ELNA MARCADO-FEHR VS BRUNO FEHR

Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 [Article 147 Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage; Article 36 -
Psychological Incapacity]

FACTS:

In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and lived with
him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on
installment. They got married in 1985.

In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The properties were divided
into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children. The custody of children was awarded to
Elna, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG
Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior
his marriage.

Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the
Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna of the
previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately
among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna filed special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its Decision dismissed the petition for
review for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.

RULING:

No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno and the
property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite 204
was acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said
property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36. All these
elements are present in the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the common properties of Elna
and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable marriages and to void marriages under
Article 40 of the Family Code.

Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage
ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANG

Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997

FACTS;

Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second
marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural
land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also purchased a house and lot in
Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of
Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.

Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession
with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house and lot allegedly bought
by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the
respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed
the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.

RULING:

No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.

The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is
Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de
facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she was only
around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00
as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only
22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name
alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find
no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina
Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family
Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their
daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically
and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
FRENZEL v. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

Ponente: J. CALLEJO Sr.

DOCTRINE:

A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored with
Ederlina that he bought her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in Davao
City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina
was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter to leave her wife
alone.

When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a
divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself
was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all
contacts with her.

On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life
savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring
for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the
amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties

HELD:

No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real
vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may
not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is
unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them
Manalo vs CA

Manalo vs CA

GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased
left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8
of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their
late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was
set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.

ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise
should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement
and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear
from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the
Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition
for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding
and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause
of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
Pedro Gayon v. Silvestre Gayon

G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970

Ponente: Chief Justice Concepcion

Facts:

Appeal by plaintiff from CFI Iloilo dismissal of his case. On July 31, 1967, Pedro complained against
defendant spouses Silvestre and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that on October 1, 1952, spouses sold to
Pedro Gelera, for P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land in Guimbal, Iloilo, including improvements
thereon, subject to redemption within 5years or not later 1957; that said right not exercised by them, or
any of their heirs or successors, despite period expiration; that Gelera sold the land on March 21, 1961,
to Pedro. Pedro had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements; that he had fully paid taxes on said
property up to 1967; NCC1606 and 1616 require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and
to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in
plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property. Genoveva
said her husband died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of the case, that the deed where
they sold property to Gelera was fake, her signature forged, and they never executed such document,
and that complaint is malicious and embarrassed her and her children, for they had to employ counsel.
And that being brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable
settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed
and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages. On September 19, 1967, dismissed for Silvestre was
dead (absolute owner, wife nothing to do with it).

Issue:

Whether or not such dismissal was valid.

Held:

No. Wife has something to do with property, being widow, she is a compulsory heir, interested, and her
motion was necessary so that other successors in interest instead of deceased could be made parties to
the case. If heirs included as defendants, they cannot be sued as representatives of decedent, but rather
as owners an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may
still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a
previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent. Concerning FC151 (compromise efforts) applies to suits "filed or maintained
between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however,
be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: (1) Between husband and
wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among
brothers and sisters. Genoveva is plaintiffs sister-in-law, not part of enumeration, so failure to seek
compromise before filing of complaint does not bar. Remanded to lower court of administrator as
defendant, or heirs if in absence.
Manacop vs CA

Manacop vs. CA

GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The
latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which
triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction
President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153
of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his
property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
Modequillo v Breva, G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

MODEQUILLO v. BREVA (1990)

FACTS:

1. On 29 January 1988, a judgment was rendered by the CA entitled Salinas etal v Modequillo,
rendering a judgment in faovr of petitioners and directing therein respondents to jointly and
severally pay its liabilities.

2. As the said judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao to satisfy
judgment on the goods and chattels of the respondents Modequillo and Malubay.

3. On 07 July 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of now
herein petitioner Modequillo. The latter filed a motion to quash the levy of execution alleging
therein that the residential lanf is where the family home is built in 1969 and that such is
exemot from execution, forced sale or attachment, provided in Articles 152 and 153 of the
Family Code.

4. However, in 1988, the RTC denied the motion. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed thereof
but was again denied.

5. Hence, this present case. Petitioner asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied
as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the Family
Code.

ISSUE: WON a final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of
a family home constituted under the Family Code?

RULING:

NO.

1. Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. If the family actually resides in its premises, it is therefore a
family home as contemplated by law.

2. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extradjudicially under the Civil Code. it became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code, upon the effectivity of the same.

3. However, the contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time
it was occupied in 1969 cannot be well taken. Under Article 162 of the FC, it is provided that all
exisiting family residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to benefits; it does not state that the provisions of it has a
retroactive effect,
Patricio VS. Dario

G.R. NO. 170829

November 20, 2006

FACTS:

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition
the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by
spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein
namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:

W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing
therein.

HELD:

No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1)
the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next
nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
INTERNET UY VS CHUA
Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition
to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before
he married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo
was conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private
respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is
strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The petition was denied.

Andal vs Macaraig

Andal vs. Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951

FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis
Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of
Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with
them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from
his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias
father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June
17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former
is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the
initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can
be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit
intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation
between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.
JANICE MARIE JAO VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:34 PM

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28 1987

FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico V. Jao.
Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by
the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and
Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared the
child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have been
conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of irregularity or
mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the
1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with in Co
Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and
types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended
that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert
cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a
"possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial,
tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father of the child."
Tison vs. CA

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, March 30, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora
Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The present
action for reconveyance involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment which was originally
owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute.
Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter.

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro
Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.

Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of
Hermogenes

Held: NO. the private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is
the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none
even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
Macadangdang vs. CA [1980]

FACTS:

Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had
intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967.

October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) she gave birth to a baby
boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.

April 25, 1972 Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.

February 27, 1973 lower court dismissed the complaint.

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando to be
an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was
denied.

ISSUE:

WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth
Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES

HELD:

In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified but not the veracity of the states or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held
that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be
shown by proof recognized by law.

The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court of appeals that
Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which is
self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence.

Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts

The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court

When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record.

Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress

Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child,
but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in
Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable,
for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the
wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case

During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no
concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of access
between Elizabeth and Crispin.

Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the
possibility of access to one another.

The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven months from the
separation of the spouses.

Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of the
spouses. (note the baby was not premature). This presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first
120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.

The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception.

In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved.

Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the husband
at the time of the conception was not impossible and there is the presumption that a child so
born is the child of the husband and legitimate even though the wife was guilty of infidelity
during the possible period of conception.
 MENDOZA vs CA
DOCTRINE Requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding
pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
(citing Franciscos RoC commentaries)
FACTS Teopista Toring Tufiacao alleged that she was born to Brigida Toring, who was then
single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by
treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
illegitimate child.

Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs
allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees. He denied it
to his dying day.

RTC: rejected Teopistas claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of
a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor
declared: Teopista continuously lived with her mother, together with her sister
Paulina. At most, only their son, Lolito Tufiacao was allowed to construct a small
house in the land of Casimiro, either by Casimiro or by Vicente Toring. Casimiro
never spent for her support and education. He did not allow her to carry his
surname. The instances when the defendant gave money were, more or less, off-
and-on or rather isolatedly periodicAll these acts, taken altogether, are not
sufficient to show that the plaintiff had possessed continuously the status of a
recognized illegitimate child.

CA: Teopista has sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status. We
consider the witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and unbiased. Vicente Toring was
an interested party who was claiming to be the sole recognized natural child of
Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if Teopista's claim were recognized.

PLAINTIFFs 1. Teopistas testimony: testified that it was her mother who told her that her father
evidence was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because
Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married
Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it
so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds
of the sale to her and her husband.
In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and
later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring.
On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-
depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the
passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing
Margarita.

2. Lolito Tufiacao testimony: corroborated his mother and said he considered

Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever
they saw each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite
him to his house and give him jackfruits. When his grandfather learned that he was
living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's land.
 3. Gaudencio Mendozas testimony: said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew
Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro
himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for
their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and
giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at
Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to
Brigida.

4. Isaac Mendozas testimony: said that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista
because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida
Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro
paid him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to
be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain
properties to Teopista.
DEFENDANTs [Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took
evidence the stand to resist Teopista's claim.]

1. 1. Vicente Torings testimony: professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by

Brigida Toring, declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter
named Ondoy, who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to
Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who
permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when
Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father.
2.
3. 2. Julieta Ouanos testimony: (Julieta is Casimiro's niece) also affirmed that Teopista
never visited Casimiro when he was hospitalized and that Vicente Toring used to
work as a cook in Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but
she knew her husband, who was a mechanic.

ISSUES WON Teopista has sufficiently proven that she is illegitimate child of Casimiro.
RULING YES, thru another method.

SC notes that both RTC and CA focused on the question of whether or not Teopista
was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based
her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under CC Art. 283.

"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.

Agreed w/ RTC and adopted RTCs ratiocination that Teopista HAS NOT BEEN in
continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child under both CC
Art. 283 and FC Art. 172.

(Relevant) HOWEVER, although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find
that she has nevertheless established that status by another method.

An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means
allowed by the ROC and special laws," according to the CC, or "by evidence or proof
in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the FC. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
 silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of RoC.

Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay

rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils
are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.
Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain
safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates
the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration
regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.

2. The pedigree must be in issue.

3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.

4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.

5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar.

1. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the
mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at
the time of Isaac's testimony.
2. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro,
which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
3. [mother and brother]
4. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro.
5. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by
evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.

The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.

And also considering the other circumstances testified to, especially the joint saving
account opened by Casimiro, SC holds that Teopista has sufficiently established that
she is the illegitimate child of Casimiro.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied, Teopista declared illegitimate child of Casimiro.

Guevara vs Guevara

GR No L-5405

Facts

-26 August 1931- Victorino L. Guevara, resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan executed a

will. The will contains the distribution of assorted movables and residential lot of
Victorino L. Guevara among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara and
stepchildren, Vivencio, Edwigis, Dionista, Candida and Pio Guevara.

-Victorino Guevara also bequeathed to his 2nd wife Augustia Posada various movables,
portion of 25 ha to be taken out of a 259 odd ha parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618 And
another 5 ha in settlement of her widows usufruct.

-Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond

-12 July 1933- Victorino executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying
to the latter the southern hall of the 259 ha lot heretofore mentioned and expressly
recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half.

-1 November 1932- Victorino and Ernesto jointly applied for registration of the big parcel
in view of the sale from the former to the latter. The decree was issued in the name of
Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a certificate of title being issued in
his sole name on 12 October 1933.

-27 September 1933- Victorino Guevara died but his will was not filed for probate

-1937- Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the deceased

Victorino and on the assumption that he had died intestate, brought suit against Ernesto
Guevara to recover 423,492 sq m.

-CA rendered decision in favor of Rosario but SC modified judgment upon certiorari.

-Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for
Rosario in the former litigation, was allowed to intervene in view of his duly recorded
attorneys lien

-31 January 1946- Ernesto Guevara, through counsel filed a motion to dismiss petition
on grounds:

a. petition itself alleged that will was revoked

b. whatever right to probate the parties may have has already prescribed

c. purpose of the probate was solely to have petitioner Rosario declared on

acknowledged natural child of the deceased.

-9 December 1946- motion to dismiss was denied

Issues

1. Whether or not the original of the record on appeal did not comply with the Rules of
Court?

2. Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over the case?

3. Whether or not the petition for probate of the will of Victorino L. Guevara is
barred by the statute of limitations, considering that the testator died on September
27, 1933, and that the petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years
later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945.

Held

1. No. The first ground is predicated upon the fact that, instead of transcribing the
motions, petitions, orders and resolutions incorporated in the original record on appeal,
Respondents herein merely attached to the original copy of said record on appeal, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, their own copies of said motions,
petitions, orders and resolutions. Accordingly, the copy of said record on appeal
furnished to Petitioner herein did not contain or enclose the aforementioned parts of
the record. It appears, however, that the Respondents were given several extensions of
time within which to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and that
Respondents eventually did so. There being no question about the authority of the court
of first instance to grant said extensions of time, it is clear that the first ground, relied
upon by Petitioner herein, is untenable.

2. No. Petitioner maintains the negative, upon the ground that the appeal involved only
questions of law. This is not correct, for the very motion for reconsideration
adverted to above, indicated that the appeal raised some issues of fact, such
as, for instance, whether or not the will in question was in the possession of
Respondent Rosario Guevara and whether Respondent Quinto had been authorized by
her to perfect the appeal on her behalf. At any rate, the case is now before us and, upon
examination of the record and consideration of all the issues therein raised, we are of
the opinion that, had the appeal been forwarded directly to this Court, we would have
disposed of it in the manner set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the review
of which is sought by herein Appellant.

3. No. Section 1299 declares that any

person interested in the estate may at any time after the death of the testator, petition
the court having jurisdiction to have the will proved. This implies that there is no
arbitrary time limit.

Section 1317 declares:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary If the court is satisfied, upon the proof

taken or from the facts found by the jury that the will was duly executed and that the will
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting
under duress menace fraud, or undue influence, a certificate of the proof and the facts
found, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court, must be attached to the
will.

Under Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no
debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the
estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in
accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless
those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of
the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law
and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it,
because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted
to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.

In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below
failed to notice that its doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition
and violative of the owners right to control his property within the legal limits. The
appealed order in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs
interested in their suppression.

Ruling

Petition denied
SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:15 PM

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to
use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the
deceased father, and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The
trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname
of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission
made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father
in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child
is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

OR

ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity

RULING: YES.

RATIONALE:
Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by
putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.

Special circumstances to the case:

Died 2 months prior to childs birth

Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented

Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to be affected

by their hereditary rights

The Court then adopted the ff. rules:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent

2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence
MONTEFALCON vs. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
Facts: Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands.
Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own
family. Vasquez was declared in default for failure to answer the service of summons(substituted). The
court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year, Vasquez
surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the court.
Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it
never acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which
was allegedly excessive and exorbitant. The appellate court granted Vasquezs contention.

ISSUE:

Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

HELD:

YES. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172,
appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. Laurences record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of
evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores.
He signed as father in Laurences certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data
entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if
the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no
further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a
consummated act. As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners
were able to prove that.
Constantino vs Mendez

Constantino vs. Mendez

209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly
support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a
restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted
being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became
pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as
Ivans illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of
November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely
testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November,
1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse
indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with
Ivan.
Conde vs. Abaya Case Digest

Conde vs. Abaya

13 Phil 249

Facts: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899.
Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had
by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession.

An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano,
came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of
the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore
entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate.

Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by
Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the
matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano
Abaya.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the natural child
from Casiano Abaya.

Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As
exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she
died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as
the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole
lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. The right of
action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
Jison vs CA

Jison vs. CA

GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and
when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza
Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was
likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA
and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence
of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed
by the former;

2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not
her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her
filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to
establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous
possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
Legitimes: Compulsory Heirs

149. Tayag vs CA

PROPERTY INVOLVES SEVERAL MILLIONS OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES.

FACTS:

(1)Respondent Emilie Cayugan in her capacity as the mother and the legal guardian of minor
Chad D. Cayugan filed a complaint of Claim for Inheritance against the Petitioner Corito
Ocampo who is the administratix of the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo.

(2)Respondent Emilie Cayugan has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cayugan.
Respondent and Atty. Ocampo had an illicit relationship with each other. As a result of the illicit
relationship, they begot a child named Chad Cuyugan.

(3)Chad had been showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by the putative
father for being his only son. This affection can be proven through letters and documents.

(4) RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:

a. although he is illegitimate he is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate

left by his deceases father, AS ONE OF THE SURVIVING HEIRS.
b. she is asking for a financial support from the estate of the putative father for she has no
means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity

c. the plaintiff refused to satisfy the claim for the inheritance against the estate of the
deceased.

(5) The estate of the deceased has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the
inheritance of the surviving heirs including Chad has not been likewise been ascertained.

(6) PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS

IMPORTANT GROUND: the complaint merely alleged that the minor Chad is an
illegitimate of the child of the deceased and actually asking for the claim of the inheritance, --
THIS MAYBE CONSIDERED AS ONE TO COMPEL RECOGNITION. Also, the letters and documents
are not a sufficient evidence, the father can no longer testify that he really made it and to
establish such filiation child must brought the action during the lifetime of the father.

a. action is premature

b. no cause of action

c. barred of prescription

d. she has no legal standing and no judicial personality

e. court has no jurisdiction

(7) RTC: ordered that the motion to dismiss be denied.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chad has the right to claim over his share of inheritance in the estate of
the deceased?

HELD:

Yes. Chad has the right to claim over his share on the estate of the deceased.

RATIONALE:

(THE MOTHER PROVED THE FILIATION OF THE SON AND HE FILED IT WITHIN THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD)

In this case, SC ruled that if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, final
judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a
private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the child. However, if the action is based on the continuous possession by the child of the
status of an illegitimate child, that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.

ARTICLE 285 of the Civil Code is the controlling factor since the alleged parent died during the
the minority of the child, the action of the for the filiation may be filed within four years from
the attainment of the majority of the minor. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of
action has not
yet prescribed.

Moreover, the right of the action of the minor child has been vested by filing of the complaint
in court under the regime of the CIvil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.

CITED CASE: Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact
of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

NOTE:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

EXCERPT FROM THE LETTERS OF THE DECEASED TO THE RESPONDENT

. Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have
now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.

. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our sake and for the child sake.

. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my
name and let me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.

. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.

. . . How is CHAD and you . . .

. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love
each other and CHAD is the product of our love.