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Three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property.
JUNE 24, 2015 / LEAVE A COMMENT

(The following is cited from Spouses Bonifacio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132424, May 2, 2006)
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and
(c)accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession
of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of
last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical
possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than
one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal
detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action
for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not
doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior
court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court
provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit
is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to
have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in
the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be
that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is
in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court
upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of
the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that
the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. (Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus,
in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent
alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which
was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased
mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will
prosper, the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under
TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent
was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they
had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to
vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer
cases of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners cause of action fails.The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made
the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was
unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy
the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of
petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was
effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized
as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited
in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner;
and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court,
in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been
present at the beginning of the possession. x x x

xxxx

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that
would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of
the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1)
respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was
by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of action
is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents
occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or
tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.
Accion Reivindicatoria
(The following is cited from Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, et. al., G.R. No. 118328 October 8,
1998)
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different
from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better
right to possess without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc., this Court held
that:
We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of
unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege
plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived
of such possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, for if the dispossession did not
take place by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have
jurisdiction.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands.
Thus, whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he
may maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to
wait until the expiration of twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed
or declared to be owner of the land. Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions
to recover possession of real property illegally detained, together with rents due and
damages, even though one (1) year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal
detention, provided the question of ownership of such property is also involved. In other
words, if the party illegally dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal
dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property he may commence such
action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal
dispossession. If he decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and the
action is filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession,
then the Court of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case. The former is
an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession,
while the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the recovery of the right to possess
and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance.

Accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil

proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal right to possess,
independently of title
 It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack
of consideration.
It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect

Accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil

proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal right to possess,
independently of title
Posted on February 2, 2012by Erineus
Besides, it must be emphasized that this case is one for recovery of possession, also known
as accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary
civil proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently
of title.[10] The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only,
not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue
of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession where the issue
of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue
of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.[11]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/165851.htm

OWNERSHIP

OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL

Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (n)

OWNERSHIP

Independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his

possession, enjoyment, disposition and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those
imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of the law

KINDS OF OWNERSHIP

1. Full ownershipall rights of an owner

2. Naked ownershipownership where the right to the use and the fruits have been
denied
3. Sole ownershipownership is only vested in one person
4. Co-ownership

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the
thing in order to recover it. (348a)

7 RIGHTS OF AN OWNER UNDER ROMAN LAW

Jus possidendi -The right to possess

Jus utendi -The right to use

Jus fruendi -The right to the fruits

Jus abutendi -The right to consume

Jus disponendi -The right to dispose

Jus vindicandi -The right to recover

Jus accessiones -The right to accessories

ACTIONS TO RECOVER

1. Replevin
2. Accion interdictalforcible entry and unlawful detainer
3. Accion publiciana
4. Accion reinvidicatoria
5. Writ of possession | writ of demolition
6. Writ of preliminary injunction

REPLEVIN

An action or provisional remedy where the complainant prays for the recovery of the
possession of PERSONAL PROPERTY

FORCIBLE ENTRY

> Summary action to recover material or physical possession of real property when a
person originally in possession was deprived thereof by force, intimidation, strategy,
threat or stealth
> Action must be brought within 1 year from the dispossession

> Issue involved is mere physical possession or possession de facto and not juridical
possession nor ownership

UNLAWFUL DETAINER

> Action that must be brought when the possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or
other person of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied

>Action must be brought within one year from last demand letter

ACCION PUBLICIANA

> Recovery of the better right to possess, and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding before the RTC
>Must be brought within a period of 10 years otherwise the real right to possess is
lost

> Issue is possession de jure

ACCION REINVIDICATORIA

> Action to recover ownership over real property

> Must be brought in the RTC

> It must be brought within 10 or 30 years as the case may be

> Issue involved is ownership and for this purpose, evidence of title or mode may be
introduced

> It is permissible to file both an action for ownership and for detainer over the
same land, and between the same parties, because the issues involved are different

WRIT OF INJUNCTION

> A person deprived of his possession of real or personal property is ordinarily not allowed
to avail himself of this remedy, the reason being that the defendant in actual possession
is presumed disputably to have the better right

WRIT OF POSSESSION

> Used in connection with the Land Registration Law is an order directing the sheriff
to place a successful registrant under the Torrens system in possession of the property
covered by a decree of the Court
OWNERSHIP HAS LIMITATIONS

1. Those given by the State or the laws

2. Those given by the owner himself
3. Those given by the person who gave the right to its present owner

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)

DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP

> The right to counter force with force

> Comparable with self-defense under justifying circumstances in Criminal Law

Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon. (388)

Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to
injure the rights of a third person. (n)

NO INJURY TO RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS

> This is one of the fundamental bases of police power and constitutes a just
restriction on the right of ownership

Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another
with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and
the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is
much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the
damage to him. (n)

STATE OF NECESSITY

ANALOGOUS TO THE RULE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW

Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another doesn't incur criminal liability provided that the following requisites
are present:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
3. That there be no other practical or less harmful means of preventing it

Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable

presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property. (n)

RULE OF EVIDENCE

REQUIREMENTS TO HAVE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION

1. Actual possession of the property

2. Claim of ownership

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim. (n)

REQUISITES IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER

1. Identity of the property
2. Strength of the plaintiffs title

Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent

authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.

Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a
proper case, restore the owner in his possession. (349a)

EMINENT DOMAIN V. EXPROPRIATION

- Eminent domain is the power of the state and expropriation is the proceeding

Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the
interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to
compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.
(n)

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and
subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)

SURFACE RIGHT OF A LAND OWNER

Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other
property on which it is found.

Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the

State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to
the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the
treasure.

If the things found be of interest to science of the arts, the State may acquire them
at their just price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated.
(351a)

Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown
deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which
does not appear. (352)

RULES REGARDING HIDDEN TREASURES

1. If the treasure is not hidden, there is no 50-50 sharing
2. If the precious metals are in their raw state, it will be owned by the State by virtue of
the Regalian doctrine
3. If the owner finds the treasure in his own land, he owns the treasure
4. If finder finds it not in his own land, there is 50-50 sharing with the owner of the land
5. If the finder is hired, then compensation or salary or fixed fee will be given to him
6. If the finder is a trespasser, then he would not receive anything

2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT REGARDING BY CHANCE

1. If there is deliberate search, it is not to be construed as by chance

2. Even if there is a deliberate search, still by chance since there is uncertainity of
finding a treasure

1.FIRST DIVISION

VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, G.R. No. 169793

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr., and

Chico-Nazario, JJ.

NIEVES AMIGO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

September 15, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1,

consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2
consisting of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-
way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707
square meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio
Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano
Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed
an Affidavit of Waiver[2] on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in favor of
her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the
subdivision of the land into two lots[3] and the issuance of titles in his name on July 18,
1996.[4]

Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion
of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano
Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T-
256651 were issue to petitioner.

Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter[5] dated Febuary 1, 2001
demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry
return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent
on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent still
refused to vacate the subject property.Thereafter, on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a
complaint[6] for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030. In his
Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a
portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the
name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities.[7]

On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which
reads:

WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a

JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M.
ENCARNACION and against the defendant NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:

a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of

land described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T-256651
he is now occupying and surrender it to the plaintiff;

b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE

THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorneys fees, and

c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per

month from February, 2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is
surrendered to the plaintiff.

COSTS against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the

ground that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this
Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-
appellee.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review[10] under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
before the Court of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to
the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to

Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT
UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER.[12]

The petition lacks merit.

In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for

forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a
summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper
inferior court;

2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and

3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for

the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional
Trial Court.[13]

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action
to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of
time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express
or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any
time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.[14] Thus, if the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and
the inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for
more than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be
brought to the proper Regional Trial Court.
 After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in this
case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.

Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein
and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.[15] On its face, the
complaint must show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony.[16]

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the
owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his
mother-in-law.He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1,
2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained
unheeded. While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on
February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the
requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally
true that petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that
time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioners
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years
have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made
his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one
for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in
the Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to
possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of
one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.[17]
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was
occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for
ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion publiciana and not one under
the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by the Court:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the
owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of
possession, they should present their claim before the regional trial court in
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession
thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
summary action for ejectment.[18]

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:

The respondents actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in

1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner
filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed anaccion
publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.

Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without

trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of
the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the
merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the
case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal
is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional
Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on
the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of
reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
 If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial
Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance
with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission
of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest
of justice.

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is
tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it
has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try
the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the
admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.[19]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-
1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings,
is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

2. FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES LYDIA FLORES-CRUZ G.R. No. 172217

and REYNALDO I. CRUZ,

Petitioners,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CORONA,

- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,*

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

SPOUSES LEONARDO and

ILUMINADA GOLI-CRUZ,

SPOUSES RICO and FELIZA

DE LA CRUZ, SPOUSES BOY

and LANI DE LA CRUZ,

ZENAIDA A. JACINTO and

ROGELIO DE LOS SANTOS,

Respondents. Promulgated:

September 18, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the August 23, 2005 decision[2] and

April 5, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81099.
 On December 15, 1999,[4] petitioner spouses Lydia Flores-Cruz and Reynaldo I. Cruz

purchased a 5,209-sq. m. lot situated in Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan[5] from Lydias

siblings, namely, Teresita, Ramon and Daniel (all surnamed Flores). Their father, Estanislao

Flores, used to own the land as an inheritance from his parents Gregorio Flores and Ana

Mangahas. Estanislao died in 1995. Estanislao and, later, petitioners paid the realty taxes

on the land although neither of them occupied it. Petitioners sold portions thereof to third

parties sometime in September 2000.[6]

After the death of Estanislao, petitioners found out that respondent spouses

Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz et al. were occupying a section of the land. Initially,

petitioner Lydia talked to respondents and offered to sell them the portions they were

occupying but the talks failed as they could not agree on the price. On March 2, 2001,

petitioners lawyer sent respondents letters asking them to leave. These demands, however,

were ignored. Efforts at barangay conciliation also failed.[7]

Respondents countered that their possession of the land ranged from 10 to 20 years.

According to respondents, the property was alienable public land.[8] Prior to petitioners

demand, they had no knowledge of petitioners and their predecessors ownership of the

land. They took steps to legitimize their claim and paid the realty tax on their respective

areas for the taxable year 2002. Subsequently, however, the tax declarations issued to them

were cancelled by the Provincial Assessors Office and re-issued to petitioners.[9]

On August 6, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the

land in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 82.[10] Respondents filed

a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case
as it should have been filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) since it was a summary
action for ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion in an

order dated November 9, 2001.[11]

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated October 3, 2003 in favor of petitioners

and ordered respondents to vacate the land, and pay attorneys fees and costs of suit.[12]

On appeal by respondents to the CA, the latter, in a decision dated August 23, 2005,

ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for recovery of possession because

petitioners had been dispossessed of the property for less than a year. It held that the

complaint was one for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC. Thus, it

ruled that the RTC decision was null and void. Reconsideration was denied on April 5,

2006.

Hence, this petition.

The issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over this case.

The petition has no merit.

It is axiomatic that the nature of the action on which depends the question of

whether a suit is within the jurisdiction of the court is determined solely by the allegations

in the complaint[13] and the law at the time the action was commenced.[14] Only facts alleged

in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action and the courts
competence to take cognizance of it. [15] One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the
complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action

thereby initiated.[16]

Petitioners complaint contained the following allegations:

xxx xxx xxx

3. That, [petitioners] are owners of a piece of land known as Lot 30-

part, Cad. 349 located at Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan as shown by a copy of
Tax Declaration No. 99-01010-01141 made [an] integral [part] hereof as
Annex A;

4. That, said Lot No. 30-part was acquired through [purchase] on

December 15, 1999, as shown by [a] Deed of Absolute Sale of Unsubdivided
Land made [an] integral [part] hereof as Annex B, B-1 & B-2;

5. That, when [petitioners] inspected subject property, they found it to

be occupied by at least five (5) households under the names of herein
[respondents], who, when asked about their right to stay within the premises
replied that they were allowed to live thereat by the deceased former owner;

6. That, [petitioners] informed the [respondents] that as far as they

are concerned, the latters occupancy was not communicated to them so it
follows that they do not have any right to remain within subject piece of land;

7. That, [respondents] seem to be unimpressed and made no move to

leave the premises or to come to terms with the [petitioners] so much so that
[the latter] asked their lawyer to write demand letters to each and everyone
of the [respondents] as shown by the demand letters dated March 2, 2001
made integral part hereof as Annex C, C-1, C-2, C-3, & C-4;
 8. That, there is no existing agreement or any document that illustrate
whatever permission, if any were given, that the [respondents] presented to
[petitioners] in order to legitimize the claim;

9. That, it is clear that [respondents] occupy portions of subject

property either by stealth, stratagem, force or any unlawful manner which
are just bases for ejectment;

xxx xxx xxx [17]

According to the CA, considering that petitioners claimed that respondents were

possessors of the property by mere tolerance only and the complaint had been initiated

less than a year from the demand to vacate, the proper remedy was an action for unlawful

detainer which should have been filed in the MTC.

We agree.

The necessary allegations in a complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[18] Petitioners alleged that the former owner (Estanislao, their

predecessor) allowed respondents to live on the land. They also stated that they purchased

the property on December 15, 1999 and then found respondents occupying the

property. Yet they demanded that respondents vacate only on March 2, 2001. It can be

gleaned from their allegations that they had in fact permitted or tolerated respondents

occupancy.
 Based on the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is apparent that such is a

complaint for unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance of the owner. [19] It is a

settled rule that in order to justify such an action, the owners permission or tolerance must

be present at the beginning of the possession.[20] Such jurisdictional facts are present here.

There is another reason why petitioners complaint was not a proper action for

recovery of possession cognizable by the RTC. It is no longer true that all cases of recovery

of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC regardless of the value of the

property.[21]

When the case was filed in 2001, Congress had already approved Republic Act No.

7691[22] which expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to include other actions involving title to or

possession of real property (accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria)[23] where the assessed

value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro

Manila).[24] Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving possession

of real property has been filed in the proper court no longer depends solely on the type of

action filed but also on the assessed value of the property involved.[25] More specifically,
since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion

reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property), jurisdiction

over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of the

property.[26]

This issue of assessed value as a jurisdictional element in accion publiciana was not

raised by the parties nor threshed out in their pleadings.[27] Be that as it may, the Court
can motu proprio consider and resolve this question because jurisdiction is conferred only
by law.[28] It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the

parties.[29]

To determine which court (RTC or MTC) has jurisdiction over the action, the

complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or

the interest thereon.[30] The complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed

value of the property. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had

jurisdiction over the action of petitioners.[31] Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint

of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether it is the RTC or the

MTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.[32]

Moreover, the complaint was filed (August 6, 2001) within one year from the

demand to vacate was made (March 2, 2001). Petitioners dispossession had thus not lasted

for more than one year to justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana.[33]

Since petitioners complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer which should

have been filed in the MTC and it contained no allegation on the assessed value of the
subject property, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings

before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. [34] It follows

that the CA was correct in dismissing the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

 SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions

in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to

the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

3 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and G.R. No. 194880
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both
represented by the PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Present:
Petitioners, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
- versus - SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

Promulgated:
CORPORATION,Respondent.

June 20, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation

(NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo
Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs).[1] The main subject matter of the instant Petition is one of these four parcels of land
covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of approximately 22,294 square meters
(hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned
by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner
NPC.[2] Petitioners are being represented in this case by the Privatization Management
Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of
government assets.[3] Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
(Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the
meantime expired.

The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December

1977,[4]petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the
Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning
01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.[5] Under the Contract of Lease (the
main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of the four
parcels of land.[6]

Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property
to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease
agreements).[7]Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them
contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to
expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFIs main lease contract with
petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:[8]

The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable]

years and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for
another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVARs exclusive option.[9]

According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed

to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the
termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension thereof.[10]

During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful

improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces
therein.[11] It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject property as
parking areas for customers and guests.[12]

In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its

stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming
the functions previously performed by TRCFI.[13]
 On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract
and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI.
Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the
subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25
years.[14]On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same
desire to renew the lease over the subject property under the new rental rate and renewal
period.[15]

On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease
had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response. [16] It further
explained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could not yet be
acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be accepted. [17] Respondent
acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any
specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement over the subject
property.[18]

On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire,
petitioner NPC through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel notified
PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the contract of lease.[19] In turn, PDAF notified
respondent of NPCs decision.[20]

On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the formers decision not to renew the
lease contract.[21] The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the
corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latters assets to the former for the purpose of
selling them to raise funds.[22] On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of
petitioner Republics decision not to renew the lease and quoted the Memorandum of
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.[23]

On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease
agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF
all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land. Thereafter,
petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for disposition.
Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.

On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to
completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.[24] The latter duly received
the Notice from the OSG through registered mail,[25] but failed to vacate and remained on
the property.[26]

On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final

notice to vacate within 15 days.[27] When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again
refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.

On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine
the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners lost income a loss arising from
the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of the main
lease contract and sublease agreements.[28] Using the market comparison approach, the
PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was 10,364,000 per
month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of 630,123,700 from 01
January 2002 to 31 March 2009.[29]

On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed that
respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages for the
illegal use and lost income owing to them:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully

prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:

1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION and all persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under
it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same, with
the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative; and

2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED PESOS (630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use
and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31,
2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR
 THOUSAND PESOS (10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until
the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely
vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative.[30]

Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations
of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no
privity of contract existed between them.[31] In the alternative, it also argued that
petitioners cause of action was more properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the petitioners supposed
dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one
year.

In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and
directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners Complaint.[32] The lower court
likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration[33] filed by respondent.[34] Respondent later
on filed its Answer[35] to the Complaint.[36]

Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment,
respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to
assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.[37]

In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the

jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly
prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the
MeTC.[38] Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of
respondent Sunvar.

The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary
proceedings.[39] Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[40] which was subsequently
denied by the RTC.[41] Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition of respondent
proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.[42]

In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of
the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to
dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. [43] The RTC reasoned
that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the
expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements on 31 December 2002.
Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an
unlawful detainer suit.

Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.[44]

Petitioners Resort to a Rule 45 Petition

Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural
issues that merit preliminary attention.

Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision.
Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since
the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be
taken except by a certiorari petition.

The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that the
resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our
procedural rules.

As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC
dismissing an action without prejudice,[45] but the aggrieved party may file
a certiorari petition under Rule 65.[46] Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the
parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are
raised or involved.[47] This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.

In Republic v. Malabanan,[48] the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule
41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal
is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court
only on questions of law.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter.[50] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.[51]

In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order
of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct
application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC
violated the Rules when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the
denial by the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a
question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this
Court.

II

Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings

Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was
erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent
Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for
unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is
annulled.

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against
an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited
pleading.[52]The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary
verbiage.[53] The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvars Rule 65 Petition,
considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this
legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition.[54] Yet, the RTC
not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition,[55] but even proceeded to hear the Rule
65 Petition on the merits.

Respondent Sunvars reliance on Bayog v. Natino[56] and Go v. Court of Appeals[57] to

justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to extraordinary circumstances is misplaced. In
both cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the
mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
conditions that are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.

In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato, an
agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato, an
illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days,
he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose,
Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed
three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take
cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayogs land. When his
house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-
San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the agricultural property,
and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the
Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition for
relief from judgment covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC,
however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper
disposal.

In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from
judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the
Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would
otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:

We disagree with the RTCs holding that a petition for relief from
judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from
judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no other than
Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and
Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of
 the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional
Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the
conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from
cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed
with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36
of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
the cases subject of summary procedure.

Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances

of this case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO,
the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no
fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the
petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or
treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular
appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the
MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that
the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in
favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was
without merit. xxx [58] (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a
procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to a
Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject
ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo
City until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been
finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In
response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned
an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the
hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.

In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing of
a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that
the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCCs erroneous suspension of a
summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the
procedural void in this wise:

Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for it

does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial
court on the merits of the case. It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order
cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that the proper
remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the
merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result
in the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-
pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to
have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being

interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because
ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section
19(g) of which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:

xxxxxxxxx

Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught

between Scylla and Charybdis in the procedural void observed by the Court
of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the
Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the
objective of speedy resolution of cases.

As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, the purpose of the

Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. (Section 36, Chapter
III, BP Blg. 129) Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions
 for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent
unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case,
however, private respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the
ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the Rules.

Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary

proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary
circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit
and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would
unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale of the said
Rules.[59] (Emphasis supplied.)

Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these

two cases are not comparable with respondents situation, and our rulings therein are
inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog, the
general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court
from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed
a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC. Worse, the subject
matter of the Petition was the denial of respondents Motion to Dismiss, which was
necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the subject of an appeal. No
circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present
to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to
have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial
proceeding.

Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that
would justify respondents resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When confronted
with the MeTCs adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the
expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have been to proceed with the
summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the
RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only
prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of respondents
having already taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with
the MeTC.
 Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances
that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The
Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to
litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely
availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive determination of an
unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition
against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties
questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of
summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.

III

Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases

We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition whether the
Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the
controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer
suits.

Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within one
year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly
filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from
respondent Sunvars receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their
Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance
of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main
lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners proper remedy should have
been an accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.

The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for
unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.

Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may by virtue of any express or
implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation bring an action in the
municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution
of possession with damages and costs.[60] Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the
lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is
served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith
within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]

In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature and scope
of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property

from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies
with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue
in the case must be the right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it

states the following elements:

1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by

contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.

2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice

to the defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession.

3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property

and deprived the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment.

4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for
ejectment.[63]
 On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession
has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the
filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action
will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[64]

There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for
an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the
subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF.
However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent
lost possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying the
property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that
petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property. What
is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.

The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the
one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.

Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the one-year period to file an unlawful
detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December
2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for
determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. Such one year period
should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real
property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.[66]

In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of
the last demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,[68] the Court, speaking through Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer
Complaint filed on 25 February 1997 from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996,
and not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July 1995:

Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-

square meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City
whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment
identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
 Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to
occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals.

xxxxxxxxx

Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion

publiciana because their possession is not de facto, they having been
authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year
had elapsed from respondents demand given on July 3, 1995 when the
unlawful detainer complaint was filed.

The petition fails.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the allegations in the complaint

make out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia,
that she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are
tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to
vacate sent to them.

Likewise, contrary to petitioners contention, the one-year period for

filing a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last
demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the
right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the
lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint
on February 25, 1997 was well within the one year reglementary
period.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)

From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01
January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject
property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any
separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by
mere tolerance of the registered owners petitioners herein. Thus, respondent Sunvars
possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009. Hence,
as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them,
respondent is necessarily bound by an implied promise that it will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[70] Upon
service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property
and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to
the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed
with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.

The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22
February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful
detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of action against
respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That
they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity
to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the
one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be
reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.

In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature
of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within
which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned
from the date of the original demand.[71] If the subsequent demands were merely in the
nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment
suit would be counted from the first demand.[72] However, respondent failed to raise in any
of the proceedings below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued
by the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to
Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any event, this
factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited
to resolving questions of law.

The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject
property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of
whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to
the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has
not escaped the Courts attention that almost a decade has passed without any resolution of
this controversy regarding respondents possession of the subject property, contrary to the
aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the
grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing,
the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and
for all, especially since this case involves a prime property of the government located in the
countrys business district and the various opportunities for petitioners to gain public
revenues from the property.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14
February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which are
represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01
December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63,
is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in
Civil Case No. 98708.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

 4 FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES LYDIA FLORES-CRUZ G.R. No. 172217

and REYNALDO I. CRUZ,

Petitioners,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CORONA,
 - v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,*

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

SPOUSES LEONARDO and

ILUMINADA GOLI-CRUZ,

SPOUSES RICO and FELIZA

DE LA CRUZ, SPOUSES BOY

and LANI DE LA CRUZ,

ZENAIDA A. JACINTO and

ROGELIO DE LOS SANTOS,

Respondents. Promulgated:

September 18, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the August 23, 2005 decision[2] and

April 5, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81099.

On December 15, 1999,[4] petitioner spouses Lydia Flores-Cruz and Reynaldo I. Cruz
purchased a 5,209-sq. m. lot situated in Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan[5] from Lydias
siblings, namely, Teresita, Ramon and Daniel (all surnamed Flores). Their father, Estanislao

Flores, used to own the land as an inheritance from his parents Gregorio Flores and Ana

Mangahas. Estanislao died in 1995. Estanislao and, later, petitioners paid the realty taxes

on the land although neither of them occupied it. Petitioners sold portions thereof to third

parties sometime in September 2000.[6]

After the death of Estanislao, petitioners found out that respondent spouses

Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz et al. were occupying a section of the land. Initially,

petitioner Lydia talked to respondents and offered to sell them the portions they were

occupying but the talks failed as they could not agree on the price. On March 2, 2001,

petitioners lawyer sent respondents letters asking them to leave. These demands, however,

were ignored. Efforts at barangay conciliation also failed.[7]

Respondents countered that their possession of the land ranged from 10 to 20 years.

According to respondents, the property was alienable public land.[8] Prior to petitioners

demand, they had no knowledge of petitioners and their predecessors ownership of the

land. They took steps to legitimize their claim and paid the realty tax on their respective

areas for the taxable year 2002. Subsequently, however, the tax declarations issued to them

were cancelled by the Provincial Assessors Office and re-issued to petitioners.[9]

On August 6, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the

land in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 82.[10] Respondents filed

a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case

as it should have been filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) since it was a summary

action for ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion in an
order dated November 9, 2001.[11]
 After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated October 3, 2003 in favor of petitioners

and ordered respondents to vacate the land, and pay attorneys fees and costs of suit.[12]

On appeal by respondents to the CA, the latter, in a decision dated August 23, 2005,

ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for recovery of possession because

petitioners had been dispossessed of the property for less than a year. It held that the

complaint was one for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC. Thus, it

ruled that the RTC decision was null and void. Reconsideration was denied on April 5,

2006.

Hence, this petition.

The issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over this case.

The petition has no merit.

It is axiomatic that the nature of the action on which depends the question of

whether a suit is within the jurisdiction of the court is determined solely by the allegations

in the complaint[13] and the law at the time the action was commenced.[14] Only facts alleged

in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action and the courts

competence to take cognizance of it. [15] One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the

complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action
thereby initiated.[16]
Petitioners complaint contained the following allegations:

xxx xxx xxx

3. That, [petitioners] are owners of a piece of land known as Lot 30-

part, Cad. 349 located at Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan as shown by a copy of
Tax Declaration No. 99-01010-01141 made [an] integral [part] hereof as
Annex A;

4. That, said Lot No. 30-part was acquired through [purchase] on

December 15, 1999, as shown by [a] Deed of Absolute Sale of Unsubdivided
Land made [an] integral [part] hereof as Annex B, B-1 & B-2;

5. That, when [petitioners] inspected subject property, they found it to

be occupied by at least five (5) households under the names of herein
[respondents], who, when asked about their right to stay within the premises
replied that they were allowed to live thereat by the deceased former owner;

6. That, [petitioners] informed the [respondents] that as far as they

are concerned, the latters occupancy was not communicated to them so it
follows that they do not have any right to remain within subject piece of land;

7. That, [respondents] seem to be unimpressed and made no move to

leave the premises or to come to terms with the [petitioners] so much so that
[the latter] asked their lawyer to write demand letters to each and everyone
of the [respondents] as shown by the demand letters dated March 2, 2001
made integral part hereof as Annex C, C-1, C-2, C-3, & C-4;

8. That, there is no existing agreement or any document that illustrate

whatever permission, if any were given, that the [respondents] presented to
[petitioners] in order to legitimize the claim;
 9. That, it is clear that [respondents] occupy portions of subject
property either by stealth, stratagem, force or any unlawful manner which
are just bases for ejectment;

xxx xxx xxx [17]

According to the CA, considering that petitioners claimed that respondents were

possessors of the property by mere tolerance only and the complaint had been initiated

less than a year from the demand to vacate, the proper remedy was an action for unlawful

detainer which should have been filed in the MTC.

We agree.

The necessary allegations in a complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1,

Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[18] Petitioners alleged that the former owner (Estanislao, their

predecessor) allowed respondents to live on the land. They also stated that they purchased

the property on December 15, 1999 and then found respondents occupying the

property. Yet they demanded that respondents vacate only on March 2, 2001. It can be

gleaned from their allegations that they had in fact permitted or tolerated respondents

occupancy.

Based on the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is apparent that such is a

complaint for unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance of the owner.[19] It is a

settled rule that in order to justify such an action, the owners permission or tolerance must

be present at the beginning of the possession.[20] Such jurisdictional facts are present here.
 There is another reason why petitioners complaint was not a proper action for

recovery of possession cognizable by the RTC. It is no longer true that all cases of recovery

of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC regardless of the value of the

property.[21]

When the case was filed in 2001, Congress had already approved Republic Act No.

7691[22] which expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to include other actions involving title to or

possession of real property (accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria)[23] where the assessed

value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro

Manila).[24] Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving possession

of real property has been filed in the proper court no longer depends solely on the type of

action filed but also on the assessed value of the property involved.[25] More specifically,

since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion

reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property), jurisdiction

over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of the

property.[26]

This issue of assessed value as a jurisdictional element in accion publiciana was not

raised by the parties nor threshed out in their pleadings.[27] Be that as it may, the Court

can motu proprio consider and resolve this question because jurisdiction is conferred only

by law.[28] It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the

parties.[29]

To determine which court (RTC or MTC) has jurisdiction over the action, the
complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon.[30] The complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed

value of the property. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had

jurisdiction over the action of petitioners.[31] Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint

of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether it is the RTC or the

MTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.[32]

Moreover, the complaint was filed (August 6, 2001) within one year from the

demand to vacate was made (March 2, 2001). Petitioners dispossession had thus not lasted

for more than one year to justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana.[33]

Since petitioners complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer which should

have been filed in the MTC and it contained no allegation on the assessed value of the

subject property, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings

before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. [34] It follows

that the CA was correct in dismissing the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions

in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to

the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

 REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

5. FIRST DIVISION

ALMARIO BEJAR (Deceased), as G.R. No. 171277

substituted by his heirs - CARMELITA
BEJAR, ALFREDO BEJAR, GREGORIA B.
DANCEL, BRENDA B. MIANO, LOURDES B.
BENDIJO, and SUSANA B. CAMILO,
Present:
Petitioners,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,
- versus -
AZCUNA, and

GARCIA, JJ.

MARICEL CALUAG,
Promulgated:
Respondent.

February 15, 2007

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 23,
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85430.

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:

On August 2, 2002, the late Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 12, Manila, a complaint for illegal
detainer and damages against Maricel Caluag, herein respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
173262-CV. The allegations therein are partly reproduced hereunder:

xxx
4. Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of light materials
consisting of wood and galvanized iron roof built on government-owned
land located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila.

5. On December 21, 1981, plaintiff sold one-half (1/2) portion of the said
residential house with an area of twenty-two feet in length and fifteen feet
in width to Fernando Mijares in the amount of Eleven Thousand
(P11,000.00) Pesos x x x

6. Subsequently, plaintiff became the owner in fee simple of the government

land where his residential house was built including the one-half portion he
sold to Fernando Mijares, located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila,
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 156220 registered and entered
in the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 30, 1983 x x x
 7. On September 2, 1991, Fernando Mijares, sold his residential house
to Maricel Caluag with residence address at 1391 R.A. Reyes St., Tondo,
Manila to be used as a warehouse for her business x x x

8. Plaintiff badly needs the portion of his land occupied by the defendant
to build a residential house for use of his family;

9. On April 9, 2002, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand letter to

defendant for the latter to vacate the portion of the property situated at 777
Coral Street, Tondo, Manila within ten (10) days from receipt of the demand
letter x x x

10. Despite formal demand from the plaintiff on April 19, 2002, defendant
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate said portion of the
property owned by the plaintiff located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo,Manila to
the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.

xxx

On October 15, 2002, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the MeTC has
no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the issue of ownership.

On February 10, 2003, respondent filed a supplement to her motion to dismiss alleging that
pursuant to the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Bahay, Almario Bejar sold to
Fernando Mijares both his house and the entire lot on which it was constructed, citing
paragraph 4 of the Kasulatan which reads:

Na alang alang sa halagang LABING ISANG LIBO PISO

(P11,000.00) kuartang Filipino
na kasasalukuyang gastahin na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahang loob k
ay FERNANDO MIJARES
x x x ay akingipinagbili, ibinigay, isinulit at inilipat ng buo kong pagaari na k
alahating harapan ng bahay ko naipaliwanag sa itaas at ang pagbibili kong
ito ay kasama ang lahat kong karapatan sa lupa kung may karapatan ako
nakinatitirikan ng bahay. [2]
On June 16, 2003, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 173262-CV for want
of jurisdiction, holding that the actual issue between the parties is the enforceability of the
subsequent sale by Fernando Mijares to respondent of the subject property; and that,
therefore, jurisdiction properly lies with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

On appeal, the RTC, Branch 47, Manila, on January 5, 2004, rendered its Decision reversing
the Order of dismissal of the MeTC. The RTC held that the issue in Civil Case No. 173262-CV
is who has better possession of the disputed property. The RTC then directed the MeTC to
hear the case on the merits.

Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 85430.

In its Decision dated May 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC judgment, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the

Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, in
Civil Case No. 03-107631 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order, dated 16
June 2003, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 12. Manila in Civil Case No. 173262-CV,
dismissing Almario Bejars complaint for lack of jurisdiction is hereby
REINSTATED.

Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila for further proceedings pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 SO ORDERED.

The appellate court held that the allegations of the complaint do not make out a case for
illegal detainer or forcible entry.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision but in its
Resolution dated January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the same.

Hence, the instant petition.

For our resolution is the issue of whether the MeTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
173262-CV for illegal detainer.

There are four (4) remedies available to one who has been deprived of possession of real
property. These are: (1) an action for unlawful detainer; (2) a suit for forcible entry;
(3) accionpubliciana; and (4) accion reinvidicatoria.

In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is who
between the contending parties has better possession of the contested
property.[3] Pursuant to Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section
3 of Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in
Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts that exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
these cases. The proceedings are governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, as
amended.

By contrast, an accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion,[4] is a plenary

action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order to determine the
better and legal right to possess, independently of title.[5]
 There are two distinctions between the summary ejectment suits (unlawful detainer
and forcible entry) and accion publiciana. The first lies in the period within which each one
can be instituted. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry must be filed within one
year from the date possession is lost, while an accion publiciana may be filed only after
the expiration of that period but within the period prescribed in the statute of
limitations. The second distinction involves jurisdiction. An accion publiciana may only be
filed with the RTC, while a complaint for unlawful detainer or forcible entry may only be
filed with the first level courts earlier mentioned.

An accion reinvidicatoria, unlike the three remedies previously discussed, involves not only
possession, but ownership of the property. The plaintiff in this action sets up title in him
and prays that he be declared the owner and be given possession thereof.[6] Otherwise put,
the plaintiff alleges ownership of real property and prays for recovery of such
ownership. Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, two things must be alleged and proven in
an accion reinvidicatoria: (1) the identity of the property and (2) plaintiffs title to it. Sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases for accion reinvidicatoria is vested in the RTC.

We are guided by the elementary principle that what determines the nature of an action as
well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.[7]

To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry, the complaint must contain
two mandatory allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff;
and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.[8] This latter requirement implies that the possession of the disputed
property by the intruder has been unlawful from the very start. Then, the action must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry to the property or, in cases where
stealth was employed, from the date the plaintiff learned about it.[9]

An examination of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV does not
show that Almario Bejar was deprived of his possession of the property by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly alleges
that Almario Bejar sold one-half portion of his house to Fernando Mijares; that the latter, in
turn, sold the same portion of the house to respondent; that
eventually, Almario Bejar became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot where his house
was built; that he needs the portion of the lot occupied by respondent for the construction
of a house for the use of his family; and that despite demand, respondent failed and still
fails to vacate the premises. From the records, it appears that Almario Bejar filed his
complaint within one year from the date of his last demand upon respondent to vacate the
contested portion of the land.

A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint sufficiently alleges that
there is a withholding of possession or refusal to vacate the property by a
defendant.[10] The cause of action arises from the expiration or termination of the
defendants right to continue possession which is upon plaintiffs demand to vacate the
premises. The complaint for unlawful detainer must then be instituted within one year
from the date of the last demand.[11] All these incidents are present in the instant case.

Considering that the allegations in Almario Bejars complaint in Civil Case No. 173262-CV
show that it is one for illegal detainer, hence, it is the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila which has
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 173262-CV.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The RTC Decision is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
MeTC, Branch 12, Manila, for further proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
 Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
 6. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA
FABELLA, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April
1997 decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the
decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case
No. 2547.

This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio
and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:

2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot

denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta.
Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n
November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached
marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her
name marked as Annex "B";

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by
building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful
possession thereof;
 4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully
surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot
they unlawfully occupied;

5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still
refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;

6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case
amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to
File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action
be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as
Annex "C";

7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the

defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were
constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses
amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and
additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12,
1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "D";

8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to

vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety,
sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2

In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that
petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of
the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the
ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more
than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply
with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of
the same plus attorneys fees.

Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.

In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they
failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises
or that they had tolerated private respondents possession of the same, which is a
requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners
complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of
prior material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:

An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support
an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior
material possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is deficient in this
respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer,
since the private respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to
occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished.

xxx

In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before
which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently,
the dismissal thereof is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision
dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547
of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.3

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30
January 1998.4

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration5:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A

CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.

Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.

In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for
unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them
the possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case
for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies the land at the formers tolerance
or permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied
promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.6

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied.8 The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession
of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.9

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of
last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical
possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint
more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry
or illegal detainer, butan accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an
action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary
civil proceeding.14

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v.
Villegas17:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not
doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior
court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed
after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible
entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession,
plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such
a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-
bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining
supplied)

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case
against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through
intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as
well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners case for
unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled23:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under
TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by
tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had
served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate
the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer
cases of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made
the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was
unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy
the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of
petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was
effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized
as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited
in Muoz vs. Court ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,24 petitioners complaint
for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated
by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for
unlawful detainer, held:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been
present at the beginning of the possession. x x x

xxxx

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that
would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of
the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1)
respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was
by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of
action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents
occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or
tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.25

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents
without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house
in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been
said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession started.
Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to
allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that
this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had
no jurisdiction over the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL AND SARAH ATUEL

AND SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO AND ELIADA
GALDIANO,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 139561
June 10, 2003

-versus-

SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ AND CONCHITA

VALDEZ,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] seeking to reverse the Decision [2] of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as the Resolution
dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in its
assailed decision affirmed the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board [3]("DARAB") which reversed the Decision [4] of the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office ("MARO") in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department
of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the
land of the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also awarded
the same segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George
and Eliada Galdiano.
The Facts
The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a property in
Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur.cralaw
Atty. Manuel D. Cab ("Cab") is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion,
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with an area of 125,804 square meters ("Cab Property"). The Cab
Property is covered by OCT No. P-5638 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab
Property is traversed by the Butuan to Davao Road and adjacent to the municipal building
of Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the lot occupied by the municipal
building. [5] chanrobles virtual law library
In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel ("Atuel") as administrator of the Cab
Property. chanrobles virtual law library
Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez ("Valdez") arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc,
Southern Leyte. Valdez is the nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion
of the Cab Property to Valdez. [6] On 9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a
"Lease of Improved Agricultural Land" under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of
the Cab Property for P300.00 per year for two years.cralaw
In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel ("Spouses Atuel") and the
Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano ("Spouses Galdiano") to occupy a 2,000-square meter
portion of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano constructed their
respective houses on this 2,000-square meter lot ("Subject Lot").cralaw
On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved the
town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential,
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission.cralaw
On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and
demanded that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and
vacate the same.cralaw
On 2 October 1988, responding to Cabs letter, the MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the
owner of the land he cultivated. The MARO added that on 14 September 1988, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969 was issued to Valdez for a
2.3231-hectare portion ("PD 27 Land") of the Cab Property. The PD 27 Land included the
2,000-square meter Subject Lot occupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano. chanrobles virtual law library
On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdezs
emancipation patent. Cab claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that
Valdez is a civil law lessee, not a tenant. [7] Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional
Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an investigation regarding the petition. [8]
On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ("HLURB") approved
the Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-eight municipalities, including that of Sibagat.
The HLURB classified the Cab Property as 90 percent residential, and the remaining
portion as institutional and park or open space.cralaw
On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez ("Spouses Valdez") filed
a complaint [9] for "Recovery of Possession with Damages" with the DARAB in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon against the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the
Spouses Valdez alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano "stealthily and
through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the above-described property with an
area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less." The Spouses Valdez claimed that the Spouses Atuel and
the Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated demands, refused "to restore possession of the said
portion of land" to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez
possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for payment of litigation
expenses, as well as unearned income from the Subject Lot and moral damages.cralaw
In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses
Valdez had no cause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot
while Atuel is the administrator of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano claimed that upon Cabs instruction and consent, they had been occupying the Cab
Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the Cab Property in
1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed out that the Spouses
Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no
dispossession to speak of. chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation
patent issued to Valdez is null and void. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
maintained that the entire Cab Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab,
has already been classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27. [10]
On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a
decision which disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby ordered to
segregate the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less, from the land of the
complainants, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-
159969, and award the same to the respondents; and hereby ordered this case dismissed.
SO ORDERED. [11]
Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the
DARAB Central Office. The DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and maintain
the possessory rights of the complainants over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land;
and chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the parties in determining the amount to be
reimbursed in favor of the respondents for whatever improvements made on the 2,000
square meter portion to be paid by the complainants.
SO ORDERED. [12]
Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for
review [13] with the Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the DARAB Central Office and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court
of Appeals denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals,
the Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to the Municipality of
Sibagat. [14]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has
primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of emancipation patents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decision
should be respected because it enjoys the presumption of regularity.cralaw
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on Pagtalunan v.
Tamayo [15] where this Court held that upon issuance of an emancipation patent, a holder
acquires a vested right of absolute ownership in the land. chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro v.
Macaraeg [16] is applicable. In Teodoro, this Court ruled that a landowner has full liberty
to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. However, "once a landowner
enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production
and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with the
help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very
essence of a leasehold agreement." Otherwise, the Court added, "it would be easy to
subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting
the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and
pernicious practices of the landed gentry." [17]
The Issue
After a review of the issues raised, [18] the question boils down to whether the Spouses
Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-
square meter Subject Lot from the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano but on an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals because of the DARABs lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present
controversy.cralaw
The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for
recovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the
jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of
jurisdiction. [19] The Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly
acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the
court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action. [20] chanrobles virtual law library
In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others,
that they are farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also
alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently
occupied the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite
repeated demands,[21] the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano refused to vacate and
restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. [22] The Spouses Valdez
prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore
possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.cralaw
The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any, between them
and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, [23] this Court
ruled:
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained in the decision of
the MARO, [24] indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for
recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the
Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other,
have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot forming part of the
PD 27 Land. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise the issue of
ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v.
Torres, [25] this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an action to recover possession
or accion publiciana, thus: chanrobles virtual law library
x x x This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of the title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is
also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In such
case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction. x x x [26]
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations
between the parties. [27] This Court held in Morta, [28] that in order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable
elements, to wit:
x x x 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
x x x [29] (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the DARABs jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa, et al. v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., [30] that:
x x x the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of the agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original
and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARP Law, an
agrarian dispute is defined as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
(d) xxx any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not and do not claim to
be the owners of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot where their houses are constructed.
They also do not claim ownership to any other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the
Spouses Valdez have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that will
bring this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657. [31] The instant case is similar
to Chico v. CA, [32] where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over a case
which did not involve any tenurial or agrarian relations between the parties. Since the
DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should not have taken
cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over
an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. [33] Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which
involve x x x possession of real property." [34] However, if the assessed value of the real
property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of
Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover
possession of real property. [35] Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction
over all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.cralaw
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered emancipation
patents. However, the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession does not
involve or seek the cancellation of any emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and
the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the emancipation patent as part of their
affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well settled that the
jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the defenses
made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. [36]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties. [37] The active participation of the parties in the proceedings
before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only
by law. The courts or the parties cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction.
Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a
cause of action.[38] The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB
does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of
the parties. [39] chanrobles virtual law library
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order or decision
rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity. [40] Accordingly, we
rule that the decision of the DARAB in the instant case is null and void. Consequently, the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the DARAB is likewise invalid.
This Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised by the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May
1999 and the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The MAROs Decision dated 4 March 1993, and the DARABs Decision dated 17
June 1998, are declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.cralaw
SO ORDERED.cralaw
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
7. Victoriano Encarnacion vs Nieves Amigo, GR No. 169793,September 15, 2006
Posted by Pius Morados on November 29, 2011

(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Real Action, Actions for recovery of Real Property)
Facts: On April 11, 1995, petitioner became the owner of a parcel of land by virtue of a
waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law, which he thereafter subdivided into two
lots.
Sometime in 1985, respondent allegedly entered the premise and took possession of a
portion of the property without the permission of the predecessor-in-interest of the said
property.

On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) with the
MTC after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate
the premises remained unheeded. The letter was received by the respondent on February
12, 2001.

Respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the
subject land since 1968.

The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the RTC dismissed the case on
appeal, on the ground that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence the latter
acquired no appellate jurisdiction over thereof.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which remanded the case
to the RTC for the proper action.

Issue: WON the proper action in this case is unlawful detainer.

Held: No.
The three kinds of actions for recovery of real property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either forcible or unlawful

detainer, which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought with the
MTC.
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession,
which should be brought in the RTC when the dispossession has lasted for more than
one year.
3. Accion reinvindicatoria, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be
brought in the RTC.
The remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. If the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the proper MTC
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year,
the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper
RTC.
Petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time
deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioners dispossession in
1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed.
The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of
action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion
publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC
via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess.

Note: The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by
the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no
longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer
try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in
the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice
 8. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012

FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO,
LETTY BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA,
BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON,
AIDA CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY
DING, JOSE ESCASINAS, GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO
ESTRERA, EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING
GUARDA, NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN,
DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING
ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE, CONRADO P AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS,
DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, VILLAR, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of
Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City,Respondents.
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision1 dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The
Court of Appeals decision reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City,
Branch 77, by dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Joses complaint for ejectment against
Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing
Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo
Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera,
Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio
Estrera, Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleo, Arsenia Garing, Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato,
Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco,
Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene
Santos, Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar, John Doe, Jane Doe and
Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque
City (respondents), on the ground that the petitioners cause of action was not for unlawful
detainer but for recovery of possession. The appellate court affirmed this decision in its
resolution of August 22, 2005.2

The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters, located in
Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1,
1999, Chua Sing leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither
notarized nor registered with the Paraaque City Registry of Deeds.4

The lease contract provided that:

That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same period upon
mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any occupant or
occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said
occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses that may be
incurred without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the
LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may be
recovered from the occupants.5 (Underscore ours)

Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the lease contract
was executed.

On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract, the
petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30 days
and that they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the petitioner
filed an ejectment case against the respondents before Branch 77 of the Paraaque City
MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11344.7

In this complaint, no mention was made of any proceedings before the barangay. Jose then
brought the dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The barangay issued a
Certification to File Action on March 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended
complaint, incorporating the proceedings before the barangay before the summons and
copies of the complaint were served upon the named defendants.10

In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner claimed that as lessee of
the subject property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully occupy the
land. He alleged that:

7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever,
much less any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
lawful and registered owner, plaintiffs lessor.12

The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents failed to vacate
the property without legal justification. He prayed that the court order the respondents; (1)
to vacate the premises; (2) to pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999
until they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay him attorneys fees of no less than
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.13

In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in possession of
the land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease contract
between the petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The
respondents also presented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by
David R. Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case
as the issue deals with ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual
and moral damages for the filing of a baseless and malicious suit.

After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence were submitted,
the MeTC resolved the case in the petitioners favor. In its decision15 of January 27, 2003,
the MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess the land and that their
occupation was merely by the owners tolerance. It further noted that the respondents
could no longer raise the issue of ownership, as this issue had already been settled: the
respondents previously filed a case for the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sings title
before the RTC, Branch 260, of Paraaque City, which ruled that the registered owners title
was genuine and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of jurisdiction over
the case because of the respondents assertion of ownership of the property. On these
premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate the premises and to remove all
structures introduced on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month from the date of filing of
this case until they vacate the premises; and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of
suit and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that no legal
basis exists for the petitioners claim that their occupation was by tolerance, "where the
possession of the defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, there
can be no tolerance."16

The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its decision17 on October
8, 2003, reiterating the MeTCs ruling that a case for ejectment was proper. The petitioner,
as lessee, had the right to file the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the land
by mere tolerance and their possession became unlawful upon the petitioners demand to
vacate on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint for ejectment was
filed on October 20, 1999, or within one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It
cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling
that a case for unlawful detainer was appropriate.

On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled
that the respondents possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessors
tolerance. It defined tolerance not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor
when another occupies his land; tolerance entailed permission from the owner by reason
of familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that the respondents
unlawfully entered the property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property)
was not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful detainer. The respondents
allegation that they had been in possession of the land before the petitioners lessor had
acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having been in possession of the land for more
than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through an ejectment case.

The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where
the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a
property. The petitioners claim, on the other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he
asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after the
respondents had occupied the land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 8, 2003 of the
RTC, Branch 257, Paraaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the amended complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises before us the
following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON
RESPONDENTS MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT
WITH THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

III

WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS
TO AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.24

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Unlawful detainer is not the proper

remedy for the present case.

The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In
unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.
However, the defendants possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the
defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for
unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of
possession.25

The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful
detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have
jurisdiction over the case.26

In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in support of
his unlawful detainer complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned
and registered in the lessors name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.

xxxx

6. Plaintiffs lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through sale,
thereafter the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered under his
name.

7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever,
much less any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true,
lawful and registered owner, plaintiffs lessor.

8. By reason of defendants continued unlawful occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff

referred the matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the
defendants to vacate the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx
hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."

9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to
vacate the premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis ours)

The petitioners allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the requirements for
unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner through an express or
implied contract.

In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents occupancy was unlawful from
the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the
defendants possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant
to vacate the property and the defendants subsequent refusal. In the present case,
paragraph 8 characterizes the defendants occupancy as unlawful even before the formal
demand letters were written by the petitioners counsel. Under these allegations, the
unlawful withholding of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters
were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.

The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents occupied
the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the complaint nor any
supporting evidence on record, however, shows when the respondents entered the
property or who had granted them permission to enter. Without these allegations and
evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.

In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentinos definition and
characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason
of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another
person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which
ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who
permits them out of friendship or courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little
disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits
others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting
some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a
long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." Further expounding on the concept,
Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely
tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be
considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization,
permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces
itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics
supplied]

The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must have been
present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29

It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a complaint for
unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the claim that the
defendants possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainants
allegation that the entry to the subject property was unlawful from the very beginning. The
Court then ruled that the unlawful detainer action should fail.

The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious when a
complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance.
In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated
by the plaintiff; and (2) the respondents allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by
mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they did
not contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the
occupation of the property by the defendant:

These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiffs theory that its cause of action
is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that defendants
occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiffs supposed act of sufferance or
tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.

As the bare allegation of plaintiffs tolerance of defendants occupation of the premises has
not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry an action that
had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The
prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of
defendants actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32

Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owners lack of
knowledge of the defendants entry of the land to be inconsistent with the allegation that
there had been tolerance.

In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the grant of
permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance,
but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was "totally
wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came about."
It stated that:

Judging from the respondents Answer, the petitioners were never at all in physical
possession of the premises from the time he started occupying it and continuously up to
the present. For sure, the petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession
only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of
said title presupposes their having been in possession of the property at one time or
another.35

Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their claims on the
validity of the owners title. Possession de facto must also be proved.

As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint
which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiffs part indicative of permission to
occupy the land, or any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must
definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible
entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the
required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court
provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit
is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived
his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior
court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in
physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court
upon plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of
the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that
the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action.37 (italics supplied)

Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the respondents of
possession over a property that they have held for at least eight years before the case was
filed in 1999, by means of a summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the
word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.

There was no change in the

respondents theory during
the appeal that would amount
to a deprivation of the petitioners
right to due process.

The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the MeTC the fact
that their occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the respondents allegedly raised
were: (1) the title to the property is spurious; (2) the petitioners predecessor is not the
true owner of the property in question; (3) the petitioners lease contract was not legally
enforceable; (4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-interest; (5) the petitioners
predecessor never had prior physical possession of the property; and (6) the respondents
right of possession was based on the "Deed of Assignment of Real Property" executed by
Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on appeal before the RTC. They
argue that this constitutes a change of theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38

It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the
answer cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do
so would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in
connection with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair
play.39

While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule is not applicable
to the present case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the petitioners failure to
allege and prove the essential requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v.
Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
(emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was required to
properly allege and prove when the respondents entered the property and that it was the
petitioner or his predecessors, not any other persons, who granted the respondents
permission to enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not the respondents
defense that proved fatal to the case but the petitioners contradictory statements in his
amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other pleadings.41

Although the respondents did not use the word "tolerance" before the MeTC, they have
always questioned the existence of the petitioners tolerance. In their Answer to Amended
Complaint, the respondents negated the possibility of their possession of the property
under the petitioner and his lessors tolerance when the respondents alleged to have
occupied the premises even before the lessor acquired the property in 1991. They said as
much in their Position Paper:

RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his supposed property, as
when he became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property described in TCT No.
52594, the property had already been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970.
Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already occupants/possessors of the property from where
they are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE of a property with a dubious
title. The main thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession and that the same
was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the
court to restore possession regardless of title or even ownership xxx. In the case at bar,
neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical
possession of the property where DEFENDANTS have already possessed for more than ten
(10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got his fake title to the property.42 (citation
omitted)

In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondents claim that their possession
was based on the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of the estate of Domingo
de Ocampo, shows that they considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of
their transactions on the property, and could not have stayed there upon the latters
permission.

We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised by the respondents
before the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the Court of Appeals,
and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he belatedly states for the first time in his
Memorandum44 before this Court that his lessor had tolerated the respondents occupancy
of the lot, without addressing the respondents allegation that they had occupied the lot in
1970, before the petitioners lessor became the owner of the property in 1991, and without
providing any other details. His pleadings continued to insist on the existence of tolerance
without providing the factual basis for this conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the
Court of Appeals had in anyway deprived the petitioner of due process or had unfairly
treated him when it resolved the case based on the issue of tolerance.
The Court cannot treat an ejectment
case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.

The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as requiring
him to properly refile the case serves no other ends than to comply with technicalities.45

The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an ejectment case
and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These cases are not
interchangeable and their differences constitute far more than mere technicalities.

In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be
treated as an accion publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same
reasons also applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant
characteristics:

On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion
publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First,
forcible entry should be filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real
property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real
property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical
possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the
better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed
in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary
action in the RTC. [italics supplied]

The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover
physical possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer
and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling
by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and
is therefore inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of
possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary
actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be
decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and
continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue
of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order
in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law
in his hands and seize the property by force and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a
substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or
ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals51 describes in detail how these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to
protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It
is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending the decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage
in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To
permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social
order.1wphi1 Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of
property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it
is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual
possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property
right. [italics supplied]

Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply file ejectment
cases instead of plenary actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings cases
which the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials. Because these "summary"
proceedings will have to tackle complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would
no longer be expeditious and would no longer serve the purpose for which they were
created. Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases, the hastily and
incorrectly decided cases, and the utter lack of system would assist the courts in protecting
and preserving property rights.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision dated
March 14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80116.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIJI of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

9. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118328 October 8, 1998

MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FIDEL and EVELYN BENOLIRAO, MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 1994 in
CA G.R. CV No. 39251 1which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
(Branch 108) in Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing herein petitioner to
demolish and remove all illegal structures which she constructed in front of the subject lot,
to vacate the said property and right of way, and return possession thereof to the
respondents.

The antecedent facts:

The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising of 1,806
square meters, more or less, located at the corner of Pilapil and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay
City. The legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading
Corporation (UCRTC) which subdivided the property into fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to
666-N. The subdivided lots were then offered for sale with first priority to each of the
tenants, including the private respondents and petitioner. 2 Lot 666-H has an area of 248
square meters, consisting of two (2) parts. One part is the residential portion with an area
of 112 square meters purchased by private respondents-spouses Benolirao 3 while the
second part is the right of way for Lot 666-I and the aforesaid residential portion. 4 Private
respondent Carisima purchased Lot 666-I. Petitioner, who was occupying the western end
and front portions of the aforesaid lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered
for sale by UCRTC. 7

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako's wife, Mrs. Rosario de Jesus.
Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on June 30,
1987, Civil Case No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for consignation
of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The consignation was
granted by the trial court and was eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October 25, 1989. 6

On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondents-
spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. 7 This sale was annotated at the back of UCRTC's title on
Lot 666-H. 8

On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made upon petitioner,
UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery of possession of the subject premises
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 docketed as Civil Case No
6652. 9 On July 15, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of
UCRTC, stating in part, to wit:

It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff, not having been authorized in writing for
the purpose, may not validly bring an action to enforce a perceived easement
of right of way pertaining to the owners of Lots 666-H and 666-I or the
Benolirao and Carisima families, while Benjamin Ongsiako possessed the
authority to institute the case (Exhibit "G"), plaintiff is not the real party in
interest. Furthermore, the situation obtaining does not call for the
enforcement of an easement of right of way. Defendant Seldoncillo is not the
 owner of and has never claimed ownership over the portion of Lot 666-H on
which her house is erected. A servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner (Article 613, New Civil Code). In the present case the ejectment of
defendant Serdoncillo from the portion of Lot 666-H occupied by the house
at the instance of the proper party (Renato Bolinarao's family ) would
remove the obstruction.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the complaint

against the defendant Marciana Serdonillo, as well as defendant's
counterclaim, is dismissed for lack of merit. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED. 10

UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court, hence, the same
became final.

On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the Exercise of
Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-spouses a Fidel
and Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot 666-H sold to the
Benolirao spouses on the ground that said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She claimed
that she has the preferred right to buy the said property and that the same was not offered
to her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and void. UCRTC and private
respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
same was dismissed on July 9, 1992. 11

On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on petitioner
reiterating their previous demands to vacate the property. 12 On December 13, 1990,
private respdndents filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the subject
premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7735, which compiaint alleges these material facts:

5. That plaintiffs, being then registered owners of the properties designated

as lot 666-H and 666-I, are likewise the owners/grantees of the right of way
granted by United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation which was
correspondingly annotated in its title (Annex "B-3" ) under Entry No.
205154/T-172291 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City;

6. That since 1982 the defendant has built and constructed a residence and
pig pen on the plaintiffs' right of way as well as on the front portions of the
latter's properties leaving them virtually obstructed with no ingress or
egress from the main road;
 7. That verbal and written demands made upon the defendant by the
plaintiffs to remove and demolish her structures had been ignored, the last of
which was on November 20, 1990, xerox copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "C" and taken as an integral part hereof, but despite such demands,
the defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to remove and
vacate her illegal structures on the portion of the properties as well as on the
right of way of plaintiffs.

8. That plaintiffs in compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law

lodged a complaint before the Barangay Captain, Barangay 84, Zone 10 of
Pasay City, which certified filing of the same in court, xerox copy of said
certification is hereto attached as Annex "D" and taken as integral part
hereof;

9. That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendant, the plaintiffs are
suffering the unnecessary inconvinience of the absence of decent and
sufficient ingress and egress on their properties, and will continue to suffer
the same unless the illegal structures are finally demolished and/or removed
by the defendants; 13

Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant of said lots in
question since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder, thus:

13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I mentioned in the complaint are formerly
portions of a big track(sic) of land consisting of 1,806 square meters then
owned by H.V. Ongsiako;

14. That since 1956 and before the 1,806 square meters of lot owned by H.V.
Ongsiako was subdivided into fourteen (14) lots in 1982, defendant is (sic)
already a legitimate tenant and occupant family of around 400 square meters
of the 1,806 square meters of the said land then owned by H.V. Ongsiako by
erecting her residential house thereon at the agreed monthly rental of P15.00
and increased to P 100.00;

15. That upon the death of H.V. Ongsiako his heirs continued collecting the
monthly rental of the premises from the defendants;

16. That the heirs of H.V. Ongsiako formed a corporation known as UNITED
COMPLEX REALTY AND TRADING CORPORATION and the big parcel of land
consisting of 1,806 square meters was transferred to the said corporation
and subdivided in 1982 into fourteen (14) lots, two (2) of which lots are the
very same lots leased by the defendant from H.V. Ongsiako and later from his
heirs and then from United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation as
alleged in the preceding pars. l3, 14, and 15;14
The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the foregoing, and finding preponderance of

evidence in plaintiffs' favor, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the defendant to demolish and remove all illegal structures she
constructed on the front portions of the subject lots and on the right of way
of the plaintiff;

2.) Ordering the defendant to vacate the property and right of way and
return possession thereof to the plaintiffs,

3) Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.

As to the damages (actual and moral) no award is given. In the absence of

proof of fraud and bad faith by the defendants, the latter are (sic) not liable
for damages (Escritor Jr. vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 577).

Actual and compensatory damages require substantial proof. In the absence

of malice and bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded (Capco vs.
Macasaet, 189 SCRA SCRA 561).

As to the attorney's fees, each party should shoulder his/her expenses.

SO ORDERED. 15

Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging
that: 1) the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of private respondents
considering that based on the letter of demand dated November 20, 1990, the action filed
should have been unlawful detainer and not an action for recovery of possession; 2) the
action filed by private respondents is barred by res judicata considering that the present
action is identical with that of Civil Case No. 6652; 3) the lower court erred in not
dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action with respect to enforcement of right of
way vis a vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred in ordering that defendants vacate the
properties in question since the lease of defendants thereon was still in existence and had
not yet been terminated. 16

On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the
findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner, stating in part as follows:

The issue as to the proper action has been resolved by the respondent court,
to wit:

The defense that what should have been filed is an ejectment

case and not recovery of possession, is not also correct. The
 filing of this case for recovery of possession, instead of an
ejectment case, is not altogether unjustified. The Benoliraos
and Carisima became the owners as early as May, 1989. Verbal
and written demands had been ignored. There is an immediate
need for plaintiffs to use the right of way, which up to the
present time is obstructed. At most, what surfaced is a
technicality which should be abandoned.

A plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff-appellees cause of

action is for recovery of possession of their property which was encroached
upon by defendant-appellant. 17

A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by petitioner on August 8,

1994 18 was denied by the respondent on September 23, 1994. 19

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by the respondent court, to wit:

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (Sp. Fifteenth
Division) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING AS AN ACCION
PUBLICIANA AN EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (THE JURISDICTION OF
WHICH CLEARLY PERTAINS TO THE INFERIOR COURT), A CASE BASICALLY INVOLVING
AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.

Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred in sustaining the trial court's finding that
the complaint filed by private respondents for recovery of possession of the subject
premises is an accion publiciana notwithstanding the fact that the action was filed within
one (1) year from demand. Petitioner contends that private respondents should have filed
an action for unlawful detainer and not an action for recovery of possession against
petitioner. Consequently, the trial court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil
Case No. 7785. In support of her contention, petitioner cited the cases of Bernabe vs.
Luna 20 and Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 21 which she states is strikingly similar to the facts
of this case. Consequently, the rulings of this Court in these two cases are squarely
applicable and controlling in the case at bar.

Private respondents, however, aver that they were merely successors-in-interest of UCRTC
and therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They claim that the demand to vacate
required by law should at the very least be reckoned from June 2, 1989, the date of the
filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6652 considering that their demands are simply a
reiteration of UCRTC's demands against petitioner. Private respondents further contend
that the allegations in the complaint determine the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 specifically alleged that private respondents are the
owners of lots 666-I and 666-H as evidenced by transfer certificates of title and prayed for
recovery of possession of a portion thereof including its right of way illegally and
unlawfully possessed by petitioner.
Petitioner's position is without merit.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. 22 What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. 23 Accordingly, the issues in the instant case can only be
properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 7785. 24

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. 25 In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria. 26

In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II 27 this Court held that the doctrine in Emilia v.
Bado, 28 decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It preserved the age-old
remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real
property, namely: (1) accion interdictal, which is the summary action for either forcible
entry ordetentacion, where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio; or
for unlawful detainer or desahucio, where the defendant's possession was originally lawful
but ceased to be must be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry;
and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan court; (2) accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of
the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, (3) accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and
includes the jus possidendi brought in the proper regional trial court.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges

ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different
from accion interdictal or accion publicianawhere plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better
right to possess without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc., 29 this Court held
that:

We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as

distinguished from that of unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction
 upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff's prior physical possession of
the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such possession by
any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, "for if the dispossession did
not take place by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the
municipal courts, have jurisdiction.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of
dispossession of lands. Thus, "whenever the owner is dispossessed by any
other means than those mentioned he may maintain his action in the Court of
First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of
twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared
to be owner of the land." Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over
actions to recover possession of real property illegally detained, together
with rents due and damages, even though one (1) year has not expired from
the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of ownership of
such property is also involved. In other words, if the party illegally
dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal dispossession as well as
that of the ownership over the property he may commence such action in the
Court of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal
dispossession. If he decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only,
and the action is filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or
withholding of possession, then the Court of First Instance will have original
jurisdiction over the case. The former is an accion de reivindicacion which
seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession, while the latter refers
to an accion publiciana, which is the recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance.

A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably show that
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being the
absolute owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title and
pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of the means of dispossession that would constitute
forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor is there any assertion of
defendant's possession which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration
of the right to possess. It does not characterize petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that
is, whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able to
construct the house and the pig pens thereon. The complaint merely avers that a portion of
the lot owned by private respondents and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner
and that she should vacate. The action therefore is neither one of forcible nor of unlawful
detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of
land allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining right of way. Indeed, the
Ocular Inspection Report of the Branch Clerk of Court, states that:
 . . . (T)he right of way hit directly the defendant Serdoncillo's property
consisting of a two-storey residential house made of wood and GI sheets and
occupying the entire width of the rear portion of the right of way. A coconut
tree stands on the middle of the road, at the back of which is a shanty made
of rotten G.I. sheets around it which is used as pigpens and place of washing
clothes extended from defendant's house. To gain access to plaintiff's
property, the group turned right and passed between an "aratiris" tree and
cemented firewall owned by Mr. Belarmino making only one person at a time
to pass. This passageway has only a width of 0.5 meter which is being used
by the defendant and her members of the family aside from the plaintiffs.

. . . Two (2) monuments of the lot boundary of the plaintiff's property are
existing, but the rest are nowhere to be found. According to Mrs. Benolirao,
they are located within the premises of the defendant's house. At the back of
Benolirao is a private property gutted by fire.

. . . Upon request, the group wass granted permission by the relatives of the
defendant to inspect the place. The group further noticed that defendant's
improvements were even encroaching on the plaintiff's lot by approximately
4.1 meters, more or less. The house of the defendant is facing the plaintiff's
property; there is a small chicken house and there is also a dog house
standing near it. 30

It is noted that at the time of the filing of said complaint, Civil Case No. 7749, an action for
annulment of the sale between UCRTC and private respondents Benolirao of Lot 666-H
initiated by petitioner was likewise pending in another court. This case puts in issue the
validity of private respondents' acquisition of the subject lots and ultimately their
ownership of Lot 666-H.

Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that private respondents definitely gave
petitioner notice of their claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including their right to
possess which is an elemental attribute of ownership.31 It is immaterial whether or not
private respondents instituted their complaint one month from date of last demand or a
year thereafter. What is of paramount importance is that the allegations in complaint are of
the nature of either an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

Petitioner's reliance on the Bernabe and Medina cases, which she claims to be squarely
applicable under the circumstances herein, is entirely misplaced. While it is true that in
these two cases the complaints were filed before the one-year period had expired from
date of last demand, the allegations in the complaint failed to state material facts which are
indicative of a case of either an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Thus, the Court
in Bernabe stated that:

In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that they are the
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 199.4 square meters more or less,
located in Tondo, Manila, that defendant (private respondent herein)
 constructed a house on said lot without plaintiff's permission; that on
November 14, 1980, plaintiffs thru counsel made a written demand for the
removal of said house as well as for the recovery of damages for the
reasonable use and occupation thereof; and that defendant refused and failed
to comply despite repeated demands.

xxx xxx xxx

We have noted that while petitioners allege in their complaint that they are
the owners of the lot on which the house of the private respondent is
constructed, their attached TCT shows that the lot is still in the name of
Fejosera Investment Incorporated, Private respondent and said company
entered into a contract of lease in 1950 for the use and occupation of said lot.
Petitioners allegedly bought the lot in question in 1973, and they must have
been fully aware of the occupancy of the private respondent of the premises
in question. Yet, they did not take any action to remove the house of the
private respondent or to inform the respondent that they had become the
new owners of the lot in question. It is clear therefore that the lease was
allowed to continue.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the possession of private respondent over the lot in question

became illegal only on November 14, 1980, when the formal demand to pay
and vacate the premises was sent to him. 32

The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the owners of the
property when defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot without their
permission. That despite formal demand defendant failed to vacate and surrender
possession of the property to them. Indeed, the averments in plaintiffs' complaint present
jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate plaintiffs' action as either an action
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Thus, the
trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, pertinent portion of which is quoted
hereunder:

It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the filing of this case
on February 19, 1981, the defendant was in possession, as a tenant, of the
premises. When plaintiff's counsel, therefore sent a written notice on
November 4, 1980 requiring defendant to vacate the premises when this
action was brought, the one (1) year period after the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession has not yet set in. It is clear that this is an
ejectment case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.

SO ORDERED. 33
We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by petitioner, to be inappropriate. The facts
distinctly show that the complaint filed by the owners of the property before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful detainer. It was the action
resorted to by the plaintiffs after advising the defendant (the lessee of the premises in
question) that a member of the family, Dr. Igama, urgently needed the house and after
repeated demands to vacate made on the lessee proved to be unsuccessful. All these
incidents, from notification to the filing of the complaint dated May 16, 1985, transpired
within a period of six (6) months. Indeed, the factual background of this case is a classic
illustration of an action for unlawful detainer. Verily, the facts are therefore diametrically
opposite to the facts or case at bar.

Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that the present case is similar to the
Bernabe and Medina cases and from which this Court should base its findings and
conclusions. The doctrine laid down in Tenorio vs. Gombais still controlling. In that case the
Court ruled that courts of first instance have jurisdiction over all actions involving
possession of land except forcible entry and illegal datainer, and therefore the lower court
has jurisdiction over the action alleged in the appellant's complaint because it is neither of
illegal detainer nor of forcible entry. 34

Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a tenant of the subject premises had been
settled in Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation, which she won before the
Metropolitan Trial Court and affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109. Said court ruled that the latter is a tenant of the site or premises in question
and that she cannot be ejected therefrom, even on the assumption that her house and pig
pen are allegedly standing on a right of way. She claims that pursuant to Section 49 (b)
(now Section 47) Rule 39, Rules of Court, the issue of tenancy in said case is now conclusive
between her and private respondent with respect to the subject premises in question.

Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit.

Sec. 49 (now Section 47), provides that:

Sec. 49. Effects of Judgments. the effect of a judgment or final order

rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity;
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties
ought not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when the right or
fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate. 35

Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites
must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and, (4) there must be between the first and second actions; (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of subject matter; and (c) identity of cause of action. 36

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and the identity of
the subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 5456
and Civil Case No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of causes of action in Civil Case No.
5456 to bar the institution of Civil Case No. 7785.

There is identity of parties. The record shows that the parties in Civil Case No. 5456 are
petitioner as plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the spouses Meliton and Efremia
Carisima and Rosario de Jesus. Private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao
acquired lot 666-H from UCRTC and are therefore the successors-in-interest of UCRTC by
title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. As such, private
respondents merely stepped into the shoes of UCRTC and acquired whatever capacity and
title the former had over the same property or subject matter of the action. Indeed, there is
actual, if not substantial, identity of parties between the two actions. 37

There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. In the case of Garcia vs.
Court of Appeals, 38 this Court held that the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the
form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the
former and the present causes of action. Petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 5456 is an
action for consignation of rentals while Civil Case No. 7785 is an action for recovery of
possession.

In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether or not consignation of rentals is
proper under the circumstances obtaining in that case. Private respondents action for
recovery of possession requires them to present evidence of their claim or title to the
subject premises and their right to possess the same from petitioner. Stated conversely, the
evidence in Civil Case No. 5456 is entirely different to that in Civil Case No. 7785. Thus, the
decision in Civil Case No. 5456 does not in any way affect nor bar Civil Case No. 7785.

Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been at odds since 1987 when petitioner
initiated Civil Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749. Private respondents'
predecessor UCRTC likewise initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the present case under
appeal, Civil Case No. 7785, all because of the use of a right of way and an encroachment of
only 4.1 meters of the subject premises. At some point in time, all these squabbles must
end. Thus, the respondent court stated that:
 It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should
decide all questions submitted to them "as truth and justice require", and
that it is greatly to be desired that all judgments should be so decided; but
controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in
the courts demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of the
courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at
some definite time fixed by law. 39

In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the Court, will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably
unsupported by the evidence or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
facts. 40 In this case, We find the said decision to be totally supported by the evidence on
record.

Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in
the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.