Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 4
II. MAIN CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PLENARY ...... 6
Core Recommendations: ................................................................................................. 6
Key Recommendations: .................................................................................................. 8
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 9
III. OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS MADE BY SURINAME ........................................ 9
Overview of the main changes since the adoption of the Mutual Evaluation Report
(MER) ............................................................................................................................. 9
IV. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORE
RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 11
Recommendation 1 PC .............................................................................................. 11
Recommendation 1- overall conclusion........................................................................ 13
Recommendation 5 NC .............................................................................................. 13
Recommendation 5 overall conclusion ......................................................................... 17
Recommendation 10 PC ............................................................................................ 17
Recommendation 10 overall conclusion ....................................................................... 17
Recommendation 13 PC ............................................................................................ 17
Recommendation 13 overall conclusion ....................................................................... 20
Special Recommendation II overall conclusion ........................................................... 20
Special Recommendation IV - NC ............................................................................... 20
Special Recommendation IV overall conclusion .......................................................... 20
V. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE KEY
RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 21
Recommendation 3 - PC ............................................................................................... 21
Recommendation 3 overall conclusion ......................................................................... 21
Recommendation 4 - PC ............................................................................................... 21
Recommendation 4 overall conclusion ......................................................................... 22
Recommendation 23 - NC ............................................................................................ 22
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The third round MER of Suriname was adopted in October 2009, in Curacao, and Suriname
was placed in expedited follow-up. Suriname reported back to the CFATF in May 2011,
(first follow-up report); May 2012, (second follow-up report); November 2012, (third
follow-up report); May 2013, (fourth follow-up report); May 2014, (fifth follow-up report);
November 2014, (sixth follow-up report); May 2015, (seventh follow-up report);
November 2015, (eight follow-up report); June 2016, (ninth follow-up report); and
November 2016, (tenth follow-up report).
2. This report is based on the CFATF procedure for removal from regular follow-up as
agreed1 by the CFAFT plenary in May 2014. Suriname has indicated that it is of the opinion
that it had met the criteria necessary for removal from regular follow-up. It contains a
detailed description and analysis of the actions taken by Suriname in respect of the core
and key Recommendations rated partially compliant (PC) or non-compliant (NC) in the
mutual evaluation, as well as a description and analysis of the other Recommendations
rated PC or NC.
3. The analysis of this report was predicated on the basis of information provided by Suriname
and is a desk evaluation that focused on Recommendations rated PC/NC, which means that
only a part of the AML/CFT system was reviewed. The analysis consisted mainly looking
at the main laws, regulations, directives, state decrees, ministerial decrees along with other
material provided by Suriname. As this is a desk-based review, the level and nature of
information provided and accepted in many instances is inherently different to that which
would have been accepted during an onsite visit. Consequently, the conclusions of this
report do not prejudge the results of any future assessments as they are based on
information that was not verified through an onsite process.
1
According to the decisions by the May 2014 Plenary, countries can apply to exit the follow-up process in the following
cases:
a. Countries who have achieved the level of C/LC in all of their Core and Key Recommendations that were
rated PC/NC in their MERs to apply to exit the FUP ; or
b. Countries that have achieved the level of C/LC in all their Core Recommendations, but have one (1) or more
Key Recommendations that were rated PC/NC and still have not achieved the level of C/LC in those
recommendations to apply to exit once they have achieved substantial compliance (the large majority of
non-Core and Key Recommendations have been addressed) in their non-Core or Key Recommendations that
were rated PC/NC in their MER.
4. Surinames AML/CFT legal and regulatory framework are based on several laws
(including Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Decrees). The main laws are the MOT and
the WID. The relevant laws are discussed, in detail, at section IV of this report.
5. Suriname was rated PC or NC on the following Recommendations:
Other Recommendations
R. 14 (Protection & no tipping-off) R. 6 (Politically exposed persons)
R. 18 (Shell banks) R. 7 (Correspondent banking)
R. 20 (Other NFBP & secure transaction R. 8 (New technologies & non-face-to-face
techniques) business)
R. 25 (Guidelines & Feedback) R.9 (Third parties and introducers)
R. 27 (Law enforcement authorities) R. 11 (Unusual transactions)
R. 30 (Resources, integrity and training) R. 12 (DNFBP R.5, 6, 8-11)
R. 37 (Dual criminality) R. 15 (Internal controls, compliance & audit)
R. 38 (MLA on confiscation and freezing) R. 16 (DNFBP R.13-15 & 21)
R. 17 (Sanctions)
R. 19 (Other forms of reporting)
R. 21 (Special attention for higher risk countries
R. 22 (Foreign branches & subsidiaries)
R. 24 (Regulation, supervision and monitoring)
R. 29 (Supervisors)
R. 32 (Statistics)
R. 33 (Legal persons beneficial owners)
SR. VI (AML requirements for money/value
transfer services)
SR. VII (Wire transfer rules)
SR. VIII (Non-profit organisations)
SR. IX (Cross Border Declaration & Disclosure)
Core Recommendations:
6. Recommendation 1: At the time of the onsite the full gamut of designated categories of
offences were not criminalized. However, Suriname addressed this by criminalizing
terrorism and TF, through the enactment of O.G. 2011 no 96, and insider trading and
market manipulation, through the enacting of the Act on Capital Markets (O.G. 2014 no
53). Now that all designated categories of offences have been designated as predicates in
Suriname R. 1 has been implemented to a level comparable to LC.
7. Recommendation 5: At the time of the onsite the WID Act did not provide for an adequate
and solid framework that imposes the required obligations on FIs. The scope of the WID
Act was limited to basic customer identification requirements and did not contain the broad
range of customer due diligence (CDD) measures anticipated by the FATF
Recommendations. Additionally, the need for the establishment of the identity of the
ultimate beneficial owner(s) was not elaborated in the WID Act. The enactment and
bringing into force of the amended WID Act and the MOT Act in 2012 have addressed
those deficiencies so that R. 5 has been brought to the level that is comparable to an LC.
8. Recommendation 10: Amendments to the WID and specifically art 8 sub 1-2 now ensures
that service providers are bound to maintain records in an accessible manner, even after the
statutory retention period of seven (7) years. There is also now a general requirement for
these records to be maintained in an accessible manner. This action has had the effect of
bringing the level of R. 10 to a level comparable to C.
10. Special Recommendation II: SR. II was deficient owing to the non-criminalization of TF.
Now that TF has been criminalized, SR. II has been implemented to a level comparable to
an LC.
11. Special Recommendation IV: Owing to art. 12 sub 1 of the MOT and the SDIUT there is
now a direct reporting requirement, which includes the reporting of attempted
transactions irrespective of the amount of funds. This ensures that the level of
compliance with SR. IV is equivalent to an LC.
Key Recommendations:
12. Recommendation 3: Suriname now has the legal basis upon which to confiscate TF related
assets. Therefore, the level of compliance is brought up to that equivalent to an LC.
13. Recommendation 4: R. 4 continues to be deficient because the MOT Act is silent on the
Gaming Supervision and Control Institute, as supervisory authority, in Suriname, ability to
share information.
14. Recommendation 23: The deficiencies for R. 23 were all addressed through legislation.
Art 22 of the MOT Act was enacted to specifically entrust the CBS as the Supervisory
Authority for service providers; Chapter 2 of the MTOSA, art 3.1 has empowered the CBS
with exclusive authority to grant licences to legal entities wishing to carry on the business
of a money transaction office; and art. 10 of the Capital markets Act places all market
participants within the capital market under the supervision of the CBS. R. 23 is now
implemented to a level equivalent to an LC.
15. Recommendation 26: Six of the nine deficiencies were addressed whilst the remaining
three are subject to ongoing implementation. The FIUS has increased manpower and is
now an independent institute within the Ministry of Justice and Police. The unit was moved
to secured premises in the business district of Suriname and acquired computer hardware
to store its information. The FIUS has also issued guidance to reporting entities and began
publishing its annual reports on its website. R. 26 is now implemented to a level which is
equivalent to a LC.
16. Recommendation 35: The deficiencies for R.35 were based on the Vienna and Palermo
Conventions not being fully implemented. Suriname acceded to the UNs International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism on July 18, 2013 and on
May 21, 2004, enacted the International Sanctions Act to address the aspects of freezing of
funds related to UN resolution 1267 and 1373. R.35 is now implemented to a level which
is equivalent to a LC.
17. Recommendation 40: All six deficiencies for R. 40 have been addressed through:
amendments to the MOT, the enactment of art. 46 of the BCSSA; amendments to the Act
on Disclosure of Unusual Transactions to give the FIUS jurisdiction over the processing of
TF related disclosures. R.40 is now implemented to a level which is equivalent to a LC.
18. Special Recommendation I: Because the deficiencies for SR. I and R. 35 were identical
the noted action which addressed the gaps for R. 35 are relevant here. SR. I is now
implemented to a level which is equivalent to a LC.
19. Special Recommendation III: The mechanisms necessary to implement all the essential
criteria with the exception of III.5 have been put in place. The freezing of assets in
accordance with S/RES/1267(1999) and S/RES/1373(2001) is enabled through Art. 2 of
the International Sanction Act; The State Decree (O.G. 2016 no 131) has been enacted to
give effect to, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanism of other jurisdictions; A
Council on International Sanctions has also been established as a legal entity with
responsibility for, among other things, executing decisions sent to it by the Minister;
procedures have been put in place for considering delisting requests and unfreezing of
funds; procedures have also been put in place for unfreezing the funds or other assets of
persons or entities inadvertently affected by a Surinames freezing mechanism; The
Council is authorized to provide access to frozen funds for: payments of necessary living
expenses, medical treatment, the fulfillment of long-term financial obligations. SR. III is
now implemented to a level which is equivalent to an LC.
20. Special Recommendation V: The lone deficiency relating to the criminalisation of all
designated predicate offences and terrorism financing was addressed. SR. V is
implemented to a level which is equivalent to an LC.
Other Recommendations:
21. Suriname has made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies in its non-core and
key Recommendations that were rated PC/NC. The Jurisdictions application for removal
from the third-round follow-up process is based on its compliance with the Core and Key
Recommendations that were rated PC/NC. Accordingly, this report will only provide a
limited analysis the Other Recommendations which is detailed at section VI of this report.
Conclusion
22. This detailed analysis of Surinames action to close the deficiencies noted in its 3rd MER
provides an overview of the progress relating to all Core and Key Recommendations that
were rated PC/NC in the 2009 MER. This analysis indicates that Suriname has addressed
all Core and Key Recommendations rated PC/NC (R. 1, 3, 5, 10, 13, 23, 26, 35, 40, SR. I,
II, III, IV & V) to a level comparable to at least an LC. Following the presentation of this
report, the Plenary agreed that Suriname had sufficiently met the criteria to exit the CFATF
third-round follow-up process. The Jurisdiction therefore exited the follow-up process.
Overview of the main changes since the adoption of the Mutual Evaluation Report
(MER)
23. Suriname began its legislative reform by enacting two Acts namely: the O.G. 2011 no 96,
which is an Act amending the Criminal Code; the Firearms Act; and the Act on the
Disclosure of Unusual Transactions, in connection with the criminalization of terrorist
crimes and their financing. This Act was published in the State Gazette of 29th July, 2011,
and came into force on 30th July, 2011; and O.G. 2011 no 155 which is a new Banking and
Credit System Supervision Act (BCSSA) that came into force on 23rd November, 2011.
24. Suriname also amended the Wet Melding Ongebruikelijke Transacties (SB 2002, 65),
MOT (Act on the Reporting of Unusual Transactions) and the Wet Identificatieplicht
Dienstverleners (SB 2002, 66), WID (Act on the identification requirements for Service
Providers). Both amendments were adopted by the Jurisdictions Parliament on July 17,
2012 and entered into force on August 9, 2012.
25. On October 29, 2012, Suriname brought the Money Transaction Offices Supervision Act
2012 (MTOSA) into force. The main objective of the MTOSA is to guarantee the integrity
of the Surinamese financial system, as well as to prevent money laundering and the
financing of crimes of terrorism. It provides that the business of a money transaction office
(MTO) must be linked to a licence issued by the Central Bank of Suriname (CBS). The
MTOSA also assigned supervisory duties for MTOs to the CBS.
26. On August 15, 2013, the State Decree on Indicators of Unusual Transactions (SDIUT) was
brought into force as (O.G.2013 no.148). Provisions of this law positively affected: Recs.
13, 26 and SR. IV, by including a requirement for attempted unusual transactions to be
reported.
27. On May 21, 2014, the Act on Capital markets came into force as (O.G. 2014, no 53).
Provisions of this law positively affected Recs. 1, 13, 23, 37, 38 and SRIV. Also on May
21, 2014 the International Sanction Act came into force (O.G. 2014 no 54). This law was
intended to lay down the general framework to comply with the international obligation,
specifically the resolutions established by the United Nations Security Council relating to
threats or disruption to international peace and security (UN resolution 1267 and 1373).
The measures to be implemented, based on this law, included the freezing of terrorist funds.
28. On April 1, 2015, the CBS amended the AML/CFT regulations. Provisions of this
amendment positively affected Recs. 15, 21, 23 and SRVII. On February 29, 2016, Act
(O.G. 2016 no. 31) was enacted, and brought into force on March 3, 2016, to amend the
International Sanctions Act, (O.G. 2014 no. 54). This law established a Council, as a legal
entity, on International Sanctions, with responsibility of supervising all service providers
for compliance with the International Sanctions Act. This amendment positively affected
SR.III.
29. On February 29, 2016, Act (O.G. 2016 no. 32) was enacted, and brought into force on
March 3, 2016, to amend the WID Act. This law is directly related to the CDD obligations
applicable in higher risk situations and was intended to make enhanced customer due
diligence mandatory for Surinames non- profit organizations. This law did not have any
positively effect on SR. VIII.
30. On February 29, 2016, State Decree (O.G. 2016 no 34) was enacted with the overarching
intent to implement article 2 section 1 of the International Sanctions Act (O.G. 2014 no.
54) and in complying with the international obligations as contained in the Resolutions
1267, 1333, 1373, 1452, 1735, 1988, 1989, 2160, 2161 and 2170 of the Security Council
of the United Nations. This amendment positively affected SR. III.
31. On July 29, 2016, Suriname amended the Surinamese Commercial Code (O.G. 2016 No.
103) to abolish the issuance of new bearer shares and create an opportunity for existing
bearer shares to be converted to registered shares. This action positively affected
Recommendation 33.
32. On October 13, 2016, the president of the Central Bank of Suriname (CBS) issued new
AML/CFT Directives to replace the April 2015 AML/CFT Directives. This action
positively affected Recommendation 9.
33. On October 17, 2016, the President of Suriname issued a State Decree (O.G. 2016 no 131),
which is inherently concerned with providing further details on the rules for implementing
the jurisdictions freezing mechanism. These mechanisms were established through the
International Sanctions Act S.B. 2014 no. 54, as amended by S.B. 2016 no. 31. The State
Decree introduces procedures for the de-listing and freezing and unfreezing of funds of
natural and legal persons. On October 25, 2016, procedures were laid down by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs. This action positively affected Recommendation 35, and Special
Recommendations I and III.
34. On October 25, 2016, Suriname enacted legislation (the WOTS Act) as O/g/ 2016 no 132,
containing rules concerning the take-over of the execution of foreign criminal court
decisions and the transference of the execution of the Surinamese criminal court decisions
to the foreign country. This action positively affected Recommendation 35 and Special
Recommendation I.
Recommendation 1 PC
R. 1 (Deficiency 1): Not all designated categories of predicate offences are covered in
the absence of the criminalization of terrorism and financing of terrorism and
insider trading and market manipulation in Suriname penal legislation.
35. Suriname criminalized terrorism by enacting O.G. 2011 no 96, (art.1A. Art.1C (2)) and
the financing of terrorism by adding the paragraph k with the following definition:
Financing of terrorism:
i. the intentional acquisition or possession of monetary instruments or objects
with monetary value for purposes of committing a terrorist crime;
ii. the intentional acquisition of monetary resources for the commission of a
terrorist crime; or
iii. the provision of monetary or material support for the acquisition of money or
objects for an organization that intends to commit a terrorist crime.
36. Insider trading and market manipulation have been criminalized through the enactment of
the Act on Capital Markets (O.G. 2014 no 53). At art 1 (General Provisions), of the said
Act, insider trading is defined (art 1 sub (m)) whilst market manipulation is defined at art
1 sub (n). Insider trading is defined as knowledge of specific inside information which
has a direct or indirect bearing on a securities-issuing institution whose securities are
traded on the stock exchange for which the holder has been granted a license, or which
pertains to trading in such securities, where such information has not been brought into
the public domain, the disclosure of such information would impact significantly on the
price of the securities or on the price of securities deriving therefrom. Even though this
definition for insider trading appears to refer to a definition for insider information, at art
19 (Market Abuse), it is prohibited for any person to make use of inside information for
their own benefit or for the benefit of a third person where such a person acquired the inside
information in his capacity either as: a member of the issuers board of executive directors,
management or supervisory bodies; through his participation in the issuers capital; through
his access to the information owing to his work, profession or position or for other reasons;
or through criminal activity. Based on the definition of insider trading at art 1 sub (m) it
appears that the mere knowledge of insider information would constitute insider trading
once a person who has such knowledge engages in the conduct prohibited by art 19.
37. As for market manipulation, art 1 sub (n) defines a situation where there is deliberate
interference in the supply or demand for securities through the dissemination of incorrect
or misleading information or through transactions or trade orders which give misleading or
incorrect signals or even where one or more persons act in concert to maintain the price of
a security at an artificial or incorrect level. Art 21 prohibits any person from engaging in
market manipulation. Under art 34 (Penalty Provisions), both insider trading and market
manipulation are deemed to be criminal offenses and a person committing either is liable
to be sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two years and to a maximum fine
of SRD 5 million. R1 deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed.
39. The text of the ML provision adequately covers all elements required by the international
standards and all the designated categories of offences are now criminalised in Suriname.
This deficiency refers to the implementation of these elements which can only be assessed
through an analysis of data and other information on prosecutions, convictions, penalties,
freezing/seizing and confiscation etc. Suriname has not as yet produced such data or other
information therefore such an analysis cannot be conducted.
40. There were three deficiencies noted by the Assessors, two of which were hinged on the
Jurisdictions ability to show that the ML provisions were being implemented. The other
deficiency was related to the non-criminalization of some designated categories of
offences. Now that the missing offences have been criminalized, the full scope of ML and
its predicates have been addressed, therefore the compliance with this Recommendation is
up to a level comparable at minimum to an LC.
Recommendation 5 NC
41. The Assessors made thirteen recommendations aimed at closing the gaps they discerned in
Surinames AML/CFT infrastructure. Suriname has responded by amending the WID Act
and the MOT Act to specifically close these gaps. The analysis of these amendments and
the effect they have had towards closing those gaps are detailed below:
R.5 (Deficiency 1) All financial institutions should be fully and effectively brought
under AML and CFT regulation and especially under the broad range of customer
due diligence requirements.
42. The preface to the CBS 2012 Directives has noted that the bank, in its capacity as
supervisor of financial institutions, has decided to issue the new directives to support
Surinames AML/CFT legislation.
43. Under art 16.1 of the Banking and Credit System Supervision Act 2011(BCSSA) the
CBS is authorised to issue guidelines with regard to the administrative and management
organization of credit institutions, including financial administration and internal control,
to their business operations to combating of money laundering and the financing of
terrorism. At art 17 of the BCSSA, if the CBS discovers that a credit institution is not
following the guidelines, it may instruct the relevant credit institution, by registered letter,
to take the necessary measures or to follow a particular line of conduct in accordance with
CBS instructions. If no satisfactory response is forthcoming from the credit institution
within a period determined by the CBS, or if the CBS determines that its instructions has
not been satisfactorily complied with, then it may place the defaulting credit institution
under undisclosed custody requiring it to carry out its activities only subject to approval by
the CBS, through persons appointed by the CBS. At art 56 of the BCSSA, the CBS is
authorized to impose a financial penalty on the credit institution for non-compliance,
including non-compliance with article 16. The amount of all such penalties is set by order
or decree, on the understanding that the penalty payable per infringement may not exceed
SRD 1,000,000 and under no circumstances can such penalty exceed 25 percent of the
annual profit, as evidenced by the most recent certified financial statements issued by the
external auditor in respect of the credit institution that was penalized. Ultimately, art 11 of
the BCSSA gives the CBS the authority to revoke the license of a credit institution if that
credit institution fails to observe the guidelines issued in accordance with the said BCSSA.
R.5 deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed.
44. According to art. 1 c of the WID and art.1 c of the MOT financial services has the
meaning of the professional or commercial performance of one or more of the following
activities:
a. C. 10 - accepting deposits and other withdrawable funds from the public;
b. C.11 granting of loans;
c. C.12 - financial leasing, with the exception of consumer-relating leasing;
d. C.8 - performing national or international financial transfers;
e. C.13 - issuing and managing of payment instruments other than cash, which in any
case includes credit cards, debit cards, cheques, travelers cheques, payment orders,
electronic and non-electronic money orders and electronic money;
f. C.14 - furnishing of financial guarantees and sureties;
g. C.16 - trading in the following:
b. money market instruments, such as cheques, bills of exchange and derivatives;
c. transferable securities;
d. futures market commodities;
a. C.17 - participating in securities dealing and related financial services;
b. C.18 - receiving in safekeeping and managing of cash or liquid securities for third
parties;
c. C.19 - other forms of investment, administration or management of funds or cash
for third parties;
d. C.5 - taking out, surrendering and payment, as well as acting as a broker in taking
out, surrendering and payment of a life insurance agreement and other investment-
linked insurance products;
e. C.7 - buying or selling Suriname dollars (SRDs) or foreign currency;
45. Whilst the inclusion of the financial activities listed above now bring Suriname closer to
fully implementing the Assessors recommendation, it must be noted that the activity of
Individual and collective portfolio management has not been included and Suriname has
not indicated whether the exclusion of this activity was predicated on the limited
occurrence of that activity in the jurisdiction, or whether there was, based on analyses, little
risk of money laundering activity occurring through the provision of this service.
R.5 (Deficiency 3): Financial institutions should be required to undertake full CDD
measures when carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers in
circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to SR VII or occasional transactions
above the applicable threshold of USD/EUR 15.000.
46. At art. 2 sub B of the WID Act (O.G. 2016 no 33) there is the Duty to provide proof of
identity when carrying out non-recurring transactions (including wire transfers) of a joint
value as established in the SDIUT. The SDUIT is however silent on a specific threshold.
This deficiency is not sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 4): The requirement to undertake CDD measures in cases where there
is a suspicion of terrorist financing and in cases where there are doubts about the
veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.
47. This deficiency has been closed by virtue art. 2 sub 2d and 2e of the WID. Article 2 sub 2
d addresses doubts surrounding the reliability of previously obtained client information
whilst article 2 sub 2 e is concerned with clients who are at risk of being involved in terrorist
financing. R.5 deficiency 4 is sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 5): The requirement to verify the legal status of legal arrangements
like trusts and understand who is (are) the natural person(s) that ultimately owns or
control the customer or exercise(s) effective control over a legal arrangement such as
a trust.
48. It is noted at paragraph 610 of the MER that Suriname Does not know trusts or other legal
arrangements R.5 deficiency 5 is sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 6): The requirements regarding identification and verification of the
beneficial owner for legal persons, including the obligation to determine the natural
persons who ultimately own or control the legal person.
49. Art 1of the WID has defined ultimate beneficial owner as the natural person who owns,
has control over or exercises control over a legal entity. At art 2 sub 1 b of the WID there
is the requirement for service providers to perform client screening, which in the case of
ultimate beneficial owners includes identifying the beneficial owner and verifying his
identity to such an extent that the service provider is convinced of the identity of the
beneficial owner. R.5 deficiency 6 is sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 7): The obligation to obtain information on the purpose and intended
nature of the business relationship.
50. This deficiency has been addressed because the client screening obligations under the
WIDs amendment Duty to provide Proof of Identity includes, at art. 2.1c, an obligation
to determine the object and intended nature of the business relationship. R.5 deficiency 7
is sufficiently addressed.
51. This gap has been specifically closed due to the WIDs amendment Duty to provide Proof
of Identity where at art. 2.1d service providers are mandated to perform on-going checks
of the business relationship to ensure that the transactions correspond with the knowledge
that the service provider has of the client and the ultimate beneficial owner. R.5 deficiency
8 is sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 9): Performing enhanced due diligence on higher risk categories of
customers, business relationships or transactions.
52. At art 4 of the WID amendment, service providers are required to carry out a more
stringent client screening process if the nature of a business relationship or transaction
entails a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. This more stringent client
screening is required to be performed both prior to the establishment of, and during the
business relationship in the specific situations noted at art 4 sub a - h. R.5 deficiency 9 is
sufficiently addressed.
53. Art 3 sub 1 of the WID requires service providers to tailor their client screening based on
the risk sensitivity for ML and TF and the type of customer, business relationship, product
or transaction. R.5 deficiency 10 is sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 11): There are no general requirements to apply CDD measures to
existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk.
54. The analysis for R.5 deficiency ix above is also applicable here. R.5 deficiency 11 is
sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 12): When regulating the identification and verification of beneficial
owners, a requirement to stop the financial institution from opening an account,
commence business relations or performing transactions when it is unable to identify
the beneficial owner satisfactorily.
55. At art 2a sub 3 and 4 there is the provision preventing a service provider from entering
into a business relationship or executing a transaction if that service provider is either
unable to perform client screening or if client screening does not result in the objectives set
out at art 2 sub 1 of the said WID Act, which includes the identification of the ultimate
beneficial owner. R.5 deficiency 12 is sufficiently addressed.
R.5 (Deficiency 13): The requirement to terminate the business relationship and to
consider making a suspicious transaction report when identification of the customer
cannot be performed properly after the relationship has commenced.
56. At art 2a sub 4 if a service provider is no longer able to conduct client screening to the
satisfaction of art 2 of the WID after entering a business relationship, that service provider
is mandated to terminate that business relationship without delay. At art 2a sub 5 there is
the requirement for the making of a disclosure in these circumstances. R.5 deficiency 13 is
sufficiently addressed.
Recommendation 10 PC
R.10 (Deficiency 1): There should be a requirement to keep all documents, which
record details of transactions carried out by the client in the course of an established
business relationship, and a requirement to keep all documents longer than 7 years
(if requested to do by a competent authority). R.10 (Deficiency 2): There should be a
requirement for financial institutions to ensure availability of records to competent
authorities in a timely manner.
58. Suriname has addressed both deficiencies through art 8 sub 1-2 of the WID. At sub 2,
service providers must maintain records in an accessible manner even after the statutory
retention period of seven (7) years, prescribed at sub 1, has expired. At sub 1 there is the
general requirement or the maintenance of records in an accessible manner for seven (7)
years after termination of the agreed business relationship. R.10 deficiency 1 and 2 are
sufficiently addressed.
59. Legislative action by Suriname has resulted in the two deficiencies being closed. The
compliance with R. 10 is up to a level comparable to C.
Recommendation 13 PC
60. For Recommendation 13 the assessors had made seven (7) recommendations intended to
close the gaps they discerned in the MER. The deficiencies and related action, taken by
Suriname to address them are detailed below:
R.13 (Deficiency 1): The reporting obligation does not cover transactions related to
insider trading and market manipulation as these are not predicate offences for ML
61. As noted in the analysis of Surinames action taken to close Recommendation 1, insider
trading and market manipulation have been criminalized as predicates through the
enactment of the Act on Capital Markets (O.G. 2014 no 53). At art 1 (General Provisions),
of the said Act, insider trading is defined (art 1 sub (m)) whilst market manipulation is
defined at art 1 sub (n). Under art 34 (Penalty Provisions), both insider trading and market
manipulation are deemed to be criminal offenses and a person committing either is liable
to be sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two years and to a maximum fine
of SRD 5 million. R1 deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed. (The full analysis of
Recommendation 1 can be found here) R.13 deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed.
R.13 (Deficiency 3): Include in the State Decree on Unusual Transaction, the
requirement to also report attempted unusual transactions
63. In the SDUIT (S.B. 2003 No. 45), art 1 has been amended to mandate that a service
provider determine whether transactions, which are actually carried out or intended to be
carried out, are unusual in the context of the specific indicators annexed in the said State
Decree. Once such a determination is made the service provider is bound to report that
transaction or intended transaction in accordance with art. 12 of the MOT Act. Article 12
of the MOT Act is concerned with the reporting duty of service providers, to disclose
(report) to the FIU any facts they uncover which are indicative of ML of TF, whether or
not the related transaction was executed or intended to be executed. The combination effect
of the amended SDUIT and the amended MOT Act has the effect of completely addressing
the gap discerned by the Assessors. R.13 deficiency 3 is sufficiently addressed.
R.13 (Deficiency 4): The financial institutions that choose to use an UTR-interface for
reporting purposes, should be obliged to improve the quality of the UTRs as soon as
possible and in such a way that the disclosures contain all information as prescribed
by article 12.2. of the MOT Act.
64. This deficiency has been addressed through art 12 sub 2 of the MOT, which is concerned
with the Duty of Disclosure. In this regard art. 12 sub 2 a g has itemized the details
which service providers must provide when reporting suspicious transactions. R.13
deficiency 4 is sufficiently addressed.
R.13 (Deficiency 5): Consider whether the obligation to report unusual transactions
without delay is sustainable.
65. It has already been noted in the preceding paragraph that art. 12 of the MOT is concerned
with a Duty of Disclosure. At art. 12 sub 1 service providers are required to report UTRs,
to the FIU, immediately following the discovery of facts which point to money laundering
or terrorist financing. At art 22 of the MOT, which is concerned with Supervision, sub
1 a - c has entrusted several bodies with the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the
said MOT Act. In this regard, the CBS has been entrusted as the Supervisory Authority for
service providers; the Gaming Supervision and Control Institute as Supervisory Authority
in so far as gaming providers are concerned and the FIUS in so far as other non-financial
service providers are concerned. The Gaming Supervision and Control Institute was
created by article 2 of the act of July 2nd 2009 (O.G. 2009 no. 78). At art. 22 sub 2 the
supervisory authorities above can give directives to their respective supervisees for
facilitating compliance with the MOT Act. At art. 22 sub 3, where a service provider either
fails to comply with a directive by its supervisor or does not comply in a timely manner
that supervisor can impose a fine of up to 1 million Surinamese dollars for each
contravention. These provisions, once effectively implemented, can have the effect of
ensuring a high level of compliance by the supervisee stakeholders. R.13 deficiency 5 is
sufficiently addressed.
R.13 (Deficiency 6): the FIU and other competent authorities should make an
inventory to identify all financial institutions and DNFBPs that have a reporting
requirement, reach out to these parties and apply sanctions in case of non-compliance.
R.13 (Deficiency 7): The FIU and other competent authorities should raise awareness
and enhance the sensitivity of all financial institutions and DNFBPs regarding ML
and TF.
67. This deficiency requires ongoing action to address it. Based on this, Suriname reported
having started conducting bi-monthly meetings between the FIUS and financial institutions
and DNFBPs.
68. Of the seven deficiencies, Suriname has sufficiently addressed 5, one has been significantly
addressed whilst the other is the subject of ongoing implementation. The compliance with
R. 13 is up to a level comparable at minimum to an LC.
Special Recommendation II - NC
SR. II (Deficiency 1): Besides the criminalization of FT, local authorities should see
to it, that, as soon as there is an act criminalizing the FT, comprehensive statistics be
kept on the number investigations, prosecutions and convictions for the act of FT.
69. This deficiency is identical to the 2nd deficiency 2 for Recommendation 1. Suriname
criminalized terrorism by enacting O.G. 2011 no 96, (art.1A. Art.1C (2)) and the
financing of terrorism by adding the paragraph k. The analysis of Recommendation 1 has
already detailed the legislative action which resulted in that deficiency being closed. (The
full analysis of Recommendation 1 can be found here) SR. II deficiency 1 is sufficiently
addressed.
70. The lone deficiency has been sufficiently addressed through legislative action. The
compliance with SR. II is up to a level comparable at LC.
Special Recommendation IV - NC
71. SR. IV (Deficiency 1): There are no direct requirements for financial institutions to
report to the FIU when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds
are linked or related to, or to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist
organisations, regardless of the amount of the transaction and including attempted
transactions.
72. Art. 12 of the MOT is concerned with a Duty of Disclosure. At art. 12 sub 1 there is the
direct requirement whereby service providers are obligated to report UTRs, to the FIU,
immediately following the discovery of facts, with due observance of the indicators laid
down in the SDIUT, which point to money laundering or terrorist financing. This obligation
is applicable to transactions performed or those intended and thus incorporates attempted
transactions. SR. IV deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed.
73. The lone deficiency for SR. IV has been sufficiently addressed through legislation which
mandates the reporting of UTRs whenever there is a suspicion that the facts surrounding
the transaction point to the financing of terrorism. The compliance with SR. IV is up to a
level comparable at minimum to an LC.
Recommendation 3 - PC
74. The two shortcomings are the fact that the FT is not an offence under Surinamese laws,
and there are no statistics available to see how effective the legislation is in practice.
R. 3 (Deficiency 1): No legal basis for the confiscation of TF related assets, in the
absence of a TF offence.
75. In Suriname TF is now criminalised by virtue of art.1C (2) of O.G. 2011 no 96. Provisional
and confiscation measures related to TF are addressed, respectively in art. 82 and 82a of
the Criminal Proceeding Code, and in art. 50, 50a, 50b and 50c of the Penal Code as
amended in O.G. 2002 no. 67 thereby creating the legal basis for the confiscation of TF
related assets. R. 3 deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed.
76. R. 3 (Deficiency 2): It is impossible to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the
systems for combating ML, due to the lack of comprehensive and reliable (annual)
statistics with respect to property / objects seized and confiscated.
78. Of the two deficiencies noted for Recommendation 3, one has been sufficiently addressed
whilst the other which is related to the maintenance of statistics. The maintenance of
statistics is addressed at Recommendation 32. The compliance with R. 3 up to a level
comparable at minimum to an LC.
Recommendation 4 - PC
R.4 (Deficiency 1): the relevant competent authorities in Suriname be given the ability
to share locally and internationally, information they require to properly perform
their functions.
79. Art 9 of the MOT Act permits the FIUS to exchange data, held in its Register of
disclosures, with other FIUs which have similar functions as the said FIUS. Whilst the
Register of disclosures contains only information on UTRs, any exchange of this
information must be predicated on the establishment of a treaty, convention or MOU.
Within Suriname the data from the Register of disclosures can only be shared through the
Procurator General, and even so, only to investigation and prosecution authorities. At art
46 of the BCSSA, which came into force on 23rd November, 2011 the CBS has the authority
to provide data or information it obtained in the execution of its duties as a supervisor, to
a supervisory authority or any overseas authority charged with the supervision of other
financial markets, following the establishment of information exchange agreement
between the two (2) parties. There are several provisions before such information can be
shared. They include:
81. The MOT Act is silent on the Gaming Supervision and Control Institute, as the other
supervisory authority in Suriname, ability to share information. However, Suriname has
reported that the necessary legislation to address this deficiency will be prepared. R.4
deficiency 1 is not sufficiently addressed.
82. The lone deficiency has not yet been sufficiently addressed.
Recommendation 23 - NC
83. Art 22 of the MOT Act was enacted to specifically address this deficiency. In this regard,
the CBS has been entrusted as the Supervisory Authority for service providers; the Gaming
R. 23 (Deficiency 2): The money & value transfer companies, money exchange offices
and stock exchange are not subject to AML/CFT supervision and money transfer
offices and money exchange offices are not registered or licensed and appropriately
regulated.
84. At Chapter 2 of the MTOSA, art 3.1 has empowered the CBS with exclusive authority to
grant licences to legal entities wishing to carry on the business of a money transaction
office. Based on the definition ascribed to MTOs at art 1.b, a licence granted by the CBS
would allow a MTO to engage in either the exchange of currency or the transfer of
currency. However, Chapter 1 art 2 prohibits a licensee from engaging in both types of
transactions simultaneously. Chapter 2 art 5 details a number of requirements that a legal
entity must satisfy before a licence can be granted. At art 5.3 the CBS can refuse to grant
a licence if the Board of executive directors or board of supervisory directors or persons
holding a controlling interest was found guilty or is guilty of money laundering or is or was
involved in financial crimes. In similar circumstances, pursuant to art 10, the CBS can also
revoke a licence already granted. R. 23 deficiency is sufficiently addressed.
86. On May 21, 2014, Suriname enacted the Act on Capital markets as (O.G. 2014, no 53).
Art. 7 of this law places all market participants within the capital market under the
supervision of the CBS. At art. 10 the CBS is empowered to issue guidelines, for the
operational management of a stock brokerage firm or stock exchange, which includes
regulations regarding the combating of MF and TF. R. 23 deficiency 3 is sufficiently
addressed.
87. All three deficiencies have been sufficiently addressed through legislative action. The
compliance with R. 23 up to a level comparable at minimum to an LC.
Recommendation 26 - PC
88. In May 2011, the Minister of Justice and Police issued a Ministerial Decree causing the
organisational chart of the Ministry of Justice to be changed to identify the FIUS as an
independent institute within the said ministry. Additionally, art 2 sub 1 of the MOT Act
has confirmed this action by establishing an office for disclosure of unusual transactions,
known as the Financial Intelligence Unit Suriname (FIUS) as an independent unit of the
Ministry of Justice and Police. R.26 deficiency 1 is sufficiently addressed.
R. 26 (Deficiency 2): To substantially increase the human and financial resourcing of
the FIU.
89. Suriname increased the strength of the FIUS by adding an additional eight (8) persons,
including four analysts and two lawyers, to the unit. Additionally, for fiscal year 2012, the
budget for the FIUS has been incorporated into the budget of the Ministry of Justice and
police. It is not clear how, incorporating the FIUS budget into the budget of the Ministry
of Justice and police, has redound to an increase in the financial resourcing of the FIUS.
Therefore, whilst the increase of the strength of the FIUS has demonstrably closed part of
this deficiency the other gap appears not to have been addressed. R. 26 deficiency 2 is not
sufficiently addressed.
R.26 (Deficiency 3): To move MOT to a location that ensures a secure conservation
and management of the sensitive information and the safety of the staff.
90. The FIUS was moved to a new location, situated in the business area of Paramaribo, in
September 2011. There the unit has been provided with additional office space and 24/7
security. R. 26 deficiency 3 is sufficiently addressed.
R. 26 (Deficiency 4): To improve the IT security measures to protect the sensitive and
confidential information.
91. In 2009, the FIUS reportedly acquired a server to store its information. Weekly backups of
the said information are also made. R. 26 deficiency 4 is sufficiently addressed.
R. 26 (Deficiency 5): That the sensitization and education of all reporting entities
should be substantially enhanced by awareness raising sessions and typology
feedback, aimed at an increased perception of suspicious activity to be reported.
92. Suriname reported that in 2009 the FIUS started conducting awareness seminars for
financial institutions and DNFBPs. Suriname has reported that part of these seminars
address issues regarding typologies which are reported by service providers and
documented in their UTR. By doing so the FIUS is providing typology feedback to service
providers with the aim to increase their perception of suspicious activities.
93. In June 2014, the FIUS launched its website (http://www.mot.sr ) where the FIUS annual
reports for the period 2003-2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; and 2013 are published and are
available for downloading. These reports include methods techniques and trends used in
ML, as identified by the FATF. The 2013 annual report is the last report available online.
A partially translated version of the 2012 report was sent to the Secretariat on April 29,
2014. That document showed detailed statistics on unusual transactions, covering the
period 2003 to 2010, with breakdowns on the value of such transactions particularized by
categories of reporting institutions. The translated document noted that typologies showing
the methods and techniques used for ML/TF and also related trends are included. Suriname
has also indicated that copies of the annual report are sent to the Ministers of Justice and
Police, Finance, the Attorney General, the Governor of the Central Bank, Embassies and
to all service provider. The annual report is made available to the general public and
students upon request. This additional information provided by Suriname shows that the
Jurisdictions FIU has been largely complying with the necessary elements of E.C. 26.8.
The closure of R.26 deficiency 5 is ongoing.
R. 26 (Deficiency 6): To issue the necessary guidance to the sector stressing the
importance of timely reporting, particularly of suspicious activity.
94. The FIUS issued guidelines, in October 2012, regarding reporting unusual transactions and
the identification obligations of service providers. At paragraph 3.2 of these guidelines a
reporting period of maximum 14 days for unusual transactions is prescribed for
transactions which fall under the scope of objective indicators whilst transactions falling
under the scope of a subjective indicator must be reported within five days. By prescribing
clear reporting timelines to be followed by reporting entities for the filing of UTRs,
Suriname has clearly demonstrated the importance for UTRs to be filed in a timely manner.
R.26 deficiency 6 is sufficiently addressed.
R. 26 (Deficiency 7): To increase the quality of the analytical process by systematically
querying all accessible sources, particularly the law enforcement and administrative
data (including tax information).
95. Art 7 sub 1 of the Mot Act authorises the FIUS to request information from government,
financial and non-financial institutions, if such information becomes necessary when
analysing UTRs. At art 7 sub 2 any government, financial and non-financial institutions
from whom the FIUS has requested information is obliged to comply. This legislative
action has created the basis upon which the FIUS can, on a case-by-case basis, access the
necessary information required to add value to its analytical process. R.26 deficiency 7 is
sufficiently addressed.
R.26 (Deficiency 8): To fully exploit all possibilities of information collection,
particularly by having the supervisory and State authorities report as provided by
the Law.
96. Based on the provisions of art 13 of the MOT, whereby government agencies must,
notwithstanding any confidentiality provisions that apply to them, inform the FIUS if they
discover, whilst carrying out their functions, any facts that point to ML of TF or the
suspicion thereof, the FIUS was expected to institutionalize a forum of supervisory
authorities and government agencies for collecting information on ML and FT. Suriname
has not conclusively reported this action. R.26 deficiency 8 is the subject of ongoing
implementation.
R. 26 (Deficiency 9): To intensify the efforts for the analysts to acquire better
knowledge and insight in money laundering techniques and schemes.
97. This deficiency is essentially related to the training and development of the staff of the
FIUS. Suriname has reported that this an ongoing effort which to date has seen orientation
visits to Belgium and participation in the Egmont Tactical Analysis Course in November
2009; a visit to the Netherlands Antilles in March 2010 and training in conjunction with
the USAs Treasury Department, in October 2012. R.26 deficiency 9 is the subject of
ongoing implementation.
Recommendation 26 overall conclusion
98. Of the nine deficiencies identified by the Assessors, five have been sufficiently addressed
whilst the other three, which have been significantly addressed, are the subject of ongoing
implementation. The compliance with R. 26 is up to a level comparable at minimum to an
LC.
Recommendation 35 PC
R. 35 (Deficiency 1): Suriname should take the necessary steps to fully and effectively
implement the Vienna and Palermo Conventions.
99. The Genesis of the Assessors comments can be found at paragraphs 620, 621 and 622 of
the MER. There are four issues articulated here, two of which are related to the Vienna
Convention and the other two (2) are related to the Palermo Convention. The resolution of
these issues are detailed below:
i. Issue#1 For Art 5 of the Vienna Convention and specifically related to R.28.2 (the
enforcement of foreign confiscation orders), the Assessors had recommended that
Legal certainty on the capability to execute foreign confiscation orders should be
ensured if necessary through specific legislation. Suriname enacted the WOTS Act
on October 25, 2016 and art 11 provides for the confiscation of objects, at the request
of a foreign state, pursuant to a treaty with Suriname. This sub-deficiency is
sufficiently addressed.
ii. Issue#2 - For Arts 15, 17 and 19 of the Vienna Convention is in relation to cross-border
cash transportation the WOTS Act is expected to address this issue. This sub-
deficiency is not yet addressed.
iii. Issue#3 and #4 which are in relation to Art 7 and 20 of the Palermo Convention and
are concerned with R.29, SR. IX and R.27.3. R.27.3 is an additional element whilst the
action taken by Suriname to close the deficiencies noted for R. 29 and SR. IX are
detailed in this report. This sub-deficiency is sufficiently addressed.
100. Per documents provided by Suriname, on July 18, 2013, the Jurisdiction acceded to the
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. R.35 deficiency 2 is sufficiently addressed.
R. 35 (Deficiency 3): UN Res. 1267 and 1373 should be implemented fully and without
delay.
101. Suriname enacted the International Sanctions Act on May 21, 2014, (O.G.2014 no.54)
addressing the aspects of freezing of funds related to UN resolution 1267 and 1373. On
February 29, 2016, Suriname issued State Decree O.G. 2016 no 34, in order to implement
art 2 section 1 of the International Sanctions Act. Per art 2 of State Decree O.G. 2016 no
34, All balances and any other means belonging to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other
organizations associated natural persons or legal bodies, entities or bodies as referred to in
the Resolutions 1267, 1333, 1373, 1452, 1735, 1988, 1989, 2160, 2161 and 2170 have been
frozen. (The full analysis of the implementation of SR. III can be found here.) R. 35
deficiency 3 is sufficiently addressed.
102. Two of the three deficiencies for R.35 have been sufficiently addressed whilst the other
(deficiency 1) has been significantly improved through legislation. The compliance with
R. 35 is up from PC to a level comparable at minimum to an LC.
Recommendation 40 PC
R.40 (Deficiency 1): The treaty condition should be discarded and replaced by the
generally accepted rule of information exchange with its counterparts, based on
reciprocity and the Egmont Principles of Information exchange. Ideally such
exchange should be allowed on an ad hoc basis or, if deemed necessary, on the basis
of a bilateral agreement between FIUs.
103. As noted at the analysis for R.26 in this report, art 9 of the MOT Act permits the FIUS to
exchange data, held in its Register of disclosures, with other FIUs, which have similar
functions as Surinames FIU. Such exchange must be predicated by the establishment of a
treaty, convention or MOU. R.40 deficiency is sufficiently addressed.
R.40 (Deficiency 2): The Law should expressly allow MOT to collect information
outside its register at the request of a counterpart FIU. One simple and adequate way
to realise this is to put such foreign request legally at par with a disclosure, which
would automatically bring them under the regime of art. 5 and 7 of the MOT Act.
104. Addressed through an amendment to art. 9 of the MOT Act. Specifically, through
O.G.2016 no.33 the FIU may now, apart from its own register, obtain information from
governmental, financial, and non-financial institutions, and also utilize other public sources
of information. R.40 deficiency 2 is not sufficiently addressed.
105. Suriname has reported that the conditions regarding the confidentiality status of the
exchanged information was included in the model MOU which has been prepared by the
FIUS. This model MOU was produced and at art 3 there is a restriction on the use of
information and documents being disseminated or to be used for administrative, judicial,
or prosecution purposes, without prior written consent. R. 40 deficiency 3 is sufficiently
addressed.
R.40 (Deficiency 4): The (physical) protection of the MOT data-base and its offices be
upgraded.
106. It has already been noted under the analysis of Surinames action relating to R. 26 that the
FIUS has been relocated to new secure accommodation within the business district of
Paramaribo and has reportedly acquired new server for securing its information. R.40
deficiency 4 is sufficiently addressed.
107. Article III sub C and D of O.G. 2011 no 96 has amended the Act on the Disclosure of
Unusual Transactions (S.B. 2001 No. 65) giving effect to the assessors recommendation.
Consequently, the main task of the FIUS has been amended to include the compilation,
registration, processing and analysis of data important for the prevention and investigation
of money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other crimes. R. 40 deficiency 5 is
sufficiently addressed.
R.40 (Deficiency 6): A legal basis should be provided for information exchange
between the CBS and counterpart supervisors, by way of MOUs or otherwise.
108. As noted in the assessment of Surinames action relating to the deficiencies noted for R. 4,
the enactment of art 46 of the BCSSA has specifically closed this deficiency. R. 40
deficiency 6 is sufficiently addressed.
109. The six deficiencies for R. 40 have been addressed through legislative action bringing the
compliance with R. 40 up to a level comparable at minimum to an LC.
Special Recommendation I - NC
110. The deficiencies identified for SR. I and the recommended actions, made by the Assessors,
to close those deficiencies were identical to the deficiencies and recommended actions for
R. 35. Consequently, the analysis of the legislative action and other measures, taken by
Suriname, and detailed at R. 35 are also applicable here. (The full analysis of the R. 35 can
be found here).
111. Two of the three deficiencies for SR.1 have been sufficiently addressed whilst the other
(deficiency 1) has been significantly improved through legislation. The compliance with
SR. 1is up from PC to a level comparable at minimum to an LC.
SR. III (Deficiency 1): No system in place complying with the relevant UN Resolution
and providing for an adequate freezing regime.
112. There are 15 essential criteria for SR. III, two of which are additional elements. Surinames
actions to close the deficiency are detailed below:
Freezing and where appropriate, seizing under the relevant U.N. Resolutions
113. III.1, III.2 & III.3 - The freezing of assets in accordance with S/RES/1267(1999) and
S/RES/1373(2001) is enabled through Art. 2 of the International Sanction Act (O.G. 2014
no 54) and State Decree O.G. 2016 no 34, which was enacted on February 29, 2016.
According to article 2 of State Decree O.G. 2016 no 34, All balances and any other
means belonging to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other organizations associated natural
persons or legal bodies, entities or bodies as referred to in the Resolutions 1267, 1333,
1373, 1452, 1735, 1988, 1989, 2160, 2161 and 2170 have been frozen. Means is defined
under article 1 of State Decree O.G. 2016 no 34 and encompasses funds as articulated in
the Terrorist Financing Convention.
114. The State Decree (O.G. 2016 no 131) has been enacted to give effect to, the actions
initiated under the freezing mechanism of other jurisdictions. A Council on International
Sanctions has also been established as a legal entity with responsibility for, among other
things, executing decisions sent to it by the Minister. Such decisions relate to
conventions or binding resolutions of international law organizations. According to art 4a
2 of State Decree O.G. 2016 no. 31, the Minister can also send such decisions to the other
entity(ies) responsible executing them. Whilst the Ministers of Justice and Police, Foreign
Affairs and Finance are responsible for the implementation of O.G. 2016 no. 31, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs is the recipient of the decisions related to Conventions,
pursuant to article 1 sub A 2 of the said O.G. 31.
115. III.4 (a) - Means referred to at article 2 of State Decree O.G. 2016 no 34, include means
which belong to the members or representatives of named organisations and also other
organisations which are associated with either natural or legal persons referred to in article
2. The reference at article 2 is to All balances and means and thus those means which are
wholly or jointly owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a third party or parties is
captured.
116. III.4 (b) - The definition of means clearly include interests, dividends or other income of
or value originating from or generated by assets.
117. III.5 Surinames communication strategy includes the publication, by the Council, within
five working days, in a digital way, of the freezing lists and of any amendments to these
lists and an announcement on the Councils website. This essential criterion however
requires Surinames financial sector and the general public to be informed immediately
upon Suriname such action.
118. III.6 - The Council has the responsibility for issuing guidelines to all service providers,
and supervising their compliance with the International Sanctions Act and its Amendments.
119. III.7 - The procedures for considering delisting requests and unfreezing of funds were laid
down by Ministerial Decree on October 25, 2016, as O.G. 2016 no. 133. Specifically, these
procedures can be found at parts I and J. At part I, any natural person or legal entity, entity
or body which appears on the sanction list of the UN, may submit a request for de-listing.
This request must include the reasons why the natural person or legal entity, entity or body
no longer meets the criteria for inclusion on the Sanctions List. A request for de-listing can
be addressed by the relevant natural or legal person, entity or body directly to the Office of
the Ombudsman, established by the UN Sanctions Committee or through the State in which
he resides, to be forwarded the Sanctions Committee of the UN. Regarding the timeliness
of delisting, the Council must notify the affected person or group, about the decision to
delist, within five working days, after the decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At
part J, the Council is empowered to evaluate whether the grounds upon which the freezing
was based are still in force. All freezing measures are to be lifted by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs after having heard he Council. Regarding the timeliness of unfreezing action, a
copy of the Ministers decision is required to be forwarded to the Council immediately
following the Ministers decision and the Council in turn must inform the affected party
within five working days of that decision.
120. III.8 The procedures for unfreezing the funds or other assets of persons or entities
inadvertently affected by a Surinames freezing mechanism was laid down by Ministerial
Decree on October 25, 2016, as O.G. 2016 no. 133. Specifically, these procedures can be
found at part H, which is concerned with Mistaken Identity. Here, the Council has a
responsibility to investigate the identity and background of the affected person or entity
and inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs within two days of the completion of that
investigation. If the outcome of the investigation is for the freezing order to be lifted then
the Minister must make that order immediately.
121. III.9The Council is authorized to provide access to frozen funds for: payments of
necessary living expenses, medical treatment, the fulfillment of long-term financial
obligations or the payment of rent, utilities and insurance premiums; the payment of
reasonable professional fees and fees for receiving legal aid; and the payment of fees for
the preservation or maintenance of frozen funds or other resources. These noted expenses
are in accordance with S/RES/1452(2002). Access to frozen funds or resources is only
granted following the approval of the Minister for the performance of extraordinary
expenditure. If the Minister intends to grant such approval, he is required to make it known
to the UN sanctions committee. The Minister approves only with the expressed consent of
the UN sanctions committee.
122. III.10 - Any person who objects to a decision taken against him by the Council may object
in writing to the Council within 30 days after the decision is made known to that person.
123. III.11 Regarding whether means in the circumstances of art 2 of the International
Sanctions Act (O.G. 2014 no 54) and State Decree O.G. 2016 no 34 are subject to the
confiscations provisions relating to Recommendations 3.1 3.4, Suriname has advised that
whilst both the International Sanction act (O.G.2014 no 54), and the State Decree to
implement art 2 of the International Sanction act are aimed to create a legal freezing regime
procedures which will result in confiscation can only follow on the basis of evidence
presented during Penal Court hearings, resulting in confiscation orders according to art.54
E of the Penal Code (O.G. 2015 no.44). Suriname has promised to provide the Secretariat
with a translated copy of the O.G. 2015 no.44 as soon as it is available.
General provisions
124. III.12 Regarding whether there are laws and other measures which provide protection
for the rights of bona fide third parties, Suriname has stated that As general provision to
appeal against a seizing or confiscation order is laid down in article 460 of the Criminal
Preceding Code (O.G. 1977 no 94). Interested parties including bona fide third parties may
complain through a Court proceeding to withdraw a seizing or confiscation order. The
English translation of this provision was promised to the Secretariat.
125. III.13 The Minister has responsibility for supervising the activities of the Council which
is obligated to report its activities to the Minister. As for sanctions, the Council may impose
a penalty, not exceeding one million SRD per day, on any service provide which fails to
comply in a timely manner to the guidelines issued by the Council relating to freezing
decisions of the Minister.
126. The mechanisms necessary to implement all the essential criteria, with the exception of III.
5, have been put in place by Suriname. The minor weakness here relate to the timeliness
with which the Council is required to inform the financial sector and the general public of
action taken under the Jurisdictions freezing regime. SR. III has been addressed to a level
of compliance comparable to a LC.
Special Recommendation V - NC
128. The lone deficiency has been addressed through legislative action. SR. V is assessed to
have been addressed to a level of compliance comparable to a LC.
129. Suriname has taken the following measures to address the other Recommendations that
were rated PC/NC. The information in this section is presented for information purposes
only and is not to be taken into consideration for Surinames application to exit the follow-
up process.
Recommendations 14, 18 and 25 were all rated PC whilst Recommendations 6, 7, 8-11, &
17, 15, 19, 21, 22, 29, SR. VI and SR. VII were all rated NC.
130. For R. 14 the deficiency was related to tipping-off not being enforced through sanctions.
This gap was fully closed through the enactment of art 21 of the MOT, which is concerned
with Criminal Provisions. According to that article, violations of the rules laid down by the
MOT are criminal offences and punishable by a maximum prison sentence of ten years and
a maximum fine of SRD 5 million. Tipping-off is actually covered at art 25 of the MOT.
131. For R. 18 the Assessors had recommended that the Jurisdiction implement a specific
requirement that covers prohibition on the establishment or continued operation with shell
banks. Art 14 sub 1 of the MOT has specifically prohibited Suriname banks from entering
into or maintaining a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank. Another
Assessors recommendation was for there to be specific enforceable obligations on financial
institution to reassure themselves that a respondent financial institution in a foreign country
does not permit its accounts to be used by shell banks. In this regard art 14 sub 2 of the
MOT has mandated that Suriname banks shall satisfy themselves that the financial service
providers that have their registered office outside of Suriname with which such Suriname
banks has either entered into or maintains a correspondent banking relationship, do not
permit their accounts to be used by shell banks. In addition to the above, directive II of
the CBS 2012 directives specifically prohibits financial institutions from entering into
correspondent relationships with so-called shell banks.
132. R. 25 deficiencies were related to the non-issuance of guidelines, and the provision of
appropriate feedback, by the FIU, to DNFBPs and FIs and DNFBPs respectively. These
deficiencies are identical to deficiency 5 and deficiency 6 at R. 26. The analysis of the
action taken by Suriname in this regard have been detailed under R. 26. Suriname has
sufficiently closed the noted gaps. (The full analysis of R.26 can be viewed here).
133. For R.6, Suriname achieved compliance with the PEP requirements through an amendment
to the WID Act which now has specific PEP-related AML/CDD provisions. At art 1 PEP
is defined as a person who occupies or has occupied an important public function abroad,
as well as his/her immediate family members and close associates. At art 4 sub b PEPs
are listed as one of the categories of customers for whom service providers are required to
perform more stringent client screening measures. At art 9sub 1 service providers are
required to establish policies and implement procedures which are aimed at determining
whether a client, potential client or beneficial owner is a PEP, and the source of assets of
any such clients. At art 9sub 2 any decision to enter a business relationship or perform an
individual transaction for a PEP can only be done or approved by the persons who has
overall management responsibility of the service provider. At art 9sub 3 if a client or
ultimate beneficial owner is determined to be a PEP subsequent to the establishment of the
business relationship then the business relationship can only be continued following the
receipt of approval to do so from the persons who has overall management responsibility
of the service provider. All of these obligations must be observed up to one year after the
client ceases to be a PEP.
134. Regarding R. 7, has Suriname has addressed the deficiency through art 13 of the WID.
Art 13 sub 1 a-c details the responsibilities of a banking institution in Suriname that is
planning to enter into a correspondent banking relationship. Payable-through accounts
and the need for financial institutions to be satisfied that the respondent has performed all
normal CDD obligations is specifically addressed at art 13 sub 1 c of the WID. Here
payable-through accounts are referred to as transit accounts and where a correspondent
banking relationship entails the use of such accounts, the Surinamese bank must satisfy
itself that the bank with which it has the correspondent banking relationship has identified
its clients that have direct access to those accounts. The CDD obligations for identification
and verification here must be in line with international standards and the Surinamese bank
must be certain that it is able to retrieve all relevant client identity data, from its respondent,
upon request. Art 13 sub 2 of the WID Act a banking institution is only permitted to enter
into a new correspondent banking relationship after receiving permission from the persons
charged with the overall management of the bank.
135. R. 8 deficiencies have been closed. Art 11 of the WID has addressed the recommendation
that financial institutions have adequate policies and procedures aimed at preventing the
use of new technologies to facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing particularly
with regards to business relationships and transactions involving clients who are not
physically present. Directive III of the CBS 2012 directives, which is concerned with
non-face to face business relationships or transactions has mandated that financial
institutions have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated
with business relationships or transactions that do not involve personal contact.
136. As for R. 9, Suriname has addressed the deficiency through art. 2 of the WID. This article
permits service providers to rely on the client screening performed by a financial service
provider having its registered office in Suriname. Additionally, the CBS 2014 directives
have mandated that financial institutions satisfy themselves that the third party is regulated
and supervised for AML/CFT and has measures in place to comply with Surinames CDD
requirements. Finally, at Section IV of the 2016 AML/CFT Directives financial institutions
in these circumstances now have an obligation to immediately obtain from the third party
the necessary information concerning certain elements of the CDD.
137. R. 11 deficiencies have been addressed through art 10 sub 1 a & b of the WID. However,
though the WID is silent on the obligations with regards to large transactions, this is
covered at Directive VI of the CBSs 2012 directives.
138. For R.17 Suriname has closed the deficiencies through art 21 and 22 of the MOT. Art. 21
has created criminal offences punishable by a maximum prison sentence of ten years and
a maximum fine of SRD 5 million for violations of the rules laid down by the MOT. Art.
22 authorises the supervisors to impose a maximum fine of SRD 1 million for each
contravention by a service provider that does not comply, or does not comply on time, with
the obligations laid down in the directives which the said supervisor has issued. At art 56
of the BCSSA, the CBS is authorized to impose a financial penalty on a credit institution
for non-compliance, including non-compliance with guidelines issued under art 16. The
amount of all such penalties are set by order or decree, on the understanding that the penalty
payable per infringement may not exceed SRD 1,000,000 and under no circumstances can
such penalty exceed 25 percent of the annual profit. Finally, at art. 1B of the Act
Penalization of Legal Entities of September 5, 2002, provision is made for penalizing
criminal acts perpetrated by legal persons. Here punishments and other measures may be
imposed on the legal person itself or against those persons who ordered the crime, as well
as against those persons who were actually in charge of the prohibited act.
139. Regarding R.15, directive X paragraphs a-e of the 2012 directives has subsumed all of the
deficiencies with the exception of the requirement that the internal audit function be
adequately resourced. On April 1, 2015, the CBS issued amended directives. Directive XL
is concerned with compliance and internal audit. Here, internal audit departments are
required to be robust in order to carry out their tasks. There are minimum requirements
which direct that the head of the department should possess knowledge and management
qualities; employees should be sufficiently trained and the internal audit department must
have sufficient employees at its disposal. Further, if the internal audit department is not
sufficiently equipped for its functions the Executive Board is required to ensure that this is
reversed within the short term.
141. R.21 is partially addressed. The Assessors had recommended that Suriname should issue a
law or regulation to implement the requirements of this Recommendation. At art 4 f of the
MOT service providers are mandated to perform a more stringent client screening prior to
the business relationship or transaction and during the business relationship if the natural
persons or legal entities originate in countries or jurisdictions that do not meet at all or
sufficiently the internationally accepted standards in the field of AML/CFT. At art 10 sub
2 of the WID transactions involving jurisdictions which do not sufficiently meet all the
internationally accepted standards in AML/CFT are required to be the subject of an
investigation into the background and object of that transaction and the findings are to be
recorded and kept for seven years. In the action taken by Suriname the legislation appears
to be deficient in the requirement for effective measures to be in place to ensure that
financial institutions are advised of concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems
of other countries. Another apparent deficiency is the lack of an ability/requirement to
apply counter measures on countries which do not appropriately apply the FATF
Recommendations.
142. R. 22 three deficiencies have been addressed through CBS 2012 Directives. At directive
XI, FIs are required to ensure that the provisions of the said directives are applied in their
branches and subsidiaries in Suriname and abroad and where there are differences in the
standard of supervision between the home country and the host country, FIs are required
to apply the higher of the two (2) but subject to the provisions of the local regulations.
Additionally, if a foreign countrys regulations make it impossible for a FI to comply with
the CBS directives that FI must report this to the CBS.
143. R. 29 has been addressed owing to the CBS being given the general power to compel
production or to obtain access to all records, documents or information relevant to
monitoring compliance. According to art 29 sub 1 a of the BCSSA, in order to carry out
its supervision functions, the CBS is entitled, at all times, to have unrestricted access to all
accounts, records, documents and other data of a credit institution. This entitlement exists
irrespective of who has possession of the information noted above. In the new art 22 of the
MOT Act the CBS has been appointed as the AML supervisory authority of financial
service providers. Under this article the CBS is authorized to give directives to the service
providers that fall under its supervision for the purpose of facilitating compliance with the
MOT Act.
144. Regarding SR. VI, all the deficiencies were addressed by Suriname. As noted for the
analysis of deficiency #2, at R.23 of this report, art 3.1 has empowered the CBS with
exclusive authority to grant licences to legal entities wishing to carry on the business of a
MTO. The 2012 directives covered MTOs and Suriname reported having already
conducted two (2) onsite inspections for MTOs, which were done in collaboration with the
OTA. Suriname reported on April 29, 2014, that the Financial Markets Division of the CBS
maintains a list of MTC agents and Sub-agents. A copy of this list was provided to the
Secretariat on May 14, 2014. The CBS can impose sanctions against credit institutions for
failure to comply with the AML/CFT guidelines issued pursuant to art. 16 of the BCSSA.
145. Regarding SR. VII, there was one recommended action aimed at covering several
deficiencies. The 2016 directives has addressed many of the deficiencies however
weaknesses still exists. Specifically, under Electronic Transfer of Funds, at page 9 of the
2016 AML/CFT Directives, the FI which will execute any cross-border wire transfer higher
than USD/EUR 1,000 has a responsibility to request and record the originators name;
account number; and address or national identity number, or customer identification
number, or date and place of birth. There is no obligation for the ordering financial
institution to identify and verify the identity of the originator per the standards anticipated
at Recommendation 5. Also, Suriname has not provided any information regarding the
record keeping requirements where technical limitations prevent the full originator
information accompanying a cross-border wire transfer from being transmitted with a
related domestic wire transfer.
Recommendations 20 was rated PC whilst Recommendations 12, 16 and 24 were all rated
NC.
146. All the deficiencies noted for R.20 are now closed. Real estate agents and car dealers have
been brought under the scope of the ID law. Likewise, pursuant to the art. 1, paragraph d,
and 12 of the MOT Act real estate agents and car dealers are subject to the reporting
obligation of the MOT Act. The CBS has launched a modernization project which will
result in electronic clearing and settlement. There is also the Banking Network Suriname
(BNETS), which was founded in 2005, and which aims to promote electronic payment and
integrating payment between FI. Finally here, the Jurisdiction has reported that both
transactions through ATM and POS have increased annually. The BNETS statistics
provided on April 29, 2014, shows that since 2007 to 2013, the use of debit cards has
doubled while payments via POS increased by almost six times.
147. Suriname has closed all the deficiencies, for R. 12, but one, which relates to continuous
and effective guidance to DNFBPs, on the purpose of, and compliance with the ID law. It
is noted however that the WID makes no distinction between DNFNPs and the other FIs in
Suriname therefore the positive influence of the new legislative measures on
Recommendations 5, 6, 8-11 have cascaded onto R. 12.
148. For R.16, the steps taken by the Jurisdiction towards closing the gaps for R.13-15 have
already been noted in this report. It is important to note here as well that even though art
22 of the MOT mandates the Gaming Supervision and Control Institute, in so far as gaming
providers are involved, to issue directives (guidance), none have as yet been issued.
149. Regarding R.24, at Art 22 1 b of the MOT the Gaming Supervision and Control Institute
has been made the supervisory authority, charged with supervising compliance with the
provisions of MOT Act, particularly as they relate to gaming providers. The Gaming
Supervision and Control Institute, as supervisory authority, is authorized to give directives
to the gaming providers and impose a penalty for non-compliance with such directives.
Law on Hazard Games (Wet op de Hazardspelen) regulates the licensing of casinos in the
Jurisdiction. However, this law was dated and contained no AML/CFT provisions.
150. For R.27 the deficiency noted by the Assessors were inherently related to implementation
issues specific to the relation between the financial investigative team (FOT) and the FIUS
regarding financial investigations and the use of UTRs. Suriname has reported that in 2012
training has been provided to members of the FOT in Suriname and that same year two
members of the FOT attended financial investigations training in France. It is unclear how
the action taken by Suriname positively affected the implementation of R. 27.
151. There was one deficiency for SR. IX and the Assessors had recommended that the
Suriname authorities should decide on the choice between a disclosure or a declaration
system for cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments and put
in place such system aimed at discovering criminal or terrorist related assets without delay.
Suriname has reported introducing a border management system (BMS) in July 2012.
This BMS reportedly will register incoming and outgoing passengers and address threats
in the area of terrorism, illegal trade, drugs trafficking and illegal trafficking of immigrants.
To complement the BMS, on January 22, 2015, the Minister of Finance decided that a
declaration system be commenced from January 30, 2015. A copy of the declaration form
actually being used was forwarded to the Secretariat on April 21, 2016.
152. Suriname closed the deficiencies for R. 33 by amending the Surinamese Commercial Code
(O.G. 2016 No. 103) to abolish the issuance of new bearer shares and create an opportunity
for existing bearer shares to be converted to registered shares. This addresses the Assessors
recommendation for measures to be taken to prevent bearer shares from misuse for ML.
153. SR. VIII was rated NC and the Assessors noted a Complete absence of an adequate
legislative and regulatory system for the prevention of misuse of the non-profit sector by
terrorists or for terrorism purposes The MER at paragraph 611
(Suriname_3rd_Round_MER) had noted that There were no specific laws and regulations
with regards to NPOs To cure this deficiency, the Assessors had recommended that
Suriname Should see to it that laws are passed and other targeted measures taken to avoid
the misuse of NPOs for FT. On February 29, 2016, Act (O.G. 2016 no. 32) was enacted,
and brought into force on March 3, 2016, to amend the WID Act. This law is directly
related to the CDD obligations applicable in higher risk situations and was intended to
make enhanced customer due diligence mandatory for Surinames non- profit
organizations. In essence however, O.G. 2016 no. 32 has added transactions done by non-
profit organizations prior to the business relationship or transaction done during the
business relationship, to the list of situations, found at article 4 of the said WID Act, for
which service providers in Suriname are bound to conduct more stringent client screening
(enhanced due diligence) measures. These obligations are burdens placed on service
providers and are in no way applicable to the non-profit organizations themselves.
154. Inherently, none of the essential criteria for this SR has been met. SR. VIII is bounded by
the principles that countries would review their domestic non-profit sector with a view to:
ensuring that the existing laws are adequate; that pertinent information relating to the make-
up of the sector is available. There should also be an outreach to the sector and an oversight
regime put in place to raise awareness on TF risks and promote transparency. Here targeted
record keeping to ensure certain types of records are available to the public and the ability
to impose sanctions are required, as is the need to ensure that Surinamese NPOs are either
licensed or registered. These are just some of the obligations noted in the Interpretive Notes
and Best Practices Paper for SR. VIII. Surinames approach would not redound to any of
these measures being implemented because the stringent measures prescribed at article 4
of the WID are limited to customer due diligence to be carried out by the service providers.
This Special Recommendation is open.
155. The two deficiencies for R. 37 and R. 38 were identical. Suriname has addressed the first
deficiency by criminalizing the missing designated categories of offences. (See R.1).
Regarding the other deficiency, for a person to be extradited from Suriname there must
first be the presumption that the person to be extradited is guilty and the offence upon
which guilt is presumed must carry a term of imprisonment of one year or longer in both
Suriname and the requesting State. A person can also be extradited where they have served
at least four months imprisonment for a similar offence to which his extradition is being
requested. Finally, there must be a similar offence in Suriname and the person to be
extradited must have also breached that offence in Suriname. Suriname has provided
information, which shows statistics on requests for persons to be extradited from Suriname.
All such requests were granted based on court decisions. Suriname further advised the
Secretariat, on November 3, 2014, that the comments by the Assessors were made without
looking into the extradition law and since in practice no problems occur with the execution
of foreign MLAT's requests, there is no need to change the law.
OTHER ISSUES
156. Regarding R. 30, the staff of the FIU was increased to twelve persons and the budget for
2012 has been incorporated into the budget of the Ministry of Justice and Police. There
was the appointment of a senior prosecutor, within the Office of the Attorney General, to
provide instructions and guidance in the investigation of ML/TF cases; on October 1, 2012
the CBS recruited 40 trainees from the University to be employed within various
departments of the said CBS, including the supervisions department. After an initial six (6)
months orientation period (ending in March 2013) these employees were expected to be
assigned to the different supervisory sections of the CBS and trained accordingly.
Suriname, with the assistance of the U.S. Treasury Department Office of Technical
Assistance, has conducted two (2) onsite inspections of the credit institutions in April and
July of 2013. The inspection itself involved five (5) staff members from the CBS and
covered five (5) days onsite plus several days in preparation and post examination analysis
of gathered information and preparation of a report. This process has had the effect of
improving Surinames technical capacity to conduct future onsite inspections.
157. For R. 32, Suriname has reported having completed and distributed a template designed to
keep comprehensive statistics on the number of investigations, prosecutions, convictions
and mutual legal assistance. This template has been distributed to the FIU, FOT, Gaming
Board Prosecutors Office and the CBS.
2015 2016
1a NUMBER OF ML/TF CASES 9 13
ANALYZED
1b NUMBER OF ML/TF CASES 3 1
REPORTED
Law enforcement
2016
1. 10
a. Number of ML/TF cases investigated
Prosecution
2016
2. 3
a. Number of ML/TF cases prosecuted
b. 5
Number of perpetrators prosecuted ML/TF cases
3. 1
a. Number of ML/TF cases prosecuted ending in a conviction
2
b. Number of perpetrators prosecuted in ML/TF cases ending with a
conviction
4. What was the total amount of confiscated funds by court order $34.000
2016
7
a. Number of mutual legal assistance and extradition requests (including 12
requests relating to freezing, seizing and confiscation) that are made or
received, relating to ML, the predicate offences and FT
2016
b. The nature of the requests for legal assistance ML
2016
c. Number of granted requests 12
2016
d. Number of refused requests 0
f. The time required to respond on, or execute a request for legal 3 months
assistance
Incoming requests
Outgoing Requests
AML/CFT on-site and off-site inspections conducted by the supervision department of FIU
Suriname.
AML/CFT on-site off-site inspections conducted by the Bank Supervision department of the
Central Bank of Suriname.
In 2014 the Financial Market Department conducted 9 on-site inspections at money transfer offices.
ANNEX V TRAINING
CBS
Since 2013 several staff of the Central Bank has participated in AML/CFT training e.g.
- In 2014 Technical Assistance from US Treasury Department
- Anti- Money Laundering Examination Seminar, Federal Reserve System, British Virgin
Islands
- Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Assessors Training, CFATF, Trinidad and Tobago
Legal systems
1. ML offence PC i. It is recommended that i. Closed 6th FuR
legislation is adopted to
make insider trading and CBS is drafting legislation
market manipulation and regarding the supervision of the
terrorism and the financing capital market. In this legislation
of the same offences under insider trading and market
Surinamese laws. manipulation will be
criminalized. According to the
Suriname ICRG/CFATF Action
Plan 2012 this legislation should
come into force before the end of
this year.
i
Central Bank working group is
discussing draft legislation with
stakeholders. The draft was
prepared in collaboration with
CARTAC. The stakeholder for this
Suriname Eleventh Follow-up Report
May 31, 2017
2. ML offence LC i. Besides the criminalization A template to keep comprehensive Closed 4th FuR
mental element of FT, local authorities statistics on the number of
and corporate should see to it, that, as investigations, prosecutions and
liability soon as there is an act convictions is developed and will
criminalizing the FT, be formally distributed in August
comprehensive statistics 2012 to the stakeholders: FIU,
be kept on the number Prosecutors office and the Central
investigations, Bank. This is in line with the
prosecutions and Suriname ICRG/CFATF Action
convictions for the act of Plan for 2012.
FT
3. Confiscation PC i. The two shortcomings are Terrorism has been penalized in Closed 4th FuR
and provisional the fact that the FT is no art. I A of the Act dated July 29,
measures offence under Surinamese 2011 (O.G. 2011 no. 96). The
laws, and there are no financing of terrorism is penalized
statistics available to see in art. IC of the same Act, in which
how effective the art.71a was added to the Penal
legislation is in practice. Code.
Provisional and confiscation
measures also related to TF are
addressed, respectively in art. 82
Preventive measures
4. Secrecy laws PC i. The assessment team Article 9 of the MOT Act is revised Legislation to be prepared with
consistent with recommends that the in order to make sharing of regard to the sharing of
the relevant competent information possible, both, locally information by the FIU and the
Recommendatio and internationally. In line with the Gaming Board with other
authorities in Suriname be
ns Suriname ICRG/CFATF Action supervisory authorities.
given the ability to share
Plan for 2012, this legislation was
locally and internationally,
adopted by Parliament on the 17th
information they require to of July 2012 and entered into force
properly perform their on the 9th of August 2012.
functions.
Art 9 addresses the aspect of
sharing of information for
investigation and prosecution
purposes. Art 13 will be revised in
order to allow MOT to share
information with other supervisory
authorities i.e. the Central Bank and
the Gaming Board
5. Customer due NC Suriname should implement By amending the WID Act and the Closed 4th FuR
diligence the following elements from MOT Act, Suriname has
Recommendation 5 which implemented the following
have not been fully elements from Recommendation
addressed: 5. In line with the Suriname
ICRG/CFATF Action Plan for
2012, legislation regarding the
following elements was adopted
by Parliament on the 17th of July
2012 and entered into force on the
9th of August 2012.
ix.
vii. The obligation to obtain In legislation amending the WID
information on the purpose Act, ART. I sub F amendments are
and intended nature of the made to art. 4 for enhanced due
business relationship; diligence on higher risk categories
of customers, business relations and
transactions.
x.
xii.
x. There should be some In legislation amending the WID
consideration/assessment Act, ART. I sub C adds a new
made based on which there article 2a section 3 and 4,
is a satisfaction about prohibiting a transaction to be
compliance with the conducted if identification and
Recommendations by verification of the client pose
countries which are
xiii.
In legislation amending the WID
xi. There are no general Act, ART. I sub C adds a new
requirements to apply article 2a section 4 which requires
CDD measures to existing termination of the business
customers on the basis of relationship. Accordingly the
materiality and risk; business relation will be
terminated.
- Financial institutions
should be required to take adequate
steps to satisfy themselves that
copies of identification data and
other relevant documentation
relating to CDD requirements will
be made available from the
intermediary upon request without
delay (relationship based);
- Financial institutions
should be required to satisfy
themselves that the third party is
regulated and supervised, and has
measures in place to comply with
the CDD requirements;
- The intermediary should be
originated from countries that
adequately apply the FATF
Recommendations.
12. DNFBP R.5, NC In line with the Suriname Closed 3th FuR
Suriname should modify the
6, 8-11 ICRG/CFATF Action Plan for
ID law in order for it to cover
the full range of CDD 2012, Suriname has modified the
measures as set out in the ID law to cover the full range of
FATF standards CDD measures as set out in the
FATF standards. This legislation
was adopted by Parliament on the
17th of July 2012 and entered into
force on the 9th of August 2012.
In this regard, the following
elements are implemented in the ID
law.
13. Suspicious NC The reporting obligation under Criminalization of insider trading Closed 6th FuR
transaction the MOT Act should cover and market manipulation in the
reporting transactions related to insider capital Market Act will qualify
attempted unusual
transactions Based on art. III sub C of the CFT
legislation (OG 2011 no. 96)
The financial institutions that UTRs are filed with the FIU
choose to use an UTR-interface regarding transactions, which are
for reporting purposes, should suspected to be related to
be obliged to improve the terrorism, terrorist acts of terrorist
quality of the UTRs as soon as organizations. Art 12 MOT Act
possible and in such a way that already incorporates attempted
the disclosures contain all unusual transactions.
information as prescribed by Sub 1 of art. 12 was amended in
article 12.2. of the MOT Act. order to include UTRs based on
TF (Art. III of the Terrorist Act
(O.G. 2011 no. 96).
The authorities should
consider whether the
obligation to report unusual Art. 12 of the MOT Act, explicitly
transactions without delay is requires reporting of all unusual
sustainable. transactions or attempted unusual
transactions.
15. Internal NC i. The Surinamese The CBS has issued in April 2012, Closed 8th FuR
controls, authorities need to new AML/CTF regulations for
compliance ensure that financial institutions in line with
&audit Recommendation 15 in the recommendations of the MER
all its aspects is clearly with regard to the internal control,
required by law, compliance and audit. The
regulation or other regulations introduce a formal
enforceable means all requirement for the financial sector
of which requirements to appoint a compliance officer,
should be capable of who will be responsible for the
being sanctioned. design and implementation of the
compliance policy.
16. DNFBP R.13- NC Art 12 sub 1 of the MOT Act was The Gaming Board has
Suriname should address the
15 & 21 amended in order to include UTRs presented its action plan which
deficiencies and shortcomings
based on TF (Art. III of the includes matters related to
noted in sections 2.5 and 3.7
Terrorist Act (O.G. 2011 no. 96). their operations of which
regarding the functioning of
Reporting by DNFBPs of ML/TF supervision is part of.
the FIU and the application
is based on art. 12 sub 1 of the
and enforcement of the
MOT Act.
provisions of the MOT Act and
the Decree Indicators Unusual
Surinamese financial-
economic situation, thereby
increasing the amount of
reports to be received pursuant
to these indicators.
It should be noted that a
significant amount of
subjective indicators described
in the various categories are
very broad and actually do not
relate with the typical activities
pursued by the relevant
DNFBPs. For example, the
subjective indicators for legal
professionals cover various
services which are typically
financial services but are not
services provided by legal
professionals. Reference can
be made to sections 7 up to and
including 11 of the subjective
indicators for legal
professionals (category F of
article 3 of the Decree
Indicators Unusual
Transactions). Suriname
should address this issue in
order to ensure effective
22. Foreign NC 1) There should be a In accordance with art. 16 of the Closed 3th FuR
branches binding obligation on all Bank and Credit System
&subsidiaries financial institutions:
Supervision Act, the Central Bank
i. To pay particular has issued AML/CTF regulations
attention to the principle that address the requirement for
with respect of countries credit institutions to ascertain that
which do not or said regulations also apply to their
insufficiently apply foreign branches and subsidiaries.
FATF If standards of the foreign country
Recommendations; are higher, the highest standard
ii. Where the minimum should apply, notwithstanding the
requirements of the home country.
AML/CFT
requirements of home
and host country differ
to apply the higher
standard to the extent
that host country laws
permit;
iii. To inform the home
country supervisor
when a foreign branch
or subsidiary is unable
to observe appropriate
AML/CFT measures.
Ii
Under the Act concerning the
supervision of Money Transaction
ii. There should be a Offices the CBS is the sole
licensing authority for Money
general requirement for
money transfer offices Transfer Offices and Money
Exchange Offices.
and money exchange
offices to be licensed or
registered. In addition,
Ii
The Act on Money Transaction
Offices came into force on October
29th 2012. This act governs the
supervision of money transfer
companies and money exchange
offices. In accordance with article
26 of this act, the Central Bank has
specific authority to issue
regulations on among other
AML/CFT. Article 28 authorizes
the Bank to share information with
local and foreign government
bodies as well as institutions that
are responsible for supervision on
the financial markets.
24. DNFBP - NC i. Suriname should In the MOT Act a new art. 22 ( sub Regulations related to the
regulation, effectively introduce as 1b) has been added, which appoint supervision of the Gaming
supervision and soon as possible an the Gaming Board as the Industry will be drafted.
monitoring AML/CFT-based
supervisory authority for casinos
regulation and and lotteries.
supervision of casinos
in accordance with As supervisory authority the
Recommendation 24. Gaming Board can issue
This includes the AML/CFT guidelines.
institution of a
regulatory body with
adequate powers and In the new art. 22 (sub 1c) the FIU
operational is appointed as the supervisory
independence, and authority for all other DNFBPs,
invested with sanctions and is authorized to issue
instruments that are AML/CFT guidelines.
effective, In line with the Suriname
ICRG/CFATF Action Plan for
v. Suriname should
consider introducing
SRO-style bodies for
other (legal)
professionals, such as
civil notaries,
accountants and tax
advisors, with
mandatory
membership and
authority to regulate
and supervise these
professionals. Given
the total amount of for
example civil notaries
(currently 19 against a
legal maximum of 20)
this does seem quite
feasible.
25. Guidelines & PC i. Suriname is strongly For all service providers financial Closed 6th FuR
Feedback urged to introduce and non-financial guidelines were
guidelines for DNFBPs issued in October 2012 and part of
Institutional and
other measures
26. The FIU PC i. That the missing i. By Ministerial decree of the Closed 6th FuR
implementing legal Minister of Justice and Police, the
instruments be drafted organization chart of the Ministry
without further delay, of Justice and Police has been
so to consolidate the changed as of May 2011 and the
legal framework of the FIU has been identified as an
organization and independent institute.
functioning of the FIU; Art 2 sub 1 of the amended MOT
Act confirms the independent
status of the FIU.
ii
FIU personnel have been increased
from 4 to 12, including 4 analysts
ii. To substantially and 2 lawyers. The budget for the
increase the human and FIU has been incorporated in the
financial resourcing of budget of the Ministry of Justice
the FIU; and Police for the fiscal year 2012.
iii
Since September 2011 the FIU is
located in a new building situated in
the business area of Paramaribo.
iii. To move MOT to a The office space 170 m2 with a
location that ensures a 24/7 electronic security system.
secure conservation
iv
and management of the
sensitive information Since October 2009 a server (Local
and the safety of the Area Network) is in use by the FIU
staff; to store information. Sensitive and
confidential information are stored
in a secured database. Backups are
iv. To improve the IT made once a week.
security measures to
protect the sensitive
and confidential
information; v
The FIU has started with awareness
raising session for all service
providers since 2009, and will
continue.
v. That the sensitization Part of the sessions addresses
and education of all issues regarding typologies which
reporting entities are reported by service providers
should be substantially and documented in their UTR. By
enhanced by awareness doing so FIU is giving typology
vi
vi. To issue the necessary In the FIU guidelines as mentioned
guidance to the sector above explicitly in paragraph 3.2 a
stressing the time frame has been given for
importance of timely reporting of UTRs . When
reporting, particularly objective indicator is involved
of suspicious activity; reporting should
vii
According to art. 7 of the MOT
Act, the FIU can, on a case to case
basis, requests information from
vii. To increase the quality law enforcement and governmental
of the analytical agencies, to be used in the
process by analytical process.
systematically
querying all accessible viii idem
sources, particularly the viii
law enforcement and
Based on art.13 of the MOT act, the
administrative data
FIU will institutionalize a forum of
(including tax
government agencies including
information);
supervisory bodies for the financial
and the non-financial sectors in
viii. To fully exploit all order to collect information related
possibilities of to ML/TF or any suspicious
information collection, grounds for these activities. The
particularly by having government agencies will include
the supervisory and police, immigration, customs,
Central Bank and the Gaming
board.
ii
According to Articles 17 and 55 of
the Banking and Credit System
ii. The CBS should have
Supervision Act, CBS has the
the authority to
authority to enforce the AML/CTF
conduct inspections of
regulations and impose sanctions.
all relevant financial
institutions including ii
on-site inspection to The Supervision also regards
ensure compliance. AML/CFT guidelines issued
according to art.16 sub 1 of the
The supervisor should Bank and Credit System
iii.
Supervision Act.
have adequate powers
of enforcement and
sanction against iii
financial institutions
and their directors or In the MOT Act a new article 22 has
senior management for been added appointing the CBS as
failure to comply with AML supervisor of the financial
the AML/CFT sector. Under this legislation
requirements adequate powers of enforcement
and sanction for failure to comply
with AML/ CFT requirements is
given to CBS.
According to article 16, 17 and 19
sub 1 and 2 the Central Bank can
conduct AML/CFT on-site
inspections and impose sanctions
30. Resources, PC i. To substantially FIU personnel have been increased Closed 5th FuR
integrity and increase the human and from 4 to 12, including 4 analysts
training financial resourcing of and 2 lawyers. The FIU is looking
the FIU; into increasing the staff.
The FIU staff has been increased to
a total of 17 members. For the
analysts in depth training has been
ii. The CBS should provided by the OTA of the USA
consider creating a team Treasury Department in 2014.
of examiners
specializing in The CBS will increase the number
AML/CFT measures of examiners. All examiners will be
that check financial trained in conducting AML/CFT
institutions compliance examinations by the US Treasury
with AML/CFT on an Department.
ongoing basis for all
On October 1st 2012 the Central
supervised entities.
Bank recruited 40 young trainees,
right out of the university, for
placement on a number of
departments in the Bank. 15 of
PP
31. National co- LC i. Although the legal As of December 9th 2011 a AML Closed
operation mandate of the AML Steering Council was established
Commission does not consisting of the Minister of Justice
include the and Police, Minister of Finance and
coordination and the President of the Central Bank.
33. Legal persons NC Suriname should take According to art. 3a of the MOT LC 10th FuR
beneficial measures to prevent the Act, provisions are established
owners unlawful use of legal persons regarding a transparent system of
in relation to money identification of local and foreign
laundering and terrorist legal persons. Special provisions
financing. There should be have been made in art. 3a sub 4 for
adequate transparency the identification of religious
concerning the beneficial organization.
ownership and control of legal According to art. 6 jo. Art. 4 of the
persons. MOT Act, special attention is
The first time a foundation, required for business relationships
public limited company, co- and transactions regarding the
operative society / association identification of beneficial owners
or association is registered, the and control of legal persons.
information about the directors In line with the Suriname
is at hand and (most of the
ICRG/CFATF Action plan for
time) accurate. However there
is no information regarding the 2012, this legislation was adopted
(ultimate) beneficial owner by Parliament, on the 17th of July
and changes in directors or 2012 and entered into force on the
beneficial owners are not 9th of August 2012.
communicated with the
Based on art. 22 of the Bank and
registrars. Measures should be
Credit System Supervision Act it is
taken to ensure that the
prohibited to use bearer shares in
information with the different
credit institutions. Furthermore all
registrars is accurate and kept
shareholdings of 5% or more are
up to date.
iii.
Provisions have been incorporated
in the CFT Act (O.G. 2011 no. 96)
implementing UN Res. 1373. ART
IA sub 9, 71 a, 111a, 111b, 160 b,
188a, 228a, 228b of the CFT Act
(O.G. 2011 no. 96) i.a. criminalizes
the willful provision or collection,
directly of indirectly with the
intention that the funds will be used
in order to carry out terrorist acts.
art.1,4a,5,5a,5b,5c,5d,5e,6a,6b,6c,
7,7a,7b and 7c.
ensured, if necessary
through specific CBS is drafting legislation
legislation. regarding the supervision on
capital markets in this legislation
insider trading and market
manipulation are criminalized
according to the Suriname Action
Plan this legislation should come
into force before the end of the
year.
38. MLA on PC i. In order to enhance the According to art. 71a of O.G. 2011 Closed 6th FuR
confiscation and quality and no. 96, seizure and confiscation of
freezing comprehensiveness of goods and values, related to all
its MLA system, the designated predicate offences,
Suriname authorities including TF, has been made
should endeavor to possible.
complete their penal
legislation with a
speedy introduction of
the missing designated Provisional and confiscation
predicate offences measures also related to TF are
(insider trading and addressed, respectively in art. 82
and 82a of the Criminal Proceeding
stock market
Code, and in art. 50, 50a, 50b and
manipulation) and the
50c of the Penal Code as amended
offence of terrorism in O.G. 2002 no. 67.
financing, so as to avoid
all prohibitions The Act on Capital markets came
into effect on May 21th 2014. Art
resulting from the dual
19 and 21 respectively, criminalize
criminality principle. insider trading and market
manipulation
collect information
outside its register at the
request of a counterpart v.
FIU. One simple and The FIU is now located in a new
adequate way to realize building with an office space of
this is to put such foreign 170 square meters, with a 24/7
request legally at par electronic security system in the
with a disclosure, which business area in the capital of
would automatically Paramaribo.
bring them under the Additional IT security measures
regime of art. 5 and 7 of had been implemented to protect
the MOT Act; sensitive and confidential data.
iv. The confidentiality status
vi.
of the exchanged
In art. III sub C and D of the CFT
information should be
legislation (O.G. 2011 no. 96),
expressly provided for to
UTRs should be filed once a
protect it from undue
transaction is, or can be related to
access or dissemination;
TF.
ii.
ii. Suriname should The International Sanctions Act
forthwith initiate the came into force on May 21 2014
accession procedure to (O.G.2014 no.54) addressing the
the CFT Convention aspects of freezing of funds related
and take the necessary to UN resolution 1267 and 1373.
implementation steps. A State Decree to give effect to
art.2 of this law has been drafted
and is subject to approval of the
iii. UN Res. 1267 and 1373 Council of ministers.
should be implemented
fully and without delay
(see comments above ii.
on SRIII). On October 16th 2012 Parliament
adopted the Act concerning the
accession of the Republic of
Suriname to the International
Convention for the Suppression of
the financing of terrorism. This
legislation entered into force on
November 2nd 2012.
The instrument of accession to the
UN/ CTF Convention has been
deposited and came into force for
Suriname on August 18th, 2013
iii.
Provisions have been incorporated
in the CFT Act (O.G. 2011 no. 96)
to implement UN Res. 1373. ART
IA sub 9, 71 a, 111a, 111b, 160 b,
188a, 228a, 228b of the CFT Act
(O.G. 2011 no. 96) i.a. criminalizes
the willful provision or collection,
directly of indirectly with the
intention that the funds will be used
in order to carry out terrorist acts.
art.1,4a,5,5a,5b,5c,5d,5e,6a,6b,6c,
7,7a,7b and 7c.
SR.V International NC
i. The deficiencies Mutual legal assistance can be Closed 7th FuR
cooperation
established in respect of requested or provided in all
the criminalization of criminal cases, including ML/TF,
all designated predicate as stipulated in art. 466a (ART I B,
offences and terrorism O.G. 2002 no. 71)
financing should be
remedied forthwith. Draft legislation addressing the
Also the restrictive freezing regime related to UN
interpretation of the resolution 1373 was approved by
dual criminality the State Advisory Council and will
principle should be be sent to Parliament.
subject to The International Sanction act has
reconsideration. been enacted (O.G. 2014 no 54) in
order to comply with conventions
or binding resolutions of
international law organizations,
e.g. UN security council
resolution 1267 and 1373. This act
also provides for a freezing
regime in respect of assets
suspected to be terrorism related.
to an electronic transfer of
funds, remains with that
credit transfer;
- on the basis of a risk
evaluation, the receiving
financial institution should
demonstrate particular
alertness when information
regarding the payer is
lacking or is incomplete. In
the event that the required
information regarding the
payer is incomplete, the
receiving institution refuses
to execute the credit
transfer or makes a request
for the complete
information regarding the
payer. If a financial
institution regularly fails to
provide the required
information regarding the
payer, the receiving
institution takes measures,
which may consist of the
sending of warnings or the
imposition of deadlines,
before deciding to refuse
all future credit transfers
all originator
October 2016, page 12: Where
information is
technical limitations prevent the
transmitted with the required originator or beneficiary
transfer. Where information accompanying a cross-
technical limitationsborder wire transfer from
prevent full origination remaining with a related domestic
information, a record wire transfer, a record should be
must be kept for five kept, for at least seven years, by
years by the receiving the receiving intermediary
intermediary financial financial institution of all the
institution of all the information received from the
information received ordering financial institution or
from the orderinganother intermediary financial
financial institution institution.
An intermediary financial
institution should take reasonable
measures to identify cross-border
wire transfers that lack required
originator information or required
beneficiary information. Such
v. Effective risk-based measures should be consistent with
procedures for straight-through processing.
identifying and
handling wire transfer
Closed
Closed
ii.
SR.IX Cross Border NC i. The Suriname The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Closed 9th FuR
Declaration & authorities should collaboration with all stakeholders,
Disclosure decide on the choice will conduct a pilot phase in
between a disclosure or November 2012, after which it will
a declaration system become official.
for cross-border This system will detect incoming
transportation of and outgoing passengers and will
currency or bearer enable blacklisting, giving the
negotiable instruments Government tools to address