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#1 G.R. No.

L-62603 March 27, 1990 ISSUE: WON the contract of lease is for definite or indefinite period of time.

UNITED REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, HELD: Definite period


vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REVEREND FATHER JOSE TORRALBA A reading of the two contracts of lease entered into between petitioner and private
SY, respondents. respondent hereinabove reproduced show that its period is from month to month
and that the lease may be terminated when either party gives a 5 days notice in
FACTS: In March 1964 and December 1964 petitioner and private respondent Rev. writing.
Father Jose Torralba Sy, entered into separate contracts of lease over two
apartments located at 913-E and 193-F Josefina Street, Sampaloc, Manila, with the No doubt such a stipulation between the parties demonstrates that the agreement
common provision covering its duration as follows: of lease is for a definite period and not for an indefinite period as held by the
appellate court.
To hold the same for one month from the (15th day of March, 1964 for Apt.
No. 913-E and lst day of January, 1964 for Apt. No. 913- F) and so on from Since the lease agreement in question is for a definite period it follows that petitioner
month to month at a rent of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00), Philippine has a right to judicially eject private respondent from the premises as an exception
Currency, per month, payable in advance on the first TEN (10) days of each to the general rule provided for in Section 4 of P.D. No. 20 which provides as follows:
calendar month, until the lease shall terminate, which termination shall be
determined by either party giving FIVE (5) days notice in writing. 1 Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph
(1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to
Private respondent removed the portion separating the two apartments and dwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be
converted the same principally for use as a Buddhist chapel. suspended until otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code
and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts insofar as they
On September 24, 1975, petitioner sent a letter to private respondent that effective are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply. (Emphasis
November 1, 1975 the new rental for the two apartments will be P500.00 per door supplied.)
or P1,000.00 for the two doors, likewise payable in advance within the first ten (10)
days of the calendar month, with the request that petitioner be informed of private #4 G.R. No. L-45164 March 16, 1987
respondent's decision as to the new rate not later than October 25, 1976 so that it
may be guided accordingly. 3 DOMINICO ETCUBAN, petitioner,
vs.
On January 3, 1977, petitioner through counsel furnished private respondent through THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS C. SONGALIA & GUADALUPE S.
counsel a xerox copy of said Opinion No. 629, Series of 1976 and demanded that the SONGALIA, respondents.
private respondent vacate and surrender the two premises within five (5) days from
receipt of the same and to pay his rental indebtedness minus the deposit made. FACTS: Plaintiff inherited a piece of land with an area of approximately 14.0400
Nevertheless, private respondent failed to vacate the premises. hectares together with his co-heirs from their deceased father. Said piece of land was
declared in their names as heirs of Eleuterio Etcuban under Tax Declaration No.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of Manila 06837 and was the subject matter in dispute in SP No. 1192-R, of the Court of First
on March 7, 1977. Instance of Cebu, a case for the settlement of the estate of the late Eleuterio Etcuban
In said case, petitioner Dominico Etcuban the spouse of the decease Demetria Initan
CC: Dismissed the complaint. and Pedro, Vicente, Felicitas, Anastacio, Froilan, Alfonso, Advincula, Anunciaciori
Jesus, Aguinaldo, surnamed Etcuban were declared as co-owners of the property in
CFI: Affirmed the decision of City Court. question. Thereafter the 11 co-heirs executed in favor of defendants (private
respondents herein) 11 deeds of sale of their respective shares in the co-ownership
for the total sum of P26,340.00. It is not disputed that the earliest of the 11 deeds of
sale was made on December 9, 1963 and the last one in December 1967. (Annexes " #7 G.R. No. 89307 May 8, 1992
1-11 ").
DR. MA. WENDELYN V. YAP, EVELIA H. BADIAGAN, TERESITA A. BALADAD and
In his complaint before the trial court, plaintiff alleged that his co-owners leased FLORENCIA C. DE VERA, petitioners,
and/or sold their respective shares without giving due notice to him as a co-owner vs.
notwithstanding his intimations to them that he was willing to buy all their respective DR. VERGEL G. CRUZ, THE HON. MARCELO R. OBIEN, as Presiding Judge of the
shares. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. BN-109 by petitioner for legal redemption. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 44, and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
TC: Rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
FACTS: Dr. Vergel G. Cruz, the private respondent in this case was
The appellate court in tackling this issue declared that plaintiff failed to make a valid the bonafide tenant of Amado Q. Bugayon, Jr. for almost five years in the premises
tender of the sale price of the land paid by the defendants within the period fixed by in question just before this controversy started. He religiously paid the monthly
Art. 1623 of the Civil Code which provides as follows: rentals of P1,400.00, introduced several improvements and operated a veterinary
clinic known as Malate Veterinary Clinic. Sometime in the latter part of July, 1985, he
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be offered for sale the goodwill of the veterinary clinic and some of its equipment to Dr.
exercised except within thirty (30) days from the notice in writing by the Wendelyn V. Yap, Evelia H. Badiagan, Teresita A. Baladad and Florencia C. de Vera,
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale the petitioners herein. During the period of negotiations, private respondent Cruz
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an introduced to the landlord Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap at the person interested in taking
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible over the clinic. However, the negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners
redemptioners. managed to enter into a contract of lease for the said premises at a monthly rental
of P1,800.00 with the landlord. As a result, private respondent Cruz brought an action
for "Forcible Entry with Damages" with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Branch 27 against petitioners herein and the landlord.
(1524a)

MTC: Rendered in favor of the plaintiff.


ISSUE: WON there is a valid legal redemption.

RTC: Affirmed
HELD: NO.

CA: Affirmed
The respondent court found that written notice was given to plaintiff-appellee in the
form of an answer with counterclaim to the complaint in Civil Case No. BN-109 which
appears on the records to have been filed on March 18, 1972. Said court ruled that ISSUE: WON the lease of Cruz was still valid and subsisting.
"this notice is sufficient to inform the plaintiff about the sale and the reckoning date
for the 30-day period commenced upon receipt thereof. No other notice is needed HELD:
under the premises because it is the substance conveyed rather than the form
embodying it that counts. We rule in favor of private respondent. When the petitioners and the landlord
executed a new contract of lease, the lease of private respondent was still valid and
The records reveal that on May 27, 1974, plaintiff-appellee deposited with the lower subsisting. There is no question that private respondent has not effectively
court the amount of P26,340.00 the redemption price. Since the answer with relinquished his leasehold rights over the premises in question in view of the failure
counterclaim was filed on March 18, 1972, the deposit made on May 27, 1974 was of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill. Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold
clearly outside the 30-day period of legal redemption. The period within which the rights is conditional in nature and has no force and effect if the condition is not
right of legal redemption or preemption may be exercised is non-extendible. complied with.
#10 G.R. No. L-58469 May 16, 1983 HELD: Personal property

MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as chattel
vs. by the private respondent is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property
WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC., and HONORABLE COURT OF the character determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New York v.
APPEALS, respondents. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by
agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property,
FACTS: It appears that in order to obtain financial accommodations from herein as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
petitioner Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the private respondent
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted and assigned several receivables with the From what has been said above, the error of the appellate court in ruling that the
former under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the questioned machinery is real, not personal property, becomes very apparent.
receivables assigned, private respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain Moreover, the case of Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. CA, 96 Phil. 70,
raw materials inventory as well as a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer heavily relied upon by said court is not applicable to the case at bar, the nature of the
Stentering Range. machinery and equipment involved therein as real properties never having been
disputed nor in issue, and they were not the subject of a Chattel Mortgage.
Upon private respondent's default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial Undoubtedly, the Tumalad case bears more nearly perfect parity with the instant
foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it. However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned case to be the more controlling jurisprudential authority.
to implement the foreclosure failed to gain entry into private respondent's premises
and was not able to effect the seizure of the aforedescribed machinery. Petitioner #13 G.R. No. 148759 June 8, 2006
thereafter filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VI, docketed as Civil Case No. 36040, the case before the lower court. GERMELINA TORRES RACAZA and BERNALDITA TORRES PARAS, Petitioners,
vs.
Acting on petitioner's application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure, ERNESTO GOZUM,1 Respondent.
the enforcement of which was however subsequently restrained upon private
respondent's filing of a motion for reconsideration. After several incidents, the lower FACTS: The plaintiffs are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land under Transfer
court finally issued on February 11, 1981, an order lifting the restraining order for the Certificate of Title No. PT-92411 situated at Amang Rodriguez Avenue, Santolan,
enforcement of the writ of seizure and an order to break open the premises of private Pasig City. Standing on this lot is a 2-storey, 3-door apartment. The property was
respondent to enforce said writ. The lower court reaffirmed its stand upon private formerly owned by the father of the plaintiffs, the late Carlos Torres.
respondent's filing of a further motion for reconsideration.
In 1981, defendant Ernesto Gozum occupied the back portion of the property on
The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and prohibition proceedings subsequently filed by a P3,500.00 monthly rental and continued to occupy the same even after the death
herein private respondent, set aside the Orders of the lower court and ordered the of Carlos Torres on December 26, 1993.
return of the drive motor seized by the sheriff pursuant to said Orders, after ruling
that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of replevin, much less of a chattel On July 1, 1995, plaintiffs sent Gozum a letter of demand to vacate [the] premises
mortgage, because it is a real property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, (Annex G, Complaint). After a failed barangay conciliation, on November 24, 1995,
the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove plaintiffs commenced an ejectment case [with the Metropolitan Trial Court] against
it from respondent's plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor, the Gozum. The case was, however, dismissed due to [a] technicality.
reason why all that the sheriff could do to enfore the writ was to take the main drive
motor of said machinery. The appellate court rejected petitioner's argument that
Almost two (2) years thereafter, on May 27, 1997, plaintiffs sent anew a formal
private respondent is estopped from claiming that the machine is real property by
demand letter to vacate on the ground that the verbal contract of lease over the
constituting a chattel mortgage thereon.
property had already expired sometime in July 1995, and the same has not been
renewed and since then, defendant had discontinued paying the monthly rentals
ISSSUE: Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property. of P3,500.00. When this latter demand was not heeded, on June 4, 1997, the present
complaint for recovery of possession or accion publiciana was initiated before the FACTS: On March 10, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. in the MTCC, alleging that "the [petitioner] sold to [respondents] a residential land
located in Sabang, DanaoCity" and that "the [petitioner] requested to be allowed to
RTC: Rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, ordering the latter live in the house" with a "promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a
and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises new residence." They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the
petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.
CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case
MTCC: Rendered in favor [of] plaintiffs (sic) spouses Renato Zamora and Melba
ISSUE: WON petitioner has cause of action. Zamora and against defendant Dolores Adora Macaslang, ordering defendant to
vacate the properties in question.
HELD: YES.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint
Undeniably, the foregoing averments constitute a cause of action that is based
primarily on unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Petitioners seek the CA: Reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in
recovery of the possession of the leased premises following the lapse of the term of favor of the respondents
the verbal lease contract entered into by petitioners predecessors-in-interest with
respondent. The allegation that the contract is on a month-to-month basis becomes ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that there was a valid demand to
material in this sense because it signifies that the lease contract is terminable at the vacate made by the respondents on the petitioner.
end of every month.17 Thus, petitioners may exercise their right to terminate the
contract at the end of any month even if none of the conditions of the contract had HELD: Ejectment was not proper due to defense of ownership being established.
been violated, and such right cannot be defeated by the lessee's timely payment of
the rent or by his willingness to continue doing so. The lease contract expires at the The respondents cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on their supposed
end of every month unless there is an implied or tacit renewal thereof as when the right to possession resulting from their having acquired it through sale.
lessee is allowed to continue enjoying the leased premises for fifteen (15) days after
the end of every month with the acquiescence of the lessor. Such exception, The Court is surprised why in plaintiffs letter dated February 11, 1998, marked as
however, cannot be invoked when notice to vacate is given to the lessee in which Exhibit "C" and attached to the same complaint, she demanded from the defendant
case the contract of lease expires at the end of the month.18 the whooping sum of 1,101,089.90. It must be remembered that this letter was
written five (5) months after the deed of absolute sale was executed.
Verily, respondents right to remain in possession of the property subject of the lease
was extinguished upon the expiration of the grace period mentioned in the July 1, Exhibit "E", which is a letter dated January 21, 1999, shows the real transaction
1995 demand letter. It thus becomes respondents obligation to turn over the between the parties in their case. To reiterate, the consideration in the deed of sale
property to petitioners, failing which petitioners would have the right to immediately (Exhibit "A") is 100,000.00 but in their letter (Exhibit "E") she is already demanding
resort to ejectment action to recover possession. Their complaint could thus fall the sum of 1,600,000.00 because somebody was going to buy it for 2,000,000.00.
under two kinds of ejectment suits, the first being for unlawful detainer cognizable
by the metropolitan or municipal trial courts under Rule 70 and the second being
Despite holding herein that the respondents demand to vacate sufficed, we uphold
for accion publiciana cognizable by the regional trial courts.22
the result of the RTC decision in favor of the petitioner. This we do, because the
respondents Exhibit C and Exhibit E, by demanding payment from the petitioner,
#16 G.R. No. 156375 May 30, 2011 respectively, of 1,101,089.90 and 1,600,000.00, revealed the true nature of the
transaction involving the property in question as one of equitable mortgage, not a
DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, Petitioner, sale.
vs.
RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA, Respondents.
Our upholding of the result reached by the RTC rests on the following circumstances lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over
that tended to show that the petitioner had not really sold the property to the the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse
respondents, contrary to the latters averments, namely: possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection
report from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They also
(a)The petitioner, as the vendor, was paid the amount of only stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91
100,000.00,26 a price too inadequate in comparison with the sum of regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
1,600,000.00 demanded in Exhibit E;27
MTC: Rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents
(b) The petitioner retained possession of the property despite the supposed to vacate the property
sale; and
RTC: Affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC
(c) The deed of sale was executed as a result or by reason of the loan the
respondents extended to the petitioner, because they still allowed the CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
petitioner to "redeem" the property by paying her obligation under the
loan.28 In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case
for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld
#19 G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006 from them the possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient
to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners, action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies
vs. the land at the formers tolerance or permission without any contract between the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by
FABELLA, Respondents. the owner.

FACTS: ISSUE: WON MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated HELD: NO.
as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo,
Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception
by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant
"A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the
Annex "B"; permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly,
defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is
building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of
possession thereof; Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot
they unlawfully occupied; These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause
of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state respondents occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they
that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a
possession that is later sought to be recovered.25

This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

(Note: yung ibang cases ay hindi related sa lease )

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