G.R. No.
198908, August 03, 2015
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution2 dated October 5, 2011,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318, which denied the
petitioner's appeal and motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-90-6616.3redarclaw
On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision4 declaring the marriage between
Virginia and Deogracio as null and void, the dispositive portion of which
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is hereby declared null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The status of their children, however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby
awarded to the petitioner.
As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains shall necessarily be
dissolved and liquidated but since the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing
or inventory of such property, the court cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are
given thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their conjugal partnership for the purpose of
liquidation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their
inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with
regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal
properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective
stand.
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order6 stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
On February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of Appeal
and for immediate execution pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-10.
On February 20, 2004, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss the
notice of appeal for lack of merit.
On March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004, the trial
court denied anew the motion for reconsideration.
In the disputed Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's appeal.
Virginia moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated October 5, 2011.
Thus, the instant petition for review substantially questioning whether respondent should be
deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.
The petition lacks merit.
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations between
Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage
before they are presumed conjugal.7redarclaw
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liability is concerned, is Article 1298 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code.9redarclaw
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 3610 of the Family
Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.11 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.12

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry
has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13redarclaw
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should,
therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did
not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work
or industry.14redarclaw
Citing Valdes v. RTC,15 the Court held that the court a quo did not commit a reversible error in
utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family
home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The rules which are set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
fact acquired during the marriage of Virginia and Deogracio. We give due deference to factual
findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case. A reversal
of this finding can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness.
There is none, in this case.
Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the
subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage.17 The certificates of titles and tax
declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is
not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in
the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."18 Thus,
the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses'
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly,
the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the
RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and the Resolution
dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are AFFIRMED. The
case is REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.

Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal
shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her
own efforts, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This Court keenly observes that only testimonial evidence was presented by the parties
respectively, to prove and dispute the claim of the other with regard to the properties and assets
acquired during the marriage. In the absence, therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove
the contrary, all the properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage are presumed
conjugal. Further, the testimonial evidence adduced by the petitioner aimed at establishing that
respondent took no part in acquiring said properties failed to convince this Court that the latter
be given only a meager share thereof.

While it may be true that management of the businesses referred to herein may have been
actively undertaken by the petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so
without the invaluable help of respondent. Even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the
house and take[s] care of the household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful
activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or
properties acquired by the marriage. In the same breadth, respondent must be considered to be
entitled to the same extent. Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that business was provided
by her mother and that, had it not been for that reason, the properties now subject of controversy
could not have been acquired. That may be true but the Court is not prone to believe so because
of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-serving allegations. Of
course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as
family man were made but the testimonies adduced towards that end, failed to fully convince the
Court that respondent should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property
because of his indiscretion.16

In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in
G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering the parties:
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,
vs. (1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced
DECISION by them in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361 with Philippine
National Bank;
PERALTA, J.:
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato
pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N. Barrido
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and its
Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of SO ORDERED.5
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No.
03-12123, which ordered the partition of the subject property.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the
propertys assessed value was only 8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCCs jurisdiction. Also,
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of respondent although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the
Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned the
ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on
following errors in the CA Decision:
January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
I.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
pecuniary estimation.
II.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the
Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT COVERED
BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN, JOSEPH
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.
property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT
No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to
the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children III.
choose to remain.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF THE
Furthermore, defendants counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION
10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary inconvenience brought
about by this suit; and an additional 10,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter others from THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6
following suit; and attorneys fees of 2,000.00 and litigation expenses of 575.00.
The petition lacks merit.
SO ORDERED.4
Contrary to Barridos contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Bilang 1298 provides:
Barrido. Its dispositive portion reads:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691)9
Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely 8,080.00, an amount which certainly
does not exceed the required limit of 20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall
within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the
instant case.
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barridos marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically
covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party.1wphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.14 Any
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found
to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 15
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.16 Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work
or industry.17
In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage
is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties
in the contract of marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error
in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family
home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the provisions on
coownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are set up to govern
the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the
names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and
cannot be converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the
subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be
divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
ALAIN M. DIO , G.R. No. 178044 The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner,

Present: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were
married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
- versus - NACHURA,
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
PERALTA, abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Promulgated:
the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
Respondent. January 19, 2011 learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned
that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts
of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

DECISION

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
CARPIO, J.: deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
The Case the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 The Decision of the Trial Court
March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil
Case No. LP-01-0149.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without
Dr. Tayagspsychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness
stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court
found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the
family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned
petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General,
Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and
VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of
Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not
apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. 7 Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1)
of the Rule provides:

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with
the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or
both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree
of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to SO ORDERED.
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for

purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
previous marriage void.11
G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984 during his lifetime in 1953, based upon the reasonable belief that the latter
is the me and exclusive owner of the said parcels of land and that since
then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and
MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY assisted by
continuously in concept of owners. Defendants - spouses further counter for
Ofrecinio Santos; and LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners,
damages and attorney's fees and in the alternative, for the value of the
vs.
improvements they have introduced in the premises.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE SPOUSES BEATO C. MACAYRA and
ALACOPUE MONDAY, respondents.
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claim that
their parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial
Jose B. Guyo for petitioners.
court and the appellate court rejected this claim of a "military fashion" marriage.

Epifanio Estrellado for private respondents.

The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed by Lucille, Margaret,
Florence, Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the
disputed properties were acquired. The father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899
American occupation forces who afterwards held high positions in the provincial government and
in the Philippine public schools system.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912
principally through the efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not
yet legally married.
The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both
deceased) lived together as husband and wife in Banganga, Davao; that out
of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein
plaintiffs, namely: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and
George, all surnamed Maxey; that during the period of their (Melbourne and
Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne
Maxey acquired the parcels of land described under Par. 4 of the com;plaint
as evidenced by the documents of sale marked as Exhibits 4-a and 5-1
(same as Exhibits Facts), Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact
Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953 the
parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not controverted by
the perties (Par. 1, /stipulation of Facts); that since thereof, the defendants-
spouses have taken immediate possession thereof continuously up to the
present.
As earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed properties were acquired in
1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime
after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan
Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs.
Beato C. Macayra.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, justice
demands that the woman should be entitled to the share of the property. Certainly she cannot be
considered mere adornment or only for man's comfort and passion." The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
Evidence, testimonial and document considered the Court hereby rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant declaring that:

Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court
1. Declaring the abovementioned sales as null and void;
of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of
sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof
with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, 2. Ordering defendant-spouses to return the said lands, and to pay for the
that the aforesaid realties were common properties of their parents, having value of the use of the same at the rate of P1,000.00 a year from 1953 until
been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; delivered, together with interests corresponding thereto at the legal rate;
and that the sales of the of the said lands in favor of the defendants-
spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was
3. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff actual damages in the sum
executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and
of P500.00 and attorney fees in the sum of P3,000.00.
consent; and that they came to know of the above mentioned sales only in
1961.
Defendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.
On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the
complaint and assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late
and lawful owners and possessors of the properties 'm question having Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial court, decease valid the deeds of sale,
purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne Maxey and ruled that the appellants are the absolute owners of the properties in question.
The appellate decision sustained the following arguments of the respondent spouses:
Plaintiffs' evidence is completely devoid of any showing that these
properties in question were acquired through the joint efforts of Melbourne
Maxey and Regina Morales. Indeed, if at all, plaintiffs' evidence tend to
establish the fact that Melbourne Maxey by virtue of his positions as Deputy
Governor of Zamboanga (p. 36, t.s.n. de la Victoria) School Supervisor in
the East Coast of Davao (p. 36, t.s.n., Id.) was more than in a position to
purchase these properties by his own efforts, his own earnings and without
the help of Regina Morales. On the other hand, we have the declaration of
Juana A. Morales, a widow of 68 years of age when she testified, the sister-
in-law of Regina Morales Juana A. Morales confirmed the fact that
Melbourne Maxey held the positions of teacher, provincial treasurer, deputy
governor, district supervisor and lastly superintendent of schools,
respectively (p. 203, t.s.n., de la Victoria). But more important is her
declaration that her sister-in-law Regina Morales had no property of her own
whence she could have derived any income nor was Regina gainfully
employed. (pp. 203-204, t.s.n., Id.) It must be remembered that the showing
must be CLEAR that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of these
properties. Here the evidence is not only NOT CLEAR, indeed, there is no
evidence at all that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of the
properties in question. In the case of Aznar, et al vs. Garcia, et al, supra, the
Supreme Court had before it the common-law wife's own testimony
claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint
industry. Her assertions however, were completely brushed aside because
aside from her claim that she took a hand in the management and/or
acquisition of the same, "there appears no evidence to prove her alleged
contribution or participation in the, acquisition of the properties involved
therein." (Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar, besides the absence of any
evidence showing that Regina Morales contributed by her efforts to the
acquisition of these properties in controversy, both plaintiffs and defendants'
evidence show that it was through Melbourne Maxey's efforts alone that
these properties were acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means
at all to have contributed in any manner to all its acquisition.
The petitioners raise the following issues in this petition:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LATE
SPOUSES MELBOURNE MAXEY AND REGINA MORALES WERE
MARRIED ONLY IN 1919, BECAUSE THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY
MARRIED AS EARLY AS 1903.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LIKEWISE, ERRED IN DECLARING THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF THE
LATE MELBOURNE MAXEY, TO THE EXCLUSION OF HIS WIFE REGINA
MORALES, BECAUSE THE MENTIONED PROPERTIES WERE
ACTUALLY ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY OF
BOTH OF THEM AND THEREFORE, THESE PROPERTIES ARE
COMMON PROPERTIES.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN UNREASONABLY
GIVING THE TERM "JOINT EFFORTS" NOT ONLY A VERY, VERY
LIMITED MEANING BUT A CONCEPT WHICH IS ENTIRELY ABSURD
AND UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IN CONSTRUING THE TERM, THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN
INTERPRETATION WHICH IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH COMMON
PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS AS WELL AS IN ACCORD WITH THE BEST
TRADITION OF THE FILIPINO WAY OF LIFE.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument that Act No.
3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal. Maxey and
Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act
No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter, it could not
have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919 through a marriage
performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no
provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an
exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or
arrangement.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne Maxey and
Regina Morales were married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact which we do not disturb at
this stage of the case. There is no showing that this factual finding is totally devoid of or
unsupported by evidentiary basis or that it is inconsistent with the evidence of record.
The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals' finding that the parcels of
land in question were exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey.
The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne Maxey and Regina
Morales took place only in February 17, 1919, still the properties legally and rightfully belonged
in equal share to the two because the acquisition of the said properties was through their joint
efforts and industry. The second and third errors mentioned by the petitioners are grounded on
the alleged wrong interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts". The
petitioners suggest that their mother's efforts in performing her role as mother to them and as
wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution to constitute the parcels of land in
question as common properties acquired through the joint efforts to their parents.
The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to the properties in question citing the case of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055)
on non-retroactivity of codal provisions where vested rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And,
assuming that Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the
disputed properties were exclusively those of the petitioner's father because these were not
acquired through the joint efforts of their parents. This conclusion stems from the interpretation
given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to mean "monetary contribution".
According to the Court
... This view with which this ponente personally wholeheartedly agrees for
some time now has been advocated by sympathizers of equal rights for
women, notably in the Commission on the Status of Women of the United
Nations. In our very own country there is strong advocacy for the passage of
a presidential decree providing that "the labors of a spouse in managing the
affairs of the household shall be credited with compensation." Unfortunately,
until the happy day when such a proposal shall have materialized into law,
Courts are bound by existing statutes and jurisprudence, which rigidly
interpret the phrase "joint efforts" as monetary contributions of the man and
woman living together without benefit of marriage, and to date, the drudgery
of a woman's lifetime dedication to the management of the household
goes unremunerated, and has no monetary value. Thus, in the case
of Aznar vs. Garcia(supra) the Supreme Court held that the man and the
woman have an equal interest in the properties acquired during the union
and each would be entitled to participate therein if said properties were the
product of their joint effort. In the same case it was stated that aside` from
 the observation of the trial court that the appellee was an illiterate woman,
there appears no evidence to prove appellee's contribution (in terms of
pesos and centavos) or participation in the acquisition of the properties
involved; therefore, following the aforecited ruling of the Court, appellee's
claim for one-half (1/2) of the properties cannot be granted.
In so concluding, the respondent Court of Appeals accepted the private respondents' argument
that it was unlikely for the petitioners' mother to have materially contributed in the acquisition of
the questioned properties since she had no property of her own nor was she gainfully engaged
in any business or profession from which she could derive income unlike their father who held
the positions of teacher deputy governor, district supervisor, and superintendent of schools.
We are constrained to adopt a contrary view. Considerations of justice dictate the retroactive
application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the
Civil Code which provides that changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by the
Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old
legislation shall have no retroactive effect, the Code Commission stated:
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The
question of how far the new Civil Code should be made applicable to past
acts and events is attended with the utmost difficulty. It is easy enough to
understand the abstract principle that laws have no retroactive effect
because vested or acquired rights should be respected. But what are vested
or acquired rights? The Commission did not venture to formulate a definition
of a vested or acquired right seeing that the problem is extremely
committed.
What constitutes a vested or acquired right well be determined by the courts
as each particular issue is submitted to them, by applying the transitional
provisions set forth, and in case of doubt, by observing Art. 9 governing the
silence or obscurity of the law. In this manner, the Commission is confident
that the judiciary with its and high sense of justice will be able to decide in
what cases the old Civil Code would apply and in what cases the new one
should be binding This course has been preferred by the Commission,
which did not presume to be able to foresee and adequately provide for
each and every question that may arise. (Report of the Code Commission,
pp. 165-166).
Similarly, with respect to Article 2253 which provides inter alia that if a right should be declared
for the first tune in the Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin, the Code Commission commented:
... But the second sentence gives a retroactive effect to newly created rights
provided they do not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. The
retroactive character of the new right is the result of the exercise of the
sovereign power of legislation, when the lawmaking body is persuaded that
the new right is called for by considerations of justice and public policy. But
such new right most not encroach upon a vested right. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 167).
The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the opinion of the Court of
Appeals that vested rights were prejudiced. We do not think so.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal
civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an
equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was
recognized through decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31,
1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through
judicial precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-
ownership may be acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is
only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs
through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.
This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman
who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage
must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to
earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. This article is
particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law" relationship was legitimated through a
valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing, the normal and
customary gender roles of Filipino men and women. No matter how large the income of a
working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running
the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the household. The fact that
the two involved in this case were not legally married at the time does not change the nature of
their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if she does
not contribute to filling that purse with funds. As pointed out by Dean Irene R. Cortes of the
University of the Philippines, "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands hand over
their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the
household. . . . And the famous statement attributed to Governor General Leonard Wood is
repeated: In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Cortes, "Womens Rights Under the
New Constitution". WOMAN AND THE LAW, U.P. Law Center, p. 10.)
The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs. Torres (28
SCRA 489) must include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or
business but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for
the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband
from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes" because there
is no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.
A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed and established, and
is no longer open to doubt or controversy; an immediately fixed right of present or future
enjoyment as distinguished from an expectant or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711; Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot be said of the
"exclusive" right of Melbourne Maxey over the properties in question when the present Civil
Code became effective for standing against it was the concurrent right of Regina Morales or her
heirs to a share thereof. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already
in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private respondents as
vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was still open to
controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable
law.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late
wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return
one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay
some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations,
however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is reversed and set aside insofar as one-half of the disputed properties are
concerned. The private respondents are ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs
of Regina Morales. No costs.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of
the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification dated March
9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20,
1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License
number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose
it may serve.[6]
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half
of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN
THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED
AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.[8]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.[9] However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.[10] In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.[11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, [13] renders the marriage
void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would
now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. [16] Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man,[17] -
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed
to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death
benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife
of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
xxxxxxxxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone
as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda.
de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, [20] where the Court awarded one-half
of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands
share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.[21]

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in
the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum
of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration
of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance
with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount
of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quohas
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of
either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-
92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following
the joinder of issues, the trial court,[1] in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is
hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the
custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
for proper recording in the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant,
the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."[3] (Italics supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property."[4]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family
Code should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground
of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." [5]
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147
is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; [6] it
provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38"[7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household."[8] Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination
of the cohabitation[9] or declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.[11]
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and
52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,[12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs
(2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43,[13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and
an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is
not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41[15] and 42,[16] of the
Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is
not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious,
that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the
trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her
answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4,
1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million
pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the
date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00,
plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty
percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together
with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2)
of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as
the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family
name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was
pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly
support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. [3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the
support pendente lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the
said Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners
appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision. [6] Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the
monthly support for the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two
Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the Petition
for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided
the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM
THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY
13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO
PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR
HEARING.[12]
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF
MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS
SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD
TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.[15]
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies
not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two
psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying
him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental
pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not
ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that
he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy,
as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he
chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he had no
desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to
reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the
parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a
breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be
awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where
damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were
awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion,
found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[16]
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the
Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 [17] of the Civil Code enumerates
the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the
instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or
injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In
granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have
assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely,
otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel
Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. . . .[18]
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of
his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have
been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of
marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the
part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in
fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary
damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
 With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court
explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission
has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest
(par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the
award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. [21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological
incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be
considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on
petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an
utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary
damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left
without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the
shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial
court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme
Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the
liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993,
226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was
ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art.
116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are
conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what
are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch
Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after
certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and
actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or
obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of
the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver
or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. In this particular case, however, there had
been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or
valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous
cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot
covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of
the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved
by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full
settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed
some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the
process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half
(1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive
legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code.
For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the
plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.[22]
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give
one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of
his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits
which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as
Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants
service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-
appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of
plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were
acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is
entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb
the ruling of the trial court.[23]
 Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do
not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab
initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of
equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on
the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake
of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of
the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination
of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation
to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine
that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage
to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has
also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-
ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be
stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the
Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. [25]
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the
same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the
parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the
court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it
is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005[26] and has,
therefore, attained the age of majority.
 With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also
now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has
attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No.
127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners
shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained
but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not
of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals
Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the
support pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, G.R. No. 159521
Petitioner, incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason,
Present:
humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
versus SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and worked hard for its development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and
GARCIA, JJ.
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
ERMINDA F. GONZALES,
Respondents. Promulgated:

December 16, 2005

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is respondent who is
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
psychologically incapacitated. He denied that she was the one who managed the pizza business
D E C I S I O N
and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties existing during their marriage.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta

Pizza representing 80% of the total management of the same and that all income from said
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision dated April 2, 2003 and
business are conjugal in nature.
Resolution dated August 8, 2003, both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

66041, entitled, Erminda F. Gonzales, plaintiff-appellee versus Francisco L.

The public prosecutor, in compliance with the directive of the trial court, and pursuant
Gonzales, defendant-appellant.
Section 48 of the Family Code,[1] certified that no collusion exists between the parties in asking

for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and that he would appear for the state to see to
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent,
it that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
started living as husband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married.

From this union, four (4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria
Each party submitted a list of the properties with their valuation, acquired during their
Angelica and Marco Manuel.
union, thus:
Valuation of Valuation of
respondent petitioner(Record,
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, (Record, p. 110) p. 111)
1. Acropolis property None P 6,000,000
2. Baguio City property P 10,000,000 10,000,000
Branch 143, Makati City, for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite,
3. Nasugbu, Batangas property 5,000,000 5,000,000
4. Corinthian house and lot 18,000,000 23,000,000
docketed as Civil Case No. 32-31111. The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically 5. Sagitarius condominium 2,500,000 2,000,000
6. Office 30,000,000 24,000,000
 7. Greenmeadows lot 10,000,000 15,000,000
8. White Plains 7,000,000 10,000,000 2) Awarding the custody of minors Maria Andrea and Marco
9. Corinthian lot 12,000,000 None Manuel to the plaintiff, and Carlo Manuel and Maria Angela with rights of
visitation given to both parties under an arrangement mutually acceptable
Personal Property (Vehicles) to both of them;

1. Galant 83 model None P 120,000 3) Ordering the parties to deliver the childrens legitimes
2. Toyota Corona 79 model - 80,000 pursuant to Article 50, in relation to Article 51 of the Family Code;
3. Coaster 77 model - 150,000
4. Pajero 89 model - 500,000 4) Ordering the defendant to give monthly support to Maria
5. Corolla 92 model 180,000 Andrea and Marco Manuel in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00)
6. L-300 90 model 350,000 Pesos within five (5) days of each corresponding month delivered at the
7. Mercedes Sedan 79 model 220,000 residence of the plaintiff staring January 1997 and thereafter;
8. Pick-up 89 model 100,000
9. Mercedes wagon 80 model 300,000 5) Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
10. Nissan Sentra 89 model 200,000 and dividing the conjugal properties between the plaintiff and the
11. 8Tamaraws - - defendant as follows:

A. 1) Plaintiffs share of real properties:

Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner used to beat respondent 1. Corinthian lot -------------------- P 12,000,000
2. Acropolis property ------------- 6,000,000
3. Baguio property ----------------- 10,000,000
without justifiable reasons, humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of people and even
4. Nasugbu property -------------- 5,000,000
5. Greenmeadows property ----- 12,500,000
in front of their children. He has been afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder 6. Sagitarius condominium ------ 2,250,000
P 47,750,000
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by his indiscriminate 2) Personal:
1. Pajero 89 model --------------- P 500,000
womanizing. The trial court found that: 2. L-300 90 model ---------------- 350,000
3. Nissan Sentra 89 model ----- 200,000
P 1,050,000
The evidence adduced by plaintiff was overwhelming to prove that
the defendant by his infliction of injuries on the plaintiff, his wife, and B. 1) Defendants share of real properties:
excessive and promiscuous hunger for sex, a personality disorder called
satyriasis, was, at the time of the celebration of marriage, psychologically 1. Corinthian house and lot ---- P 20,500,000
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage although 2. Office ----------------------------- 27,000,000
such incapacity became manifest only after its solemnization. P 47,500,000
The defendants evidence, on the other hand, on the psychological
incapacity of plaintiff did not have any evidentiary weight, the same being 2) Personal:
doubtful, unreliable, unclear and unconvincing.
1. Galant 83 model --------------- P 120,000
2. Toyota Corona 79 model ---- 80,000
3. Coaster 77 model -------------- 150,000
4. Corolla 92 model -------------- 180,000
5. Mercedes Sedan 79 model --- 220,000
On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of 6. Pick-up 89 model -------------- 100,000
7. Mercedes wagon 80 model 300,000
which reads: P 1,150,000
8. Four (4) Tamaraws -------------
6) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in cash the amount
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered: of P2,196,125.

1) Declaring the marriage contracted by and between
FRANCISCO L. GONZALEZ and ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO solemnized
by Rev. Fr. Alberto Ampil, S.J. on February 4, 1979, at the Manila Hilton
Chapel, Nuestra de Guia Parish, Ermita, Manila, NULL and VOID ab
initio with all legal effects as provided for under applicable laws;
7) Ordering the defendant who has actual possession of the
conjugal properties to deliver to plaintiff her share of the real and personal
properties, including four (4) Tamaraws, above-described, and execute the
necessary documents valid in law conveying the title and ownership of said
properties in favor of the plaintiff.
 contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household."

Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner appealed to the
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between
Court of Appeals. He did not contest that part of the decision which declared his marriage to
spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and
respondent void ab initio.
woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife

without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void
In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the assailed Decision
marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during
of the trial court.
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through

the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated July

23, 1997.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of

the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by

the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
properties should be divided equally between the parties.
household.

Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the Appellate Courts Decision
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza
declaring his marriage with respondent void. Consequently, their property relation shall be
business, petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she
governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code quoted as follows:
helped him in managing the business. In his handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989,
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife he admitted that Youve helped me for what we are now and I wont let it be destroyed.
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be

his partner in his pizza business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. the business in 1976. Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2)
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have manage the personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets. She
reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or

allowance.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general

rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this

Court.[2] Factual findings of the Appellate Court are generally binding on, especially this Court,

when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court, [3]as in this case. This is because it is

not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[4]

WHEREFOR, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, are AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997.[1]
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of property.[2] The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 30,
1998 states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the marriage between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno
F. Fehr on March 14, 1985 is hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved and in
lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is
established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to
the rights previously acquired by creditors.
Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR and PATRICK
FRANZ FEHR, is hereby awarded to petitioner, she being the innocent spouse.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various motions[4] filed by
respondent after the case had been decided. The Order pertained to the properties held by the
parties, thus:
xxxxxxxxx
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds
the following properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that
the same is owned by petitioners parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735,
considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive
funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx
Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be distributed in the
following manner:
TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:
a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m., covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 14734; and
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)
TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:
a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq. m. and covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and
b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)
Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of
respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer
ownership of Suite 204 in the name of respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 14735, being respondents exclusive property, acquired prior to his marriage.
Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the subject properties, namely
the Ground Floor Front (Fridays Club), Ground Floor Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at
LGC Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in
common, in proportion to one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting all expenses
for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal License fees, clearances,
etc. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to deliver to respondent the following: a) the
balance of his share of the monthly rentals from February 1998 to May 1998; and b) his one-half
share (1/2) of the monthly rentals of the aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this
date. Thereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals
derived from the properties adjudicated to them as stated above.
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children,
Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and medical expenses.[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication
of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged
that Suite204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent
were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family
Code. Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the best interests of the children if she
would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share in the support of the children.
She instead proposed that the Upper Basement and the Lower Ground Floor of the LCG
Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could use the income from the lease of said
premises for the support of the children.[6]
Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated October 5, 2000 that since the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-
ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common
pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, noted that the parties have
already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent
and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium
was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent. [7]
 On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the October 5,
2000 Order of the trial court.[8] Respondent filed an Opposition to the Notice of
Appeal.[9] On January 12, 2001, petitioner withdrew the notice of appeal [10] and instead filed on
the following day a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
questioning the findings of the trial court in its Order dated October 5, 2000.[11]
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26, 2001, dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. The appellate court stated that petitioner has not shown any
reason to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as the errors she raised were mere errors of
judgment which were the proper subject of an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari. [12]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied by the
appellate court.[13]
Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following arguments:
1) Petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 in the Court of Appeals in view of the
fact that the questioned orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of or lack of jurisdiction.
2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the questioned orders were errors of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.[14]
We shall first address the procedural issue, whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was
proper because the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its Order
dated October 5, 2000, and there were no other speedy and adequate remedies available. She
asserts that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Suite 204 of the
LCG Condominium was the exclusive property of respondent, although it was established that
they lived together as husband and wife beginning March 1983, before the execution of the
Contract to Sell on July 26, 1983. Furthermore, the trial courts ruling dividing their properties into
three, instead of two as provided under Article 147 of the Family Code, or four, as allegedly
agreed by the parties during a conference with the trial court judge on May 3, 2000, also
constituted grave abuse of discretion.[15]
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioner may no longer avail of any
remedy, whether an appeal or a petition for certiorari, as she had lost all the right to appeal from
the time the Decision of January 30, 1998 became final and executory. He argues that the Order
of the trial court dated October 5, 2000 is no longer assailable because it was merely issued to
execute the final and executory Decision of January 30, 1998. He also submits that the division
of the properties into three and the distribution of 1/3 share each to the petitioner, the
respondent, and their children was proper, in accordance with Articles 50, 51, 147 and 148 of
the Family Code mandating the delivery of the presumptive legitime of the common children
upon dissolution of the property regime. Respondent further claims Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium to be his exclusive property as it was acquired on July 26, 1983, prior to their
marriage on March 14, 1985.[16]
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As
a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy such as when
an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and
does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not
assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where
the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been
deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party
where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there
may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be
inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.[17]
The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject respondents submission that all the
appellate remedies of petitioner have been foreclosed when the Decision dated January 30,
1998 became final and executory. What is being questioned in this petition is not the January 30,
1998 Decision of the trial court declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trial court dated
October 5, 2000 dividing the common properties of petitioner and respondent into three1/3 to
petitioner, 1/3 to respondent and 1/3 to their children, and affirming its previous ruling that Suite
204 of LCG Condominium is the exclusive property of respondent. The issue on the validity of
the marriage of petitioner and respondent has long been settled in the main Decision and may
no longer be the subject of review. There were, however, incidental matters that had to be
addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order pertained to the division and
distribution of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, pursuant to the courts
directive in its main decision to dissolve the conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it
finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, and as such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via
ordinary appeal. However, considering the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind
adherence to the general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of
her just share in their common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income
to support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. We have held that where a
rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical
rules may be relaxed.[18]
We now go to the substantive issues. The crux of the petition is the ownership
of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent
should be partitioned.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of
long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latters
residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was
born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they
purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced
by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos
Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the
name Elna Mercado Fehr. Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was
issued in the name of petitioner.[19]
In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was
acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said
property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.[22]
and maintenance of their family and of the household.
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a
common property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the parties should be
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of petitioner and
respondent in accordance with this Courts ruling.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, [20] as in the case at
bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during
their cohabitation.

We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:[21]

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term capacitated in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Article 37 and 38 of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the
case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to
marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner
moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage,
however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents
psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment
basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together.
Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.

As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold
that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in the records that
support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties
into three1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact,
alleges in her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the
properties1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two
children. Moreover, respondents argument that the three-way partition is in accordance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to
voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e.,