INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, VOL. 9, NO.

1, 1995 37

Reichenbach's concept of prediction

WENCESLAO J. GONZLEZ
Department of Philosophy and Logic, University of Murcia, Spain and the Center for
Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, USA

Abstract Reichenbach emphasizes the central importance of prediction, which isfor him
the principal aim of science. This paper offers a critical reconstruction of his concept of
prediction, taking into account the different periods of his thought. First, prediction is studied
as a key factor in rejecting the positivism of the Vienna Circle. This part of the discussion
concentres on the general features of prediction before Experience and Prediction (EP)
(section 1). Second, prediction is considered in the context of Reichenbach's disagreements with
his contemporariesCarnap and Popper(section 2). Pointing out these differences gives an
additional basis for understanding how Reichenbach saw "prediction" in the period when EP
was written. Third, Reichenbach's theoretical framework of prediction is analysed following EP.
This analysis studies the semantical, logical, epistemological and methodological bases of his
concept of prediction (section 3). Fourth, Reichenbach's conception of prediction, based on an
objectivist interpretation of probabilities, is compared with the perspective on prediction of
subjective Bayesians (the present personalists). This comparison (section 4) illustrates Reichen-
bach's views regarding the links of prediction with probability. Fifth, innovations and elements
of continuity after EP are noted which give a more complete picture of Reichenbach's thought
on prediction (section 5). This contributes to a comprehensive characterization of his concept of
prediction. Finally, there is an assessment of his whole view of the matter and a presentation
of the ingredients for a satisfactory alternative (section 6).

Introduction
Predicting the phenomena in the world of our experience and making such predictions
on sound grounds is one of the central objectives of science. Reichenbach was keenly
aware of the importance of this aim; he stressed more than any of his contemporaries
the role of prediction in scientific work.1 He addresses the problems of prediction within
the philosophical context of logical empiricism. Thus, his concept of prediction is
related to the main concerns of the Gesellschaft fr wissenschaftliche Philosophie. In effect,
it deals with the fundamental issues of that society: semantical (empirical meaning),
logical (induction and probability), epistemological (defence of empiricism and refuta-
tion of the synthetical a priori) and methodological (rejection of absolute verificationism
and of falsationism). His views on prediction are thus related to the central philosophical
problems of his times. Indeed, for Reichenbach, prediction has a decisive role in science
because he considers it as its principal aim.
Although this paper offers frequent historical comments regarding Reichenbach and
his contemporaries, its concern is mainly with the topic itself: with the semantical,
0269-8595/95/010037-22 1995 Inter-University Foundation
38 W. J. GONZLEZ

logical, epistemological and methodological bases of his concept of prediction. The aim
is to offer a critical reconstruction of Reichenbach's thought on prediction, considering
Experience and Prediction (EP) as his main contribution to the topic and analysing its
position in relation to the other stages of his philosophy. The starting point is in the role
of prediction as a factor in rejecting logical positivism (its semantical and epistemolog-
ical basis) and in developing his own philosophy of logical empiricism. Later on, after
the comparison with Carnap and Popper, there is a characterization of his concept of
prediction according to semantical, logical, epistemological and methodological consid-
erations, which constitutes the core of the present paper. The theoretical framework of
prediction in Reichenbach is clarified through a comparison with an alternative of
empiricist inspiration (the personalist Bayesian). Finally, the innovations and elements
of continuity in Reichenbach's thought after EP are considered.

1. Prediction and the rejection of the positivism of the Vienna Circle

Before publishing EP, Reichenbach presents prediction as the first point of attack
against the foundations of the positivistic system (1936a, pp. 151-152). In fact, he
develops the central ideas regarding the concept of "prediction" in an endeavor to refute
the semantical, logical and epistemological theses of the Vienna Circle. A basic claim for
his rejection of the positivist approach is that "scientific propositions make assertions
about the future. Indeed, there is no scientific law which does not involve a prediction
about the occurrence of future events; for it is the very essence of a scientific law to
assure us that under certain given conditions, certain phenomena will occur" (1936a, p.
152). From this point of view, there are reasons for denying validity to the positivist
account of meaninggiven its strictly empiricist characterbecause the meaning of
scientific laws never depends entirely on past experience: in the actual practice of science
the meanings of its laws are always related also to the future. Accordingly, "the demand
of absolute verifiability must be dropped for all synthetic propositions" (Reichenbach,
1936c, p. 124).
Reichenbach also stresses the links of prediction with induction and probability as
a key point for criticizing the doctrines of the Vienna Circle. On the one hand, he thinks
that the problems of propositions about the future and the problems of probability and
induction hang together. He insistsagainst the positiviststhat "the principle of
induction is not only a rule of action but also a rule which we must use to get
propositions concerning the future" (1936c, p. 124). On the other hand, he considers
that it is a puzzle "how logical neo-positivism proposes to include assertions of
probability in its system" (1933/1978a, p. 407). This deficiency is particularly important
for Reichenbach, who was completely committed to the defense of probability, not only
in the logical sphere but also in the semantical and epistemological realms. Probability
is essential for his views on propositions about the future, because he thinks that the
predictive character of science cannot be understood without it.
Semantical and logical reasons accompany epistemological ones in the rejection of
the Vienna Circle on the basis of prediction.2 Reichenbach uses arguments about the
role in empirical knowledge of grounded expectations about the future to attack the
foundationalist idea of grounding all empirical knowledge in phenomenal experience.
He thinks that the Viennese attempt of interpreting the propositions of science as mere
"report-propositions" (Protokollstze) is not workable. For, as just noticed, this view is
in sharp contrast to the actual practice of science, because scientific propositions make
assertions about the future (1936a, p. 152). A scientific law always involves predictions
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 39

about the future occurrences under certain given conditions. Insofar as the positivist
system is based on propositions which contain nothing but a repetition of "report-
propositions", it could not possibly justify the predictive character of science. Therefore,
the positivist system does not capture the meanings of propositions of actual science,
because it denies itself means for justifying propositions about the future.
According to Reichenbach, "this was the precise reason why the Berlin group could
not accept positivism. The members of this circle insisted upon the necessity of a theory
of propositions about the future. They maintained that any philosophy which neglected
the fact and function of propositions about the future in science flagrantly contradicted
the very first condition of empiricism: namely, to correspond to the practice of science"
(1936a, p. 152). A precedent of this critique appears in his review of Carnap (1928),
where Reichenbach points out that scientific "assertions are not merely reports of past
perceptual experiences, but are also invariably predictions of future perceptual experi-
ences" (1933/1978a, p. 407). Later on, he describes his own Berlin group as working in
a concrete program which demands the analysis of specific problems in science and
avoids all large-scale theoretical maxims like those set up by the Viennese School
(1936a, pp. 143-144). In fact, he refuses to use the term "positivism" for his philoso-
phy3 and emphasizes that the soil of his book is "logistic empiricism", understood as a
broad movement rather than a theory or doctrine (1938, p. V). Nevertheless, both
groups collaborated in publishing the periodical Erkenntnis since 1930.4
Lying behind Reichenbach's views on prediction is the recognition of the validity of
actual science, which he views from the perspective of probability.5 This probabilistic
account accompanies his central topics: the theory of meaning, the characterization of
induction and the defence of an empiricist epistemology different from phenomenalism.
Prediction emerges as a clear indicator that the meaning of scientific propositions looks
to the future (it includes expectations regarding how things will behave in the future)
and not merely at present or past experience. At the same time, predictive knowledge
impedes seeing physical reality as pure phenomena actually present or already experi-
enced. Besides these significant positions, which put him closer to real science than his
contemporaries of the Vienna Circle (particularly, the phenomenalists), there is an
underlying assumption: to accept science as given and to reject the idea that science
requires a particular foundation on empirical basis (phenomenalism physicalist, and so
on).
Many aspects of Reichenbach's conception of prediction are not completely devel-
oped until EP. Nevertheless, important seeds of the ideas of EPincluding the central
claims on predictionappear in previous papers (1925/1978a, pp. 289-291; 1930/1959,
pp. 67-78; 1936b, pp. 32-40; 1935a), especially regarding its links with induction and
probability.6 On the one hand, he sees induction as the most favorable procedure for
obtaining future-propositions. He considers that all requirements for a theory of
future-propositions are fulfilled with the justification of the principle of induction
(1936c, p. 125). On the other hand, Reichenbach maintains that the theory of
propositions about the future should be based on a theory of probability. Thus, "when
we state a proposition about the future, we never pretend that it is certainly true. This
is the case not only for the weather forecasts of the meteorological bureau, but also for
the prediction of the astronomer that the sun will rise tomorrow. But there is no
difference in principle between the astronomer's prediction about the sun and the
metereologist's prophecy about the weather, as far as their fundamental assumptions are
concerned" (1936a, p. 153).
40 W. J. GONZLEZ

These theses are controversial. Firstly, it can be questioned that induction is the
most favorable procedure for predicting future events: deductions could be used as well
with the same purpose, and there seems to be no reason to consider them less reliable
than inductions. Secondly, the denial of the possibilities of validity of any predictions as
certainly true does not correspond to actual science, because in the practice of science
the scientist seeks predictions that could be true or closer to truth. For, in some cases,
we effectively know in advance that some predictions are true (mainly, in astronomy: the
eclipses of sun or moon). Thirdly, there are considerable differences in the reliability of
predictions according to the degree of control of variables. So, Reichenbach's example
illustrates the opposite of his conception: the prediction of an astronomer characterizes
the reliability, whereas that of a meteorologist is used frequently to show unreliability.
Moreover, the differences in the degree of controlling variables could be used to
introduce terminological distinctions. So, "foreseeing", "predicting" and "forecasting"
would be different activities in the realm of scientific prediction (Gonzalez, 1995).
Perhaps a follower of Reichenbach could try to meet these criticisms with two
arguments: (i) deduction isfor himalso acceptable for predicting, in addition to
induction; and (ii) the emphasis should be in the grounds for predicting rather than in
the problem of truth, because his epistemology is fallibilist. According to the first
argument, Reichenbach would not deny that a prediction may be deduced from a theory
and some initial conditions, but the theory and initial condition statements are well
grounded only if they themselves are inductively supported by evidence. Thus, deduc-
tion, without inductive grounding for the premises, does nothing to support the
reliability of the prediction deduced. As it stands, this argument requires taking into
account that in his philosophy, especially in his characterization of logical empirism,
Reichenbach always stresses the importance of induction for prediction and pays no
attention at all to deduction.7 Later on, many years after EP, he maintains that the value
of deduction is in its emptiness: "the conclusion cannot state more than is said in the
premises, it merely makes explicit some consequence which is contained implicitly in the
premises" (1951, p. 37).8 Deduction isfor him"merely an instrument of connec-
tion" (1951, p. 57) which cannot create independent results. Therefore, he does not
accept the legitimacy of predictions based on deductions as such, whereas in science we
can find predictions based on deductions from mathematical models (e.g. physics and
economics) without direct inductive support (quantum mechanics and general equilib-
rium gives examples of these). In other words, the possibility of predictive deductions as
such cannot be ruled out, and their reliability could be at least as accurate as those based
in inductions.
If the emphasis goes to fallibilism, the follower of Reichenbach can maintain that
he is a radical fallibilist, becausefor himthere is nothing that we know about the
physical world that we know to be true. He takes Hume absolutely seriously. So,
Reichenbach's point in comparing the astronomer and the metereologist is that the
predictions of both are fallible. As it stands, this argument raises at least two problems.
Firstly, if he is consistent in his thought: (i) he is frequently presented as "realist" and
realism requires the notion of "truth", which in fact he replaces by other concepts; and
(ii) he criticizes severely Popper's philosophy (Reichenbach, 1935b), which includes
fallibilism as a central feature and now this feature seems to be in Reichenbach. A
second difficulty is how to make compatible his conception with actual science, which
is a central concern in his philosophical enterprise.
Some aspects of these two problems are studied in the later sections of this paper.9
But other aspects regarding the relations between prediction and the problems risen by
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 41

Reichenbach's fallibilism are relevant here. One point seems quite clear to him: we never
aver as certainly true a proposition that we state about the future (1936a, p. 153).
Moreover, he is convinced that "propositions about the future cannot be expected to
state certain truths" (1936a, p. 153). For him, probability is the guide for judgements
about the future: it replaces the role of truth and falsity. In effect, "the theory of
propositions about the future will therefore be a theory in which the two truth-values,
true and false, are replaced by a continuous scale of probability" (1936a, p. 154). Either
understood as a pure replacement of the notion of "truth" or in mere fallibilist terms,
these claims support a non-realist conception of prediction. Realism on prediction
accepts the existence of true propositions about the future (or at least the possibility of
reaching them) and requires both truth and objectivity. Thus, Reichenbach is notand
cannot justifiably bea realist on prediction, although there is a tendency to consider
him as a realist in his support of objective knowledge against phenomenalism.
Insofar as he takes Hume seriously and maintains that there is nothing we know
about the physical world with absolute certainty, Reichenbach departs from the actual
science that he wants to study. For, in some cases, actual science can make predictions
which are effectively true (e.g. in astronomy). Thus, a prediction is a statement asserted
to be true about some future event. Increasing the grounds for predicting reduces the
unreliability: the reliability depends on the degree of control of variables. From this
point of view, the differences between the astronomer and the meteorologist still remain:
the astronomer can make more reliable predictions about the sun than the meteorologist
forecasts about the weather. In the first case the predictions are true or at least closer
to truth than in the second case.

2. Prediction in the disagreements with Reichenbach's contemporaries

During the period in which EP was written, prediction appears as a central point in the
disagreements of Reichenbach with his contemporaries, especially those whom he
directly confronts: Carnap and Popper. Both are criticizedthe second one more
severelytwo years before EP was published (1936a,c). His criticisms of the first one
applies specifically to prediction: Reichenbach points out that Carnap attempted to solve
the problem of propositions about the future "by a kind of intellectual violence; he
declared that the meaning of a proposition about the future consisted in a report about
the facts of the past. The proposition that the sun will rise tomorrow, he maintained,
contained nothing but a report that the sun had risen in the morning of every past day.
But the method of undoing the Gordian knot by cutting it is not accepted in science,
and Carnap soon looked for more adequate solution. As yet, the Viennese School has
not developed a complete theory of propositions about the future" (1936a, pp. 152-
153). Later on, in EP (1938, p. 76, 38), he emphasizes that, to some extent, they were
in tune, due to the modifications that Carnap introduces in Testability and Meaning
(1936, 1937).10
Putnam has pointed out the "convergence" between these philosophers: Reichen-
bach once told him "that he welcomed Carnap's shift from an Eigenpsychische basis (a
phenomenalistic basis) to a physicalistic basis in Testability and Meaning as an indication
of convergence in their views, which was also how Carnap saw the matter" (1991, p.
63). However, Putnam considers that the views on language in EP reveal "deep
disagreements with Carnap in spite of this 'convergence'." For one thing, it turns out
that what Reichenbach is thinking of is not the choice of sense-datum language versus
'thing language'; it is, instead, the choice of a language in which I can speak of things
42 W. J. GONZLEZ

as existing when unobserved ('usual language') as opposed to the choice of a language

in which I can speak of things as existing only when they are observed by me (an
'egocentric language') (1991, pp. 63-64).
Prediction is an area of disagreement between them, because Reichenbach accepts
the need for predicting unobservable phenomena from the very beginning. His rejection
of "positivism" is linked to his stress on prediction and the emphasis in the inferences
from what is known to what is literally unknown. Thus, "my theory of propositions
about the future is nothing but the consistent application of the principles of logicist
empiricism, and that to reject the probability structure of the world is to overlook the
approximate character of knowledge" (1936a, p. 159). The principles of logical empiri-
cism include several important theses that accompany the concept of prediction, each
one different from Carnap's positivism (especially before Testability and Meaning): (i) a
probabilistic interpretation of the meaning which impedes the strict verificationist claims
and it is not focus in the concept of "truth"; (ii) a frequentist conception of probability
which stresses the notion of "weight" and follows a different interpretation from
Carnap's probabilities, although Reichenbach recognizes in EP Carnap's improvements
with the notion of "degree of confirmation";11 and (iii) a defense of the approximate
character of knowledge which leads to a fallibilist epistemology instead to a
verificationist or confirmatory approach.
Carnap and Reichenbach adopt diverse perspectives on science, which have a direct
repercussion on the theoretical framework of prediction. For Carnap, science needs
foundations and these should be based in empirical knowledge with complete certainty;
whereas Reichenbach rejects such a possibility and accepts scientific knowledge as a
given sociological fact (1938, p. 3). He considers that Carnap's perspective, which
accepts nothing but absolute certainty as contents of science, "may be regarded, after a
fashion, as a modern fulfillment of Descartes' quest for an absolutely certain basis of
science; and indeed Carnap's theory is a reminiscent of Descartes' rationalism in more
ways than one" (1936a, p. 149). On the one hand, prediction isfor Reichenbachan
important task of science as a sociological reality which should be clarified in actual
science; on the other hand, Carnap starts with the search of certainty in present
knowledge, paying no direct attention to future knowledge as such. Indeed, Reichen-
bach argues that if we accept Carnap's reduction of scientific assertions (1928), we
forfeit the indisputable basic principle that such assertions are invariably predictions of
future perceptual experiences (1933/1978a, p. 407).
Between Reichenbach and Popper there are thus various disagreements, most of
them related to the problem of induction and the concept of probability. Particularly in
this second topic, Reichenbach feels compelled to declare his "opposition to the thesis
presented in Popper's book, for they appear to me to be completely untenable"
(1935b/1978b, p. 372). They result from the rejection of the idea, which Reichenbach
place, in the forefront of his epistemological work, that the process of proposing and
testing hypotheses is carried out through probability judgements (1935b/1978b, p. 373).
He thinks that Popper sees the value of his arguments as consisting in the "elimination
of the concept of probability from the epistemological problems of science" (1935b/
1978b, p. 373). Even though Reichenbach considers it a merit that Logik der Forschung
deals with propositions about the future, his attitude is contrary to it: "I cannot take this
book as a serious account since it is lacking in consistency" (1936a, p. 153). The
divergence reappears openly in EP (1938; pp. 88, 302, 338), where he maintains that
a principle of absolute falsification "is not tenable. Any falsification also presupposes
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 43

certain inductions based on observations of other things and may be assumed with
probability only" (1938, p. 88).
Rejecting Popper's approach (induction, probability and falsification),12 Reichen-
bach proposes an alternative framework for prediction. However, it is not clear that he
is being careful when he attributes absolute falsification to Popper, because Popper
holds that there is a conventional element in the acceptance of a basic statement which
falsifies a theory (1959; 1968, p. 104).13 In addition, there are some similarities between
them, (i) Both accept scientific knowledge as given: science does not need particular
empirical foundations; (ii) epistemological fallibilism is an ingredient in both thinkers,
because Reichenbach agrees with Popper in "the thesis that the propositions of science
no claim absolute truth and are to be rejected on the appearance of contradictory
evidence" (1935b/1978b, p. 373); (iii) they share a common interest in propositions
about the future: prediction is for both an important aim of science, although this topic
is more emphasizes in EP than in the Logik der Forschung.
However, in spite of some similarities, their focuses on prediction are divergent. For
Reichenbach, the basis for a successful prediction are in the induction and the probabil-
ity theory of knowledge; whereas, for Popper, predictions are basically the logical
consequences of the theory and, therefore, draw deductively. Reichenbach stresses the
divergence and points out that the aim of scientific theories is to be able to attain the
best prediction of the future (1935b/1978b, p. 386). For him, a successful procedure for
predicting occurrences and constructing hypothesis conforming to probability logic
should induce us to favor the probability theory of knowledge over all other epistemolog-
ical theories (1935b/1978b, p. 385). Moreover, in his review of the Logik der Forschung,
Reichenbach suggests that on his own principles Popper ought to admit, and needs to
introduce, induction in order to construct a theory of prediction. For "Popper admits
that 'our guessing is guided by the unscientific, metaphysical belief (which can be
explained biologically) that there exist regularities which we can unveil, discover'
(section 85). If he goes this far, he ought rather to admit that this belief is nothing other
than the principle of induction, for it is, in fact, this principle that determines our
opinions about the future" (1935b/1978b, pp. 384-385).
Therefore, the theoretical framework of prediction in Reichenbach is different from
logical positivism and critical rationalism. In EP, besides some similarities, there are
clear disagreements with Carnap and Popper. From the semantical and epistemological
points of view, Reichenbach is closer to the former when Carnap gives up his initial
verificationism and rejects his earlier phenomenalism, adopting a new verifiability theory
of meaning and physicalist theses in Testability and Meaning. To some extent, they were
in tune, and both can be included in the "transition version" of verificationism.
Regarding the latter, Reichenbach is usually very critical. Erroneously, he maintains that
"Popper's position is related to that of the Viennese Circle" (1936a, p. 153) and makes
use of the conceptual tools of logical positivism (1935b/1978b, p. 372). However, he
saw also the clear differences between them. Let us see details of his conception on
prediction.

3. Reichenbach's theoretical framework for prediction

Basically, Reichenbach discusses his concept of prediction within the following theoreti-
cal framework, (i) From the semantical point of view, the positivist verificationist theory
of meaning is rejected and the probability theory of meaning takes its place; thus,
prediction needs a meaning based on probability and, therefore, cannot have absolute
44 W. J. GONZLEZ

character. Scientific language is open to "unobservable things", (ii) The logical aspects
are seen from a probabilistic perspective: "it is only a probability-logic which furnishes
a frame wide enough for the system of scientific propositions" (1936a, p. 154). The
theory of probability is associated with the problem of induction; de facto, there is an
interdependence between probability and induction.14 (iii) Epistemologically, prediction
requires an empirical basis and acquires a high or a low probability of being correct
according to the information available about the future. "The happenings of the future
can be foretold only on the basis of comprehensive information covering the total
occurrence" (1956, p. 22). (iv) Methodologically, prediction relies completely on the
validity of induction; its development could only be on inductive grounds.
Semantically, the language that Reichenbach uses neither distinguishes
"prediction" from "prophecy" nor "prediction" from "forecast". He does not deem
clear differences in the sense and reference of these terms. So, he uses expressions such
as "reliable prophecy" as equivalent to a prediction with a high degree of certainty that
derives from past facts, not from future ones (1936a, p. 154). He adopts a pragmatic
criterion, which assesses to be valid even in the case of a clairvoyant: "we demand the
forecast of the clairvoyant and compare it with later observations; if then there is a good
correspondence between the forecast and the observations, we shall infer, by induction,
that the man's prophecies will also be true in the future. Thus it is the principle of
induction which is to decide whether the man is a good clairvoyant" (1938, p. 354).
Prediction appears then as a term used to foretell an unknown future on the basis of the
present information; for the purposes of control of what is predicted, he considers that
non-scientific predictions could be valid as well (prophecies or forecasts; activities of a
clairvoyant).
Prima facie in EP there is no clear difference between scientific predictions and
non-scientific ones: both are considered legitimate as propositions about the future and
compatible with the inductive method. But, in my judgement, scientific predictions can
be distinguished from pre-scientific forecasts or non-scientific prophecies, insofar as they
have a theoretical support and cannot be reduced simply to a matter of experience:
scientific predictions are a qualified class of predictions, better grounded than non-sci-
entific ones. The more precise character of scientific language contributes to clarify these
activities concerning the future. At the same time, there are differences between
"prediction" and "forecast" within the scientific realm. They have a different control of
the variables and give a diverse reply to the question: why can we expect such and such
phenomena? The differences in the answers are conditioned by factors such as the level
of error, which is the main objective of forecasting (Gonzalez, 1995, section 5).
Nonetheless, it is possible to interpret these remarks as being in line with Reichen-
bach's position rather than a criticism of a view that he actually held. The argument is
this: if by scientific prediction one means predictions derived from scientific theories
which have high probabilities, then these second-level probabilities may give much
stronger grounds for the predictions than the primary induction about the clairvoyant.
Generally, for Reichenbach, statements in advance knowledge, where second-level
probabilities come into play, can be much more strongly grounded than first-level
probabilities derived directly from induction by simple enumeration. However, for him,
the activities of a clairvoyant could be acceptable without induction even though we use
the principle of induction to assess clairvoyant's predictions (1938, p. 354). Thus, it
seems that the realism of assumptions is abandoned in favour of a mere application of
the inductive principle. Reichenbach's criterion on prediction is heavily pragmatic; the
key point is to control "the unknown method by a known one" (1938, p. 354). But it
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 45

is precisely in the realism of assumptions where the difference between scientific

predictions and non-scientific ones begins; for scientific predictions, it is not good
enough to rely on the clear intuition of the future, the mere practical knowledge of
events or the success in the results. In addition, for measuring the cognitive success of
assertion, Reichenbach uses the notion of "weight" instead of the concept of "truth",
where weight of a sentence isas Putnam explains"my estimate of the relative
frequency of successful assertions in some appropriate reference class containing the
sentence whose weight it is" (1991b, p. 112). In other words, for Reichenbach,
"sentences are not true or false: it is just that I am justified in 'betting'" with them"
(Putnam, 1991a,b, 112). It leads him towards a methodological instrumentalism.
That Reichenbach does not follow a realist approach is clearly pointed out by
Putnam (1991a,b), who analyses the languages that Reichenbach accepts in EP. Before
this book, there are traces of the rejection of semantical realism, especially when he
proposes a pragmatic probability theory of meaning against the semantic approach of the
truth theory of meaning. In his proposal, the demand that every proposition must be
"decidable" as true or false is replaced by the demand that every proposition must be
"decidable" with a certain degree of probability; and, propositions have the same
meaning when the observable facts confer on them the same probability values (1936a,
p. 154). In this pragmatic perspective the central notion is "probability", becausefor
himit "provides us with a scale to guide our judgments about the future. The theory
of propositions about the future will therefore be a theory in which the two-truth values,
true and false, are replaced by a continuous scale of probability" (1936a, p. 154). This
replacement goes so far that he asserts: "it would be illusory to imagine that terms 'true'
or 'false' ever expressed anything else than high or low probability values" (1936a, p.
156).
Again Reichenbach's pragmatic approach leads to an instrumentalist position. On
the one hand, he has a conceptual confusion, because probability belongs to the sphere
of certainty, whereas truth or falsity are not in themselves in that field. Probability
depends on human assessment and could be interpreted as something objective or
subjective. On the contrary, truth is in itself independent of human recognition; when
human recognition intervenes successfully what we have is a proof (or an evidence) of
the truth. So, something could be true and have low probability. On the other hand, his
attempt to avoid the terms "true" or "false" contributes to his adoption of a very weak
position: to interpret the propositions about the future as a mere wager (Setzung). For
him, "a scientific system is not maintained as true, but only as our best wager on the
future. To discover what is our best wager in any situation of inquiry is the aim of all
scientific toil; never can we arrive at predictions which are certain" (1936a, p. 158). This
does not correspond to scientific practice, where the scientists can make predictions
which are certain (e.g. eclipses of sun and moon) and they try to get propositions that
could be true.15
Besides the semantical aspects of prediction, there are logical components which
are crucial in Reichenbach's conception. Above all, induction and probability appear as
central points. He thought that there was a solution to Hume's problem: to abandon the
idea of a proof to justify that the conclusion of an inductive inference is true and to
accept that the inductive inference cannot have the pretense of being able to obtain a
true proposition. "What we obtain is a wager; and it is the best wager we can lay because
it corresponds to a procedure the applicability of which is the necessary condition of the
possibility of predictions. To fulfil the conditions sufficient for the attainment of true
predictions does not lie in our power; let us be glad that we are able to fulfil at least the
46 W. J. GONZALEZ

conditions necessary for the realization of this intrinsic aim of science" (1938, p. 357).
For him, induction is the instrument of foreseeing the future, which is applied in every
repeated attempt, wagering on it as our best bet. The sufficient conditions of prediction
are beyond us: we cannot realize them; meanwhile the necessary conditions are at hand,
because they are related to induction. According to Salmon, Reichenbach considers that
there is no sufficient condition of a successful prediction, but the ability to gain success
by the use of induction is a necessary condition of the possibility of a successful
prediction. "If the future can be predicted, then the rule of induction will enable us to
predict it" (Salmon 1953, p. 47) (cf. Reichenbach 1936a, pp. 157-158; 1938, p. 359).
The inductive procedure includes anticipation and later correction; it allows us to
make correct inferences from observed phenomena to phenomena not yet observed,
rather than to make true predictions of future events. From this perspective, one may
understand something that is prima facie paradoxical: thatfor Reichenbachin a
process of correction (Verfahren der Korrektion) we can "improve our methods of
prediction without knowing whether prediction is possible at all" (1936a, p. 158). But
the problem is to justify the procedure itself, i.e. to vindicate induction. He offers a
pragmatic justification (1938, pp. 348-363; 1951a, p. 246), which has been studied in
detail by Salmon (1991, pp. 99-122). His analysis shows that Reichenbach's attempt to
vindicate the simple rule of induction fails and not only in Reichenbach's version but
also in other different attempts.16 Therefore, insofar as induction is a key condition to
prediction and induction itself is not justified, it seems that there is a serious problem
with the logical basis of prediction.
Regarding induction, Reichenbach insists also after EP in considering unquestion-
able Hume's proof that the conclusion of inductive inferences can never be proved to
be true (1944, pp. 48-49). Nevertheless, he also asserts after that "a way out of Hume's
skepticism can be shown when knowledge is conceived, not as a system of propositions
having a determinable truth value or probability value, but as a system of posits used as
tools for predicting the future" (1944, p. 49). Posit is a term which appears frequently
in EP. Its meaning is close to a bet or a wager. It has also a pragmatic character, insofar
as it is a question of dealing with some propositions in a certain way and decision
intervenes.17 Posit is in Reichenbach's rule of induction and, according to Salmon, "it
is not entirely clear whether he intended this term in the sense of an inference or in the
sense of an estimate, but the fact that he included a margin of error d in the formulation
of the rule suggests that it can properly be construed as an estimate" (1991, p. 116).
What still remains unclear is its justification at least for scientific purposes.
Probability is another key point in Reichenbach's logical basis of prediction. On the
one hand, he emphasizes the connection between prediction and induction. Accord-
ingly, he claims that one of his achievements is the successful justification of the
inference of induction by enumeration, and therefore of all forms of inductive inference.
In his judgement, "the inductive inference is regarded as permissible, not because it
appears self-evident, but because it represents an instrument of prediction so devised
that it must lead to success if success is attainable" (1949, p. VIII).18 For him, scientific
method pursues the goal of predicting the future. "In order to construct a precise
formulation for this aim we interpret it as meaning that scientific method is intended to
find limits of the frequency. Classical induction and predictions of individual events are
included in the general formulation as the special case that the relative frequency is = 1.
It has been shown that if the aim of scientific method is attainable it will be reached by
the inductive method" (1949, pp. 474-475). On the other hand, Reichenbach highlights
the realm of probability itself and the use of the rule of induction as a
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 47

tool to find limits of the frequency. In fact, he points out the dependence of predictions
on the probabilities understood as frequencies: "The observed frequency from which we
start is only the basis of the probability inference; we intend to state another frequency
which concerns future observations. The probability inference proceeds from a known
frequency to one unknown; it is from this function that its importance is derived. The
probability sustains a prediction, and this is why we want it" (1938, p. 339).
Epistemologically, the repercussion on prediction of this probabilistic approach is
clear: knowledge hasfor himonly an approximate character and predictive knowl-
edge increases this approximate character, because the future is literally unknown. So,
probability "is the essential form of every judgment concerning the future" (1938, p.
75). His main criticisms of logical positivism and critical rationalism rely heavily on the
need for an epistemological stance based on probabilistic grounds: neither an absolute
verification nor an absolute falsification. The theory of propositions about the future
requiresin his viewprobabilistic assumptions which suppose the primacy of certainty
over truth. Thus, instead of emphasizing "truth" or "falsity", his idea is to express what
he considers attainable: the high or low probability values of propositions about the
future. Probability sustains prediction from the starting point of the present knowledge:
the known frequency goes towards the unknown one. He adopts an instrumentalist
perspective: prediction is an aim in itself and the improvement of the methods of
prediction could be made without knowing whether prediction as such is possible de
facto (1936a, p. 158).
Such a logico-probabilisitic focus on predictive knowledge appears before EP
(1935b/1978b, p. 376). Years later, in his chapter on predictive knowledge (1951, pp.
229-249), this perspective remains as a central point. For him, "the theory of probabil-
ity supplies the instrument of predictive knowledge as well as the form of the laws of
nature" (1951, p. 233). This theory is independent of synthetic a priori propositions and
adopts a frequency interpretation, where probability propositions are constructed by
means of an inductive inference. Thus, probability propositions express relative frequen-
cies of repeated events, i.e. frequencies counted as a percentage of the total number of
events. They are derived from frequencies observed in the past and include the
assumptionrelevant for predictionthat the same frequencies will hold approximately
for the future (1951, p. 236).
Above all, Reichenbach insists in something basic: "an absolute reliability of the
predictions cannot be warranted" (1938, p. 86). This general claim has few exceptions
(such as eclipses of sun and moon) and could be accepted without difficulty. But the
problem is the predictive knowledge itself: its characteristics and limits. For him, the
solution is again in posits: "the concept of posit is the key to the understanding of
predictive knowledge" (1951, p. 241). It supposes that a proposition about the future
cannot be uttered as true and establishes that the limits are based on probabilistic
grounds. However, the possibility of true predictions cannot be excluded and, even in
the case that this was not so, the proposal of "posits" needs more justification. But this
requires changing his epistemological basis towards realistic grounds: to root the
prediction of phenomena in a knowledge of reality. Then, according to the type of event,
some are more predictable than others. For this reason, the distinction between
"foresight", "prediction" and "forecast" could be introduced: the knowledge of future
events depends on the degree of control of variables, degree that is different according
to the type of event (Gonzalez, 1995, section 5). From this perspective, it is not
acceptable that "the method of trial and error is the only existing instrument of
prediction. A predictive statement is a posit" (1951, p. 241).
48 W. J. GONZALEZ

Nevertheless, against radical empiricism, Reichenbach recognizes the need for

objective bases of knowledge: "a mere report of relations observed in the past cannot be
called knowledge; if knowledge is to reveal objective relations of physical objects, it must
include reliable predictions" (1951, p. 89). Conversely, throughout his philosophical
worksbefore, during and after EPhe makes frequent remarks in favour of epistemo-
logical objectivity in a sense which resembles a realist position. In effect, besides the
critical comments towards positivism (especially in the phenomenalist version) which
have been already pointed out, Reichenbach maintains several "realist" theses in his
paper on Dewey (1939). (i) "The basis of all knowledge is the world of concrete things
around us" (1939, p. 162) and not mere sense data, (ii) "The immediate reality is
composed of things, not the qualities" (1939, p. 162), thus the qualities are in the things.
In addition, there is a clear distinction between real and apparent objects (1936, p. 165).
(iii) We need theoretical entities: Dewey's non-realistic interpretation of scientific
concepts is not tenable (1939, p. 164). (iv) "There are many things which never can
have immediate existence but have objective existence or reality; such are the scientific
things like H2O, or electricity, which are not directly observable. I have proposed for
these things the term 'illiata', i.e. inferred things" (1936, p. 166).
On the other hand, Reichenbach constantly presents his doctrine as "empiricism".
In fact, his empiricism coincides with realism in the attempt of describing reality as it
is.19 So, he accepts the idea of "objective knowledge". But this is not linked to the search
for truth, rather it is to increase the grounds for certainty by the achievement of objective
probabilities (in the frequentist sense). Thus, several obstacles appeal which make his
position different from a genuine epistemological realism. The most important is the
replacement of the notion of "truth", which impedes a link between objectivity and
truth, the touchstone of realism. In addition, his previous "realist" claims should be
interpreted in the context of his empiricist program. Accordingly, as Putnam has pointed
out, Reichenbach's epistemological picture is quite different from realism, (i) "The
claim that 'we observe physical things, not impressions' has surprisingly little conceptual
content for Reichenbach" (1991b, p. I l l ) , (ii) The existence and behaviour of
'unobserved things are permissible, but "doing so requires the postulate that 'unob-
served things obey the same laws as observed things', and this postulate is a convention"
(1991b, p. 112). (iii) For him, the whole purpose of inquiry is the prediction of
experiences: he "really thought through the problems involved in viewing language
simply as a tool for the prediction of experiences" (Putnam, 1991b, p. 113). That tool
connects with his conception of knowledge as being functional: "the proof that knowl-
edge is functional, that it is the best instrument for making predictions, could not be
given before a satisfactory interpretation of probability was found" (1951, p. 259).
Again, the epistemological structure is instrumental and has its foundations in probabil-
ity, because empirical knowledge isfor hima knowledge of probabilities with predic-
tional value (1938, pp. 190-191). But can science rely completely on probabilities? This
initial difficulty has two faces: is defacto scientific knowledge built on probabilities as its
foundation? And ought scientific knowledge be developed always in the sphere of
probabilities? After that a new difficulty appears: the interpretation of probabilities.20
Methodologically, prediction is conditioned by its semantical, logical and epistemo-
logical bases (Gonzalez, 1990, pp. 67-74). To some extent, this occurs in Reichenbach:
his characterization of meaning in probabilistic terms, his defense of the interdepen-
dence between induction and probability, and his focus on probabilistic knowledge as
something oriented to make predictions have repercussions for the growth of the
predictive function of science (1938, p. 73). He considers the predictive method
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 49

primarily inductive and secondarily probabilistic, insofar as "the theory of probability

presupposes the use of induction" (1951, p. 242) Both induction and probability theory
consider prediction to be the aim of science. The aim of predicting the future is seen
from an instrumentalist perspective: "every inductive prediction is like casting a net into
the ocean of the happenings of nature; we do not know whether we shall have a good
catch, but we try, at least, and try by the help of the best means available" (1951, p. 246).
From the focus on prediction, the deductive-nomological and the inductive-proba-
bilistic models have important differences, mainly in the dichotomy "explaining"-
"predicting". In its initial presentation by Hempel and Oppenheim, the
deductive-nomological patterns involve a logical symmetry between "explaining" and
"predicting", as they recognize: "whatever will be said in this article concerning the
logical characteristics of explanation or prediction will be applicable to either, even if
only one of them should be mentioned" (1948/1965, p. 249). There is a pragmatic
difference: an explanation is when the empirical phenomenon is given and the an-
tecedent conditions and general laws are provided afterwards; whereas in a prediction
the antecedent conditions and general laws are given and the empirical phenomenon is
derived prior it occurs (1948/1965, p. 249). Hempel and Oppenheim stress the key
point of temporal sequence: explanations are offered after the facts have occurred;
whereas predictions are made before they occur (or, at least, before they are known).21
Instead, the thesis of asymmetry considers that the difference is more than pragmatic: the
contents of a prediction are not logically identical to those in an explanation (Scriven,
1962/1988, p. 54). According to this asymmetry, the grounds for "explaining" and
"predicting" are quite often different and do not depend merely on temporal conditions;
rather, they are conceptually different. So, they have diverse epistemological bases and,
consequently, the methodologies are different.
Even though Reichenbach was not involved in this controversy, which arises after
Hempel-Oppenheim's paper (1948, pp. 135-175), he develops some ideas which could
be interpreted as his answer to the question of symmetry versus asymmetry. In EP he
discards two extremes: the complete primacy of prediction and the attempt of expla-
nation detached from any future projection (which is a consequence of the postulate of
absolute verifiability). On the one hand, he criticizes the position which trusts com-
pletely on prediction, because "no true statements concerning the future can ever be
attained" (1938, p. 73). On the other hand, he rejects the attempt to avoid the
interpretation of scientific propositions as forecasts of future experience. For him, the
very aim of science is the prevision of the future (1938, pp. 73-74), and "there are
degrees in the domain of the unknown" (1938, p. 75). Therefore, the impossibility of
obtaining knowledge about future events with certainty should be recognized without
repudiation of the scientific role of prediction. However, it appears weaker than the
explanation of present or past events, because prediction does not guarantee true
statements. Thus, explanation and prediction seem to be asymmetric.
Where the asymmetry appears clearly is in The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. There is
asymmetry insofar as a gap exists between propositions about the past or the present and
propositions about the future. For Reichenbach, such a gap is manifest: "since state-
ments about the future are unjustifiable if they are regarded as being of the same type
as statements about the past or the present, we infer that statements about the future
must be given a different interpretation; knowledge of the future must be construed as
essentially different from knowledge of the past" (1951, p. 91). Explaining the past or
the present and predicting future events require diverse types of knowledge. When the
question is one of predicting, the knowledge is not observational: "when knowledge has
50 W. J. GONZLEZ

become observational it is no longer a knowledge of the future" (1951, p. 91). In the

case of explaining past or present events, the knowledge is observational. This argument
could be used to justify the initial epistemological asymmetry between explaining and
predicting: the difference is not merely the temporal anisotropy among them.
What is difficult to accept is Reichenbach's claim "that the simplest theory furnishes
the best predictions" (1938, p. 376). For him, "this assumption cannot be justified by
convenience; it has a truth-character and demands a justification within the theory of
probability and induction" (1938, p. 376). Even though this justification could be
possible, the main concern should be in the actual science and in what the history of
science has shown regarding simplicity and prediction. For Rescher, "induction with
respect to the history of science itself would soon undermine our confidence that nature
operates in the way we deem the simple; au contraire, the history of science is an
endlessly repetitive story of simple theories giving way to more complicated and
sophisticated ones. We opt for the simplest adequate alternative just because there is (ex
hypothesi) then and there no preponderating reason for resorting to a more complex
possibility" (1980, p. 179). Therefore, the best predictions do not need to be furnished
by the simplest theories. Moreover, predicting is usually a more complicated process
than explaining: knowledge of the events that could happen is more difficult to achieve
(as regards their existence and amount) than knowledge of events that already have
happened (and cannot change).

4. Reichenbach and the Bayesians: objective versus subjective probabilities

Until now, the present discussion has stressed Reichenbach's emphasis on the links of
prediction with probability. To elaborate further on his views of the prediction-probabil-
ity connection, this section will consider some details of his interpretation of probability
and its differences from the Bayesian perspective. This comparison between his objec-
tive conception of probability and a subjective one clarifies his position regarding the
links of prediction with probability. Among the plethora of interpretations of probability,
the Bayesian one is particular important and in its personalist formulation has received
special attention in recent years.22 Again, this comparison should be understood within
the aim of this paper: the critical reconstruction of Reichenbach's thought on prediction
in systematic terms. Accordingly, in this section the focus is completely thematic, not
historical.
Undoubtedly, this topic is relevant: probability isfor Reichenbachnot only the
essential form of every judgement concerning the future, but also "the representative of
truth for any case where absolute truth cannot be obtained" (1938, p. 75). In EP he
distinguishes initially between two concepts of "probability": the mathematical and the
logical. The first is used in mathematical physics and all kinds of statistics, and it is
interpreted in terms of frequency. The second is of a quite different type: it does not
present itself as a mathematical form and appears in conversations in words such as
"probably", "likely" or "presumably". This case corresponds to the logical concept of
probability, which has not been able to attain the same degree of perfection as the
mathematical concept (1938, pp. 298-299). Furthermore, he thinks that the logical
concept is not applicable in many cases; whereas he considers that the mathematical
concept is a great success, because it has been developed as a theory of relative
frequencies (1938, pp. 299-300). A reason for this disparity is that "the mathematical
concept of probability states a property of events, whereas the logical concept of
probability states a property o propositions" (1938, p. 302).
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 51

Within the theory of probability, induction and probability appear linked when
Reichenbach points out their functions. He establishes such functions in the study of the
problem of induction. "First, a frequency is used as a substantiation for the probability
statement; it furnishes the reason why we believe in the statement. Second, a frequency
is used for the verification of the probability statement; that is to say, it is to furnish the
meaning of the statement" (1938, p. 339). The existence of a limit of frequency depends
on the applicability of the inductive principle. The inductive inference does not try to
obtain a true statement; it achieves only a wager. Nevertheless, this is important for
Reichenbach, because the best wager "corresponds to a procedure the applicability of
which is the necessary condition of the possibility of predictions. To fulfill the conditions
sufficient for the attainment of true predictions does not lie in our power" (1938, p.
357).
When Reichenbach establishes the interdependence of the problems of induction
and probability, he adopts a clear posture: "we decide unequivocally in favor of that
determination of the degree of probability which mathematicians call determination a
posteriori. We refuse to acknowledge any so-called determination a priori such as some
mathematicians introduce in the theory of the games of chance" (1938, p. 340).
Reichenbach and the Bayesians differ in the way of understanding the nature of
probabilities. For the former, probability (frequency) is something objective; whereas,
for the latterat least, in what is now the more representative tendency: the personalist
oneprobabilities are subjective. As a consequence, they disagree in the conception of
scientific inference, which carries with it a different view on scientific prediction.
For the Bayesians, according to the personalist interpretation, the most important
features of scientific prediction depend on the confirmation or, in general, the evaluation
of theories. Firstly, the main goal in science is not to make predictions. So, against
Lakatos's position, there is no rational basis for giving more relevance to predictions
than to other aspects in science: "a theory that produces a false prediction may still
remain very probable" (Howson & Urbach, 1989, p. 97). Secondly, predictions have a
specific role in the "corroboration" of theories. This cannot be understood in the
Popperian sense, because if the predictions fail, it is not compelled by logic to infer that
the main theory is false. In fact, scientists consider evidence in a different way: (i) many
deterministic theories have no directly checkable deductive consequences and the
predictions by which they are tested are necessarily drawn only with the assistance of
auxiliary theories; (ii) there are theories explicitly probabilistic and this fact avoids the
possibility of categorical predictions; and (iii) in some deterministic theories, instead of
checking logical consequences, there is an examination of experimental effects which are
predicted only with certain probability (Howson & Urbach, 1989, pp. 6-8). Thirdly, no
special reasons exist for preferring prediction to accommodation. So, the problem that
Hempel has raised is solved by deciding what is pertinent in each case. "The plausibility
of the thesis that predictions always glean more support than accommodations rests ...
on nothing more than invalidly generalising from this special case in which the thesis is
true" (Howson & Urbach 1989, p. 282). Finally, the Popperian distinction between
"prediction" and "prophecy" is avoidable, insofar as "prophecy" can be understood as
something which is predicted. Thus, it corresponds to some degree of belief that can
receive a mathematical expression according to the probability calculus. This could be
a corollary more of Dutch Book argument: the strength of belief can be measured
numerically and such measure satisfies the axioms of the probability calculus.
Reichenbach maintains theses different from the personalist Bayesians. They are
grounded on probability understood as something objective and in the idea of predictive
52 W. J. GONZLEZ

value as the bridge between the known and the unknown (1938, p. 33). Firstly, the very
aim of science is the prevision of the future (1938, p. 74). Butfor him"predicting
the future presupposes inductions and that the problem of induction must be solved
before a theory of meaning can be given which includes the predictive function of
science" (1938, p. 73). Secondly, predictions contribute to the process of testability of
theories and hypotheses; however, "an absolute reliability of the predictions cannot be
warranted" (1938, p. 86). Furthermore, it is logically possible that future observations
differ from previous ones. "This is due to the independence of empirical observations;
there is no logical compulsion that a future observation should correspond to former
ones, or to any expected result" (1938, p. 51). Thirdly, the alternative between
prediction and accommodation seems to face towards that, insofar as the inductive
procedure consists in "the method of anticipation and later correction" (1938, p. 358).
Finally, within the methodological realm, the Popperian distinction between
"prediction" and "prophecy" is avoidable. "Prophecy" could be a mere case of predic-
tion, which requires the control of an application of the inductive principle. If there is
a good correspondence between the prophecies and the observations, "we shall infer, by
induction, that the man's prophecies will also be true in the future" (1938, p. 354). The
principle of induction decides the reliability of who makes prophecies.
Together with these differences, the Bayesian (personalist) and Reichenbach (fre-
quentist) approaches have similarities. They are similar insofar as both share an
empiricist common ground and discard rationalist perspectives. Thus, both reject the
Popperian theses. However, they emphasize different points in their conceptions, such
as in verifiability. In EP there is a crucial topic with two sides. On the one hand,
Reichenbach stresses a theory of meaning (1938; pp. 55, 71-72, 30-31), whereas this
aspect is strange to the present Bayesian approach. In effect, the Bayesians pay no
attention to the relevance of the problem of meaning in the process of empirical
confirmation of hypotheses. On the other hand, there is an epistemological conception
related with the problem of the truth of observational statements. This theme lies
outside the boundaries of the Bayesian field, because they are not interested in the truth
of the evidence or in the correctness in accepting them as true. Their conception of
support considers only how the acceptance as true of some evidential statements affects
the belief in some hypotheses.23
Concerning scientific prediction, the methodological repercussion of the Bayesian
and Reichebachian approaches have different shapes, (i) The emphasis on the role of the
subject varies. On one side, the position based on the Bayes' theorem highlights his role:
the research method has intuitive principles as a starting point, which include the
introduction of prior probabilities. On the other side, Reichenbach does not stress at all
the researcher's role. For him, the relevant context is justification rather than discovery:
science has its roots in the epistemological fieldsomething objectiveand can be
developed without incorporating psychological components, (ii) Both approaches accept
the inductive probability, but they conceive it differently. The Bayesians look for
subjective probabilities according to the degree of belief expressed by means of a
probability calculus; meanwhile Reichenbach seeks objective probabilities in accordance
with the frequency of an event. They involve different risks as well: subjectivism, the
former; and to obtain divergent predictionsand, therefore, arbitrarywith the rule of
induction that he proposes, the latter (Boudot, 1972, p. 171; Salmon 1957, pp.
180-190). (iii) The determinist events are not the "ideal" cases for scientific expla-
nation, because they should be interpreted from a theory of probability. However,
probability is understood in a different way: Reichenbach rejects the personalist in-
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 53

terpretation of probabilities (a subjective one), although he accepts Bayes' theorem as a

formal theorem of probability calculus.

5. Prediction after EP
After EP, Reichenbach added few new ideas on prediction. Among the innovations are
"postdictability" and "postdiction". Usually, he reiterated the previous key points and
sometimes he clarifies them, especially in The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. There is a
noticeable continuity between the book he wrote in 1937 in Istanbul and the book he
published in 1951 during his stay in Los Angeles. This allows us to complete the picture
of his views on prediction and it contributes specifically to a final characterization of his
concept of "prediction". With these elements at hand there is a solid ground for a final
assessment of his conception on this topic. In addition, it helps us to outline some
ingredients for a satisfactory alternative to his views on prediction.
Postdictability as opposed to predictability is the main innovation after EP. This term
is introduced by Reichenbach in Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1944,
p. 13). Predictability looks forward (future occurrences), whereas postdictability looks
backwards (past occurrences). He emphasizes the inherent limitations of each of them.
For him, with the same right with which the scientist maintains any of his fundamental
theorems, he is entitled to assert a limitation of predictability. "We may add that the
same limitation follows for the determination of past data in terms of given observations,
and that we therefore must also speak of a limitation of postdictability" (1944, p. 13). It
could be interpreted as an expression of logical symmetry between explanation and
prediction, one directed towards past experiences and the other to towards future ones.
However, within his conceptiondeveloped in section 3it is difficult to maintain such
an interpretation; rather, it seems that Reichenbach is stressing the limits of science,
according to his probabilistic view. In fact, on the same page he wrote: "it is a
consequence of the limitation of measurability that all relations between observational
data are restricted to statistical relations".
Postdiction is a term that Reichenbach uses in his posthumous book The Direction of
Time. It appears in an epistemological context: "Predictions require a knowledge of the
total cause; postdictions, or statements about past events, can be based on partial effects,
on records" (1956, p. 23). There are at least three differences between them: the kind
of knowledge (causal/based on effects), the direction of knowledge (future/past), and the
level of information (total/partial). The last aspect of prediction means that to foretell
the happenings of the future we need a basis of comprehensive information which covers
the total occurrence. Thus, a war could be predicted when we know the state of
armament of various countries, their political aspirations, and soon. He considers that
only in exceptional situations could it be possible to predict the future from isolated
indications, i.e. on the basis of certain observations. But, even "if such a prediction is
possible, it can be made only in general terms and will never supply the detailed
information attainable concerning recorded events" (1956, p. 23).24 Following his
example, we can predict a war, but we are not able to predict which persons will be
killed. These remarks on predictability could be ledin my judgementtowards a
difference in the kind of prediction according to the type of event predicted. So,
prediction might not be a uniform task: it depends directly on the type of reality
predicted and, therefore, on the type of variables studied.
Continuity is the main feature of prediction in Reichenbach's writings. This is the
case of The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, where he follows the lines drawn in EP. Both
54 W. J. GONZLEZ

books include a concept of "prediction" which could be summarized in six points,

particularly patent in the later book, (i) Prediction is the anticipation of the future on the
basis of present knowledge: to say in advance something that could happen objectively
(1951, p. 89). Reichenbach does not accept the "prediction of the past" or the
"prediction of the present". In effect, prediction is related to observations not yet made:
it is open to future experience. Prediction derives from frequencies observed in the past
and include the assumption that the same frequencies will hold approximately in the
future (1951, p. 236). (ii) Predictions are essentially corrigible. Some predictions are
better than others, because they are right in the greater number of cases. However,
prediction always works by means of trial and error: a predictive statement is a posit
(1951, p. 241). If the posit on further observations turns out to be false, we shall correct
it (1951, p. 245). (iii) Predicting implies something not certain (1951, p. 233). Prediction
isfor himlike a bet or a wager; therefore it includes uncertainty. Predictive knowl-
edge is less definitive than knowledge about the past or the present. It is something that
is being expected rather than a reality that we are experiencing now or have experienced
in the past. One cannot claim that a prediction will turn out to be a true one; however,
one can assert that a prediction could be right in the greater number of cases (1951, p.
240). (iv) He accepts the possibility of "unobservable things". Then, predictive knowl-
edge allows an ontological ingredient: in principle, something not yet observed will occur.
But prediction is like casting a net into the ocean of happenings of nature and it is not
known whether we shall have a good catch (1951, p. 246). (v) Predictions cannot be
made in a purely empirical way, because it needs reason. "Observation informs us about
the past and the present; reason foretells the future" (1951, p. 80). Thus, it is not
enough to have empirical bases. This is the main cause of the failure of classical
empiricism. But, for Reichenbach, reason should not be restricted to analytical princi-
ples, otherwise it cannot reflect the predictive nature of knowledge (1951, p. 90). (vi)
Prediction has a particular link with mathematics, which has provided the success of
modern science: "the mathematical method has given modern physics its predictive
power" (1951, p. 103). However, he rejects the rationalist tendency which regards
mathematical knowledge as the prototype of all knowledge and, thus, wanted to make
reason the source of knowledge of the world (1951, p. 91).
Most of these features appearwith nuancesin later conceptions on prediction.
In fact, these views usually accept prediction as anticipation of the future, its corrigible
character, the uncertainty of its knowledge, the need of reason for predicting and the
link with mathematics. Reichenbach stresses the importance of the problem of predic-
tion more than any other philosopher of his times.25 Moreover, he overemphasizes it
insofar as prediction isfor himthe aim of science, instead of being one among other
important aims. He rightly rejects the initial version of logical positivism on the basis of
its inadequacy to develop a theory of propositions about the future. His critical remarks
on the Logik der Forschung suggests the interesting claim that Popper ought to admit,
and needs to introduce, induction in order to construct a theory of prediction.26
However, the alternative to Carnap and Popper presented in EP, which includes the
interesting defense of the asymmetry that exists between explanation and prediction, is
far from solid.

6. Conclusion
Several problems in Reichenbach's views on prediction makes me reluctant to consider
it as a satisfactory proposal, (i) Semantically, he does not establish clear boundaries
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 55

between scientific and non-scientific predictions. We need such a demarcation. At the

same time, the differences in the degree of control of variables inside science should be
emphasized by means of terminological distinctions, such as "foresight", "prediction"
and "forecast". His pragmatic criterion on meaning has the serious obstacle that it
excludes true predictions, something which is accepted in the practice of science (e.g.
in astronomy), (ii) Logically, there is an overemphasis in induction. For him, as Salmon
has pointed out, "if successful predictions are possible, then the persistent use of the rule
of induction will lead to successful predictions" (1953, p. 47). Within the realm of
induction the main difficulty arises from Reichenbach's vindication of induction. Insofar
as his vindication of the rule of induction (and later attempts to justify his view) has not
been successful, it is clear that prediction cannot be based on such a perspective, at least
in its present formulation, (iii) Epistemologically, the heavily empirical character of this
perspective gives elbow room to the theoretical components in themselves. His underly-
ing instrumentalism tries to avoid the concepts of truth and falsity. He errs in thinking
that they can be substituted by high and low probability, (iv) Methodologically,
prediction is conditioned by the previous steps, mainly the dependence on induction
understood in a pragmatic way. Besides that restricted dependence, the other unjustified
claim is that the simplest theory furnishes the best predictions.
Any satisfactory alternative to Reichenbach's concept o prediction should include
in my judgementthe following ingredients. First, semantical elements are necessary,
because pure pragmatic focus is insufficient to cover what science is de facto and ought
to be. Among the semantical elements needed are the notions of "truth" and "falsity",
which cannot be replaced by high and low probability. But we also can distinguish
between "foresight", "prediction", "forecast" and "planning" as well as between
"prediction" and "prophecy". Scientific and non-scientific terms could be separated by
means of that clarification. Second, the emphasis in induction should be balanced:
deduction has a very important role in making predictions. If Popper has been heavily
criticized by his attempt to (dis) solve the problem of induction by neglecting it,
Reichenbach could also be criticized by the converse attempt of overemphasizing the
contribution of induction to prediction. Third, the epistemological basis of prediction
should be objective and open to the possibility of making correct predictions, otherwise
it is very difficult to guarantee the scientific character of prediction (mainly in social
sciences).27 Fourth, methodological developments on scientific prediction could only be
made on the grounds of what science is and ought to be. This includes the possibility
of qualitatively based predictions which could complement quantitatively based predic-
tions, both within the asymmetry between explanation and prediction.

Acknowledgements
A preliminary version of this paper was prepared during a stay at the London School of
Economics. The present version was developed at the Center for Philosophy of Science,
where I met another visiting fellow interested in H. Reichenbach: Arto Siitonen. I thank
Nicholas Rescher for the comments on this paper and his constant encouragement. I am
indebted to Wesley Salmon for his suggestions for improving this text and to Hilary
Putnam for the discussion on this topic. I express my gratitude to the University of
Pittsburgh for use of the Reichenbach Archives. The research at University of Pittsburgh
has been made possible through the grant 93-066 of Direccin General de Investigacin
Cientfica y Tcnica (DGICYT).
56 W. J. GONZALEZ

Notes
1. Certainly the topic of scientific prediction does not start with Reichenbach. It has a long tradition: Francis
Bacon emphasized the role of prediction in the appraisal of scientific theories; Newton's theory was
reinforced by the success of Halley's prediction; W. Whewell stressed the importance of the prediction of
new phenomena as evidence for or against a theory. However, Reichenbach put the topic of prediction
in a new framework, establishing it as a central issue within philosophy of science as a specific branch of
philosophy. Generally, his contemporaries paid more attention to explanation than to prediction.
2. In Reichenbach's texts issues such as "induction" are not purely logical; rather they are based on
epistemological factors: "The justification of the principle of induction is no pseudo-problem, but the
most important problem of modern Epistemology, without the solution of which we are not entitled to
call our logic empiricism, a refutation of the synthetical a priori" (1936c, p. 124).
3. For Putnam "Reichenbach refused to call himself a positivist, because he associated that term with
phenomenalism" (1991, p. 72).
4. The periodical Erkenntnis "succeeded the Annalen der Philosophie, with Carnap and Reichenbach as
editors. The first issue, which bears no publication date, must have appeared in 1930. Reichenbach wrote
the introduction and played a leading role in guiding the further development of the journal" (Hempel
1991, p. 7).
5. The interest in probability is a constant in Reichenbach's thought. Before the verificationist theory of
meaning and the phenomenalism of logical positivism, he has already a philosophical perspective based
on probability (1925/1978), pp. 289-291).
6. The connections prediction with induction and probability are stressed in (1930/1959, pp. 6778). In that
case, several years before EP, the focus is basically an attempt to grasp the causal structure of the world.
7. Regarding his Berlin group, Reichenbach recognizes that "the central problem selected for analysis was
probability and induction. Their enquiries led to a new mathematical theory of probability and to a
solution of the problem of induction" (1936a. p. 144). For him, "induction is always presupposed by
science (and daily life as well)" (1936a, p. 147). The links between prediction and induction are constant
throughout his presentation of logical empiricism before EP (1936a, pp. 152, 156-158), whereas there is
no mention at all of the role of deduction regarding prediction.
8. "The value of deduction is grounded in its emptiness. For the very reason that deduction does not add
anything to the premises, it may always be applied without a risk of leading to a failure. More precisely
speaking, the conclusion is not less reliable than the premises" (Reichenbach, 1951, pp. 37-38).
9. The relations with Popper belong to section 2 and the issue of his realism receives special attention in
section 3.
10. Years later, Carnap recognizes explicitly his agreement with the ideas found in EP (1963, p. 58).
11. "This 'degree of confirmation' corresponds, in many respects, to our 'weight'; with the difference,
however, that Carnap doubts whether it is identical with 'probability' " (EP, p. 76).
12. According to Kraft, "Reichenbach erected a quite different structure of knowledge against Popper; he
advocated inductivism and completely negated Popper's interpretation" (1974, p. 201).
13. It is paradoxical that the reasons Popper gives for this conventional element being necessary are similar
to the reasons Reichenbach gives for the necessity of judgement about singular statements being
probabilistic. For a fuller discussion of the differences between Popper and Reichenbach, cf. Coffa (1991,
pp. 328-348).
14. "The theory of probability involves the problem of induction, and a solution of the problem of probability
cannot be given without an answer to the question of induction" (1938, p. 339).
15. According to the interpretation of Reichenbach as radical fallibilist, his position is the following: it is not
good to aim at something (truth in science) that you cannot know whether you have attained it; so aim
for high probability instead. But the problem of adequacy to actual science still remains: some predictions
are certain (conditional and unconditional ones) and not merely highly probable; in addition, the aim of
science is truth and, although this is generally quite difficult to prove, sometimes we know if we have
attained it.
16. Other arguments for showing that Reichenbach's vindication of induction fails have been developed by
Putnam in the Proceedings of 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
(Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1993).
17. "The word 'posit' may express this taking for true, without implying that there is any proof for the truth;
the reason why we decide to take the proposition as true is that this decision leads, in repeated
applications, to the greatest ratio of successes" (1938, p. 313).
18. "The inductive inference is a procedure which is to furnish us the best explanation concerning the future"
(1938, p. 348).
 REICHENBACH'S CONCEPT OF PREDICTION 57

19. Empiricism is a position which can go either towards realism or anti-realism depending on the stress of
its components. Van Fraassen (1980) has shown how to be empiricist and anti-realist.
20. Cf. section 4.
21. Later on, C. Hempel gave up the symmetry thesis. He establishes that the requirement of explanatory
relevance "represents a necessary condition for an adequate explanation, but not a sufficient one. For
example, a large body of data showing a red shift in the spectra of distant galaxies provides strong grounds
for believing that those galaxies recede from our local one at enormous speeds, yet it does not explain
why" (1966, pp. 48-49). This conception is a denial of the symmetry thesis.
22. A critical examination of the Bayesian doctrines is made in Earman (1992).
23. "The Bayesian theory of support is a theory of how the acceptance as true of some evidential statements
affects your belief in some hypotheses. How you came to accept the truth of the evidence, and whether
you are correct in accepting it as true, are matters which, from the point of view of the theory, are simply
irrelevant" (Howson & Urbach, 1989, p. 272). "We say nothing about whether it is correct to accept the
data" (Howson & Urbach, 1989, p. 272).
24. "For physical quantities of irregular variation, prediction is technically impossible, whereas postdiction is
easily achieved by the use of registering instruments" (1956, p. 179).
25. Compare, for example, with Carnap, who paid little attention to this problem and published a paper on
this topic eight years after EP. Cf. Carnap (1946, pp. 520-521).
26. On the need of an inductive element for a coherent Popperian theory of prediction, cf. Salmon (1981, pp.
115-125).
27. Objectivity is not identical to "physically", although physical things are objective. On objectivity and
realism, cf. Gonzalez (1986, 1993).

References
BOUDOT, M. (1972) Logique Inductive et Probabilite (Paris, Armand Colin).
CARNAP, R. (1928) Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin, Weltkreis).
CARNAP, R. (1936) Testability and meaning, Philosophy of Science, 3, pp. 419-471 and Philosophy of Science,
4, pp. 1-40.
CARNAP, R. (1946) Theory and prediction in science, Science, 104, (2710), pp. 520-521.
CARNAP, R. (1956) The methodological character of theoretical concepts, in H. FEIGL & M. SCRIVEN (Eds),
The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, pp. 38-76 (Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press).
CARNAP, R. (1963) Intellectual autobiography, in P.A. SCHILPP (Ed.) The Philosophy of R. Carnap (La Salle,
Open Court).
COFFA, A. (1991) The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Camap (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
EARMAN, J. (1992) Bayes or Bust? (Cambridge, MIT Press).
FRAASSEN, B.C. VAN (1980) The Scientific Image (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
GONZALEZ, W.J. (1986) La Teora de la Referencia (Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and Publicaciones
Universidad de Murcia, Salamanca-Murcia).
GONZLEZ, W.J. (1990) "Ambito y caractersticas de la Filosofa y Metodologa de la Ciencia, in W.J.
GONZALEZ (Ed.), Aspectos metodolgicos de la investigacin cientfica, 2nd edn, pp. 49-78 (Ediciones
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid and Publicaciones Universidad de Murcia, Madrid-Murcia).
GONZLEZ, W.J. (1993) El realismo y sus variedades: El debate actual sobre las bases filosficas de la Ciencia,
in A. CARRERAS (Ed.) Conocimiento, Ciencia y Realidad, pp. 11-58 (Mira-SIUZ, Zaragoza).
GONZLEZ, W.J. (1995) Prediction and mathematics: the Wittgenstenian approach, in G. MUNEVAR (Ed.) Tke
Philosophy of Science in the New Spain. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, Kluwer).
HAHN, H., CARNAP, R. & NEURATH, O. (1929) Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (Wolf,
Vienna). Translated (1973) as The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle (Dordrecht,
Reidel).
HEMPEL, C. & OPPENHEIM, P. (1948) Studies in the logic of explanation, Philosophy of Science, 15, pp.
135-175 also in C. HEMPEL (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays, pp. 245-295 (New
York, Free Press).
HEMPEL, C.G. (1991) Hans Reichenbach remembered, Erkenntnis, 35, pp. 5 = 10.
HOWSON, C. & URBACH, P. (1989) Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (La Salle, Open Court).
KRAFT, V. (1974) Popper and the Vienna Circle, in P. A. SCHILPP (Ed.) The Philosophy of K. Popper, vol. 1,
pp. 185-204 (La Salle, Open Court).
POPPER, K. (1935) Logik der Forschung (Vienna, Springer). Translated into English (1959, 1968) as Logic of
Scientific Discovery (London, Hutchinson).
PUTNAM, H. (1991a) Reichenbach's metaphysical picture, Erkenntnis, 35, pp. 61-75.
58 W. J. GONZLEZ

PUTNAM, H. (1991b) Logical positivism and intentionality, in, PH. GRIFFITHS (Ed.) A. J. Ayer: Memorial
Essays, pp. 105-116 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
REICHENBACH, H. (1925) Metaphysik and Naturwissenshcaft, Symposium, 1(2), pp. 158-176. Translated as
'Metaphysics and natural sciences', in H. REICHENBACH (1978a), pp. 283-297.
REICHENBACH, H. (1930) Kausalitt und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Erkenntnis (2-3), pp. 185-188. Translated by
M. Reichenback as 'Causality and probability', in H. REICHENBACH (1959) pp. 67-78.
REICHENBACH, H. (1931) Ziele und Wege der heutingen Naturphilosophie (Leipzig, Meiner). Translated by M.
Reichenbach: 'Aims and methods of modern philosophy of nature', in H. REICHENBACH (1959) pp.
79-108.
REICHENBACH, H. (1933) Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Kantstudient, 38, pp. 199-201.
Translated by E. Schneewind as 'Carnap's Logical Structure of the World, in H. REICHENBACH (1978a), pp.
405-408.
REICHENBACH, H. (1935a) Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij).
REICHENBACH, H. (1935b) ber Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Bemerkungen zu Karl Popper Logik der
Forschung, Erkenntnis, 5(4), pp. 267-284. Translated by E. Schneewind as 'Induction and probability.
Remarks on Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery, in H. REICHENBACH (1978b) pp. 372-387.
REICHENBACH, H. (1936a) Logistic empiricism in Germany and the present state of its problems, Journal of
Philosopohy, 33(6), pp. 141-160.
REICHENBACH, H. (1936b) Warum ist die Anwendung der Induktionsregel fr uns notwendige Bedingung von
Voraussagen?, Erkenntnis, 6(1), pp. 32-40.
REICHENBACH, H. (1936C) Induction and probability, Philosophy of Science, 3, pp. 124-126.
REICHENBACH, H. (1938) Experience and Prediction (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
REICHENBACH, H. (1939) Dewey's theory of science, in P. A. SCHILPP (Ed.) (1951) The Philosophy of J. Dewey,
2nd edn, pp. 159-192 (New York, Tudor).
REICHENBACH, H. (1944a) Bertrand Russell's logic, in P. A. SCHILPP (Ed.) (1951) The Philosophy of Bertrand
Russell, 3rd edn, pp. 48-49 (New York, Tudor).
REICHENBACH, H. (1944b) Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Berkeley, University of California
Press).
REICHENBACH, H. (1949) The Theory of Probablity. Second edition translated by E. H. Hutten & Maria
Reichenbach (Berkeley, University of California Press).
REICHENBACH, H. (1951) The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley, University of California Press) (2nd edn,
1966).
REICHENBACH, H. (1956) The Direction of Time, edited by M. Reichenbach (2nd edn, 1991 with foreword by
H. Putman) (Berkeley, University of California Press).
REICHENBACH, H. (1959) Modern Philosophy of Science (London, Routledge Kegan Paul).
REICHENBACH, H. (1978a) Selected Writings, vol. I, edited by M. Reichenbach & R. Cohen (Dodrecht, Reidel).
REICHENBACH, H. (1978b) Selected Writings, vol. 2, edited by M. Reichenbach & R. Cohen (Dordrecht,
Reidel).
RESCHER, N. (1980) Induction (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press).
SALMON, W. (1953) The uniformity of nature, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14, pp. 39-48.
SALMON, W. (1957) The predictive inference, Philosophy of Science, 24(2), pp. 180-190.
SALMON, W. (1981) Rational prediction, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 32, pp. 115-125.
SALMON, W. (1991) Hans Reichenbach's vindication of induction, Erkenntnis, 35, pp. 99-122.
SALMON, W. (1993) On the alleged temporal anisotropy of explanation, in J. EARMAN, A. JANIS, G. MASSEY &
N . RESCHER (Eds) Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds (Pittsburgh, University of
Pittsburgh Press).
SCRIVEN, M. (1962) Explanations, predictions and laws, in J. C. PITT (Ed.) (1988) Theories of Explanation, pp.
51-74 (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
SPIRTES, P., GLYMOUR, C. & SCHEINES, R. (1993) Causation, Prediction and Search (New York, Springer).

Notes on contributor
Wenceslao J. Gonzalez is Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Murcia and
Visiting Professor at the University of La Corua. He has been Visiting Fellow at the Center for Philosophy
of Science, University of Pittsburgh. His research interests are in philosophy and methodology of science, both
in the general perspective (mainly in realism and anti-realism, scientific progress and scientific prediction) and
in specific fields (philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of economics). Correspondence: Professor
Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Murcia,
30071-Murcia, Spain. Tel and fax: 34-68-364109. Email: wencglez@fcu.um.es.