Answer Key:

I. Eminent Domain, Police Power, Taxation

II. The practice of law, Cayetano vs. Monsod

III.

[a] Define the archipelagic doctrine of national territory, state its rationale; and
explain how it is implemented through the straight baseline method. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under the Archipelagic Doctrine, the waters around, between and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part
of the internal waters of the Philippines. (2nd sentence, Art. I)

This Doctrine is based on the principle that an archipelago, which consists of a

number of islands separated by bodies of water, should be treated as one integral
unit, and the waters inside the baselines are considered internal waters.
(Nachura)

Using the straight baseline method, imaginary lines are drawn joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area
the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the
drawing of baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent, from the general
configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be
considered internal waters; while the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall
then be measured from the baselines. (Art. 48, UNCLOS)

[b] Section 2 of RA 9522 declared the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
Scarborough Shoal as "Regimes of Islands." Professor Agaton contends that since
the law did not enclose said islands, then the Philippines lost its sovereignty and
jurisdiction over them. Is his contention correct? Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to determine the maritime zone
of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with the Philippine
claim of sovereignty. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines
 continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal when it affirmatively states that both KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal are areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction.

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of
the Philippine archipelago, the Philippines would have committed a breach of
two provisions of UNCLOS III. Although the Philippines has consistently
claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago" hence, will
exceed 100 nautical miles. These will constitute violations of Article 47(3) and
Article 47(2) of UNCLOS III. (Magallona v. Ermita, GR No. 187167, Aug. 16, 2011)

IV.

The flight attendants challenge on the ground of the equal protection clause is without
merit.
The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause may be invoked only
against governmental interference or action and not against the acts of private
individuals or entities.
Here PAL is a private entity.

Hence the flight attendants challenge is without merit. [Yrasuegui v. Philippine

Air Lines, G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008]

VI.

The judgment or conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on the

extrajudicial confession of the accused. The lawyer assisting them must be independent.
City Attorney Johnny Enrile is not independent.
As City Attorney, he provides legal support to the Mayor in performing his duties
which includes the maintenance of peace and order. (People vs. Sunga GR 126029)

Alternative:

Affirmed if the accused fails to object when the evidence was offered which would
make it admissible.

VII.

A) The advice of Georginas counsel that she file a petition for a writ of amparo is not
correct. In order that a writ of amparo can be availed of against a private individual, for
the disappearance of someone, the involvement of the government is indispensable.
There is no showing of any participation of the government in Bens disappearance.
(Navia vs. Pardico GR 184467)

B) No, C/ Supt. Dalisay cannot be held responsible for Bens disappearance. Command
responsibility has no application in a writ of amparo proceeding. It may be established
merely for the court to craft the appropriate remedies against the responsible parties.
(2013 Item IX BAR)

VIII.

Can sue the municipality. Negligience for taking care of the window pane
State immunity as defense will not prosper because under the law, a municipal
corporation can be sued and be sued as expressly provided under the local government
code. Furthermore, under the civil code, it can also be held liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or
supervision (art. 2189). In the present case, the municipal building is under their control
and supervision, thus, no immunity from suit. (2009 Bar)

IX.
I shall argue that under Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the
educational institution enjoys academic freedom. Academic freedom includes its
rights to prescribe academic standards, policies and qualification for the admission
of a student (University of San Agustin, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The claim of Bobbys family is not meritorious. It is
provided under Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution that Academic
Freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Colleges, publicly- or
privately-owned, if they offer collegiate courses, enjoy academic freedom. From the
standpoint of the educational institution, the university has the freedom to determine
who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall be taught; and who may be
admitted to study (Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234). (2013 Bar)

X.

No, it is not yet too late for Notoreous to raise the issue of constitutionality.
The Supreme Court has held that the requirement that the constitutional issue be raised
at the earliest opportunity refers only to raising the issue in a competent court.
Here the Office of the Ombudsman before which proceedings against Notoreous were
had is not a competent court but only an administrative body.

Hence Notoreous may still raise the issue of constitutionality before the Court of
Appeals. [See Estarija v. Ranada, 492 SCRA 652 (2006), Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., 539 SCRA
34 (2007), and, Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, 548 SCRA 295 (2008)]

XI.
No, the Civil Service Commission may not properly take cognizance of the
administrative charges against Dahlia Daldal.
The Supreme Court has held that administrative jurisdiction over a court employee is
vested aexclusively with the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment with the judiciary. [Ampong v. Civil Service
Commission, 563 SCRA 293; Civil Service Commission v. Andal, 608 SCRA 370]

XII.

The size of the tarpaulin makes it easier for people to view the
message. Every expression of a citizen with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. The tarpaulin was not posted in return for any consideration
from any candidate or party. It is not covered by the regulation of the Commission
on Elections. (Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015)

XIII.

A. The requisites for a valid classifications are as follows, to wit: (1) substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; (2) germane to the purpose of
 the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally
to all members of the same class.

In this case, the assailed law does not violate the equal protection clause. First,
the law rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship
between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women, all make for real differences justifying the classification. Second, the
classification is germane to the purpose of the assailed law, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, as spelled out in its declared
policy. Third, the classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and the
law applies equally to all members. The application of the challenged law is not
limited to existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions
as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse. And the law applied equally to all women and
children who suffer violence and abuse. (Garcia v. Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25,
2013)

B. He is not correct.

Such function of the Barangay Chairman is purely executive in nature, consistent

with his duty under the LGC "to enforce all laws and ordinances" and "to
maintain public order in the barangay." (Garcia v. Drilon, supra.)

XIV

The legislative district which elected AA as member of the

provincial board for three consecutive terms was the same. He is disqualified to run
again because of the three-term limit. (Naval vs. Commission on Elections, 729

SCRA 299)

XV.

a. Yes. (Estrada vs Escritor, August, 4, 2003 and June 22, 2006) Right to
freedom of religion must prevail. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same
 time, strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Although the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interest. Benevolent neutrality approach requires that the court make an
individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.
b. The case will not prosper. The expulsion/excommunication of members of
a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of
the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.
(Taruc v. Bishop dela Cruz, et al. Mar. 10, 2005).
(2009 Bar XVI)

XVI.

a. Gerona Case

b. SUGGESTED ANSWER: The freedom of exercise of religion entails the right to

believe, which is absolute, and the right to act on ones belief, which is subject to
regulation. As a rule, the freedom of exercise of religion can be restricted only if
there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has the
right to prevent. (Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529.) The non-
establishment clause implements the principle of separation of church and state.
The state cannot set up a church, pass laws that aid one religion, and all religions,
prefer one religion over another, force or influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will, or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. (Everson vs. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1.) (2012 Bar item X)

XVII.

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is
no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced;
and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict
with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate
his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good
faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Ichong vs.
Hernandez

XVIII.

Gov. Yuri is correct.

In the conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city, the registered voters
of the entire province should participate in the plebiscite, not just the residents of the
concerned city. In converting a city into a highly urbanized city, Sec. 453 of the LGC
calls for the conduct of a plebiscite by the "qualified voters therein." Meanwhile, Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution mandates that no LGU shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered without approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the "political units directly affected." Construing the law in
harmony with the Constitution, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453
of LGC means the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to a
highly urbanized city but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such
conversion. (Umali v. COMELEC, GR No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

As the income, population and area of Laguna will be reduced, it will certainly be
directly affected by the conversion of Malumanay into a highly urbanized area.
Therefore, the province of Laguna as well as the qualified voters in Malumanay should
participate in the plebiscite called for its conversion.

XIX.

Yes. Since BB was disqualified, he was not a valid candidate. Since

he was not qualified to run, he could not be substituted. (Aratea vs. Commission on
Elections, 683 SCRA 105
XX.

Repatriation results in recovery of the original nationality. Since he

was originally a natural-born Filipino citizen, his repatriation restored him to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. (Bengzon vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545)

XXI.

No, the Philippines may not hail China before the International Court of Justice.
Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the consent of the parties is
needed for the ICJ to acquire jurisdiction over a case.
Here China had stated that its position is non-negotiable and not subject to arbitration
or dispute-resolution.
Hence it is clear that China would not consent to the bringing of the dispute to the ICJ
and thus the Philippines cannot hail China before the ICJ.

XXII.

Her defense is bereft with merit.

Custodial investigation begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to

be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory questions which tend to illicit incriminating statements. (People v.
Dela Cruz, GR No. 118866-68, Sept. 17, 1997)

As Paulyn was not taken into custody but only invited and that there was no particular
suspect yet and no questions propounded that will possibly incriminate her, Paulyn's
constitutional rights were not violated.(2016 Bar ITEM 1)

XXIII.

Yes. Only AA, the original author of the statement, should be

prosecuted for libel. Since CC merely shared the statement with others, he cannot
be held liable. Because of the unique culture of cyberspace, the inclusion of CC in the
case would have a chilling effect upon those who shared the statement. This is in
violation of freedom of expression. This makes the law overbroad. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)