THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
1. CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. v. DSWD
FACTS:
Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the
Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of the Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:(a) the
grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral
and burial service sfor the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based
on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided,
further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and
to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued
by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the
Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that
under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from
Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand,
under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted
directly from the tax due amount.
The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall
include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It
stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
Drug store owners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments
to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a
mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme
whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is violative of Article 3
Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
RULING:
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As
such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the
question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program. The Court believes so.
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The Senior Citizens Act is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. It is [t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
It is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is
unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate
correctly and come up with a financial report. In treating the discount as a tax deduction,
petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for
every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by
them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction.
To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive
maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from
the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants
a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to
sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the
government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full
amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be
reimbursed to the drugstores.
Petitioners computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states
that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income
derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net
income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not
be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses,
and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the
discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate
their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the
computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly
of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of
the discount.
The right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution
provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities,
continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the
command of the State for the promotion of public good.
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2. MIRASOL VS DPWH Neither do we find AO 1 oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to
adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners right
use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure
to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized
Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways.41 police power measure
may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process
that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.
and equal protection of the law.43 Petitioners attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle
Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of certain administrative issuances of the DPWH
for being inconsistent with RA 2000, entitled Limited Access Highway Act. Among others, ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail. Petitioners contention that AO 1
is AO1 which requires motorcycles shall have an engine displacement of at least 400cc. unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is not
prohibited.44
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only
unconstitutional. justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-
RULING: The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A toll way is not an ordinary road.
of the police power of the state.33 The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation,
essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers.34 The tendency is to extend and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition
rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of
reasonableness.35 What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness exists,36 for its determination rests The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The
upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.37 right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse
We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners
precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are
to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. They free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners
cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited
vehicle height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these by regulation.
rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way is constructed
necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation. Inevitably,
such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does
not invalidate the rules.
Consider Section 3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways.38 The
regulation affects the right to peaceably assemble. The exercise of police power involves
restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself. Thus, the test of constitutionality of a
police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on
constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.
None of the rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary and capricious. The DPWH, through
the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate
motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that
the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents.39
Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to
ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways.
However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what
is "best," rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power
measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purpose desired can in fact
be probably fully accomplished, or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose
intended.40 Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the
governmental regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" are arguments reserved for the
Legislatures discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the
assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case to be so.

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3. HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City, Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
City Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina require its exercise and
City vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY- (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
MARIKINA, INC., G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, MENDOZA, J.: purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
FACTS: Respondent St. Scholasticas College is the owner of 4 parcels of land in Marikina concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Heights. St. Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. is located within the property. The Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck
property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some 30 years ago. Abutting the down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements. The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted an public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it
ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five meter would also be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987
allowance between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken
establishments and educational and religious institutions. for public use without just compensation.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property will
them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, continue to remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title
and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the
vehicles to park. The respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
directive. In response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The Court
on the enforcement of the subject ordinance. Not in conformity, the respondents filed a is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a
petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents private property for public use
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina. without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness,"
the Ordinance asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. it is obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.
police power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled
safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity. that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
The RTC rendered a Decision ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of
petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
respondents property. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
ISSUE: Whether the Ordinance in imposing a five-meter setback a valid exercises of police purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
power by the City Government of Marikina.
HELD: No. "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people." The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise
of police power to local government units in the Local Government Code.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been
used by the Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further
a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying
strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest.
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of
1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys
purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.

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4. G.R. NO. 188920, February 16, 2010
Jose Atienza, Jr., etc., petitioners vs COMELEC
Facts: July 5, 2005, Drilon, the president of LP announced his party's withdrawal of support
for the administration of PGMA but Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilon's move claiming that he made the announcement without consulting the
party.
next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed
Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECOs composition.
(4) Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction
when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their
expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership
controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically
upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.

March 2, 2006, Atienza hosted a party conference to discuss local autonomy and party
matters, when convened, the party proceeded to declare all positions in the party vacant and
elected new officers, making Atienza as the new president of LP. Drilon immediately filed a
petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections. Drilon is claiming that the election was
illegal because the party was not properly convened. Drilon also claims that the officers of
LP were elected to a fixed 3 year term that was yet to end on November 2007.
Atienza claimed that the majority of LP attended the assembly and that the amendments of
LP's constitution were not properly ratified thus the term of Drilon and other officers already
ended on July 2006.
(5) Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue
of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected
right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first
summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to
Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative
proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

COMELEC ruled in favor of Drilon, Hence, this petition,

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party;
(2) Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal
standing to question Roxas election.
(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO
membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;
(4) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue
concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the
expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party;
(5) Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s
constitutional right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party.

Held:
(1) Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point
out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the
NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party
to the case.

(2) Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing
to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP members,
having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties. As non-
members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.

(3) In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim
that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to
those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir
Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted
that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas,
et al. The Courts decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the

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