League v. El Pueblo de Filipinas, G.R. No.

47367, [September 2, 1941], 73 PHIL 155-160

CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; REBELLION; SEDITION; CASE OF

CARS. - It is not the greater or lesser extent of the territory in which an armed public
uprising against the Government takes place and develops, the one that determines its
nature of rebellion or sedition, but the end that with said uprising is pursued. The
rebellion has more transcendental ends, and its effects are more serious and more
pernicious for the Government, than those of the sedition, because with it they want to
subtract from obedience to the Government or its laws, a part or all of the Philippine
territory or body of its armed force, or divest the Chief Executive, or the Legislature of
some or all of its prerogatives or faculties. This, or at least, achieve absolute
independence by means of weapons, before the end of the year 1935 that was when
the uprising occurred, make this take place in several provinces, and take the
municipality of Santa Rosa, occupying its municipal building , to remove it from
obedience to the constituted government, is what the appellant and his minions or
sakdalistas proposed that he was treasurer when they rose up in arms, as they rose
up, going so far as to attack the Constables who had gone there to restore the order,
causing some casualties. Rebellion and non-sedition is how the offense committed by
the appellant should properly qualify.

The appellant Jose League requests in this case the revision of the sentence of the Court of
Appeals, which confirmed the one that had dictated the Court of First Instance of Laguna
finding him guilty of the crime of rebellion and sentencing him to the indeterminate
punishment of two years, four months and one day of correctional prison to eight years and
one day of major prison, and to pay a fine of P10,000, besides the costs of the process.
The facts on which the Court of Appeals was based to dictate the judgment of whose revision
it is, are, according to its same story that is stated in its decision, as follows:
"It has been proven in the record that defendant Jose League was the general treasurer of
the party called Sakdalista, whose objective was to obtain the absolute independence of the
Philippines before the end of 1935, that the Sakdalists planned an armed uprising in several
provinces, especially that of Laguna, that on the night of May 2, 1935 the telegraph and
telephone wires that connected the municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, with the border
towns and with Manila were cut off, the electric lighting turned off and the houses closed; that
armed people were on the roads to stop the passage of vehicles, requisitioning the
passengers and snatching the weapons they were carrying, that several hundred sakdalistas,
armed with bands, flags and a variety of weapons, marched in groups to seize of the
municipal building of Santa Rosa and subtract this municipality from obedience to the duly
constituted government, that there was a bloody encounter between said sakdalistas and the
constabularios that were sent to restore the order; that in that meeting there have been dead
and wounded; that among the vehicles that the sakdalistas tried to stop in the night of cars
was the car of attorney Feliciano Gomez who was in the passenger with several members of
his family; that by not stopping said automobile to the intimation of the sakdalistas was shot
by these; that Jose League, the appellant here, was among those armed people who tried to
stop the lawyer Gomez's car; that he saw and knew the appellant, because it had been his
childhood companion and the driver Damian Hernandez also saw him that occasion armed
with a shotgun at a distance of ten meters from the vehicle; that the defendant fired two shots
with his shotgun against Gomez's car and the projectiles hit the body; that among the
detained vehicles there was a jitney belonging to Ricardo Mendoza who recognized among
the persons who arrested him the defendant because it was well lit by the clarity projected by
the jitney lights.

The appellant defended himself in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals to
which he raised his case later, to appeal the decision of that, which was adverse, trying to
prove an alibi, saying that on the occasion of the proceedings it was I was in Manila; but, in
this instance, it no longer insists on said defense for having declared those two Tribunals that
it could not merit credit for having proven clearly the opposite, that is to say, that it took direct
part in the uprising, through the testimony of the witnesses Feliciano Gomez , Damian
Hernandez and Ricardo Mendoza. He now confines himself to maintaining the proposition
that the proven facts only constitute sedition and not rebellion. He invokes for this the same
reasons that the First Division of the Court of Appeals took into account, in resolving an
analogous question raised in another case that he also met about three months before, that
is, on August 4, 1939, stating that the The crime committed by those who appealed there was
not rebellion but sedition. (Criminal case C. A. - G. R. No. 44809, The People of the
Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Aurelio Almazan et al., Arsenio Batitis and Isaias Lijauco,
defendants-appellants).
I declare in effect the First Division of the Court of Appeals that the facts proven in the
aforementioned case, which were substantially the same as those proven here, are only
constitutive of sedition, for the reason that, - using their own terms - , "Rebellion is a rising
that affects a large portion of territory; it is national and not local in character, and it has been
purely political purpose." The disturbance was engineered by the appellants of fact merely a
local disturbance ".

But, we find justified the change of judgment of the Court, because his last decision, which
the appellant asks us to review, promulgated on October 23, 1939, is more in accordance with
the law than his decision issued in the aforementioned case. It is not the greater or lesser
extent of the territory in which an armed public uprising against the Government takes place
and develops, which determines its nature of rebellion or sedition, but the end that is pursued
with said uprising. The rebellion has more transcendental ends, and its effects are more
serious and more pernicious for the Government, than those of the sedition, because with it
they want to subtract from obedience to the Government or its laws, a part or all of the
Philippine territory or body of its armed force, or divest the Chief Executive, or the Legislature
of some or all of its prerogatives or faculties. This, or at least, achieve absolute independence
by means of weapons, before the end of the year 1935 that was when the uprising occurred,
make this take place in several provinces, and take the municipality of Santa Rosa, occupying
its municipal building , to remove it from obedience to the constituted government, is what the
appellant and his minions or sakdalistas proposed that he was treasurer when they rose up in
arms, as they rose up, going so far as to attack the Constables who had gone there to restore
the order, causing some casualties. Rebellion and not sedition is as it should be properly
qualified the crime committed by the appellant, because rebellion is, according to Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code:
"to rise publicly and to take arms against the Government in order to subtract obedience from
it, or from its laws, the Philippine territory or part of it, or some troop body of land or sea or
any other kind of force Armed, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the co-legislative bodies
of their prerogatives or faculties in whole or in part. "

The purpose of a sedition, according to Article 139 of the aforementioned Revised Penal
Code, which remains the same because the amendments introduced in the Commonwealth
Law No. 217, which came into force one year after the commission of the crime They are not
substantial, they are different. Are these:
"1. To prevent the enactment of laws, the execution thereof, or the celebration of a popular
election;
2. To prevent the Insular Government or any provincial or municipal government or its officials
from freely exercising their functions or complying with any administrative order;
3. To exercise any act of hatred or revenge on the person or property of any official or public
employee;
4. To exercise for any political or social purpose any act of hatred or revenge against
individuals or any social class; Y
5. To dispossess, for a political or social purpose, all or part of their property to any person,
the municipality, the province or the island governments or the United States. "
The acts executed by the appellant and his followers do not fit in any of those that are listed in
the aforementioned article that speaks of sedition.
In view of the facts that the Court of Appeals has declared proven, and considering for the
reasons stated that the judgment of said Court, subject to revision, is in accordance with the
law; hereby, we confirm the same and we condemn the appellant to pay the costs of the
process. This is how it is ordered.