[CASE DIGEST (ARTICLE 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE)]

Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

PADILLA V MAGDUA
GR No. 176858

(September 15, 2010)

FACTS:

(1) Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the

land transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-
heirs. Juanita, the mother of the heirs had allegedly executed a notarized
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4
June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land.

(2) The land was subsequently sold by Ricardo's daughters, Josephine

Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua
(Dominador).

RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the
Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of
an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs
appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then
prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to
question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical
that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo's daughters in favor of Dominador.

ISSUE:

The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by

prescription.

APPLICABLE LAW/S: Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in

the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

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Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period

of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-

owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. (400a)

Section 1, Rule 9 of the rules of Court. Defenses and objections not

pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
case.

HELD:

No, it has not prescribed.

Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a

co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or
other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing. In the present case, all three requisites have been met.

After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of

their mother's land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the
plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as
his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly,
Ricardo's interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In

Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe
in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had
repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period
begins to run.

However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run

only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo's
repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the
RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-
year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription
period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over
the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.

In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied

upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription,
insufficiently established Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to the
land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine
who among the parties are legally entitled to the land.

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 [CASE DIGEST (ARTICLE 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE)]
Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR v. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON

475 SCRA 73
(2005)

FACTS:

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in

good faith and with just title for a period of ten years while extraordinary
acquisitive prescription only requires uninterrupted adverse possession for
thirty years.

Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs.

Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a Joint Affidavit he executed
with Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration in Restars
name. The same covers a 5,918 square meter parcel of land in Aklan
which was among the properties left by Restar. Flores thereafter sought the
issuance of another Tax Declaration in his name. Flores later on died.

Ten years later, the heirs of Flores sisters, Dolores R. Cichon, et. al.
(Heirs of Cichon) filed a Complaint against Flores heirs for partition of the
lot, declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan
alleging that the widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on
to the lot to finance the education of her children, to which they agreed on
the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be
divided into eight equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot,
the defendants Flores heirs refused, they claiming that they were the lawful
owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores. Flores heirs claimed
that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more
than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time
immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce
of the lot or that upon Flores death in 1989, Esmenia requested the
plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her childrens education,
they contending that by 1977, the children had already finished their
respective courses.

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

The RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores and his heirs had
performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership,
concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision finding that there was no adequate notice by
Flores to his co-heirs of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither
was there a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right
to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs claim of ownership.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Heirs of Flores acquired ownership over the lot by

extraordinary prescription

HELD:

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be

ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten
years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession
for thirty years.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-
owners of the lot by intestate succession. Heirs of Chichon never
possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until
January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the
present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars
death and exercised acts of dominion thereon tilling and cultivating the
land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof. Flores
possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription
after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article
1137 of the New Civil Code.

Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of
one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also
had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
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Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit 20). If they were
able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of
the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from
their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers
and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated
in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his

co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of
Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit
stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of
respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without
respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued
enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents.
And Flores adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had
for more than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and
continuous possession in the concept of owner which length of
possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of the
heirs of Cichon, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he and
his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is
unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights.

Dura lex sed lex.

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS

FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR., ET AL. VS. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 210252.

(June 16, 2014)

FACTS:

Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and

respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra,
David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their
parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion
C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.

The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the

subject property. In 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for
partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on
dismissed as neither of the parties appeared and appealed.

Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of

Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result,
TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in the
names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their 7/10
undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the
spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as
a result.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages

against respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents lifetime,
the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of their 10
children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the
subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They
had been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of

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the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly entitled to equitable title.
Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds was denied.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners cause of

action was already barred by estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners
offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is an admission petitioners
part that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged
the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses
Candelario had to redeem the property. Not having been repaid, the
Candelarios accepted their share in the subject property as payment.
Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the
property.

RTC: dismissed petitioners complaint, as it did not find merit in

petitioners asseverations that they have acquired title over the property
through acquisitive prescription and noted there was no document
evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer
of the siblings interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was
upheld.

CA: upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is
co-owned by the plaintiffs- appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and
defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided interest) and
considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey
building at the back portion of the property, partition is in order, in accord
with the subdivision plan.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the
property;

2. Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for partition is already

barred by laches

or res judicata; and

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision

agreement as basis for the partition of the property.

HELD:

PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over

the property. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must

concur, namely:

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in

the real property subject of the action; and

(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting

cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners cause of

action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first
requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of

whether or not petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or
equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is generally improper for
Us to delve into.In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show
that petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to
substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that
respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the
Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from
the petitioners. Petitioners inability to offer evidence tending to prove that
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the
property in favor of petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim.

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by
preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, petitioners failed to discharge the
said burden. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10
siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the
spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses became co-
owners of the same.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.

As to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim,

the petitioners countered that the action for partition has already been
barred by res judicata.

The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice
satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is understandable why
petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However,
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot
defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. This is pertinent
to Article 494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does
not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is
interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific shares so as to
prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the
law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must
prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is
not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation,
that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494 is
an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even
if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it
is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

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This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be
barred by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases
concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the
respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a
competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is
improper for co- ownership does not or no longer exists.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now

proceed to petitioners second line of attack. According to petitioners, the
claim for partition is already barred by laches since by 1999, both
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent
siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in
2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent
siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from
claiming the same for they could not have acquired a better right than their
predecessors-in-interest.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or
should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The
principle is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the
character of the petitioners title, but only with whether or not by reason of
the respondents long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be
barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so
would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be

said to have neglected to assert their right over the subject property. They
cannot be considered to have abandoned their right given that they filed an
action for partition. The fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is
evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over the same.

The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is

merit, however, in petitioners contention that the CA erred in approving the
proposal for partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier
cited, provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of
Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and
petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition for respondents admitted that
the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in
preparing the same. The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation
whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with
petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to
approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing
respondent spouses to divide unilaterally the property among the co-
owners based on their own whims and caprices.

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

RAUL ARAMBULO AND TERESITA DELA CRUZ VS GENARO

NOLASCO AND JEREMY NOLASCO

(March 26, 2014)

FACTS:

Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a

233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was
succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.

On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that

all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective
shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-
owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in
common, the courts may afford adequate relief.

Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell,
because they were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding
the sale of the property.

RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their
consent to sale.

Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.

CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel
Nolasco to give their consent.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this
withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.

HELD:

CA was correct.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a coowner is

entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co

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owner without the consent of the other coowners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the coownerseller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a coowner of the property.

To be a coowner of a property does not mean that one is deprived

of every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the
previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.

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INING V. VEGA
703 SCRA, 406
(August 12, 2013)

FACTS:

Leon died without issue. His heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. The heirs of
Romana are herein respondents, while the heirs of Gregoria are the
petitioners. Leonardo (ROMANA SIDE) filed a case for partition, recovery
of ownership and possession, with damages, against GREGORIAs heirs.
Leonardo mentioned that he kept asking for partition but this was
unheeded. It was in 1979, LucimoSr (Antipolo, who is a kid of Gregoria was
survived by this man and others) claimed absolute ownership and deprived
Leonardo of the benefits of the land. Lucimo argues that Enriquez already
bought the land from Leon, and that Lucimo side had bought the property
from Enriquez. RTC held that there was never any sale to an Enriquez but
GREGORIA HEIRS but because off adverse possession for 30 years, the
action of Leonardo had already prescribed. CA held that prescription began
to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of
his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo.

SC held that no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs

against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. The act of making the affidavit equated to a repudiation.) For
prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
HOWEVER, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not
an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to
Antipolos daughter Teodora. One who is merely related by affinity to the
decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of
the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of
the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedents
heirs.

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Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the

owner of a parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by OCT RO-630. Leon
and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings
RomanaRoldan (Romana) and GregoriaRoldanIning (Gregoria), who are
now both deceased.

RESPONDENTS are the heirs of ROMANA. PETITIONERS are the

heirs of GREGORIA.

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property

belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC
of Kalibo a case for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregorias heirs. Leonardo alleged that on several
occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregorias heirs
refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level of the
LuponTagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action
sometime in 1980; that Gregorias heirs claimed sole ownership of the
property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera,
which portions must be collated and included as part of the portion to be
awarded to Gregorias heirs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the
owner of half of the subject property.

In their Answer, herein petitioners claimed that Leonardo had no

cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of
the subject property; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse,
notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they
have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardos claim is
barred by estoppel and laches.

The trial court dismissed the complaint of Leonardo on the ground

that his right right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the
New Civil Code. Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071)
to be the common property of the heirs of GregoriaRoldanIning and by
virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer
certificate of title to the heirs of Gregoria. It also found that the April 4, 1943
and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that
Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold

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the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of
Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leons siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and
the respondents are entitled to Romanasshare as the latters successors.

However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from
Leons death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the partition
case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same
was already barred by prescription. It held that under Article 1141 of the
Civil Code, an action for partition and recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property
which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for his long
inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property
should go to Gregorias heirs exclusively.

The CA did not agree with the trial courts pronouncement that
Leonardos action for partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared
that prescription began to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from
Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo
Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a
new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a
repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which
repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive
period under Article 1141.

ISSUE:

W/N case should be dismissed on the ground of prescription/laches. NO

HELD:

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Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn,
Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein became entitled to
the property upon the sisters passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code,
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject

property.Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-
owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so
in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way
as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights.They have the full ownership
of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in
their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. Finally, no prescription shall run in favor
of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-

owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation
of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-
owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing."

From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court

erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek
partition from the death of Leon in 1962.Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth
paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-
owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other
co-owners.

Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the property only

sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name,
and informed the latter before the LuponTagapamayapa of his 1943
purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation were followed
later on by Lucimo Sr.s act of withholding Leonardos share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his
Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription
began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in 1980 when it
has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the
co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA
thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under
20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under
Article 1141.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts notice, however, is that
while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a
co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely
Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.Under
the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the

property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation
of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason,

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Jesylene S. Apolonio
PROPERTY 2JD

prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a
partition of the property has not been lost.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the

existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any
time.

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