PEOPLE VS.

JOSON
46 Phil. 380, October 7, 1924
G.R. No. L-22366

Facts:
Eustaquio Joson, et. al. distributed and posted in different public places within the
municipalities of Virac and Bato several posters and bills reading as follows: "Seores Electores:
Guiromdoma nindo an magna casaquitan na tinitios ta. Barato an bandala huli que Vera: mahal an
bagas huli qui Pedro Martinez," which in English means: (Voters, bear in mind our sufferings,
hemp is cheap, due to Vera, and rice is dear, due to Martinez), and is calculated to belittle and
defeat Jose O. Vera, Provincial Governor and candidate for re-election, and Pedro Martinez,
Representative for the Second District and also candidate of re-election.
On April 28,1983 an "order of arrest" was issued, signed by Judge Rosauro. On the same
date (April 28, 1923), and without having been actually arrested under said order of arrest, all of
the defendants appeared in court and gave "bail bonds" for their liberty, which bonds were duly
approved by the Honorable M. Rosauro.

Accused:
The defendants appeared and presented a motion to dismiss the action based on the
following grounds: That in view of the facts and irregularities above set forth, the filing of the
aforesaid information does not constitute the commencement of any valid or legal criminal action,
nor interrupt the period for the prescription of the offense with which the accused are charged, and
said offense has in fact prescribed.

Resolution:
Section 71 of Act No. 3030 (the Election Law) provides that "Offenses resulting from
violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission." The complaint charges that
the crime with which the defendants were charged was committed from the 1st to the 6th day of
June, 1922. The complaint was presented on the 28th day of April, 1923. The complaint was
presented, therefore, within the year following the commission of the crime. If the presentation of
a complaint has the effect of interrupting the period of prescription, then the present action was
not barred at the time the complaint was presented.
The lower court argued, however, that inasmuch as the defendants had not been arrested,
that the action had not been prosecuted within the period prescribed by the law and that the action
was barred. No rule of law relating to the prescription of actions is better settled than that the
commencement of an action interrupts the running of the prescriptive period. The record contains
no explanation why the prosecution of the present case was delayed from the 28th of April, 1923,
to the 20th of March, 1924. Such delay should not be permitted.
In view of all of the foregoing, our conclusions are: That the presentation of the complaint
within the year of prescription interrupted the running of the prescriptive period and the action was
not barred by prescription; that the lower court committed the errors complained of by the
Attorney-General; that the cause was improperly dismissed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the record should be returned to the court whence it came, with direction that the prosecution
proceeds as speedily as possible.