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Italian Mafia

Chapter January 2014


DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_639

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Giulia Berlusconi
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Italian Mafia

Giulia Berlusconi

Overview

Different ways of conceptualizing the mafia have been proposed over the time,
emphasizing either the cultural or the organizational factors. The former describes
the mafia as a subculture typical of certain areas of Southern Italy, whereas the lat-
ter focuses on its internal configuration. The mafia has also been conceptualized
as a business enterprise, although its political dimension has also been emphasized
by delineating it as an industry of private protection. Indeed, Italian mafias differ
from other criminal organizations for their will to political dominion in the areas
of their traditional presence. Another peculiarity of mafia groups in Italy is their
internal configuration and the resort to symbols and rituals that promote the crea-
tion of strong ties among the affiliates.
Italian mafia organizations include Cosa Nostra (Our Thing) in Sicily, the
Ndrangheta (Society of the Men of Honor) in Calabria, and the Camorra in Cam-
pania. Although these criminal organizations share common elements, they differ
in terms of history, internal organization, illegal market activities, and infiltration
in the legitimate and informal economy, and cannot thus be considered as a single
phenomenon. The historical and cultural background, the internal organization,
and the expertise provide an explanation for the differences that emerge with re-
gard to the presence of mafia groups in illegal markets and the way they conduct
their criminal activities. Extortion is instead common to all Italian mafia organiza-
tions, and it constitutes the core business of Italian mafias, since it allows them to
gain control over a specific territory and thus exercise political power in that area.
The large profits coming from illegal activities are invested both in the illegal
markets and in the legitimate economy. Investments in the legitimate economy al-
low mafia organizations to extend their political dominion by infiltrating into and
controlling legitimate economic sectors. Among the economic sectors, mafia
groups seem to favor the public construction industry, as well as other protected
sectors where the public administration regulates the participation by requiring a
specific license or permission and thus reduces the competition.
To this day, most research on Italian mafias focused on areas of their traditional
presence and explored the reasons they emerged in those territories, whereas little
is known about the colonization and transplantation processes. In the future, the
adoption of more complex interpretations of the mobility of criminal groups might
help identify the factors that foster transplantation and that make it successful.
2

Mafia and Organized Crime

For a long time, the term mafia has been used as a synonym for organized crime
(Blok 2008), and Italian mafia has been considered a paradigm of organized crime
(Paoli 2003). Nonetheless, the term mafia refers to a specific form of organized
crime (Finckenauer 2005), and the illegal organizations that have been presented
as its archetype include large-scale criminal groups other than Italian mafias, such
as the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza (Paoli 2002).
The main trait that distinguishes mafia groups from other criminal organiza-
tions is their political dimension. Although actively involved in illegal market ac-
tivities, mafia groups cannot be reduced to these activities (Paoli 2002) nor is their
internal configuration the consequence of their participation in illegal businesses
(van Duyne 1997). Besides the provision of illegal goods and services and the
maximization of profits, mafia groups aim at exercising political dominion over
the areas where their members live and where most of their illegal activities are
conducted. The control over the territory is guaranteed by a generalized system of
extortion, which also allows mafia organizations to increase their income (Paoli
2003).
Another peculiarity of mafia groups is their internal configuration. Despite var-
iations, mafia organizations are characterized by the presence of government bod-
ies that coordinate the activities and regulate the relationships among their mem-
ber. Symbols and rituals, including a ceremony of affiliation, promote the creation
of ties of brotherhood among the members of the organization, who become men
of honor and are subject to the duty of silence (Paoli 2003).

Italian Mafias

The first comprehensive study of the mafia was published in 1876 by Leopoldo
Franchetti (1974), who described it as an extralegal social system, namely, a spe-
cific and socially accepted way of exercising violence to solve conflicts. After
Franchettis work, different ways of conceptualizing the mafia have been pro-
posed over the time, emphasizing either the cultural or the organizational factors
(Sciarrone 2009). The cultural approach describes the mafia as an attitude, a sub-
culture typical of certain areas of Southern Italy, rather than a formal organization
(Hess 1973), although organizational factors have also been considered by analyz-
ing the network of family, friendship, and business relations of mafia members
(Blok 1988; Schneider and Schneider 1976). The organizational approach instead
emphasizes the internal configuration of mafia groups and describes them as for-
mal organizations with articulated structures and a set of symbols and rituals. The
depiction of mafia organizations as criminal associations can also be found in the
Italian penal code, where Article 416bis describes the mafia as a specific type of
criminal organization and lists the main features of mafia groups.
3

In the mid-1980s, the focus shifted from cultural and organizational aspects to
the illegal activities carried out by criminal organizations, and the mafia was con-
ceptualized as an enterprise. According to Pino Arlacchi (1988), between the
1950s and the 1960s, the Italian mafia had experienced an entrepreneurial trans-
formation and had focused on the accumulation of capital. Other scholars refused
the identification of mafia groups with business enterprises and the sharp distinc-
tion between a modern and an old mafia. They instead emphasized either the im-
portance of the threat or use of violence to regulate economic transactions (Catan-
zaro 1992) or the political dimension, describing the mafia as a specific
economic enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes and sells private pro-
tection (Gambetta 1993, 1). More recently, the complexity of the phenomenon
has been recognized (Santino 2006), and Italian mafias have been described as
multifunctional organizations involved in a plurality of illegal activities and
aiming at pursuing a plurality of goals, including the exercise of political power
over a specific territory (Paoli 2004, p. 274). Mafia groups cannot thus be reduced
to their economic dimension, both because they originated before the illegal mar-
kets they operate in and because their activities include noneconomic ones, such
as the exercise of political dominion (Paoli 2002).
Most of these conceptualizations of the mafia have been proposed with particu-
lar reference to the Sicilian mafia, also known as Cosa Nostra. However, mafia
organizations which originated from and mainly operate in Italy include Cosa
Nostra (Our Thing) in Sicily, the Ndrangheta (Society of the Men of Honor) in
Calabria, and the Camorra in Campania. Although these criminal organizations
share common elements, the history of the mafia cannot be reduced to a single
scheme or interpretation, valid in every situation and time (Lupo 1996, p. 26).
Italian mafias differ in terms of history, internal organization, illegal market ac-
tivities, and infiltration in the legitimate and informal economy (Sciarrone 2009),
and they thus need to be discussed separately.

Cosa Nostra

The term mafia first appeared in 1865 in a report by the then-prefect of Palermo
Filippo Gualterio, who used it to refer to Sicilian criminal groups. Only 20 years
later, the same term was adopted in the United States to refer to a criminal organi-
zation of Italian origins. The same organization was also referred to as La Cosa
Nostra, as Joseph Valachi testified in 1963 before the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations of the US Senate Committee on Government Operations. The
same term has also been adopted by Sicilian mafiosi, together with other names,
such as Onorata Societa` (Honored Society) (Lupo 1996).
Evidence of antecedents of Cosa Nostra in Sicily can be found starting from the
second half of the nineteenth century, although only in the 1920s, the Italian gov-
ernment ordered a systematic repression of Sicilian mafia groups. After World
War II, Cosa Nostra extended its power, mainly by expanding from the country-
4

side into the largest cities and infiltrating into the public construction industry. In
the mid-1970s, the Sicilian mafia entered the illicit drug market further increasing
its power and profits, until the beginning of the 1990s. In 19921993, the killing
of the state prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino was followed by
an intensification of law enforcement repression. As a consequence, Cosa Nostra
adopted the so-called strategia dellinabissamento (sinking strategy), aimed at
reducing its visibility and thus the attention from law enforcement agencies by
minimizing violence. However, this strategy also led mafia groups to concentrate
their illegal activities in Sicily, mainly focusing on extortion and infiltration in the
legitimate economy (Lupo 1996; Savona 2012).
The internal structure of Cosa Nostra has not changed since the 1950s. It is
composed of a number of cosche or families. Each cosca controls a specific terri-
tory, and a boss, who is elected by the affiliates, is in charge of its management.
His counselors are also elected by the affiliates and assist the boss in his decisions.
The hierarchical structure of the cosche, the direct election of the high-ranking po-
sitions, and the frequent turnover guarantee the cohesion of the group and help
strengthen the ties of brotherhood among mafia members. In 1957, a Commission
was also created to regulate the relationships among the different families. The
meetings were attended by representatives of the mandamenti, namely, groups of
three or four families. The Commission had the aim of settling disputes, sanction-
ing violations and taking any decision related to the use of violence, whereas each
cosca was still autonomous in doing business (Paoli 2003).
The intensification of the law enforcement repression since the early 1990s and
the arrest of Bernardo Provenzano, the latest chief of Cosa Nostra, in 2006 have
considerably weakened the Sicilian mafia, which has experienced a strong reor-
ganization process. However, despite the undergoing crisis, the organization can
still rely on a widespread network of entrepreneurs and politicians that ensure Co-
sa Nostra the ability to commit extortion and infiltrate into the Sicilian legitimate
economy (DIA 2010).

The Ndrangheta

Evidence of the presence of the Ndrangheta in Calabria dates back to the end of
the nineteenth century, although the term ndrangheta has been consistently
used only since the 1960s. Different names instead appear in the first judicial doc-
uments, such as mafia or camorra which were used to refer to Sicilian and
Neapolitan mafia organizations or onorata societa` (honored society) and
picciotteria (Paoli 2003). The limited violence and the fact that it was consid-
ered outdated in comparison to Cosa Nostra and the Camorra made law enforce-
ment agencies and scholars not to pay too much attention to the Ndrangheta
(Ciconte 2011). Today the Calabrian mafia is instead considered the most power-
ful among Italian criminal organizations and the most involved in drug trafficking,
and in June 2008, it was included into the US Treasury Department Office of For-
5

eign Asset Control (OFAC) Foreign Drug Kingpin list (U.S. Department of State
2011).
The Ndrangheta is organized in cosche or ndrine which are usually formed by
the members of the same family and exercise their influence over a specific terri-
tory according to the arrangements made with the other families. The fact that
members of the ndrine are bonded by kin ties guarantees secrecy and trust (Paoli
2003). Within each ndrina, specific tasks are also assigned to the affiliates, ac-
cording to their formal rank in the organization. A two-level hierarchical structure
is present; low-level affiliates are referred to as members of the societa` minore
(lower society), whereas bosses are part of the societa` maggiore (higher society).
Within both the societa`, a long series of different roles and tasks can then be
identified.
The familistic structure of the Calabrian mafia has been considered for a long
time a sign of backwardness, compared with the Sicilian mafia and the Neapolitan
Camorra. Rather than being old fashioned, this type of structure guarantees a high
degree of cohesion among its members and minimizes the risk of defections. The
number of defectors has indeed always been lower than that of other Italian mafia
groups (CPA 2008; Ciconte 2011). The internal cohesion is also guaranteed by a
set of formal rules, an extensive use of rituals and symbols, and strong barriers to
entry. As in Cosa Nostra, an affiliation ceremony or battesimo is indeed required
for a new affiliate to be appointed and become a man of honor (Paoli 2004).
For a long time, the Ndrangheta was conceived as a confederation of families
without a coordinating body which establishes common rules in order to avoid
conflicts among the cosche. This idea of the Ndrangheta as an horizontal organi-
zation started to be reexamined in the 1990s and has been abandoned when the ex-
istence of a collective body (Crimine or Provincia) entitled to establish common
rules and settle disputes emerged from recent criminal investigations (TrMi 2010).
However, despite the presence of a collective body, each family enjoys a monopo-
ly on its territory and the autonomous running of illegal activities, even though a
collaboration among different cosche is frequent, especially for the trafficking of
drugs (Ciconte 2011).
The power of the Calabrian mafia also comes from its ramifications, both in
other Italian regions and abroad. In the last decades, the Ndrangheta has indeed
created outposts both in Central and Northern Italy and in foreign countries, where
it has developed an extensive network of contacts to facilitate its involvement in
illegal market activities. Kin ties maintain their importance in the internal organi-
zation of the ndrine also outside Calabria, since they allow for a quick replace-
ment of affiliates in case of arrests by law enforcement agencies. However, in ad-
dition to mafia associates, Ndrangheta groups resort to other individuals outside
the organization and can rely on an extended network of contacts with both com-
mon criminals and legal entrepreneurs and politicians (CPA 2008; Ciconte 2011).
6

The Camorra

The Camorra refers to a variety of independent criminal groups and gangs which
conduct their illegal activities in Campania. These criminal groups unlike Sicili-
an and Calabrian ones vary considerably from long-lasting family businesses to
gangs developed around charismatic leaders, often in competition among each
other (Paoli 2004).
First mentions of the Camorra as a criminal organization can be found in police
records which date back to the early nineteenth century, when written statutes de-
scribing symbols and rituals, as well as signs of the presence of stable coordina-
tion mechanisms, were found (Behan 1996). Although most symbols and rituals
have been maintained, the Campanian underworld has changed, and the contem-
porary Camorra has turned into a different criminal organization. In the 1960s, the
Camorra groups entered the tobacco and later the drug market, making large prof-
its which were then invested both in the same illegal markets and in the legitimate
economy, dealing mainly with public sector contracts (Paoli 2004). With the de-
velopment of the contraband industry, competition among rival groups increased,
as well as their dynamism and the territorial control (Behan 1996).
The presence of a stable mechanism that coordinates the activities of the differ-
ent groups and settles disputes among them no longer exists, making wars against
rival gangs more likely to occur than in Sicily and Calabria (Paoli 2004; DIA
2010). The Camorra is indeed horizontally organized, with criminal groups form-
ing temporary alliances and maintaining their autonomy (Barbagallo 2010). As for
Cosa Nostra and the Ndrangheta, the direct physical control over a territory is
fundamental for Camorra groups. Once this control is won, criminal gangs can
not only extend their protection rackets, illegal gambling, usury, cigarette, and
drug trading; they can begin to become power brokers, mediating between ordi-
nary people and ruling politicians (Behan 1996, p. 110).
The heterogeneity of criminal groups and gangs which populate the Campanian
underworld is reflected upon the illegal activities they conduct. Smaller groups are
mostly involved in the supply of illegal goods and services, such as extortion, loan
sharking, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, exploitation of prostitution, and illegal
gambling; the most powerful and longlasting groups combine these illegal activi-
ties with infiltration into the legitimate economy and the public administration
sector (Paoli 2004; DIA 2010).

Illegal Activities

Extortion and protection constitute the core business of Italian mafias. Although
extortion is not as profitable as other illegal activities, such as usury, drug traffick-
ing, or infiltration in the public sector contracts, it does not require any initial in-
vestment, and it can be carried out without high risks or high managing costs. Be-
7

sides being a source of profit, it allows mafia groups to gain control over a specific
territory and thus exercise political power in that area, as well as it enables them to
establish contacts with legal entrepreneurs and penetrate into the legitimate econ-
omy. The sum that legal entrepreneurs are forced to pay is usually calculated on
the basis of their legal profits, so to encourage their compliance and minimize the
risk of reporting to law enforcement agencies. In some cases, however, extortion
is also exploited by mafia groups to take possession of profitable businesses by
forcing entrepreneurs to undersell their company when they are no longer able to
handle mafia organizations request of money (Paoli 2003; Savona 2012).
Extortion can take shape in different ways. The most common one involves the
request of money in exchange for protection. However, mafia groups also resort to
indirect extortion (Sciarrone 2009, p. 76). In this case, the Mafiosi establish spe-
cial relationships with a selected number of legal entrepreneurs, and they ask for
materials or services normally provided by the entrepreneurs businesses in ex-
change for protection. Another form of indirect extortion involves the request to
hire affiliates or other people related to mafia members. By giving suggestions for
hiring, mafia groups create new jobs for those who accept their presence and col-
laborate with them, and thus increase the collusive behavior within their commu-
nities (Sciarrone 2009).
Whereas extortion is common to all Italian mafia organizations, some differ-
ences emerge with regard to their presence in illegal markets and the way they
conduct their criminal activities. These differences depend on the history and cul-
ture of the three mafia groups, as well as their internal organization and their ex-
pertise. These three factors historical and cultural background, organization, and
expertise provide an explanation for the involvement of the Ndrangheta and the
Camorra in drug trafficking, an illegal business formerly run by Cosa Nostra. The
same factors also explain the involvement of the Camorra in counterfeiting and in
the illegal traffic in waste. The Neapolitan mafia has indeed exploited the need for
new places for waste disposal and the inefficiency of the public administration and
corrupt politicians to enter the market, whereas the lack of the same combination
of criminal opportunities in Sicily and Calabria have prevented Cosa Nostra and
the Ndrangheta to do the same (Savona 2012).
Together with extortion, drug trafficking is among the most profitable illegal
activities conducted by mafia organizations, and it is carried out in coexistence
with other criminal groups. Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, mafia groups tried do
gain the monopoly of the drug market both in their traditional communities and in
some Italian cities, enforcing retailers to buy solely from them, but they never
succeeded in controlling the whole exchange of drugs in an entire city or even in
one neighborhood, except for a few mafia strongholds in southern Italy (Paoli
2004; DIA 2010).
The Ndrangheta is particularly active in the illegal drug market since 1980s,
when the Calabrian mafia has succeeded in entering this profitable market partly
at the expense of Cosa Nostra, whose members were no longer considered trust-
worthy interlocutors, especially by South American drug producers. Among drug
trafficking activities, the Ndrangheta is mainly involved in the importation and
8

wholesale distribution of drugs, especially cocaine and heroin. The position of


strength of Ndrangheta families in the illegal drug market is guaranteed by their
extensive network of contacts in Center and Northern Italy, both with their affili-
ates and with external drug dealers. In the last decades, the Calabrian mafia has al-
so created outposts in foreign countries which serve as transit countries for the
smuggling of drugs (CPA 2008; DIA 2010; Ciconte 2011).
The illegal activities mafias are involved in are not limited to the trafficking of
drugs. Other illegal goods are provided by the Italian criminal organizations, such
as firearms and counterfeited products. Mafia groups are also involved in the illicit
traffic in waste, illicit gambling, loan sharking, frauds, as well as robberies and
homicides (DIA 2010). The large profits are then invested both in the illegal mar-
kets and in the legitimate economy.

Infiltration of the Legitimate Economy

The infiltration of mafia organizations in the legitimate economy has to do with


the very nature of Italian mafia groups and their claim to exercise a political do-
minion within their communities (Paoli 2004, p. 284). Extortion allows mafia
groups to achieve an indirect control of companies, by forcing them to pay for
protection services, hire specific people, or supply materials or services. Invest-
ments in the legitimate economy allow mafia organizations to extend their politi-
cal dominion by infiltrating into and controlling legitimate economic sectors. The
management of legal companies is indeed a way mafias can create new job oppor-
tunities and extend their power within their communities, as well as establish rela-
tionships with legal entrepreneurs and politicians. Also, the large illegal profits
generated from illegal activities cannot be completely reinvested in the same ille-
gal markets. The management of legal companies thus enables the mafiosi to
launder part of their money and make even more profits from investments in the
legal markets (Arlacchi 1988; Ruggiero 1996; Fanto` 1999).
Among the economic sectors, mafia groups seem to favor the public construc-
tion industry, as well as other protected sectors, i.e., those where the public ad-
ministration regulates the participation by requiring a specific license or permis-
sion and thus reduces the competition. These economic sectors are generally
characterized by a low productivity, but they do not require specific skills nor
technological innovations (Sciarrone 2009). Also, they allow mafia groups to capi-
talize on their competitive advantages, namely, the constant availability of floating
assets and the possibility to discourage the competitors by resorting to violence
(Arlacchi 1988).
9

Future Directions

Most research on Italian mafias focused on areas of their traditional presence,


namely, Western Sicily (Palermo, Agrigento, and Trapani provinces), Southern
Calabria (Reggio Calabria province), and Naples and its surroundings. Only re-
cently the interest in the mobility of criminal groups has generated a small but sig-
nificant number of studies on mafia transplantation into new territories (Sciarrone
2009; Varese 2011; Campana 2011). Different interpretations have been proposed
on whether, why, and how mafia groups expand to new and distant territories. Pe-
ter Reuter (1985) and Diego Gambetta (1993) have argued that mafia organiza-
tions tend to be local in scope and are not likely to migrate. However, examples of
successful mafia transplantation do exist (Varese 2011). The possibility that gen-
eralized migration of the population or of convicted mafiosi relocated outside their
areas of origin might foster the mobility of criminal groups has also been dis-
cussed, as well as the hypothesis that involves specific mafia expansion strategies
(Sciarrone 2009). To this day, little is known about the colonization and transplan-
tation processes, whereas a significant body of research has explored the reasons
Italian mafias emerged in their territories of origin. The adoption of more complex
interpretations of the mobility of criminal groups might help identify the factors
that foster transplantation and that make it successful

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