104 SCRA 710 Political Law One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill

Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest

concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the
operation of its forest concession. In 1956, Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5
thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation
of forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of
P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is
not covered by such provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its
enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to
the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a
forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to
forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And
out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in
logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08
because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid
during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence,
ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of
the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is An Act to
Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the
subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act
deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this
partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed
in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather
than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC.
HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that
there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and
proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec
5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso,
which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general
subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to
prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.
But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings
bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject
was held by Congress which passed it.
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval,
many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought
simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from
which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been in disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the
judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power
to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress
on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as

unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as
it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election
Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one
hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda
and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon
filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they
are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his
Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good
law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on
the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of

Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective.

HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes
a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding,
to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of

harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for
this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the
Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,
Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process
is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and
orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it
shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does
not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act
No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in

constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
Astorga v Villegas
Edit 0 1

Case Digest [Topic/Content, Brief Title of Case]

Title: ASTORGA vs VILLEGAS
GR No. 23475, April 30, 1974

Facts:
In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065.
He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police
force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA
4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition
with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas et al and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent
denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and
Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have
never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house
as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces
and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for
deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments
which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the
HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by
the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing
was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was
not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to
this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the
RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not
invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.

Issue:
Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly
enacted.
Decision:
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in
this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however
that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their
signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to
be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
18 SCRA 247 Statutory Construction Construction; defined Noscitur A Sociis

In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. The mechanics of the
contest were as follows:

1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period;

2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;

3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.

4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.

To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However, then
acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a
violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).

Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to
be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises.

According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot be
mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.

Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for declaratory
relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery
consists of the following elements:

a. consideration;

b. prize;

c. chance.

Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is missing. Said
element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything theres no consideration on
the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was merely
applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a
construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said contest, assuming
arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited
by the Postal Law to be mailed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.

2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

HELD:

1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Blacks Law Dictionary: Construction
is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

2. No.

The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no
consideration).

The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing
jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit
definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term gift enterprise was
used in association with the term lottery. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in
statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does
not include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail
of the Philippine postal service.
 Equal Protection 1978 Election Code Block Voting
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa
Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978
Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code,
grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper
spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the
candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided
for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot).
Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this
provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for
himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to
suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he
would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main objection of Peralta
against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent
candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name
of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an
advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that
the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as
provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his
ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will
receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party
group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by
party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In
the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to
join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before
filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law
accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such
alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a
political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision,
it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative
advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule
depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim
that he was the victim of discrimination.
 People vs. Purisima (Statutory Construction)
Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense
filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own
orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege
facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the
crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081which seeks to
maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of
lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished
from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in
particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the
weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary
in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or
conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory
offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.
Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of Illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to
penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion,
subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent
and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

 [Syllabus]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay

of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in
1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election
on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the
[1]

petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC,
however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall
election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a
petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial
court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and
required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
COMELEC approval. [2]

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time,
re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996,
the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the
petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation
maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its
law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. [3]
 Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996
recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was
set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every
three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor
Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the
SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK
election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for
barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do
not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added.]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be

interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to
[4]

subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of
office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates
the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to
petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by
petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
[5]

statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,

nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. [6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should

be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of
[7]

Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,

should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article
X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity
which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x
[8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the
local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding
the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The
electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a
recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring
to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next
regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. [9]
 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot
and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court
on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956.]
SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY
AUDITOR and the CITY ENGINEER, Respondents-Appellants.

DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering Respondents to
reinstate Petitioner as foreman (capataz), Garbage Disposal, Office of the City Engineer, Cebu City, at
P3.90 per day from the date of his removal.
The case was submitted to the court for decision on a stipulation of facts the most pertinent of which
are as follows: Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City,
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

at P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was
taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal
Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health Department to the Office of the City
Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition was not headed by
the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a person in the
Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code
as amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution. The court further held that the notation
at the bottom of Petitioners appointment to the effect that his appointment is temporary pending
report from the Government Service Insurance System as to the appointees physical and medical
examination did not make his appointment merely temporary.
First error assigned on this appeal is the failure to include in the complaint, the names of the persons
holding the Offices of City Mayor, City Treasurer, City Auditor and City Engineer, all of Cebu City, they
being designated only by their official positions. This is no reason for a reversal of the proceedings and
of the judgment. As said persons were sued in their official capacity, it is sufficient that they be
designated by their official positions.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words Civil Service in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of
the Constitution and the use of small letters for the same words, civil service, in section 670, Revised
Administrative Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the
above-mentioned sections of the Constitution. We see no validity in this argument. Capital C and S
in the words Civil Service were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in
the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no difference between the use of
capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the
unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are
expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights and privileges should be
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work
and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified
service. This cannot be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and
void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs.
Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778).
There is, however, an additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the memorandum submitted
by the attorneys for the Respondents in lieu of oral argument. This is the fact that as Petitioner was
removed on June 16, 1953 and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15
days, Petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being considered as having
abandoned his office.
We cannot or should not overlook this objection. If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform
to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in
law be considered as having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated. These
defenses are valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of
Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with approval
Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to take steps for
his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce to the order of
removal and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case of unreasonable delay he
cralaw

may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to recover its emoluments. (Mesias vs.
Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which may be
deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case decided by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States, 11 months was considered an unreasonable delay amounting to
abandonment of office and of the right to recover its emoluments. However, we note that in actions of
quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year.
This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the
part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year,
they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons
of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming
rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may
be unduly retarded; chandelays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be
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discouraged. The following considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be
applicable to employees in the civil service: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year
could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he
being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office
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should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples interest requires that such right should
be determined as speedily as practicable. (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off. Gaz., [8], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled
to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the
Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person
actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service
although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the
period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to
a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the
period of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the objection as to the
delay in filing the action is raised for the first time in this Court, not having been raised in the court
below. The above circumstance (belated objection) would bar the consideration if it were a defense
merely. However, we consider it to be essential to the Petitioners right of action that the same is filed
within a year from the illegal removal. The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed
against it subject to waiver. It is essential to Petitioners cause of action and may be considered even at
this stage of the action.
We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the
existence of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot
prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss. (Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off.
Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a causes of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a defense
(section 10, Rule 9).
For all the foregoing considerations, we hold that as Petitioner was dismissed on June 16, 1953 and did
not file his petition for mandamus for his reinstatement until July 1, 1956, or after a period of one year,
he is deemed to have abandoned his right to his former position and is not entitled to reinstatement
therein by mandamus. Without costs. SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and
Endencia, JJ., concur.