Heirs of Malabanan vs.

Republic (2009)

Summary Cases:

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

Subject: Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has not been
repealed by the passage of the Property Registration Decree; Judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title- limited period to avail; Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed;
Herbieto and Buenaventura rulings in relation to Section 14(1) are considered obiter; Proof that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable; Ownership of patrimonial lands by prescription;
Ownership by extraordinary prescription; An express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property has been converted into patrimonial is required, otherwise, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains incapable of acquisition by prescription; Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be counted for purposes of prescription; Just title; Rules
of registration and ownership under Section 14(1) vis-a-vis Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree; Malabanan has not acquired ownership of the lands either under Section 14(1) nor Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree

Facts:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

Aristedes Velazco, witness for Malabanan, testified that the property originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons- Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons. Magdalena' son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties. Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle Eduardo Velazco, was the property sold to Malabanan.

Also submitted as evidence was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land on March 15, 1982.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan and granted his application. The Republic interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA reversed the RTC and held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any
period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. The CA
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable
and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored
in the computation of the period of possession. The CA based its interpretation on the Court's ruling in
Republic vs. Herbieto.

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Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals. Thus, it was the heirs of
Malabanan who filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, relying on the Court's ruling in Republic v.
Naguit, which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains
the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with
respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act and the Property Registration Decree.

Held:

Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

1. Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to
time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.

2. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into
(a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.

Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act

3. Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization."

4. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides that private
persons may validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

5. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073:

First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain."

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier."

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has not been repealed by the passage of the Property
Registration Decree

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6. Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. It bears observation that Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act (CA 141) is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. It is
Section 14(1) of the Decree that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.

7. It is the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.

Judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title- limited period to avail

8. There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act
limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. Under the
current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until
31 December 2020.

Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed

9. The [OSG] suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning
of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under
a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

10. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. (Republic v. Naguit)

11. The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in
Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto absurdly limits the application of the provision to the
point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to
12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Herbieto and Buenaventura rulings in relation to Section 14(1) are considered obiter

12. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that
the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.

13. In the subsequent case of Buenaventura, the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of
possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
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inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession..." That
statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in
Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter.

14. On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of
the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on
Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.

Proof that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable

15. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.

16. In this case, Malabanan presented a certification issued by the CENRO-DENR stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable per map xxx dated December 9, 1980.
This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. In the present
case, no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing
that the lots in question are forestal land.

Ownership of patrimonial lands by prescription

17. Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
18. When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the
only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State.

19. It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,
they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that
are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself
proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

20. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith, as well as just title.

Ownership by extraordinary prescription

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21. There are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule:

(1) The first source is Republic Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through
possession in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years. This provision was repealed in 1977 with the
enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time.
Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by RA 1942.

(2) The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules
on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there
are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code-ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse
possession... for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."

22. The first source of the 30-year period rule, RA 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the
only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14(2).

An express declaration by the State that the public dominion property has been converted into
patrimonial is required, otherwise, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains incapable of acquisition by prescription

23. Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".

24. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even
if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law. This interpretation is in accord with the Regalian
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable
or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.

Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be counted for
purposes of prescription

25. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls
wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

26. Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession
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preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in
possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.

27. Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is
no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2)
is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

28. It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to
Section 14(1). Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

Just title

29. There are indispensable requisites for ordinary acquisitive prescription good faith and just title.
The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code, provisions that more or less speak for themselves.

30. On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is
just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right."

31. Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by
prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.
(Tolentino)

Rules of registration and ownership under Section 14(1) vis-a-vis Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree

32. Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the
ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of
ownership.

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (ownership acquired by judicial confirmation of
imperfect title)

33. Since Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.

Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree (ownership acquired by acquisitive prescription)
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34. Under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

Malabanan has not acquired ownership of the lands either under Section 14(1) nor Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree

35. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence-the Tax Declarations they presented in particular-is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

36. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of
the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

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