Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 192486 November 21, 2012 BONIFACIO PIEDAD, represented by MARIA INSPIRACION
PIEDAD-DANAO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and
EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, respondents.
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD
VIRAY, Petitioners, DECISION
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI, Respondents. PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than Bonifacio moved for reconsideration but was, however, denied.
one year, one may avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the
better right of possession, or possession de jure, of realty Hence, this petition.
independently of title. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an
action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly reversed the RTC ruling and,
possession.48 consequently, dismissed Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
and Damages against Sps. Gurieza.
#2
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property On September 1, 2001, petitioner Marcela M. Dela Cruz occupied and
from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the possessed the questioned property pursuant to the alleged
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
Enciso Benitez, without the authority and consent of the Hermanos.
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
On September 27, 2001, A. Hermano, through a counsel, sent a formal
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material demand letter to Dela Cruz to vacate and turn over the possession of
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of the property and to pay P 20,000 a month as rent starting September
ownership by any of the parties. 17 1, 2001.
Thus, under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint Respondent appealed the decision at the RTC; the said court, however,
must be filed "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
affirmed the decision of the lower court entoto. The same filed a
withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the defendant
originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a petition for review at the CA, of which, granted the petition, reversed
contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) eventually, the defendant's and set aside the decision of RTC. Furthermore, the court rendered a
possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by decision declaring Hermano as the lawful possessor of the property
the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the and order Dela Cruz to vacate the same. With the CAs decision,
defendant's right of possession; (c) thereafter, the defendant remained petitioner filed a petition for review at the Supreme Court.
in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment
thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has adequately pleaded and proved
withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment. 19 a case of forcible entry.
In this light, the Court shall solely resolve the issue as to who between HELD: The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession
the parties has the better right of possession de facto over the subject carries with it the concomitant burden of establishing ones case by a
lot. Corollary thereto, issues pertaining to ownership are better
preponderance of evidence. To be able to do so, respondents herein
threshed out in another action instituted for such purpose.
must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court holds that Bonifacio of that of petitioner. It is not enough that the allegations of a
had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer. complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must prove
prior physical possession. It is the basis of the security accorded by law
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus holds that the CA erred in to a prior occupant of a property until a person with a better right
dismissing Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
acquires possession thereof.
against Sps. Gurieza.
Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO
proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the
AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO, Respondents.
concept of owner based on the presumption that no one in ones right
G.R. No. 160914
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in ones actual or
March 25, 2015
constructive possession.
G.R. No. 201286 July 18, 2014 The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action for
failure by the respondent to prove prior physical possession which is
INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner, required in a complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, RTC reversed the
vs. MTCC decision stating that MAHA was able to prove by preponderance
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS, of evidence that petitioners occupation was by mere tolerance and
RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C.
their occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that they
ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
vacate the property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling
that the cause of action was an unlawful detainer case.
CARPIO, J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a superior right of possession
FACTS: over the property in question.
The respondents, as co-owners of Lot No. 1595-A, with an assessed HELD: No. The evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property,
value of assessed value of P57,960 and a market value of P264,930, MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire
filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory
portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. But when
Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with
they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand
Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City against the petitioner, Inocencia Tagalog. In their for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already
complaint, the respondents alleged that Inocencia occupied a portion expired or had been terminated. Well settled is the rule that a person
of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis on the who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
basis of a verbal contract. When Inocencias house of light material permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
was damaged in a typhoon, Inocencia discontinued paying rent and by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which,
stopped inhabiting the house. They then demanded that she remove
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him
the debris, and vacate the land as they will subdivide and develop it for
which in the present case is an unlawful detainer case.
their own use. Inocencia however refused to vacate, instead she
constructed a two-storey house made of concrete. They informed the
Office of the Municipal Engineer of the construction of the house #8
without their consent and the required building permit. Despite the
[G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011]
warning given by the municipal official, Inocencia proceeded with the
construction. In her Answer, Inocencia asserted that the lease contract
SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND failure to allege prior physical possession in his complaint for the first
DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS. time on appeal.
Besides, said the RTC, since the complaint alleged that Servillano
ABAD, J.: owned the property, it may be presumed that he also had prior
possession of it.
FACTS: No evidence to the contrary having been presented, the presumption
stood.
This case is about a) the need, when establishing the jurisdiction of the
court over an action for forcible entry, for plaintiff to allege in his Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for review with the Court
complaint prior physical possession of the property and b) the need for of Appeals (CA).
plaintiff to prove as well the fact of such prior physical possession. The CA rendered a decision, annulling the decisions and orders of
both the MeTC and the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims he and his wife, Dr.Estrella E. Gavilan- The CA pointed out that Abad merely alleged in his complaint that he
Abad, bought a registered property from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis leased the property to Teresita after he and his wife bought the same
Farrales. and that, thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the same.
The latter were the wife and sons, respectively, of the late brother of Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional averment of prior physical
respondents Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-Villamayor possession, the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his action.
(Daisy). Teresita operated a boarding house on the property. Further, Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual possession from 1967
through the barangay certification. Since the MeTC had no jurisdiction
Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house over the case, all the proceedings in the case were void.
themselves, they agreed to lease the property back to Teresita so she
could continue with her business. Abad moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence, in
But, although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly the present petition for review.
abandoned the boarding house, forcing the Abads to take over by
engaging the services of Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the ISSUES:
boarding house business.
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint the
Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have certain damage to some jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property
toilets repaired. to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and
While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house painters
to give the boarding house fresh coat of paint. Oscar and Daisy came, 2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved that he
accompanied by two men, and forcibly took possession of the enjoyed prior physical possession of the property in question.
boarding house.
Frightened, the painters called the Abads who immediately sought HELD:
police help. The Abads were later appeased, however, when they
learned that the intruders left the place. AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE
Two days later, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy Yes, Abad sufficiently alleges in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of
forcibly entered and took possession of the property once again. prior physical possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with
Because of this, petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a complaintfor jurisdiction over his action.
forcible entry against the two before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC). Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to enable
first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized the place. had prior physical possession of the property; and, second, that the
They claimed ownership of it by inheritance. defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force,
They also claimed that they had been in possession of the same from intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.
the time of their birth.
That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967 as attested There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint
to by a March 31, 2003 certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro. that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject property.
The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as
While the defendants admitted that Daisy herself ceased to reside on one "of which they have complete physical and material possession of
the property as early as 1986, they pointed out that she did not the same until deprived thereof."
effectively give up her possession. Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffsprior physical
Oscar and Daisy further claimed that when their parents were still possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to
alive, the latter mortgaged the property to a bank to secure a loan. confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees.
After their mother passed away, they decided to lease portions of the The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his
property to help pay the loan. Daisy managed the operation of the allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules.
boarding house. It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that
To bolster their claim, Oscar and Daisy presented copies of rental dispossession took place under the required conditions.
receipts going back from 2001 to 2003. They would not have been able
to lease the rooms unless they were in possession. It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make
out a case for forcible entry.
Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to dismiss the action on the The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to
ground of failure of Abad to show that he and his wife enjoyed prior prove that he had prior physical possessionfor this gives him the
physical possession of the property, an essential requisite in forcible security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a
entry cases. better right lawfully ejects him.
Abad's allegation that he and his wife immediately leased the
property after they bought it was proof that they were never in Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the
possession of it for any length of time. property after buying the same since they immediately rented it to
Teresita who had already been using the property as a boarding house.
The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of ownership
Daisy could not acquire ownership of the property since it was that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession of the same.
registered.
And, as owner, Abad was entitled to possession. But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September
2002.
Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy went up to the Regional Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have proved that they had been
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. renting spaces in the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by
The RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC in its totality. receipts that they issued to their lessees.
It held that Oscar and Daisy could no longer impugn the jurisdiction This was long before they supposedly entered the property, using
of the MeTC over the action since they raised the ground of Abad's force, in 2002.
Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited receipts covered rents in a changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of
place called "D's Condominium" in Sampaloc, Manila, and were only possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.Further, since
made to appear through handwritten notations that they were issued the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on August
for rooms in the property subject of the suit. 5, 2003 marked the passage of the one year limit from demand
But a close examination of the receipts shows that "D's required in ejectment suits.
Condominium" was just the name that Daisy employed in her business
of renting rooms. The receipts did not necessarily describe another ISSUES:
place.
Indeed, they provided blank spaces for describing as the subject of 1. Whether or not the amended complaint changed the cause of
rent the property subject of this case. action
And, except for Abad's bare claim that Teresita and his sons had long 2. Whether or not the action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC
been in possession before they sold it to him and his wife, he offered
no evidence to show that this was in fact the case. HELD:
For these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove Second, the Court ruled that this is not an action for forcible entry,
prior physical possession in his favor. since the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in
The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force,
entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint. intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of
eviction suit.
The Court ruled that this is an action for unlawful detainer: (1) the
#9 defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs notice
G.R. No. 178159 March 2, 2011 to defendant, terminating the latter's right of possession; (3) the
defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the
enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff's last
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioner,
demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a
vs.
complaint for ejectment. If the defendant had possession of the land
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
upon mere tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at
the beginning of defendants possession.
ABAD, J.:
Here, while there was no specific allegation of "tolerance" in the
FACTS: complaint, the Court concedes that the rules do not require the
plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact language of such rules.The
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands inSan Rafael, Dionisios alleged that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant and that
Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo) when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under
cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs a promise that she would leave upon demand.These allegations clearly
permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon imply the Dionisios "tolerance" of her (or any of her assignees).
demand.In September 1989, spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the
Dionisios) bought the property from Cruz. In April 2002, the Dionisios Petition is GRANTED.
found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already
Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength of a The decision of the CA is reversed and that of the MTC reinstated.
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" dated April 7, 1977. #10
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded that Wilfredo vacate the G.R. No. 176341 July 7, 2014
land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction
suit against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael,
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Bulacan.Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in which he
vs.
declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint.The
Dionisios filed their amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo
maintained his original answer. DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked Wilfredo to vacate the DOCTRINE:
property and pay rent and costs. The RTC affirmed, adding that the The date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
action was one for forcible entry. The CA, however, reversed. The CA counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively
FACTS: Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit
Manuel Torres, assigned three (3) parcels of land to Tormil Realty & in March 1994 up to November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to
Development Corporation located in Pasay City and all improvements possess the premises was not challenged. It was only after Tormil
thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said corporation. prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the same that it terminated
However, despite the assignment, title to the real properties remained Pro-Guards right to possess the unit it was occupying through a letter
in the name of Manuel Torres. Later on Manuel Torres unilaterally to vacate dated November 16, 1998. Hence, it is only from that point
revoked the assignment. that Tormil is considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-
Guards occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guards possession became
Subsequently, Manuel Torres and Edgardo Pabalan established Torres- unlawful at that same moment. This is supported by the allegation in
Pabalan Realty Incorporated. As part of his capital contribution, Manuel the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not because
Torres, assigned the three (3) parcels of land to Torres-Pabalan Realty of non-payment of rentals, but because of withdrawal of tolerance.
Incorporated. Edgardo Palaban was then the General Manager and Tolerance or [t]oleration is defined as the act or practice of permitting
Administrator of Tormil Realty & Development Corporation and he or enduring something not wholly approved of, while tolerated acts
later on resigned. In 1985, the construction of the Torres Building on are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner
the land was completed and was rented out. of the property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case with the SEC to compel Manuel ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice
Torres to fulfil his obligation by turning over the documents necessary to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.
to effect the registration and transfer of titles in the name of the
properties assigned to it by Manuel. With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is
settled that: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters
Edgardo was the Administrator of Torres-Pabalan Realty. He then set tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
up a law office together with Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura on the 2nd necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
floor of the building. Torres building was later then declared for tax demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
purposes. remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
SEC, then made a decision in favour of Tormil which was later affirmed continued by tolerance of the owner.
by SEC EnBanc. Manuel appealed to the CA. During the pendency In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of
thereof, Pro-Guard entered into a lease contract with Edgardo for the possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
lease of a unit at the 3rd floor of the building. In exchange for the rental
payments, Pro-Guard provided security services to Torres-Pabalan. Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is obliged to
consign the payment of rentals. One legal cause for consignation is
Then the CAs decision was released. CA ruled in favour or Tormil. when two or more persons claim the same right to collect. Various
claimants to a debtor's payment must have the appearance of a right
Tormil then sent letters to the law office and Pro-Guard to settle their to collect such that the debtor would have a reasonable doubt, not
accounts with the previous owner and enter into new lease contracts based on negligence, as to who is entitled to the payment.
with Tormil. Since Tormils letters were ignored, it sent demand letters
to vacate the premises and pay their rentals from the time they have The dispute regarding the validity of Manuel's assignment to
occupied the said rented units. Since, their letter was once again Tonnil of the realties was pending before the SEC, Tormil did not claim
unheeded, Tormil filed an ejectment suit with the MeTC against to Pro-Guard that it is the true owner of the premises. It neither sought
Edgardo and Augustus and Pro-Guard. payment of rentals which it now claims Pro-Guard should have
consigned during the pendency of its suit against Manuel.
Tormil averred that the occupancy by defendants of units in Torres
building was out of tolerance. As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-Guard, the lease contract
remained to be then between it and Torres-Pabalan.
Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormils ownership of the parcels of The latter was occupying and running the building, as evidenced by
land where the building stands and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was several tax declarations in its name which, while not conclusive proofs
the owner of the same. It was also the onewho funded the buildings of ownership, nevertheless, are good indicia of possession in the
construction. Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the building were concept of owner.
surreptitiously and unlawfully cancelled on the sole basis of the SEC
Case. Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was paying rentals to the Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act on behalf of Torres-
owner, Torres-Pabalan, in the form of security services provided to the Pabalan, administered the premises. Pro-Guard is not permitted to
latter. It likewise called attention to the fact that it was no longer in the deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
premises as Tormil forcibly ousted it therefrom. relation of landlord and tenant between them.
MeTC ruled in favour of Tormil. RTC affirmed MeTC ruling. CA likewise Pro-Guard is ordered to pay reasonable and fair rentals
affirmed the decision. All the courts have ruled that Tormil have beginning Nov. 16, 1998 up to the time that the premises are fully
sufficiently proved its entitlement to possession of the property. What vacated.
is left is the determination of the reckoning point when Pro-guard and
Edgardo and Augustus will pay the rentals. #11
KAPUNAN, J.: possession of the property. Proceeding in the case were suspended
with the filing for Annulment of Title with Reconveyance and
FACTS: Damages by Lucio Arvisu and several of private respondents. The first
ejectment case was eventually dismissed and the judgment of dismissal
attained finality. The ejectment case was later resolved in favor of
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC of petitioners, but on appeal, the case was dismissed without prejudice to
Tanza, Cavite against private respondents as defendants. Subject of the the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial question in the
complaint was a 21,435 square meter parcel of land in Sta. Cruz de second case filed by Lucio Arvisu against petitioners.
Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite with title in the names of Maria,
Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina Arcal. It was alleged that defendants
occupied the subject land thru plaintiffs implied tolerance, or Because of the pendency of the cases involving ownership, the
permission but without contract with plaintiffs. From the dates of their proceedings in the first ejectment case were suspended. Petitioner
occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from could not but await the outcome of these case and preserve the status
defendants, nor the latter pay to plaintiffs any rental for their quo.
occupancy therein;
The rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer must be filed within
Meanwhile, Lucio Arvisu and substantially all defendants filed with RTC one year from demand, demand being jurisdictional. This one-year
of Cavite, a civil case for Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and period is counted from the last demand. An unlawful detainer suit
Damages against Salud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deseased), involves solely the issue of physical or material possession over the
Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal. The said complaint was property or possession de facto, that is who between the plaintiff and
ordered to be dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute. An the defendant has a better right to possess the property in question. In
appeal was made to the Court and said appeal was considered the case at bar, petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer was
abandoned and dismissed. confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession of the property
and was resorted to after private respondents has indubitably failed in
their suit assailing petitioners right to ownership.
With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs, except Virgilio
Arcal, MTC rendered a favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs
ordering defendants among others, to vacate the property in question
and remove residential houses and improvements introduced therein
and return the possession thereof to plaintiffs. #12 NONE
On appeal with the RTC by defendants, the foregoing decision was G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014
reversed and set aside, and the said complaint for ejectment was
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of the proper action after the
prejudicial question is resolved in a fair and adversary proceeding. FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to vacate the
premises in question, but they proved futile as they refused and failed,
and still refuse and fail to vacate the premises, to the damage and BERSAMIN, J.:
prejudice of plaintiffs.
#13 NONE
Private respondents failed to file their answer, prompting petitioners to
file a motion to render judgment. MTC held that petitioners are G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014
registered owners of the property and as much they have the right to
enjoy possession thereof. On appeal, RTC affirmed in toto the MTC's
decision. ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact
EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
Private respondents filed a petition for review with CA. CA, ruled in
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
favor of the private respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
ISSUE:
#14
Whether or not the complaint filed does not constitute an unlawful
detainer suit. (NO)
G.R. No. 203760 December 3, 2014
HELD:
HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural
guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA, Petitioner,
CA made the conclusion that from the allegations in the complaint, it
vs.
can be gleaned that private respondents did not actually occupy the SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.
subject property upon the tolerance of petitioners, as tolerance was
withdrawn when demands to vacate were made on private
respondents prior to the commencement of the ejectment case; PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
therefore, unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy. The SC
disagreed with CA.
The Facts
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession In his forcible entry complaint, petitioner Homer C. Javier, represented
becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia, alleged that he
possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A person is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who was the
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located at Corner
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal (subject
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, land). Petitioners family contented that since Javier was born, he has
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The lived in the residential house erected thereon. Upon Vicentes death,
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession over
from the date of the demand to vacate. the same. On March 26, 2007, despite the petitioners vigorous
objections, respondent Susan Lumontad gained entry into the subject
land and started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on
a 150 sq. m. portion thereof. The dispute was submitted to barangay 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the
conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between the dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint.
parties.11 Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent Hence, it was erroneous to conclude that petitioner only made a
the instant forcible entry complaint, averring, in addition to the general allegation that respondents entry in the premises was made by
foregoing, that reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of means of force and intimidation47 and, consequently, that a forcible
the above-said portion may be fixed at 5,000.00 per month.12 entry case was not instituted before the MTC. Given that a forcible
In her Answer respondent admitted that during Vicentes lifetime, he entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus
indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject land. erred in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the
Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the merits in an action for recovery of possession and ownership, otherwise
subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY- known as an accion reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section
002-1303115 in her name.16 Hence, she took possession of the said 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which reads:
portion not as aan illegal entrant but as its owner.17 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, petitioner's forcible
The MTC Ruling entry complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.19 SO ORDERED.
It was found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two
(2) lots: the first lot, with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to
petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and #15
where the subject building was erected, was given to one Anthony de
la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, G.R. No. 158231 June 19, 2007
but was eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through
sale.20 Based on this finding, the MTC concluded that petitioner had BABY ARLENE LARANO,* Petitioner,
no cause of action against respondent since she was merely exercising vs.
her rights asthe owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided lot.21 SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION and RAFAELA T.
Also, the MTC observed that petitioners complaint failed to aver the CALENDACION,** Respondents.
required jurisdictional facts as it merely contained a general allegation
that respondents entry into the disputed portion was made by means
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
of force and intimidation, without specifically stating how, when, and
where were such means employed. With such failure, the MTC
intimated that apetitioners remedy should either be an accion FACTS:
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria instituted before the proper Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated
forum.22 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC. in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna.
RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and ordered respondent to petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby
vacate the disputed portion and surrender possession thereof to the latter agreed to buy a 50,000-SQM portion of
petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500K as down payment
amounts of P5,000.00 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said and the balance payable in nine installments of P500K each, until
portion, as reasonable compensation for its use and occupation, and September 2001.
P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, including costs of suit.24 Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of
On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being the owner and the riceland was transferred to respondents under the
possessor of the property in question, has the right to be respected in CONDITION that they shall account for and deliver the
his possession and that respondent forcibly and unlawfully deprived harvest from said riceland to petitioner. However,
him of the same.27 RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY the installments and to
Unconvinced, respondent moved for reconsideration, which was account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland.
denied. Thus the petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. Petitioner sent a demand letter to vacate the riceland within 10
The CA Ruling days from receipt thereof, but the demand went unheeded.
Set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the latter court for Consequently, she filed on an unlawful detainer case
trial on the merits.31 It held that the issue of possession of the subject respondents before the MTC.
land is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership, such that the Respondents allege that: (a) a Contract to Sell was executed but
former issue cannot be determined without ruling on who really owns deny that it contains all the agreements of the parties; (b)
such land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits petitioner has no cause of action because the 3-year period within
in the exercise of the latters original jurisdiction in an action for which to pay the purchase price has not yet lapsed; (c) MTC has
recovery of ownership and possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint failed to
40 of the Rules of Court. It further stated that petitioner was not able to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was made
sufficiently establish that respondent employed force and intimidation upon them.
in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject landas he failed to MTCS RULING: Vacate the premises and pay the amount of
demonstrate the factual circumstances that occurred during his P365K for the use and occupation of the property.
dispossession of said property.39 RTCS RULING: Upon appeal, RTC affirmed the decision and
The Issue Before the Court modified the amount to P400K.
Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling and ordered CA RULING (PetRev): Set aside RTCs Decision and dismissed the
the remand of the case to the latter court for trial on the merits in an complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings
action for recovery of ownership and possession. before the MTC for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the
The Courts Ruling main issue extend beyond those commonly involved in
Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for unlawful detainer suits, but one incapable of pecuniary
forcible entry, petitioners case nonetheless fails to impress on the estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction
merits. of the RTC, not the MTC.
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry. o According to CA, the issues in the case pertain to WON: (a)
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that there was a violation of the Contract to Sell; (b) such violation
the allegations in the petitioners complaint do not make a case for gives the petitioner the right to terminate the contract and
forcible entry but another action cognizable by the RTC.42 consequently, the right to recover possession and the value of
A plain reading of petitioners complaint shows that the required the harvest from the Riceland
jurisdictional averments, so as to demonstrate a cause of action for PETITIONERS CONTENTION: CA should have dismissed outright
forcible entry, have all been complied with. Said pleading alleges that the petition since it contains no verification as required by the
petitioner, as the original owners, i.e., Vicentes, successor-in-interest, Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the complaint before the
was in prior physical possession of the subject land but was eventually MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific
dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by performance, did not limit itself to the allegations in the
respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the complaint but resorted to unrestrained references, deductions
same and, thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly, with these and/or conjectures, unduly influenced by the allegations in the
details, the means by which petitioners dispossession was effected answer.
cannot be said to have been insufficiently alleged as mistakenly ruled RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Verification is just a formal
by the MTC and later affirmed by the CA. The "how" (through unlawful requirement and petitioner waived her right to question the
entry and the construction of the subject building), "when" (March 26, defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the CA
correctly pointed out that the present case involves one that is WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May
incapable of pecuniary estimation since the crux of the matter is 13, 2003 of the CA is AFFIRMED
the rights of the parties based on the Contract to Sell.
#16
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer NO
Petitioners argument: He contends that the alleged tolerance given ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict
by respondent to him in occupying the land does not give rise to a respondent from the subject property.
HELD: Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of RA
72791 was not complied with.
LAND TITLES
Palisoc filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special
As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person Order of Demolition. The RTC declared the decision denying
illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can Bugarins appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of
never be barred by laches. the case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Bugarin filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA on April 10,
In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate 2003. Bugarin contended that the RTC committed grave abuse of
her allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the MeTC
Coprada's submission that there was an oral sale is a mere had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
afterthought.
The MeTC eventually issued the Special Order of Demolition.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered
by a title, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC properly ordered the demolition.
respondent's unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the
property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title Bugarins position:
of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is (1) The MeTCs orders violated the mandatory requirements of RA 7279
evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or
land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an demolition and there had been no consultation on the matter of
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the resettlement.
person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that (2) There was neither relocation nor financial assistance given.
the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession (3) The orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of
thereof. the law.
Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners Palisocs position:
of a portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor is a (1) RA 7279 is not applicable. There was no proof that Bugarin et al. are
collateral attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not allowed. The registered as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries.
validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by (2) Even if RA 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law
respondent in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of PD No. had already been complied with. Bugarin were already notified on
1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition, when the writ of execution
cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct proceeding was served.
for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the
title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an action expressly HELD: YES, the MeTC orders were properly issued.
instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent has the
right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer. further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the
execution is practically ministerial. The defendant (Bugarin) may stay it
#20 only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a supersedeas bond; and (3)
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for
the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the
G.R. No. 157985 December 2, 2005 appeal.
ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately
ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS, executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review,
LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL, PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
BASOY, FELY BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, JUN BO, ALEX BORRES, ANNA
MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO, However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin
ROMULO FERRY, LEONISA GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL, SALOME received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their MR. They
CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, JEREMIAS JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the CA.
MADEJA, JOMARI MANONG, NESTOR MANONG, VALENTIN MANONG, Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April
EDMUNDO/FELY MINA, TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION PASCUA, 10, 2003.
ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO, ARMANDO ROMERO,
SANCHO VILLAFUERTE, and FERNANDO YAMID, Petitioners, DOCTRINE! The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the
vs. judgment on the merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T. even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is: (1) its
NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the exercise of power in
excess thereof; (3) or GADLEJ. The existence and availability of the right
QUISUMBING, J.: of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the certiorari is that there should be no appeal.
FACTS: A complaint for ejectment was filed before the MeTC by Palisoc
Bugarins petition for certiorari before the CA was filed as a substitute
et al. (Palisoc) against Bugarin et al. (Bugarin). The MeTC declared
for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
Palisoc as the rightful possessors and ordered Bugarin to vacate the
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but
premises and pay Palisoc et al. the rentals.
was lost through fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition
for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and
Bugarin appealed to the RTC while Palisoc moved for execution
executory.
pending appeal. The RTC denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC
decision. Bugarin filed a MR with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the MeTC. The
of Execution. The RTC denied the MR and granted Palisocs motion
MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the order to enforce the RTC
for execution for failure of Bugarin to post a supersedeas bond or to
judgment. The orders also did not violate RA 7279. Under the said law,
pay the back rentals. This decision was received by Bugarin on March
eviction or demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for
12, 2003. A writ of execution pending appeal was issued.
eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is
shown on record that Bugarin et al. are underprivileged and homeless
Bugarin filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of
citizens as defined in RA 7279. The procedure for the execution of the
Execution. Palisoc filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition
eviction or demolition order under RA 7279 is not applicable.
since Bugarin refused to vacate the premises. The RTC deferred action
on the motions to allow Bugarin to exhaust legal remedies available to
them. Bugarin filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to
of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. The
Lastly, the order of demolition had already been executed. Bugarin had RTC then reversed the MTCs decision.
already vacated the area and Palisoc now possess the properties free
from all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of Issue (1) Can RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction conduct a
possession. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot
relocation and verification survey of lot in question? (2) Was an action
and academic.
for unlawful detainer proper?
G.R. No. 136274 September 3, 2003 Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership.
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by
FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners, xxxx
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the
MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents.
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or
CORONA, J.: required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
In the case SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION vs. CA, et al., Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of
GR 136274, September 3, 2003, although an ejectment suit is an the relocation and verification survey in aid of its appellate
action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the jurisdiction and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing
parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
he or she is: on the survey and the surveyors testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.
#22 NONE
(2) CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the
G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014 context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary
dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner, property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs
vs. property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
MIAQUE, Respondents.
unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under
any contract, express or implied. The defendants possession was lawful
#23 NONE at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or
G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014 termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession
of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ- centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
TABINO, Petitioners, possession de facto.
vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
The MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over
the case. The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the
DEL CASTILLO, J.: allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by
the complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that
#24 has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an
action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015 the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION any contract, express or implied.
GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
However, the allegations of the petitioners complaint did not show
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.
that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of
their property by the respondents; or how the respondents entry had
BERSAMIN, J.:
been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents
had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents
Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a
illegal use and occupation of the property. As such, the action was
relocation and verification survey which showed that respondents had
not unlawful detainer.
encroached on a portion of said lot. When the respondents refused to
vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession
thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for
unlawful detainer.
#25 NONE
MTC dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed the
decision of the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC ultimately January 27, 2016
dismissed case. Another appeal to RTC was made. RTC ordered the
petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation G.R. No. 217694
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, discovery of their entry into the subject premises will not and cannot
vs. automatically create an action for unlawful detainer. It must be stressed
ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent. that the defendants possession in unlawful detainer is originally legal
but simply became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
MENDOZA, J.: right to possess. The plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of possession. Otherwise, if it was
#26 unlawful from the start it is actionable for forcible entry. Filing for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016
In this instant case, the failure of petitioners to allege the key
MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q. CATACUTAN, jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FERNANDO
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer was not
Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN
met, the MCTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. A void
AND TERESITA PUNZALAN, Respondents.
judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. Petitioners may
be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but they unfortunately
PERALTA, J.:
availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession. Nevertheless, they
may still opt to file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with
FACTS:
the proper RTC.
The MCTC then rendered a Decision on June 22, 2009, in PERALTA, J.:
The Spouses Punzalan brought the case to the RTC. The RTC January 18, 2017
also then affirmed the MCTC Decision in toto. Aggrieved, the Spouses
Punzalan forwarded the cases to the Court of Appeals. On February 17, G.R. No. 221071
2012, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.
denied hence this petition. The petitioners insist that their complaint
causes an action for unlawful detainer which therefore gives the MCTC REYES, J.:
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
HELD: