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Abstract--This paper describes the three main problems associated with the R~stma~---Cet article dicrit les trois problkmes principaux qui Jurent rencontris
difficult sections of the work which were encountered and for which solutions were lots des travaux de construction des parties diffwiles du tunnel de Seikan et done les
found during construction of the Seikan Tunnel: (1) the excavation of squeezing solutionsfurent trouvles sur place. On peut citer: l'excavation du sol en compression
ground; (2) water inflow accidents; and (3) the excavations of unconsolidated plastique, les accidents d~ fi l'eau surgissante, et les excavations des zones non
zones. Squeezing ground, which appeared in the F-lOfault with an earth pressure consolidies. Le sol en compression plastique qui apparut daus la faille F 10 avec
as high as 2 MPa, was excavated employing spring line drifts and the short bench une pressionjasqu'a 2 MPa fut excuvi gl l'aide de lignes d'entrainement fi ressort et
method with steel pipe supportsfilled with reinforcing hoop-shaped steel bars and fi l'aide de la mlthode de la plateforme courte. Cette mithode utilise des supports
grouted with a high*strength mortar. The most serious water inflow incident fairs de tuyaux d'acier remplis d'arceaux de renforcement en acier cimentis ensemble
(maximum rate of 70 m3/min.) occurred in the service tunnel on the Hokkaido side par un mortier de grande rlsistance. La vague d'eau surgissante la plus importante,
in May 1976, causing inundation of 3 km of the service tunnel and 1.5 km of the avec un dlbit de 70 nil~rain, apparut daus le tunnel de service du cdti de Hokkaido
main tunnel. By correctlyjudging the situation and making strenuous efforts over en mai 1976 et, causa une inondation de 3 km dans le tunnel de service et de 1,5 km
the next 5.4 months, the remedial work which included water drainage--was dans le tunnel principal. Grdce fi une ~valuation correcte de la situation et fi des
safely completed. There were no fatalities or serious injuries resulting from the efforts importants pendant 5,4 mois, la phase de rlparation qui comprit le drainage
accident. The unconsolidated soft sand layer of the Kuromatsunai Formation, de l'eau fut achevle sans danger. II n'eut pas defatalitls ou de blessures slrieuses
which existed in the middle of the Tsugaru Straits, was excavated without any risultant de l'accideut. Les sables non-consolidis et mous de la formation
water inflow accidents. This was accomplished with the aide of water-seal grouting Kuromatsunai qui existaient au milieu des ddtroits de Tsugaru furvnt excavls sans
and by carrying out construction procedures with care. Although different measures aueun problkme d'eau surgissante. Cette phase fut accomplie en bouchant les
were required for each problem, the difficulties were overcome by careful infiltrations d'eau et en procldant avec soin tout au long de la construction. Bien que
investigation and construction management. de difflrentes mesuresfurent requisent pour chaque problkme, les difficultis furent
surmontles ~ l'aide d'examens attentifs et une gestion soign~e de la construction.
Tt~'~lling and U~l~tgroundS[~* T~lmology, Vol. 1, No. 3/4, pp. 373-379, 1986. 0866-7798/86 $3.00+.00
Printed in Great Britain. ~) 1986 Pergamon Journals Ltd. 373
Total length of tunnel 53. 8 5 0 k m
Length of underleo portion 23, 300 km
Honshu side Hokkaido side
300~
200 "1
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-400
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15 20 25 30 35 40 (km)
, , ~ I ~ , ~ , I ~ , , , I . . . . I , J , , I ~ , , ~ I ,
Kuromotsunai Formation
Yokumo Formation Basalt,
Rhyolite
Andesite
I KunnuiFormation
----- Fault, Unconformity
Fukuyama Formation
/ / '
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Volume 1, Number 3/4, 1986 TUNNELLING AND UNDERGROUND SPACE TECHNOLOGY 375
Table 1. Water inflow accidents.
Water inflow
rate (mS/min) Total water Volume of Time required Method
Inflow collapeed debris Buried section for recovery employed
Section Date maximum final (ms) (ms) (m) (months) far recovery Geology
Tappi r Andesite
inclined shaft 1969.4.21 16 5.3 5300 300 15 6.3 grouting (Fault)
Yoshioka J
service tunnel 1974.1.8 11 0.3 9000 1100 60 11.6 grouting Tuff. (Fault)
~ Hokkaido side
~T-- ~ n
aiP
u
r ~station
At about 3 a.m. on May 6, 1976, water Judging by the conditions observed, it decided to construct a bypass tunnel 60
inflow of about 0.03 m3/min near the face was considered that if a pump station m from the original route, on the oppo-
of the service tunnel suddenly increased were installed about 3 km behind the site side of the main tunnel. By October
to about 0.5 m3/min. Within about 30 point of water inflow the advance of the 15, 1976, the bypass tunnel had reached
min. the inflow rate had reached as much water line could be maintained at this a point beside the point of the water
as 4 m3/min. Since the service tunnel had point; thus, a station with a capacity of inflow; and, on January 31, 1977, the
a downward gradient of 12/1000, the 32 m3/min was provided. This installa- bypass tunnel rejoined the original route
tunnel was gradually inundated from the tion was completed before 10.30 p.m. on of the service tunnel at a point 148 m
face. Thanks to emergency pumping May 9, 1976, and, soon after the pump- ahead of the water inrushing point (Fig.
facilities, the advance of the flood water ing started, the water level achieved 5).
could be temporarily stopped and main- equilibrium. Although this water inrushing acci-
tained at a position 100 m from the On May 15, 1976, a full-scale pump- dent was the largest in scale when
collapsed face. ing operation was started in which three compared with the previous three, fortu-
The reinforcing of the pumping facil- mobile pumps and two floating facilities nately it was overcome without any
ties continued until about 2.45 p.m., were moved in intervals of about 80 m; injury to the workforce.
when suddenly, with a tremendous roar, and on June 24, 1976, the point was Despite the precautions taken in the
the water inflow increased to as much as reached at which the collapse could be excavation--such as investigation of the
70 m3/min. To prevent water inflow from confirmed. After constructing a bulkhead geological and groundwater conditions
going further into the tunnel a temporary behind this point, grouting was carried by advance boring and careful
dam was made from cement bags, but as out in order to fill the void left by the grouting--inrushing occurred, making
water overflowed the dam workers had to collapse, which extended 75 m from the us reflect on whether we should have
be evacuated. face, been more or less optimistic in our
At about 5.00 a.m. on the morning of Based on the results of exploratory judgments. As counter-measures, grout-
May 7, 1976, as the water began to flow boring conducted from behind the bulk- ing criteria were reconsidered and the
into the main tunnel through the con- head, and in consideration of the time draining equipment was reinforced.
necting gallery and the rate of water required and the cost of construction to The construction of the main tunnel at
inflow also decreased, the advance of the excavate along the original line or, alter- points where water inrushing had occur-
water in the service tunnel slowed down. natively, to drive a bypass tunnel, it was red was carried out by the side drift
,,
*- * Y -. \ . bk--,, . I - -
' , ,-,'v ~ -~
method, in which the face of the side drift gradient of 3/1000 and, for the large As regards the main tunnel, it was
was brought close to the face of the upper section of the main tunnel, special care confirmed that the "degraded mudstone"
half of the main tunnel, and the grouting had to be exercised in grouting and formation existed continuously over a
from both faces was carried out excavation. length of 480 m, between 25.530 and
prudently. The fault zone was finally Of special note is that only the pilot 26.010 km, owing to the fact that the
traversed (Fig. 6). tunnel and the main tunnel were tunnel crossed this formation obliquely
The points that these serious water designed to be excavated in the central due to its unfavorable inclination and
inflow accidents have in common are part of the undersea section, since the strike. Actually, the formation was only
that the sections of the service tunnel pilot tunnel would also serve the role of 25 m thick.
were comparatively small i.e. 18--20m2; service tunnel (see Fig. 1). Based on experience with the pilot
and that, because the tunnel had a After the F-I fault near the 30.100 km tunnel, the grouting time required for the
downward gradient, the debris of col- point on the Yoshioka side, the lower main tunnel was assumed to be too long
lapse was not washed away. Rather, the part of the Kuromatsunai Formation was to be tolerated, if only ordinary grouting
collapsed area blocked the water adv- excavated for about 1200 m. The excava- from the cutting face were employed.
ance with rock and fine material from tion, progressed well, with no difficulties. Therefore, it was decided that sup-
layers above, so that the volume of the The Kuromatsunai Formation reap- plementary grouting work should be
water inrushing decreased gradually. If peared around the 27.120 km point as carried out from the pilot tunnel in order
the inflows had occurred in a tunnel with part of a syncline, with its axis near the to execute more intensive grouting. The
an upward gradient or in a main tunnel 25.710 km point and stretching over a excavation was carried out carefully by
with a larger section, the situation would distance of about 4000 m. Also, the the side drift method. Immediately after
have been quite different. formation called "degraded mudstone" the excavation, shotcrete of 0.1 m thick-
(consisting mainly of alternating sandy ness was placed and 4.0 m-long rock
mudstone and tuffaceous sandy mud- bolts were installed in order to stabilize
Excavation of Unconsolidated
stone) appeared for about 700 m between the ground. At the same time, measure-
Sandy Ground
26.110 and 25.410 km (Fig. 7). As the ments of convergence, stress in the rock-
From the results of the preliminary formation contained only 15--20%, of bolts and ground displacement were
geological survey, it was known that the fine grains and had an inferior uncon- carried out.
central section of the straits consisted of fined compressive strength of 2 MPa, As precautions against water
poorly consolidated sandy mudstone cal- high permeability and water content, the inrushing and consequent total flooding
led the Kuromatsunai Formation. The borings collapsed easily and grouting of the tunnel during excavation, steel
Kuromatsunai Formation was also found was not very effective in reducing ground flood gates capable of resisting a water
on land. Because rock tests revealed that water flow. In the case of the pilot pressure of 2.7 MPa were installed in the
the formation had a low unconfined tunnel, which encountered only the pilot tunnel and in each of the connecting
compressive strength of about 5 MPa lower part of the "degraded mudstone" galleries between the pilot tunnel and
and high porosity, it was assumed that formation, 15 months were necessary to main tunnel. Other measures included
the cut-off of water inflow would be cover a distance of 420 m because of the taking great care in the excavation of the
difficult. The section of the tunnel in the time-consuming grouting work. main tunnel. The sequence of tunneling
middle part of the straits had an upward was controlled so that the excavation of
Volume I, Number 3/4, 1986 TUNNELLING AND UNDERGROUND SPACE TECHNOLOGY 377
Plon
Service tunnel
Profile
16
Profile
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13
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Section
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