G.R. No.
L-5094 August 7, 1952 On August 6, 1951, or after the lapse of more than a year since the decision
JUAN JABON, ALEJANDRO DIGAL, CANDIDO JABON, and PAULINO
JABON, petitioners,
vs.
HIPOLITO ALO, Judge of First Instance of Bohol, and SATURNINO alias
CATALINO YTEM, respondents.
Agapito Hontanosas for petitioners.
Felix Magdales for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to nullify
an order of respondent Judge entered on August 11, 1951.
Saturnino alias Catalino Ytem filed an action against Juan Jabon and three
other persons praying that he be declared owner of a parcel of land
containing approximately an area of four hectares. Defendants in turn,
prayed that Juan Jabon be declared owner of the property and the claim of
the plaintiff for damages be denied.
On March 13, 1950, Judge Jose Querubin, then presiding the court, after
trial, rendered judgement, the dispositive part of which reads:
In view whereof, the Court declares the defendant Juan Jabon the
owner of the portion of land described in his tax declaration No.
13439, having an extension of 2 hectares 07 ares and 36 centares
and indicated in the report of the commissioner and his sketch,
Exhibit X and X-1, as to the portion by angels A, B, C, D, and back to
A and the rest of the portions covered by tax declarations, Exhibits
D, E, and F, belong exclusively to the plaintiff, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
This decision became final for lack of appeal, and so on May 8, 1950, a writ
of execution was issued ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the
land adjudicated to the plaintiff. As defendants resisted the execution
plaintiff asked the court to declare them in contempt, but Judge Jose Veluz,
then presiding the court, denied plaintiff's motion. ruling that the writ of
execution was not in accordance with the dispositive part of the decision.
had become final, plaintiff moved that the dispositive part of the decision be
amended by including therein an order directing the defendants to vacate
the land adjudicated to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of defendants, the respondent Judge, Hon. Hipolito Alo, entered
an order on August 11, 1951, which practically amended the decision, for in
said order he directs that defendants should vacate the land and should
deliver its possession to the plaintiff. The case is now before this Court on a
petition for certiorari, defendants contending that the respondent Judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction.
As may be noted from the dispositive part of the decision which appears
quoted in the early part of this decision, the court merely declares plaintiff
owner of the portions of the land under litigation which are not covered by
the area of 2 hectares, 07 ares and 36 centares adjudicated to defendant
Juan Jabon. It does not give plaintiff any other relief, much less it orders
plaintiff to be placed in possession of the land adjudicated to him. It later
developed, however, that when plaintiff attempted to execute that part of
the judgment rendered in his favor, a portion of the land was occupied by
the defendants, and the latter had their houses built thereon. And because
the decision contains no directive for their ejectment they resisted the
execution. The question now that arises for determination is whether that
decision, which has become final and executory more than a year ago, can
still be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included, such as
the delivery of the possession of the land and the ejectment therefrom of the
defendants.
Our answer is in the negative. Rule 39, section 45, provides that "that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon
its face to have been do adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto". Here there has been only a
declaration of ownership. No other relief is awarded to the plaintiff. In the
absence of any other declaration, can we consider a mere declaration of
owner-ship as necessarily including the possession of the property
adjudicated? We do not believe so, for ownership is different from
possession. A person may be declared owner, but he may not be entitled to
possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a
lessee of which tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which
he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid
defenses to resist surrender of possession. We, therefore, hold that a
judgment for ownership, does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident.
In a similar case, this Court held:
It may be admitted that the judgment absolving defendant Talens
was in effect a declaration that the sale to him was valid. It may also
be admitted, though with some reluctance or reservation, that it was
a declaration of ownership of the lot. But it is doubtful whether it
also included a direction to surrender it to him. Although it is true
that the owner is generally entitled to possession, it is equally true
that there may be cases where the actual possessor has some rights
which must be respected or defined. A lessee is not the owner; yet a
declaration of ownership in another person does not necessarily
mean his ouster.
Touching the case at bar, if the possessor Garcia had made
necessary improvements for which he is entitled to compensation, an
order of possession would deprive him of such payment without
having had an opportunity to claim for them and prove their value.
His Honor, the trial judge, obviously foresaw this possibility among
others, and refused to decree the restitution, taking "into
consideration that said decision (of the Court of Appeals) seems not
to close all the doors for the parties to protect their interests, if they
still have any."
Consequently, we hold that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
G. R. No. 3221-R absolving Talens from the complaint did not include
an order for delivery of possession of the land.
The petition is denied, with costs. (Talens vs. Garcia et al. 47 Off.
Gaz. [Supp, to No. 12], pp. 358, 360-361.)
Consequently, we hold that the order of respondent Judge dated August 11,
1951, is null and void, it having been issued excess of his jurisdiction.
Petition is hereby granted, with costs. The preliminary injunction issued is
declared final.
Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Montemayor, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur for the same reason given in my concurring opinion on the point in
the case of Contreras et al., vs. Felix et al., 44 Off. Gaz., 4306, 4315.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I think the application for certiorari should be dismissed.
The general rule is that a court may amend its judgment as truth and
justice require, to the end that the judgment may express what was actually
decided or intended. This power is inherent and independent of statutes;
but the power to amend and correct judgments is very largely regulated by
statute in the different jurisdictions. (49 C.J.S. 447, 448.) Where it clearly
appears what judgment should have been rendered as of course on the facts
in the record, the court will assume to treat the failure to render such
judgment as a mere clerical misprision, and will amend the judgment so as
to make it conform to that which should have been rendered on the facts.
(Idem, p. 454.)
This is the rule in the jurisdiction as announced in a long lime of decisions,
and this rule fits the facts and the pleadings in the case at bar. In a
nutshell, here was an action to recover title to, and possession of, land in
which "the plaintiff asked that he be declared the absolute owner of the land
and that the defendant be ordered to vacate the property and to pay the
corresponding damages." (See the court's order under review.) The
defendant resisted the demand with the allegation that they, and not the
plaintiff, were the owners and entitled to stay in possession of the property
in litigation. They did not assert any right to possession independent of the
ownership. Consequently upon the issues, possession was inseparably
linked to title. As a matter of fact, possession was the immediate objective of
the suit, declaration of ownership occupying a secondary importance of that
objective.
It is evident, as Judge Alo says, "that the omission, in the judgment, of the
corresponding order for the delivery of the land in question to the plaintiff
was simply an oversight." Otherwise, as His Honor aptly observes, the
decision would be left "hanging in the air for no purpose at all" and "the
proceedings in this case would amount to a mere futility."
What, indeed will the plaintiff get from the judgment if the judgment is not
amended in the manner requested by him? The plaintiff has been declared
the owner, it is true, but what good does that pronouncement do to the
plaintiff without the possession?
The solution suggested is that the plaintiff should bring a new action. But
what is the plaintiff to allege and prove, and what is the court to decide, in
the new case that was not alleged and proved and decided in the finished
case? Upon what theory will the possessory action be based if not upon
ownership which already and finally has been adjudicated?
And where will such action possession be instituted? .In that court of the
justice of the peace? Could the parties litigate in that court of the matter of
possession, and could the justice of the peace have jurisdiction to try that
matter with the inevitable authority to reverse or modify the findings and
final judgment of the Court of First Instance? And again, upon what theory
would the summary action be based? Necessarily it would have to be upon
contract or the allegation of force, violence or stealth. But there was never a
contract between the parties, and there was no force committed or alleged
to effect entry upon the land.
owner ship. If the defendants had a right to be indemnified for their
construction and to stay on the land before indemnity was paid, that right
is barred by prior judgment. It should have been asserted before in the form
of counterclaim or cross-claim.
The defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he
may have. (Section 9, Rule 9.) Defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. (Section 10, Rule
9.) And that is deemed to have been adjudged, in a former judgement which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.(Section 45, Rule 39.)
There is no parity between this case and of Talens vs. Garcia et al., 47 Off.
Gaz. (Supp. to No. 12), pp. 358 et seq. In the latter case the party who
applied for execution for the delivery of the land was defendant who, in his
answer, had sought no affirmative relief for the possession. His defense was
simply that he owned the land. Upon the pleadings in that case, it was to be
doubted whatever in the judgment itself the defendant could be declared
entitled to possession.
For the foregoing reasons, with regret I have to dissent.

If an action to secure possession of the property were to be recommenced,

the action would have to be filed in the Court of First Instance, in which
case, exactly the same issues which were joined and disposed of in a valid
judgment would have to be retried and readjudged.

It is pointed out that the defendants have a house or part of a house erected
on the land adjudicated to plaintiff and that the defendants might have a
claim to compensation for the for the improvements or wish to buy the
property.

It suffices to remark in reference to this new angle that the defendants

themselves did not and do not now make such claim. The parties planted
their cases on the simple question of the right of possession predicated on
G.R. No. 169898 October 27, 2006
SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, NAMELY: JOSE T. VILLANUEVA,
PABLO T. VILLANUEVA, PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO T.
VILLANUEVA, DELIA V. DELA TORRE, JUANITA V. INGLES, &
SABELITO V. GELITO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the Decision1 dated March 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 72530 which affirmed the Decision2 dated August 6, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 5745,
declaring private respondents as absolute owners of the subject parcel of
land. Likewise assailed is the September 20, 2005 Resolution3 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
A complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, tax
declarations and recovery of ownership and possession with damages was
filed by private respondents against petitioners.
Private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children and
grandson of the late spouses Lucas Villanueva and Regina Tupas
Villanueva; that during the lifetime of Lucas Villanueva, he owned a parcel
of residential land designated as Lot 764-A situated at Barangay Balabag,
Malay, Aklan with an area of 140 square meters, more or less, and declared
for taxation purposes under his name under Tax Declaration No. 252
(1947); that spouses Villanueva possessed the subject parcel of land during
their lifetime openly, publicly and continuously in the concept of an owner
and after their death, they were succeeded by their children; that sometime
in August 1997, petitioners and their hired laborers fenced the whole land
in question without the knowledge and consent of private respondents; that
when confronted by private respondents concerning the fencing of the land,
petitioners alleged that they acquired the same through inheritance from
their father, Eutiquiano Salazar, who in turn purchased the land from the
late Ciriaco H. Tirol by virtue of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property.
In their Answer,4 petitioners claimed that petitioner Anita S. Aguirre is the
lawful owner and actual possessor of the land in question, it being a portion
of a bigger parcel of land she inherited from her deceased parents
Eutiquiano Salazar and Regina Supetran Salazar who bought the land from
Ciriaco H. Tirol per Deed of Exchange of Real Property5 dated December 31,
1971 and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Aklan; that the
parcel of land is included under Tax Declaration No. 4033 (1953) in the
name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and the same is in the possession of the Tirol
family as owner thereof continuously, openly and adversely even before the
second world war; that the land had been surveyed as part of Cadastral Lot
764, NP-06-000001, Malay Cadastre, in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar by
the Bureau of Lands; that the land has been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 1264 (1974) and subsequent tax declarations in the name
of Eutiquiano Salazar; that the land was first fenced with bamboos in 1981
and with cement hollow blocks in 1985 without any opposition from private
respondents; and that the action is barred by prescription and private
respondents are guilty of laches in failing to assert their alleged right of
ownership after the lapse of more than fifty (50) years since it was
possessed by the heirs of the late Trinidad vda. de Tirol.
On August 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs the lawful owners and entitled to
possession of the land in question identified as Lot 764-A in
the Commissioner's Sketch marked Exhibit "L", and as
owners, are entitled to the possession of the same;
2. Ordering the defendants to restore possession of the land in
question to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of One
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P1,800.00) by way of
 litigation expenses, and another sum of Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) as reimbursement for attorney's fees; and
4. Ordering the Provincial Assessor of Aklan to issue a new tax
declaration of the land in question in the name of the plaintiffs
upon compliance of the requirements of that office and upon
payment of appropriate taxes on the land including back
taxes, if any.
For insufficiency of evidence, plaintiffs claim for moral damages is
denied and for lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.
With cost against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.6
The trial court noted that the tax declarations in the name of Trinidad vda.
de Tirol and the survey plan did not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is
the owner and possessor of the land in question, thus, he has no right to
transfer ownership of the same to Eutiquiano Salazar; that petitioners were
not possessors in good faith since they knew as early as 1954 that private
respondents were in possession of the land; that petitioners did not acquire
the land via extraordinary acquisitive prescription considering that their
possession only lasted for 26 years from 1971 up to 1997 when private
respondents first instituted the complaint.
On March 17, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying
petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition
raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
AGUIRRES HAD ACQUIRED TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY VIA ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
VILLANUEVAS CAUSE OF ACTION HAD BEEN BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE
EQUITABLE RULE ON LACHES;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
VILLANUEVAS WERE IN "POSSESSION" AND "OWNERSHIP" OF THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED
OF EXCHANGE BETWEEN CIRIACO TIROL AND THE AGUIRRES
ASCENDANT-PREDECESSOR IN 1971;
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
AGUIRRES HAVE NOT PROVED THE ROOT OF THEIR RIGHT OF
OWNERSHIP OVER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY; AND
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING FOR
THE AGUIRRES THE FACT THAT THE LATTER HAD "JUST TITLE,"
AND HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY "IN
GOOD FAITH" SINCE 1971.7
We find merit in the petition.
This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference drawn by the
appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, as in the instant case,
we can review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual
conclusions based on the record.8
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and
other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under
conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title
for 10 years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can
only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years.9
Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be for
at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title. Possession is "in good
faith" when there is a reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing
is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his
ownership.10 There is "just title" when the adverse claimant comes into
possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is neither
the owner nor in a position to transmit the right.11
In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to support petitioners claim
that the requirements for ordinary prescription are present.
The trial court found that petitioners possession was for more than 10
years and with just title, thus:
There is no question that the defendants have been in public, and
uninterrupted possession of the land in question in the concept of an
owner for a span of twenty six (26) years from the time the land in
question was included in the deed of exchange in 1971 up to the time
the plaintiffs complained in 1997 (Exh. "K"). There is also no question
that defendants possession of the land in question was with just
title. Just title in the sense that the defendants acquired the land in
question by way of exchange which is one of the modes recognized by
law in acquiring ownership.12
Contrary however to the findings of the trial court, petitioners possessed the
property in good faith. Petitioner Anita Aguires father, Eutiquiano Salazar,
bought the subject property from Ciriaco Tirol, whose claim on the property
is founded on the following documents: (1) Tax Declaration No. 729 in the
name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the year 1945 (Exhibit "4"); (2) Tax
Declaration No. 4033 in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the year 1953
(Exhibit "4-A"); and (3) the survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in
1952 (Exhibit "6"). Thus, petitioners honestly believed that ownership of the
subject parcel of land was transmitted to Anita by succession from his
deceased father, and who thereafter possessed the property and exercised
dominion over it.
Likewise, the trial courts finding that petitioner Anita Aguirre was not a
possessor in good faith since she knew as early as 1954 that private
respondents were in possession of the disputed land has no basis. Anita
Aguirre testified that Magdalena Tupas built a house in the controverted
property in 1957 with the permission of Bernardo Escalante, the
administrator of the Tirols.13
To prove their ownership, petitioners presented Tax Declaration No. 1264
for the year 1974 (Exhibit "4-B") and other tax declarations (Exhibits "4-C,
"4-D", "5" and submarkings) for the year 1980 to 1994, in the name of
Eutiquiano Salazar declaring the subject land for taxation purposes. While
tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and
do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of
a claim of ownership through prescription.14
Records also show that Lucas Villanueva, private respondents predecessor-
in-interest, did not actually possess the subject property during his lifetime.
Private respondent Delia Villanueva Dela Torre, testified that her parents
while still alive resided in Sitio Din-iwid, Balabag, Malay, Aklan, about less
than a kilometer away from the land in question.15 Neither did any of the
private respondents ever reside therein.16 The actual possession by the
private respondents rests solely on the possession of Magdalena Tupas and
her husband for eight years allegedly with the permission of Regina Tupas
Villanueva. However, the testimonies of Rubio Sastre and Magdalena Tupas
regarding the actual possession of Lucas Villanueva through planting of
trees and gathering of fruits cannot be given full weight and credence
because the witnesses were of tender years then, barely seven or twelve
years old, and did not have discernment of the concept of possession and
ownership. Moreover, no evidence was presented on how Lucas Villanueva
acquired the land in question from Eusebio Sacapano, the uncle of Regina
Tupas Villanueva. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 252 for the year 1947
(Exhibit "C") in the name of Lucas Villanueva does not have probative value
since it was executed four years after the death of Lucas Villanueva in
1943. Tax receipts submitted by the private respondents in payment for the
year 1986 up to 1996 were actually paid on the same day, February 20,
1996 by his son Dionito Villanueva.17
On the other hand, after buying the property in 1971, petitioners possessed
the same in the concept of an owner. They peacefully occupied it, built
fences, planted plants and used the same as ingress and egress towards
their cottages. Having been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
disputed land in good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997,
petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by ordinary acquisitive prescription.
Moreover, the action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to
assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims
for the peace of society.18

In the instant case, private respondents knew as early as 1981 that

petitioners are building fences in the perimeter of the disputed land but did
not take action to assert their rights over the subject parcel of land. They
waited 16 long years to oust petitioners from the possession of the land.
Definitely, laches had already set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 17,

2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72530, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, in Civil Case
No. 5745, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are
hereby DECLARED as lawful owners of the subject property through
acquisitive prescription.

SO ORDERED.