Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
In this case, two applications for registration of the same parcel of land
were filed in different branches of the Court of First Instance. The certificates of
title were issued in the name of respondent de Castro, while the other, for the
heirs of Pedro Lopez was still pending.
On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez et al. filed an application for the
registration of a 69-hectare parcel of land in Tagaytay City with the CFI of
Cavite.
In their answer, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of
land they sought to register was their inheritance. The municipality filed a
motion to dismiss.
In his report, dated April 15, 1971, clerk of court Rolando Diaz stated
that since time immemorial, the Delos Reyes owned and possessed parcel of
land in question. On November 3, 1870, they sold it to Dimaranan. On
September 15, 1892, the property was passed to Pedro Lopez de Leon, Sr. And
Maxima Trinidad until their death when their children took over ownership and
possession thereof. Upon their death, their respective heirs succeeded over the
property and on February 25, 1971, they partitioned it.
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On April 19, 1971, the court rendered a decision approving the report of
the clerk of court and ordering the decree of title be issued in favor of the
applicants (Lopez).
In the course of examining the records for the purpose of issuing the
decree of registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration
Commission discovered that lot 1 had been decreed in favor of private
respondent Honesto de Castro, et al.
On August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an order declaring the
court had lost jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.
Seven (7) years later, on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a
complaint for execution of judgement and cancellation of land titles of the
defendants and their successors-in-interest before the RTC of Cavite.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.
Hence, the heirs of Pedro Lopez lost their property in favor of Honesto de
Castro.
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2. THE DIRECTOR OF LAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS
276 SCRA 276
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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3. CACHO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
269 SCRA 159, March 3, 1997
FACTS:
On 29 June 1993, the lower court decreed the reconstitution and re-
issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969, noting that the LRC Registry Book
of Ordinary Registration Cases showed that Decree No. 10364 was issued o9
May 1913 and Decree No. 18969 was issued on 07 July 1915.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The lower court and the court of appeals correctly found that decrees of
registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench.
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The issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
land registration commission.
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4. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
308 SCRA 317, June 17, 1999
FACTS:
Lot 10704 was a parcel of land partly local and corn land situated at
Cagmanaba, Oas, Albay. Originally, the land was owned by Eliseo Rivera who
began possessing and occupying the same in the concept of owner openly,
continuously, adversely, and exclusively since 1926. He planted corn and
coconut seedlings which later bore fruit. Sometime in 1928, the spouses
Ignacio Almazar and Gregoria Rivera purchased the land from him. The land
now was declared in the name of Gregorio Rivera under Tax Declaration No.
18333. They continued planting corn.
The land was surveyed in the name of herein claimant per certification of
CENRO. Likewise, all taxes have been paid up to the current year.
Finding that the claimant has satisfactorily possessed and occupied the
land in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely and exclusively
since 1926, the court ordered the registration and confirmation in the name of
Spouses Monico Rivero and Estrella Nota.
ISSUE:
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HELD:
Yes. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act provides: Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interests have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least 30 years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of
the title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be
conclusively essential to the government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
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5.REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL
295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion
possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on schools power.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol
was entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32
years (1959-1991).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in
dispute?
HELD:
No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that
the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation
of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable in accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus
meets the first requirement.
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Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much
later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by
law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to
assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved
the lot for Opol National School.
In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the
land in dispute.
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FACTS:
Claiming that the aforesaid OCT were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstruction. In 1953, the RD
issued TCT to said lot.
In 1974, petitioners filed a civil case for injunction with damages against
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land and cut
down the bamboos thereat.
The court dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. On the other hand,
the court rule din favor of the RP.
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ISSUE:
HELD:
No. Under the Spanish Crown, private ownership of land could only be
acquired through royal concessions, which were documented in various forms,
such as:
1. Royal Grant
2. Special Grant
3. Title by Purchase
4. Possessory Information Title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage
Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Under the law, forest land cannot be owned by private persons, it is not
registrable and possession thereof no matter how lengthy cannot convert it into
private ownership.
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7.JAMES BRACEWELL vs. COURT OF APPEALS & REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
323 SCRA 193, January 25, 2002
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has vested rights over the parcels of land?
2. Whether or not Sec. 48 of Court of Appeals No. 141 could be invoked
in this particular case?
HELD:
No. Sec. 48 of C.A 141 was amended by PD 1073 in January 1977, which
now reads (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.
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land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation.
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FACTS:
On May 15, 1975, private respondent A. Carino filed for the registration
of some 43,614 sq. m. lot located at Cabuyao, Laguna. According to
respondent, the subject land was originally owned by his mother Teresa
Lauchengco who died in 1911, and later administered by him in behalf of his
five sisters and brothers after the death of their father in 1934.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs
decision ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of Respondent
Carino was valid?
HELD:
No. The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land
Registration Act which requires that he who alleges in his petition or
application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the
Spanish times, such as Titulo Real, or royal grant, a Concession Especial or
special grant, a Composicion Con Al Estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
compra, or title through purchase; informacion possessoria or adjustment title,
which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.
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FACTS:
More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the
registration of two parcels of land locate d in Abra. Rosario Valera, private
respondent, presented documents showing that when she was still single, she
bought lot 1 from Cristeta Trangued and heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were
allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish in the concept of owners and
who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued
possession of said land in concept of owner and continued to pay tax thereon
in her name.
On 23 April 1956, the trial court ruled that applicant has a registrable
title.
(1) the claims of petitioners as shown in the sketch plan are not shown in
the original survey.
(2) the claims of other petitioners appeared in the original survey
although three of these claims bear different identifying names.
(3) the Calle para Collago maintained by the oppositors to be the extent
or boundary of the property of the applicant on the south side is existing and
still is the existing boundary on the south and on the southeast side as shown
in the sketch plan.
However, the court just reiterated its former decision ordering the
registration of the lot in the name of applicant Rosario Valera.
ISSUE:
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Does Rosario Valera have a rightful claim over the lot in question?
HELD:
It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size
or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The Damasens were declared to have a rightful claim over the specific
portions of Lot.
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FACTS:
1. The Deed of Sale by Calixtra Yap in favor of LSBDA is NULL & VOID
ab initio;
2. The intestate estate of Joaquin Ortega is declared owner in fee simple
of the 735,333 sq. m. & NDC is ordered to segregate same area &
convey the same to the estate of J. Ortega.;
3. The Register of Deeds is ordered to issue 8 new titles;
4. xxxx
5. xxxx
6. xxxx
7. xxxx
8. xxxx
A motion for reconsideration was filed with the Court of Appeals where
the latter REVERSED & SET ASIDE the RTCs judgment.
1. Whether or not the sale of Calixtra Yap of the estate of the late
Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was NULL & VOID;
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HELD:
The petition has no merit. There was no showing that the land had been
classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA, hence, petitioners
could not have become owners thereof through prescription. Petitioners
challenge to LSBDA cannot be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise
and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
LSBDAs title was based on Miscellaneous Sales Patent issued by the Director
of the Bureau of Lands. LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Therefore, the same was valid.
Moreover, the title became indefeasible & incontrovertible after the lapse
of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. Sec. 32 of PD 1529
provides that upon expiration of said period of 1 year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible.
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FACTS:
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner & possessor of a parcel of land
with an area of 12,508 sq. m. located at Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
In 1938, Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter Rosa Fontanilla who
then started paying the real estate property tax thereon.
On August 21, 1955, Rosa sold the land to her nephew, herein
Respondent Santiago Fontanilla, thru a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The
instrument was not registered. Respondent spouses Fontanilla constructed
their house on the lot in question.
On December 16, 1957, Rosas heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two
children, Fructoso & Paciencia, executed another Deed of Absolute Sale over
the same land in favor of Respondent Fontanilla.
ISSUES:
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HELD:
1. YES. The appealed decision was supported by evidence.
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of
the declarant, tax declarations & receipts can be strong evidence of ownership
of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription.
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FACTS:
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that
the finding of the Trial Court was not sufficiently supported by evidence. The
Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took
effect only in 1980 & the certificate of real estate tax payment was dated 1990.
The CA affirmed the judgment appealed from, ruling that, To our mind, it
is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations & tax
receipts of the land in question. All that the law mandates is proof of open,
continuous, peaceful & adverse possession which appellee has convincingly
established xxxxx.
HELD: YES. Respondent Divinaflor acquired a registrable title over the subject
property.
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possession & occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceing the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant & shall be
entitled to a Certificate of Title under the provisions of this Chapter.
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FACTS:
The land in dispute, 19.4 has., was owned by Ulpiano Mumar since
1917. He sold it to respondent Cajes in 1950 for which tax declarations were
issued in 1950, 1961, and 1974.
In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to Sps. Beduya who, like Alvarez, were
never in possession of the property. Sps. Beduya then obtained a loan from
petitioner DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) for P 526,000.00 and
mortgaged the land.
It appears that respondent Cajes had also applied for a loan from DBP in
1978, offering his 19.4 has. as security for the loan which was approved.
However, after the release of the loan, DBP found out that the land mortgaged
by Cajes was included in the land mortgaged by the Sps. Beduya. Petitioner
DBP cancelled the loan & demanded payment from Cajes.
Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a
re-appraisal of the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by
petitioners representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent
Cajes was occupying a portion of said land. Private respondent Cajes was
informed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he was occupying, &
he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondent refused to do so,
petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against
him, invoking that it was an innocent purchaser for value. The Regional Trial
Court-Tagbilaran City rendered a decision declaring petitioner DBP the lawful
owner of the entire land on the ground that the decree of registration was
binding upon the land.
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The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
HELD :
Petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registered
owner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at the
foreclosure sale. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which
would create a suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent
purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, & then claim
that he acted in goof faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor.
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FACTS:
On February 26, 1979, the Santiagos sued the Villanuevas for forcible
entry. On February 14, 1980, a criminal case was also filed against the
Villanuevas for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
In their complaint dated July 30, 1991, Lina Vda. De Santiago & her
children maintained that as successors-in-interest of Anacleto, they were
unlawfully deprived of the possession, use & enjoyment of the fishponds for the
last 12 years by Carlos & now, by the latters widow, Estrelita Vda. De
Villanueva, and their children.
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The Santiagos asked the court the Viilanuevas to vacate the lots and
restore to them possession & ownership of the lots registered in their
precedessors name.
In a decision dated December 18, 1992, the Trial Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action and res judicata. The CA reversed the RTC
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
HELD :
Yes. The high court ruled that respondents titles constituted indefeasible
proof of ownership which entitles them to possession of the properties.
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FACTS:
On the other hand, spouses Armando Abad alleged that their possession
was lawful and in concept of an owner for more than 70 years dating back
before 1920. According to them, the land was purchased by their parent, the
late Juan Abad, and Marcelino Nievera from Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F.
Totanez, who purchased the same from Antonio Fernandez, who in turn
purchased the property from Vicente Espino, whose possession & ownership of
the property was public, exclusive, notorious, open & continuous long before
the alleged registration of the subject property in the name of Antonio
Francisco, under Act No. 496, the latter being known as a mere trustee or
overseer.
On August 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Trial Court in toto.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners Cervantes & Abad have a right to the parcels
of land they were occupying?
Petition DENIED.
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FACTS:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
situated at the Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz,
Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. He died intestate & was
survived by his four children.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack-A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In the case of Halili, the court held that a certificate of title accumulates
in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
eld by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title
and shows exactly the real interest of the owners. The title, once registered,
with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged or diminished, except in direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.
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FACTS:
On 15 April 1995, the trial court rendered its decision against the
respondent.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners title over the said parcel of land is valid?
HELD:
It must be noted that petitioners title was irregularly issued after the lot
covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied
on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or
encumbrances appearing thereon.
As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct
attack/proceeding. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject
to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in direct
proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title over the
subject lot, petitioner is entitled t protection against indirect attacks against
his title.
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FACTS:
On April 28, 1983, the same lot was bought by (respondent) Blas
Trabasas from Dolores Sayson, who claimed that she was the owner of such
land.
The RTC issued its decision (1993) declaring that neither respondents
(Trabasas) nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in possession of the
land. Trabasas has no equitable right to the possession of the land under
litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of
decree or registration issued by the Director of Lands?
HELD:
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Commonwealth Act no 141 (Public Land Act) gives in its sections 3 and 4
to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (now the Secretary of DENR) ultimately the authority to
dispose and manage public lands. The courts have no jurisdiction to inquire
into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands.
Only the DENR secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.
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FACTS:
The land in question was situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoined the
Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano had converted it into a
fishpond.
In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they were
the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by
purchase and that; it was not within any forest or military reservation.
The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest
Development, opposed the application on the principal ground that the land
applied for was WITHIN THE UNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and
that such area was denominated as FOREST LANDS-did not form part of the
disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the
Valerianos. This was affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the
subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be
categorized as part of forest lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
HELD:
No. Courts cannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and
jurisdiction.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and
not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession
applicants (Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
The conversion of the subject property into a fishpond by Applicants does
not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject
property from unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter.
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FACTS:
The Trial Court entered judgment declaring the Free Patent and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title null and void, ordering the Director of
Lands to cancel the said patent and issue another patent in favor of Abanilla,
excluding the respective portions of land possessed by Esquivel & Nuesa, and
ordering Abanilla to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Isabela the Original
Certificate of Title, who was thereby ordered to cancel the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue
of the said patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six
(6) months.\
HELD:
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Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, expressly
provides that any false statement in the application, which is an essential
condition of the patent or title shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted.
The lapse of one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be
reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a
title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the
height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shielf of fraud in securing
title.
The State is not bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec. 38,
Act 496, any may still file action for cancellation of certificate of title even after
six years from its issuance.
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FACTS:
Plaintiffs Agripino Padre, et. al, sought to quiet title on two (2) parcels of
land situated at Taleb, Bantay, Ilocos Sure, thru two (2) civil cases they filed
before the lower court where the latter made its findings of facts and
conclusion, to wit:
1. Civil Case No. 2954 The land was originally owned by Jose Padre
who gave it to Fausta Padre without a Deed of Transfer. Fausta Padre
declared the land for taxation purpose in her name. On December 2,
1966, she sold a portion of the land to Avelina Paranada, married to
Vicente Viernes. The late Jose Padre had been in possession of the
subject land up to the time it was given to Fausta. Fausta was also in
possession of the property until the years 1973-1975 when Juliana
Pacleb Parel cut down trees on the land. Hence, the case was filed.
2. Civil Case No. 2964 The land was originally owned by Calixto Paa
who gave the same to Sabas Paa without a deed of transfer. Calixto
declared the land for taxation purposes in his name. He paid realty
taxes to evidence his possession. The complaint was filed because
Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down some trees on the portion of the land in
question.
On the other hand, defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel, et. al. contended that
the parcel of land was formerly owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold it to
Blas Pacleb without a deed of transfer. Some of the adjoining lots were the
properties of Bartola Pero, the deceased grandmother of Juliana Parel, one of
the defendants and a portion of it was the land of Roman Pacleb, the
predecessors-in-interest of defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel.
The defendants in both Civil Cases were in actual possession of the land
in dispute. Being in actual possession under claim of ownership, it was
presumed that defendants were the owners.
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expenses of litigation. The plaintiff had the right to litigate & it was not sound
public policy to punish a party by making him pay damages, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation for having exercised their right erroneously xxx.
In this appeal, the appellants raised several errors of the lower court.
ISSUES:
HELD:
2. YES. The Regional Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has
prior possession of public lands.
Petition DISMISSED.
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FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an action to quiet title instituted by the
late Victorio Vda. De Aliwalas against the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco, the Director
of Lands & the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the public
domain & it was so declared on October 12, 1933. Thereafter, Dr. Jose Aliwalas
applied with the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent
covering this lot. On December 11, 1936, the Director of Lands granted the
application and issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588.
This patent was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April
8, 1937. On the same day, OCT No. 159 was issued in the name of Jose
Aliwalas. From then on, Dr. Aliwalas paid the corresponding realty taxes
thereon having declared the land for taxation purposes in his name.
Page 41
On the basis of the evidence, the Trial Court rendered judgment
declaring the plaintiff Aliwalas as the true owner of the property, ordering the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel the TCTS in the name of Cipriano
Tengco, et. al.; ordering the defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco to vacate the
land in question xxxxxxx.
ISSUE:
HELD:
2. No. They are not guilty of laches or prescription. Title acquired through a
homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is
imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered
owner.
Petition DENIED.
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23. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, etc. vs. THE HEIRS OF C. CARLE, et.
al.
105 Phil. 1227, 1959
FACTS:
The Director of Lands filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Mindoro praying that the Homestead Application be declared null and void and
the respondent, heirs of Ciriaco Carle, be ordered to surrender the patent and
the certificate of title.
The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that said action was filed
beyond the period of limitation provided for by law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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title to the land thus granted and registered may no longer be the subject of
any inquiry, decision, or judgment in a cadastral proceeding.
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FACTS:
In 1946, defendant Ramelo entered the land through force and deceit,
Plaintiff Ingaran complained to the Local District Land Officer who wrote a
letter to said Ramelo advising him to desist from his occupation of the land
because Homestead Application of Bumanglag was still subsisting, but Ramelo
refused to vacate.
ISSUES:
HELD:
No. Plaintiff did not acquire vested right over the land in question.
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FACTS:
Juan Padilla and his heirs Defendant Padillas succeeded in obtaining the
approval of the Director of Lands of their Homestead Application without
excluding therefrom the foreshore and marshy lands as well as the areas
reclaimed and occupied by the plaintiffs and covered by plaintiffs applications.
Defendant Padillas wrote the plaintiffs demanding the latter to vacate the
premises reclaimed and occupied by the said plaintiffs because said defendants
would bulldoze, level and fill up the same in order to construct improvements.
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ISSUES:
HELD:
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FACTS:
The record shows that in Land Registration Case No. 11732 & under the
date April 19, 1917, the aforesaid lot number 625 was decreed in favor of
FLORENTINO PAMINTUAN by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and
that Certificate of Title No. 540 was thereupon issued to him in 1918.
In the meantime, Cadastral Case No. 132 was instituted. This case
embraced the district in which the lot in question was situated and the lot was
given its cadastral number in the proceedings were pending under Act No. 496.
Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot at the trial of the cadastral case
and the Court of First Instance awarded it to the respondents (Nicomedes,
Maria, Mercedes, Arosa & Eusebia ESPINOSA) and ordered the cancellation of
certificate of title number 540.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. In a cadastral case, the Court has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of a land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is null and void. The jurisdiction of the court
in cadastral cases over land already registered is limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands.
Petition GRANTED.
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FACTS:
The Plaintiff is a mutual building and loan association who brought this
action to recover from the defendants the title to and possession of a land
described in TCT Nos. 5261 & 5617, both of which were issued by the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Tayabas, where the land was located.
- That the land in question formerly had OCT 477 (by virtue of a
homestead patent) and registered in the registry of deeds of
Tayabas in 1921 in favor of TIMOTEO OLVIGA & RAFAEL
IGLESIA.
- That in 1929, the same land now known as Lot 3912 and covered
by OCT 30174 was sold by TIMOTEO OLVIGA to defendant
Spouses Bonifacio and Irenia Olviga.
The court held that the titles (TCT 2205) obtained by Tabien and
the plaintiff should not prevail over those subsequently obtained by the
defendants on the ground that the former were issued in a cadastral
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proceeding, and the latter in accordance with Section 22 of Act No. 496
(Land Registration Act).
The plaintiff avers that the court erred in not declaring it as owner
of the land in question.
ISSUE:
Should Tabiens title and that of plaintiff prevail over that of the
defendant spouse, on the ground that the former title was issued in a cadastral
proceeding?
HELD:
Yes. Because the proceedings under the Land Registration Law and
under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that
both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings
and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. (Aquino
vs. Director of Lands)
Since the title of Tabien and the plaintiff were issued in accordance with
the provisions of Act No. 496, the same shall have all the characteristics of
IRREVOCABLE TORRENS TITLE, and since the title of Tabien is prior to that
issued for the defendant spouses Bonifacio Perez & Irinea Olviga.
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FACTS:
On August 27, 1958, the oppositors (Bernabe Olivia, et. al.) filed a
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by Jose
Duran, et. al. as said lots were already registered in their names attaching
therewith the original certificates of title.
The applicants filed their objection to the motion, alleging that the
reasons for the motion to dismiss did not appear in the application but were
mere assertions of the parties & that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to
consider the application even though the lots were already covered by
certificates of title.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. Once registered under Act No. 496, a certificate of title becomes
indefeasible as a Torrens Title.
Sec. 122 of of Act 496 provides that, xxxx After due registration and
issue of the certificate and owners duplicate, such land shall be registered land
for all purposes under this Act.
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FACTS:
Sometime in 1963, the Pajomayos filed with the Court of First Instance of
Urdaneta Pangasinan a complaint, alleging that:
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When the case was called for trial on July 6, 1964, the counsels for the
parties submitted to the court a stipulation of facts xxxx that the parties agree
that the land in question is covered by Two Certificates of Title, one in the
name of Diego Pajomayo under Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 issued
under Free Patent, and Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 in the name of
Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral Case No. 91 of Malasique Cadastre.
The defendants appealed the decision of the lower court and assigned the
following error: The lower court erred in declaring OCT No. 14034 of herein
appellants null and void.
ISSUE:
Which of the two original certificates of title should prevail? The OCT
1089 held by plaintiffs-appellees or OCT 14034 held by defendants-appellants?
HELD:
The appeal has no merit and the OCT No. 1089 of the plaintiffs should be
upheld.
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiffs based their claim of title to
the land in question on OCT No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo in
1931 by virtue of a free patent that was granted to him. The law requires that a
homestead patent must be registered in the office of the register of deeds of the
province where the land lies. Sec. 122 of the Land Registration Act provides
that it shall be the duty of the official using the instrument of alienation, grant,
or conveyance in behalf of the government to cause such instrument before its
delivery to grantee, to be filed with the Register of Deeds for the province where
the land liesxxxx
Thus, it has been ruled by this court that once a homestead patent
granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Sec.
122 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act), the certificate of title issued in virtue of
said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land
Registration Act.
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Necessarily, when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the
other, one should be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled.
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30. ERNESTO DAVIT, et. al. vs. CRISTITO MALAY, et. al.
318 SCRA 711, November 19, 1999
FACTS:
The spouses Andres Adona & Leoncia Abad, husband and wife for a good
number of years, were blessed with five children, among them was Carmen
Adona. Carmen married Filomeno Malay; three children were begotten by the
marriage, namely Cristitito, Nora and Dionisio (among the herein private
respondents). Following the death of Leoncia Abad in 1923, Andres Adona
cohabited with Maria Espiritu, a widow, without the benefit of marriage.
Andres & Maria sired two children-Esperanze, represented herein by her heirs,
all surnamed David, and Vicente Adona. Maria Espiritu likewise had a child by
her previous marriage, Fulgencio Lemque, now herein represented also by his
own heirs. During his lifetime, Andres Adona applied for a homestead patent
over a parcel of agricultural land located at Dirita, Iba, Zambales, containing
an area of 22.5776 hectares. After Andres Adona died, Maria Espiritu,
predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, succeeded in obtaining Original
Certificate of Title No. 398 over the land in her name. After Maria Espiritu had
died in 1945, the children, as well as descendants, of Andres Adona by his
marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful and quiet possession
of subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant-buyers were in good faith and for value.
HELD:
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FACTS:
On August 30, 1991, petitioner Jerome Solco filed with the Regional Trial
Corut, Quezon City, an action for damages totaling to P 11,621,913.00 moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs, with preliminary
attachment against respondents DAE Sugar Milling Corp., Azucar Management
& Development Corp., Eduardo L. Lopingco, Teody Lopingco and Rosita
Lopingco, claiming that the sugar quedans he had purchased out to be
worthless.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The Court finds the Memorandum of Agreement dated November 25,
1993, executed by petitioner Jerome Solco and respondent DAE Sugar Milling
Co., Inc. (DAE) void in that Solco and Dae Sugar have nothing to ratify because
the levy and sale on execution of TCT No. 115609 have been nullified by both
the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court. Thus, the levy and sale to be
implemented or validated are now non-existent.
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FACTS:
On March 5, 1986, Estrella Mapa filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 99 a petition for reconstitution of documents and
issuance of certificates of title over certain parcels of land covered by OCT 614,
Decree No. 6667, GLRO Rec. No. 5975. Estrella Maps claimed that on Jun 16,
1913, the Director of Lands issued certificates of sales to Vicente Salgado over
the parcels of land covered by OCT 614, Decree No. 6667, GLRO Rec. No. 5975
in accordance with Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. The
sale involves four (4) parcels of land (Lot Nos. 755, 777, 778 and 783) located
at Brgy. Payatas, Quezon City. Lot No. 755 has an area of 3,691 hectares, Lot
No. 777 has 25.0155 hectares, Lot No. 778 has 24.5091 hectares, and Lot No.
783 has 25.0363 hectares. The four lots formed part of the Piedad Estate.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The court ruled the petitioner not owner of the land. Petitioner Liao
claims that his predecessor in interest acquired the property through sale
certificate Nos. 780, 781, 783, issued by the Director of Lands is 1913. It is
shown, however, that the sale certificates were signed by the Director of Lands
and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. These sales were void. This is
because the sales were not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. In Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court also said that approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands. In the
absence of such approval, the sales were void. In view of the invalidity of the
sales, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sales.
Petition DISMISSED.
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FACTS:
On April 7, 1980, private respondent Petra Bilog, assisted by her
husband Felipe Bilog, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, involving an Eight
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four (8,474) square meter parcel of land
registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16109 of the
Registry of Deeds of La Union. She alleged that sometime in 1964 or 1965,
petitioners took possession and assumed ownership of the said property,
appropriating the fruits therefrom. She alleged that despite demands on them
to vacate the land, petitioners refused to do so and even filed a case for
Annulment of TCT and/or Reconveyance with Damages before the same court,
which case was, however, dismissed on February 12, 1980. Thus, in her
complaint, private respondent prayed that she be declared the true and
absolute owner of the subject land and petitioners be ordered to turn over
possession thereof to her.
On November 19, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union,
Branch 3, rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, dismissing the complaint
and declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16109 in the name of private
respondent null and void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court
and private respondent was declared the true and absolute owner of the
subject land. Accordingly, petitioners were ordered to turn over the subject
land to private respondent.
With the denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on May 20,
1994, [5] the instant Petition was filed, anchored upon the following grounds:
(1) The decision (annex a) erred in declaring the deed of partition with
sale (exh. 1) and the deed of absolute sale (exh. 2) not authentic and valid;
(2) The decision erred in holding that defendants failed to substantiate
their claim of ownership and in giving more credence to plaintiffs testimonial
evidence and tax declaration no. 21460 (exh. B) and certification of tax
payments (exh. C);
(3) The decision erred in finding/holding that the non-registration of the
deed of partition with sale and the deed of absolute sale with the register of
deeds made the purchases thereunder "dented" and did not automatically vest
title or ownership over the subject property to the buyers;
(4) The decision erred in holding that the daily notebook (exh. 3)
containing the memorandum of installment sale by leonora calonge to
defendant-appellee fortunata agasen (exh. 3-a to 3-c) over the parcel of land
described in exh. 2 was not a valid or credible document of transfer;
(5) The decision gravely erred in holding that tct no. 16109 (exh. A)
cannot be collaterally attacked on the ground that it is barred by the rule on
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indefeasibility of a torrens title after the lapse of one year from the decree of
registration.
Issue:
ISSUE:
HELD:
To begin with, it is not denied that the two subject documents are
notarized documents and, as such, are considered public documents which
enjoy the presumption of validity as to authenticity and due execution. [8] One
of the documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, was identified by Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Maximo Quero, the administering officer who had notarized it.
The legal presumption of validity of petitioners duly notarized public
documents has not been overcome by preponderant evidence by private
respondent, upon whom the burden of proof rests, having alleged the contrary.
[9]
The subject documents were also attached by petitioners to their Answer
where they were alleged as part of the counterclaim. As such, private
respondent should have specifically denied under oath their genuineness and
due execution. [10] After all, a counterclaim is considered a complaint, only
this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on
the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an
independent action. [11] Having failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the said documents, private respondent is
deemed to have admitted the same.
The following circumstances all indicate the genuineness and due
execution of the subject documents: (1) The subject documents were duly
notarized public documents; (2) The documents enjoy the legal presumption of
validity; (3) Their genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied
under oath by private respondent; (4) Private respondents signature thereon
were found genuine by the lower court upon a comparison of her signature
thereon with that in her own documentary evidence; (5) The actual
identification and positive testimony of petitioner; and (6) The testimony of the
lawyer who had notarized one of the subject documents. Private respondents
bare denial of the same cannot, by any measure, overcome the above-
mentioned evidence and legal presumptions in petitioners favor.
The memorandum of sale appearing in Exhibit "3" is sufficient to prove
the sale between petitioner Fortunata Calonge Agasen and her late sister, the
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previous vendee of the land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale from private
respondent. After all, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have
been entered into provided all essential requisites are present. [14] The
provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for
convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the
validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a
public instrument. [15]
Petitioners have adequately explained why they have not pursued their
action for annulment of title against private respondent, which the Court of
Appeals viewed as having "further darkened the cloud of suspicion which
hovered over the questioned documents." Private respondent herself admits
that petitioners were the first to assert their right, by filing an action for
annulment of title and/or for reconveyance with damages against private
respondent [18] which complaint was, however, dismissed without prejudice.
[19] On the other hand, the complaint of private respondent was filed two
months after the dismissal of their complaint, prompting them to merely
interpose their cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the lower
court.
Finally, the Court of Appeals is likewise in error in holding that private
respondents title was "vested with the garment of indefeasibility." The rule on
indefeasibility of torrens title --- i.e., that torrens title can be attacked only for
fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration --- applies only to original titles and not to subsequent registration.
An action for annulment of title and/or reconveyance which was previously
filed by petitioners and interposed in their counterclaim is an action open to
them to attack private respondents fraudulently acquired title. Neither may the
compulsory counterclaim of petitioners challenging the title of private
respondent be brushed aside as merely a collateral attack which would bar a
ruling on the validity of the said title.
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FACTS:
After a public bidding held on March 18, 1950, the Board of Liquidators
awarded 5249 Ts-217 a 450-square meter land situated in Dadiangas, General
Santos City, to Eusebio Diones of Takurong, Bubon, Cotabato. On March 11,
1955, Eusebio Diones transferred his rights over the lot to Enrique P. De
Guzman (de Guzman, for brevity) for P 700.00 as evidenced by an Agreement of
Transfer of Right. On November 12, 1956, the Board of Liquidators cancelled
the award previously given to Eusebio Diones.
From the time he purchased the lot, de Guzman did not occupy it. In
1963, Lucena Ong Ante, another claimant of Lot 5249 Ts-217, authorized
Carmen Ty to occupy the land. Ong Ante paid the corresponding real estate
taxes from 1963 until 1980. Carmen Ty remained the occupant of the land
until this time. De Guzman filed with the Board of Liquidators, Miscellaneous
Sales Application No. 00222-E, and submitted supporting documents. In 1973,
de Guzman sold the lot to his married daughter and her husband, Carolina R.
De Guzman and Rio Rivera for P 5,000.00. The covering deed of sale could not
be located and Rio Rivera admitted that his father-in-law Enrique P. De
Guzman was not in occupation of the lot in question. On September 4, 1973,
the Register of Deeds of General Santos City issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-7203 to spouses Rio Rivera and Carolina R. De Guzman. On March 21,
1974, Lucena Ong-Antes adverse claim was annotated on the title of the lot.
ISSUES:
3. Whether or not the validity of the patent and the original certificate of title
can still be assailed after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the
disputed title.
4. Whether or not the spouses Rivera were innocent purchasers for value.
HELD:
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2. Yes. The court ruled that the State can assail a patent fraudulently
issued by the Director of Lands. Where public land acquired by an
applicant through fraud and misrepresentation, the State may institute
reversion proceedings even after the lapse of one year. The indefeasibility
of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation.
3. No. We agree with the trial court that spouses Rivera are not innocent
purchasers for value. Spouses Rivera is related by consanguinity and
affinity to Enrique P. De Guzman knew that de Guzman was not in
possession of the land. In fact, Rio Rivera testified that his father in law
was not in possession of the lot in question. Carmen Ty was in
possession of the land since 1963 and paid the real estate taxes thereon.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the presumption of a
buyer in good faith must prevail. The burden of proving the status of a
purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that
status. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary
presumption of good faith. The rule is settled that a buyer of real
property which is in the possession of persons other than the seller must
be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as
buyer in good faith.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Page 64
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Petition GRANTED.
Page 65
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial
survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos
which in turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records,
petitioners name would not be found on the said survey plan approved by the
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Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the portion of Lot 1893.
Petitioners claim was clearly meritorious.
Petition GRANTED.
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37. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
95 SCRA 22, 1980
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Weather or not there was fraud committed by the applicant in this case.
HELD:
No. There was no fraud committed. It should be noted that the report of
the LRA that was submitted to the court states that there are some corrections
in the technical descriptions of the property but the area of the property has
remained the same as applied for. That is why this court, in its order dated
October 28, 1993, granted the motion of counsel for the applicant to approve
the technical corrections for the reason that the correction without need for the
re-publication amendment does not appear to be substantial. It should be
noted also that the order of the Land Registration Authority recommended the
corrected technical description of Lot 1832 Cad-688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre
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be approved and the applicant be ordered to publish in the official gazette the
corrected technical description of Lot 1834 Cad-688 Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
An order issued approving the said technical description to be utilized in the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration. So it is clear that with
respect to Lot 1832, which is the subject opposition in this case, the LRA
merely stated that the corrected technical description of Lot 1832.
Petition GRANTED
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
Who has a better right over the subject property, the Esquiviases or the
Domalaons?
HELD:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court erred in holding laches in this case.
HELD:
No. The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to
the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property, and, therefore,
void, is likewise untenable.
Art. 493 of the Civil Code provides that Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
even he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Petition GRANTED.
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property subject of the deed of donation which was
not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect should be excluded from the
Operation Land Transfer.
HELD:
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existence for these farmers free from pernicious restraints and practices, and
there is no better time to do it than now.
Petition DENIED.
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FACTS:
The factual alpha of the present dispute was sometime in 1967 when the
spouses Armando and Iluminada Olizon obtained a loan from respondent
Prudential Bank in the amount of P25, 000.00 and, as security therefor, they
executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land consisting of 1,000 square meters located at Barrio Calaanan, Kalookan
City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604
of the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City. Unfortunately, that transaction
spawned the succeeding events hereunder chronologically narrated,
eventuating in this appeal wherein we are now expected to pen the judicial
omega.
It appears from the records that the Olizon spouses failed to pay their
aforestated obligation upon its maturity, so private respondent extra judicially
foreclosed the real estate mortgage. At a public auction thereafter held on
March 11, 1975, the subject property was sold to respondent bank as the
highest bidder, pursuant to which it was issued a certificate of sale as of the
same date. On March 12, 1974, the said certificate of sale was duly annotated
at the back of petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604.
On January 14, 1986, respondent bank filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City a petition to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24604, which was lost in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City,
the said proceeding being docketed as Case No. C-2746.
On June 11, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City ordered the
reconstitution prayed for. As a consequence, Transfer of Certificate of Title No.
24604 in the name of the Olizon spouses was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 149858 was issued on June 5, 1987 in the
name of respondent bank.
On November 27, 1989, respondent bank this time filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession against petitioner spouses, docketed as LRC Case No. C-3094, 4 and
which petition was granted by the trial court on February 8, 1990.
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ISSUES:
HELD:
Neither can the supposed failure of respondent bank to comply with the
posting requirement as provided under the aforesaid Section 3, under the
factual ambiance nor circumstances which obtained in this case be considered
a sufficient ground for annulling the aforementioned sale. We are not unaware
of the rulings in some cases that, under normal situations, the statutory
provisions governing publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sales
must be strictly complied with and that failure to publish the notice of auction
sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which
invalidates the sale. However, the unusual nature of the attendant facts and
the peculiarity of the confluent circumstances involved in this case require that
we rule otherwise.
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
assailed judgment of respondent
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FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the then Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III which upheld the validity of the deed of sale
of a parcel of land executed by petitioner Severo Sales in favor of respondent
Leonilo Gonzales
On July 4, 1955, Sales mortgaged said property, together with two other
parcels of land, to Faustina P. Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the payment
of a loan in the amount of P2, 240.00 payable on or about July 4, 1956. 2
On August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an order declaring the
court had lost jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.
On October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No. 5861 was canceled and in lieu
hereof, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was issued to Sales but the area of the
property was stated therein as 5,229 square meters more or less.
More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the consent
of his wife, Margarita Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900) square meters of the
same property in favor of their daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez.
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Ernesto Gonzales acceded to the request and asked Sales and his wife to
sign a document transferring the mortgage to him. According to the Sales
spouses, they were not given a copy of said document. 8 Around a month later,
Sales had the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861 surveyed by a private
surveyor.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Sales and his
daughter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower
court erred in upholding the validity of the deed of sale and in not considering
the unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor thereof.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the earlier deed of donation should "prevail" over the deed
of sale or be "recognized".
HELD:
The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has not
been registered neither under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law.
The parties hereto have agreed to register this document under Act 3344."
Such agreement had to be expressly stipulated in the deed of donation because
under Act 3344, the Register of Deeds is not authorized to effect any
registration unless the parties have expressly agreed to register their
transaction thereunder. A perusal of the records shows, however, that the deed
of donation was not registered at all. Besides, at the hearing, petitioners failed
to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners' counsel even failed to
secure a certification from the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan of its due
registration as directed by the trial judge.
Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the
donee thereby effectively transmitting the rights to said property from Sales to
his daughter, such deed, however, did not bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party
to the donation. This is because non-registration of a deed of donation under
Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous
transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein which petitioners invoke
that "any registration made under this section shall be understood to be
without prejudice to a third party with a better right" Petitioner Esperanza
Sales Bermudez may not be a considered a third party being the daughter of
the vendor himself and the "better right" possessed by a third party refers to
other titles which a party might have acquired independently of the
unregistered deed such as title by prescription.
The court take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not
registered, the Deed of Sale was registered as evidenced by the notation made
by Cipriano Abenojar, Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan 35 and the
official receipt issued by the Registry of Deeds.
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FACTS:
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence
on matters of prescription of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco
v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of
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the complaint with the fiscals office also interrupts the period of prescription of
the offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to
January 6, 1976.
ISSUES:
HELD:
No. It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined and penalized by special laws.
In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, [11] this Court ruled that Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining the
reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad
Page 81
______________________________________________________________________________
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of
Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in
the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his
criminal acts that effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this
case do not specifically show how the respondent allegedly employed acts that
could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the transaction other than the
bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the government
officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent
Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant
Information. On the other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that
the subject Deed of Sale was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Camarines Norte and that the corresponding Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee, Philippine Smelters
Corporation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court does not find it necessary to discuss
the other points raised by the respondent in his Comment as additional
grounds for the denial of the instant petition.
Page 82
44. CHU Sr. vs. Benelda Estate Development Corporation
353 SCRA 424, March 1, 2001
FACTS:
The petitioners spouses Manuel Chu, Sr. and Catalina Chu were the
registered owners of five (5) parcels of land situated in Barrio Saguin, San
Fernando, Pampanga. They executed a deed of sale on Sept. 30, 1986 with
assumption of mortgage in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan. It was made to
appear in the deed of sale that the total consideration had been fully paid to
enable Cunanan to have the parcels of land registered in her name so that she
could mortgage the same to secure a loan and thereupon pay from the
proceeds of the loan.
Cunanan failed to pay the balance of the total purchase price to the
petitioners. Without the knowledge of the petitioners, Cunanan sold the three
(3) parcels of land to Cool Town Realty and Development Corporation, and the
two (2) other parcels of land to the spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos. The
spouses Carlos, in turn, sold these two (2) properties to the respondent
Benelda Estate Development Corporation.
The respondent filed its answer with a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the amended complaint states no cause of action against respondent. It
alleged that respondent corporation, through its officers, acted in good faith in
buying the properties inasmuch as it exerted all efforts to verify the
authenticity of the titles and that no defect was found.
Page 83
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court and
dismissed the case as against the respondent on the ground of lack of cause of
action and for failure of the petitioners to include the spouses Carlos as
indispensable parties in the complaint.
ISSUES:
a) Whether the spouses Amado E. Carlos and Gloria A. Carlos (sellers of the
subject titled parcels of land to respondent) are real and indispensable parties
in the case at bar.
b) Whether or not the respondent corporation is an innocent purchaser for
value.
HELD:
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a
petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer thereof.
In land title cases, the court held that a person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and the
law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.
Page 84
Thus, a title procured through fraud and misrepresentation can still
be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value.
The appellate court therefore was correct in entertaining the petition for
the reason that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to dismiss the case against the respondent, despite the obvious
insufficiency of the amended complaint against the corporation respondent.
Page 85
45. AFP Mutual Benefit Association Inc. vs. CA
327 SCRA -203, March 3, 2000
FACTS:
Prior to September 7, 1976, Investco, Inc. was the owner of six (6) parcels
of raw land, located in Quezon City and Marikina (Metro Manila, now a City),
registered under titles in the names of its predecessors-in-interests, Angela
Perez-Staley and Antonio Perez, Jr.
On September 7, 1976, Investco, Inc. agreed to sell the six (6) parcels of
land to Solid Homes for P10, 211,075.00, payable in installments from July 22,
1977 to January 22, 1983. Among other terms, the parties agreed that Solid
Homes would pay the amount of P100, 000.00 as down payment upon
execution of the contract; that Solid Homes would pay P1, 942,215.00 as
additional down payment on July 22, 1977, October 22, 1977, and January 22,
1978; and that Solid Homes would pay the balance of P8, 188.860.00 in ten
(10) semi-annual installments for a period of five (5) years, with interest at
twelve (12%) percent per annum. The first installment was due on July 22,
1978.
On April 20, 1981, Solid Homes filed with the trial court an answer to
Investco, Inc.s complaint alleging that the purchase price under the contract
Page 86
was "not yet due" and that the former, in fact, exceeded the installment
payments due thereon. Solid Homes prayed for dismissal of Investco, Inc.s
complaint, and interposed a counterclaim for the refund of its excess
payments, moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, and attorneys fees of
P20,000.00 "or in the sum equivalent to 10% of whatever amount is awarded in
favor of defendant."
On September 20, 1984, Solid Homes filed with the Register of Deeds of
Marikina a notice of lis pendens with reference to Civil Case No. 40615
requesting that the same be annotated on the titles in Investco, Inc.s name.
On the same date, the notice of lis pendens was recorded as Entry No. 117191
of the primary Entry Book, Volume 14 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
However, the notice of lis pendens was not actually annotated on the
titles in the name of Investco, Inc.
On May 27, 1985, the trial court ordered the original record transmitted
to the appellate court in view of Solid Homes filing of a notice of appeal.
In the meantime, on April 23, 1984, Investco, Inc. offered to sell the
property to AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. for P27,079,767.00,
subsequently reduced to P24,000,000.00, payable in installments. Investco,
Inc. furnished AFP MBAI with certified true copies of the titles covering the
Marikina property.
In June, 1984, AFP MBAI verified the titles with the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila and found that copies of the titles that Investco, Inc.
gave were genuine and faithful reproductions of the original titles on file with
the Register of Deeds. AFP MBAI noted that there were no liens or
encumbrances annotated on the titles.
Moreover, AFP MBAI, through its Real Estate Committee, made an ocular
inspection of the property sometime in June and July, 1984 "to determine the
nature of the property and its (metes) and bounds." During the inspection, AFP
MBAI found that the Investco, Inc. property was underdeveloped raw land
Page 87
"which is mostly cogonal, (with) few trees and shrubs and bounded on one side
by the Marikina River."AFP MBAI confirmed the presence of squatter shanties
numbering about twenty (20) to thirty (30). Except for a foot path used by the
squatters, there was no development on the property.
After determining that the Investco property was suitable for the housing
project of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and that the titles covering the
same were "clean" and "genuine," AFP MBAI agreed to purchase the same from
Investco, Inc. for the price of P24,000,000.00, payable in installments for a
period of one (1) year.
Among other terms, Investco, Inc. warranted to AFP MBAI that "it has
good and valid title over the properties subject of (the) sale and (that it ) shall
hold (AFP MBAI) free from any adverse claim of whatever nature and from liens
an encumbrances of third parties."
In November, 1984, AFP MBAI again verified the records of the Register
of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila and confirmed "(t)he absence of any lis
pendens, adverse claims or any liens or encumbrance (on) the originals of the
title(s) x x x." AFP MBAI also inquired from the Malacaang Legal Office, the
Land Registration Commission, and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina if
there were cases and other problems concerning the property, but found no
case involving either Investco, Inc. or the property pending with said court and
offices.
AFP MBAI also obtained a certification from the Clerk of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Marikina that Investco, Inc. "has no pending case before (that)
court."
In April, 1985, AFP MBAI completed its payments of the purchase price.
Page 88
Homes prayed that (a) the Register of Deeds be ordered to annotate on the titles
registered in the name of Investco, Inc. the notice of lis pendens dated
September 19, 1984 in relation to civil Case No. 40615, and to carry over the
same to the titles in the name of AFP MBAI; (b) alternatively, to declare AFP
MBAI as a buyer in bad faith, bound by the judgment to be rendered in Civil
Case No. 40615; and (c) AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. be ordered to pay Solid
Homes jointly and severally, unspecified amount of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney fees of P100,000.00 plus "ten (10%)
percent of the total amount to be awarded to plaintiff."
Solid Homes also prayed for an order to enjoin provisionally the Register
of Deeds from registering any deed affecting the titles in derogation of solid
Homes rights under the contract executed between itself and Investco, Inc.
In due time, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. filed with the trial court an
answer to the complaint. After pre-trial and trial, on April 25, 1990, the trial
court rendered decision.
On December 24, 1991, AFP MBAI filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision, which Solid Homes opposed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis
pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc. and AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc., in relation to Civil Case No. 40615 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig and
thereby be bound by the final judgment therein.
HELD:
No. Basically, Solid Homes complaint was one for "annotation of lis
pendens and other matters with prayer for restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction" against Investco, Inc. AFP MBAI and the Register of
Deeds of Marikina, to cause the annotation of lis pendens in the titles of
Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI. Actually, therefore, the suit is to compel the
Register of Deeds of Marikina to annotate the notice of lis pendens on the titles
of AFP MBAI with a claim for damages against Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI for
Page 89
depriving Solid Homes of its rights to the property as provided under the
contract to buy and sell. In its verified complaint, Solid Homes alleged that "the
act of defendant Register of Deeds in not causing the annotation of the lis
pendens on the titles then registered in the name of defendant Investco, Inc.
and in issuing titles in the name of defendant AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc., without carrying over the proper annotation of lis pendens are contrary to
law".
The rule that "all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate
of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title"
applies herein with full vigor. In the absence of anything to excite suspicion,
the buyer is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles
of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. "Good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof." Here, Solid Homes alleged that Investco, Inc. and AFP
MBAI "confederated with each other in entering into the aforementioned sale in
order to deprive herein plaintiff (Solid Homes) of its rights over subject
properties under the Contract to Sell and to Buy..." However, Solid Homes
adduced no evidence to prove such allegation of bad faith.
Page 90
The conclusion is inevitable that contrary to the holding of the Court of
Appeals, AFP MBAI was a purchaser in good faith and for value, and,
consequently, acquired valid and indefeasible titles to the Investco, Inc.
property.
Resultantly, we find the appeal via certiorari of solid Homes without merit. Its
objective was to compel AFP MBAI to execute a deed of transfer of the titles to
parcels of land originally covered by the agreement to buy and sell between
Solid Homes, Inc. and Investco, Inc. and for Solid Homes to pay AFP MBAI, in
substitution of Investco, Inc. the amount of P4,800,282.91 with interest
thereon at one per cent per month from March 22, 1982, until paid. Thus, if
Solid Homes would succeed in its scheme in the case, it would unjustly enrich
itself enormously, acquiring subject property now worth billions for the measly
sum of P4,800,282.91 with interest at one per cent a month from March 22,
1982, which it was unable to pay Investco, Inc. in the first place.
(1) In G. R. No. 104769, GRANTS the petition, and SETS ASIDE the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27398 and, in lieu thereof, renders
judgment:
(a) Dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 52999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig Branch 165;
(b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Marikina to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-104941, N-104942,
N-104943, N-104944, N-104945 and N-104946 of the Register of Deeds for
Marikina, Metro Manila;
(2) In G.R. No. 135016, DENIES the petition, for lack of merit.
Page 91
46. Sps. JAYME and EVELYN UY vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. NICANOR
and ESTER DE GUZMAN,
G.R. No. 109197, June 21, 2001
Facts:
The spouses DE GUZMAN were the registered owners of certain parcels of land,
evidenced by certificates of title. The spouses erected a residential house
therein worth around Php10Million, while the value of the lots was around
Php4k to Php5k per square meter. Later, due to financial constraints, the said
spouses obtained a loan from Mario Siochi, secured by a mortgage over the
said properties. However, the spouses were required to sign a document
dubbed as Deed of Sale. Later, unknown to the said spouses, Mario Siochi
was able to transfer the registration of the said parcels of land in his name,
using the Deed of Sale. Accordingly, new transfer certificates of title over the
said lots were issued in the name of Mario Siochi. In turn, Mario Siochi sold
the said lots to the spouses UY, both engaged in buy-and-sell of real estates, in
the measly amount of Php2.7Million. For this, the spouses UY were able to
obtain new transfer certificates of title over the said parcels of land in their
name. In turn, the spouses UY leased the said properties to Roberto
Salapandan. However, since the spouses DE GUZMAN remained in possession
of the said properties, Roberto Salapandan was not able to occupy it. Roberto
Salapandan then filed an ejectment case against the spouses DE GUZMAN. It
was at this juncture when the spouses DE GUZMAN learned, for the first time,
that the said parcels of land are already registered in the name of the Sps. UY.
The spouses DE GUZMAN filed a case for quieting of title against the spouses
UY, Mario Siochi and Roberto Salapandan. On the part of the spouses UY, they
argued that they are innocent purchasers for value, thus, the properties should
remain registered in their name.
Issue:
Held:
Firstly, it was proved that the transaction between Mario Siochi and the
spouses DE GUZMAN was an equitable mortgage, and not sale. Thus, Mario
Siochi cannot sell the subject properties to the spouses UY. The fact that the
spouses UY merely relied in the certificates of title over the subject lots
Page 92
registered in the name of Mario Siochi is not material. For while it is true that a
person dealing with registered lands need not go beyond the certificate of title,
it is likewise a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard, and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to face up to the fact that such
defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in the vendors or mortgagors title, will not make him an innocent
purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective,
and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required
of a prudent man in a like situation.
In this case, IF the spouses UY only conducted the required diligence, they
should have discovered the defect in the title of Mario Siochi over the subject
parcels of land. The fact that the properties remained in the possession of the
spouses DE GUZMAN and the cheap purchase price (Php2.7Million) they have
paid to Mario Siochi should have incited their awareness to conduct further
inquiry, especially so that they are businessmen dealing with real estates for
which a higher degree of diligence is required of them by law.
Page 93
47. ARTEMIO BALTAZAR and AURORA GALVEZ vs. Court of Appeals and
GOOD EARTH ENTERPRISES, INC., 78728, December 8, 1988
Facts:
Issue:
Resolution:
AURORA GALVEZ is NOT an innocent purchaser for value. Firstly, the court
where the complaint of ARTEMIO BALTAZAR was filed DID NOT acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the corporation for improper service of
summons. The sheriff DID NOT conduct the proper service thereof as required
by the rules (i.e. service upon the President, secretary, cashier, etc). Neither
did the publication cure the defect, since summons by publication is done only
in cases where: 1) the defendant or his address is UNKNOWN; 2) service upon
defendants who are residing abroad; and 3) service upon residents temporarily
out of the country. GOOD EARTHs address is NOT UNKNOWN (The address of
GOOD EARTH is correct, yet, the sheriff DID NOT inquire at the given address
whether GOOD EARTH has office therein); GOOD EARTH is NOT residing abroad;
GOOD EARTH is NOT temporarily out of the country. Thus, summons by
Page 94
publication should have NOT been resorted to. As regards the claim of
AURORA GALVEZ, she has NOT proved her status as a purchaser in good faith
and for value of the land. The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in
good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status. In discharging
that burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith,
i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is here
essential is integral with the very status which must be proved. Also, whatever
rights AURORA GALVEZ might have had cannot be superior to the rights of
GOOD EARTH which was, at all relevant times, the lawful registered owner of
the subject parcel of land, and which had not been negligent in any manner
and indeed had not performed any act which gave rise to or any occasion for
any claim of right by third persons. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
AURORA GALVEZ had successfully proven that she was a purchaser in good
faith and for value. Even so, as between two persons, both of whom are in good
faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the
lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights. Under the foregoing principle derived from the above case
law, AURORA GALVEZ has no rights as against GOOD EARTH. Her recourse is
against ARTEMIO BALTAZAR.
Page 95
48. BENIGNA SECUYA, et. al. vs. GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA, 136021,
February 22, 2000
Facts:
Issue:
Resolution:
Indeed, a party who has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would move a reasonably cautious man to make an inquiry will not be
protected by the Torrens system.
However, in this case, granting arguendo that GERARDA knew that BENIGNA
SECUYA, et. al., through Superales and his family, were actually occupying the
disputed lot, it must be stressed that the vendor, Cesaria Caballero, assured
GERARDA that BENIGNA SECUYA, et. al. were just tenants on the said lot.
GERARDA cannot be faulted for believing this representation, considering that
BENIGNA SECUYA, et. al's claim was not noted in the certificate of the title
covering Lot No. 5679. Moreover, the lot, including the disputed portion, had
been the subject of several sales transactions. The title thereto had been
transferred several times, without any protestation or complaint from BENIGNA
SECUYA, et. al. In any case, GERARDA's title is amply supported by clear
evidence, while BENIGNA SECUYA, et. als claim is barren of proof.
Page 96
49. AZNAR BROTHERS vs. Court of Appeals, 128102, March 7, 2000
Facts:
The Heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on are the registered owners of a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 4399 and covered by OCT RO-2856. However, the original
copy of this certificate of title is NOT in the possession of the Registry of Deeds
as it was allegedly lost during the world war. Later, AZNAR BROTHERS
acquired ownership of Lot No. 4399 by virtue of the Extrajudicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Heirs of Crisanta
Maloloy-on on March 3, 1964. However, this Deed has not been annotated on
OCT RO-2856, obviously, because this certificate of title is NOT in the
possession of the Register of Deeds. Later, however, said certificate of title was
reconstituted on August 25, 1988.
Issue:
Resolution:
The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting
rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on
the clean title of the properties." This principle has no bearing on the present
case, as no subsequent transfer of the subject lot to other persons has been
made either by private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest.
Page 97
50. Spouses ALEXANDER AND ADELAIDA CRUZ vs. ELEUTERIO LEIS, et.
al., 125233, March 9, 2000
Facts:
GERTRUDES acquired a parcel of land for which TCT No. 43100 was issued in
the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was referred therein as a "widow." Later,
GERTRUDES obtained a loan from spouses ALEXANDER and ADELAIDA
CRUZ, secured by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100.
GERTRUDES, however, failed to pay the loan. Unable to pay her outstanding
obligation after the debt became due and payable, GERTRUDES executed two
contracts in favor of ALEXANDER CRUZ. The first is denominated as
"Kasunduan," which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting
Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same
property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in the
"Kasunduan." For failure of GERTRUDES to repurchase the property,
ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of ALEXANDER CRUZ in
whose name TCT No. 130584 was issued, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the
name of GERTRUDES ISIDRO. Later, when GERTRUDES died, her heirs assail
the validity of the transfer of title from GERTRUDES to ALEXANDER, claiming
that the subject property covered by the then TCT No. 43100 is a conjugal
property, thus, GERTRUDES cannot transfer the entirety of the lot to
ALEXANDER.
Issue:
Resolution:
It must be noted that the property was registered as TCT No. 43100 solely in
the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of
the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is
sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate
of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires
a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The
rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property.
He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted
on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is
to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system.
Page 98
51. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
CEFERINO PAREDES, 112115, March 9, 2001
Facts:
A parcel of land was reserved by the then Bureau of Lands as a School Site for
the San Francisco Townsite Reservation in Agusan Del Sur. Notwithstanding
the reservation, CEFERINO PAREDES applied for free patent over the said
parcel of land, wherein he did NOT divulge in the application that the subject
property is a reserved land, despite knowledge of such. Intriguingly,
CEFERINO PAREDES was able to obtain a free patent thereto from the DENR.
Accordingly, upon the registration of the patent, a certificate of title (OCT- P-
8379) was issued in favor of CEFERINO PAREDES. Later, the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, assails the validity of title of
CEFERINO PAREDES over the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not CEFERINO PAREDES has a valid title over the subject parcel of
land.
Resolution:
Page 99
52. HEIRS OF EULALIO RAGUA, et. al. versus THE COURT OF APPEALS,
89366-67, JANUARY 31, 2000
Facts:
This case involves a prime lot consisting of 4,399,322 square meters, known as
the Diliman Estate, situated in Quezon City. On this, 439 hectares of prime
land now stand the following: the Quezon City Hall, Philippine Science High
School, Quezon Memorial Circle, Visayas Avenue, Ninoy Aquino Parks and
Wildlife, portions of UP Village and East Triangle, the entire Project 6 and
Vasha Village, Veterans Memorial Hospital and golf course, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Sugar
Regulatory Administration, Philippine Tobacco Administration, Land
Registration Authority, Philcoa Building, Bureau of Telecommunications,
Agricultural Training Institute building, Pagasa Village, San Francisco School,
Quezon City Hospital, portions of Project 7, Mindanao Avenue subdivision, part
of Bago Bantay resettlement project, SM City North EDSA, part of Phil-Am Life
Homes compound and four-fifths of North Triangle. This large estate was the
subject of a petition for judicial reconstitution originally filed by Eulalio Ragua
in 1964. However, this petition failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of publication and posting of notices provided under Republic Act
No. 26, Sections 12 and 13. Notwithstanding this failure, the trial court
granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
Resolution:
Page
100
53. JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS VS. THE CITY OF LEGASPI, 133913,
October 12, 1999
Facts:
The City of Legaspi filed a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of its titles to
twenty parcels of land, including Lot 1 (Psd 3261), the certificates of which had
allegedly been lost or destroyed during World War II. The trial court granted the
petition and ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the Original
Certificates of Title over these lots, including OCT No. 665 (for Lot 1), in favor of
the applicant, notwithstanding failure to comply with publication and notice
requirements, and the existence of the certificate of title over Lot 1 registered in
favor of STILIANOPULOS.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
Resolution:
First, under Section 13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to the occupant of the
land covered by the title sought to be reconstituted is mandatory and
jurisdictional. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is
served on the possessor or anyone else having interest in the property involved,
the order of reconstitution is null and void.
However, laches has set in against STILIANOPULOS. More than 20 years have
lapse from the time the trial court rendered the decision in the reconstitution
case without any protest from STILIANOPULOS.
Page
101
54. EVANGELINE L. PUZON VS. STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., G.R. No. 139518, March 06, 2001
Facts:
A fire in the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City destroyed, among
others, the original copies of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 240131 and
213611 registered in the name of EVANGELINE PUZON. Accordingly,
EVANGELIN filed a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of the two destroyed
titles. The sources of the reconstitution were the owners duplicate certificates
of title. Without sending notices to the adjoining owners of the subject
properties, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the Register of
Deeds to issue the reconstituted certificates of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition.
Resolution:
The source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was EVANGELINE's
duplicate copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition
is governed, not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. Nothing in
this provision requires that notices be sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily,
that requirement is found in Section 13, which does not apply to petitions
based on an existing owner's duplicate TCT.
Put differently, Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 require that 30 days before the date
of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official
Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the
main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal hall where the
property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of the
certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the
location of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an
interest in the property, must appear and file such claims as they may have.
For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement: that the notice be
mailed to occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may
have an interest in the property. To repeat, mailing the notice is not required
for a petition based on Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a), as in the present
case.
Page
102
55. JOSELITO VILLEGAS AND DOMINGA VILLEGAS VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 129977,
February 01, 2001
Facts:
A parcel of land was acquired by the FORTUNE TOBACCO for which it was
issued a certificate of title (TCT No. T-68737). Later, the Office of the Register of
Deeds was burned together with all the certificates of title therein, including
the original copy of TCT No. T-68737. Accordingly, FORTUNE TOBACCO filed a
petition for judicial reconstitution. No NOTICES, however, were posted as
required by RA 26. Notwithstanding this, the trial court granted the petition
and ordered the reconstitution of TCT No. T-68737.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
Resolution:
Although the order of reconstitution reveals that there was publication of the
notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette as required by
law, there was, however, no mention of compliance with the requirement of
posting of the notice of the petition in the provincial or municipal building of
the city or municipality where the subject property is located. While proof of
publication of the notice of the petition was submitted by Fortune, there was
no proof of posting of the notice, presumably because no such posting was
accomplished. The lack of compliance with these requirements for the judicial
reconstitution of certificates of title deprived the court of jurisdiction over the
petition. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to hear and decide a
petition for reconstitution of title is conferred by R.A. 26. The Act prescribes a
special procedure that must be followed in order that the court may act on the
petition and grant the remedy sought. The specific requirements and procedure
are as laid down in Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 26. The proceedings therein being
in rem, the court acquires jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for the
reconstitution of the owner's title upon compliance with the required posting of
notices and publication in the Official Gazette. These requirements and
procedure are mandatory and must strictly be complied with, otherwise, the
proceedings are utterly void, which is why the petitioner is required to submit
proof of the publication and posting of the notice. Non-compliance with the
jurisdictional requirement of posting of the notice renders the order of
reconstitution null and void. Consequently, the reconstituted title of Fortune is
likewise void. Fortune cannot now invoke the prior title rule, as it in effect has
no valid title to speak of.
Page
103
56. DORDAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
270 SCRA 329
FACTS:
Since 1957 also, after declaring the lot for taxation purposes,
respondents have been paying the realty taxes on the lot.
In 1961, the heirs of Rafael Dizon and petitioner Federico Dordas filed a
petition for judicial reconstitution of the title of the lot. The court ordered the
reconstitution of the title upon the ground that the title was lost or destroyed
during the last world war. This, notwithstanding the fact that the only
documents submitted by petitioner was a tracing cloth and blueprint plan
which are not among the documents recognized by Republic Act No. 26 that
warrant judicial reconstitution of title. Furthermore, petitioner Dordas failed to
serve notice of the reconstitution proceedings on private respondents who were
the actual occupants of the subject lot. This is clearly violative of the notice
requirement mandated by R.A. No. 26.
This present action for reconveyance was filed on March 27, 1962, or
more than twenty (20) years from February 9, 1931 is surely barred by the
statutes of limitation.
Page
104
Private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. The
respondent court reversed the trial court and declared null and void the
reconstituted title obtained by petitioner.
In the same petition, Federico Dordas claimed that the lot has actually
been in this possession and that all improvements thereon belong to him with
no one having any adverse interests whatsoever. This fact is re-echoed in the
order granting the reconstitution saying that Dordas is the sole occupant of the
lot. Notably, these allegations were overpowered and belied by the unrebutted
testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses and Exhs. C, D, E, F & G, which are the
pictures of the houses of Filomeno, Celoria, Remedios Tinsay, Rosalina Banilla,
the Liberal Party Headquarters and Diosdado Borres all standing within the lot,
all establishing [that] the appellants are, in fact, in possession of the lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the better right to reconstitute the title of
lot in question
HELD:
No. Art. 1139 of the New Civil Code provides that actions prescribe by
mere lapse of time fixed by law. In the case of Talle v. CA, 208 SCRA 266, it
was ruled that actions for reconveyance based on fraud or on implied or
constructive trusts prescribe in ten (10) years. But it is unsafe to assume that
plaintiff's cause of action in this case accrued on February 9, 1931 or after the
expiration of the four (4) year repurchase period in the Deed of Sale between
Rafael Dizon and Francisco Contreras The pacto de retro period is a personal
prerogative of Rafael Dizon to exercise and is not applicable to herein plaintiff's
who acquired the lot from Rafael Dizon's vendee (Francisco Contreras) only in
December 27, 1957. In other words, the computation as to when herein
plaintiff's cause of action accrued should not be counted from February 9,
1931.
Page
105
Republic Act No. 26, is "THE ACT PROVIDING FOR A SPECIAL
PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS TITLE WHICH WERE
LOST OR DESTROYED." As the title of the law suggests, it covers
reconstitution of previously issued but lost or destroyed title over any parcel of
land. In other words it presupposes that the lot had already been brought
under the provisions of the Torrens System or Act 496. In obtaining a new title
in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, the same Republic Act. No. 26 laid down
procedures which must strictly be followed because it could be the source of
anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original
registration of title proceedings.
As the law mandates using the phrase "in the following order", the
enumerated items become the only sources whereby a title may be
reconstituted. When none of these itemized sources was submitted by Dordas
in the reconstitution proceedings and instead relied heavily on tracing cloth
and blueprint plan of Lot 1474 and its technical description which are not
among those mentioned under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 the
reconstitution suffers fatally. The two (2) pieces of documents plan and
technical description, are mere additional requirements of the law in case
reconstitution is to be made from sources in Section 2F or 3F of the act, that
is, any other document, which in the judgment of the court is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title (Sec. 12.
RA 26). But, in themselves, such plan and technical description of the lot are
not recognized sources for reconstitution of title under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 26.
The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment
in the trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In
all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly
complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void..
The foregoing principle applies in the instant case not only because of
the non-compliance by petitioners with the documentary prerequisites in
judicial reconstitution of title but also because petitioners failed to satisfy the
publication requirement under R.A. No. 26. Private respondents who are in
actual possession of the properties were not properly notified.
Page
106
In view of all the foregoing, the SC uphold the ruling of respondent
Court of Appeals as regards the fact that private respondents have a better
right to the ownership of the real property in question, respondent Court of
Appeals having correctly nullified and set aside petitioners' reconstituted TCT
No. RT-2063.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY DENIED for utter lack of merit.
Page
107
57. Talusan vs. Tayag
356 SCRA 263, April 4, 2001
FACTS:
Page
108
[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents]
the sum of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have
incurred x x x but said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the
status quo.
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary
damages of not less than P20,000.00; attorneys fee of P30,000.00, plus
appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every appearance; and litigation expenses of
not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute the case.
The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the
[petitioners] pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final
Bill of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision
has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality
issued on October 8, 1987;
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral
damages of at least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorneys fees in the sum
of P10,000.00; and, expenses of litigation.
Page
109
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988,
wherein he denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that no
irregularity or illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with
respect to the delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of
the defendant herein were all within the limits of his authority and in
accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real
property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code
and therefore, no damages may be imputed against him. He also claimed, by
way of affirmative defenses, that:
Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs
[because of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third
persons including defendant herein.
Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the
December 16, 1987 judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case
No.207-R.
Page
110
According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R
had already upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to rule
again on the same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a
coequal court, contrary to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to
proceeding and whether the auction sale of subject condominium unit should
be annulled.
HELD:
Page
111
a preferred right over the other whose title has not been registered, even if the
latter is in actual possession of the subject property.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought
this misfortune upon themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale
after its execution nor moved for the consolidation of ownership of title to the
property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the real property taxes due.
Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981, they did not
take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches. The law helps the
vigilant, but not those who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of
obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the slothful and the contemners
of their own rights.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Page
112
58. LIM vs. VERA CRUZ
356 SCRA 386, April 4, 2001
FACTS:
That on January 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to him said 200 square
meter portion, which is included in the formers one-eight share in Lot 4204,
consisting of 1,732 square meters;
That a complaint for ejectment was filed against him in 1993 by private
respondent Henry Lim, who claims to be the owner of the property occupied by
him, being a portion of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-16375
registered in his name;
That judgment was rendered against him in the ejectment case, which he
elevated to the appellate court, and that upon investigation, he discovered that
TCT No. T-16375 in the name of private respondents was obtained in bad faith,
by fraud and/or clever machination.
On July 22, 1998, respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice
of lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T-16375 upon the posting by
private respondents of an indemnity bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00.
ISSUE:
Page
113
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
HELD:
No. Sec. 14 Notice of lis pendens In an action affecting the title or the
right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties
and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing of such notice for record
shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of
its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
Sec. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused registration thereof.
Based on this principle as well as the express provisions of Sec. 14, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular
property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens.
In justifying the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the trial court
held that respondents unregistered deed of sale can not be accorded more
weight than petitioners certificate of title.
Page
114
Hence, even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis
pendens may be annotated on the title. And such annotation can not be
considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title.
The Court observed that the trial judge was convinced that the
cancellation of the lis pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should not have
required petitioners to post a bond of P2,000,000.00
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of
the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be
rendered meaningless if petitioners are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the
amount, in substitution of said notice.
The Court held that the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice
of lis pendens pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient bond by the
party on whose title said notice is annotated.
Petitioners likewise insist that since respondent lost in the ejectment suit
they filed against him, it follows that he also lost whatever right he has in the
200 square meter portion and that, therefore, he has no more right to be
protected by the notice of lis pendens. It bears emphasis that respondent
caused the registration of the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 195-M-94
for quieting of title to his, 200 square meter lot, not in the ejectment case.
Indeed, there is nothing in the records indicating that the notice of lis
pendens is for the purpose of molesting herein petitioners or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of respondent.
Page
115
59. PO LAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
316 SCRA 721, October 13, 1999
FACTS:
On November 12, 1981, Lim filed in the same Civil Case No. 2953 a
motion to annotate the said Resolution of the Court of Appeals of March 11,
1989 in G.R. No. 44770-R on the certificate of title of the spouses Po Lam.
On September 19, 1985, Lim again filed with the trial court in Civil Case
2953, a motion to include spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam as
party defendants in the case, as well as a motion to execute the March 11,
1981 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in AC G.R. No. 44770-R.
On October 16, 1985, both motions were denied by the trial court and on
appeal, in CA G. R. No. 08533-CV, the Court of Appeals upheld the Order of
Denial.
On October 29, 1990, Felix Lim assigned all his rights to and interest in
subject properties to Jose Lee, (a lessee of a commercial building standing on
Lot No. 1557), who since then, has substituted Felix Lim as party plaintiff, now
the private respondent.
June 1970, after the herein petitioners bought subject lots from LACHO,
the former leased the commercial building on Lot 1557 to the herein private
respondent, Jose Lee.
On January 14, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City decided
Civil Case No 6767 affirmed the decisions rendered in AC-G. R. No. 44770-R
promulgated on March 11, 1981.
Page
116
ISSUE:
HELD:
His mere refusal to believe that such a defect exist, or his willful closing
of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title, will
not make him innocent purchaser for value, if it develops afterwards that the
title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had notice of such defect as
would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution
which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
This fact coupled with the non-cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2581 covering Lot 1558, should have
sufficiently alerted the petitioners vis-a-vis a possible defect in the title of
LACHO, especially so that Lots 1557 and 1558 were simultaneously sold to the
petitioners in a single deed of sale executed on May 28, 1969.
Then too, considering that Lots 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial
lots at the heart of the commercial district of Legaspi City, it is unbelievable
that the petitioners who were assisted in purchasing the lots by Atty. Rodolfo
Madrid (who during his time was a well-known lawyer of competence in the
Province of Albay) would have released the purchase price of 700,000.00
without inquiring into the status of the subject lots.
Verily, spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam willfully closed their
eyes to the possibility of a defect in the vendors (LACHO) title.
Page
117
The petitioners, very much aware of the pending litigation affecting the
lots under controversy, gambled on the outcome of the litigation. Consequently,
they cannot now be permitted to evade the outcome of the risk they assumed.
Page
118