South Asia. The uncertain triangular
between India-Pakistan-china is also contributing to the tensions between India and
Pakistan. The legacy of distrust and conflict, the unresolved border issues, and the
plurality of perceptions and options considered by decision-makers in each country added
to the tension and complexity of the region. The tension between India and Pakistan
highlighted the long shadows that Asia’s rising power, China, cost on the Indian
subcontinent. Though the roots of India-Pakistan animosity are deep-seated in religion,
history, and the politics of revenge--and thus predate India-China hostility--- China’s
strategists recognized the enduring nature of the India- Pakistan enmity and exploit it to
Beijing’s advantage. In fact, Beijing has long been the most important player in the India-
Pakistan-China triangular relationship. Since the Indo-China border war of 1962, China
has aligned itself with Pakistan and made heavy strategic and economic investments in
that country to keep the common enemy, India under strategic pressure. In the triangular
power balance game, the South Asian military balance of power is neither pro-India nor
pro-Pakistan; it has always been pro-China. And Beijing will take all means possible,
including war, to ensure that the regional power balance does not tilt in India’s favour.
Even in the absence of war, Pakistan hopes to continue to reap significant military and
economic payoffs not only from the intensifying Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry in
Southern Asia but also from what many believes is the coming show down between
China and the United States, which will further increase the significance of China’s
strategic ties with Pakistan. Has the South Asian security framework benefited from these
external interventions? At one level, yes. The active interest of the international
community in pushing for peace in South Asia has had a positive impact on the major
South Asian players. However, the military relationship between the US and India has
added a new dimension to Pakistan’s security equation –thereby aggravating its security
perceptions. Taking some of the central factors of the Indo-US defence agreement one by
one, fallout for Pakistan can be assessed more clearly. The most important, both in the
short term and long term, is the Indo-US agreement to cooperate on missile defence
(MD). Acquisition of missile defence capability by India directly destabilizes the nuclear
deterrence in South Asia as well as undermining Pakistan’s doctrine of minimum
deterrence and nuclear restrain. To sustain a credible deterrence Pakistan will have to
begin multiplying its missiles and warheads very soon –as well as deploying its nuclear
arsenal in a scattered fashion into the interior of the country. Along with the role of great
powers in the South Asian region, there are some other potent powers elements that are
really disturbing the peace between India and Pakistan. There are some groups and
organizations who do not want the normalcy and peaceful relations between the two
countries. Through different terrorist activities in both countries they generate the
tensions, distrust and misperceptions on both sides. The terrorist attack on Indian
parliament by militants in December 2001 really reflects such a situation. India, after the
attack blamed Pakistan for it and vowed to retaliate. Despite Pakistan’s categorical
condemnation of the attack, it mobilized all of its forces (land, marine and air) and
deployed them on the Pakistani border. Indian strike corps, armoured divisions, brigades
and entire artillery were moved for major offensives against Pakistan. The belligerent
posture including the withdrawal of its high commissioner from Islamabad was adopted
by India. All means of contact and communication like air, rail and road services between
the two countries were also severed. Pakistan with some reservation, responded in the
same way. The deployment of one million troops by both sides to their shared borders
heightened the tension in the region. The terrorist attacks on Indian railways in August
2006, and Mumbai attacks have again damaged the pace of peace process between the
two countries. Pakistan was ready to extend help to catch the culprits but India rebuke
Pakistani offers and instead began a series of allegations against Pakistan accusing her of
not doing enough against terrorist organizations based in Pakistan. The point is, the India-
Pakistan adversarial relationship with its undercurrents of mutual suspicion and bristling
with countless animosities bordering on hostility, is so delicately poised that at any given
moment it does not need more than a few hours to degenerate into a conflict situation on
account of a misstep or two on either side, even when it is camouflaged in veneers of
cordiality as it has been during the past three to four years. nashadwajid@gmail.com