Rule 72-90
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article
Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad
Sagalongos -San Luis
514 SCRA 294
FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San
Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss dad) contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children. On August
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. On June
20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had
no children with Felicidad but lived with her
for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their Felicisimos conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993,
Felicidad filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that
Felicidad has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court
of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee
had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph
2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate Felicidads
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation
of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file
for letters of administration over Felicisimos
estate.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP,
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate leaving 2
parcels of lands and improvements in
Pasay City, Joaquin contracted 2 marriages
during his lifetime, Eduardo, his son in his
second marriage, was named by the RTC
as administrator for the whole estate of the
Land.
RTC issued the order of partition in favor of
the heirs of Joaquin of which Eduardo was
also included, however Eduardo filed a
motion for reconsideration, and an appeal
afterwards, both them alleging that the
Court erred in declaring that the bulk of the
realties subject of this case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia and not to
the marriage with his manager as a
consequence thereof the Heirs of the 1st
Marriage was awarded with more property.
He also alleged that the RTC, acting as an
intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was
not vested with the power and authority to
determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with
general jurisdiction.
ISSEU:
Whether or not RTC as an intestate court,
had jurisdiction to resolve the same
HELD:
Yes RTC had jurisdiction to resolve the
same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of
the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters
having to do with the probate of the will
and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally
pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate
action.
Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
SC held that the general rule does not
apply to the instant case considering that
the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that
no rights of third parties will be impaired by
the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether
the subject properties are conjugal is but
collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction
to settle the estate of Joaquin.
Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-Suntay
(G. R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012,
Perez J.)
Facts:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina)
died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico
Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren:
three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico and
Cristina only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio
I), who predeceased his parents. After
Cristinas death, respondent Isabel, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.
Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a
Motion to Dismiss Isabelas petition for
letters of administration on the ground that
Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate
grandchild of the latter as a result of her
parents marriage being declared null and
void.
Undaunted, Federico nominated Emilio III
to administer the decedents estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration
issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III
filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing
the allegations in his grandfathers
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the
estate of the decedent, Cristina. Federico
died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9
November 2001, the trial court rendered a
decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedents intestate estate.
On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court
in an earlier case reversed and set aside
the ruling of the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether Emilio III is better qualified to act
as administrator of the estate than Isabel
Held:
No. Isabel is better qualified to act as
administrator of the estate than Emilio III.
The general rule in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent is
laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters
of administration granted, If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve; (b) If such
surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve; (c) If there
is not such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be
observed, an order of preference, in the
appointment of an administrator. This order
of preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and
the creditors in the appointment of an
administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount
consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent
is the prospective administrators interest in
the estate. This is the same consideration
which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account
in establishing the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator for the
estate. The rationale behind the rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy and economical administration of
the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest
and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly.
In all, given that the rule speaks of an order
of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedents estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but an interest therein greater than
any other candidate. The collected teaching
is that mere demonstration of interest in the
estate to be settled does not ipso facto
entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the
order of preference set forth in Section 6,
Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed as administrator.
Given Isabels unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedents legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next
of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be
a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the
Courts and depends on the facts and the
attendant circumstances of the case. Thus,
we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts
and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabel and her siblings apparent
greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the
setting aside of the order of preference
mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice
be made of one over the other.
The evidence reveals that Emilio III has
turned out to be an unsuitable administrator
of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out
that after Emilio IIIs appointment as
administrator of the subject estate in 2001,
he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the
damage and prejudice thereof.
Lee vs. RTC of Quezon City/G.R. No.
146006/February 23, 2004/J. Corona
Facts: Dr.Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated
the Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, Inc. on 1956. At the time of the
companys incorporation, Dr.Ortaez
owned ninety percent (90%) of the
subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980,
Dr.Ortaez died. He left behind
a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and
Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate
children by LigayaNovicio (herein private
respondent Ma. DivinaOrtaez-Enderes
and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico
Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).
Special administrators Rafael
and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of
the estate of their father which included
2,029 shares of stock in Philippine
International Life Insurance Company,
representing 50.725% of the companys
outstanding capital stock. Juliana (wife) and
Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011
shares respectively to FLAG. The legal
family entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of
Dr.JuvencioOrtaez, partitioning the estate
among themselves. This was the basis of
the number of shares separately sold by
them. The lower court declared the shares
of stock as null and void. CA affirmed.
Meanwhile, the FLAG-
controlled board of directors, increased the
authorized capital stock of Philinterlife,
diluting in the process the 50.725%
controlling interest Dr.JuvencioOrtaez, in
the insurance company. Enderes filed an
action at the SEC. The SEC hearing officer
dismissed the case acknowledging the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. Jose Lee and
Alma Aggabao as president and secretary
of Philinterlife ignored the orders nullifying
the sales of the shares of stock.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the
shares of stock of Philinterlife is void.
Ruling: YES. Our jurisprudence is clear
that:
(1) any disposition of estate property
by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court
approval and
(2) any unauthorized disposition of
estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or
participation in the property under
administration under NCC 533 which
provides that possession of hereditary
property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of
death of the decedent. However, an heir
can only alienate such portion of the
estate that may be allotted to him in the
division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication,
that is, after all debtors shall have been
paid or the devisees or legatees shall have
been given their shares. This means that
an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any
specific property therein.
It goes without saying that the
increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital
stock, approved on the vote of petitioners
non-existent shareholdings and obviously
calculated to make it difficult for
Dr.Ortaezs estate to reassume its
controlling interest in Philinterlife, was
likewise void ab initio.
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside
Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement.
The amount was intended for the payment
of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel
Tractor.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died,
leaving a holographic will. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence SantibaezAriola, executed a Joint
Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3)
tractors.
A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilitieswas executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank.
The trial court found that the claim of the
petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate
estate of the late EfraimSantibaez was
pending, as the sum of money being
claimed was an obligation incurred by the
said decedent.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
WON the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs, thus no need for
the probate court to approve the joint
agreement on the ground that the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations
related thereto.
Held
A probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be
administered.
In testate succession, there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated.
The three (3) subject tractors being the
subject of any partition among the heirs is
not valid. The joint agreement executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
The filing of a money claim against the
decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.
SC found that finding of the trial court that
the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that
it is the successor-in-interest of the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF
DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES namely
ESTELA, ERIBERTO and VIRGILIO
SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES,
ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA
SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and
PACITA MENDOZA vs. HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO BRIONES namely: SILVERIO
BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BINIFACIO
CABAHUG JR., ANITA TRASMONTE,
CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA
BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS
G.R. NO. 150175
FEBRUARY 5, 2007
DOCTRINE: The settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding
in rem, and that the publication in the
newspapers of the filing of the application
and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a
notice to the whole world of the existence of
the proceedings and of the hearing on the
date and time indicated in the publication.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners were the heirs of the late
Donata Ortiz-Briones while respondents
were the heirs of the late MaximinoBriones.
Maximino married Donata but their union
did not produce any children. When
Maximino died in 1952, Donata instituted
intestate proceedings to settle her
husband's estate in CFI Cebu City. The
court issued Letters of Administration
appointing Donata as the administratrix of
Maximino's properties. Subsequently, CFI
also issued an order awarding ownership of
real estate properties to Donata which she
filed at the Registry of Deeds. Thus, new
TCT's were issued covering the real estate
properties in her name.
When Donata died on 1977, Erlinda,
one of her nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the
intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her
husband was appointed as administrators
of Donata's intestate estate.
On 1985, SilverioBriones, nephew of
Maximino, filed a petition with the RTC for
letters of Administration for the Intestate
estate of Maximino which was later on
granted by the RTC. RTC likewise allowed
Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino's
properties. Gregorio (Erlinda's Husband)
filed a motion to set aside order claiming
that the said properties were already under
his and his wife's administration as part of
the intestate estate of Donate. For this
reason, the Letter of Administration issued
to Silverio was set aside by the RTC.
On 1987, the Heirs of Maximino filed
a complaint with the RTC against the heirs
of Donata for the partition, annulment and
recovery of possession of real property.
The Complaint was later on amended
alleging that Donata, as administratrix,
through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust and without the knowledge
of the other heirs, succeeded in registering
the properties under her name.
RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of
Maximino and ordered Erlinda to reconvey
the real estate properties to the heirs of
Maximino. The heirs of Donata appealed
the case to the CA but the Appellate Court
affirmed the ruling made by the RTC. SC
reversed the decision rendered by the CA
and the RTC. Thus, Respondents moved
for the reconsideration of the decision
rendered by the Supreme Court.
The main contention of respondents
was that since the CFI Order was based on
Donata's fraudulent misrepresentation that
she was Maximino's sole heir, it being void,
such order does not produce any legal
effect.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
WON the CFI order declaring Donata
to be the sole heir of Maximino was valid
despite Donata's alleged misrepresentation.
YES
RULING OF THE CASE
The heirs of Maximino failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that
Donata managed, through fraud, to have
the real properties, belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino, registered in
her name. In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established between
Donata and the heirs of Maximino under
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata
was able to register the real properties in
her name, not through fraud or mistake, but
pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October
1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order,
presumed to be fairly and regularly issued,
declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making
Donata the singular owner of the entire
estate of Maximino, including the real
properties, and not merely a co-owner with
the other heirs of her deceased husband.
There being no basis for the Complaint of
the heirs of Maximinoin Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, the same should have been
dismissed.
While it is true that since the CFI was
not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not
able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that
the settlement of estate, whether testate or
intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that
the publication in the newspapers of the
filing of the application and of the date set
for the hearing of the same, in the manner
prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings
and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication
requirement of the notice in newspapers is
precisely for the purpose of informing all
interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who
were not named as heirs or creditors in the
petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.
This Court cannot stress enough that
the CFI Order was the result of the intestate
proceedings instituted by Donata before the
trial court. As this Court pointed out in its
earlier Decision, the manner by which the
CFI judge conducted the proceedings
enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
encompassed in such presumption is the
order of publication of the notice of the
intestate proceedings. A review of the
records fails to show any allegation or
concrete proof that the CFI also failed to
order the publication in newspapers of the
notice of the intestate proceedings and to
require proof from Donata of compliance
therewith. Neither can this Court find any
reason or explanation as to why Maximinos
siblings could have missed the published
notice of the intestate proceedings of their
brother.
Moreover, even if Donata's allegation
that she was Maximinos sole heir does
constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify
abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and
the disputable presumptions of the regular
performance of official duty and lawful
exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in
rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No.
928-R.
Sabidong vs Solas
A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013
Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is
one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of
land, designated as Lot 11 originally
registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and
situated at Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs
are in possession of one-half portion of Lot
11 of the said Hodges Estate, as the other
half-portion was occupied by
PriscilaSaplagio. In 1983 ejectment suit
however Saplagio was ordered to vacate
the portion of Lot 11 leased to her.
In 1984, respondent who was the Clerk of
Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City
Offered to Purchase on installment Lots 11
and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges
Estate rejected respondents because the
actual occupant of Lot 12 manifested their
intention to buy it. He was nevertheless
informed that he may file an offer to
purchase Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to
avail of the priority given to them which the
respondent immediately made.
The probate court (Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings
No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late
Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R.
Natividad, Administratrix"), approved the
offer upon the courts observation that the
occupants of the subject lots "have not
manifested their desire to purchase the lots
they are occupying up to this date and
considering time restraint and considering
further, that the sales in favor of the x
xxofferors are most beneficial to the estate
x xx".
Consequently the title of the lot was
transferred to the respondent. Later on a
writ of demolition was issued by the probate
court in favor of respondent and against all
adverse occupants of Lot 11.
In 1999, a complaint was initiated against
the respondent in the Supreme Court
alleging the prohibition for court personnel
to buy properties in litigation. The complaint
likewise alleged that the respondent
committed deception, dishonesty,
oppression and grave abuse of authority. It
was alleged that complainant and his family
were made to believe by the respondent
that he is the representative of the Estate.
The complainant relied on the
representations of the respondent that he
was authorized to facilitate the sale, with
more reason that respondent represented
himself as the City Sheriff;
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is prohibited
to purchase the property subject of probate.
Held:
NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property.34 Where the
property is acquired after the termination of
the case, no violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent
purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994,
the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which
was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long
become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be
said that the property is no longer "in
litigation" at that time considering that it was
part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No.
1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge.36 A property forming part of the
estate under judicial settlement continues to
be subject of litigation until the probate
court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The
rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and
terminated.37 The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all
the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.38 Since there is no evidence to
show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of
Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed
and terminated at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed
to be "in litigation" subject to the operation
of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale
of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not
violate the rule on disqualification to
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No.
1672 was then pending before another
court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was
Clerk of Court.

Aranas vs Mercado,
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
Facts: Emigdio Mercado died intestate and
survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado, and their five children. He
inherited and acquired real properties
during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation. He
assigned his real properties in exchange for
corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold
his real property to such corporation.
Thelma, his daughter, filed in the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita, his second wife,
as the administrator of Emigdios estate.
Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate of Emigdio. Claiming that Emigdio
had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved
that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory. Teresita, joined by other heirs of
Emigdio, contended that one of the real
properties had already been sold and came
into the possession to Mervir Realty.
Hence, such property should not be
included in the inventory.
Issue: Whether or not, the other properties
which were sold to the corporation should
be included in the inventory.
Ruling: Yes, the property sold to the
corporation should be included in the
inventory. The Rules of Court provides that
within three months after his appointment,
every executor or administrator shall return
to the court a true inventory and appraisal
of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. For the
phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the
inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity,
which is the corporation in the given facts.
Furthermore, while it is true that the probate
Court does not have the jurisdiction to
resolve issue of ownership because it has
limited jurisdiction only with respect to
settlement of estate, it can resolve the
question of ownership only for inventory
purpose.
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG v. MA.
GRACIA RIOZA PLAZO
G.R. No. 187524
August 05, 2015
Facts:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L.
Rioza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife,
respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma.
Fe Alaras, as well as several properties
including a resort covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.
Respondents alleged that sometime
in March 1991, they discovered that their
co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita
Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses
Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who
are now deceased and substituted by their
son, Dr.Ruel B. Villafria, without their
knowledge and consent. When confronted
about the sale, Benita acknowledged the
same, showing respondents a document
she believed evidenced receipt of her share
in the sale, which, however, did not refer to
any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
When respondents went to the subject
properties, they discovered that 4 out of the
8 cottages in the resort had been
demolished.
Subsequently, respondents learned
that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-
judicial settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a tabloid called
Balita. They filed their complaint praying,
among others, for the annulment of all
documents conveying the subject
properties to the petitioners and certificates
of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied
the allegations and he also presented an
Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of
Rights and Sale which provides, among
others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the
family home to the spouses Rolando and
Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as
a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the
resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.
On October 1, 2001, the trial court
nullified the transfer of the subject
properties to petitioners and spouses
Bondoc due to irregularities and the Extra-
Judicial Settlement was notarized by a
notary public who was not duly
commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. The Deed of Sale was undated,
the date of the acknowledgment therein
was left blank, and the typewritten name
"Pedro Rioza, Husband" on the left side of
the document was not signed The trial court
also observed that both documents were
never presented to the Office of the
Register of Deeds for registration and that
the titles to the subject properties were still
in the names of Pedro and his second wife
Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries
and buyers of the subject properties were
not even presented as witnesses who
supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance.
On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in
favor of respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the nature and extent
of the interests of the parties thereon, may
fall under an action for settlement of estate.
Ruling:
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that
some of respondents' causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by
the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and
the nature and extent of their interests
thereon, may fall under an action for
settlement of estate. However, a complete
reading of the complaint would readily show
that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed
for, the action is clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession.
It must be recalled that the general
rule is that when a person dies intestate, or,
if testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules of
Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator
in the order established in Section 6 of Rule
78 of the Rules of Court.29 An exception to
this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein
the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and
no debts due from his estate, may divide
the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action for partition without
submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the
court.30 The reason is that where the
 deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of
an administrator to administer the estate for
them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately
entitled.31redarclaw
In this case, it was expressly alleged
in the complaint, and was not disputed, that
Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate
without any pending obligations. Thus,
contrary to petitioner'.s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation
to submit me subject properties of the
estate to a special proceeding for
settlement of intestate estate, and are, in
fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
The instant petition is denied.
Rule 91
Castorio Alvarico vs. Amelita L. Sola
G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Bureau of Lands approved and granted the
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of
land in favor of Fermina Lopez. Lopez then
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and
Transfer of Rights over the land in favor of
Amelita Sola.
In 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an
order approving the transfer of rights and
granting the amendment of the application
from Lopez to Sola. In 1994, Alvarico
claimed that Lopez donated the land to him
and immediately thereafter, he took
possession of the same.
Sola maintained that the donation to
Alvarico is void because Lopez was no
longer the owner of the property when it
was allegedly donated to him since the
property was already been transferred to
her.
During trial, Sola submitted a copy of Deed
of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights
over the property dated 1983 executed by
Fermina in her favor, and a certification
from the municipal treasurer that she had
been declaring the land as her and her
husbands property for tax purposes since
1993.
Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation
dated January 4, 1984, showing that the lot
was given to him by Lopez and he
immediately took possession in 1985 and
continues in possession up to the present.
He also claimed that Sola was in bad faith
because he was first in material possession
in good faith.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Alvarico declaring he lawfully owned the
land and the defendant, Sola, was directed
to reconvey the same to the former. Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Who between Alvarico and Sola has a
better claim to the land?
Ruling:
Sola has a better tile to the land. The
execution of public documents, Affidavits of
Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity, hence convincing evidence is
required to assail and controvert them. It is
undisputed that original certificate of title
was issued in 1989 in favor of Sola. It
requires more than bare allegation to defeat
the Title which on its face enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity of issuance. A
Torrens title, once registered, serves as
notice to the whole world.
Even assuming that Sola acquired title to
the disputed land in bad faith, only the State
can institute reversion proceedings under
Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Alvarico
has no standing at all to question the
validity of Solas title. It follows that he
cannot recover the property because, to
begin with, he has not shown that he is the
rightful owner thereof. A private individual
may not bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have the effect of
canceling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on
the basis thereof, such that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain.
G.R. No. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P.
MALTOS, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
EUSEBIO BORROMEO, respondents
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
FACTS: On February 13, 1979,
EusebioBorromeo was issued Free Patent
No. 586681 over a piece of agricultural land
located in San Francisco, Agusandel Sur,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-9053. On June 15, 1983, well within the
five-year prohibitory period,
EusebioBorromeo sold the land to
EliseoMaltos. EusebioBorromeo died on
January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that
prior to his death, he allegedly told his wife,
Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children to
nullify the sale made to EliseoMaltos and
have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
5477 cancelled because the sale was within
the five-year prohibitory period. On June
23, 1993, NorbertaBorromeo and her
children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a
Complaint for Nullity of Title and
Reconveyance of Title against
EliseoMaltos, Rosita Maltos, and the
Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 946.
EliseoMaltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos
Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that
the sale was made in good faith and that in
purchasing the property, they relied on
EusebioBorromeo's title. Further, the
parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale
was made during the five-year prohibitory
period, the land would revert to the public
domain and the proper party to institute
reversion proceedings was the Office of the
Solicitor General. The Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer,
arguing that the deed of sale was presented
for Registration after the five-year
prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on
its part to register the deed. The heirs of
Borromeo countered that good faith was not
a valid defense because the prohibitory
period appeared on the face of the title of
the property.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are
the legal heirs of the late EusebioBorromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed
property within the prohibitory period is
valid or binding.
HELD: 1.The five-year period prohibiting
the sale of land obtained under homestead
or free patent is provided under Section 118
of the Public Land Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance1 of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
The main purpose in the grant of a freq
patent of homestead is to preserve and
keep in the family of the homesteader that
portion of public land which the State has
given to him so he may have a place to live
with his family and become a happy citizen
and a useful member of the society. In
Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the
conservation of a family home is the
purpose of homestead laws. The policy of
the state is to foster, families as the
foundation of society, and thus promote
general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is
predicated on public policy. Its violation
gives rise to the cancellation of the grant
and the reversion of the land and its
improvements to the government at the
instance of the latter. The provision that
"nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
that expiration of the five-year period" is
mandatory and any sale made in violation
of such provision is void and produces no
effect whatsoever, just like what transpired
in this case. Clearly, it is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away
what public policy by law seeks to preserve.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public
Land Act is applicable since title already
vested in EusebioBorromeo's name. Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the sale was made within the
five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is
sufficient cause to revert the property in
favor of the state. However, this court
cannot declare reversion of the property in
favor of the state in view of the limitation
imposed by Section 101 that an action for
reversion must first be filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General.
2.
The doctrine of in pari delicto non orituractio
is inapplicable when public policy will be
violated. The in pari delicto rule is provided
under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil
Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts that
constitute criminal offenses, while Article
1412 pertains to acts that do not These
provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from
the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal
offense, both parties being in pari delicto,
they shall have no action against each
other, and both shall be prosecuted.
Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code
relative to the disposal of effects or
instruments of a crime shall be applicable to
the things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one
of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one
may claim what he has given, and shall not
be bound to comply with his promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful
or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the contract,
or demand the performance of the other's
undertaking;cralawlawlibrary
(2) When only one of the contracting parties
is at fault, he cannot recover what he has
given by reason of the contract, or ask for
the fulfilment of what has been promised
him. The other, who is not at fault, may
demand the return of what he has given
without any obligation to comply with his
promise.
The case under consideration comes within
the exception above adverted to. Here
appellee desires to nullify a transaction
which was done in violation of the law.
Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would
apply to her because her predecessor-in-
interest has carried out the sale with the
presumed knowledge of its illegality, but
because the subject of the transaction is a
piece of public land, public policy requires
that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-
acquiring it because it was given by law to
her family for her home and cultivation. This
is the policy on which our homestead law is
predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It
is not within the competence of any citizen
to barter away what public policy by law
seeks to preserve." We are, therefore,
constrained to hold that appellee can
maintain the present action it being in
furtherance of this fundamental aim of our
homestead law.
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable,
the question now arises as to who between
the parties have a better right to possess
the subject parcel of land. This issue was
addressed in Santos:
What is important to consider now is who of
the parties is the better entitled to the
possession of the land while the
government does not take steps to assert
its title to the homestead. Upon annulment
of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced
to the purchase price and its interest. As
against the vendor or his heirs, the
purchaser is no more entitled to keep the
land than any intruder. Such is the situation
of the appellants. Their right to remain in
possession of the land is no better than that
of appellee and, therefore, they should not
be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of
appellee during and until the government
takes steps toward its reversion to the
State. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not
err in ruling that while there is yet no action
for reversion filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the property should be
conveyed by petitioners to respondents.
With respect to Appellees' claim for the
reimbursement of the improvements on the
land in question, they are hereby declared
to have lost and forfeited the value of the
necessary improvements that they made
thereon in the same manner that Appellants
should lose the value of the products
gathered by the Appellees from the said
land. We are constrained to hold that the
heirs of the homesteader should be
declared to have lost and forfeited the value
of the products gathered from the land, and
so should the defendants lose the value of
the necessary improvements that they have
made thereon.
Reversion is a remedy provided under
Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion
to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of Commonwealth of
the Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is "to restore
public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain.
The general rule is that reversion of lands
to the state is not automatic, and the Office
of the Solicitor General is the proper party
to file an action for reversion. The objective
of an action for reversion of public land is
the cancellation of the certificate of title an|l
the resulting reversion of the land covered
by the title to the State| This is why an
action for reversion is oftentimes
designated asj an annulment suit or a
cancellation suit. Since an action for
reversion presupposes that the property in
dispute is owned by the state, it is proper
that the action be filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, being the real party-in-
interest.
There is, however, an exception to the rule
that reversion is not automatic. Section 29
of the Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the
land has begun, the purchaser, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, may convey or encumber his
rights to any person, corporation, or
association legally qualified under this Act
to purchase agricultural public lands,
provided such conveyance or encumbrance
does not affect any right or interest of the
Government in the land: And provided,
further, That the transferee is not delinquent
in the payment of any installment due and
payable. Any sale and encumbrance made
without the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
shall be null and void and shall produce the
effect of annulling the acquisition and
reverting the property and all rights to the
State, and all payments on the purchase
price theretofore made to the Government
shall be forfeited. After the sale has been
approved, the vendor shall not lose his right
to acquire agricultural public lands under
the provisions of this Act, provided he has
the necessary qualifications.
In this case, a free patent over the subject
parcel of land was issued to
EusebioBorromeo. This shows that he
already had title to the property when he
sold it to petitioner EliseoMaltos. Thus,
Section 101 of the Public Land Act applies.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Rules 92-97
G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003
PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner
vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-
GUSTILO, respondent.
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Facts: Respondent filed at the RTC
of Makati a Petition For Letters Of
Guardianship over the person and
properties of her sister Julieta who, for the
most part during the years 1995 and 1996,
has been a patient in the Makati Medical
Center where she is under medical
attention for old age, general debility, and a
mini-stroke which she suffered in the United
States in early 1995. Petitioner, Julietas
close friend and companion of more than
60 years, filed an Opposition to the petition
for letters of guardianship. She asserts that
the petition lacked factual and legal basis in
that JulietaLedesma is competent and sane
and there is absolutely no need to appoint a
guardian to take charge of her
person/property and that respondent is not
fit to be appointed as the guardian of
JulietaLedesma since their interests are
antagonistic. Also, petitioner has interposed
her objection to the appointment of
respondent as guardian because she thinks
that the latter dislikes her. The trial court
found Julieta incompetent and incapable of
taking care of herself and her property and
appointed respondent as guardian of her
person and properties, which were affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the appellate court
and the trial court erred in finding that
respondent is suitable for appointment as
guardian of the person and properties of
Julieta.
Ruling: No. In the selection of a
guardian, a large discretion must be
allowed the judge who deals directly with
the parties. As a rule, when it appears that
the judge has exercised care and diligence
in selecting the guardian, and has given
due consideration to the reasons for and
against his action which are urged by the
interested parties, his action should not be
disturbed unless it is made very clear that
he has fallen into grievous error. In the case
at bar, petitioner has not shown that the
lower courts committed any error. Petitioner
can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta
to establish her claim that there existed a
rift between the two which amounts to
antagonistic interests. No inference as to
the existence of antagonistic interests
between respondent and Julieta can thus
be made. Petitioner's assertion that
respondent's intent in instituting the
guardianship proceedings is to take control
of Julieta's properties and use them for her
own benefit is purely speculative and finds
no support from the records.
The claim that respondent is hostile to the
best interests of Julieta also lacks merit.
That respondent removed Julieta from the
Makati Medical Center where she was
confined after she suffered a stroke does
not necessarily show her hostility towards
Julieta, given the observation by the trial
court, cited in the present petition, that
Julieta was still placed under the care of
doctors after she checked out and was
returned to the hospital when she suffered
another stroke.
Likewise, petitioner opposed the petition for
the appointment of respondent as guardian
before the trial court because, among other
reasons, she felt she was disliked by
respondent, a ground which does not
render respondent unsuitable for
appointment as guardian.
Accordingly, for lack of merit, the petition is
hereby dismissed.
Caiza vs CA
GR No. 110427 February 24, 1997
NARVASA, C.J.:
Facts:
Carmen Caiza was adjudged
incompetent because of her advanced age
and physical infirmities which included
cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal
guardian of her person and estate. Caiza
was the owner of a house and lot in
Quezon City. Later, she commenced a suit
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City to eject the spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises
through her legal guardian, Amparo.
Out of kindness, she had allowed the
Estrada Spouses to temporarily reside in
her house, rent-free but because of an
urgent need of the house on account of her
advanced age and failing health, she,
through her guardian, had asked the
Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate
the house. However, they had refused to do
so.
The Estradas insist that the case against
them was really not one of unlawful
detainer; they argue that since possession
of the house had not been obtained by
them by any "contract, express or implied,"
as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the
premises could not be deemed one
"terminable upon mere demand (and hence
never became unlawful) within the context
of the law." Neither could the suit against
them be deemed one of forcible entry, they
add, because they had been occupying the
property with the prior consent of the "real
owner," Carmen Caiza, which "occupancy
can even ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza
is admitted to probate." They conclude, on
those postulates, that it is beyond the
power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust
them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza later on died and was
substituted as plaintiff by her legal
guardian.
Issue:
Whether or not Amparo as legal
guardian had the authority to bring the
action and to continuously represent Caiza
even after her death.
Ruling:
Yes. She was appointed by a
competent court the general guardian of
both the person and the estate of her aunt,
Carmen Caiza. By that appointment, it
became Evangelista's right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over,
Caiza's property, both real and personal, it
being recognized principle that the ward
has no right to possession or control of his
property during her incompetency.That right
to manage the ward's estate carries with it
the right to take possession thereof and
recover it from anyone who retains it,and
bring and defend such actions as may be
needful for this purpose.
Evangelista was merely discharging the
duty to attend to "the comfortable and
suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly
imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally,
and proceeds applied to maintenance of
ward. A guardian must manage the estate
of his ward frugally and without waste, and
apply the income and profits thereof, so far
as maybe necessary, to the comfortable
and suitable maintenance of the ward and
his family, if there be any; and if such
income and profits be insufficient for that
purpose, the guardian may sell or
encumber the real estate, upon being
authorized by order to do so, and apply to
such of the proceeds as may be necessary
to such maintenance."
G.R. No. 194366
October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-
MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-
MILLAN,DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA
D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D.
ILLUT-PIALA,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND
JULPHA IBRAHIM UY,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
AnunciacionNeri had seven children: first
marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely:
Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage
with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout
the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties located in Samal,
Davao del Norte.
In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate.
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as
natural guardian of his minor children Rosa
and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating
among themselves the said homestead
properties and thereafter, conveying them
to the late spouses Uy for a consideration
of P 80,000.00.
In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a
complaint for annulment of sale of the
homestead properties against spouses Uy
before the RTC, assailing the validity of the
sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. The complaint was later
amended to include Eutropia and Victoria
additional plaintiffs for having been
excluded and deprived of their legitimes as
children of Anunciacion from her first
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the father or mother, as the natural
guardian of the minor under parental
authority, has the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the minor?
RULING:
All the petitioners are legitimate children of
Anunciacion from her first and second
marriages and consequently, they are
entitled to inherit from her in equal shares,
pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil
Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the
heirs of Anunciacion should have
participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that
then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement
was not valid and binding upon them. While
the settlement of the estate is null and void,
the subsequent sale of the properties made
by Enrique and his children, Napoleon,
Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses
is valid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares. With respect to Rosa
and Douglas who were minors at the time
of the execution of the settlement and sale,
their natural guardian and father, Enrique,
represented them in the transaction.
However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely
clothed with powers of administration and
bereft of any authority to dispose of their
2/16 shares in the estate of their mother.
Administration includes all acts for the
preservation of the property and the receipt
of fruits according to the natural purpose of
the thing. Any act of disposition or
alienation, or any reduction in the
substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules
of Court provides:
SEC. 7.Parents as Guardians. When the
property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or
less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the childs property,
with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition
required by Section 2 hereof. For good
reasons, the court may, however, appoint
another suitable persons.
Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the
natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power
to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to
a judicial guardian of the wards property
and even then only with courts prior
approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered
into by Enrique in behalf of his minor
children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon
reaching the age of majority, is
unenforceable in accordance with Articles
1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil Code.
However, records show that Napoleon and
Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate with absolute deed
of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and
Manifestation before the RTC, they both
confirmed, respect and acknowledge the
validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in
1979. The ratification thus purged all the
defects existing at the time of its execution
and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas
1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to
spouse Uy. The same, however, is not true
with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence
showing ratification.
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA
G.R. No. 184528
April 25, 2012
Facts: This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals affirming
the Order of the RTC in a Special
Proceedings, which dismissed
NiloOropesas, petitioner, petition for
guardianship over the properties of his
father, respondent, CiriloOropesa.
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner)
filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, a petition for him and a
certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as
guardians over the property of his father,
the (respondent) CiriloOropesa. In the said
petition, it is alleged among others that the
(respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten
(10) years already having suffered a stroke
on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his
judgment and memory [were] impaired and
such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his stroke,
the (respondent) was observed to have had
lapses in memory and judgment, showing
signs of failure to manage his property
properly; that due to his age and medical
condition, he cannot, without outside aid,
manage his property wisely, and has
become an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his
girlfriend.
CiriloOropesa filed his Opposition to
the petition for guardianship filed by his
(ever caring and loving) son. During trial,
petitioner presented his evidence, which
consists of his, his sister, and respondents
former nurses testimony.
After presenting evidence, petitioner
rested his case but failed to file his written
formal offer of evidence. Respondent,
thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to
declare that petitioner has waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and
Evidence since they were not formally
offered; To expunge the documents of the
petitioner from records; and to grant leave
to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to
Evidence. A subsequent Demurrer was filed
and was granted. Motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner and
appealed the case to Court of appeals but
failed. Hence this petition to the Supreme
Court.
 Issue: Whether respondent is considered
incompetent as per the Rules who should
be placed under guardianship?
Ruling: No. The petition is without merit.
Under the rules, incompetent includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable
to read and write, those who are of
unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind, and other similar causes, cannot
without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
Finding that a person is incompetent should
be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence. Nilo lacks material evidence to
support his claims that his father is
incompetent due to his alleged deteriorating
medical and metal condition. The only
medical document presented report of
neuropsychological screening proves that
he is indeed competent to run his personal
affairs.
Rule 98
G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012
LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C. KUN,
MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO,
and NAPOLEON O.
GARCIA, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) is a government financial institution
and the official depository of the
Philippines. Respondents are the officers
and representatives of Asian Construction
and Development Corporation (ACDC), a
corporation incorporated under Philippine
law and engaged in the construction
business. On several occasions
respondents executed in favor of LBP trust
receipts to secure the purchase of
contruction materials that they will nedd in
their construction projects. The trust
receipts matured and ACDC failed to return
to LBP the proceeds of the construction
projects or even the materials subject of the
trust receipts. After several demands ACDC
failed to act accordingly, consequently LBP
filed a complaint for Estafa or violation of
Art. 315 , par 1(b) of the RPC in relation to
PD 115, against the respondent officers of
ADC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the disputed transaction is a
trust receipt or a loan?
RULING
The the transaction is one of a trust receipt.
There are two obligations in a trust receipt
transaction. The first is covered by the
provision that refers to money under the
obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the
owner of the merchandise sold. The second
is covered by the provision referring to
merchandise received under the obligation
to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus,
under the Trust Receipts Law intent to
defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee
fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
goods covered by the trust receipt to the
entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to
return the goods under trust, if they are not
disposed of in accordance with the terms of
the trust receipts. In all trust receipt
transactions, both obligations on the part of
the trustee exist in the alternative the
return of the proceeds of the sale or the
return or recovery of the goods, whether
raw or processed. When both parties enter
into an agreement knowing that the return
of the goods subject of the trust receipt is
not possible even without any fault on the
part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt
transaction penalized under Section 13 of
P.D. 115; the only obligation actually
agreed upon by the parties would be the
return of the proceeds of the sale
transaction. This transaction becomes a
mere loan where the borrower is obligated
to pay the bank the amount spent for the
purchase of the goods. Article 1371 of the
Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge
the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered." Under this
provision, we can examine the
contemporaneous actions of the parties
rather than rely purely on the trust receipts
that they signed in order to understand the
transaction through their intent. We note in
this regard that at the onset of these
transactions, LBP knew that ACDC was in
the construction business and that the
materials that it sought to buy under the
letters of credit were to be used for the
following projects: the Metro Rail Transit
Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition
Project LBP had in fact authorized the
delivery of the materials on the construction
sites for these projects, as seen in the
letters of credit it attached to its complaint.
Clearly, they were aware of the fact that
there was no way they could recover the
buildings or constructions for which the
materials subject of the alleged trust
receipts had been used. Notably, despite
the allegations in the affidavit-complaint
wherein LBP sought the return of the
construction materials, its demand letter
dated May 4, 1999 sought the payment of
the balance but failed to ask, as an
alternative, for the return of the construction
materials or the buildings where these
materials had been used.
The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized
the delivery of construction materials to a
construction site of two government
projects, as well as unspecified construction
sites, repudiates the idea that LBP intended
to be the owner of those construction
materials. As a government financial
institution, LBP should have been aware
that the materials were to be used for the
construction of an immovable property, as
well as a property of the public domain. As
an immovable property, the ownership of
whatever was constructed with those
materials would presumably belong to the
owner of the land, under Article 445 of the
Civil Code
Even if we consider the vague possibility
that the materials, consisting of cement,
bolts and reinforcing steel bars, would be
used for the construction of a movable
property, the ownership of these properties
would still pertain to the government and
not remain with the bank as they would be
classified as property of the public domain,
which is defined by the Civil Code. In
contrast with the present situation, it is
fundamental in a trust receipt transaction
that the person who advanced payment for
the merchandise becomes the absolute
owner of said merchandise and continues
as owner until he or she is paid in full, or if
the goods had already been sold, the
proceeds should be turned over to him or to
her. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the January 20, 2005 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76588. No costs.
Rules 99-100
CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 105308
September 25, 1998
Facts: This case is a petition for review on
certiorari over the Decision of CA affirming
the decree of adoption issued by the RTC
of Cebu for the adoption of minors Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all
surnamed Cang.
Minors parents are Hebert Cang
(Petitioner) and Anna Marie Clavano. Anna
Marie subsequently filed for legal
separation which was granted. Petitioner
then left for the United States. Petitioner
sought a divorce decree there, and was
granted. Petitioner thereafter took an
American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. Later on, he
divorced his American wife and never
remarried. While in the U.S., Petitioner
remitted money to the Philippines for his
minor children.
Meanwhile, Spouses Clavano, here in the
Philippines, filed a Special Proceedings for
the Adoption of the three (3) minor Cang
children before the RTC of Cebu. 14 year
old Keith, as well as the mother Anna
Marie, consented to the said adoption and
alleged that Petitioner abandoned them and
forfeited already his parental rights over
their children. Anna Marie consented to the
adoption of her children to her relatives
because she would go to U.S. as well, to
find a job and live there.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption,
Petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto.
He alleged that although he has only
meager finance compared to Spouses
Clavano, he cannot allow anybody to strip
him of his parental authority.
Pending resolution of the petition for
adoption, Petitioner moved to reacquire
custody over his children alleging that Anna
had gone to the US thereby leaving custody
to their children to Spouses Clavano
(Private Respondents). Such petition was
granted and the Trial Court ordered that the
custody of the minor children should be
transferred to their father.
Later on, the the Petition for Adoption was
granted.
Issue: Whether adoption should be
granted?
Held: No. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.
The General Rule under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court provides that:
The written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption.
The exception of this rule is that the
requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is insane or
hopelessly intemperate.
In the instant case, records disclose that
Petitioners conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to constitute abandonment.
While admittedly, Petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the US, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children
through telephone calls and letters. He
used to send packages by mail and catered
to their whims.
[G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for
the Province of Camarines Sur, and
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
Balalong, respondents.
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, the petitioner
herein, TomasaVda. De Jacob, claimed to
be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
Special Administratix for the various estates
of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed
Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased. Defendant-appellee, the private
respondents herein, Pedro Pilapil, on the
other hand, claimed to be the legally-
adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his
claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July
1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose
L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the
petition for adoption filed by deceased
Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46
(entitled Tomasavda. de Jacob v. Jose
Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming
his share of the deceased estate as
Alfredos adopted son and as his sole
surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity
of the marriage between appellant Tomasa
and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant
Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-
83) questioning appellees claim as the legal
heir of Alfredo. The lower court as well as
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
private respondent declaring that the Order
dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of
the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA to be
genuine and that the private respondent
was the legally adopted child and sole heir
of deceased Alfredo and that the
reconstructed Marriage Contract presented
by the petitioner was spurious and non-
existent. The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the
Issue: Whether or not Pedro Pilapil is the
legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob
Ruling: No. At the trial of this case at
present, two expert witnesses were
presented, one for petitioner and one for
Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied
mainly on respondents expert and brushed
aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself. Judge Moya could not recall having
ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over
his name, he positively declared that it was
not his. The fact that he had glaucoma
when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he
could with medication still read the
newspapers; upon the request of the
defense counsel, he even read a document
shown to him. The Court find no reason to
disregard and the respondent has not
presented any to disregard the Deposition
of Judge Moya. Judge Moyas declaration
was supported by the expert testimony of
NBI Document Examiner
BienvenidoAlbacea, who declared that the
questioned and the standard signature Jose
L. Moya were not written by one and the
same person. Other considerations also
cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
alleged Order was purportedly made in
open court. In his Deposition, however,
Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate
decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were
criminal cases, in which the accused
pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was
assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information.
Furthermore, no proof was presented that
Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records
Management in Manila and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines
Sur, issued Certifications that there was no
record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted
by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the
alleged adoption of respondent. The burden
of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover,
the evidence presented by petitioner shows
that the alleged adoption is a sham. Thus,
the Petition is grantedand the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals was
reversedandset aside.The marriage
between Petitioner TomasaVda.de Jacob
and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was
recognized and declared valid and the
claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro
Pilapil is declared nonexistent.
Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996
MENDOZA, J.
Facts: On September 2, 1988, Spouses
Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto
filed a petition for adoption of minor Midael
C. Mazon, before the Regional Trial Court
in Cavite City Branch XVI.
In their petition, Spouses Carato alleged
that Midael C. Mazon had been living with
them since he was seven years old. They
further alleged that when they got married
on January 19, 1986, Midael C. Mazon
stayed with them under their care and
custody.
In the petition, they prayed that after
hearing, a judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the Michael C. Mazon their
child for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the
natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally
changed to that of the petitioners and that
the first name which was mistakenly
registered as MIDAEL be corrected to
MICHAEL.
The case was set for hearing on September
21, 1988, giving notice thereof by
publication and by service of the Order
upon the DSWD and Office of the Solicitor
General.
The OSG opposed the petition insofar as
the correction of name of Midael was
concerned. According to the OSG, although
the change in the name sought was clerical,
the petition was basically for adoption and
not for correction of entry under Rule 108.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption
and prayer of Spouses Caranto to change
the name of the child from Midael to
Michael. The RTC ruled that Rule 108,
contrary to the claim of the OSG, was only
applicable to concerns related to civil status
of persons.
Issue: Whether or not change of name falls
under Rule 108 (Correction of Entry).
Ruling: Yes. Contrary to the findings of the
RTC, change of name falls under Rule 108.
Section 2 (o) of the said rule states:
"Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. xxx (o) changes of name."
Clearly, Rule 108 does not only concern
civil status of persons but also concern
changes of name.
This also means that the decision of the
trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer
for the correction of entry, was void. This is
so because the Local Civil Registrar, an
indespensable party in proceedings falling
under Rule 108, was not notified. Section 3
of the said Rule states:
3. Parties. - When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
Furthermore, the decision of the RTC was
void also on the ground that the supposed
Petition for Correction of Entry (change of
name) was not published. Meaning, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Nery v. Atty. Sampana (A.C. No.10196;
September 9,2014; Carpio, Acting C.J.)
Facts: Melody Nery engaged the services
of Atty. GlicerioSampana for the annulment
of her marriage and for her adoption by an
alien adopter. The petition for annulment
was granted and Nery paid Php 200,000.00
for Sampanas services. For the adoption
case, respondent asked Nery if she had an
aunt, whom they could represent as the
wife of her alien adopter. Sampana also
gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage
contract, which they would use for her
adoption. Thereafter, he was paid in
installment in the amount of Php
100,000.00.
Sampana made Nery believe that a petition
for her adoption was filed and that the
hearing was already set. However, when
Nery inquired about the status of her
petition for adoption from the court (Branch
11, Malolos, Bulacan), she discovered that
no such petition was filed. Consequently,
Nery asked for reimbursement, to which
Sampana agreed but claimed a deduction
of Php 12,000.00 for filing fees. However,
Nery claimed the full amount since no
petition was filed.
A disbarment complaint was filed. However,
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to
the filing of the petition for adoption, but
after investigation, the IBP found Sampana
guilty of malpractice.
Issue: (1) Whether or not respondent is
guilty of malpractice.
(2) Whether or not an alien adopter can
adopt petitioner.
Ruling: (1) Yes. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause. Sampana
admitted that he received "one package
fee" for both cases of annulment and
adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he
unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
adoption and fell short of his duty of due
diligence and candor to his client.
(2) Yes. He suggested to Nery that if the
alien adopter would be married to her close
relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act,
the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the
petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed
Nery of the status of the petition. He then
conceded that the annulment case
overshadowed the petition for adoption.
Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter
entrusted to him. He even kept the money
given him, in violation of the Codes
mandate to deliver the clients funds upon
demand. Thus, the Court suspended Atty.
Sampana from the practice of law for 3
years.
Castro vs Gregorio
GR No.188801 15 October 2014
Facts: This is a petition for review on
Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition
before the appellate court sought to annul
the judgment of the trial court that granted
Rs decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to
Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately,
they separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Joses alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who
succumbed to death after nine days from
birth due to congenital heart disease, and
Joanne BenedictaCharissima Castro
(Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of
Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was
instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro
alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
(Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was
granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against
Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that
Jose had been remiss in providing support
to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year;
that she single-handedly raised and
provided financial support to Joanne while
Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and allege lover, Larry, and even went to
the extent of adopting Larrys two children,
Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro
denied the allegation that he had remiss his
fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that
he always offered help but it was often
declined. He also alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children thats
why he adopted them. Later on Atty.
Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and
Reginas adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was
not obtained and the document purporting
as Rosarios affidavit of consent was
fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and
Reginas birth certificates shows disparity.
One set shows that the father to is Jose,
while another set of NSO certificates shows
the father to be Larry. P further alleged that
Jed and Regina are not actually Joses
illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. CA denied
the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by
the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, it ruled that there is no explicit
provision in the rules that spouses and
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be
personally notified of the hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination
of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the
scope of the action for annulment of
judgment. The alleged fraud could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is
required in an action for annulment of
judgment.
Issues:
Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant
case?
Whether consent of the spouse and
legitimate children 10 years or over of the
adopter is required?
Decision: The grant of adoption over R
should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision
was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party
precisely to prevent the participation of any
other interested party, as in this case, then
the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether
the fraud was committed through the use of
forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
Joses actions prevented Rosario and
Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had
Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Joses petition since he
failed to fulfill the necessary requirements
under the law. There can be no other
conclusion than that because of Joses
acts, the trial court granted the decree of
adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III,
Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a
joint petition for adoption. The law,
however, provides for several exceptions to
the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this
instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal
separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of
the adopters children if they are 10 years
old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners
consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should
have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in
this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally
serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
Bartolome vs. Social Security System,
740 SCRA 78 , November 12, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS: John Colcol died in a work-related
accident while he was employed as an
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc. He was enrolled under the
governments Employees Compensation
Program (ECP).
Since John was childless and unmarried,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns
biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits with the SSS.
However, SSS denied the claim, stating
that the petitioner is not considered as the
parent of John as he was legally adopted
by Cornelio Colcol, the victims great
grandfather, therefore Bernardina cannot
be considered as Johns beneficiary
because she is not the deceaseds
legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however,
already died on October 26, 1987, less than
three years since the decree of Johns
adoption became final.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the interpretation
of the ECC stating that only legitimate
parents may benefit from compensation is
correct.
2. Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a
dependent parent notwithstanding her son's
adoption by someone else.
HELD: 1. No. The term parents in the
phrase dependent parents in the
aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor
Code is used and ought to be taken in its
general sense and cannot be unduly limited
to legitimate parents as what the ECC did.
The phrase dependent parents should,
therefore, include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and whether by
nature or by adoption. When the law does
not distinguish, one should not distinguish.
Plainly, dependent parents are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological
or by adoption, who are in need of support
or assistance.
Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it
say that legitimate parents pertain to
those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the ECP. It
was only in the assailed Decision wherein
such qualification was made. In addition,
assuming arguendo that the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to
parental authority, petitioner can still qualify
as Johns secondary beneficiary. True,
when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then
about two (2) years old, petitioners parental
authority over John was severed. However,
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the
ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death,
was that when the adoptive parent died less
than three (3) years after the adoption
decree, John was still a minor, at about four
(4) years of age. Johns minority at the time
of his adopters death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption
is a personal relationship and that there are
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,
who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
2. Yes. It is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to
the estate of their child who was the subject
of adoption. While the benefits arising from
the death of an SSS covered employee do
 not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption vis--vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by
virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, We rule, include
the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor
offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot
leave undetermined the fate of a minor child
whose second chance at a better life under
the care of the adoptive parents was
snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life
might have been better off not being
adopted at all if he would only find himself
orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelios death at the time of Johns
minority resulted in the restoration of
petitioners parental authority over the
adopted child.
Rule 102
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86
year old of age, possessed extensive
property valued at millions of pesos. For
many year, he was the Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country
Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio,
herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten
6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-
Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia,
Marietta and Shereen. They separated
from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano
lived at Makati every time he was in Manila
and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the
other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo
City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US,
he stayed with her wife for about 5 months
in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and
Lin, alleged that during this time their
mother overdose Potenciano which caused
the latters health to deteriorate. In
February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC
petition for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano due to the
latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio, Potenciano did not return to
Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999,
petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband
alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of
habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention,
or by which the rightful custody of a person
is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the
restraint of liberty must an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must
be actual and effective not merely nominal
or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual
and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify
issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter
was 86 years of age and under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to
discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against
his free choice. Otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of
a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that
the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter
beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.
G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003
Atty. Edward Serapio v. Sandiganbayan
(3rd Division)
Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner)
filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A
petition for certiorari assailing the
resolutions of the Third division of the
Sandigan bayan denying his petition for
bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion
to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of
plunder together with Former President
Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada
among others. Petitioner was a member of
the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He
allegedly received, on behalf of the said
foundation, millions of pesos coming from
illegal activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing
of a case against him before the Sandigan
bayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued.
Upon learning of the said warrant he
voluntarily surrendered to the PNP.
Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion
for Bail but such motion is opposed by the
prosecution for the reason that petitioner
should be arraign first before he can avail of
Bail. Later on Petitioner simultaneously filed
a motion to quash. The bail hearing was
reset several times due to various
pleadings filed by petitioner and the
prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for
habeas corpus for the reason that the
prosecution have waived their right to
present evidence in opposition to his
petition for bail; the prosecution launched
an endless barrage of obstructive and
dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the
bail hearings; and, on the failure of the
People to adduce strong evidence of his
guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being
deprived of his liberty. Petitioner also cited
Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the
Court held that habeas corpus extends to
instances where detention, while valid from
its inception, has later become arbitrary.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for
habeas corpus should be granted?
Ruling: No. SC finds no basis for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
General rule applies.
Petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting ones right
to bail. It cannot be availed of where
accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of
right but on the discretion of the court and
the latter has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper
recourse is to file an application for bail with
the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to
proceed.
MoncupavsEnrile does not apply in this
case because petitioners restraint of liberty
did not become arbitrary. His application for
bail has yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for
bail cannot be pinned solely to the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution
because he himself is partly to be blamed
(his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas
corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process
issued by the court which jurisdiction to do
so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas
corpus may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as the fundamental instrument
for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action due to its
ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes.
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE v.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA
G.R. No. 210636; July 28, 2014
FACTS: Raquel filed before the RTC-
Caloocan a verified petition for writ of
habeas corpus directing petitioner Hazelina
to produce before the court respondent's
biological daughter, minor Criselda, and to
return to her the custody over the child
which was granted by the court. But,
despite diligent efforts and several
attempts, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in
personally serving petitioner copies of the
habeas corpus petition and of the writ.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for
Guardianship over the person of Criselda
before the RTC-Quezon City but was
dismissed due to the pendency of the
habeas corpus petition before RTC-
Caloocan. Thereafter, respondent filed a
criminal case for kidnapping against
petitioner and her counsel.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of
an alias writ of habeas corpus before the
RTC-Caloocan, which was granted. The
Alias Writ was served upon petitioner at the
Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City during the preliminary
investigation of the kidnapping case.
ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC Caloocan
has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
petition filed by respondent.
Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan
in Quezon City where petitioner was served
a copy is enforceable.
Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the
person of Criselda.
HELD: YES, the RTC-Caloocan has
jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
proceeding. A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court.
However, the petition may be filed with the
regular court in the absence of the
presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court
shall refer the case to the Family Court as
soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the
appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
YES. The writ issued by the Family Court or
the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong. In the
case at bar, respondent filed the petition
before the family court of Caloocan City.
Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both
belong to the same judicial region, the writ
issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be
implemented in Quezon City. Whether
petitioner resides in the former or the latter
is immaterial in view of the above rule.
As regards petitioners assertion that the
summons was improperly served, suffice it
to state that service of summons, to begin
with, is not required in a habeas corpus
petition. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of
habeas corpus plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent.
In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas
Corpus Of Datukan Malang Salibo,
Datukan Malang Salibo
v.
Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, BJMP
Building, Camp BagongDiwa, Taguig
City And All Other Persons Acting On
His Behalf And/Or Having Custody Of
Datukan Malang Salibo
G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015
FACTS: Butukan S. Malang, one of the
accused in the Maguindanao massacre,
had a pending warrant of arrest issued by
the trial court in People vsAmpatuan Jr. et.
al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned
that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to
be Butukan S. Malang, he presented
himself to clear his name. Salibo presented
to the police pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other
documents tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia
when the massacre happened. The
authorities, however, apprehended and
detained him. He questioned the legality of
his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he
is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The
CA issued the writ, making it returnable to
the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of
the Return, the trial court granted Salibos
petition and ordered his immediate release
from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed
the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S.
Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, orderly course of trial must be
pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ of habeas corpus may be
invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according
to the CA, should have been a motion to
quash information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the
Warden erred in appealing the RTC
decision before the CA. Salibo argued that
although the CA delegated to the RTC the
authority to hear the Wardens Return, the
RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA
ruling, and hence, it should have been
appealed directly before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salibo properly
availed the remedy of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
HELD: Yes, habeas corpus is the remedy
for a person deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person
is not under any lawful process and is
continuously being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo,
who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued in the case of People vsAmpatuan.
Based on the evidence presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not
have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore,
Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any
warrant charging him of an offense, nor
restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court.
Second, Salibo was not validly arrested
without a warrant. When he was in the
presence of authorities, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an
offense and the police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he
might have committed. Further, Salibo was
not an escape prisoner. This only means
that the police officers have deprived him of
 his liberty without due process of law.
Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself
of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
H. Change of Name vs. Correction/
Cancellation of Entries, as amended R.A.
9048 and 10172 (Rule 103 vs. Rule 108)
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS
ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her
minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN
ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and
CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]
Facts: This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the RTC of
Quezon City dismissing motupropio the
petition for Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct
some entries in the birth certificate of her
son, Charles Christian.
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert.
of her son the following:
The surname Borbon should be changed
to Eleosida (since the parents were never
married; the child is illegitimate and,
therefore, should follow the mothers
surname;
The date of the wedding should be blank;
Petitioners name should be Ma. Lourdes
Eleosida (instead of Borbon).
No opposition was made to this petition.
RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis
that only clerical errors (CLERICAL
ERRORS) of a harmless and innocuous
nature like misspelled name, occupation of
the parents, etc. may be subject of judicial
order authorizing changes or corrections
and not as may affect the civil status,
nationality or citizenship of the person
(substantial/material change/error) involved.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether changes or corrections
which are substantial may be subject of a
judicial proceeding.
Decision: Yes, Court find merit in the
petition.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. (Note: CLERICAL -
SUMMARY; SUBSTANTIAL-
ADVERSARIAL)
If all the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 (Notice and publication
[especially]) (Note: Adversarial) have been
followed, it was therefore error for the trial
court to dismiss the petition motupropio
without allowing the petitioner to present
evidence to support her petition (and all the
other persons who have an interest over
the matter to oppose the same).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, ET. AL
G.R No. 170340, JUNE 29,2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
CarlitoKho and his family applied for the
correction of various details in their birth
certificate. Carlito petitioned for 1) change
of citizenship of his mother from Chinese
to Filipino; 2) delete John from his name;
3) delete the word married opposite the
date of marriage of his parents. The last
correction was ordered to be effected
likewise in the birth certificates of
respondents Michael, Mercy, Nona and
Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature
of the change is premised on RA 9048,
which allows first name and nickname in
the birth certificates without judicial order.
The Municipal officer approved the change.
The Solicitor General objected to the
correction on the ground that the correction
is not merely clerical but requires an
adversarial proceeding. The Court of
Appeals favored with Kho.
ISSUE: Whether or not Khos request for
change in the details of their birth certificate
requires an adversarial proceeding.
RULING: It cannot be gainsaid that the
petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlitos mother as it
appeared in his birth certificate and delete
the married status of Carlitos parents in
his and his siblings respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the
correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the
changes entail substantial and controversial
amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of
Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter
that has a bearing and effect on the
citizenship and nationality not only of the
parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that
Carlitos and his sibllings parents were
married alters their filiation from
legitimate to illegitimate. with significant
implications on their successional and other
rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only
be granted in an adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of RA 9048
known as An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct A Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Register Without Need of Judicial
Order. has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial
precedence that substantial corrections to
the civil status of persons recorded in the
civil registry may be effected through the
filing of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements
under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding
necessary to effect substantial corrections
to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/
CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN
WANG also known as JULIAN WANG, to
be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN
WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 159966. 30 March 2005. Tinga, J.
Facts Julian Lin Carulasan Wang (herein
referred to as Julian) was born out of
wedlock. In 1998, his parents, Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang got married, and
thereafter executed a Deed of Legitimation,
as a result thereto, petitioners name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang.
Anna Lisa and Sing-Foe plan to stay in
Singapore for a long time to send Julian to
school together with his sister, Wang Mei
Jasmine. Since in Singapore middle names
or the maiden surname of the mother are
not carried in a persons name, they
anticipate that Julian will be discriminated
because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Also,
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores
Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter R, but if there is, they pronounced
it as L. Hence, on 22 September 2002,
petitioner Julian, represented by his mother,
filed a petition for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name.
The trial court held that the reason given for
the change of name sought in the petition,
that Julian will be discriminated when he
study in Singapore because of his middle
name, did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law; the same is merely for
the convenience of the child. To grant such
petition would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of
Singapore instead of Philippine law, which
is controlling. Further stated, Article 174 of
the Family Code provides that, legitimate
children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should now
be taken from petitioner Julian, considering
that he is still a minor.
Trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration; hence, petitioner filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner
pointed out that the middle name Carulasan
will cause him undue embarrassment and
the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will
be an obstacle to his social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean community.
Issue: Whether the petitioner shall be
allowed to drop his middle name anchored
on grounds of convenience?
Ruling: No. The Court affirmed the
decision rendered by the trial court.
The State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a
right; as such, before a person can be
authorized to change his name either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must
show reasonable cause or compelling
reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
In addition, petitioner must not only show
proper reasons, but also the fact that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid
are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change
of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the
court and not all the best evidence
available. What is involved is not a mere
matter of allowance or disallowance of the
request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant
and with the sole prerogative for making
such determination being lodged in the
courts.
G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009.*
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO
JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA, petitioners, vs.THE CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK
ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by
LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and
LUCILLE C. TITULAR, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and
Pablo Braza Jr. were married. During the
wake of Pablo, who died in a vehicular
accident, respondent Lucille Titular and her
son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son,
respectively, of Pablo. Stated in Patricks
birth certificate from the Local Civil
Registrar of Negros Occidental that: (1)
Pablo is the father of Patrick having
acknowledged by the father on January 13,
1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by
virtue of the subsequent marriage of his
parents; hence, his name was changed to
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise
obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married in 1998.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main
cause of action is for the correction of
Patricks birth records and that the rest of
the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
They contended that Patrick could not have
been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and
Pablo because said marriage is bigamous
on account of a valid and subsisting
marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
ISSUE: May the court pass upon the
validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy in an action to correct entries in
the civil registrar?
HELD: No. Under Rule 108, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and
rule on legitimacy and filiations. The
proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry.
The Petitioners cause of action is actually
to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucilles marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy,
which causes of action are governed not by
Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and
Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively,
hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
G.R. NO. 166676, SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner VERSUS JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, respondent
PONENTE: J. QUISIMBING
FACTS: The following facts were presented
by the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as female in the Certificate
of Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics because of
CAH, which is a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the
latter issued a medical certificate. Such
document testified respondents claim.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal
of the abovementioned ruling had been
filed.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the trial court
erred in ordering the correction of entries in
the birth certificate of respondent to change
her sex or gender, from female to male
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
HELD: No. The trial court did not err in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent. The court
considered the unique circumstance in this
case where nature had taken its course.
As for respondent's change of name under
Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial
court's grant of respondent's change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that
respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate
from female to male.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
Facts: Dr, Norma LugsanayUy filed a
Petition for Correction of Entry in her
Certificate of Live Birth. She alleged that
she was born on February 8, 1952 and is
the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and
SoteraLugsanay. Her Certificate of Live
Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy"
when in fact she is allegedly known to her
family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay.
She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings
bear the surname Lugsanay and are all
Filipinos.
Dr.Uy sought the correction of entries in her
birth certificate, particularly those pertaining
to her first name, surname and citizenship.
She also sought the correction allegedly to
reflect the name which she has been known
for since childhood, including her legal
documents such as passport and school
and professional records.
RTC issued an Order finding the petition to
be sufficient in form and substance and
setting the case for hearing, with the
directive that the said Order be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
City of Gingoog and the Province of
Misamis Oriental at least once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense
of respondent.
CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA
held that respondents failure to implead
other indispensable parties was cured upon
the publication of the Order setting the case
for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil
Monday
Registrar,
Class
the7:30-9:30
OSG and pmthe City
Prosecutors Office.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition
on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties. It assailed that the
changes are obviously not mere clerical as
they affects her rights and obligations in this
country and these changes are clearly
substantial.
Issue: Whether or not failure to implead
and notify the affected or interested parties
may be cured by the publication of the
notice of hearing?

Ruling: No. When a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Section 3 of Rule 108 states that when
cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
The fact that the notice of hearing was
published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken. Summons must be
served not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction but to comply with
the requirements of fair play and due
process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
The subject matter of the petition is not for
the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
Supreme Court adheres to the principle that
substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.
If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified
or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the
consequence of which might be detrimental
and far reaching.
ANDAYA-BORJA, CATHERINE MAE B.
2014-0319
G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014
FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner vs.THE
OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRATION OF LAS PIAS
CITY, respondent.
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for
correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the RTC and named
respondent Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Las Pias City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the
illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A.
Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his
birth certificate stated that his parents were
married. His birth certificate also stated that
his mother's first name is Tely and that his
first name is Franc Ler. The RTC dismissed
the petition and ruled that the proceedings
must be adversarial since the first
correction is substantial in nature and would
affect petitioners status as a legitimate
child. It was further held that the correction
in the first name of petitioner and his
mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under RA 9048.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in
dismissing the petition for correction of
entries.
Ruling: No. We agree with the RTC
that the first name of petitioner and his
mother as appearing in his birth certificate
can be corrected by the city civil registrar
under RA 9048. Indeed, under Section 1 of
RA 9048, clerical or typographical errors on
entries in a civil register can be corrected
and changes of first name can be done by
the concerned city civil registrar without
need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section
1, as amended by RA 10172, states that
No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname, the day
and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there
was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry, which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general
in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
We also agree with the RTC in ruling that
correcting the entry on petitioners birth
certificate that his parents were married to
"not married" is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said
correction is substantial as it will affect his
legitimacy and convert him from a
legitimate child to an illegitimate one.
Substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings. This substantial
correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. We also stress that a
petition seeking a substantial correction of
an entry in a civil register must implead as
parties to the proceedings not only the local
civil registrar but also all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be
affected by the correction. This is required
by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner
should at least implead his father and
mother as parties since the substantial
correction he is seeking will also affect
them.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and
AFFIRM the Orders of the RTC, Branch
201, LasPias City. The dismissal ordered
by the RTC is, however, declared to be
without prejudice.
Prerogative Writs
Daniel MasangkayTapuz v. Hon. Judge
Elmo Del Rosario
G.R No. 182484
June 17, 2007
Facts: The private respondents spouses
Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a
complaint for forcible entry and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against
the petitioners and other John Does
numbering about 120.
The private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (1) they are the registered
owners of the disputed land; (2) they were
the disputed lands prior possessors when
the petitioners armed with bolos and
carrying suspected firearms and together
with unidentified persons entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation,
without the private respondents permission
and against the objections of the private
respondents security men, and built
thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer, the petitioners
denied the material allegations and
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the
actual and prior possessors of the disputed
land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the
private respondents certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. They asked
for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
 The MCTC, after due proceedings,
rendered a decision in the private
respondents favor, finding prior possession
through the construction of perimeter fence
in 1993.
The petitioners appealed the MCTC
decision to RTC. On appeal, Judge Marin
granted the private respondents motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction upon posting of a
bond. The writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision
was actually issued by respondent Judge
del Rosario after the private respondents
had complied with the imposed condition.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the
issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently
denied the petitioners MR and to Defer
Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed
the motion for demolition. The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the
Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow
the private respondents to effectively take
actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed a
Petition for Review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and Order of
Demolition in CA.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff
issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas
data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ
of amparo and habeas data is proper
HELD: No. We find the petitions for
certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas
data fatally defective, both in substance and
in form. The petition for the issuance of the
writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to content and
substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents
that led to the petition, that the petition for
certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders
has been filed out of time. Based on the
same material antecedents, we find too that
the petitioners have been guilty of willful
and deliberate misrepresentation before
this Court and, at the very least, of forum
shopping. In sum, the petition for certiorari
should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum
shopping rule, for having been filed out of
time, and for substantive deficiencies.
To start off with the basics, the writ of
amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the
reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands requires that every petition for
the issuance of the Writ must be supported
by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these
statements both sworn and unsworn is
the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to
the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only
to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of
armed men bare to the waist and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
These allegations obviously lack what the
Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the
right to life, liberty or security. The petition
likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information
under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as
integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous
efforts made to secure information, has not
also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the fishing expedition that this
Court in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data had in mind in defining what
the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.
In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data is fully in order. PETITION
DENIED.
Infant JULIAN YUSA y CARAM,
represented by his mother, MA.
CHRISTINA YUSA y CARAM vs. Atty.
MARIJOY SIGUE, Atty. SALLY ESCUTIN,
VILMA CABRERA and CELIA YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652. 5 August 2014.
Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts
Petitioner Ma. Christina YusayCaram
(herein referred to as Christina) had an
amorous relationship with
GicanoConstantinoIII (herein referred to as
Marcelino), and eventually became
pregnant without the benefit of marriage.
Christina mislead Marcelino into believing
that she had an abortion; and to avoid
placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son, she intended to have the
child adopted through Sun and Moon Home
for Children (Sun and Moon, for brevity).
After giving birth to Baby Julian, Christina
surrendered him by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Not
long after, Marcelino suffered heart attack
and died. During the wake, Christina
disclosed to the family of Marcelino the birth
of Baby Julian and the fact that she gave
him up for adoption. The said family vowed
to help Christina recover and raise the
baby.
Christina wrote a letter to the DSWD asking
for the suspension of Baby Julians
adoption proceedings. However, DSWD
had already issued a Certificate declaring
Baby Julian as Legally Available for
Adoption, he was matched with spouses
Vergel and Filomina Medina; and
thereafter, supervised trial custody
commenced. The Certificate
abovementioned had attained finality and,
in effect, Christinas parental authority was
terminated and Baby Julian is effectively
made a ward of the State. DSWD, in
response to the letter, informed petitioner
that they were no longer in the position to
stop the adoption process, and Christina
lost her right to reacquire her parental
authority over Baby Julian or halt the
adoption process since the reglementary
period for the said action had already
lapsed under Sec. 7 of RA No. 9523.
Christina filed a petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Amparo, seeking to obtain custody
of Baby Julian from respondents. Christina
argues that the life, liberty and security of
Baby Julian is being violated or threatened
by herein respondents; that the latter
"blackmail" her into surrendering custody of
her child to the DSWD, and utilized an
invalid Certificate of Availability for Adoption
to misrepresent that all legal requisites for
adoption of the minor child had been
complied with. As such, respondents had
acted beyond the scope of their legal
authority thereby depriving her of her
custodial rights and parental authority over
him.
Initially, the trial court affirmed the remedy
availed of by petitioner and issued a Writ of
Amparo, commanding respondents to
produce the body of Baby Julian at the
scheduled hearing, to which they refused to
comply. However, the court, later on,
dismissed the petition for issuance of a Writ
of Amparo, on ground that the same it is not
the proper remedy to regain custody of the
child. The court held that Christina should
have filed either (a) civil case for custody of
her child as laid down in the Family Code
and the Rule on Custody of Minors; or (b)
Petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors, in case there is extreme urgency to
secure custody of a minor who has been
illegally detained by another, either as a
principal or ancillary remedy.
Issue
Whether a petition for a Writ of Amparo is
the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child?
Ruling
No.The Court held that the Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," as such, it is
confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof.
In relation thereto, "enforced
disappearance" is characterized by an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person
by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
In this case, Christina alleged that the
respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and
that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the
Amparo rule. Contrary to her position,
however, the respondent DSWD officers
never concealed Baby Julian's
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a
copy of the DSWD's Memorandum explicitly
stating that Baby Julian was in the custody
of the Medina Spouses; she even admitted
in her petition for review on certiorari that
the respondent presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as
used in the context of the Amparo rule as
the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the
respondents of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying
with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority
over the child and contesting custody over
him. Since it is extant from the pleadings
filed that what is involved is the issue of
child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a
ward of the State, the Amparorule cannot
be properly applied
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT
OF HABES DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO, ET. AL.
GR NO. 189155 SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino
descent. She enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group
BAYAN-USA. Petitioner together with her
companions decided to rest in the house of
one Mr. Paolo in La Paz, Tarlac after doing
survey work. 15 heavily armed men forcibly
entered and barged inside the house. The
armed men were all in civilian clothes and
wearing bonnets with the exception of their
leader. Petitioner and her companions were
abducted by the armed men.
Petioner was detained for being a member
of the Communist Party of the Philippines-
New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). Petitioner
was escorted to a room that she believed
was a cell. From there, she could hear the
sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off
and landing and some construction bustle.
She inferred that she was taken to the
military camp of Fort Magsaysay. Petitioner
was interrogated for 5 straight days coupled
with torture.
Petitioner was finally released and returned
to her uncles house in Quezon City but the
abductors gave the petitioner a cellular
phone with a SIM card, an email address
with password, and other things. She was
also sternly warned not to report the
incident or something will happen to her
and her family.
After her release, petitioner seek sanctuary
against the threat of future harm as well as
the suppression of any existing government
files or records linking her to the communist
movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Petitioner impleaded public officials
occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as
respondents on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture.
ISSUES:
Amparo
1. Whether the doctrine of command
responsibility invoked by the petitioner in
impleading the public respondents is proper
in her amparo petition.
2. Whether the totality of evidence proves
that the respondents were her abductors or
that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay.
3. Whether the prayer to inspect Fort
Magsaysay is correct.
Habeas Data
1. Whether or not the grant of Habeas Data
by the Court of Appeals is correct.
RULING:
Amparo
1. No. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law
that establishes liability. Command
responsibility is an omission mode of
individual criminal liability. whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators. Since
the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual
liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather
than in a summary amparo proceeding.
2. Direct evidence of identity is accorded
more weight than circumstantial evidence in
amparo proceedings. Given that the
identities of the men in the cartographic
sketches were not identified as belonging to
the military or public officials, they cannot
be held liable. Roxas is just a sojourner in
the Philippines and not even a citizen so
the Court cant rely on her inference that
she was taken to Fort Magsaysay merely
because the distance from Mr. Paolos
house to where they were taken felt like the
distance between the house and Fort
Magsaysay.
3. It is a rule in amparo proceedings that a
place inspected must at least be identified
with clarity and precision and that the
allegations be sufficient in themselves to
make a prima facies case. Since it was not
proven that Fort Magsaysay was indeed the
place where abductees were taken, an
order to inspect it would tantamount to
fishing expedition for evidence. Thus,
prayer to inspect Fort Magsaysay is hereby
denied.
Habeas Data
1. No. Habeas data is conceptualized as a
judicial remedy for enforcing a right to
privacy, most especially the right to
information, privacy of individuals. It
operates to protect a persons right to
control information regarding himself
particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. The indispensable element is a
showing, at least substantially, that a
violation or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security has
happened which the petitioner has failed to
do. There is no evidence that any of the
public respondents have violated or
threatened a right to privacy of the
petitioner. There wasnt even evidence that
they had access to the photos and videos.
The grant of habeas data by the CA has no
legal basis.
Burgos vs. Esperon
(G.R. 178497, February 4, 2014, Brion, J.)
Facts:
These incidents stemmed from our June
22, 2010 Resolution referring the present
case to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) as the Courts directly commissioned
agency, tasked with the continuation of the
investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos
abduction with the obligation to report its
factual findings and recommendations to
this Court. This referral was necessary as
the investigation by the Philippine National
PoliceCriminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNPCIDG), by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) Provost Marshal,
and even the initial CHR investigation had
been less than complete. In all of them,
there were significant lapses in the handling
of the investigation. In particular,
we highlighted the PNPCIDGs failure to
identify the cartographic sketches of two
(one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their
interview with the eyewitnesses to the
abduction.
Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim
of enforced disappearance, the CA
concluded that the present case falls within
the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA
found that the totality of the evidence
supports the petitioners allegation that the
military was involved in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note
of Jeffrey Cabintoys positive identification determine whether an enforced
of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who disappearance has taken place; to
approached him and told him not to determine who is responsible or
interfere because the man being arrested accountable; and to define and impose the
had been under surveillance for drugs; he appropriate remedies to address the
also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga disappearance.
the face he identified in the pictures
because he resembles his friend Raven. As shown above, the beneficial purpose of
The CA also held that Lt. Baliagas alibi and the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
corroborative evidence cannot prevail over present case with the CAs final
Cabintoys positive identification, determination of the persons responsible
considering especially the absence of any and accountable for the enforced
indication that he was impelled by hatred or disappearance of Jonas and the
any improper motive to testify against Lt. commencement of criminal action against
Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal,
was responsible and the AFP and the PNP investigation and prosecution proceedings
were accountable for the enforced are already beyond the reach of the Writ
disappearance of Jonas. of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Issue: G.R. No. 199199

Whether the Petitioner can request
for another writ
Held:
No. the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude
in crafting remedies to address an enforced
disappearance, it cannot (without violating
the nature of the writ of Amparo as a
summary remedy that provides rapid
judicial relief) grant remedies that would
complicate and prolong rather than
expedite the investigations already ongoing.
Note that the CA has already determined
with finality that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance.
The petitioners request for the reissuance
of the writ and for the rehearing of the case
by the CA would be redundant and
superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing
investigation being conducted by the DOJ
through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation
directed by the Court in this Resolution; and
(3) the continuing investigation directed by
the CA.
The ROLE of the Supreme Court in a writ
of Amparo proceeding is merely to
August 27, 2013
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF
THE BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON,
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A.
JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES
AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR,
HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR,
PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO
C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO,
ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M.
AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES,
GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP.,
AND TR ORE
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together
with the parish priest of the Holy Infant
Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa
Laban sa Mina saMatnog, filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and
attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon.
The petition contained the following
pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009,
they protested the iron ore mining
operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in
Barangays Balocawe and Bon-otDaco,
located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no
avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern
tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect,
preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is
susceptible to flooding and landslides, and
confronted with the environmental dangers
of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground
settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard; (4) after investigation,
they learned that the mining operators did
not have the required permit to operate; (5)
Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit,
which they did not have authority to issue;
(6) the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), despite knowledge, did not do
anything to protect the interest of the
people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,
R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs:
(1) the issuance of a writ commanding the
respondents to immediately stop the mining
operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2)
the issuance of a temporary environment
protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation
of an inter-agency group to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of
damages; and (5) return of the iron ore,
among others.
The case was referred by the Executive
Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53
being the designated environmental court.
In the Order dated September 16, 2011, the
case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition is dismissible
on the grounds that there is no final court
decree, order or decision that the public
officials allegedly failed to act, on which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus.
RULING:
The concept of continuing
mandamus was first introduced in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.
Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the
Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus
enjoys a distinct procedure than that of
ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental
laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil
Procedure). Similar to the procedure under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special
civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a
court may take further action; otherwise, the
court may dismiss the petition outright.
Courts must be cautioned, however, that
the determination to give due course to the
petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise
of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the
spirit of the law and always with the view in
mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Sufficiency in form and substance
refers to the contents of the petition filed
under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station in
connection with the enforcement or
violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the
petition concerns an environmental law,
rule or regulation, and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts
until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to
pay damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the malicious neglect to perform
the duties of the respondent, under the law,
rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.
On matters of form, the petition must be
verified and must contain supporting
evidence as well as a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. It is also necessary
that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency, instrumentality or its
officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance,
on the other hand, necessitates that the
petition must contain substantive
allegations specifically constituting an
actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie
basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an
agency or instrumentality of government or
its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be
performed by the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer is specifically
enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty
results from an office, trust or station in
connection with the enforcement or
violation of an environmental law, rule or
regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a
special civil action that may be availed of
"to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law." The petition
should mainly involve an environmental and
other related law, rule or regulation or a
right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on
the need for a final judgment, decree or
order is apparently based on the definition
of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued
by a court in an environmental case
directing any agency or instrumentality of
the government or officer thereof to perform
an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision
erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a
court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree
shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has
rendered a judgment in conformity with
Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
become final, the issuing court still retains
jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law
and to monitor the effective performance of
said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of
the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the
court and if the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in
the court docket. A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment
as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction
after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the courts decision."
Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769
J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin
department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an
administrative clerk. She was ordered to be
transferred to Alabang due to concerns
over her safety. She complained under the
premise that the transfer was a denial of
her due process. She wrote a letter stating
that:
It appears that the veracity of these
accusations and threats to be [sic] highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all. She added, instead of
the management supposedly extending
favor to me, the net result and effect of
management action would be a punitive
one. She asked for deferment thereafter.
Since the company didnt respond, she filed
for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan
RTC due to meralcos omission of provding
her with details about the report of the
letter. To her, this constituted a violation of
her liberty and security. She asked for
disclosure of the data and measures for
keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the
jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the
petition wasnt in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas
Data applies to entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved partys
person, family or home
Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for
Lim?
Held: No, petition dismissed
Ratio:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of
habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party
Its a forum for enforcing ones right to the
truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a
response to killings and enforced
disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT
issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor
are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due
process clause. Lim was concerned with
her employment, one that can be solved in
the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondents right
to privacy. Respondent even said that the
letters were mere jokes and even conceded
the fact that the issue was labor related due
to references to real intent of
management.

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT.
NERI A. ILAGAN
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
Facts: In his Petition for Issuance of the
Writ of Habeas Data dated June 22, 2012,
Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy
Margate Lee (Lee) were former common
law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he
visited Lee at the latters condominium,
rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded
to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed
that his digital camera was missing. On
August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at
the latters office regarding a purported sex
video (subject video) she discovered from
the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and
another woman. Ilagan denied the video
and demanded Lee to return the camera,
but to no avail. During the confrontation,
Ilagan allegedly slammed Lees head
against a wall inside his office and walked
away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said
video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004, before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave
misconduct before the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed
that Lees acts of reproducing the subject
video and threatening to distribute the same
to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM
and uploading it to the internet violated not
only his right to life, liberty, security, and
privacy but also that of the other woman,
and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas
data in his favor is warranted.
Finding the petition prima facie
meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of
Habeas Data dated June 25, 2012,
directing Lee to appear before the court a
quo, and to produce Ilagans digital camera,
as well as the negative and/or original of
the subject video and copies thereof, and to
file a verified written return within five (5)
working days from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return dated July 2,
2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept
the memory card of the digital camera and
reproduced the aforesaid video but averred
that she only did so to utilize the same as
evidence in the cases she filed against
Ilagan. She also admitted that her
relationship with Ilagan started sometime in
2003 and ended under disturbing
circumstances in August 2011, and that she
only happened to discover the subject video
when Ilagan left his camera in her
condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended
that Ilagans petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data should be dismissed
because: (a) its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in
the cases she filed; and (b) she is not
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data regarding the person of
Ilagan.
The RTC granted the privilege of the
writ of habeas data in Ilagansfavor.
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of Ilagan.
Ruling:
 The petition is meritorious. As
defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data
Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as
a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family,
home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support
a petition for the issuance of such writ,
Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party. In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.
In this case, the Court finds that
Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege
that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through
the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video.
While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in
the suppression of this video which he
fears would somehow find its way to
Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption he failed to explain
the connection between such interest and
any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging
and eventually proving the nexus between
ones privacy right to the cogent rights to
life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas
data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets
the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This
is because nothing therein would indicate
that Lee actually proceeded to commit any
overt act towards the end of violating
Ilagans right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. Nor would anything on record
even lead a reasonable mind to conclude
that Lee was going to use the subject video
in order to achieve unlawful ends. Hence,
due to the insufficiency of the allegations as
well as the glaring absence of substantial
evidence, the Court finds it proper to
reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the
habeas data petition.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al.
v.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16,
2014
Villarama, J.
FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-
class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy
in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel to enter and
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty. On January
6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
 On January 15, 2013, the USS
Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next
port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On
January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the
grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the provinces
of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have
legal standing.
HELD:Yes, petitioners have legal standing.
As reiterated by the Supreme Court in
many cases, locus standi is a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. Specifically, it is a partys
personal and substantial interest in a case
where he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the act being
challenged, and calls for more than just a
generalized grievance. However, the rule
on standing is a procedural matter which
Supreme Court has relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the
subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., Supreme Court recognized
the public right of citizens to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. It declared that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and political rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
On the novel element in the class
suit filed by the petitioners, who were
minors, in Oposa, Supreme Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future
generations.
Case Title: HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE,
in his capacity as DENR
Secretary v. Hon. Teodoro Casino, et al.
G.R. No. 207257/February 3, 2015/J. Del
Castillo
Facts: The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate for a
proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic,
Zambales to be implemented by RP
Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number
of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and
Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary
on the ground that actual environmental
damage will occur if the power plant project
is implemented and that the respondents
failed to comply with certain laws and rules
governing or relating to the issuance of an
ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the
petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and
invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR and
Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing
error in invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, arguing that the
determination of the validity of the ECC as
well as its amendments is beyond the
scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan;
while the latter claim that it is entitled to a
Writ of Kalikasan.
Issues: Whether the parties may raise
questions of fact on appeal on the issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can
be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling: Yes, the parties may raise
questions of fact on appeal on the issuance
of a writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on
the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an
exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court because of the extraordinary
nature of the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be
challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because
such writ is principally predicated on an
actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that
transcends political and territorial
boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the
writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
must not only allege and prove such
defects or irregularities, but must also
provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects
or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise,
the petition should be dismissed outright
and the action re-filed before the proper
forum with due regard to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal
link or reasonable connection was shown or
even attempted relative to the aforesaid
second set of allegations. It is a mere listing
of the perceived defects or irregularities in
the issuance of the ECC.
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Taon Strait v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of
Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and
181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the Department
of Energy (DOE) entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology,
sample analysis, and reprocessing of
seismic and magnetic data. Geophysical
and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas
sampling in Taon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX
converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract
No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately
2,850 sqm. offshore the Taon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted
seismic surveys in and around Taon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kms.
to determine the areas underwater
composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project,
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration
well. Since the same was to be drilled in the
marine waters of Aloguisan and
Pinamungajan where the Taon Strait was
declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements under Presidential Decree
No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled Establishing
an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures and For
Other Purposes.
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area
Management Board (PAMB) of the Taon
Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where
it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and
favourably recommended the approval of
the latters application for an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII
granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in
Taon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February
2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well
with a depth of 3,150 meters near
Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate
original petitions were filed commonly
seeking that the implementation of SC-46
be enjoined for violation of the 1987
Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the
Resident Marine Mammals which inhibit
the waters in and around the Taon Strait,
joined by Stewards Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal
guardians and friends seeking their
protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the
petitioners are the Central
VisayasFisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-
governmental organization established for
the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in
Region VII and representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities
of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Their contentions are:
A study made after the seismic survey
showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the
destruction of the payao or the artificial
reef.
The ECC obtained by the respondents is
invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its
issuance.
SC-46 is null and void for having violated
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no
general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving
oil exploration and extraction
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from
entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was
located, an area grated than the 1.5-
kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in
the Initial Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the
late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose
L. Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo
Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Taon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a
Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged
Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-
allegations are:
The Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file the
petition.
SC-46 is constitutional.
The ECC was legally issued.
The case is moot and academic since SC-
46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.
ISSUES
WON the case is moot and academic
WON Petitioners have a legal standing
WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING
No. The Court makes clear that the moot
and academic principle is not a magic
formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Despite the
termination of SC-46, the Court deems it
necessary to resolve the consolidated
petitions as it falls within the exceptions.
Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is
violative of the Constitution, the
environmental and livelihood issues raised
undoubtedly affect the publics interest, and
the respondents contested actions are
capable of repetition.
Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a
more liberalized approach. The Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases allow
for a citizen suit, and permit any Filipino
citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the
principle that humans are stewards of
nature:
Section 5.Citizen suit. Any Filipino
citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet
unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected
baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and
R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Although the petition was filed in 2007,
years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has
been consistently held that rules of
procedure may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases
became effective, the SC had already taken
a permissive position on the issue of locus
standi in environmental cases. In Oposa,
the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the
name of generations yet unborn based on
the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in
the present case are joined as real parties
in the Petition and not just in representation
of the named cetacean species.
Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides in part:
The President may enter into agreement
with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on
real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress
of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution.
(Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed
by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or
the Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87
is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a
general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory
to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified
of such contract, renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into
and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover,
public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the
present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that
the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the
corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that
the President has authorized or approved of
the service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is
required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the Presidents approval for
the execution of any contract under said
statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-
46 vis--vis other pertinent laws to serve as
a guide for the Government when executing
service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the
Taon Strait is an environmentally critical
area, having been declared as a protected
area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside
the scope of its management plan may only
be implemented pursuant to an ECC
secured after undergoing an Environment
Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the
effects of such activity on its ecological
system.
Public respondents admitted that
JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior
to the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which
required the drilling of the exploration well.
This means that no environmental impact
evaluation was done when the seismic
surveys were conducted. Unless the
seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Taon Strait, such
surveys were done in violation of Section
12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed
by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a
NIPAS area. Since there is no such law
specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be
done in said protected seascape.