PART II

Retracing the Path

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 CHAPTER 5

Cognition as Computing

This chapter takes a closer look at the fundamental claims of computationalism. The
discussion divides into four sections. The first explicates the central theses of
computationalism and analyzes how they are related to one another. The second looks into the
concept of computation as defined in terms of the Turing machine. The third examines the
difference between the classical and connectionist models of computationalism and
investigates how this difference bears on the theses of computationalism. And the fourth
examines the kind of intelligence assumed by proponents of computationalism and likewise
investigates how it bears on the same theses.

1. The Central Theses

Herbert Simon and Craig Kaplan (1989, 2) define cognitive science as the study of
intelligence and its computational processes in humans (and animals), in computers, and in
the abstract. This definition identifies the levels on which a computationalist investigation of
the nature of intelligence is to be carried out; namely, on the abstract level, on the human (and
animal) level, and on the machine level. Based on these levels, the central claims of
computationalism can be classified in terms of a general thesis, which concerns the abstract
level of intelligence, and two sub-theses, which concern the levels of humans and machines.

Accordingly, the general thesis of computationalism corresponds to the claim that

thinking or cognition is a type of computational process. Some put this as: cognition is a
species of computing. Cognition is here defined abstractly, not specifically pertaining to
whose intelligencehumans or machines, but which can be instantiated by humans and
machines. Consequently, the two sub-theses are precisely the human and machine
instantiations of this abstract thesis, which we can respectively call the thesis of human
computationality and the thesis of machine intelligence. The former corresponds to the claim
that human cognition is a computational process, while the latter corresponds to the claim that
machines capable of computationally simulating human cognitive process is intelligent.

Computationalism thus claims that cognition is a species of computing whether it is in

the case of humans or in the case of machines. The difference between human intelligence and
machine intelligence is here regarded simply as a matter of degree, in that human intelligence
is seen as just more complex and sophisticated than machine intelligence. But this difference
is a contingent thing and hence it is possible that in the future machine intelligence would
equal or even surpass human intelligence in terms of complexity and sophistication. However,
while we speak of humans and machines as instantiations of the general thesis of
computationalism, the abstract level of this thesis requires that it also applies to any other
conceivable type of entities, say aliens, which can be said to be intelligent as well. Meaning to

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say, if it is really true that cognition is a species of computing then any entity, not just humans
or machines, considered to be intelligent must be an entity whose intelligence is a species of
computing or whose intelligence is a computational process.

The general thesis concerns two features; namely, the feature of being cognitive,
which we can refer to as cognitivity, and the feature of being computational, which we can
refer to as computationality. The relation between these two features is not that they are
identical nor that computationality falls under cognitivity but that cognitivity falls under
computationality. Meaning to say, while it is not necessary that all computational systems are
cognitive, it is necessary that all cognitive systems are computational. Furthermore, the points
of reference for these two features are not the same. Machines are the point of reference for
the computational feature is machines, while humans are the point of reference for the
cognitive feature. Humans are given as cognitive systems and machines are judged to be
cognitive or not based on their similarities to humans; while machines are given as
computational systems and humans are judged to be computational or not based on their
similarities to humans. It is not the case that machines are given as computational and
cognitive and then humans are judged to be computational and cognitive, or vice-versa. These
considerations explain why the thesis of machine intelligence does not claim that all
computing machines are cognitive, only those capable of simulating human cognitive process;
but the thesis of human computationality claims that all humans capable of cognition are
computational in terms of their cognitive processes.

Now, if the basis for saying that computing machines are cognitive is that they are
capable of simulating human cognitive processes, what about the claim that human cognition
is necessarily computational, what is its basis? Definitely not that the fact that humans are
capable of simulating the computing processes of a machine, for to begin with these
computing processes of machines are products of human cognition. Meaning, these machines
are human artifacts and their computational processes are designed by humans. The mere fact
that humans perform computations, as they do when doing mathematical calculations, does
not necessarily mean that their cognitive processes are computational. What it only entails is
that the human mind is capable of performing computations, which may be one of the many
types of processes that the human mind can possibly also perform.

What happens, it seems, is that since a computing machine is said to be cognitive

when it simulates human cognitive processes, it is then thought that cognition, in the abstract,
must be a kind of computation. The cognitive nature of the machines computationality is then
thought to be an instantiation of the abstract idea that cognition is a kind of computing.
Consequently, it is also thought that human cognition must also just be an instantiation of this
abstract idea, and thus human cognition must also be a kind of computation. The line of
reasoning seems to be as follows. The general thesis of computationalism is abstracted from
the thesis of machine intelligence and is then attributed to humans thereby forming the thesis
of human computationality. Now what this implies is that ultimately the basis for the thesis of
machine intelligencethe simulation of human cognitive processesalso serves as the basis
for the thesis of human computationality.

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 There are definitely many questions that will be raised as a result of our observations.
But we need to begin with the basics before we can appropriately deal with these questions. In
what follows, we shall be dealing with the following concerns: what it really means to say that
something is computational and what it really means to say that something is cognitive in the
context of computationalism.

2. The Concept of Computation

What does it really mean to say that thinking is a kind of computing? But first what does it
really mean for anything to be computing? Computing is generally the process of
implementing a computation, which is also called an algorithm. To compute is simply to
implement a computation. What then is a computation? Computation can generally be defined
as a step-by-step effective procedure for getting a desired result. Harnish (2002, 125) puts it as
follows: The essence of an algorithm (or effective procedure) is that it is a series of steps for
doing something that is guaranteed to get a result. More precisely, it is a finite sequence of
well-defined steps, each of which takes only a finite amount of memory and time to complete,
and which comes to an end on any finite input. Computing is not limited to solving
mathematical problems or functions, as algorithms are general in that they apply to any
problem. Thus, there can be an algorithm or an effective procedure for cooking eggs, for
instance, or for washing the laundry.
As Crane (1995, 88) explains:

Like the notion of a function, the notion of an algorithm is extremely general. An

effective procedure for finding the solution to a problem can be called an algorithm, so
long as it satisfies the following conditions: (A) At each stage of the procedure, there
is a definite thing to do next. Moving from step to step does not require any special
guesswork, insight or inspiration. (B) The procedure can be specified in a finite
number of steps. So we can think of an algorithm as a rule, or a bunch of rules, for
giving the solution to a given problem.

In this regard, thinking as computing means nothing but that thinking is a process of
carrying out certain computations or effective procedures. But more importantly, it also means
that thinking process can be spelled out in terms of a well-defined series of steps. But what
kind of computations should there be such that when carried out constitutes thinking? For
obviously not all sorts of implementing computations constitute thinking. As we noted earlier
there can be an effective procedure, and hence a computation, for cooking eggs but the
process of cooking eggs does not constitute thinking.

Roger Schank (1984, 68) describes what researchers in the discipline of artificial
intelligence intend to accomplish in the following way: AI researchers are still trying to
determine the processes that comprise intelligence so that they can begin to develop computer
algorithms that correspond to human algorithms for understanding. This statement, to begin
with, gives credence to our previous observation that the general thesis of computationalism
concerns intelligence in the abstract which is then applied to humans. What is problematic
here is that the abstract thesis is not derived from the case of human intelligence but from the
case of machine intelligence. We shall pursue this issue later on. But for our present purposes

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this statement of Schank speaks of human algorithms for understanding, which can also be
referred to as cognitive algorithms. Accordingly, these cognitive algorithms then constitute
the type of computations such that their implementation constitutes thinking. But what these
cognitive algorithms are is precisely the project of artificial intelligence. Be it as it may, the
underlying assumption is that thinking operates via the implementation of certain
computations.

2.1. The Turing Machine

The notion of computation has initially been defined in terms of the Turing machine. The
Turing machine does not refer to a particular type of machine that one can buy and use. It is
an abstract specification of any possible computing machine. It specifies the basic operations
that a physical system must be capable of performing in order to qualify as a computing
machine. These basic operations involve two operations; namely, receiving an input and
executing a command or instruction to produce an output upon reading an output. For these
operations to be possible there must, however, be the following: (1) a storage system, (2) a
reading and printing device, (3) a set of symbols, (4) a translation system, and (5) a set of
instructions or commands.

The storage system can be anything so long as it is divided into certain portions such
that a bit of data or information can symbolically be stored in it. In the case of Turing, he
conceives of the storage system (corresponding to what is presently called memory) as a
tape of infinite length that is divided into squares. In each square, a symbol can be written in
case the square is empty or does not yet contain a symbol. If the square already contains a
symbol, such symbol can be erased and either be left empty or a symbol (either a new one or
the same as the one erased) be written anew. What are written and stored in the tape are
symbols, which are also called representations for they are intended to represent certain data.
These symbols are finite in number but they can be combined in unlimited ways. These
symbols serve as the language of the machine for its operations (corresponding to the 0s and
1s of modern computers). And of course the machine does not receive inputs or information
in the form of the symbols that it uses. The machine translates the inputs that it receives into
its own language, so to speak. And this requires that the machine has a translation system.
This translation, which is the symbolization of the input data, allows the machine to operate
on a very general level, very much in the same way that the use of symbols in logic allows us
to speak of reasoning in a very general manner. The generality of the language of the machine
enables the machine to receive a wide variety of data and process them in multifarious ways.

For the symbols to be written, stored, erased, and overwritten, there must be a
scanning and printing device. Since the storage system is a tape consisting of squares, this
device must be capable of moving the tape from left to right and vice-versa as it reads, stores,
erases, and overwrites symbols in the squares. And of course, whatever the device does is in
line with the machines set of instructions or commands, called by Turing as the machine
table. These commands are in the conditional form. For instance, if it reads 0 in square A,
it should move to square B and write 1 or if it reads 10 in square X, it should move to
square Y and overwrite the symbol already written there with the symbol 1010. Now, as the
machine is performing a particular task, Turing describes the machine as being in a particular

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internal state. There is nothing subjective or mysterious about these states being internal;
their being internal only means that they refer to the physical states of the machine on the
level of performing its tasks and not on the level of the physical composition of the machine
(the physical states of the physical composition of the machine, in this lights, would be the
machines external states). To use the viewpoint of functionalism, these internal states are the
functional states of the machine, which take place on the level of the functional organization
of the machine, in contrast to its lower-level physical states, which take place on the level of
its material components.

This machine was originally conceived by Alan Turing for purposes of determining
the computability of any given mathematical function; that is to say, whether there is a
mathematical procedure that can be used to find the value of a given mathematical function,
or what comes to the same, whether there is a computation or an algorithm to find the value of
a given mathematical function. If a given mathematical function is computable then there
must be a computation or a mathematical procedure to find the value of such function. Before
we proceed with our discussion, it may be asked, but what is a mathematical function? Here,
Gottlob Freges discussion of the nature of a function is helpful (see Frege 1960).

According to Frege, a function is any incomplete expression. Examples are: the

capital of , 2 plus 2 equals , and is the author of Noli Me Tangere. The missing
parts can be represented by variables (x, y, z, etc.) and thus we say: the capital of x,
2 plus x, and X is the author of Noli Me Tangere. Now what we replace the variables with
to complete the function are called arguments. And once a certain argument is used to
complete the function, the resulting complete expression yields a value. For instance, if we
have the argument Philippines for the function the capital of x the value is Manila. If we
have the argument 6 for the function 2 plus x, the value is 8. And if we have the argument
Rizal for the function X is the author of Noli Me Tangere, the value is (the) True. A
mathematical function is no different, as in the case of the example 2 plus x. Of course, the
meaningful arguments for a given function are not unlimited. If, for instance, we use the
argument Philippines for the function 2 plus x, there is no value that will be yielded. The
set of meaningful arguments for a given function is called by Frege the functions value
range. Obviously the value-range of the function the capital of X would include names of
countries. And if we have the function X is the present king of France, this function has null
or zero value-range since there is no possible argument for X to yield a meaningful value (in
this case, a truth-value).

If we have a mathematical function, the effective step-by-step procedure to complete

it, to find its value, or to find the appropriate argument so that it will yield the desired value, is
called a computation or an algorithm. 2 plus 2 equals X is obviously computable, but there
have been mathematical functions which are not obviously computable. And during the time
of Turing, some of these were raised by the great German mathematician David Hilbert. We
need not go into these functions, but the important point here is that Turing conceives his
Turing machine to address the question that was raised by Hilbert alsocalled the
Eintscheidungsproblemon whether there can be a mechanical procedure to determine
whether a given mathematical function is computable, or whether a given mathematical
problem is soluble (Turing in fact was able to demonstrate through his machine that some

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classes of problems in mathematics are not computable or soluble, an example of which is the
halting problem.) (see Penrose 1994, 28-29). And what results from Turings machine is a
definition of what computation is or what computability consists in. Accordingly, a
computation is anything that can be run by a Turing machine. This definition, which is widely
accepted among mathematicians, has come to be known as the Church Thesis or sometimes as
the Church-Turing Thesis [for it is said that Alonzo Church has independently arrived at the
same conclusions as Turings (see Crane 1995, 99, Penrose 1994, 20-21)), and though another
logician, Emil Post, has done the same even earlier than Church (see Penrose 1994, 20)].

Turings genius and amazing discoveries, however, do not stop here. In the course of
developing his concept of the Turing machine, he then realizes that all possible Turing
machines could be run by a single Turing machine, or more precisely, all the operations of
various Turing machines could be performed by a single machine. If the operations of all
Turing machines can be reduced to the same basic operations, then a single machine will
suffice to run the operations of all other Turing machines. What is simply needed is for the
table machines (the programs) of the other Turing machines be inputted in the tape (memory)
of this single machine. This single Turing machine is called the Universal Turing Machine. If
in principle all the individual Turing machines can be put in this universal machine, then the
storage capacity of this universal machine must be unlimited. This partly explains why the
tape of the Turing machine is infinite in length.

The Universal Turing Machine is in fact the theoretical forerunner or model of the
modern-day, general-purpose, digital computer. Think, for instance, of the individual
machines that enable us to do mathematical calculations (the calculator), to view DVD
movies (the DVD player), to view televisions shows (the TV set), to hear music (the radio,
CD player, and MP3 player), to organize our activities (the electronic organizer), to
communicate with other people (the telephone and cell phone), to write and print documents
(the electronic typewriter), and play games (the play station). Each of these machines is an
instantiation of a particular Turing machine, an input-output device with memory (the tape)
and program (the table machine). But all of them can be put in one single machine, as it is
already done in our present computers. The only difference between the Universal Turing
Machine and our present computers is the storage capacitythe formers is unlimited while
the latters is still limited though rapidly expanding as time passes by.

If computation is defined in terms of being run in a Turing machine and the computer
is the approximate embodiment of the Universal Turing Machine, then a computation can also
be defined in terms of the actions of the computer, as Roger Penrose (1994, 17) does: What
is a computation? In short, one can simply understand that term to denote the activity of an
ordinary general-purpose computer. To be more precise, we must make take this in a suitably
idealized sense: a computation is the action of a Turing machine. Consequently, any
computational system is a Turing machine; and the human mind, as a computational system
that has enormous storage capacity and the capacity to run multiple types of operations is
(more precisely, an instantiation of) a Universal Turing Machine, and hence is a computer.
Furthermore, as the computer differs from the Universal Turing Machine as a matter of
degree, then it follows that the difference between the human mind and the computer is
likewise a matter of degree. Human intelligence and computer intelligence are of the same

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nature; they are just different types of the same process: the process of computing (see
Pylyshn 1989, 52).

Couched in the modern language of computers, the general thesis of computationalism

has been expressed as the view that the mind is to the brain as software is to hardware. The
computer software or program is here understood as an encoded computation, or class of
encoded computations, that is run or implemented by the computer hardware. As Schank
(1984, 5-6) explains: The centerpiece of any computer program is the algorithm it uses to
accomplish its task. Accordingly, the thesis of human computationality is also expressed as
the view that the human mind is a digital computer; while the thesis of machine intelligence
as the view that a digital computer also has a mind. In considering the relation between
computers and thought, Tim Crane (1995, 84) asks two questions, namely: (1) Can a
computer think? Or more precisely: can anything think simply by being a computer? (2) Is the
human mind a computer? Or more precisely: are any actual mental states and processes
computational? These are precisely the questions that the two sub-theses of
computationalism intend to address and to which they both give a positive response.

2.2. Classical and Connectionist Models

At the present, it is usual to distinguish between two types of computationalism: the classical
or symbolic and the connectionist. The computationalism that we have discussed thus far is of
the classical type. It is called classical because it is the type of computationalism that has been
existing prior to the advent of the connectionist type. It is, however, called symbolic because
it regards computational process as a process performed over symbols or representations
either in the case of humans or in the case of machines. A classic pronouncement to this effect
comes from Simon and Kaplan (1989, 40): Computer, and (in our view) human beings are
symbols systems. They achieve their intelligence by symbolizing external and internal
situations and events and by manipulating those symbols. They all use about the same
symbol-manipulating process. Pylyshn (1989, 57) makes the same explanation: The
important thing is that, according to the classical view, certain kinds of systems, including
both minds and computers, operate on representations that take the form of symbolic codes.
Basically, therefore, from a symbolic computationalist point of view, computation is
essentially a symbol-manipulating process.

One important formulation of this type of computationalism, in the area of artificial

intelligence, is the physical symbol system hypothesis by Newell and Simon (1995).
According to Newell and Simon, intelligent systems, such as the human mind and the
computer, are physical symbol systems. In this regard, intelligence as computing means that
intelligence is essentially symbol-manipulation. As they (1995, 97) explain:

A physical symbol system is an instance of a universal machine. Thus the symbol

system hypothesis implies that intelligence will be realized by a universal computer.
However, the hypothesis goes far beyond the argument, often made on general
grounds of physical determinism, that any computation that is realizable can be
realized by a universal machine, provided that it is specified. For it asserts specifically

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 that the intelligent machine is a symbol system, thus making a specific architectural
assertion about the nature of intelligent systems.

In the area of philosophy, symbolic computationalism is best represented, and well

defended as well, by Jerry Fodor in his theory of mental representation, which is more
popularly known as the mentalese or language-of-thought hypothesis. Fodors hypothesis
supplements the view already articulated in Newell and Simons physical symbol system
hypothesis. Fodor begins with the idea, which appears to him as self-evident, that there can be
no computation without a system of representation. Given this, his task is then to investigate
the nature of this system of representation. And his investigations have led him to suppose
that this system of representation has a language-like structure.

Fodor was greatly influenced by the idea of the famous linguist-philosopher Noam
Chomsky that we are born with the same linguistic categories that enable us to learn various
natural languages. This view is Chomskys alternative to the claim of the behaviorist B. F.
Skinner that the learning of natural languages is a matter of conditioning or association
between stimuli and responses, which Chomsky has shown to be mistaken. In the hands of
Fodor, these innate linguistic categories have become the language of thought. The language
of thought may be compared to the internal language of computers, or better yet, of our cell
phones. As Fodor (1979, 67) explains: On this view, what happens when a person
understands a sentence must be a translation process basically analogous to what happens
when a machine understands (viz., compiles) a sentence in its programming language.
Notice that we can easily change the natural language of our cell phones, say from English to
Filipino or German, for these languages are just programmed into the internal language or
the language of the main program of our cell phones. As such, the rules governing the
computational states of our cell phones are not the grammatical rules of the natural languages,
but the rules of their internal language. In the same way, our mental states do not follow the
rules of our natural languageswhich, in a way, are just programmed into our minds, but the
rules of the language of thought.

Fodor advances three arguments for his language-of-though hypothesis, namely, (1)
the productivity of thoughts, (2) the systematicity of thoughts, and (3) the systematicity of
reasoning. The productivity of thoughts refers to the capacity of the human mind/brain to
produce many new thoughts from a number of old thoughts by combining these old thoughts
in novel ways. Systematicity of thoughts, on the other hand, refers to the capacity of the
human mind/brain to understand new thoughts built on already-understood old thoughts. For
instance, anyone who understands John loves Mary will also understand Mary loves
John, or anyone who understands the statement A small red ball is in a large blue box will
also understand the statement A large blue ball is in a small red box. And systematicity of
reasoning refers to the capacity of the human mind/brain to recognize inferences that are of
the same logical structure. For instance, anyone who can infer the statement It is sunny
from the statement It is sunny and warm and humid (or can infer P from P and Q and R) can
also infer the statement It is sunny from the statement It is sunny and warm (or can also
infer P from P and Q). The idea is that since the features of productivity and systematicity
involving ordinary language or linguistic representations are made possible by the logical or
formal structure of language, the productivity and systematicity involving the mind or mental

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representations must also be made possible by a system that has a structure similar to the
logical or formal structure of language.

Let us now examine the connectionist type computationalism, or simply

connectionism, according to which cognition, and thus computing as wellfor as a type of
computationalism connectionism likewise adheres to the view that cognition is a species of
computing, is basically the interaction among the units in neural networks (or neural nets).
Leading figures in this type of computationalism include Paul Smolensky (1993) and David
Rumelhart (1989). Discussions on the concepts involved in connectionism are usually highly
technical and detailed. For our purposes, we shall, however, just discuss some of its basic
concepts enough to give us a general picture of its difference from symbolic
computationalism. Accordingly, we shall explain what units in neural networks means, how
the interaction among such units comes about, and where computation comes in.

To begin with, the units, also called nodes, are the basic elements of a connectionist
system called a network or net. These units receive, process, and send information, and they
are interconnected thereby forming a network or net. Based on their functions, the units are
of three kinds: the input units, which receive information from outside the network and to be
processed in the network; the output units, which carry the resulting processed information;
and the hidden units, which are the units in between the input units and output units. The
hidden units, which may come in various layers, receive information from the input units,
process these data, and then pass these processed data to the output units. The direction of the
flow of information, or activations, may be forward, that is from the input units to the hidden
units and then to the output units; or it may be recurrent, where the activations, after passing
from the input units to the hidden units, pass through several layers of hidden units in a back
and forth manner first before finally sending the processed information to the output units.

The flow of information among the units is made possible by the connections among
the units. These connections are said to have weights or strengths, which affect the amount of
information flowing through them. The weight of a connection is called a connection weight.
Each unit is said to have a maximum amount of data that it can receive, called its threshold
level. It is when the information received by a unit exceeds its threshold level that it is
activated to pass information to other units. The amount of information that will be received
by a unit will therefore be a combination of the strength of the connection through which the
information passes through and the amount of information given off by the sending unit.

Now where does computation come in? The strengths of the connections among the
units can be adjusted, and so given a certain input to a network, the output it will give off can
be manipulated. This process of adjusting the connections among the units of a network is
called the process of teaching the network, and it is this process that is governed by a
computation. A computation here specifies how much adjustments should be done to the
connections of a network such that given a certain input the network will give off a certain
output. On the other hand, these networks are called neural for it is believed, though
arguably, that the connectionist model of computing is close to how the human brain works.
The units correspond to the human brains neurons and the connections correspond to its
synapses.

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 Based on our general accounts of the two types of computationalism, the main
difference between symbolic computationalism and connectionism is that in symbolic
computationalism a physical system processes an input to generate a desired output by
manipulating symbols following a certain program, while in connectionism a physical system
processes an input to generate a desired output by adjusting the connections among the units
in networks following a computation or a learning program. There are other various ways of
expressing this difference. One is that computation in the classical type is serial for it is a step
by step process, while that in the connectionist type is parallel for the interactions among the
untis in networks take place simultaneously. This accounts for why connectionism is also
sometimes referred to as PDPparallel distributed processing. Another is that computation
in the classical type is described as symbolic for computations are carried out through and
over symbols, while that of the connectionist type is described as sub-symbolic for the
computations are carried without the use of symbols but by means of the adjustments of the
connection weights. But if in connectionism, computation does not make use of symbols, how
are information represented? There are two possible ways: localized representation, where
one unit is made to represent one item of information; and distributed representation, where
one item of information is represented by the patterns of connections among the units.

In response to the connectionist model, Fodor and Pylyshn (Fodors close ally), in a
joint publication (Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis, 1993),
have launched criticisms against this model. The main contention is that only a symbolic type
of computationalism can account for the features of productivity and systematicity of thoughts
and reasoning undeniably at work in mental processes. Fodor and Pylyshn further claims that
at best connectionism is just a theory concerning the implementation of symbolic
computationalismof how symbolic computationalism works. For these reasons, they do not
regard connectionism as a rival to classical computationalism but simply as a sub-theory of
classical computationalism. In any case, the difference between classical and connectionist
computationalism does not touch the core of the claims of computationalism. For whether
computation is symbol-manipulation or interaction among the units in neural networks, it is
still computation. But since the classical model is, relatively speaking, well-established type
of computationalism, we shall assume this type of computationalism in discussing
computationalism throughout the remaining part of this book.

3. The Concept of Intelligence

While computationalism is presented as a theory of mind, cognitive scientists and scientists

working in artificial intelligence, however, specifically express their goal as the understanding
of intelligence or cognition in computational terms and as manifested in behavior or action.
Simon and Kaplan (1989, 1), for instance, define cognitive science as follows: Cognitive
science is the study of intelligence and intelligent systems, with particular reference to
intelligent behavior; while they (1989, 29) define artificial intelligence as follows:
Artificial intelligence is concerned with programming computers to perform in ways that, if
observed in human beings, would be regarded as intelligent. With regard to intelligence, they
(1989, 1) understand it in the following way:

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 Although no really satisfactory intentional definition of intelligence has been
proposed, we are ordinarily willing to judge when intelligence is being exhibited by
our fellow human beings. We say that people are behaving intelligently when they
choose courses of action that are relevant to achieving their goals, when they reply
coherently and appropriately to questions that are put to them, when they solve
problems of lesser or greater difficulty, or when they create or design something useful
or beautiful or novel. We apply a single term, intelligence, to this diverse set of
activities because we expect that a common set of underlying processes is implicated
in performing all of them.

Possessing mentality, of course, is not just the possession of intelligence or the

capacity to perform intelligent action or to manifest intelligent behavior. Intelligence is not all
there is to having a mind. Having a mind also means being conscious or having conscious
experiences. But when cognitive science and AI speak of the possession of mentality, be it of
humans or machines, they specifically mean the possession of intelligence. By mind, they
specifically mean intelligence or cognition, hence the expressions intelligent machines,
cognitive computer, and cognition as computation. The implication of this is that these
disciplines are limiting their claims regarding the mind only to intelligence or to the cognitive
aspect of the mind.

3.1. Schanks Three Levels of Understanding

Schank (1984, 62) states that AI is an attempt to build intelligent machines, not people. The
idea being that AI does not attempt to reproduce in machines the whole of human mentality.
Intelligent machines may be as intelligent as humans, but they are not humans; and this is
precisely because being human is not just being intelligent. Schank makes this clear when he
distinguishes among three levels of human understanding or intelligenceSchank regards
intelligence as inextricably linked to understanding. From the lowest to highest, these three
levels of understanding are the levels of making sense, cognitive understanding, and complete
empathy. Schank then argues that among these levels of human understanding the ones that
machines can ever get to achieve are the levels of making sense and cognitive understanding.
The level of complete empathy is exclusive to humans. Let us elaborate on this point by
Schank.

First, on the level of making sense, understanding simply means knowing what is
happening in a given situation; and hence this level of understanding only requires simple
recognition of the terms used and the actions performed in such situation (Schank 1984, 45).
Second, on the level of cognitive understanding, understanding means being able to do some
of the following: (1) learn or change as a result of its experiences; (2) relate present
experiences to past experiences intelligently, i.e., by making useful comparisons and picking
out important and interesting relationships; (3) formulate new information for itselfcome to
its own conclusions based on experience; and (40 explain itselfsay why it made the
connections it did, and what thought process was involved in reaching a conclusion (Schank
1984, 47-48). With computers, experiences would mean inputs. Lastly, on the level of
complete sympathy, understanding means identifying with or being able to relate with the
experiences and feelings of another. The assumption here is that the one who understands and

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the one being understood share some memories and experiences, or that ones memories and
experiences resemble those of the other (Schank 1984, 45). To further illustrate the differences
of these levels, let us take a look at the following example of Schank (1984, 57-58):

INPUT:
Did I tell you about what happened with Mary last night? We were at this party
drinking and talking about nothing in particular and all of a sudden we werent talking
anymore and I noticed her face was right near mine. She moved closer and we kissed.

OUTPUTMAKING SENSE
You and Mary were at a party. You were close to each other. You kissed each other.
You didnt talk while kissing.

OUTPUTCOGNITIVE UNDERSTANDING:
Mary must like you. From what youve told me about other women you know, she is
more assertive than they are. She must have felt good being with you at the party.

OUTPUTCOMPLETE EMPATHY:
Thats like what happened to Cindy and me after the party. She came up to me and
asked if I could give her a lift, and while we were in the coatroom she threw her arms
around me and started kissing me.

In this example, one understands the situation on the level of making sense because
one is able to recognize what is happening in the situation. On the level of cognitive
understanding, one understands it because one is able to relate present experiences to past
experiences and formulate new information based on this relation. On the level of complete
sympathy, one understands it because one is able to identify or relate with the experience of
the person in the situation due to ones similar experience in the past. According to Schank
(1984, 58), while a computer that is appropriately programmed can understand the situation
up to the level of cognitive understanding, no computer is going to understand this story at
the level of COMPLETE SYMPATHY for the simple reason that no computer is ever going to
go to parties and get kissed and hugged by people. Actually, it is conceivable that a machine
run by a computer, say an android, to go to a party and get kissed and hugged by people. But
what this machine would not able to know is what it is like to go to a party, get kissed, and
hugged by people. It may have such experiences as inputs, but such inputs would lack the
same qualities that go with such experiences if experienced by humans. And this explains why
no computer would be able to identify with a human having such experiences in a certain
qualitative way. In any case, Schank (1984, 45) concludes that:

Computers are not likely to have the same feelings as people, or to have the same
desires and goals. They will not be people. The complete empathy level of
understanding seems to be out of reach of the computer for the simple reason that the
computer is not a person.

There are two consequences of this considerationthat it is not really the goal of
cognitive science and AI to explain the mind in its entirety in computational terms. The first is

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that computationalism is never really meant to be an exhaustive theory of the mind. The
second is that the usual criticisms leveled against computationalism seem to be misplaced.
These criticisms refer to those arguments that show that computationalism fails to account for
or leave out in their explanation the other important features of mentality, such as qualia or
consciousness and intentionality. These criticisms are built on the understanding (or
misunderstanding) that computationalism and the disciplines that espouse it would also like to
explain in computational terms human feelings in addition to human intelligence. Consider,
for instance, the following remarks by Roger Penrose (1989):

The question of whether a mechanical device could ever be said to thinkperhaps

even to experience feelings, or to have a mindis not really a new one. (p. 3)

Suppose also that the machines have been carefully programmed and fed with great
quantities of data of an appropriate kind. The manufacturers are claiming that the
devices actually think. Perhaps they are also claiming them to be genuinely intelligent.
Or they may go further and make the suggestion that the devices actually feelpain,
happiness, compassion, pride, etc. (p. 5-6)

One of the claims of AI is that it provides a route towards some sort of understanding
of mental qualities, such as happiness, pain, hunger. (p. 14)

The supporters of strong AI would claim that whenever the algorithm were run it
would, in itself: experience feelings; have a consciousness; be a mind. (p. 180)

That being the case, it could, however, be argued that intelligence, strictly speaking, is
a conscious mental activity. One cannot simply talk of intelligence and not talk of
consciousness at the same time. This, actually, is the position taken by Penrose when he
argues that intelligence cannot take place without awareness. Penrose (1994, 38-39) regards
the terms intelligence, understanding, and awareness as related in the following way:
(a) intelligence requires understanding and (b) understanding requires awareness. In
his view (Penrose 1994, 39), consciousness has a passive aspect, which refers to awareness,
and an active aspect, which refers to the feeling of free will. Intelligence or the activity of
thinking is a necessarily conscious phenomenon, and thus to say that something can be
intelligent without being conscious is to misuse or to deviate from the original meaning of the
word intelligence. Consequently, attributing intelligence to machines necessarily implies
attributing consciousness to machines as well. And this perhaps explains why he attributes to
strong AI the claim that machines can be constructed such that it will not only be capable of
thinking but of feeling as well.

The view that intelligence necessarily requires consciousness is also assumed in

Searles Chinese room argument where he criticizes the claim of strong AI that machines that
can simulate the intelligent behaviors of humans are capable of genuine understanding.
According to Searle, genuine understanding, as in the case of humans, requires intentionality
or the awareness of the meanings or semantics of the symbols involved in ones thinking
activity. In his analysis, computers just manipulate symbols solely according to the syntactical
properties of these symbols without knowing what these symbols mean. As such, computers

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are not really capable of genuine understanding, though their output behaviors seem to
suggest that they are.

Contrast the above view with how AI scientists regard intelligence. Schank (1984, 51,
39)) writes that When we ask What is intelligence? we are really only asking What does an
entity, human or machine, have to do or say for us to call it intelligent? and We really have
no standards for measuring intelligence other than by observing the behavior of something we
suspect is intelligent. A while ago, we discussed Schanks levels of understanding, notice that
these levels are distinguished in terms of the kind of output one exhibits if presented with a
situation or a storyas in the case of the example we discussed. Observe again how Simon
and Kaplan (1989, 1) define cognitive scienceas the study of intelligence and intelligent
systems, with particular reference to intelligent behavior as computation; and intelligence
people are behaving intelligently when they choose courses of action that are relevant to
achieving their goals, when they reply coherently and appropriately to questions that are put
to them, when they solve problems of lesser or greater difficulty, or when they create or
design something useful or beautiful or novel (1989, 1). Observe also how Simon and
Newell (1995, 96-97) express their Physical Symbol System Hypothesis and define what an
intelligent action is: A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for
general intelligent action.By general intelligent action we wish to indicate the same scope
of intelligence as we see in human action: that in any real situation behavior appropriate to the
ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the environment can occur, within some
limits of speed and complexity.

3.2. Functional and Common-sense Views on Intelligence

We can see that these AI scientists define intelligence not in terms of consciousness
but in terms of functionality. Thus, we can distinguish between two contrasting views
concerning the nature of intelligence. We can call these views the Functional View and the
Common-sense View. The former is the one adhered to by computationalists, cognitive
scientists, and AI scientists; while the latter is the one adhered to by the likes of Penrose and
Searle. Intelligence undoubtedly has a functional and a conscious aspect. Its functional aspect
has to do with the type of activities that it can perform or tasks it can accomplish as well as
the type of processes that it undergoes to perform certain activities or to accomplish certain
tasks. This aspect involves all the behavioral activities that Schank and Simon and Kaplan talk
about concerning an intelligent action or behavior like solving problems and replying
appropriately to certain questions. Its conscious aspect, on the other hand, has to do with the
fact that the processes it undergoes to perform certain activities or accomplish certain tasks is
accompanied by consciousness. And by consciousness, we basically mean awareness, which
always comes in a certain qualityqualia or the phenomenal property, and which sometimes
involves awareness of what mental states mean or represent in the worldintentionality or
the intentional property.

Now when we distinguish between the functional view and the common-sense view,
we do not mean to distinguish views that deny the existence of either the functional or the
conscious properties of intelligence. I think it will be extremely difficult to support a view that
denies either the functional properties or the conscious properties of intelligence. The

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distinction only concerns which between these two types of properties is primary or definitive
of the concept of intelligence. Accordingly, the functional view does not deny the reality of
the conscious properties of intelligence but claims that it is the functional properties of
intelligence that are important to the concept of intelligence. On the other hand, the common-
sense view does not deny the functional properties of intelligence but it claims that it is the
conscious properties that are important to the concept of intelligence. Another way of putting
this is that for the functional view it is the functional properties that primarily define the
concept of intelligence, while for the common-sense view it is the conscious properties that
primarily define such concept. Thus, the question is not whether or not intelligence is possible
without consciousness but whether it is the functional properties of intelligence that primarily
defines the concept of intelligence or its conscious properties.

An important thought experiment that is used to defend the thesis of machine

intelligence is the Turing test. This test, originally called the imitation game, was devised by
the mathematician Alan Turing in the 1950s in order to deal with the issue of whether it is
meaningful to ascribe intelligence to machines. Let us examine which type of intelligence is
being considered here. There are many ways of describing this test. Here is one simplified
version. Imagine a human interrogator communicating with two respondents, one of which is
a human being while the other is a machine. A wall physically separates the interrogator and
the two respondents; and the interrogator communicates with the respondents only through
text messages using computers. Let us say that there are two computer terminals, one for each
respondent; and the interrogator, though he knows that he is communicating with a human
being and a machine, does not know in which terminal he is communicating with the human
respondent or with the machine. Now, if after a series of questions and answers, the human
interrogator could not tell, on the basis of the respondents answers, which is the human and
which is the machine, then the machine is said to have passed the Turing test. This means that
we can now meaningfully say that the machine is intelligent.

Some believe that the Turing test is not necessary to the claims of AI and cognitive
science. Chalmers (n.d., 8-9), for instance, writes:

Justification of the thesis of computational sufficiency has usually been tenuous.

Perhaps the most common move has been an appeal to the Turing test, noting that
every implementation of a given computation will have a certain kind of behavior, and
claiming that the right kind of behavior is sufficient for mentality. The Turing test is a
weak foundation, however, and one to which AI need not appeal. It may be that any
behavioral description can be implemented by systems lacking mentality altogether
(such as the giant lookup tables of Block 1981). Even if behavior suffices for mind, the
demise of logical behaviorism has made it very implausible that it suffices for specific
mental properties: two mentally distinct systems can have the same behavioral
dispositions. A computational basis for cognition will require a tighter link than this,
then.

Instead, the central property of computation on which I will focus is one that we have
already noted; the fact that a computation provides an abstract specification of the
causal organization of a system. Causal organization is the nexus between computation

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 and cognition. If cognitive systems have their mental properties in virtue of their
causal organization, and if the causal organization can be specified computationally,
then the thesis of computation sufficiency is established. Similarly, if it is the causal
organization of a system that is primarily relevant in the explanation of behavior, then
the thesis of computational explanation will be established.

Chalmers is right in observing that any behavioral description can be implemented by

systems lacking mentality together and that two mentally distinct systems can have the
same behavioral dispositions. As such, the Turing test will not ground the view that human
thinking is computational in nature. But the Turing test is not really meant to establish that
view. What it is meant to establish is the view that a computational system such as the digital
computer can also be intelligent. The Turing test is a test for the intelligence of computational
machines (or computing machinery as the title of Turings paper has it), and not a test for
the computationality of human intelligence. The same test can be done to a non-computational
machinery to determine whether it is intelligent. Turing (1995, 25-26) implies this when he
writes: the present interest in thinking machines has been aroused by a particular kind of
machine, usually called an electronic computer or digital computer. Following this
suggestion we only permit digital computers to take part in our game. Meaning to say, it is
for purposes of addressing the issue of whether a digital computer thinks that Turing considers
a digital computer as the machine to be tested in his test. Had it been the case that it was a
different type of machine or entity (say an alien) under consideration, then it would not have
been the digital computer as playing the test. In any case, the point is the test can be done on
anything whose intelligence is under consideration.

But there is a sense in which strong AI needs the Turing test. And this is to determine
what sort of computations or programs will produce intelligence in machines. The problem,
however, is that this test only works for systems already established to be computational in
nature, such as computers. Since it does not establish the computational nature of intelligence,
only the intelligence of a computational system, it does not apply to human intelligence. In
fact, in the original test, human intelligence is the given and is not what is in question.

4. Concluding Remarks

Since the computational theory of mind focuses on human intelligence and not on human
mentality in its entirety, it can be said that its conclusions are only intended to apply to the
functional aspect of human intelligencethat aspect of our intelligence which we can share
with machines. In this light, the arguments purporting to show the implausibility of this theory
by showing that its conclusions are precisely limited only to the functional aspect of the mind
seem misplaced. However, even if we grant this narrow application of the claims of this
theory, there is still reason to doubt such claims. For the fact that our functional intelligence is
computable or lends itself to a computational simulation does not necessarily establish that it
is computational. That is to say, while our functional intelligence can be simulated
computationally such that its behavioral manifestations can be replicated by a machine, such
behavioral manifestations need not be the result of a computational process or of the process
of implementing a set of computations as performed by our mind. We shall further pursue this
line of argumentation in the next chapter.

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