CHAPTER 4

Mind-Body Relation

The inquiry into the nature of the mind-body relation or, more specifically, the relation
between mental states (or the minds states and processes) and bodily states (or the bodys
physical states and processes) is technically called the mind-body problem. From the
discussions of philosophers on this problem, two types of mind-body problem can be
distinguished. The first type concerns the ontological relation between mental states and
bodily states. It investigates, in particular, how the existence of mental states relates to that of
bodily states. We can call this type of mind-body problem as the ontological mind-body
problem. The second type concerns the causal relation between mental states and bodily
states. It investigates, in particular, whether there really is a causal relation between these two
types of states; and if there really is, the nature of this causal relation. We can call this type of
mind-body problem as the causal mind-body problem. In this chapter, we shall look at the
various solutions proposed to these two types of mind-body problem.

1. The Ontological Mind-Body Problem

In contemporary philosophy of mind where science is the dominant perspective, physical

existence is regarded as something that is given and so the problem concerning mental
existence has to be resolved in terms of how it relates to physical existence. This then
becomes the thrust of the ontological mind-body problem in the contemporary scene. It
investigates how the existence of mental states relates to the existence of bodily states with a
view to resolving the problem concerning the existence of mental states. Some philosophers
consider this to be the most challenging aspect of the mind-body problem, as David Chalmers
(1997, 25) remarks: The hardest part of the mind-body problem is the question: how could a
physical system give rise to conscious experience? And Collin McGinn (1997, 529) concurs:
The specific problem I want to discuss concerns consciousness, the hard nut of the mind-
body problem. How is it possible for conscious states to depend upon brain states?

There are four basic views on how the existence of mental states possibly relates to the
existence of bodily states. The first is reductionism, which claims that mental states are
reducible to or are nothing but some kind of bodily states. The second is emergentism, which
claims that mental states along with their properties emerge from the interaction among the
physical properties of the brains physical states. The third is supervenience, which claims that
mental states are dependent on or are determined by brain states such that a particular change
in the brain states necessarily results in some particular change in the mental states. And the
fourth is physical realization, which claims that mental states are the states of some higher-
level physical system (the software) as they are realized or implemented by some lower-level
physical system (the hardware). Let us examine these views more closely.

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1.1. Reductionism

Reductionism, in its general philosophical sense, is the view that shows that a certain type of
phenomena, called the reduced phenomena, can be shown to be nothing but a certain other
type of phenomena, called the base phenomena. The reduced and base phenomena can be of
various domains, fundamental of which are as follows (Searle 1997, 452): entities, properties,
theories, linguistic expressions, and causal relations. Corresponding to these domains are the
following types of reduction: ontological reduction, which involves entities, property
ontological reduction, which involves properties; theoretical reduction, which involves
theories; logical or definitional reduction, which involves linguistic expressions; and causal
reduction, which involves causal relations.

Among these types of reduction, the ontological type is considered to be the most
fundamental for the other types are philosophically relevant and controversial only in so far as
they lead to ontological reduction. Take for instance behaviorism. Behaviorism is a
reductionist theory of mind that is classified either as logical or ontological depending on the
kind of reductionism that is being advanced. Accordingly, logical behaviorism advances a
logical type of reductionism in that expressions about mental states are claimed to be nothing
but expressions about behavioral dispositions; while ontological behaviorism advances an
ontological type of reductionism in that mental states are claimed to be nothing but behavioral
dispositions. Logical behaviorism, it will be recalled, is further divided into the type that leads
to ontological behaviorism and the type that does not. Consequently, ontological behaviorism
and the type of logical behaviorism that leads to ontological behaviorism are the ones
regarded as philosophically relevant and controversial in so far as the existence of mental
states is concerned.

Ontological reductionism, as applied by contemporary approaches to the mind-body

problem, involves mental states as the reduced phenomena while the bodys physical states or
bodily states as the base phenomena. Besides behaviorism, the identity theory, which reduces
mental states to brain states, also serves as a paradigm example of a reductionist theory of this
kind. There is, however, no logical constraint why reductionism cannot be the other way
round, wherein bodily states are the reduced phenomena while mental states the base
phenomena. This kind of reductionism is implicit among idealist theories of the mind, those
that only admit the reality of metaphysical phenomena and thus reject the reality of physical
objects. A classic case in point is Berkeleys idealism, which claims that reality consists only
of minds and their contentsthe mental states. Berkeley believes that physical objects, which
obviously include bodies and their physical states, are ontologically reducible to our ideas of
them. On this view, a physical object is just a mental construct out of certain ideas. We can
call reductionism of this kind, where the reduced phenomena are physical states while the
base phenomena are mental states, as metaphysical reductionism to contrast it from physical
reductionism, where it is the other way round. In contemporary philosophy of mind, however,
reductionism is naturally understood as physical reductionism owing to the dominance of
materialist views.

Reductionism (henceforth understood in its physical sense) has a broad and narrow
sense. In its broad sense, it rejects the reality of mental states; while in its narrow sense, it

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merely rejects the metaphysical or non-physical reality of mental states. Accordingly, all types
of materialist views subscribe to reductionism in its narrow sense, for to say that mental states
are nothing but behavioral dispositions (behaviorism), neural states (identity theory),
functional states (functionalism), higher biological states (Searles biological naturalism), or
computational states (computationalism) is to reduce mental states to some type of physical
states, and hence rejects the metaphysical reality of mental states. One, however, can reject
the metaphysical reality of mental states but still maintain their identity by regarding these
states as higher-level physical states that are distinct from lower-level physical states. This is
the view that we have classified in Chapter 2 as realist physicalism, which includes
functionalism, computationalism, and biological naturalism. On the other hand, materialist
views that subscribe to reductionism in its broad sense are what we have classified in the
same chapter as reductive physicalism (under non-realist physicalism, the other non-realist
physicalist view, it will be recalled, is eliminative physicalism), and they include behaviorism
and the identity theory.

The main advantage of reductionism is explanatory and ontological simplicity. Instead

of having two sets of explanations, one for the reduced phenomena and another one for the
base phenomena, there will only be one set of explanations, that of the base phenomena. And
instead of having two sets of entities, that of the reduced phenomena and that of the base
phenomena, there will only be one set of entities, that of the base theory. Explanatory and
ontological simplicity when carried out successfully is a scientific virtue, but when forced
when done simply for its own sake, it comes at a price, namely, that something important
about the reduced phenomena may be left out in the process. Qualia, considered to be a vital
feature of mental states, for instance, are often argued (by anti-reductionists) to be left out
once mental states are reduced to the neural states of the brain. When some important features
of the reduced phenomena are left out in their reduction to the base phenomena, it is an
indication that the reduction is merely forced and cannot be carried out successfully.

1.2. Emergentism

Emergentism, generally speaking, claims that certain properties emerge from or are caused by
the interaction of some lower-level properties. The usual example given to explain this is the
case of water or H2O. Transparency, liquidity, and wetness are properties of water are not
simply the combined properties of hydrogen and oxygen, but the properties that arise from the
interaction among the properties of hydrogen and oxygen. In this sense, the properties of
water are emergent properties. Perhaps the combinations of colors will provide another good
illustration. Secondary colors are consequences of the combinations of the primary colors: the
secondary color green is the result of the combination of the primary colors yellow and blue,
the secondary color orange is the result of the combination of the primary colors red and
yellow, and the secondary color violet is the result of the combination of the primary colors
red and blue. In this sense, secondary colors are emergent colors, which result from the
interaction of the primary colors.

Emergent properties have two related characteristics. First, emergent properties are not
the same as resultant properties. Following Searle (1997, 451) both types of properties can be
seen as system features. Take for example a group of people. If some people group together

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one resultant property would be their aggregate weight, which one gets to know by simply
adding up the weight of each member of the group. The emergent property, on the other hand,
is the property that arises out of the interaction of the members of the group. Team work, for
instance, is a possible emergent property of the group. It is said that resultant properties can
be deduced or predicted from the individual properties of the members of a group. If we know
the weight of each member of the group, we can deduce or predict what would be their
aggregate weight. But the same is not true of emergent properties. We cannot deduce or
predict that they are going to have team work simply on the basis of our knowledge of their
individual traits. And second, emergent properties cannot be reduced to, or be broken down
into, the lower-level properties that cause them. This characteristic is necessarily tied to the
earlier one since it is only resultant properties that can be reduced to the properties that
constitute them. The aggregate weight of a group of people is reducible to the weights of each
individual member of the group, but it is absurd to say that the groups teamwork can be
reduced to the teamwork of each individual member of the group.

Now, in the context of the philosophy of mind, emergentism is the view that claims
that mental states and properties emerge from or are caused by the interaction among the
physical properties of the brains physical states. Notice that it is not only mental properties
but also mental states themselves that are caused by the interaction among the physical
properties of the brains physical states. The reason is that what makes certain states mental is
precisely their possession of the mental properties. As such, in saying that mental properties
are emergent properties we in effect are also saying that mental states are emergent states.
This is no different from the examples we discussed above. It is not only the properties of
water that are emergent but the substance water itself. It is not only the properties of green
that are emergent but the color green itself.

As in the case of emergent properties in general, mental properties are also not
resultant properties and hence cannot be reduced to the properties that produce them.
Emergentism, however, in the context of the philosophy of mind, is committed to materialism;
as such, mental properties, like the physical properties from which they emerge, are regarded
as something physical as well. The only difference between mental properties and the physical
properties that cause them is that mental properties are higher-level physical properties while
the physical properties that cause them are lower-level physical properties. On this point,
emergentism is aligned with non-reductive physicalism. Major proponents of emergentism in
the philosophy of mind include Samuel Alexander (1920) and C. D. Broad (1962). In the
contemporary scene, however, a good representative of an emergentist philosophical theory of
mind is Searles biological naturalism.

1.3. Supervenience

Supervenience basically refers to the dependence of one type of phenomena (facts or

properties), called the supervening phenomena, on another type of phenomena (facts or
properties), called the base phenomena. This dependency relation is also a relation of
determination, for as the supervening phenomena depend on the base phenomena the base
phenomena determine the supervening phenomena. Speaking of supervenience in terms of
properties, Chalmers (1996, 33) formulates the principle of supervenience in the following

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way: B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible situations are identical with
respect to their A-properties while differing in their B-properties. We can, I believe, simplify
this formulation in the following way. Let A refer to the base phenomena and B to the
supervening phenomena. The principle of supervenience then states that: B supervenes on A if
it is not possible for B to occur in any given situation without A first occurring in the same
situation. (To say that it is not possible for two objects to have the same triangular shape and
not have the same white color is simply to say that it is not possible for any given object to
have a triangular shape without that object having a white color first.)

Based on our formulation, the differences among various types of supervenience can
accordingly also be simply stated. There are two main distinctions philosophers of mind make
about supervenience. The first concerns the domain of the supervening relation. In this regard,
supervenience is either global, when the domain is entire worlds (or universes), or local,
when the domain is individuals (like objects, entities, persons). The second concerns the
nature of the supervening relation. In this regard, supervenience is either logical, when the
supervening relation is governed by the law of non-contradiction, or natural (or nomological)
when it is governed by the laws of nature. The differences among these types of
supervenience can accordingly be stated as follows:

Global supervenience: B globally supervenes on A if it is not possible for B to occur in a

given world without A occurring first in that world.

Local supervenience: B locally supervenes on A if it is not possible for B to occur in a given

individual or set of individuals without A occurring first in that individual or set of
individuals.

Logical supervenience: B logically supervenes on A if it is not logically possible for B to

occur without A occurring first.

Natural supervenience: B naturally (or nomologically) supervenes on A if it is not naturally

possible for B to occur without A occurring first.

An example of global supervenience is the supervenience of our worlds biological

facts, such as the plants and animals, on its physical facts, such as its geography and weather
conditions. It is impossible for this world to have biological facts without these physical facts
occurring first, such that if there is another world that is identical to our world in terms of the
physical facts this other world will likewise be identical to our world in terms of the
biological facts. An example of local supervenience is the supervenience of the weight of a
particular object on the objects other physical properties, which include its size and mass. It
is impossible for the object to have the weight that it has without its other physical properties.
Another example, which is popular in the literature, concerns the supervenience of aesthetic
properties on physical properties. If sculpture X is beautiful it is because of its physical
properties, such that if an exact replica of that sculpture is made, this replica must also be
beautiful.

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 The examples given above, as they violate neither natural laws nor the law of non-
contradiction, can also serve as examples for both natural and logical types of supervenience.
But now let us elaborate on the difference between these two latter types of supervenience.
Natural supervenience implies logical supervenience, for what is naturally possible is also
logically possiblefor what accords with the laws of nature are non-contradictory. For
instance, a mile-high chair is naturally possible. There is no law of nature that will be violated
for the construction of such chair. And there is nothing contradictory about the concept of
such kind of chair, and hence it is logically possible also. But logical supervenience does not
imply natural supervenience, for what is logically possible is not always naturally possible.
For instance, a flying elephant is logically possible as there is nothing contradictory about
such concept, but it is not naturally possible for such possibility goes against the law of
gravity. Based on this considerations, if As supervenience on B is natural this would mean
that this supervening relation is true only in the natural world or the world governed by
natural laws; but if it is logical this would mean that this supervening relation is true in all
logically possible worlds or worlds that are logically consistent though governed by different
natural laws.

The two general types of distinctions, the global-local distinction and the natural-
logical distinction, cut across one another. Accordingly, we can have a supervenience that is
global and logical, global and natural, local and logical, and local and natural.

In mind-body supervenience, mental states are regarded as supervening on brain

states. This means that it is impossible for mental states to occur without the occurrence first
of brain states, such that it is not possible for two individuals to have the same brain states
without the same mental states. The controversy in mind-body supervenience concerns not so
much on whether it is global (whether the supervenience of the mental over the physical is
true on the level of the entire world such that a world that has the appropriate physical facts
will have the corresponding mental facts) or local (whether the supervenience of the mental
over the physical is true on the level of individuals such as that an individual that has the
appropriate physical facts will have the corresponding mental facts) but whether it is logical
(whether the supervenience of the mental on the physical is true in all possible worlds) or
merely natural (whether the supervenience of the mental on the physical is only true in our
natural world). Accordingly, the controversy concerns the opposition between logical mind-
body supervenience and natural mind-body supervenience. Logical mind-body supervenience
claims that it is not logically possible for mental states to occur without brain states first
occurring; while natural mind-body supervenience merely claims that it is not naturally
possible for mental states to occur without brain states occurring first. Another way of stating
this difference is that logical mind-body supervenience claims that the dependence of mental
states on brain states is necessary, while natural mind-body supervenience claims that it is
merely contingent.

It is said that the reduction of mental states to brain states requires logical mind-body
supervenience as a necessary condition. The idea is that such reduction can only be carried out
if it can be shown first that is logically impossible for mental states to occur without brain
states occurring first. Consequently, if logical mind-body supervenience is shown to be
incorrect then mind-body reductionism cannot be carried out. It will be recalled that

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Chalmers zombie argument is precisely directed against logical mind-body supervenience. If
zombies, our unconscious molecule-per-molecule replica, are logically possible or
conceivable then it is not true that mental states or consciousness in general logically
supervenes on brain statesthough it may be true that mental states or consciousness in
general naturally supervenes on brain states. If in one logically possible world zombies can
exist then it is simply true that it is logically possible for brain states to occur without mental
states occurring thereafter. And if it is logically possible for brain states to occur without
mental states occurring thereafter then it is not true that it is logically impossible for mental
states to occur without brain states occurring first. As it is logically possible to have brain
states without mental states it is logically possible to have mental states without brain states.
That being the case, the mental states do not logically supervene on brain states; and
consequently mental states cannot be reduced to brain states.

1.4. Physical Realization

According to this view, mental states are higher-level physical states that are realized by some
lower-level physical system. In our case, our mental states exist only as they are realized in
the physical system of our brain. Here the lower-level physical states refer to the neural states
of our brain. Consequently, this leads to the idea that there can be other physical systems that
can likewise realize mental states. That is to say, other physical systems different from human
brains in terms of material composition but share the functional or causal organization of
human brains can realize the same mental states realized by human brains. This idea is what
has been called the principle of multiple realizability. If mental states exist by virtue of
physical realization, it follows that mental states are multiply realizable.

It will be recalled that this principle form part of the foundations of functionalism and
computationalism. If mental states are functional states, that is, states defined in terms of their
functional roles in an input-output system (the role played by mental states to produce
behavioral outputs from sensory inputs and their relation to other mental states), it follows
that any physical system that can perform the same functional roles of mental states will have
the same mental states. An important consequence of this is that it shows that mind-body
reductionism cannot be done. If the stimulation of the C-fibers in the human brain is just one
among possible physical realizations of pain, then pain cannot just be C-fiber stimulation. In
the case of computationalism, functional states are further defined as computational states.
The functional roles of mental states are results of implementing computations or algorithms,
which form the so-called software in contrast to the implementing system which is called the
hardware. On this view, if mental states are computational states then mental states are
multiply realizable for the reason that the same computations (software) can be implemented
by different physical systems (hardware) that have the same implementing capacity or
sophistication.

2. The Causal Mind-Body Problem

The ontological mind-body problem investigates how the existence of mental phenomena
relates to the physical existence of bodily states. The mind-body relation is here investigated
to resolve issues about the existence of mental phenomena. The mind-body relation is,

55
however, investigated for another purpose, and this is to resolve issues concerning the causal
powers of the mindon whether mental events can cause bodily movements. This now is the
causal mind-body problem, which some philosophers also refer to as the problem of mental
causation. John Searle (2004, 193, see also Kim 1998, 50), for instance, writes:

One of the residual problems left to us from dualism is the problem of mental
causation. Our first mind-body problem was, How can physical processes ever cause
mental processes? But to many philosophers the other half of the question is even
more pressing, How can anything as ethereal and insubstantial as mental processes
ever have any physical effects in the real world?

In examining the various solutions given to this problem, it is best to begin with the
one closest to our common sense and then examine how other solutions deviate from it. This
of course does not mean that our common sense is the yardstick for the plausibility of these
solutions. This is just for purposes of an orderly presentation of these various solutions to the
problem. Accordingly, we shall begin with the common sense view that mind and body
interact with one another, and shall then proceed with the other views that deviate in varying
degrees from this view.

2.1. Interactionism

The solution to the mind-body problem that is closest to our common sense is called
interactionism. While this view is often associated with the Cartesian dualism, one actually
need not be a substance dualist to subscribe to it. As we shall see later, some forms of physical
property dualism or non-reductive physicalism also endorse it. To properly understand
interactionism, we need to see what types of causal relation it claims about the mind and the
body. In this regard, there are four possible types of causal relation involving mental and
physical events corresponding to the four possible directions of causation involving the same
events. The first is the mental-to-mental direction of causation, an example of which is when
a belief causes a desire. The second is the mental-to-physical direction of causation, an
example of which is when a desire causes an action. The third is the physical-to-mental
direction of causation, an example of which is when the burning of the skin causes pain. The
fourth is the physical-to-physical direction of causation, an example of which is when the
cutting of the skin causes the skin to bleed.

Interactionism affirms all said directions of causation. But in addition, it also claims
that the causal powers of the mental can be exercised in a voluntary and hence non-
deterministic manner. For instance, if our skin is cut it will deterministically cause the skin to
bleed (physical to physical) and will deterministically cause the sensation of pain (physical to
mental). But as a result of pain, we may voluntarily desire to put medicine on the injury
(mental to mental) and may voluntarily act on this desire (mental to physical).

To put it more clearly, interactionism involves the following theses:

(1) Mental states are real or are distinct from bodily states.
(2) Mental states and bodily states causally influence one another.

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 (3) The causal powers of mental states can be exercised voluntarily.

It shall be observed that the third thesis assumes the second thesis and the second thesis
assumes the first one. In this light, if one rejects the first thesis, one necessarily rejects the two
other theses as well; and if the second thesis is rejected one necessarily rejects the third thesis
as well but not necessarily the first thesis. Conversely, one may affirm the first thesis without
necessarily affirming the second thesis; and one may affirm the second thesis without
necessarily affirming the third thesis. Based on these considerations, we can arrange the other
solutions to the mind-body problem according to following kinds: the no-mind solution,
where the first thesis is rejected; the no-causation solution, where the first thesis is affirmed
but the second thesis is rejected; and the no-free-will solution, where the first and second
theses are affirmed but the third one is rejected. The no-mind solution, though in a certain
sense a solution, is more of a rejection of the problem. This is the position of the non-realist
physicalists we spoke of earlier. If there is no mind and there is only the body, then there is no
mind-body problem. If regarded as a solution, it is a negative one. In the sections that follows,
we shall only discuss the positive solutions to the problem, namely those taking the no-
causation solution and the no-free-will solution.

Interactionism in the Cartesian version is not acceptable to most philosophers, and this
is mainly because of the theoretical difficulty of explaining how it has become possible for
two qualitatively (or ontologically) different kinds of substance to causally interact with one
another. If minds are metaphysical whose movements or acts follow the dictates of a free will
while bodies are physical whose movements follow the deterministic laws of nature, how can
their movements have causal relations? What kind of laws will bridge the minds free
volitions with the bodys deterministic movements? Where is the point of contact between the
mental states of the mind and the physical states of the body? These questions constitute what
has been called the problem of mental causation. Consequently, within the framework of
Descartes substance dualism, interactionism appears to be a very mysterious phenomenon.
Descartes though tries to demystify it by claiming that the alleged point of contact transpires
in the pineal gland, the pea-sized conical mass of tissue behind the third ventricle of the brain.
This explanation, however, is generally dismissed simply as a desperate attempt of Descartes
to salvage his dualism.

As indicated earlier, however, one can accept interactionism without the ontology of
Cartesian dualism. One who does so is John Searle. Searle regards mental states as higher-
biological states whose properties such as consciousness, intentionality, qualia, and free-will
are properties that emerge from neurophysiological processes. The basic reason that Cartesian
interactionism appears mysterious is that it is an interaction between two substances lying in
two qualitatively different realmsone beyond space-time while the other within space-time.
Thus, if the mental is seen as likewise lying in the same realm as the physical, then the
mystery of their interaction vanishes. More precisely, if mental states are seen as higher-level
physical states and physical states as lower-level physical states, then interactionism is not
between two qualitatively different states but between two levels of states of the same quality.
Needless to say, however, how this interactionism works needs to be positively explained, and
here we can have other sorts of problems. In any case, the point is that to subscribe to
interactionism is not necessarily to subscribe to Cartesian dualism.

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 Another is Donald Davidson (1980a) through his theory called anomalous monism.
This theory is Davidsons way of overcoming the following inconsistency or contradiction
engendered by the theses of interactionism. According to Davidson (1980a, 209-210), there
are three principles concerning mind-body causation which when taken together gives rise to
an inconsistency or contradiction. These principles are as follows. The first is the Principle of
Causal Interaction, which states that at least some mental events interact causally with
physical events (Davidson 1980a, 208). The second is the Principle of the Nomological
Character of Causality, which states that where there is causality, there must be a law: events
related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws (Davidson 1980a, 208). And
the third is the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, which states that there are no strict
deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained
(Davidson 1980a, 208). The contradiction lies in the fact that the first two principles together
imply that we can predict the occurrences of some mental events and explain them on the
basis of laws, but this is denied by the third principle.

Davidson thinks that this contradiction can be explained away without denying any of
these three principles. Accordingly, Davidson argues that mental events are actually physical
events also, and thus the monism. The mere fact that there is a causal connection between
mental events and physical events is evidence enough that mental events are also physical.
What differentiates mental events from other physical events, however, is that mental events
possess mental properties in addition to their physical properties. Another way of saying this
is that mental events are physical events that can be picked out by or identified using mental
descriptions. One crucial property of mental events, for Davidson, is that the attribution of
such events to a subject requires that the subject is assumed to be rational and consistent. That
is to say, to say that a person has this particular belief or desire is to assume that the person is
rational and consistent in his actions. For instance, to say that a person has a desire to drink
water when he says he is thirsty is to assume that it is appropriate for him to make or have
such desire when he is thirsty and that he will always make or have such desire whenever he
is thirsty. Such assumptions are not required in the attribution of physical events to a person.
For instance, to say that a person is bleeding is simply to see that the person is actually
bleeding. We do not have to assume that it is appropriate for the person to bleed under certain
conditions and that the person should bleed whenever he is under such conditions. Mental
events thus are physical events that have the identity of being mental. The causal relation
between mental events qua physical (mental events taken as physical events) and physical
events is not anomalous, for it is covered by laws and is thus predictable. What is anomalous
is the causal relation between mental events qua mental (mental events taken as mental
events) and physical events, for here such causal relation is not covered by laws and is thus
not predictable.

2.2. The No-Causation Solutions

Since interactionism is theoretically problematic, some see the solution to the mind-body
problem not in denying the reality of the mind but in denying the alleged causal relation
between the mind and the body. This type of solution, which we have called the no-causation
solution, however, has different versions depending on which among the four types of causal

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relation as discussed above are being rejected or maintained. In this light, a no-causation
solution to the mind-body problem is either one of the two following versions: the version that
denies all four directions of causation and the version that denies only the mental-to-mental
and the mental-to-physical directions of causation. We can call the former as the extreme
version, while the latter as the moderate version, of the no-causation solution to the mind-
body problem. Let us now examine the specific views of these two versions of the no-
causation solution to the mind-body problem. For the extreme version, we have two views:
the parallelism of Leibniz and the occasionalism of Melbranche, while for the moderate
version, we have the view called epiphenomenalism.

a. Parallelism

Parallelism claims that the physical states of the body are parallel events having no point of
contact between them. This means that the causal relation that we seem to see between our
mental states and bodily states is a mere illusion. It is a mere illusion, for instance, that it is
our intention to raise our arm that causes our arm to rise. But what explains the fact that some
mental events and physical events transpire as if they are causally related? More specifically,
what explains, for instance, the fact that on some occasions my intention of raising my arm is
immediately followed by the rising of my arm when these two events (my intending to raise
my arm and the actual rising of my arm) have no causal relation whatsoever? According to
Leibniz, the seeming causal interaction between mental and physical events is simply a result
of the pre-established harmony governing the whole universe, which was designed by God
according to His divine wisdom. Every event in the universe, be it mental or physical, is
independent of one another. Leibniz expresses this by saying that monads, the basic
constituents of the universe, according to Leibniz, are windowless; that is to say, no external
factors can affect their movements. The monads are in a way programmed by God to move in
synchronization with one another, and it is this synchronized movement of things that give us
the illusion that they have causal links.

A good analogy would be the movements that we see in a movie. If you look at the
negatives of the movie you will see that each is distinct and separate from the other, but each
is synchronized with one another such that when they are run by the movie projector they give
us the appearance of continuity of the movements in the movie. Better still think of this movie
as a cartoon movie. We all know that a cartoon movie is just a series of drawings that are
arranged in ways that will give us the appearance that the characters in the movie move as if
they are alive. Needless to say, this idea when applied to movies appeals to our common
sense, but not when applied to the whole universe or to our actions. Leibnizs view definitely
has metaphysical assumptions that are too many to handle. For instance, to the question, why
would God pre-establish the harmony in the universe? Leibnizs answer is that God does it in
order to ensure that the world that He created works according to His divine plan and hence
remains to be the best of all possible worlds.

b. Occasionalism

Occasionalism claims that the seeming causal interaction between events, mental or physical,
is a result of Gods interventions. These interventions are occasions for God to be involved in

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every event that happens in the world. For instance, if my finger is burned God intervenes to
give me the sensation of pain and he again intervenes to give me the desire to put medicine on
my burned finger and he again intervenes for me to act on this desire. So God is there
intervening in every event that happens. The difference between this view from Leibnizs is
that for Leibniz when God created the world He already programmed everything to move in
harmony and so God need not anymore intervene in every event that happens. Think of a
person synchronizing a set of alarm clocks so that their buzzers will sound in succession. On
the other hand, think of a person manually operating on a set of bells so that they will sound
in succession. In the former, the person does not have to do anything once the alarm clocks
are set; while in the latter, he operates on the bells one by one. Like Leibnizs view, this view
seems to be highly mysterious and counter-intuitive.

c. Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism claims that mental states are mere by-products (or indirect effects)
of the physical states or processes of the brain, which do not have any causal powers. What
causes certain physical states and movements of the body are other physical states and
movements of the body. Mental states, though they are also caused by the physical states of
our body, are only indirectly caused by such states; and this is the sense in which mental states
are said to be mere by-products of the physical states of our body. And as mere by-products,
they do not cause anything. Let M stand for a mental state while P for a physical state.
Epiphenomenalism claims that P1 can directly cause P2 and indirectly cause M1; and P2 in
turn can directly cause P3 and indirectly cause M2; but M1 cannot cause P2 nor M2. (Both
M1 and M2 can also be indirectly caused by P1 but still M1 and M2 have no causal relation
with one another and with P2.) Jaegwon Kim (1996, 129) illustrates this using the
phenomenon of shadows. The shadows that our body cast, say, on the wall, as we move are
indirectly caused by our body and its movements. There are other factors that cause these
shadows, such as the light (and its angle relative to our body and the wall), the wall, and
others. The shadows at different instants have no causal relation in that a shadow at one
instant does not cause a shadow at another instant. Furthermore, these shadows do not have
any causal effect on any instant of our bodys movements.

Thus, the pain, for instance, that we experience immediately after touching a hot
object with our bare hand is only indirectly caused by or is a mere by-product of the physical
state of our body upon touching the hot object, brought about by the physical reactions of our
skin to the heat of the hot object. The action of removing our hand from the hot object is what
is directly caused by the physical state of our body, which happens without any influence
from the pain that we experienced. If later we have the desire to put some ointment on our
hand, this desire is not caused by the pain that we experienced but is again indirectly caused
by some physical states of our body resulting from the incidence. And still later if we do put
some ointment on our hand, this action of ours is not caused, directly or indirectly, by our
desire to do so, but is again directly caused by some physical states of our body that indirectly
caused the said desire.

Epiphenomenalism is able to avoid the theoretical difficulty of interactionism without

rejecting the reality of mental states or invoking some form of divine intervention. It is also

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able to avoid the problem of causal over-determination, referring to the implausible possibility
that a physical state and a mental state simultaneously causing another physical state (M1 and
P1 simultaneously causing P2). Epiphenomenalism, however, is often criticized for rendering
the occurrence of mental states as serving no practical purposes; and as such violates the
theory of evolution. If mental states indeed had no causal powers then their existence would
have no survival purpose or value whatsoever; but nature, in the first place, would have not
had endowed us with the capacity to experience such states had it been the case.

2.3. The No-Freedom Solution

This variety of solution to the mind-body problem is provided by the computational theory of
mind, or computationalism for short (also known as computer functionalism or strong
artificial intelligence). To recall, according to this view, what we call the mind is understood
as a computer software or program while what we call the brain is understood as the computer
hardware. Consequently, our mental states are believed to be nothing more than the
computational states of our brain as it is implementing a certain program. For instance,
according to this view, when we are playing chess we are simply implementing in our brain
the software of chess (which we have programmed in our brain when we studied the rules of
such game); and consequently, our mental states while playing this game are the states of the
chess program in our brain as it implements such program. And since there can be many
programs that a computer hardware can run, so our brain can also have many minds to run. In
this light, the only difference between our brain and our desktop computer concerns their
degree of complexitythat is to say, our brain is just a more complex type of computer
hardware.

Computationalism does not reject the reality of mental states for regarding such states
as a higher-level kind of physical states. In addition, this view also claims that mental states
have causal powers over themselves and over the lower-level physical states, which include
brain states and ultimately behaviors. But unlike interactionism, this view rejects the thesis
that such causal powers can be exercised voluntarily, and this is for the reason that our
behaviors ultimately are programmed actions. We may, on this view, have intentions but these
intentions are not voluntarily formed (for they are, we may say, programmed objectives); and
when we put our intentions into actions, it is because we are programmed to do so (and if we
do not, it is also because we are programmed not to do so). We are therefore nothing but
complex mechanical systems or programmed machines. Observe the following remarks by
Roger Schank (1984, 52), one of the leading supporters of strong artificial intelligence:

The fact that anything a computer might be made to do would be just a program
doesnt denigrate it. A person is just a program, too, in a way. To the extent that a
persons behavior at any time is a function of his experiences, he has been indirectly
programmed by his experiences (or, directly by parents or school)From a certain
point of view then, humans are also just programmed. And from this point of view a
computer is just a very slow, very literal, very spineless human. It also is just
programmed, but it never rebels against its programmer. Perhaps if we could program
absolutely everything into a computer, its intelligence indeed would be

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 indistinguishable from that of a human. It would be both intelligent and just
programmed.

One advantage of this view is that it offers a good solution to the problem of mental
causation. If we will recall, this the problem concerning how mental states, which are
governed by a certain set of laws, can interact with the physical states of the body, which are
governed by another set of laws different from that that govern mental states. One
requirement for this to be possible is that there should be bridge laws, the psycho-physical
laws that will act as the interface between psychological laws of the mind and the physical
laws of the body. In the absence of such laws, which Donald Davidson (1980a), in his
anomalous monism, argues that there are indeed no such laws, the mental-to-physical
direction of causation will appear as an utterly mysterious phenomenon. This is the sense in
which Cartesian interactionism is unpalatable to most philosophers. In the hands of
computationalism, however, mental causation is explained in terms of realizability or
implementation. If a computer program sets a machine into motion, we simply understand this
as the machine implementing or realizing the computer program, which does not sound
mysterious at all. Here the laws of the hardware are built in such a way that they naturally
implement the laws of the software. There seems to be no need for a separate bridge laws, for
such laws are already built in the software and the hardware.

One criticism against this view, however, is that it fails to take into account the
fundamental differences between human minds and intelligent mechanical systems.
Humans, for instance, are aware of what their mental states represent in the world but it is
dubious whether computers are also aware of what their computational states represent in the
world, for we, humans, are the ones that interpret what these computational states represent in
the world. Another, there is no qualitative difference in the way two or more computers have
the same computational states, but there is a qualitative difference in the way two or more
humans have or experience the same mental states.

3. Concluding Remarks

The mind-body problem is one reason for the mystery of the mind. We intuitively know that
our mental states and bodily states causally and ontologically affect one another. We
intuitively know that under normal conditions, physical injuries will cause us pain and our
desires will cause us to perform certain actions. But these intuitions of ours are difficult to
justify and explain. In this chapter, we saw various solutions conceived by philosophers to the
mind-body problem, including the solution that rejects the validity of our intuitions regarding
the relation of our mental and bodily states. The following table shows these various
solutions.

Mind-Body Relation

Ontological Mind-Body Problem Causal Mind-Body Problem

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Reductionism Interactionism

Emergentism No-Mind Solution

Supervenience No-Causation Solution

(parallelism, occasionalism, epiphenomenalism)
Physical Realization
No-Freedom Solution

As our discussions have shown, all solutions have problems. While one solution
avoids the problems of other solutions, it, however, either shares the problems of some other
solutions or it creates its own problems. Some believe that the difficulty of the problem lies in
the fact that we still do not know much about the subject matter, while some believe it lies in
the very nature of the problem itself. Collin McGinn (1997, 538) beautifully puts the latter
viewpoint in the following: It is not the size of the problem but its type that makes the mind-
body problem so hard for us. For the former viewpoint, it is the amount of knowledge that
we have about the issue that makes the resolution of the issue difficult for us, while for the
latter viewpoint it is the very nature of the issue.

McGinn regards the mind-body problem as a type of problem whose solution is

beyond the limits of our cognitive capacities. Each type of organisms capable of cognition in
some degree is biologically constituted such that its cognitive capacities have their natural
limits. Bats, for instance, cannot see what some organisms see, but they can hear what some
organisms cannot hear. It is beyond bats, in this light, to discriminate colors, as it is beyond
some organisms to discriminate sounds bats are capable of discriminating. In like manner,
there simply are problems whose resolutions our beyond our given cognitive capacities, and
McGinn claims that the mind-body problem is one of them. Some, however, react to
McGinns claim saying that it would be defeatism to give up in advance (Searle 2004, 146).
There were problems before that were thought to be insoluble but which we now have the
solutions, and possibly the mind-body problem will be like these problems. Whatever is the
case, the mind-body problem will surely still be with us for a long, long time.

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