CASE 1
LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856
FACTS:
Laurel was charged with treason during the Japanese occupation.
He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to
the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he
cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country
since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced
already by the Republic.
ISSUE: W/N absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese
occupation?
HELD/RATIO:
Laurel was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent
allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of
sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine
government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be
suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced.
Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was th e exercise
of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended
allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such
change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same.
What happened was a mere change of name of government, from
Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.
DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political
laws of the Philippines were suspended. Thus, treason under the
Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the
land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty,
it is true that the Philippines werent sovereign at the time of the
Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the
acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where
the Philippines are now indeed sovereign.
CASE 2
U.S. VS LAGNASON
3 PHIL 495
FACTS:
1
Dalmacio Lagnason lead a band of armed men in the province of
Occidental Negros campaigning through its Northern part against
the United States Government. He was captures in a fight. 20 of his
men died. He and some of his men were captured. Rifles, bolos,
daggers were confiscated from them. They wore black shirts, white
pantaloons and black caps.
ISSUE: W/N the crime was treason?
HELD:
YES. Engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort amounts
to a levying of war within the meaning of section 1 of Act No. 292,
no matter how vain and futile the attempt. The crime of rebellion
and insurrection constitute treason, but when the treason consists
in engaging in an insurrection or rebellion it is to be punished in
accordance with section 3 of Act No. 292.
DISSENTING:
The crime of treason and the crime of rebellion are distinct and
separate offenses; they are crimes of the same class, but differ in
magnitude and gravity. If the intention is to utterly overthrow the
Government the offense is treason, but if it is simply to obstruct
and resist the authority of the United States or the Government of
the Philippine Islands" the offense is rebellion or insurrection.
CASE 3
PEOPLE VS. PEREZ
83 PHIL 314
FACTS:
Seven counts of treason were filed against Susano Perez aka Kid
Perez, the accused, for recruiting, apprehending, and
commandeering women (Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia
Lamay, and Flaviana Bonalos) against their will to satisfy the
immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and other
Japanese of Officers.
ISSUE: W/N furnishing of woman for immoral purpose to enemy was
treason?
HELD:
NO. The act of the accused of providing the enemies with women
and entertainment, boosting their (the enemies) morale and
making their lives more pleasant, is not treason. Sexual and social
relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
 improve their war efforts or weaken the power of the government.
Any favourable effect toward the Japanese that the accused might
have made was trivial, imperceptible and unintentional. Intent of
disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which in the
absence of admission may be gathered from the nature and
circumstances of each case. In this particular case, it was not
evident that the intent of the accused in providing the enemies with
women was to help them overthrow the government.
CASE 4
PEOPLE VS. ADRIANO
78 PHIL 560
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
Allegedly appellant was a member of the Makapili group during
World War 2.The Makapili is an armed group of Filipinos which
sided with the Japanese and committed hostilities against their
fellow countrymen. After the war, the Peoples Court convicted the
appellant for treason.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the appellant for treason the
Peoples Court made was correct.
Held:
No. Absent two witnesses to testify this claim of treason in which
the law strictly applies, the appellant was acquitted.
CASE 5
PEOPLE VS. ROBLE
G.R. NO. L-433
TUASON, J:
FACTS:
Roble did allegedly 3 acts which justified his conviction in the lower
court for complex crime of treason with murder. Lead a group of
Pro Japanese Filipinos and killed a guerrilla supporter. Lead a group
to torture a guerrilla supporter which led to the latters death.
Detained and killed an alleged member if the guerrilla
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of complex crime of treason with
murder is correct.
Held:
No. It is not correct for murder is absorbed in the crime if
treason.Thus the court modifies this as treason with aggravating
circumstance of ignominy.
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CASE 6
People vs. Alvero
G.R. L-820
EN BANC
Facts:
Alvero on counts of Political, Economic, and Military collaboration
allegedly supported the Japanese campaign in the Philippines.
Alvero supplied motor and automobile equipments to the Japanese.
Alvero adhered to the advocacy of the Japanese and even called
himself their servant. Alvero was a major figurehead in the Makapili
group. He was convicted of treason by the Peoples Court.
Issue: Whether or not to affirm the conviction.
Held:
Yes as his diary and sales of equipment and among others heavily
shows his guilt and his adherence to the Japanese.His denial holds
no weight since it was unsubstantiated. The decision is affirmed.
CASE 8
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE Luis GODINEZ
[No. L895. December 81, 1947]
FACTS:
1. Jose Godinez was a shipmaster in the Philippine coastwise
trade before the Pacific War.
2. He rendered service to the Japanese Navy as their Pilor in
bringing their ships into harbor and otherwise performing work
connected with navigation. He was paid monthly salaries.
3. The prosecution said that such acts gave aid and comfort
to the enemies, but Godinez denied the allegation stating that he
was threaten by the Japanese that if he do not render his service
he or his family could be killed.
4. The prosecution, on the other hand, said that there was
no imminent danger to his life because some of other merchant
officer succeeded in evading service to the Japanese and were not
molested.
5. Moreover, he was accused of helping to the Japanese
together with criminal intention" to betray render him guilty of
treason.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution is correct in asserting that Jose Godinez did
commit the crime of treason by rendering his service to the
Japanese.
 RULING:
No. It was not demonstrated, however, that the other seamen
were surrounded by the same circumstances of herein indictee, as
to family members, means of evasion, personal relations or
conditions, etc., all of which necessarily affected any decision to
serve or not to serve. It may be that such marine officers were not
pressed by the Japanese precisely because the herein accused and
others (Eduardo Gonzales, Marcelo Ayesa) had consented to render
pilotage service.
Those who refused to cooperate, in the face of danger,
were patriotic citizens; but it does not follow that the faintheart,
who gave in, were traitors. Moreover, Mere governmental work
under the Japanese regimeand pilotage service may be
considered in the same lightdoes not constitute per se indictable
disloyalty. Lastly, it is hard to believe appellant wished the defeat
of our allies, because he had two sons in the guerrilla forces.
CASE 9
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE
VALENCIA)
JANUARY 29, 1948
FACTS:
1. Eduardo Prieto pleaded guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 among the 7
counts of treason that was filed against him in the Peoples Court.
2. The lower court convicted him of the crime of treason complexed
by murder and physical injuries, with aggravating circumstances.
3. On counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 it was shown that Prieto aided the
Japanese soldiers when he acted as the Japanese soldiers
informer and agent, when he accompanied them in apprehending
different guerrillas and when he participated in torturing and killing
the guerilla.
4. Prieto tortured and killed guerrilla in the following manner: (1) he
tied the hands of Abraham Puno then gave him fist blows and
placed a red hot iron on his body; (2) he also gave fist blows on
the face and other parts of the body to Mariano Ponce; (3) he also
tied the hands of Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin with rope,
tortured and detained them, and thereafter he killed them with a
bayonet; and (4) he tortured Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil
Soco for guerrilla activities.
ISSUE: WON the lower court is correct is convicting Eduardo Prieto of the
crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries, with
aggravating circumstances.
3
HELD:
No. The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in
these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not
offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States continuation defining treason, after
which the former was patterned, there must concur both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort one
without the other does not make treason.
Where murder or physical injuries are charged as an
element of treason, they become identified with the latter crime
and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. This rule would not, of course,
preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if
the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for
those crimes instead of relying on them as an element of treason.
It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
treason that they cannot be regarded separately under their
general denomination.
The use of torture and other atrocities on the victims
instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be
taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of
article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code. However,
there being an aggravating circumstance and a mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusin perpetua.
CASE 10
PEOPLE VS LABRA
FACTS: The evidence has conclusively shown that appellant Pablo Labra,
being a Filipino citizen, in biolagion of his allegiance to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, adhered to the empire of Japan
and gave it aid and comfort by acting as an agent of the Kempei
Tai, the Japanese Military Police. His main activity was arresting,
investigating and torturing guerillas. He took part in the arrest of
one Tomas Abella, a guerilla suspect who was later beheaded and
one Nicolas Tudtud who was found dead in a seashore.
The lower court found appellant guilty of treason and of the murder
of Tomas Abella.
Issue: whether or not appellant was guilty of murder
Held: No. The lower court erred in finding appellant guilty of the murder
of Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella is alleged in
 court three of the information, as one of the elements of the crime
of treason for which appellant is prosecuted. Such element
constitutes a part of the legal basis upon which appellant stands
convicted of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be
considered as legal ground for convicting appellant of any crime
other than treason.
CASE 11
PEOPLE VS ALBANO
Facts: Benjamin Albano, at that time a sergeant in the Bureau of
Constabulary of the puppet government, was charged with treason.
There is enough evidence, in accordance with the two-witness rule
that the accused together with his men, arrested some suspects of
being involve in the guerillas. The suspects denied such allegations
but the accused was charged with treason but he contended that
he was merely following orders and that the prosecution failed to
establish adherence to the enemy and rendering of aid and
comfort.
Issue: whether or not Albano is guilty of treason
Held: Yes. The contention of Albano is without merit because the words
and deeds of appellant clearly eXhibit such adherence and
assistance to the toe. Possibly, under certain circumstances,
members of the police force during the occupation who merely
urged guerillas to keep the peace and stop their activities did not
commit treason; but when it is shown by evidence that said officer
were not content to render lip service to the enemy in making pleas
for public orders, but went further and torture their own
countrymen who were guerillas, a verdict of guilt must inevitably
be returned.
CASE NO. 14
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELIPE REYES
No. L-1624 January 18, 1950
REYES, J.
FACTS:
December 1, 1944, in the different barrios of the Municipality of
Taguig, Rizal the accused, acting as informer or agent of the
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, for the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, with the
aid of a group of armed men and Japanese soldiers who afforded
him (them) impunity, guided and accompanied a group of armed
4
men and Japanese soldiers in the 'zonification' of the different
barrios in search of guerilla suspects. The accused and his
companions arrested about 267 male residents, suspected of being
guerrillas, and herded them together in a place which was
afterwards surrounded by armed men and Japanese soldiers, and
having thus confined the 267 guerrilla suspects and illegally and
arbitrarily having deprived them of their freedom, carried out the
purpose and plans of the enemy.
The only question of fact presented in the appeal is the
participation of the appellants in the "zoning" above described.
As to the participation of Leon Gutierrez the witness Julita Gregorio
testified that she saw the said appellant between 6 and 7 o'clock in
the morning of December 1, 1944, arresting and driving the male
residents towards Tipas and that he was among those who went to
her store that morning and took her husband along. No one,
however, corroborated this testimony.
The same defect is to be noted in the testimony of the witnesses
against the appellant Felipe. Maria Umali Ramos testified that this
appellant was one of those who took her husband from their
house. But no one corroborated her on this point.
ISSUE: Whether of not the accused should be convicted of treason absent
the corroboration to a witness testimony
HELD:
No. The rule is that every act, movement, deed and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of two witnesses. The two-witness rule must be adhered
to as to each and every one of all the external manifestations of
the overt act in issue and each of the two- witnesses must testify
to the whole of the overt act; or if it is. Separable, there must be
two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
CASE NO. 15
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TIBURCIO ALITAGTAG
NO. L-924. AUGUST 30, 1947
FACTS:
 Tiburcio Alitagtag was prosecuted in the People's Court charged
with treason on three counts. Briefly it is alleged (1) that on
February 4, 1945, in Santa Rosa, Laguna, the accused participated
in the arrest and execution of Augusto Ramirez, a guerrilla suspect;
(2) that on the same day the accused took part in the arrest of one
Canuto Velandres and two others who are still unknown; and (3)
that in the month of December, 1944, the accused enlisted and
served as a member of the Makapilis and retreated with Japanese
troops upon the approach of the American and guerrilla forces.
The Peoples Court declared that the overt acts described in counts
2 and 3 had not been duly proven. However, the court considered
the evidence adduced on the third countthat the defendant was a
Makapiliproof of adherence to the enemy.
(There is clear evidence that the defendant's associates were
Makapilis, and two witnesses, Dichoso and Perez, swore that the
accused was also a Makapili. Although the statements of these
witnesses do not tally as to the occasion when they saw the
defendant render service or perform duties as a Makapili, and
though the statements do not meet the two-witness requirement as
proof of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, they nevertheless are
competent and sufficient proofs of adherence.
Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of
two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gathered
from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act or
from the circumstances surrounding the act. )
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant could be convicted absent the two
witness testimony regarding his adherence to give aid to the
enemy.
HELD:
Yes. Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths
of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gathered
from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act or
from the circumstances surrounding the act.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MAKAPILI ORGANIZATION AND ITS
PURPOSES.Judicial notice may be taken of the existence and
purposes of the Makapili organization as matters of public notoriety
and interest and as part of contemporary history. The courts knew
as historical facts that the Makapili association was organized under
the sponsorship. direction and supervision of the Japanese army;
5
that its aims were as stated in the preamble and purposes of its by-
laws, Exhibit A-1; that it was a body of men recruited and armed
chiefly for the purpose of warfare and placed itself at the disposal
of the enemy; that it received military training and instruction from
Japanese military personnel and was equipped by the invaders for-
combat; that Filipinos joined that association and rendered service
in furtherance of the above objectives, fighting side by side with
the Japanese, commandeering supplies for the latter, and in many
instances excelling their overlords in the commission of atrocities
against their own countrymen in a campaign to suppress what they
and the Japanese regarded as subversive acts.
APPOINTMENT OR ENLISTMENT IN MAKAPILI ORGANIZATION,
How PROVED.Appointment or enlistment in that organization
need not be established by direct testimony. It may be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances. A person who acted as and
was actually engaged in the work of a Makapili, bearing arm,
wearing Makapili or Japanese uniform, drilling under Japanese
military officers, taking part in the rounding up and execution of
guerrillas, joining the Japanese in their retreat, and the like, such
person is presumed to have been regularly inducted. It is presumed
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
CASE NO. 16
PEOPLE VS. ROSAS
NO. L-2958
TUASON, J.:
Facts:
1. Patricio Rosas was found guilty for 3counts of treason for which he
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
2. Counts 1 and 3 are general allegations of the same overt acts
averred in count 5, except as to the charge of looting and arson,
which is laid in count 3 but not in count 5, hence, these three
counts may still be reduced to one.
3. Two witnesses, Dionisia Igamin and Maria Empalmado, testified
count 5, the rest of the prosecution witnesses' testimony having
reference to counts 1 and 3.
Issue: Whether or not the two-witness rule has been complied with in this
case?
Ruling:
 No. The evidence on the charge that the appellant was a Makapili
has not been proved by the requisite two-witnesses rule. The
witnesses have corroborated each other on the material points of
this feature of the accusation. The trial judge himself states that
the evidence presented to show that the defendant joined and
enlisted in the Makapili organization "falls short, strictly speaking,
of the necessary legal requirement." Nevertheless, the testimony is
valid and sufficient proof of adherence to the enemy.
CASE NO. 17
US VS FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET.AL.
NOV. 3, 1906
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
1. Francisco Bautista, Aniceto de Guzman, and Toms Puzon were
convicted of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and
destroy the government.
2. Evidence shows that a junta was organized and a conspiracy
entered into by a number of Filipinos for the purpose of
overthrowing the government by force of arms and establishing
Repblica Universal Democrtica Filipina.
3. Francisco Bautista is an intimate friend of Artemio Ricarte, the chief
of the military forces to be organized; that Ricarte wrote and
notified Bautista of his coming in Manila; and that Bautista took
part and was present in several meetingswhereat the plans of the
conspirators were discussed.
4. Tomas Puzon had an agency with the prime leader of the
movement; that Puzon held several conferences with such prime
leader; that Puzon accepted the commission and voluntarily united
himself and undertook to do his part in organizing.
Issue: Whether or not Bautista, de Guzman, and Puzon is in conspiracy to
overthrow the government?
Ruling:
No. The fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken
into consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with
the conspirators. In the first of these cases the United States vs.
De los Reyes the accused was charged with treason, and the
court found that the mere acceptance of a commission by the
defendant, nothing else being done either by himself or by his
companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within the meaning
of the law.
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CASE 18
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO AND SARAW
Facts:
Two boats left Matuta and Peta, a dutch possession. On their way,
their boat has been surrounded by six vintas manned by 24 moros
all armed. They get all the cargos in the boats and attach some of
the men and brutally violated the women by methods too horrible
to describe. The moros including Lol-lo and Saraw take the women
who were brutally violated. Upon arriving at their destination, the
women were able to escape. When Lol-lo and Saraw returned
home, they were arrested and charged with the crime of piracy.
Issue: Whether or not Lol-lo and Saraw were guilty as charged
Held:
Yes, Lol-lo and Saraw are guilty as charged. The proven facts
cannot be disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible defredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furendi and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility. In the given case, the crime of
piracy us proven. Hence, death penalty was imposed to Lol-lo for
the crime committed with aggravating circumstance and life
imprisonment is sentenced to Saraw.
CASE 19
SANTOS VS. MISA
GR NO. L-319, MARCH 28, 1946
Facts:
The petitioner Go Tian Tek Santos, is a Chinese citizen who was
apprehended by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the US Army and
was turned over to the Commonwealth Government and was
thereafter, detained. He is claiming that such detention was illegal
as he owes allegiance neither to the United States nor to the
Commonwealth Government of the Philippines. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue: whether or not Go Tian Tek Santos is guilty of the crime espionage
Held:
Yes. Go Tian Sek Santos is guilty of the crime espionage. As the
record states, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject.
The Commitment Order No. 291 issued by the US Army authorities
 describes him as such. But he is not entitled to liberty now. His
foreign state does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the
said law. As stated by the OSG, he might be prosecuted for
espionage, a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the
offender and considered as an offense against national security.
CASE 24
People vs. Rolando Delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes
GR. No. 174774
August 31, 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
Facts:
1. February 17, 2000 - Accused appellants, Rolando Botong delos Reyes,
Raymundo Mac-Mac Reyes, Emmanuel Cocoy de Claro, Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom, were all arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery,
distribution and transportation of shabu.
2. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) found probable cause to indict
appellants.
3. March 7, 2000- Insisting on their innocence, delos Reyes, de Claro and
Lantion-Tom moved for reinvestigation of the case which the trial court
granted.
4. After reinvestigation, OCP recommended that the RTC proceed with the
indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and de Claro and dismiss the
charges against delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom.
5. Charges against Lantion-Tom was dismissed.
6. These were the versions presented during the preliminary investigation
and reinvestigation.
Arresting Officers
On February 17, 2000, a confidential informant called up relative to
a drug deal to commence at the parking area of Shangrila hotel. At
2pm, they met with the confidential informant and positioned
themselves at the area. At 10pm, Reyes and delos Reyes arrived
separately (on board different cars) and subsequently went inside
Whistletop Bar and Restaurant. Delos Reyes was calling de Claros
cellular phone. Delos Reyes and De Claro went to the latters car where
Lantion-Tom was waiting. A transparent plastic bag was taken and
handed over to delos Reyes and in turn handed it to Reyes. The officers
accosted the accused respondents. According to the officers, the
accused respondents have admitted that in their possession was illegal
drugs.
Rolando delos Reyes (Sinumpaang Salaysay)
7
On February 17, 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan
Pasig with his neighbor, Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who
was to pay his indebtedness. While in the parking space, several armed
men suddenly appeared and shouting at them to open the door of the
vehicle. He and his neighbor were forced out of the vehicle with one of
the armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of SM and asking
them where the bag did, containing shabu came from. When he
answered hindi ko alam they were blind folded and forcibly taken to
the groups vehicle and continuously asked who the source of shabu
was. When delos Reyes blindfold was removed he found himself at
Camp Bagong Diwa.
He claims that he was arrested in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City and
not in the Whistletop Restaurant and Bar. Emmanuel de Claro presented
a blotter from the barangay containing the incident report made by
delos Reyes wife that her husband and her nephew went missing on
February 17, 2000 and were arrested by unknown armed men in
Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City.
Emmanuel de Claro and his common-law-wife Mary Jane Lantion-Tom
(Counter Affidavit)
They claim that they were at the Whistletop to talk to Lantion-
Toms accountant regarding the business permit. They were with
Emmanuels brother, Roberto and a friend James who were waiting for
them outside.Lantion-Tom went to accompany the accountant while
Emmanuel was left inside the restaurant.When the accountant left,
Lantion-Tom was suddenly surrounded by armed men who introduced
themselves as police officers and were arresting them for being the
source of shabu drug deal. Roberto and James were likewise arrested
but released on the following day.
7. Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting officers
as to the circumstances on the alleged drug deal leading to their
arrest are unfounded and purely fabricated.
8. April 4, 2000 - RTC: Probable cause exists not only against Reyes and
de Claro but with delos Reyes as well.
9. The prosecution presented the testimonies of the members of the
Regional Mobile Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP) NCR
Police office and the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
P03 Santiago
Their team leader sensed that the drug deal had already been
consummated so the police team immediately effected the arrest of the
suspected drug dealers. On cross-examination PO3 Santiago admitted
that he did not actually see what was inside the plastic bag and that he did not
even see delos Reyes hand over such plastic bag to Reyes. From his
position, he could not conclude that the suspects were committing and
illegal drug deal as he has no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic
bag and that he and the other arresting officers just relied on the information
relayed by the confidential informant.
SPO1 Lectura
Upon meeting with the confidential informant, he conducted a short
briefing and then positioned his team within the vicinity. When he sensed
that the drug deal had been consummated, he decided to arrest the
suspects. He arrested Reyes from whom he seized white plastic bag. During
cross examination he denied that Marlon David was with Rolando when the
latter was arrested but he later admitted that the police also arrested
Marlon David. He acknowledged that his team heavily relied on the
information given by the confidential informant in identifying the suspects in the
illegal drug deal.
PO3 Yumul
He narrated same version of events as that of PO3 Santiago and
SPO1 Lectura
SPO1 David (investigator at the intelligence and investigation section)
He received a plastic bag containing a box with sachets of
suspected shabu. He was told by Lectura that the articles were seized
from the suspected drug dealers. He said that he prepared the affidavit of
arrest of the arresting officers.
P/Insp. Cruto (forensic chemist)
He conducted physical examination of the seized sachets. All tested
positive for shabu.
10. RTC: accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced life imprisonment.
11. Emmanuel asked the RTC to review its judgment of conviction. He
contended that the accusations that he was engaging in illegal drug
deal was suspicious, if not credible. He argued that that the prosecution
failed to contradict his well-supported alibi so they could attend to
several documents pertaining to a business permit. He insisted that the
RTC should have highly regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes testimony which directly contradicted the police officers.
12. RTC acquitted de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly
admitted that it erred.
13. There were pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants of which
records of the case were forwarded to the Supreme Court. Case was
forwarded by the SC to the Court of Appeals for proper action and
disposition.
14. CA sustained conviction of appellants including de Claro. Merely
modified the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.
8
According to the CA, the police officers testimonies deserve credence
than accused appellants defenses of denial and alibi. There was no
evidence to rebut the presumption that the police officers regularly
performed their official duties.
15. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for final review.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure made by the officers without a
warrant is valid
Ruling: No. It is invalid. The Supreme Court grant the appeal and reverse the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
and (6) stop and frisk situations.
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest.
The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
(b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
It is evident that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and
searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing delos Reyes and de
Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic
bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de
Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-
appellant Reyes.
These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a
felonious enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior
 knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their
confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police
officers actually saw what was inside that box.
There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that
the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested
suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized
from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to
establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their
attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel
de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from
custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 25
Milo vs. Salanga
20 July 1987
Gancayco, J.:
Facts:
1. An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera,
Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat in the Court of First Instance.
2. Tuvera, Sr., who is a barangay captain, with the aid of some other
private persons, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of
their guns and fists blows without legal grounds.
3. Tuvera Sr., with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of
the police force helped one another and feloniously locked Armando
Valdez inside the municipal jail for about 11 hours.
4. Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced
at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the
information.
5. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition
thereto.
9
6. Respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash on
finding that Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged
with Arbitrary Detention.
7. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must vested with
authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of crime.
Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the
judges or mayors.
8. Respondent Judge did not consider private Tuvera as public officer.
Issue:
Whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, is a public officer who can be
liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention
Ruling:
Yes. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants
(who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were
recognized as persons in authority.
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio
Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to
look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the
municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio; to look after the general welfare
of the barrio; to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within
the barrio; and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the
same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the
barrio.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention.
It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with
abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime.A perusal of the powers
and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a
barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction
is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must
 be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is
the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the
aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private
respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-
529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial
court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 26
United States vs. Samonte
6 September 1910
Ruling: Yes. Any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may
arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or has committed, a
breach of the peace in his presence.
In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer, not only had authority
to arrest the defendant at the time, but it was his duty to do so, he having heard
the priest call for help and having arrived on the scene before the disturbance
had finally ended.
Fallo:
The penalty imposed by the court below being in accordance with the law and
the proofs presented, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
Appellant. So ordered.
Due to the resistance of Samonte, Glindo could not arrest him. Glindo
immediately went to the house of councilman and reported the matter. The
councilman ordered him to arrest Samonte.
When Samonte was found, the policeman attempted to hold him but he resisted
striking at the policeman again with his knife. The councilman ordered Samonte
to submit himself but the latter resisted and also struck the councilman with a
knife.
The arrest did not took place that night on account of his resistance.

Trent, J.:

Facts:
CASE 27
SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA
1. Isaac Samonte was tried in the Court of First Instance on a charge of
80 Phil 859
criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities.
12 May 1948
2. One night, Samonte and Rabe were together in one house in the barrio of
FERIA,J.:
Macalalong in the province of Tayabas. When they left the house and met
shortly afterwards in Verdades Street in the said barrio, later they became
Facts:
engaged in a quarrel. Rabe called Police! Police!.
1. A complaint was filed by one Bernardino Malinao against the petitioners
3. Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman being on patrol duty that night heard
for the crime of robbery.
the priest call for help. He arrived at the scene just as when Rabe was
2. A policeman of City of Manila, Benjamin Dumlao arrested the petitioners
getting up
on April 2, 1948 and presented a complaint against them with the
4. Glindo attempted to arrest Samonte saying to him In the name of the
fiscals office of Manila.
United States do not move. Samonte replied Dont come near, because I
3. April 7, 1948 Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus for they
will take your life.
were still detained and the city fiscal has not yet released them or filed
5. Glindo continued toward Samonte until the former was strucked by the latter
an information against them with the proper courts of justice.
with a knife.
4. Until May 12, 1948 (the writing of the Supreme Court Decision), the
Court still does not have the information with regard to the action taken
Issue: Whether or not Gregorio Glindo has the authority to arrest Samonte even
by the office of the fiscal on the complaint filed by Dumlao against
without a warrant
petitioners.
5. Regardless of what action might have been taken already by the office
of the fiscal, if there was any, the court shall decide this case to rule on

10
 the question involved and for the information and guidance of officers to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that
concerned. the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a
complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are
Issue: being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered
1. Whether or not the peace officer has authority to arrest without a unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
warrant court of justice. So ordered.
2. Whether or not the city fiscal of Manila is a judicial authority within the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Ruling:

1. No except in authorized cases. A peace officer has no power or

CASE 28
authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
People vs. Rogelio Mengote
offended party or any other person authorized by law. What the
22 June 1992
complainant may do in such a case is to file a complaint with the city
fiscal of Manila or directly with the justice of peace courts in
Cruz, J.,:
municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal of has no
authority, and he has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with
Facts:
having committed a public offense even if he finds, after due
1. A stolen pistol was found in possession of Rogelio Mengote at the
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been
moment of his warrantless arrest and was convicted of illegal
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori, a police officer
possession of firearms.
has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
2. He pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though
because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the
after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of
poisonous tree.
the offense charged.
3. The government insists that the revolver was validly received in
evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to a lawful
2. No. The judicial authority within the meaning of Article 125 of the
arrest even if admittedly without warrant.
Revised Penal Code must be a judge who has authority to issue a
4. The incident occurred when an informer called the police and informed
written warrant of commitment or release containing the ground on
them that there were three-suspicious-looking persons in Tondo,
which it is based. Judicial authorities mean the courts of justice or
Manila.A surveillance team was dispatched to the place.
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary
5. At the trial, patrolmen said that they saw 2 men looking from side to
detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a
side one of whom was holding his abdomen. When they were
public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
approached and the patrolmen identified themselves as policemen, the
may be established by law. It cannot be construed to include the fiscal
2 run away but were unable to escape. The suspects were then
of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a
searched.
warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary detention of a person
6. One of the suspects was Mengote. In his possession is a revolver with 6
arrested without warrant.
live bullets.
7. Rigoberto Danganan, a prosecution witnesses identified the subject
Fallo: weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his
house in Malabon. He pointed out that Mengote was one of the robbers.
8. Petitioners contention: The revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant was previously
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as obtained neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful
to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been
petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the
absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied
with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours
11
 testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is lawful.
Ruling:
No. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person; (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases failing
under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or
was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not
necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part
of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been
committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is,
What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person
"looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
Mengote was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street
shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the
noonday sun.
The policemen admitted that they were dispatched in that place after a
receiving a telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking"
persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery without the caller
explaining why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on
the impending crime.There was nothing to support the arresting officers'
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen.
12
The police officers did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein.
The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said
firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
imputed to him.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is
validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 29
People vs. Burgos
Facts:
Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del
Sur. From the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant
tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had
his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a
firearm are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive
activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership
of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been
made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family.
He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that
the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the
firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the
subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are
lawful.
Ruling:

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the
RoC:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless
arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendants
arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document, and was not committing any subversive acthe was plowing
his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An
essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have
been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime may have been
committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with
which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why
they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if
indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension
that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
CASE 31
People vs Sucro
Facts:
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to
monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro
was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was
transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie
Macabante. Macabante was intercepted and admitted that he bought
marijuana from Sucro. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at
the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4
13
teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante.
Issue:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Ruling:
Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute
rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything,
which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to
secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However,
warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE
existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the
accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is
presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.
CASE 32
Go vs CA
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from his car, shot
Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able
to take down petitioners car plate number. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time,
positively identified petitioner as the gunman. Petitioner posted bail, the
prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Ruling:
 No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could
the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded
as effected when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman
who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunmans cars plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioners wifes name. That information did not, however,
constitute personal knowledge.
CASE 33
People vs Tangliben
Facts:
Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting
surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm
they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted
suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found
marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters
for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4
art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
14
Issue:
Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Ruling:
No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may
w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing
possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even
without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on
the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer
pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying
marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough
time to secure a search warrant.
CASE 34
PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT
GR No. 91107 June 19, 1991
PADILLA, J.
Facts:
1. Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national visiting the Philippines, was
charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act after an
inspection conducted by NARCOM Officers in Cordillera.
2. During the inspection of the bus where Malmstedt was on-board,
NARCOM officers noticed something bulging from his waist and
asked him to produce the same for inspection but Malmstedt
refused.
3. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch containing marijuana,
thus the officers asked him to alight and his belongings searched
wherein 2 teddy bears were found containing marijuana inside.
4. During the arraignment, Malmstedt raised as defense the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects maintaining that such cannot
be admissible as evidence against him
5. The trial court found him guilty, thus this petition.
Issue: WON the search made was illegal as it is without a warrant.
Held:
 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, where the search was made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person: (a) when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
A crime was actually being committed by the accused when he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under (a) which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest, the officers having sufficient probable cause to believe that said
accused was then and there committing a crime.
CASE NO. 39
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO vs. JUSTO LUKBAN
Malcom, J.,
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, with the
intention to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute closed. Between October 16
and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police. The city authorities
quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with
some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters
Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of
soldiers.
About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders
from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city
of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some
170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the
steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under
the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a
lif e in Mindanao.
15
The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October
29.
The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the
hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no
previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had
been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to
these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-
treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations
with men, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion
found means to return to Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the women were illegally restrained of their liberty
by forcibly changing their domicile
HELD:
Yes. RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY.A prime specification of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential objects and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city,
who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant
region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which
began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to
Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.
No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or
the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality.
CASE 41
REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT
LIM V. PONCE DE LEON
MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya of Brookes Point, Palawan a motor launch
named M/L SAN RAFAEL. A year later or on April 9, 1962
Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale
Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation,
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan
the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being
informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the
Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the
detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of
the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to
the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining
that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander,
defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of
Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch SAN RAFAEL from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded
with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the
latter refused. Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha
through his counsel made representations with Fiscal
Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on
the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal
offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught, plaintiffs-
16
appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on November 19, 1962, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a complaint for
damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce de
Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando
Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search
warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch
without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of
Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not
vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the Marine Vessell be effected
without search warrant
HELD:
NO. Requisites for issuance of valid search warrant.A search and
seizure to be reasonable, must be effected by means of a valid
search warrant. And for a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
Seizure of personal property; Prohibition against seizure of personal
property, even if property the corpus delicti of a crime, without
search warrant.Under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court which complement the constitutional provision, two
principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the seizure of a
stolen property search warrant is still necessary; and (2) that in
issuing a search warrant the judge alone determines whether or
not there is a probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus
delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure without a warrant.
CASE 45
Quintero vs. NBI
162 SCRA 467
June 23, 1988
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. May 19, 1972 Petitioner Eduardo Quintero was a delegate of the
1st District of Leyte in the 1971 ConCon
2. He disclosed in his speech that certain persons had distributed
money to some delegates to influence them in the discharge of
their functions.
3. Quintero delivered to the Concon the payola he himself received,
for Concons action. However, he did not reveal the names of those
who gave him money.
4. Eventually, he was pressured to name them so he released a sworn
statement addressed to the Concon, mentioning the names of the
persons who gave him the payola.
5. In his statement, it appeared that varying amounts of money were
being handed to him by different people from different offices,
some from other delegates, from wives of representatives.
6. The then First Lady Imelda Marcos was among those implicated in
Quinteros expose.
7. Due to this, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos denounced Quintero and made
a statement sayng that he will uncover the people behind this act
making Quintero as a tool.
8. That same day/evening, NBI agents raided the house of Quintero
on the basis of a search warrant issued by the CFI Manila Judge
Asuncion. NBI claimed to have found bundles of money in
Quinteros residence.
9. NBI filed a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Quintero
with the court issuing a TRO enjoining the use in any proceeding of
the objects seized by NBI from his residence.
10. The search warrant delivered to the occupant of the searched
premises was issued in connection with the offense of grave
threats and not direct bribery which was the criminal complaint
filed against Quintero.
11. The 1935 Constitution was enforced at that time of the issuance of
the search warrant which was being questioned.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned search warrant issued by the judge is
null and void for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court
Ruling: YES. The Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search
warrant issued by the judge is null and void for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court
No relation at all can be established between the crime supposedly
committed and the evidence ordered to be seized. There was thus no
ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to claim that facts and
circumstances had been established, sufficient for him to believe that the
crime being charged had been committed.
17
Statements of applicant and complainant did not provide sufficient
basis for the finding of probable cause.
The respondent judge should have known that an application for
search warrant if based on hearsay cannot justify the issuance of a search
warrant, before he issued the questioned search warrant.
The search itself that was conducted by the NBI agents who raided
the house of petitioner pursuant to the questioned search warrant was
highly irregular as no members of the household were in a position to watch
them, thus they conducted the search on their own. This procedure is held
to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides
that no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made,
except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the
neighborhood.
Requirements of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were
not complied with. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give
a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must in the
presence of one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property. In the case at bar, the one who attested to the receipt
from the raiding party was himself a member of the raiding party.
The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned
warrant , and the actual manner in which the search was conducted,
strongly suggest that the entire procedure ws an orchestrated movement
designed to destroy Quinteros public image with incriminating evidence
and that the evidence allegedly seized from his residence was planted by
the very raiding party that was commanded to seize such.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent
Judge is declared NULL and VOID and of no force and effect. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 6 June 1972 is hereby
made PERMANENT. The amount of P379,200.00 allegedly seized from the
house of petitioner Quintero, now in the possession of the Central Bank, and
already demonetized, is left with Central Bank, to be disposed of, as such, in
accordance with the law and the regulations.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 46
People vs. Lovedioro
250 SCRA 389 Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack
29November1995 delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The
killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder
Rebellion -- Art.134 of the Revised Penal Code under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the
FACTS: penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by
1. Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo law.
while Lucilo was walking.
2. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss.
3. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of FALLO
murder, and subsequently found guilty.
4. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder
instead of rebellion.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated
5. It was confirmed by the prosecutions principal witness that Lovedioro
September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
was a member of the New Peoples Army.
AFFIRMED, in toto.
ISSUE
SO ORDERED.
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder,
instead of rebellion?

RULING
CASE 47
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DE GRACIA
Yes. Overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of
G.R. No. 112984 November 14, 1996
rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does
not exist. FRANCISCO, J.:

Political motive should be established before a person charged with a

common crime, alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable
penalty, could benefit from the laws relatively benign attitude towards
political crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of
itself suffice.
The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no
contribution to the achievement of the NPAs subversive aims, in fact, there
were no known acts of the victims that can be considered as offending to
the NPA.
Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership to the N.P.A was
conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
FACTS:
1. In an Information dated April 10, 1992, the brothers Cresencio De Gracia,
Dalmacio de Gracia and Bonifacio de Gracia were charged with the crime of
murder, the accusatory pleading averring substantially as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1992, in the Municipality of
Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Viscaya, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed
with a bladed weapon with intent to kill, with evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and helping with one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, criminally and feloniously attack assault, stab and hack one
Crispin Almazan hitting his throat and face, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple hack-stab wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.

18
2. Upon arraignment, the accused, with the exception of Dalmacio de Gracia
who is at large, pleaded not guilty and the case accordingly proceeded to
trial.
3. Thereafter, judgment was rendered finding Cresencio and Bonifacio de
Gracia guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
4. Accused-appellants now seek the reversal of their conviction based on the
following assignment of errors:
ISSUES
Whether or not:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS CRESENCIO DE GRACIA AND BONIFACIO DE GRACIA,
JR. ON THE BASIS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
INCONSISTENT AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT ON
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IMPUTATION OF MOTIVE UPON THE VICTIM
AND THE LATTERS RELATIVES WHO TESTIFIED FOR THE
PROSECUTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF
RELATIVE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BONIFACIO DE GRACIA, JR. WITH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN NOT
APPLYING THE BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY.[4]
RULING
19
Appellants lay stress on the apparent contradiction between the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses as to the location of the incident and
the weapons used on the assault. Prosecution witnesses viewed the incident
from different locations and angles, hence the variation in their perceptions.
The discrepancy as to the place where the appellants met the victim is
negligible considering that the yard was part of the rice field. Similarly, the
disparity as to the kind of the weapon used is insignificant as both a spear
and a bolo fall under the description pointed sharp edged instrument.
In the whole, the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential. The
witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in every
detail as differences in recollection or viewpoints or impressions are
inevitable. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not required for as long as the
witnesses concur on material points, slight differences in their remembrance
of the details do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
testimony.[8] Indeed, if rights were to be lost merely because witnesses,
while agreeing on the essential fact, fail to testify harmoniously to all the
particulars, in a very large proportion of cases involving wrongs to be
redressed the law would fail to furnish a remedy. Hence, variations in the
testimony of witnesses on the same side in respect of minor, collateral, or
incidental matters do not usually impair the weight of their united testimony
to the prominent facts.[9]
Next, appellants invoke self-defense and defense of relative.
It is a settled rule that when an accused invokes self-defense, the
burden is on him to establish by clear and convincing evidence his
justification for the killing.[10] He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution. For
self-defense to prevail, three (3) requisites must concur, to wit: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[11]
Upon minute examination of the evidence on record, we find that
appellants have failed to discharge this burden. The first and crucial element
for self-defense to prosper is wanting in this case. Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
on the life and limb of a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude
exhibited in the alleged shouting incident between Crispin and the brothers
is not sufficient.[12] Thus, as correctly observed by the trial court:
Considering the fact that not all the essential elements of self-defense as
mentioned above were present, this Court is brushing aside the self-defense
theory of accused Bonifacio (Jr.) De Gracia. His evidence is not sufficient to
sustain self-defense.[13]
 Another factor which militates against the appellants claim of self-
defense and defense of a relative is the physical evidence on record. Crispin
suffered no less than five (5) stab wounds on different parts of his body and CASE 48
a compound fracture on the nasal bone. Just as the presence and severity of People of the Philippines vs. Dasig
a large number of wounds on the part of the victim disprove self- G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.
defense,[14] so do they belie the claim of defense of a relative and indicate
not the desire to defend ones relative but a determined effort to kill. FACTS:
1. In the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad,
In the final analysis, appellants first three assignment of errors hinge Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their
on the trial courts assessment of the witnesses credibility. Factual findings of commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic.
the lower court especially on the credibility of the witnesses is generally
accorded great weight and respect on appeal.[15] In this case, the trial court
considered the testimonies of prosecution witnesses as natural, probable, 2. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad
straightforward, and credible.[16] We find no cogent reason to hold otherwise manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and
as the trial court is in the best position to make an honest determination of posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
the witnesses deportation during trial.[17]
3. At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Catamora noticed eight
Lastly, appellant Bonifacio claims the benefit of the mitigating (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting
circumstance of voluntary surrender. We note that Bonifacio surrendered suspiciously.
and was in fact accompanied by his uncle to the police station, albeit he
remained silent. Nonetheless, we cannot take Bonifacios silence against him.
4. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to
What matters is that Bonifacio, spontaneously, voluntarily and
approach Manatad.
unconditionally placed himself at the disposal of the authorities.[18] This act
of repentance and respect for the law indicates a moral disposition favorable
to his reform.[19] 5. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed,
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged
The applicable penalty for murder prior to the enactment of the Death Catamora to a gun battle.
Penalty Law is reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being no
aggravating circumstance but with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary
6. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and
surrender, the penalty imposable on Bonifacio in accordance with Art. 64 (2)
thereafter saw Manatad sprawled on the ground.
of the Revised Penal Code should be the minimum period, that is, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he is entitled to a minimum penalty of prision mayor maximum to reclusion 7. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Catamora sought
temporal medium, being the range of the penalty next lower than that refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[20] The same mitigating take Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is
circumstance, however, cannot favor Cresencio as he did not surrender. dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back up.
Cresencio was thus correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
8. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and fled
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED from the scene of the shooting.
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant Bonifacio is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years (20) years of reclusion 9. On a surveillance days after, on a suspected safehouse of
temporal as maximum and the P50,000.00 award for moral damages should members of the sparrow unit, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and
be denominated as indemnity. Cresencios sentence of reclusion Edwin Nues trying to escape.
perpetua and the award for actual damages are likewise AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellants. 10. Nues and wounded Dasig were captured and ammunitions
were confiscated.
SO ORDERED.

20
 11. Dasig extrajudicially confessed that he and the group of Edwin
Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues
were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.
12. However, upon arraignment, Dasig and Edwin Nues entered a
plea of "not guilty."
13. After the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused
Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." While trial was
still ongoing, Nuez died thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
14. In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by
which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective,
and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that
assuming he conspired in the killing of Manatad, he should be
convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct
assault.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Dasigs extra-judicial confession is admissible in
Court
2. Whether or not Dasig was accorded his constitutional rights as
an accused
3. Whether or not he committed murder with direct assault
Ruling
1. Yes. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession
is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given
as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency.
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have
beenadmitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In
an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity
of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood
by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-
21
judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As
has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of
appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt.
Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with
regularity and legality.
2. Yes. Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel he must provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own
counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the
latter case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the
records show that no objection was voiced by the accused
throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and
afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City
Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the
choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that
Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus it was too
late."
3. Yes, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is
guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion,
and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct
assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this
point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court
erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in
Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government,
among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this
case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with
the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in
the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue
City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that
the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army
with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing
of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of
the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable
for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a
person in authority."
CASE 49
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement
UMIL VS. RAMOS
of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
187 SCRA 312
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A.
4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at
bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the
crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically
pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to
the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just
executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be
made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of
prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered
to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that
the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,
appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the
liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to
22
overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime committed is
simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating
in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years
of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which
have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to
explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as
they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were
made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first
conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
1. On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information
which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound.
2. The wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along a
street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
3. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management
as "Ronnie Javellon," however it was disclosed later that the true
name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural.
 4. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the a person:
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile
patrols. (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
5. For reference, the consolidated cases include the following facts : committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was an NPA
courier.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live ammunition
person to be arrested has committed it; and
were found at the timeof her arrest, and she admitted to owning such
documents.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
As regards Domingo Anonuevo & Ramon Casiple, agents frisked them and escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
found subversivedocuments & loaded guns without permits. serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a search from one confinement to another.
warrant. Ammunition & subversive documents were found in her car.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
the latters companion in killing Romulo Bunye II. delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
The release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is Section 7.
detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and
of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the
person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing
an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person
Issue: Whether or not Rolando Dural and other petitioners were lawfully
making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
arrested
person arrested has committed it.
Ruling:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
YES. The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their
arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant
offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith
their release on habeas corpus.
constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is
recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be
effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
as amended, which provides:
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without
a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at
the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the
23
 most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose
behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly
committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are,
further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional
liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 50
People vs Hernandez
L-6025-26 / July 18, 1956
Concepcion, J:
Facts:
1. Amado Hernandez is a bonafide member of Congress of Labor
Organizations, an affiliate of Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan
(Hukbalahaps), a known group performing rebellious activities.
2. Hukbalahaps have risen publicly and taken arms to remove the
territory of the Philippines from the allegiance of the government,
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians.
3. On about March 15, 1945, Hernandez and other appellants were
accused of cooperates and synchronizes its activities with the Huks
by actively engaging in its armed rebellion against the government
of the Philippines.
4. They were charged and convicted of the crime of rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robbery and were sentenced
with life imprisonment.
5. Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the court
where his case was pending, but was denied on the basis of the
nature of the offense (if the crime was complexed, the penalty for
24
the most serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a petition
to the Supreme Court.
6. Prosecution argued that the gravity of the crime committed
required the denial of the bail and it maintained that capital
punishment may be imposed for the crime Hernandez was
convicted of.
7. Defense contends that there is no complex crime in the crime of
rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by petitioner was rebellion
complexed with crime murders, arson & robbery, and should be punished
with life imprisonment, thus bail should not be granted
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with
other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include
and absorb the said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail.
Murder and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is
taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single
crime and that there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis,
the Court cited several cases convicting the defendants of simple
rebellion although they killed several persons.
Thus, motion for bail was granted.
The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and,
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
there from. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can
be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each
one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the
graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48
could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The
reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two
or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts.
Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he
must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties
for each offense.
CASE NO. 51
Ponce Enrile vs Amin
G.R. No. 93335 / September 13, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J:
Facts:
1. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged of having committed rebellion
complexed with murder with RTC of Quezon City.
2. He was also charged with violation of Pres. Decree 1829 with RTC of
Makati City because he allegedly harbored and concealed in his house
Ex. Lt. Gregorio Gringo Honasan, who was suspected of having
committed a crime.
Allegations:
a) Rebellion Case:
In the evening of Dec.1, 1989, fugitive Honasan and some 100
rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the
residence of Sen. Enrile.
Honasan conferred with Sen. Enrile accompanied by about 100
fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches.
These facts led the prosecution to conclude that Enrile and
Honasan were co-conspirators in the failed Dec. coup.
b) Violation of PD 1829 Case:
Sen. Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasanby
giving him food and comfort on Dec.1, 1989 in his house.
3. Omnibus Motion filed by Sen. Enrile:
a. To hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest pending
personal determination by the court of probable cause
b. To dismiss the case and expunge the information from the
record
4. The court denied the omnibus motion. Sen. Enrile filed Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss but was also denied.
5. Enriles arguments on his appeal to the Supreme Court on certiorari:
The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.
Honasan in a supposed meeting on Dec.1, 1989 is
ABSORBED in, or is a COMPONENT ELEMENT of, the
complexed rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as
25
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the
same meeting on Dec.1 1989.
The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be
only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion.
6. Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the
theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on
the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sen. Enrile could be separately charged of violation of
PD 1829 nothwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him
RULING:
No. The violation of PD 1829 is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the
component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions.
The Hernandez case remains a binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as
means necessary to its commission or as an intended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
Sen. Enriles act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is a mere
component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion, it cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. All crimes, whether punishable
under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients,
or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion
and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime
form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot
be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. Sen. Enrile cannot be tried separately
under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecute din the rebellion case.
CASE NO. 52
Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163 / June 5, 1990
Narvasa, J.:

Facts:
1. In February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
103.
2. He was charged together with Mr. and Mrs. Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder which allegedly committed during their failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
3. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. Then, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon
City on the following day.
4. Later on the same day, Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. The
following are his arguments:
That the crime being charged against him is nonexistent.
That he was charged with a criminaloffense in an
information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process;
That he has been denied with his right to bail
That he was arrested and detained on the strength of a
warrant issued without thejudge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause
5. Solicitor Generals answer: the case does not fall within the
Hernandez ruling sincethe in Hernandez, the information charged
murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary
means for the commission of rebellion whereas in Enriles
case, murder and frustrated murder charged against Enrile were
committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion.
Issues:
CASE NO. 53
26
1. Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito
compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code
2. Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling
Ruling:
Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although
ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of
rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and
multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make
rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the
maximum. There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why
Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in this case. If murder were
not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately,
then the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and
(2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty
could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity
with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The Hernandez ruling is still valid. Hernandez doctrine remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion
are deemed absorbed. The Court reiterates that based on the this doctrine,
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and
the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, since there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. These other crimes such as murder or all those
that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence
petitioners should be entitiled for bail, before final conviction.
People vs Pimentel
G.R. No. 100210 / April 1, 1998
Martinez, J:
Facts:
1. In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with
subversion under Republic Act 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) as
amended before the RTC of Manila. A warrant of arrest was issued
but was not served due to his disappearance.
2. Seven years later, Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant
of arrest in the subversion case, and was also found to possess an
unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six rounds of live
ammunition.
3. Due to this, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion under PD 1866 before the
RTC in Makati City.
4. Tujan filed a motion to quash the illegal possession case on the
ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted
for subversion. He contended that common crimes such as illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed
absorbed in subversion. And since the present case is the twin
prosecution of the earlier subversion case, he is entitled to invoke
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
5. Opposing the Tujans motion to quash, the State contended that he
does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time
because:
he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case
the previous offense charged against him is for Subversion,
punishable under RA 1700, while the present case is for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion, punishable under PD 1866, a different law
Issue:
Whether or not Tujan was placed in double jeopardy with the filing
of the second information for illegal possession of firearm & ammunition in
furtherance of subversion
Ruling:
27
No. Sec. 21 of Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal,
conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In the present
case, Tujans motion to quash filed in the trial court did not actually raise the
issue of double jeopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. It is
noteworthy that the private respondent has not even been arraigned in the
first criminal action for subversion. Besides, the two criminal charges against
private respondent are not of the same offense as required by Section 21,
Article III of the Constitution.
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under RA1700,
as amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the
subsequent enactment of of RA 7636 on Sept. 22, 1992, totally repealing RA
1700, as amended, has substantially changed the complexion of the present
case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being favorable to the accused-
private respondent, who is not a habitual delinquent, should be given
retroactive effect.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion
against the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should
be dismissed. As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this charge should be amended to
simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since subversion is no
longer a crime. It would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence
the accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer exists.
Subversion charge against Tujan was dismissed, illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition in furtherance of subversion against the same accused is
deemed amended. Accused was ordered to be released immediately from
detention, since he was already detained for 7years, whereas the amended
charge has a penalty of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.
CASE NO. 54
Ocampo vs Abando
G.R. No. 176830 / February 11, 2014
Sereno, J:
Facts:
1. A mass grave site was discovered at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the 43rd Infantry Brigade
containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to be victims of
Operation Venereal Disease (VD). Said Operation VD was
launched by the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines
to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

2. PNP SOCO conducted a forensic crime analysis to identify the
bodies by way of SNA sample, however, the Initial Specialist Report
remained inconclusive as to the identities of the skeletal remains
and the leght of time that they had been buried.
3. In a Special Report, 10 possible victims were named after
comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.
4. Believing that their relatives remains were among those discovered
at the mass grave site,12 complaint-affidavits were filed by the
relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. They swore that
their relatives had been abducted or last seen wit members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.
5. Also, 4 former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP filed their affidavits
alleging that petitioners Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad,
being members of CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, ordered the
Operation VD in 1985. On the basis of these affidavits, petitioners
were charged with murder.
6. In a resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of
anInformation for 15 counts of multiple murders against 54 named
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein. The
said 4 former members of CPP/NPA/NDFP were dropped as
respondents and were considered state witnesses.
7. On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable
cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime
charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
8. Petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition:
seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of
Judge Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.
praying for his unconditional release from PNP custody, as
well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition
9. Ocampos arguments:
A rebellion case against him & 44 others was then pending
before the RTC of Makati City.
28
Common crimes, such as murder, are already absorbed by
the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary
means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners were denied due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of
arrests
2. Whether or not the murder charges against petitioners should be
dismissed under the political offense doctrine
Ruling:
1. Yes, petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrests. A
preliminary investigation is not a casual affair.It is conducted to
protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety
of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to
serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known
addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a
majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and
the attached documents or evidence.
As to the issuance of warrant of arrest, Ocampos allegation that
Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners have no merit.
2. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been
defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested." In this case,
the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of
Judge Abando as the trial judge.
 The political offense doctrine is NOT a ground to dismiss the charge
against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that
the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion. Under the
political offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty.
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in
the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as
its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as
rebellion alone.
When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the
trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether
the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for
the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders
were committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and
that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can be
clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as coconspirators. The court ruled that the burden
of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the
defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows. The proof showing political motivation is adduced during
trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present
evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to
determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
Case No. 55
People vs. Umali
FACTS:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were
found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid
staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in
the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid
resulted in the burning down and complete destruction of the
house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at
P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the
house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan
29
and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the
wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders
engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and
that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by
the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain
Alzate.
After trial, the court found Umali et.al, found guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson
and robbery.
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the
political situation in Tiaong. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old
time friends and belonged to the same political faction. However, these
friendly relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan,
Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the political head
and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his
(Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked
to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. Then
the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for
reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings and definitely blast
his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked
Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader. The result of the elections plainly
showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat
Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and
Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted
measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's victory.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the crime committed is
rebellion.
Ruling:
Yes. The court is convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily
the most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of
sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly
and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the
purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code
under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of
local Government. Rather, the object swas to attain by means of force,
intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon
the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor
 of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to
constitute sedition.
Case No. 56
League Jose vs. People
FACTS:
Case No. 57
People vs Cabrera
FACTS:
The Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had a rough
relationship with each other. The constabulary force had grudges
against the Police force of Manila because of the incident wherein a
Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household
of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said
policeman. More so, a day after one Macasinag was shot by a
Manila police, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that the
Police who shot himwas back to his original duties while Macasinag
was declared dead. There were also rumors that the said shooting
was ordered. As a result, some members of the Constabulary,with
rifles and ammunitions, escaped their barracks through a window
and went to attack the Police force, killing and wounding several
policemen and civilians. After trial, the court convicted Graciano
Cabrera at. with the crime of sedition.
Issue;
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Graciano Cabrera
et.al with the crime of sedition.
Ruling:
No.
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act
No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods
any one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of
subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is and necessary that
30
the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance
was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of
section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a
fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but
it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.
Case No. 58
U.S. vs Lapus
FACTS:
A complaint for sedition was filed alleging that on the night of June
3, 1902, a band composed of about four hundred men, among
whom were the accused Mateo Lapus et.al., armed with guns,
revolvers, talibones, bolos, and clubs, raided the town of Cabiao.
They went through the streets of the town firing shots, yelling, and
frightening the inhabitants thereof.
Some of said band went to the house of the municipal president,
while others raided several houses, taking captive sixty or seventy
of the inhabitants.
They roamed about the streets of the town threatening and
intimidating the people.
Some members of the band, among them the chief, Domingo
Cunanan, told the prisoners that the latter were often found in the
justice court, and that they were loaning money at usurious terms
to their farm laborers, and when the latter were unable to pay the
loan they compelled their children to work for them as servants;
that if the wealthy landowners continued oppressing the poor they
would not stop disturbing the towns, because the law must be
equally applied to rich and poor.
These acts were said to be in compliance with the orders of Felipe
Salvador, chief of the association called "Santa Iglesia", to which
they belonged.
 Issue:
Whether or not the crime of sedition was committed.
Ruling:
Yes. The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition provided
for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of section 5 and punished by section 6 of
Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission. The appellants were members
of an illegal association and had publicly and tumultuously attacked
the town of Cabiao and roamed over its streets, firing shots,
yelling, and threatening the residents with death, and thereby
frightening them. They performed acts of violence on the persons
of the president and other residents of the town, against the law
and the supreme authority and with political-social purposes. For
these reasons the acts performed by the defendants constitute
sedition as defined by the aforesaid sections of Act No. 292. The
crime of sedition was consummated, even though the object of the
defendants was not realized.
Case No. 59
US vs Apurado
Facts:
Filomeno Apurado et.al.were convicted of the crime of sedition as
defined in section 5 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission
Before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros,
entered upon its regular morning sessions, some 500 residents
assembled near the municipal building and demanded the dismissal
from office of the treasurer, secretary, and the chief of police, and
the substitution in their places of new officials whose names were
suggested by the spokesman of the party;
They wanted the council to accede to their wishes and drew up a
formal document setting out the reasons for its action.
The persons who took part in the movement were wholly unarmed
except that a few carried canes.
The crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as
their pressing into the council chamber during a session of that
body can be called disorder and misbehavior; and that the
31
movement had its origin in religious differences between the
residents of the municipality.
The petitioners desired the dismissal of the officials because they
believed that they should not be permitted to hold office in the
municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance to one of the
factions into which the town was at that time divided.
Issue:
Whether or not Filomeno Apurado et.al were guilty of sedition.
Ruling:
No.The provisions of Section 5 of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of speech" or "the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government
for redress or grievances" guaranteed by the express provisions of
section 5 of "the Philippine bill. Not only were the individual
members of the crowd wholly unarmed, but they were manifestly
desirous that fact should be known, for it appears that two
American officials having asked what the purpose of the gathering
was, were assured that the assembly merely desired to petition for
the removal of several municipal officials; and in proof of the fact
that they had no intention of committing a breach of the peace, the
members of the crowd raised their jackets and camisas to prove
that they were carrying no concealed weapons.
The prosecution emphasizes unduly the fact that a few of those
who took in the demonstration carried canes, but there is nothing
in the record to indicate that any usual number of sticks were in
the hands of the petitioners, or that they had been brought to the
meeting for the purpose of using them as weapons of assault.
CASE 61
G.R. No. L-21049
December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE VS. ISAAC PEREZ,
MALCOLM, J.:
Facts:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and
Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to
meet on the morning of April 1, 1992. Upon meeting, they became
engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-
General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times:
"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he
has killed our independence." With that act, he was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of
the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority. Upon conviction of such
charge, Perez then appealed the case to this court.
Issue: whether or not Isaac Perez is guilty of the crime Sedition
Held:
Yes, Isaac Perez is guilty of the crime Sedition. In criminal law,
there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State,
the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The
offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this
character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of
commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against
legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a
violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures
as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open
violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution.
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of
the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of
the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form
of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous
comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this
instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest
bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency
in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among
the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the
President of the United States by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at the
pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive
power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with
32
law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil
authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious
attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the
Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs.
Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended
by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books
exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who
shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or against the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make
any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing
his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites
rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the
community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted
authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has
made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited
rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities.
He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb
the peace of the community and the safety or order of the
Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the
action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8
of Act No. 292 as amended.
CASE 62
G.R. No. L-1451
March 6, 1906
THE UNITED STATE vs. AURELIO TOLENTINO
CARSON, J.:
Facts:
On May 14, 1903, Aurelio Tolentino utter seditious words and
speeches and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels in
Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by accused-appellant
and which was presented by him and others on the May 14, 1903
at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila entitled 'Kahapon
gayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow) which is
against the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the
lawful officers, instigate others to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious
conspiracies and riots, tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the
safety and order of the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Issue:
whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the
accused was in fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292
of the Philippine Commission
Held:
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense
are define in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words
or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others
to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend
to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government;
(7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding
paragraph the judgment of conviction in this case must be
sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of those offenses. We
are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama
directly and necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious
conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the
safety and order of the Government.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the
time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a
33
spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are
satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to
incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to
conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be
used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its
stead.
CASE 64
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town
of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his
picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb
of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing
on a barrel.
After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies
of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation not only in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication
with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it
was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and
addressed to the latter's supposed wife. The note contains
statements of dismay with the administration of President
Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte,
and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the
Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and
Mussolinis, and to teach their children to burn pictures of
Roxas if and when they come across one.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter
above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdang and other local periodicals
and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by
signing said pseudonymous nam in said note or letter and
posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein
he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a
tree."
Issue: Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of
the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?
Held: Yes.
The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.1 It calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with
Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators. And the communication reveals a
tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the
disposition to remain loyal to the government.2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the
govemment or to weaken the oonfidence of the people in the
government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they
are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself.
The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses or to induce people to
resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon
their minds.
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and
submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas." However, such criticism
should be specific and therefore constructive specifying particular
objectionable actuations of the government; it must be reasoned or
tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an
invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under
examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the
government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called
shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth.
Instead the article drips with maleviolence and hate towards the
constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public
servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant
would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.
34
CASE 66
People vs. Dasig
G.R. No. 100231.
April 28, 1993.
Facts:
At about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight
(8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting
suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of
the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but
sensing that they were being followed, they immediately proceeded
to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun
battle.
At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the
other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the
ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat.
Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he
saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatads gun and again fired at him
to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group including
Nuez acted as back up.
Thereafter, the Nuez group commandeered a vehicle and fled
from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that
he can identify accused-appellant Nuez because of a mole at the
bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the
accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his
companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the
sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the
place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuez trying to
escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuez and
confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and
ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig,
who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left
upper arm and subsequently apprehended.
Issue
Whether or not he committed murder with direct assault or simple
rebellion.
Held
 Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government,
among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this
case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with
the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in
the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue
City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that
the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New Peoples Army
with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing
of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of
the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable
for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a
person in authority.8
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement
of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion.9 The act of killing a
police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.
CASE 67
Gelig vs. People
G.R. No. 173150
July 28, 2010
Facts:
Lydia Gelig and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos
(Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon
Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son,
Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to
this case.
Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that
Gemma called him a sissy while in class. Lydia slapped
Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her
to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent
assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her maxillary
area, as shown by a medical certificate5 issued by a
doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma
continued to experience abdominal pains and started
bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981,
she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and
was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered
incomplete abortion.
Issue
35
Whether or not Lydia Gelig is liable for Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion.
Held
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an
offense against public order that may be committed in two ways:
first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more
common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or
[b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of
official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.15
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged
in the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with
paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils
who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was
assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom
and accused Gemma of calling her son a sissy. Lydia refused to
be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a
verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded
towards the principals office but Lydia followed and resorted to the
use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The
violent act resulted in Gemmas fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of
persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the
provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in
AuthorityWho shall be deemed as such.
xxxx
 In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code,
teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties
or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in
authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved
June 12, 1985).
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a
hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42
days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too
lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of
Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and
abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not
substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not
unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other
factors.
(Guilty of Direct Assault, but NO unintentional abortion)
CASE 69
69. THE UNITED STATES vs. NICOMEDES GUMBAN
GR NO. 13658
November 9, 1918
Avancea, J.
FACTS:
Petronilo Gumban, municipal president of Jaro, Iloilo, was in the
barrio of Pavia of the said municipality, inspecting the quarantine of
animals.
He was getting some information from a councilor, Magdaleno
Suliano, regarding the condition of the animals in his barrio, when
Gregorio Ismaa, a tenant of Magdaleno Suliano, arrived to report
the fact that he had surprised a carabao belonging to Policarpio
Gumban, destroying a planted area belonging to the said
Magdaleno Suliano, and that, having seized the carabao, he
brought the same to the police station at Pavia, which is within the
zone affected by the quarantine.
Then Epifanio Gumban and the accused Nicomedes Gumban,
brothers of Policarpio Gumban, the owner of the carabao, arrived
36
there and protested to the president that their brother's carabao
was taken to Pavia which is within the zone affected by the
quarantine.
The president, upon hearing said protest, said that it was his
opinion that Gregorio Ismaa was right in taking the carabao to the
police station at Pavia.
However he promised to intervene in the matter and to telephone
to the man in charge of the quarantine to find out whether, on the
following day, the said carabao could not be withdrawn from the
zone affected by the quarantine and upon hearing this statement of
the president, the accused insulted the said president and gave him
a slap on the face which struck his left ear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of assault upon an agent of
authority
HELD:
Yes. The information qualifies the crime charged as an assault upon
an agent of authority. Inasmuch as the offended party, as
municipal president, is a person in authority and not a mere agent
of authority, the designation of the crime given by the fiscal is
erroneous. But, as has been decided by this court in many cases,
this mistake does not affect the information, because the
qualification which the fiscal makes is not what constitutes the
crime but the f acts stated in the information. In relating the facts
constituting the alleged crime, the fiscal further says that the
offended party was a municipal president and therefore an agent of
authority. This, however, is nothing but a mere conclusion of law
which can be considered discarded from the information. The
allegation made that the offended party was a municipal president
is sufficient to make one understand that the crime charged in the
information is that of assault upon a person in authority. For this
reason, we believe that, in accordance with the information filed in
this case, the accused can be found guilty of the crime of assault
upon a person in authority.
CASE 70
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX BENITEZ
GR No. 48396
September 11, 1942
Moran, J.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 28, 1939, while D'Artagnan Williams,
Division Superintendent of Schools for Negros Occidental, was
working in his office, defendant Felix Benitez, special agent in the
office of the Provincial Governor, gave the former a fist blow
causing him a contusion over the mastoid bone on the left ear.
The assault appeared to have been prompted by the defendant's
desire to avenge a supposed affront to the Provincial Governor by
the Division Superintendent in connection with the appointment of
teachers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a division superintendent of schools is a person in
authority within the meaning of article 148, in connection with
article 152, of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Yes, since under the law (section 917 of the Revised Administrative
Code), a division superintendent of schools is given the power of
general superintendence over schools and school interests in his
division, with the right to appoint municipal school teachers and to
fix their salaries, and further, since education is a state function
and public policy demands an adequate protection of those
engaged in the performance of this commission, we believe and so
hold that a division superintendent of schools should be regarded
as a person in authority.
CASE 71
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TIBURCIO BALBAR
GR Nos. L20216 and L20217
November 29, 1967
Makalintal, J.
FACTS:
37
Tiburcio Balbar entered the room where schoolteacher Ester
Gonzales was conducting her classes.
Without warning and right after complainant had finished writing
on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his arms around her
and kissed her on the eye.
Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried to
flee.
Defendant allegedly brought out his daga (a local dagger) and
pursued complainant, catching up with her before she was able to
get out of the room and defendant embraced her again, at the
same time holding on to his daga.
They both fell to the floor, as a result of which complainant
sustained slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not quashing the information for Direct Assault should
be set aside by reason of absence of knowledge of the accused
that the victim is a person in authority.
HELD:
NO. The lower courts dismissal of the information on the ground
that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that
the person attacked was a person in authority is clearly erroneous.
Where an information for direct assault upon a person in authority
sufficiently alleges that the accused knew the complainant was a
school teacher, was in her classroom and engaged in the
performance of her duties when she was assaulted, it is error to
quash the same upon the ground of absence of express allegation
that accused had knowledge that she was a person in authority,
and the case should be remanded for trial on the merits, for it
matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly
alleged. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not
expressly alleged, complainants status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not
excuse noncompliance on his part (Art. 3, Civil Code). This article
applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal, and
whether substantive or remedial, for reasons of expediency, policy
and necessity.

CASE 72
U.S. v. GUMBAN,
SUPRA
FACTS:
The warrant for the arrest of Tabiana and his herdsman was placed
in the hands of two policemen, Emiliano Callado and Baltazar
Cabilitasan. Tabiana told the policemen that he would come in later
and report at the municipal building with his herdsman. At 6. p.m.,
the Tabiana not having appeared at the municipal building, the
policemen were directed by the chief to find him and have him
come to the municipal building in obedience to the warrant
In passing near the market place Tabiana detached himself from
the custody of the policemen without their consent and entered the
market. The policemen, instead of following Tabiana into the
market, they waited about half an hour, at the end of which time
they went into the market and found Tabiana with some of his
friends. Tabiana asked for the warrant. Callado drew the warrant
from his pocket; and as he showed it to the Tabiana who took it,
looked at it, and put it into his pocket. After that he said, "Come
along" and gave the policeman a push, as did also more than one
other of Tabiana's friends.
They went to the municipal building but as it was getting late, the
chief of police and other officials were gone. Tabiana and his
friends left the municipal building, saying that they were going to
find the justice of the peace (the justice of the peace lived with
Tabiana) Presently, however, the chief of police arrived at the
CASE 73
municipal building, and learning what had taken place, he
PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ
dispatched the two policemen to go after Tabiana and procure the
59 PHIL 343
return of the warrant of arrest and to insist that Tabiana should
come down at once so that the matter could be finished.
When the policemen arrived they found Tabiana, he was requested
to give up the warrant and go to the police station he denied
having taken the warrant. Tabiana then approached the policeman,
Callado, and hit him in the breast with his hand or fist, at which
instant the policeman seized him by the wrist and resistance
ceased. As the policeman started to carry the prisoner away two
bystanders interfered and took him away from the policeman.
By this time Julian Canillas, the justice of the peace, had arrived on
the scene and being evidently excited, he hit Callado on the back,
when he too was stopped by another policeman. Julian Canillas
directing himself to the policeman said, "Go back to the municipal
building and to-morrow you will take those clothes off," referring to
38
the uniforms worn by the policemen. The policemen then went
away, which may be attributed not only to the command of the
justice of the peace but also to the fact that some of Tabiana's
friends indicated a determination to fight if the policemen should
persist in their purpose of arresting Tabiana.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tabiana resisted the persons in authority.
HELD:
YES. Tabiana guilty of resistance and serious disobedience to
public authority. Resistance is impossible without the employment
of some force. A man may abscond or evade or elude arrest, or
may disobey the commands of an officer without using force but he
cannot resist without using force of some kind or in some degree.
If at the ultimate moment no force is employed to resist, there is
not resistance but submission; and if it had been intended that
every manifestation of force, however slight, against the
authorities, and their agents should bring the case under article
249, Reasonably interpreted they appear to have reference to
something more dangerous to civil society than a simple blow with
the hands at the moment a party is taken into custody by a
policeman.
Julian Canillas is found to participated in the offense committed on
the occasion, knowing that Tabiana was liable to arrest under the
warrant issued by himself; and he is therefore punishable in the
same manner.
FACTS:
Amador E. Gomez, as provincial sheriff of Camarines Norte,
appeared at the house of the defendant, Gabriel Hernandez, to
proceed with the attachment of the personal property belonging to
the latter and his wife, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by
the court in civil case No. 775, entitled The Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Gabriel Hernandez, the said defendant Gabriel
Hernandez, who was then governor of Camarines Norte, and
Marcos Panotes, who was chief of police of the municipality of
Daet, taking advantage of their respective public positions and
abusing the same, voluntarily, illegally and criminally, without any
legal motive or right whatsoever, detained, locked up and deprived
 the said offended party of his liberty against his will, for a period of
time less than three days.
ISSUE:
HELD:
RESISTANCE TO AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN AUTHORITY; FALSE
IMPRISONMENT; ARBITRARY DETENTION; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF.
The alleged offense of resistance to an agent of a person in
authority, with which the GABRIEL HERNANDEZ is charged,
consisted in his having prevented the provincial sheriff from
carrying away his piano and chairs from his house by holding him
by the arm with hand while with the other he wrested the chair
which the said sheriff was trying to hand over to one of the several
laborers standing by for his orders below or at the foot of the stairs
of the appellants house. The alleged offense of arbitrary detention
with which he was also charged consisted in his having ordered the
chief of police to arrest said sheriff, depriving him of his liberty at
least from 6 to 8.45 oclock in the evening.
CASE 75
U.S. VS. BALUYOT
40 PHIL 385
CASE 74
PEOPLE VS RILLORTA
180 SCRA 102
FACTS:
Romy Ramos, a thresher operator, recounted that while they were
threshing the palay stock near the premises of the of Barangay
Captain Emiliano Doton. Pascual Baylon Rillorta accosted Ramos
and threatened him with a gun saying "Damn you, you better go
home or I'll kill you here" Rillorta resented the threshing of palay in
his barrio by the Ramos' threshing party, whom he regarded as
outsiders, because he wanted the palay stocks in his barrio to be
threshed in his own thresher.
On their way home, Calapugan, Ramos and his companions, Romy
Elizaga and Ceferino Facon, aboard their thresher, were stopped by
the three accused. Pascual Rillorta, who was armed with a bolo,
warned them not to return to thresh palay in barrio Barangobong.
Barangay Captain Doton, who was following behind Ramos' group,
advised Pascual Rillorta to let the threshing party pass. The three
PASCUAL, WESLEY and WILSON RILLORTA chased Barangay
Captain Doton. Upon overtaking him, they surrounded him and
pushed him toward the creek. Pascual Rillorta hacked him with a
bolo while his sons (Wesley and Wilson) held Barangay Captain
39
Doton 's hands. Barangay Captain Doton yelled "I'm going to die,
they are going to kill me."
Pascual Rillorta denied having killed Barangay Captain Doton. He
alleged that Barangay Captain Doton attacked him. For his part,
Wesley alleged that he simply defended his father who was
attacked by Doton.
ISSUE:
W/N Barangay Captain Doton was performing his official duties as
barangay captain when attacked.
HELD:
YES. Under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code and P.D. 299, a
barangay captain (formerly a "barrio lieutenant") is a person in
authority. When Doton intervened to prevent a violent encounter
between the Pascual Rillorta and Ramos' group, he was discharging
his duty as barangay captain to protect life and property and
enforce law and order in his barrio.
FACTS:
Conrado Lerma was elected governor of the Province of Bataan.
One of his competitors upon this occasion was, Jose I. Baluyot. He
was then commissioned as captain of the National Guard. pendency
of the accusation for estafa and its damaging effects upon his
reputation, he had been asked to resign from the position; and
although he had not resigned when the act which gave occasion to
this prosecution occurred, he had apparently been temporarily
relieved from duty with that organization pending investigation.
He was to deliver a piano owned by his wife to the provincial
building and inquired for the governor upon the pretext that he
desired a friendly interview.
Baluyot had been called into the office upon the governor's first
arrival and had withdrawn for a few moments to permit another
person to have an interview was also calculated to put the
governor off his guard at the moment Baluyot re-entered the office.
The unarmed governor could make no effectual defence against a
person armed with such a deadly weapon as a revolver. It is
obvious also that the means and methods thus deliberately
selected by Baluyot were intended to insure the execution of the
crime without any risk to himself arising from the defence which
the governor could make.

The governor tried to make an escape but was fired the second
and third shot.
ISSUE:
Whether of not the crime was committed whilst the governor was
in the performance of his duty.
HELD:
Yes. A complex crime of murder and assault upon a person in
authority during the performance of his duty. The provincial
governor was killed within his office in the provincial building whilst
performing his duty.
CASE 76
Severino Justo vs CA
GR No. L-8611
REYES J.B.L.,J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals from Court of
First Instance Ilocos Norte.
There were two public teachers who are complainant and
defendant in this case.Justo asked De la Cuesta if it is possible to
have a certain Ms. Racela as teacher in her district. De la Cuesta
said no but maybe a "shop teacher. Insulted and his feelings
hurt,the complainant lashed out and said in these exact words
Shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his
promise., and then challenged De la Cuesta to a fist fight outside
office premises. Complainant grabbed a lead paper weight. The two
went out the room and then stopped at a certain Mr. Bueno's office
table; Bueno was there apparently. De la Cuesta said that Justo
should drop the lead paper weight. Defendant put grabbed the
neck and collar of Justo. Bueno broke up the fight, but before
that defendant threw punches at complainant. Justo was
found guilty of assault. Justo claims both parties mutually
agreed to fight, both disrobed themselves as teachers.
Issues:
Whether or not there was mutual agreement to fight
Whether or not mutual agreement to fight disrobes public duty as
teachers
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Held:
1. No, there was never a mutual agreement to fight. Complainant
never agreed. It appears that when the two left the room. Justo
was following the complainant.
2. No, being a public official, the duty is attached to their
personality until such person ceases to hold office. No mutual
agreement to fight can disrobe that.
The Supreme Court finds no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against
Appellant.
CASE 77
US vs. Prudencio Garcia
G.R. No. 6820
Arellano, C.J.,
FACTS
This is appeal for the crime of attempt against an authority
in which the defendant was found guilty.
There was a case involving Carmen Pascual. The decision of the
case was announced. Apparently, Garcia was outraged by the
decision and blurted, "We dont agree to the decision!". The
justice of the peace, whose name is not present in the Supreme
Court resolution, said that if he does not agree he could post bail
Garcia replied with outrageous and vexing remarks. The judge
rhetorically asked what involvement does he have with the case
when he is not even a party to it. The judge told him to get out
as Garcia was making a disturbance. Garcia made an
implied threatening remark just before he left. When the
Justice of the peace was about to go home, apparently Garcia was
waiting in the shadows, like a thief in the night or a lion pouncing
on his prey. Garcia then attacked the said justice with a cane
and slapped the face of the justice. The defendant denies
that he attacked the justice and states that the latter provoked
him and admits to slapping.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant did assualt the justice of the
peace
 Held: Yes, the facts were presented in the lower court with 5
witness claiming what is stated in the facts is true. Further, Garcia's
statements of provocation are unsubstantiated. CASE 79
Hilarion Sarcepuedes vs People of the PHilippines
The judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance upon the G.R. No. L-3857
Appellant. BENGZON, J.:

CASE 78
People vs.JESUS HECTO, PEDRO HECTO and LORETO HECTO, accused,
PEDRO HECTO and LORETO HECTO
G.R. No. L-52787
EN BANC
FACTS:
CFI LEYTE finds herein accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of murder with assault upon a person in
authority and sentencing them to DEATH.
Appellants slaughtered a carabao but did not pay slaughter
fee. Barangay Captain Catalino Pedrosa asked the appellants to
pay but latter said they already did paid however it was apparently
a lie. Catalino confronted the appellants and a heated exchange
happened which lead to fists being thrown by appellants but the
wife of the Captain was there to pull him out of the fight. Later the
Captain while escorting his nephew to the latters parents house,
he was attacked. A gunshot was heard which prompted the
Captain's wife to go outside their house but she was halted by
appellant who aimed their guns at her. More shots were fired to the
body of the Captain who was lying on the ground and then not
satisfied the appellants sadistically stabbed the captain. The
defense of appellant was denial and that they were somewhere
else when the incident happened.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting the appellant of direct assault upon a person in
authority.
Lucrecia Bustamante is a teacher-nurse who ordered the closing of
a pathway in her land which led to the premis of the school she
was working. Hilarion did not like this act. Hilarion went straight to
the school to confront her. A heated exchange brewed up and
Hilarion pushed Lucrecia to the window and hit her with a raincoat
twice. Hilarion pleads that Lucrecia on that day was not in her
official capacity.
Issue: whether or not to affirm the decision.
Held Yes, the defendant's statement is unfounded. She is a person
in authority within the meaning of the law at the time of the assault
she was piercing the earlobe of a student which was part of her
function. Finding no legal error in the affirmed decision, The
Supreme Court affirms the decision, with costs against the
appellant.

Issue: Whether or not appellants' guilt should be affirmed.

Held: Yes, although some of the evidence is hearsay. The

testimony of the Captain's wife and Mario Cadayong corroborated
with the facts. The fact that appellants went into hiding after the
incident is evidence of guilt. The decision is modified as the trial
court erred in convicting them of the complex crime of murder with
assault upon a person in authority.Barangay Captain was in his
official capacity when the accused killed him,the CFI erred in not
ruling this.The penalty is modified to Reclusion Perpetua.

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