CERTIORARI
1. Balba v Peak Development Inc GR 148288 (August 12, 2005)
D: P filed an illegal dismissal case against R. Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. NLRC
reversed and said that there was illegal dismissal. R filed a pet cert 65 with the CA. CA denied
but on MR reversed itself, and dismissed complaint. Petitioner Balba appealed to the SC,
alleging that the CA should not have delved into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of
grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
I: May CA may delve into factual issue in order to resolve allegations of grave abuse of
discretion?
H: Yes. The conflicting views of the LA and the NLRC on the factual issues or the insufficiency
of the evidence supporting the respective allegations of the parties, warranted the review thereof
by the CA, at the very least to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. HOWEVER! The Court still agreed with petitioner that the CA
erred in concluding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. It considered the first
decision of the CA as in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Additional Facts: This stems from an illegal dismissal case filed by Rosemarie G. Balba against
Peak Development Inc. She was considered a managerial employee. The following are
respondents reasons for terminating Balba:
1. Failure to promptly implement and/or comment on the recommendation of the internal
auditor despite clear instruction x x x;
2. Failure to promptly produce appropriate studies required by management (E-VAT study);
3. Implementation of clearly insufficient basic office procedure;
4. Failure to follow general office policies and procedures.
After sending her a letter to explain her side of the allegations above, Peak considered Balbas
explanations unsatisfactory and proceeded to terminate her. She then filed a case for illegal
dismissal, etc. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed, finding that there
was illegal dismissal and ordering separation pay instead of reinstatement. Peak filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. Initially, CA dismissed the petition:
First of all, it must be stressed that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public respondents evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings thereon.
Secondly, in certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their determination,
the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not said public respondent had acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Travelaire and Tours Corp. vs.
NLRC, 294 SCRA 505), and when the ground invoked in a civil action for certiorari is abuse of
discretion, the abuse must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
In the case at bench, apart from the bare allegation of petitioner, there is nothing in the records
of the case, much less the challenged decision and order which would indicate that indeed
public respondent NLRC committed any grave abuse of discretion.
However, on MR, it reversed itself and granted the petition, reinstating the LAs decision. Balba
appealed to the SC, alleging that the
CA should not have delved into factual issues in order to resolve allegations of grave abuse of
discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
2. New Frontier Sugar Corp v RTC of Iloilo GR 165001 (January 31, 2007)
D: petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. The RTC issued an Omnibus Order dated January
13, 2003, a final order since it terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case before the
trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal
from the Omnibus Order.
F: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA which dismissed
the special civil action for certiorari and affirmed the dismissal orders issued by the RTC who
acted as a special commercial court.
New Frontier Sugar Corp (petitioner) is engaged in the business of raw sugar milling.
Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell due,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation.
RTC issued a Stay Order
Equitable PCI Bank (respondent bank) filed a comment alleging that petitioner is not
qualified for corporate rehabilitation.
RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing the case.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which CA denied.
CA sustained the findings of the RTC that since petitioner no longer has
sufficient assets and properties to continue with its operations and answer
its corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation.
CA also ruled that even if RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same
cannot be corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA
was a special civil action under Rule 65 instead of an ordinary appeal
I: W/N CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it as improper, appeal being
an available remedy?
H: NO.The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It
is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order
of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than
sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
The Omnibus Order dated January 13, 2003 issued by the RTC is a final order since it
terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case before the trial court; it leaves nothing more
to be done. As such, petitioners recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order.
In this regard, A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC promulgated by the Court on September 4, 2001 provides
that a petition for rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding given that it seeks to establish
the status of a party or a particular fact. Accordingly, the period of appeal provided in paragraph
19 (b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 for
special proceedings shall apply. Under said paragraph 19 (b), the period of appeal shall be thirty
(30) days, a record of appeal being required.
However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on September 14, 2004,
clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation and intra-
corporate controversies. It is provided therein that all decisions and final orders in cases falling
under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealed to the
CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC.
In any event, as previously stated, since what petitioner filed was a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules, the CA rightly dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Orders.
3. Camutin v Sps Potente GR 181642 (January 29, 2009)
D: In the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the Municipl Trial Courts
(MTCs) Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy since sustaining the MTCs orders that the
proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely suspended and archived subject to its revival
upon resolution of the civil case OF PARTITION filed with the RTC would unnecessarily and
unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules objective of speedy
disposition of cases.
F: In a Petition for Review, petitioners assail the order of the RTC dismissing the special civil
case before them.
Petitioners were the registered owners of parcels of land in Cavite. They reside
abroad and discovered, upon coming back to the Phils, that the house and
warehouse of respondents were erected on their lots
Respondents agreed to pay petitioners monthly rentals and and they agreed that the
should the properties be sold, respondents would have the right of first refusal, and
should respondents be unable to purchase the properties, they would peacefully
vacate the premises.
Respondents failed to pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able to purchase the
lots. Consequently, petitioners sold a portion of the lots to a third party who had it
fenced
The buyer filed a complaint for partition before RTC.
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents before the
MTC
MTC issued an order/writ of execution where it noted the pendency of the
civil case before the RTC and the existence of an amicable settlement to
await first the resolution of the RTC on the said pending civil case.
MTC ordered that the proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely
suspended and archived subject to its revival upon resolution of the civil
case.
MTC also denied petitioners MR.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 w/ the RTC.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the petition for certiorari is a
prohibited pleading.
I: W/N the petition for certiorari should prosper?
H: The petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is
not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or
ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the
MTC's Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On the
contrary, sustaining the MTC's orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the
unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules' objective of speedy disposition of
cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only
ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case was not resolved
on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus,
the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on
the ground that it is a prohibited pleading.
However, the MTC's revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof
on the grounds aforestated have rendered the resolution of the present Petition for Review
superfluous and unnecessary. In their Petition for Review, petitioners seek the nullification of the
RTC's orders and the subsequent recall of the MTC's orders suspending the proceedings in the
unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of the unlawful detainer case has
apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus no more need for the Court
to decide the present petition on the merits.
4. Bugarin v Palisoc GR 157985 (December 2, 2005)
D: Ejectment case. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the
latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.
o A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to
a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.
The defendant (Bugarin) may stay it only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (3) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the
appeal.
Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory, without prejudice
to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin received on March 12, 2003 the
RTC decision denying their MR. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before
the CA. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003.
FACTS:
o A complaint for ejectment was filed before the MeTC by Palisoc et al. (Palisoc)
against Bugarin et al. (Bugarin).
o The MeTC declared Palisoc as the rightful possessors and ordered Bugarin to vacate
the premises and pay Palisoc et al. the rentals.
o Bugarin appealed to the RTC while Palisoc moved for execution pending appeal.
o The RTC denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC decision. Bugarin filed an MR
with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. The RTC denied the MR and
granted Palisocs motion for execution for failure of Bugarin to post a supersedeas
bond or to pay the back rentals. This decision was received by Bugarin on March 12,
2003. A writ of execution pending appeal was issued.
Bugarin filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution. Palisoc filed a Motion to
Issue a Special Order of Demolition since Bugarin refused to vacate the premises. The RTC
deferred action on the motions to allow Bugarin to exhaust legal remedies available to them.
Bugarin filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer Implementation of Writ of Execution and
Opposition to Motion to Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of RA
7279[1] was not complied with.
Palisoc filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition. The
RTC declared the decision denying Bugarins appeal final and executory, and remanded
the records of the case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Bugarin filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA on April 10, 2003. Bugarin contended that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the MeTC
had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
The MeTC eventually issued the Special Order of Demolition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC properly ordered the demolition.
Bugarins position:
(1) The MeTCs orders violated the mandatory requirements of RA 7279 since there was no 30-
day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been no consultation on the
matter of resettlement.
(2) There was neither relocation nor financial assistance given.
(3) The orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law.

Palisocs position:
(1) RA 7279 is not applicable. There was no proof that Bugarin et al. are registered as eligible
socialized housing program beneficiaries.
(2) Even if RA 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law had already been
complied with. Bugarin were already notified on March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition,
when the writ of execution was served.
HELD: YES, the MeTC orders were properly issued.
A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful
possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial. The defendant
(Bugarin) may stay it only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a supersedeas bond; and (3)
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy
of the property during the pendency of the appeal.
Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory, without prejudice
to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin received on March 12, 2003 the
RTC decision denying their MR. They had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before
the CA. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003.
DOCTRINE! The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the
instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the
judgment is: (1) its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the exercise of power in
excess thereof; (3) or GADLEJ. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the certiorari is that there should be no
appeal.
Bugarins petition for certiorari before the CA was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition
for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory.
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the MeTC. The MeTC cannot be faulted
for issuing the order to enforce the RTC judgment. The orders also did not violate RA 7279.
Under the said law, eviction or demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for eviction
and demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is shown on record that Bugarin et al.
are underprivileged and homeless citizens as defined in RA 7279. The procedure for the
execution of the eviction or demolition order under RA 7279 is not applicable.
Lastly, the order of demolition had already been executed. Bugarin had already vacated the area
and Palisoc now possess the properties free from all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs
turn-over of possession. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and
academic.
5. Lalicon v Vergara 276 S 518
D: Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied.The
unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the
fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his
motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently
defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a
plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in
his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an
information is denied.
FACTS:
Lalican was charged for the illegal possession of lumber.
He argues that the law only contemplates illegal possession of timber, and not of
lumber, in accordance with Sec. 68 PD 705. He moves for the quashal of Information
since it was a nonexistent crime, or that it did not constitute an offense.
Lower court ruled in favor of Lalican and ordered the quashal of the Information. The
prosecution filed an MR.
Pending the resolution of the MR, the presiding judge inhibited himself from taking
cognizance of the case. When the case was assigned to another branch, the new
judge set aside the quashal Order.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition arguing that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside
the quashal Order.
ISSUE (in relation to the topic): Whether the lower court committed GAD
HELD: No
RATIO: There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case. Certiorari may be issued only where it
is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of power.
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over the
case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of
law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and
conclusions.
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. The
recourse is to proceed to trial, and in case of conviction, appeal. The denial of a motion to quash
is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. AN interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only
when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
6. Sps Nische v Equitable-PCI Bank GR 167434 (February 19, 2007)
D: GR: Before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioner is mandated to file of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order, and the
subsequent denial of the court a quo;
XPNs:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
Here, Order of the trial court granting petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction and thus a
nullity. If the trial court issues a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of proof of a
legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the writ is a nullity.
F:
Bank as creditor-mortgagee filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of 2 real estate
mortgage contracts executed by Sps. Nisce.
Sheriff set the sale at public auction on Jan. 14 or on Jan. 30 in case the former date
set did not push through
Sps. Nisce filed a complaint for nullity of suretyship agreement. They pointed out that
the petition for foreclosure filed by the bank included the alleged obligation of
 Natividad (the wife) as surety for a loan of Vista Norte Trading Corp., a company
owned by their son.
They alleged that since they were creditors and debtors to each other there should be
an offset by legal compensation.
Sps. Nisce filed a petition for a writ of preliminary and prohibitory injunction.
RTC granted spouses plea for a writ of preliminary injunction to solve first the issue of
setting off.
Bank, instead of filing an MR, assailed the RTC decision via petition for certiorari (Rule
65)
I: W/N RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it assailed the order? Yes
W/N filing of MR is condition sine qua non to the filing of certiorari under Rule 65?
GR: Yes. BUT in this case, No.
H: The Petition in the Court of Appeals Not Premature
The general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
the petitioner is mandated to comply with a condition precedent: the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order, and the subsequent denial of the court a quo. It must be
stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last
resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and
factual issues. However, the rule is subject to the following recognized exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or public interest is
involved.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/167434.htm - _ftn56
As will be shown later, Order of the trial court granting petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
and thus a nullity. If the trial court issues a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of
proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the writ is a nullity.
7. Advocates for Truth in Lending Inc & Olaguer v BSP GR 192986 (Jan. 15, 2013)
D: The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions. It does not perform
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in
the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case.
Facts:
Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the
public, filed directly with the Supreme Court this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by
virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, has no authority to continue enforcing Central
Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the CB-MB in 1982, which "suspended" Act No.
2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.
AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono
concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It was incorporated on July 9,
2010, and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and president,
Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.
To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts and going directly to this Court to
secure a writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the transcendental importance of
their Petition can readily be seen in the issues raised therein, to wit:
a) Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB had the
statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of
interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods
or credit beyond the limits prescribed in the Usury Law;
b) If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB
Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended
Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates;
c) Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce
CB Circular No. 905.
Issue: Is Certiorari proper?
Held: No. The petition must fail.
The Petition is procedurally infirm. The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for
certiorari, as well as to grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.
A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same
must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not
be brushed aside as mere technicality.
As provided in Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.17 Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using
discretion of a judicial nature.18The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive
functions with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit
institutions, and branches and agencies thereof.
It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No.
905 was done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case.
8. Galicto v Aquino GR 193978 (February 28, 2012)
D: E0 7 is not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or a mandatory act. It is an executive act and therefore
not within the scope of a Petition for Certiorari.
Facts:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and
enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the
President on September 8, 2010.
Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been
issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws.
EO 7 ordered
o (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all
GOCC, and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the
President, and
o (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of
the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.
Issue: Is Certiorari proper?
Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to
issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.
Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to
assail the validity of EO 7:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
PROHIBITION
9. David v Rivera 420 S 90
D: It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the
existence but by the adequacy of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the
remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.
While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this
does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the
inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard and
decided the case without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the
existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the
remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.
Here, two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter,
issue, and parties, and ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for
prohibition.
Facts
Claiming to be the owner of the subject land, Agustin Rivera (respondent) filed a
complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction before the Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAB) of
Pampanga against petitioners Sps David.
Petitioners, on the other hand, filed a complaint for ejectment before MCTC of
Pampanga averring that they need the subject land for their personal use but the
respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated demands
Respondent asserted that MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of
the tenancy relationship between him and the predecessors-in-interest of
the petitioners and reiterated his claim of ownership over the subject land.
During the pendency of the ejectment case, PARAB declared the respondent as
tenant of the land and ordered that his peaceful possession thereof be maintained.
Petitioners appealed to DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board)
MCTC rendered its decision ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land.
It ruled that petitioners as the registered owners have a better right to
possession of the subject land
Respondent filed before the RTC of Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or TRO, seeking the nullification of the MCTC decision
Ground: MCTC has no jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in
nature
RTC issued a TRO and ordered issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Case went to trial.
After respondent rested its case, petitioners filed a MTD:
Grounds: (1) that the extraordinary remedy of prohibition could
not be made a substitute for the available and speedy recourse of
appeal; (2) the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Mabalacat, Pampanga
was legally vested, determined as it was by the averments of the
complaint in conformity with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; hence,
the decision of the ejectment court was a legitimate and valid
exercise of its jurisdiction.
RTC denied MTD
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in CA
CA found NO grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying
the MTD
CA stated that: The order of denial is merely interlocutory, hence,
cannot be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
I: W/N a petition for prohibition is proper?
H: Yes. At the outset, it may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to review an
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidence
filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case. Being interlocutory, an
order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if the
decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues
raised in the demurrer. However, it is also settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when
the denial of a demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he perceived was
an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to
the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond cavil in view of the following considerations:
First. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two tribunals exercised
jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject matter, issue, and parties, and
ultimately rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for prohibition. The
MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the case for ejectment pursuant to Section 33 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. On the other hand, the ratiocination of the
DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the case falls squarely within its
jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was connected with, agrarian relations. The
 respondent also points out that his right to possess the land, as a registered tenant,
was submitted for determination before the PARAB prior to the filing of the case for
ejectment.
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the
respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the
special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,
or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is
no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can
be obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the
limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels.
Second. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior
court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of
prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding
further on the ground that it heard and decided the case without jurisdiction. Since the
right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy
by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is not plain,
speedy or adequate
Third. We cannot also sustain the petitioner's assertion that jurisdiction is a question of
law; hence, the RTC could have ruled on the matter without the reception of the
parties evidence. The very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the
real relationship existing between the parties. It is necessary that evidence thereon
be first presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed
upon by the court.
In this case, the trial court ruled that respondent's evidence in support of his application for a writ
of prohibition was sufficient to require the presentation of petitioner's contravening proof. The
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in so ruling.
10. Longino v General GR 147956 (February 16, 2005)
D: COSLAP has no jurisdiction to determine the preferential lease rights over PNRs property
because only the PNR could determine this.
Facts:
This is a dispute over the preferential right to lease of a PNR property. The
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) ruled in favor of the Private
Respondent Serrano.
Longino filed a petition for prohibition against the COSLAP and Serrano with the
Court of Appeals
Longino alleged that in taking cognizance of Serranos complaint, the COSLAP acted
without jurisdiction; and, when it issued the said Resolutions, with grave abuse of its
discretion. She averred that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction to review the lease
contracts entered into between her and the PNR. She contended that she had the
preferential right to lease the property.
CA dismissed the petition. The CA also ruled that Serrano had the preferential right
over the disputed lot and that the December 16, 1999 Resolution of the COSLAP had
already become final and executory. Hence, the appellate court concluded that the
petition for prohibition was moot and academic.
Issue: Is prohibition proper?
Held: Yes. The Court, likewise, rules that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the issues raised
by the parties because as early as January 19, 1999, the Board of Directors of the PNR had
approved Resolution No. 99-03, directing the PNR Management to desist from selling or leasing
its properties needed for the right-of-way of its North Rail Project, to wit. Notwithstanding the
Resolution of the Board of Directors, the COSLAP declared the private respondent the legal
possessor of the property and had the priority to lease the same. When to lease property owned
by it, whom to lease such property, as well as the terms and conditions thereof, are matters
addressed to the PNR.
Upon the expiration of the January 22, 1996 Lease Contract of the private respondent and the
PNR on December 31, 1996, she had no more right to possess the leased property. Indeed, the
PNR had the right to have her evicted therefrom. And yet, the COSLAP declared, by its
Resolution, that the private respondent herein, who was heavily indebted to the PNR, was the
lawful possessor of the property.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
11. Holy Spirit Homeowners v Defensor GR 163980 (August 3, 2006)
D: Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification.
Facts:
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio
F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co- petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of
the association.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee).
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
xxxx
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of
Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one
(1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to
the availability of lots.
xxxx
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated
based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of
35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
xxxx
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/G.R.%20No.%20163980.htm
7/13
3/21/2017 G.R. No. 163980
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell (a) Westside
(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
xxxx
(c) for both eastside and westside
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in item a.1
above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after approval of the
subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing Authority
factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the
NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).
Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally
 infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose of
the law sought to be implemented.
Issue: Is the Petition for Prohibition proper?
Held: No. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or
threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its
cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained.
12. Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc v CA GR 98310 (October 24, 1996)
D: The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of
fact, and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the
prohibition proceedings. In a prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.
Facts:
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI, for brevity) filed this action for
prohibition, Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent Minister (now
Secretary) of Natural Resources from enforcing its Order of Execution against it, for
liability arising from an alleged encroachment of the petitioner over the timber
concession of respondent DAVENCOR located in Mati, Davao Oriental.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, ruled in favor of the petitioner, but
on appeal, was reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner MIWPI Coroporation asserts that it should not be held liable for the illegal
encroachment of Matuguina Logging Enterprises (MLE) a sole proprietorship that was
held to be liable for encroachment.
o MLE was incorporated to MIWPI
TC ruled that the execution against MWPI is invalid because it was MLE which was
held liable by the DENR for encroachment. Execution should conform to the judgment
rendered.
CA reversed. CA held the failure to comply with the procedure in order to satisfy the
requirements of due process was cured by the present action for prohibition where the
liability of appellee has been ventilated.
Issue: Was the Petitioner denied due process? Is prohibition proper in this case?
Held: Yes, P was denied due process. CA is incorrect to say that due process flaw was cured
because in a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal,
board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.
The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact,
and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the
prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent
Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the execution of its order which
is under scrutiny.
Assuming, arguendo, that prohibition is the proper remedy for determining the propriety of
piercing the separate personality of petitioner with its stockholders, the evidence presented at
said trial does not warrant such action.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from that of
persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It
may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder cannot be made to answer for any of its financial
obligations even if he should be its president.
13. Tan v Comelec GR 73155 (July 11, 1986)
Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition to stop the R from conducting a plebiscite.
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885An Act Creating
a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during
which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a
supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein
that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as
scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the
legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed
upon and resolved by this Court.
They claimed that the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the
territory of Negros del Norte, excluding the rest of the province of Negros
Occidental (province from which Negros del Norte will be taken). .
They claimed that this exclusion violated the constitutional requirement that
for a province to be created there should be an approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
The plebiscite pushed through.
The Petitioners now filed present case still questioning the constitutionality of BP 885
and praying that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the COMELEC hold another
plebiscite with the rest of the Negros Occidental being allowed to participate.
Issue: Whether or not Mandamus should be issued?
Ruling: No. Mandamus will not be issued to conduct another plebiscite. The Court will issue the
mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo ante and restore the territorial
integrity of the province.
The Court is prepared to declare the first plebiscite as null and void and violative of the
provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
However, the Court is not disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because
there is no legal basis to do so.
With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and
also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual
and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding
of another plebiscite does not exist.
Constitutional infirmity: non-inclusion of the mother province, and the
created province does not even satisfy the 4019 land area requirement or territory for
a new province.
In the Teehankees concurring opinion, he provides:
The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite was held
and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del
Norte has been constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged
Act.
This Court has always held that it "does not look with favor upon parties
'racing to beat an injunction or restraining order' which they have reason to
believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and
pendency of the appropriate petition therefor.
Where the restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have been
properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be issued by
the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante." (Banzon v. Cruz, 45
SCRA 475, 506 [1972]).
Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the
restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will
issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo
ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros Occidental
 by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the
invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and
the equally invalid appointment of its officials.
14. Diaz v Secretary of Finance GR 193007 (July 19, 2011)
D: 1) A petition for declaratory relief may be treated by the Court as one for prohibition if the
case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved for the public
good.
2) The Court has also held that a petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify
acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief, assailing the validity of the impending
imposition of VAT by the BIR on the collections of tollway operators. BIR is planning to
impose VAT on toll fees.
Petitioners allege Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the
NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the meaning of sale of services that are subject
to VAT;
o that a toll fee is a users tax, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on
toll fees would amount to a tax on public service; and that, since VAT was
never factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its imposition would
violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
On August 13, 2010 the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining
the implementation of the VAT.
Later, the Court issued another resolution treating the petition as one for prohibition.
o The government has sought reconsideration of the Courts resolution,
arguing that petitioners allegations clearly made out a case for declaratory
relief, an action over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
o The government adds, that the petition does not meet the requirements of
Rule 65 for actions for prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll
fees.
o Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbol has a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR action in the form of an
appeal to the Secretary of Finance.
Issue: May the Ps petition for declaratory relief be appreciated by the Court as a Petition of
Prohibition?
Held: Yes. There are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for
prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved for the public good. The Court has also held that a petition for prohibition is a proper
remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative
authority.
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its imposition would
impact, not only on the more than half a million motorists who use the tollways everyday, but
more so on the governments effort to raise revenue for funding various projects and for reducing
budgetary deficits.
To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT has been imposed,
could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the government. A belated
declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any attempt to refund to the motorists what
they paid an administrative nightmare with no solution. Consequently, it is not only the right, but
the duty of the Court to take cognizance of and resolve the issues that the petition raises.
Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court has
ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions to be resolved are
of great importance to the public. The same may be said of the requirement of locus standi
which is a mere procedural requisite.
MANDAMUS
15. Mayuga v CA (August 30, 1996)
D: Petitioners have failed to prove their cause of action for mandamus, hence the petition was
correctly dismissed by the CA. Mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public officer to
perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public officer has
unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.
Here, The order of the trial court dated January 3, 1996 merely granted private respondents
Motion for the Declaration of Defendants as Non-underprivileged x x x and for the Issuance of
an alias Writ of Execution. There is nothing in it that expressly or impliedly denied petitioners
appeal from the Order denying relief from judgment. To be sure, the notice of appeal at bar is
not even subject to the approval of the trial court because it was deemed perfected after the
fifteenth day, i.e., the last day to appeal by both petitioners and private respondent. Likewise,
petitioners have not alleged that the trial court neglected to order the transmittal of the records to
the Court of Appeals.
We hold that petitioners have failed to prove their cause of action for mandamus, hence, the
petition was correctly dismissed.
This petition originated from an action for recovery of possession filed in 1993 by RPN
Realty, Inc. against petitioners before RTC.
RPN claims ownership over a property in Sta. Ana occupied by petitioners
Petitioners denied RPNs ownership over the land.
RTC ordered petitioners to vacate the land
No appeal was taken thus order became final and executory.
RTC issued a writ of execution.
Petitioners, filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment" alleging that they had no
knowledge of the court's decision because their former counsel transferred his law
office
Private respondents opposed the motion and moved for the issuance of a special
order of demolition.
RTC denied petitioners motion. Petition filed an appeal denying the motion
Private respondent also filed a "Motion for the Declaration of Defendants as Non-
Underprivileged and Homeless and Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution.
RTC granted private respondent's motion and also issued an alias writ of execution
and demolition
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari
CA issued a TRO on demolition order but later on dismissed the petition
Hence this appeal
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling on the merits of the case when
the action before it was not an appeal but a special civil action for
mandamus and certiorari.
They contend that the respondent court could not have affirmed the trial
court's judgment on the merits because the records of the case were not
elevated on appeal.
The petition for mandamus was allegedly filed to compel the trial court to
allow the appeal from the order denying relief from judgment, and for
certiorari to annul the order issuing the alias writ of execution and demolition
Ruling: The Rules provide that if a petition for relief from judgment is filed and denied, the order
of the trial court denying the same may be appealed to the CA
The appeal is taken by the mere filing of a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the judgment or order within fifteen (15) days from notice of said judgment or
order. The appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party, after which the trial court shall order the elevation of the records of the case to
the appellate court. Refusal to do so is remediable by mandamus.
In the case at bar, petitioners timely filed their notice of appeal on the third day after
receipt of the order denying relief. They complain that their appeal was denied by the
trial court in the order
SC: Petitioners' argument is incorrect.
Mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public officer to perform a duty specifically enjoined
by law once it is shown that the judge or public officer has unlawfully neglected the performance
thereof.
A court neglects the performance of its duties only when after demand has been made upon it, it
refuses to perform the same.
Petitioners have not shown that the trial court refused to accept the notice of appeal, much less
denied said notice. There is nothing in it that expressly or impliedly denied petitioners' appeal
from the Order denying relief from judgment.
Therefore, since petitioners have failed to prove their cause of action for mandamus,
hence, the petition was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals
Further, CA treated the petition as the appeal itself from the order denying relief from judgment.
It correctly found that the failure of petitioners' former counsel to notify them of the adverse
decision to enable them to appeal therefrom constitutes inexcusable negligence and is not a
ground for relief from judgment.
Since petitioners' ground for relief is not well-taken, it follows that the trial court's
judgment on the merits stands. Contrary to petitioners' allegations, the Court of
Appeals did not rule on the merits of the case. The appellate court merely confirmed
the existence of the judgment on the merits and, in keeping with the Rules and
jurisprudence, made the pronouncement that said judgment had long become final
and executory.
The Court of Appeals therefore committed no error in affirming the order granting the
issuance of the alias writ of execution.
16. Kant Wong et al v PCGG GR 79484 (December 7, 1987)
D: In the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, it is not accurate to say that
the writ will never issue to control the discretion of official bodies. There is an exception to the
rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice,
or palpable excess of authority." Here, In this case, for reasons already stated, we find that the
PCGG acted with gross abuse of discretion in maintaining the Hold-Orders against petitioners
for an indefinite length of time. By so doing it has arbitrarily excluded petitioners from the
enjoyment of a fundamental right the right to freedom of movement to which they are
entitled. 9mandamus lies.
Facts:
o Petitioners are foreign nationals who are the representatives of the Hongkong-Chinese
investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in two domestic garment corporations,
namely, De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-Fashion
Manufacturing Corporation, which firms were ordered sequestered by the PCGG on 25
March 1986 on the thesis that the Marcoses, through nominees and dummies, appear to
control 67 % of the firms' shareholdings.
o In this original action for Mandamus, petitioners pray that respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG, for short) be commanded to lift without delay
the Hold-Orders issued against them by the said entity for being in violation of their right to
travel and for having been issued in grave abuse of authority since they are in no way
involved in ill-gotten wealth nor in transactions connected therewith.
o Petitioners filed before the PCGG an Urgent Motion to Lift Hold-Order. PCGG denied
motion. Hence, the recourse of mandamus with SC.
Issue: WON PCGG with gross abuse of discretion in maintaining the hold orders against
petitioners?
Held: Yes. Acting upon an Urgent Motion filed by petitioner Yim Kam Shing, this Court lifted,
effective immediately, the Hold-Order issued against him for the purpose of allowing him to leave
for Hongkong for urgent medical treatment.
17. Uy Kiao Eng v Nixon Lee GR 1776831 (January 15, 2010)
D: Mandamus may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
which the public has no interest. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds:
[a] That the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or
[b] That such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. Also,
when there is another remedy such as in this case.
Facts:
o Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother
Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to
produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the
allowance thereof could be instituted.
o Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs
estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner
refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in
custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.
o The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to
evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the
petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court.
The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for
reconsideration.
o The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and
ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time
that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.
o Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the
matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not
the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as
basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
Held: No.
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against
an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ
of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government;
hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,mandamus is not
used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Here, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe
production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
18. Magtibay v Garcia (January 25, 1983)
D: A writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.
Facts:
Petitioner was relieved from being cadet colonel and as battalion commander of the lst
BCT of the U.P. Cadet Corps. He was also excluded from the roll of the graduating
class of the ROTC Advance Course for failing a subject.
This is an appeal from the order of a CFI dismissing Ps petition for mandamus.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in refusing to review the actuations of Lt.
Col. Santiago Q. Garcia, commandant of the University of the Philippines ROTC as to
matters affecting the regulation and supervision of the U.P. ROTC Corps of Cadets.
Issue: Whether the courts may review the exercise of discretion of a public officer on matters in
which it is his duty to act?
Held: No, SEE Doctrine.
19. Paloma v Mora 470 S 711
D: Removed GM of Palompon, Leyte
Mandamus lies to compel the performance when refused of a ministerial duty but not to compel
the performance of a discretionary duty. An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing
power is in essence temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of
Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal
but only an expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due
hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from office. The protection
afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers and Employees,
therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.
Here, Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water
District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him
under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.
F:
Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water
District by its Board of Directors in 1993.
His services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95, which
was passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of the
Palompon, Leyte Water District.
The Board, in the same Resolution, designated respondent Valentino Sevilla as
Officer-in-Charge.
Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for
preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC to contest his dismissal with the
prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager.
I: W/N mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District
to reinstate the General Manager thereof?
H: NO. Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but
not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes
upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that
of the court.
The Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 categorically provides that the general manager shall
serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors.
SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the board, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general
manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve
at the pleasure of the board.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District
to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.
The case of Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. delineated the nature
of an appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power in this wise:
An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is in essence temporary
in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the
Board opts to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an
expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due
hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated from office. The
protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers
and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by petitioner.
In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within the wide
arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case
is the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here, considering that the
petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the formers services obviously ceased to be
pleasurable to the latter. The Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the
General Manager thereof the moment the latters services cease to be convivial to the former.
Put another way, he is at the mercy of the appointing powers since his appointment can be
terminated at any time for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or due
hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence, petitioner is treading on
shaky grounds with his intransigent posture that he was removed sans cause and due process.
20. Quarto v Ombudsman GR 169042 (October 5, 2011)
D:
Facts:
President Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of
San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province,
the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their
respective sitios.
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed
through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its
Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959.
Later, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial
Court in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition
sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local
officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the
duties and functions of their respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a
presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the
officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties
and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of
the Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of
affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that
the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it
(petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality
was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting
through the Solicitor General.
Issue: whether or not the petition for quo warranto is proper
Held:
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call
upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be
brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor
General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may,
under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of
another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to
commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he
claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another." While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so
named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually,
however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to
exist and to act in that capacity.
21. Velasco v Belmonte GR 211140 (January 12, 2016)
D: A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act
or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
Here, the decision of the COMELEC to appoint P as the representative is final. Hence, , Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer the
oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives, respectively.
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed under Rule 65 by Petitioner Velasco against
Speaker Belmonte to administer the proper oath in his favor so he can assume the
position of representative of Marinduque.
This is because the COMELEC had already ruled that he, Lord Allan Jay Velasco, is
proclaimed the winning candidate for the position because the his rival Reyess COC
was canceled by the COMELEC due to citizenship and residency requirements even
before Reyes proclamation as winner. Hence, as second-placer the COMELEC
declared Velasco as representative of Marinduque.
Respondent Reyes contends that the SC does not have jurisdiction over the
mandamus proceeding because as the declared winner of the election, the matter has
already been elevated to the HRET. Also, that mandamus may not be used to compel
Speaker Belmonte to administer the oath, because the Respondents (being members
of the HR) have discretion to administer the oath or not.
Issue: Is R correct?
Held: No. The nullification of her COC came before her proclamation. Hence, she was never
declared a member of the House of Representatives. So, the SC still has jurisdiction over
Reyes.
A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or
duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. As the facts
stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether
or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives, respectively.
It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R.
No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053
(DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and
beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
QUO WARRANTO
22. Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez 239 SCRA 11
D: When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to
the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding. It is commenced by
the Sol-Gen. If commenced by a person, it is only when he claims to be entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision must be timely
raised.
o Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on
20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that
the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality of
San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly
created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to
question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period
can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest
imperativeness, must aquo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
Facts:
o President Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal
district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of
the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora
and Tala along with their respective sitios.
o Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President
and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San
Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959.
o Later, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the
Regional Trial Court in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of
San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353
and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their
respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the
petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act,
was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued,
 the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
o In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way
of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner
municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of
Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from
questioning the creation of the new municipality; and that, considering the petition to
be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the
action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor
General.
Issue: whether or not the petition for quo warranto is proper
Held: No, but the court nonetheless tackled the merits of the case. When the inquiry is
focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when
directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain
circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person"
with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an
action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be
"entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." While
the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation
of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that
capacity.
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case
hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
factomunicipal corporation.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jurestanding of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Muni-cipality of San Andres has been
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon.
23. Tarrosa v Singson 232 S 553
D: Quo warranto as a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General, or by
a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by
another. Petitioner who did not aver entitlement to the office cannot bring the action for quo
warranto. Question of title to an office may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of
salary to the person holding office, brought by one not claiming to be entitled to said office.
F:
o Petitioner, as a taxpayer filed this petition for prohibition against respondent Gabriel
Singson as Governor of BSP for not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
o Section 6, Article II of RA 7653 does require the BSP governor to be confirmed by the
CoA. In their comment, respondent alleges that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
o They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments
which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
I: Whether or not petitioner had standing to file this case?
H: No
R: The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of
respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196[1967]). Such a special
civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.
It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold
the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery.
Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no
need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and
emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. However, for the information of all
concerned, we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale: Congress cannot by law
expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
24. Lota v CA 2 S 715
D:
Where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office,quo warranto is the proper remedy
(Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil. 491). But, where the respondent, without claiming
any right to an office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, the remedy is
mandamus, not quo warranto.
Any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo
warranto without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal (Navarro vs.
Gimenez, 10 Phil. 226; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra), and only the person who is in
unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office may be
made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action.
Facts
1. Moises Sangalang was the cementery caretaker from 1951 until he was extended a new
appointment by
the Local Health Officer.
2. Flaviano Lota, then mayor of Taal appointed Jose Sangalang as cemetery caretaker, thus
taking
Moises place.
3.Moises filed a complaint against Mayor Lota, Jose and the municipal treasurer.
4.The CFI of Batangas rendered in favor of Moises.
5. Mayor Lota appealed.He claimed that the trial court erred in not dismissing complaint on the
ground
that the real party in interest, which is the municipality of Lipa was not made party-defendant;
and the
trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground that appellee was not validly
appointed to
the post of municipal cemetery of Taal.
6.CA rendered a decision declaring Moises to continue in the office as cementary caretaker.
7. Lota contended that the CA erred in holding that the present action is one of quo warranto; in
not
dismissing the action for failure of the Moises to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as
party
defendant; and in declaring that respondent Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold, and continue
in the
office of caretaker of the municipal cemetery of that municipality
Issues:
1) WON the CA erred in holding the action is one of a quo warranto.
2) WON the CA erred in not dismissing the action for failure of the plaintiff to join the
Municipality of
Taal, Batangas, as party defendant
Held:
1) No. Quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties not
to try disputed titles (38 C.J. 546; 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957
ed., 200). Hence, where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office,quo warranto is
the proper remedy (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil. 491). But, where the
respondent, without claiming any right to an office, excludes the petitioner therefrom,
the remedy ismandamus, not quo warranto
2) No. Any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo
warranto without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal (Navarro vs.
Gimenez, 10 Phil. 226; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra), and only the person who is in
unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office may be
made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action.
25. Calleja v Panday GR 168696 (Feb 28, 2006) quo warranto against a corporation
D:
Actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office
in a corporation are no longer cognizable by the SEC. Jurisdiction over these cases
have been transferred to courts of general jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8799. Pursuant
to this, the SC designates certain branches of the RTC to be Special Commercial
Courts that will try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the SEC.
Here, the RTC br. 58 is not a special commercial court. It has no authority to try and
decide a case, and at the same time to remand the same to another co-equal court in
order to cure the defects on jurisdiction.
Facts:
Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur
for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction,
Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners.
Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court,
they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed
men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.
MTD was filed by the Petitioners based on lack of jurisdiction.
RTC dismissed the MTD, but remanded the case to a special commercial RTC
because it lacked jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari based on Rule 45.
Issue: May the RTC of general jurisdiction remand the case to a Special Commercial court?
Held: NO. The RTC br. 58 is not a special commercial court. It has no authority to try and decide
a case, and at the same time to remand the same to another co-equal court in order to cure the
defects on jurisdiction.
The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial
court to order the transfer of respondents petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is
specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03- SC, which clearly
stated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court
Note:The SC proceeded to try the case despite the wrong remedy (it should have been 65).
26. Garces v CA GR 114795 (July 17, 1996)
D: Quo Warranto tests the title claimed by another to ones office. Mandamus on the other hand
avails to enforce clear legal duties. Here, the actions should be quo warranto not mandamus
because Concepcion continues to occupy Garces position (election registrar of Gatulac, and
exercises functions thereto).
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac.
She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn,
was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte
But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming
office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.
Concepcion continued occupying the Gatulac post.
She filed a mandamus case against Empeynado.
RTC dismissed because quo warranto is the proper remedy.
Issue: Should the action be qw or mandamus?
Held: Quo warranto. Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position
and exercises the corresponding functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo
warranto and not mandamus.[26] Quo warranto tests the title to ones office claimed by another
and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to
enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.
But here, Court said SC Concepcions transfer was illegal because it is not one of the
grounds allowed for transfer as enumerated in EO 17.
27. Mendoza v Allas GR 131977 (Feb 4, 1999)
D: A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though
such successor may trace his title to the same source.
Facts:
Petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court granting his petition
for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and
benefits.
TC denied execution because the person against whom quo warranto was issued
(Allas) who was usurping Ps position had already been promoted as Deputy
Commissioner of Customs. Hence, the quo warranto case cannot be executed against
the new appointee of the Director 3 position (Olores).
Issue: May Ollores (new appointee in place of Allas against whom quo warranto was issued be
subject to the execution of the quo warranto proceeding?
Held: Yes. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even
though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the
writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the
person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in,
or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent
Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to
the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The
Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
28. Lokin v Comelec GR 179431-32 (June 22, 2010) partylist nominee change
Facts:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari
and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue
 implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of
a party-list nominee not written in the party-list system act
Petitioner was initially a nominee of the Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
partylist. Prior to elections however CIBAC, through its president, filed a list of
substitution of nominee and removed Petitioner Lokin.
But Lokin won as second nominee (second seat). So, Lokin filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with the SC to install him in his seat.
R argued that the SC has no jurisdiction because questions as to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of winning candidates should be done through the HRET,
not the SC. Moreover, that Loki should raise the question in an election protest or in a
special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for
certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Was Ps action of Certiorari and Mandamus proper?
D/ HELD: YES. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an
action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking
to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a
contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office.
Special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office,
Here, since the object of the action is to install the petitioner in his place. Then Certiorari with
the SC is proper and not an electoral protest or a quo warrant proceeding.
EXPROPRIATION
29. Republic v Gingoyan GR 166429 (December 19, 2005)
30. National Power Corp v Manubay Agro-Industrial GR 150936 (August 18, 2004)
FACTS:
NPC, a GOCC created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of
hydroelectric power, commenced its350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.
Such project aims to transmit electricity coming Leyte to Luzon and various load centers in its
vision to interconnect the entire country into single power grid.
One of these lands, where only a portion will be traversed by the transmission lines, is owned by
respondent MANUBAY.
NPC filed a complaint for expropriation before the RTC of Naga against in order to acquire an
easement of right of way over the land which the latter owns. Respondent filed its answer. RTC
issued an order authorizing the immediate issuance of a WoP and directing Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff to immediately place NPC in possession of the subject land. Subsequently, RTC directed
the issuance of a writ of condemnation in favor of NPC. The court also appointed three (3)
commissioners composed of 1 rep of NPC, 1 rep of MANUBAY and 1 rep of the court.
Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual appraisal/valuation reports. Taking
into consideration the condition, surroundings and the potentials of respondents expropriated
property, RTC approved Chairperson Teoxons (NPC) recommendation in the amount of
P550/sqm. The trial court opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC
Power Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of the land for an indefinite
period of time, thereby justifying the payment of the full value of the property.
RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner Sec.3-A of RA 6395 which
prescribes that the just compensation forth acquired easement of a right of way over an
expropriated property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10 percent of the market
value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of this Court that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus,
valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.
CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. It observed that, given their nature, high-powered electric lines
traversing respondents property would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely -- the value
and the use of the affected property; as well as endanger lives and limbs because of the high-
tension current.
ISSUE:
W/N an easement of right of way is considered "taking" of property so as to warrant
expropriation proceedings over the subject property? YES
HELD:
SC: The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and
respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is,
nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect
of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would
deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to
payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land.
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land.
But a dominant portion thereof has been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga
as residential.
The chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, in adopting the recommendation of
Commissioner Bulaos, made a careful study of the property. Factors considered in arriving at a
reasonable estimate of just compensation for respondent were the location; the most profitable
likely use of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other
properties within the vicinity. Averments pertaining to these factors were supported by
documentary evidence. Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function, and the trial court apparently did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in
setting the price at P550 per square meter -- an award affirmed by the CA -- we see no reason
to disturb the factual findings as to the valuation of the property. Both the Report of
Commissioner Bulaoan the commissioners majority report were based on uncontroverted facts
supported by documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular inspection of the property.
SC DOCTRINES: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners
loss. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner
of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of
money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."
31. Republic v CA and Heirs of Cris Santos GR 146587 (July 2, 2002)
FACTS
Petitioner instituted expropriation on a land situated in Bulacan to be utilized for the continued
broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines
project.
More than 9 years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued an
order condemning the properties of defendants located in Bulacan. The court also ordered
plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for the property. The government failed to
pay the compensation. Respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the
expropriated property.
Thereafter, Pres. Estrada issued Proclamation no. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the
expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and
another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao.

The Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September
1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the
amount of P4,664,000 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis
Santos. The Santos heirs, opposed and asked to adjust the compensation to conform to the
current zonal value of the land (because its use was converted, and thus changing the appraised
value). RTC ruled in favor of the Republic. Petitioner appealed to the CA.

ISSUE
1. Whether the change in the present use of the expropriated property from what was originally
intended and agreed upon justifies reversion? NO
2. Whether non-payment of just compensation automatically warrant reversion of the
expropriated property back to its owner? NO

HELD
No, changes in the present use do not justify reversion and non-payment of just compensation
does not automatically warrant reversion of the expropriated property to its owner.

RATIO
1. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Petitioner, as the
condemnor and owner of the property, has a right to alter and decide the use of said property.
The limit to this right is only that it be used for public purpose. Plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to public use. They can only
demand the fair market value of the expropriated property.

The judgment rendered on the expropriation proceedings did not only provide for the payment of
just compensation, but it also adjudged the property condemned in favor of the Republic. The
government has occupied, utilized and for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the
property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as condemnee has
amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the judgment on the expropriation,
thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution.

2. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the
fact that the right of the expropriating authority is not that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to
which the remedy of rescission applies.

In an in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After the condemnation, the
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title. Thus, by giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.

Respondents in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same
argument could likewise apply against them. Delaying the filing of action to compel payment
against petitioner would militate against them. Consistent with the rule that one should take good
care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the
finality of the judgment, which resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and
possession of the property.

32. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v City of Pasig GR 152230

33. NPC v Luis Samar and Magdalena Samar GR 197329 (September 8, 2014)
34. Republic of the Philippines, represented by NPC v Heirs of Borbon and Court of
Appeals GR 165354 (January 12, 2015)