LUVIMIN CEBU MINING CORP. and LUVIMIN PORT SERVICES COMPANY, INC.

, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU PORT AUTHORITY and PORT MANAGER ANGELO C. VERDAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On October 28, 1997, a Certificate of Registration and Permit to Operate was issued by the CPA to the petitioners authorizing
them to operate a private port facility at in Cebu.

CPA then rescinded the foregoing registration/permit on the following grounds:

1. A Foreshore Lease Agreement (FLA) is a prerequisite in the approval of a port license. Petitioners foreshore lease
application was still pending with the DENR during the approval of said license.
2. Said foreshore lease application was denied.
3. Petitioners submitted application for OLP sometime in the year 2000 but until now no permit is granted.5
CPA declared the registration/permit defective, forthwith took possession of the port facility, and started to fence the
premises. These events prompted the petitioners to file a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance
of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against CPA.

In their complaint, the petitioners alleged that the unilateral cancellation of their permit/license denied them due process of
law. The petitioners reclaimed the parcel of land in Barangay Talo-ot and built thereon a wharf using their own money. The
wharf is a roll-on-roll-off (RORO) facility for the transport of vehicles, goods and passengers without having to use cargo
handling equipment and giving the public low-cost alternative transport and cargo handling services.
The CPA letter rescinding their license was issued without any prior warning. CPA and Verdan built a Field Office inside the
wharf without any notice to the petitioners. Then the CPA almost completed fencing the premises of the wharf and the ramp
from the pier towards the sea.
In support of their prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners averred that their right to operate
the Talo-ot Port in Argao, Cebu is clear and unmistakable. CPA had no legal basis to rescind the petitioners
registration/permit in view of the favorable endorsements they have obtained from the Barangay Captain of Talo-ot,
Sangguniang Bayanof Argao, Office of the Provincial Planning and Indorsement and the Under secretary and Officer-in-
Charge of the Department of Tourism. The petitioners also claimed that they were already granted an Environmental
Compliance Certificate by the Office of the Executive Regional Director of the DENR.
RTC rule in favor of petitioners and a TRO was issued effective for twenty (20) days.

The CA ruled that an injunctive writ cannot be issued to enjoin the respondents from taking over the port facility because the
repair of the RORO ramp are considered as national government projects as defined in Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 8975 against
which no injunctive writ can lie pursuant to Section 3 of the same law.

The CA further decreed that no irreparable injury was caused to the petitioners because whatever loss they will likely suffer
from the revocation of their license/permit and takeover by the respondents of the port facility can be measured or quantified
by way of damages, specifically, actual or compensatory damages, exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of
litigation.

Issue: Was the ruling of the CA correct?

Held:

Yes. The trial court erred in issuing a TRO. Section 3 of RA 8975 prohibits courts from issuing temporary restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions, or preliminary injunction, against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person
or entity, whether public or private acting under the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project; (b)
Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof; (c) Commencement
prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project; (d) Termination or rescission of any such
contract/project; and (e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
Section 2 states that the above prohibition covers national government projects, which refer to all current and future national
government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and
-controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise
known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities such as site acquisition, supply
and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance,
improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.

Meanwhile, the term infrastructure means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways,
airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore
protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings, and other related construction projects
that form part of the government capital investment.
Further, projects covered by R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. No. 7718, pertain to those which are participated in by
private entities

While the contractual arrangement between the government or its instrumentality and private entity are of various kinds and
nomenclature, they nonetheless share a common system whereby the private entity undertakes the construction, financing,
operation and/or maintenance of a given infrastructure facility subject to its eventual transfer to the concerned government
entity upon completion, after a fixed number of period or after the private entity has recouped its investments. This system
permeates the arrangement between CPA and the petitioners as revealed in the following proviso of the latters Certificate of
Registration and Permit to Operate

Evidently, Talo-ot Port, where the petitioners operate their facility, is a national infrastructure project. The Certificate of
Registration and Permit to Operate granted by the CPA is premised on a contract for a national infrastructure project
contemplated by R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. No. 7718, the termination or rescission of which cannot be validly
enjoined by an injunctive writ issued by a lower court pursuant to R.A. No. 8975.

As for their claim for exception from application, petitioners cannot do so. No constitutional issue of due process is involved
because the petitioners were not deprived of any property or property right when their Certificate of Registration and Permit
to Operate was cancelled. The petitioners were given a mere privilege to operate a private facility in Talo-ot Port; they were
not given any property right on the port, its wharf and/or appurtenances. They had no vested right to operate a private port
facility in Talo-ot Port and their certificate/permit can be withdrawn anytime as stated in the condition imposed by CPA

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Facts:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded
with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to
prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners
of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705, 1 as
amended,
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as
charged.
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's
conviction was affirmed.
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he
was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

Issue: WON the petitioner should be acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the
seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized

RULING: NO
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active
participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the
cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the
truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the
truck. The acts of Taopa constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt.
We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, MTCC,
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
The administrative complaint against Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan relates to an order he has issued, authorizing, prior to the
arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of a criminal case, the release of seized evidence to movants who claim
ownership thereof.
Several persons were apprehended for violation of Section 86 of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as The Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998 . The items seized from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300 watts), (c) 1
unit light (500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic container boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes
of fish. Three days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma Villarosa, asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was
used in the illegal fishing activity, filed an Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net, alleging that the fish net which costs
no less than P600,000.00 was left unattended at the beach exposed to the elements and movements of the sea which could
cause its early deterioration and ultimate loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor,
granted the motion in his order.
The public prosecutor filed, on 24 March 2000, a motion for reconsideration. Instead of deciding the pending motion,
respondent Judge deferred its resolution until after the arraignment of the accused and the pretrial of the case would have
been had.[
Special Prosecutor Romeo B. Senson filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge for Gross Misconduct with
Prayer for Preventive Suspension asseverating that the release of the evidence had exposed said evidence to tampering and
that the deferment of the resolution of the motion for reconsideration virtually resulted in the undue archive of the case.
In his comment, respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which the accused were charged with
having transgressed, did not provide for the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still
could prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being presented since it had
sufficient witnesses for the purpose.

Isse: WON the contention of the respondent was correct

Held: No.
The attempt at justification must fail.
As the Office of the Court Administrator has so correctly pointed out, while it can be argued that the remedy is judicial in
nature or that the case involves an error in judgment, Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court (however), is much too
elementary to be brushed aside (and that) x x x the existence of a judicial remedy does not (necessarily) preclude resort to an
administrative remedy. Nowhere in the statute would it appear that the seizure of the items, alleged to have been used in the
illegal fishing activity, is proscribed by it. Evidently, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an
incident to a lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The seized items ordered released by respondent Judge have not yet been offered in evidence; hence, the prosecution, not the
court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to have the responsibility over such items. The pronouncement by
the Court in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeal is instructive; viz:
x x x The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. If found to be contraband, i.e.,
articles the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime and the repossession of which would subject defendant to
criminal penalties and frustrate the express policy against the possession of such objects, they will not be returned, but shall
be confiscated in favor of the State or destroyed, as the case may be. If not contraband, the property shall be returned without
undue delay to the person who appears from the evidence to be the owner or rightful possessor.
While, verily, respondent Judge has committed a fundamental error, no proof, however, is extant or has been proffered to also
establish that he has acted with malice or in bad faith.

JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, which will collect 0.5% on
the assessed value of land in excess of Php 100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon
City Government. The special assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the
purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was enacted collecting garbage fees on residential properties
which shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for
garbage collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner, questions the validity of the said ordinances.

Issues:

1. WON SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is valid.

a. WON the SHT is a tax which is within the QC government to impose.
b. WON the SHT violates the rule on equality.
c. WON the SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
2. WON SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is valid.
a. WON the Ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double taxation.
b. WON it violates the rule on equality.

Ruling:

1. SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is VALID.

a. Yes. The SHT charged by the QC Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Cities are allowed to
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others,
programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized
housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is
levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of
the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to
the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation
will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and
safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better
consumers of business products.

b. No, the SHT does NOT violate the rule on equality. For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing
urban development and housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two
distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical
dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public
purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one over another. It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

c. No, the SHT is NOT confiscatory nor oppressive. The reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed.
It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows.
While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the
questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. Even better, on certain
conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid beginning in
the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and
just.

2. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is INVALID. Although it does not violate the rule on double taxation, it
nonetheless violates the rule on equality.

a. SP-2235 does NOT violate the rule on double taxation.

The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an
activity. In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that if the generating of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. In a U.S.
 case, the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given
by the city which had previously been provided at no cost to its citizens.

Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double
taxation must necessarily fail.

b. Yes, SP-2235 violates the rule on equality.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one
hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most
likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a
similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium
or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit
occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the
same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a
socialized housing project.

Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of promoting shared
responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources
and in generating waste. Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of
a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that
could truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among
others, household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district,
capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-
2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic Act
No. 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED
to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement.

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P. CERICOS,

vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the
Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the
distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities. The petitioner applied for a
Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR seeking to be exempt
from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Candas findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon
(RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay
waterworks project of the DPWH that had recently been issued a CNC.3
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination document was required for the
project due to its significant impact in the area.5

RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit documents to enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within an
environmentally critical area or not.
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight certifications,7 including the certification issued by the Philippine
Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), as follows:
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (RO-MGB) to
the effect that the project area was not located along a fault line/fault zone or a critical slope because RO-MGB did not have
the data and expertise to render such finding, and thus had to forward the petitioners request to the MGB Central Office. 9
Upon the MGBs advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the required certification from PHIVOLCS, but the certification
did not state whether the project area was within a critical slope. Instead, the certification stated that the project site was
approximately 18 kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayons letter dated February 4, 2003 declared that the project
was within an environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC,
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Loay,
Bohol,12 alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with the certification
requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same area.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONERS DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED
BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY
PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER

Ruling:

Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application when he made his finding.
It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements for review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive
aspect of the application, that is, whether the project and the project area were considered critical to the environment. In fact,
this was the reason why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit certifications from the various government agencies
concerned. Surely, the required certifications were not mere formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his
decision on whether to grant or deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit the needed
certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the
PHIVOLCSs certification showed that the project site had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that
sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the
petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its
application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner grossly misunderstood the nature of the remedy of mandamus.
To avoid similar misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a short exposition on the nature and office of the remedy is now
appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It is believed that the writ was originally part of the class of
writs or mandates issued by the English sovereign to direct his subjects to perform a particular act or duty. 28 The earliest writs
were in the form of letters missive, and were mere personal commands. The command was a law in itself, from which there
was no appeal. The writ of mandamus was not only declaratory of a duty under an existing law, but was a law in itself that
imposed the duty, the performance of which it commanded. The King was considered as the fountain and source of justice,
and when the law did not afford a remedy by the regular forms of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were
invoked in aid of the ordinary powers of the courts.
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the Kings name out of the court of Kings Bench that had a general supervisory
power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, gradually supplanted the old personal command of the sovereign. 31 The
court of Kings Bench, acting as the general guardian of public rights and in the exercise of its authority to grant the writ,
rendered the writ of mandamus the suppletory means of substantial justice in every case where there was no other specific
legal remedy for a legal right, and ensured that all official duties were fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was properly
within its control. Early on, the writ of mandamus was particularly used to compel public authorities to return the petitioners
to public offices from which they had been unlawfully removed.
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ emanating from the King himself, superintending the police
and preserving the peace within the realm. It was allowed only in cases affecting the sovereign, or the interest of the public at
large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the necessity to compel the inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial
powers invested in them by restraining their excesses, preventing their negligence and restraining their denial of justice. 36
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly prerogative features and has been assimilated to the nature of
an ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an extraordinary remedy in the sense that it is only issued in
extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary modes of proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford
redress to a party aggrieved, and where without its aid there would be a failure of justice.
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart from the other remedial writs, i.e., that it is used
merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty. In fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought
to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that
there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100%
Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration, development and
utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a
signatory to the SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life and is declared by laws as a
protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed assailing
the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the activities for its ecological impact was in the name of Resident
Marine Mammals which are literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred to as
Stewards, in their representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and
other environmental concerns.
FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also questioned the SC-46 on the ground
that service contracts are no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null and void
because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal Blaan
case.

Petitioners' Allegations

Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon Strait, petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by
50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but
after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to
the destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill"32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic
survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations
and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's
issuance.

In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' allegations of
reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the
issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing
within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius
"exclusion zone" stated in the IEE.33 It also agrees in the allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their
discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict
compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact Assessment system, the
Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations.34 It further claims that despite several requests for copies of all
the documents pertaining to the project in Taflon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Taon Strait Resolution and the ECC were
given to the fisherfolk.35

Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations

Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no
legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the
petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may not be
compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and that all the petitioners failed to
show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been
rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21,
2008

Issues: WON the petitioners have locus standi

Ruling
YES.

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights
to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and
environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for
persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these
animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to
show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi
in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and
jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current
trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.

Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit,"
and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental
laws:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may
file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested
parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish
the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." 56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. 57

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.