Case

-----------------
! INTHE
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Petitioner/Appellant/Defendant
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT
Respondent and Plaintiff

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,
a CA General Partnership,
dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community
Real Party In Interest

PETITION FOR REVIEW

after 4th District Court of Appeal Denied Discretionary Review on 11114117 in E069254
of Appellate Division's affirmation on 9/25/17 in ACIAS1600035 of the trial court's order
denying statutory & contract attorney fees to prevailing party on 10/6116 in UDFS1406978
Hon. Janet M. Frangie at San Bernardino Justice Center, Department S-29 (909) 521-3467

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780

950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA 93103
nancvduffvsb@vahoo.com
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Attorney for Petitioner Bonnie Shipley

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................. 2

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES (filed separately)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................'................................................. 3-4

ISSUE PRESENTED .................................................................................................................. 5

Did Court of Appeal violate due process and equal protection under 5th and 14th

amendments of the United States Constitution and CA Constitution, Art. I, 7(a)

by affirming denial of prevailing party fees under MRL's Civil Code 798.85,

mandatory reciprocal fees under Civil Code 1717 and Civil Code 1021.5 fees

for enforcing citizen rights not being enforced by state or local government?

WHY THE COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW .................................................................... 5

CHRONOLOGY OF PERTINENT EVENTS ............................................................................ 8

THE CONTRIVED SCHEME ........................................................................... 9

ARGlTMENT 1........................................................................................................................ 14

1. Court of Appeal violated due process and equ~l protection under 5th and 14th
amendments of the United States Constitution and CA Constitution, Art. I, 7(a)
by affirming denial of prevailing party fees under MRL's Civil Code 798.85,
mandatory reciprocal fees under Civil Code 1717 and Civil Code 1021.5 fees
for enforcing citizen rights not being enforced by state or local government.

A. Prevailing party Attorney Fees are mandatory under MRL Civil Code 798.85 ................. 14

B. Non-Signatory Shipley is Entitled to Reciprocal Contract Fees Under Civil 1717 ............ 19

C. Shipley is entitled to Fees under CCP 1021.5 under Controlling Whitley Test ................. 20

D. Global Effect of Transmuting a Reciprocal Fee Statute Into a Unilateral One

To Benefit Only Evicting Landlords thereby Denying Tenants Equal Protection ............... 20

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................... 21

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ....................................................................................... 22

EXHIBITS:
A. 4th District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) 11/14/17 Denial of Petition for Review ........... 23-24

B. Appellate Division's 9/25/17 Order affirming Fee Denial ........................................ 25-36

C. Trial Court's 10/4/16 Order Denying fees .................................................................. 37-48

Proof of Service .................................................................................................................... 49-51

Page 2
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Arrietta v. Mahon (1982)
31 Cal.3d 381 .......................................................................................................................... 14, 18
Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013)
219 CA.4th 809, 819-820 .............................................................................................................. 19
Cacho v. Boudreau (2007)
40 Cal.4th 341, 345 ....................................................................................................................... 13
Cardenas v. Noren (1991)
235 CA.3d 1344 ............................................................................................................................ 18
Conservatorship of Estate of Whitley (2010)
50 Cal. 4th 1206, 1217-1218 ......................................................................................................... 19
Del Cerro v. Proffer (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 943, 948-949 ........................................................................................................ 15
Eden Twp. Healthcare Dist. v. Eden Med. Center (2013)
220 CA 4th 418, 426-427 .............................................................................................................. 19
Gorman v. Tassajara (2009)
178 CA.4th 44 ................................................................................................................................. 8
In re Perl, (9th Cir. 2016)
811 F 3d 1120 ................................................................................................................................ 14
MHC Fin. v. City of Santee (2005)
125 CA 4th 1372, 1377 .............................................................................................................. 6, 13
Palmer v. Agee (1978)
87 Cal.App.3d 377, 387................................................................................................................. 15
Pardee v. Gray
66 Cal 524 ..................................................................................................................................... 13
Reynolds Metals v. Alperson (1979)
25 Cal.3d 124, 128 ........................................................................................................................ 19
Rickley v. County of Los Angeles (9th Circuit 2011)
654 F.3d 950, 953, 956-957 (federal case - holding same as Rickley state case) ...................... 8, 9
Rickley v. Goodfriend (2012)
207 CA.4th 1528, 1533 (state case holding same as Rickley federal case) ................................. 7, 8
Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011)
202 CA. 4th 382, 401 .................................................................................................................... 19
Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
17 Cal. 4th 599, 611 .................................................................................................................. 6, 19
SC Mfr. Homes v. Canyon Estates (2007)
148 CA.4th 663......................................................................................................................... 6, 13
Serrano v. Unruh (1982)
32 Cal.3d. 621, 639 ....................................................................................................................... 15
Tract 19051 Homeowners Assn. v. Kemp (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1135, 1142 ................................................................................................................... 19
Trope v.Katz (1995)
11 Cal.4th 274 ................................................................................................................................. 7

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 STATUTES

CCP 415.46; 715.010; 715.020; 1169; 1174.25 ................................................................................. 18

CCP 415.46(e) (bars claim to possession if PCRP claim is not filed to join case) .............................. 14

CCP 415.20 (service of summons by substituted service) ................................................................... 11

CCP 715.020(d) (bars claim to possession if PCRP claim is not filed to join case) ............................ 14

CCP1021.5 (fees to enforce codes where government does not enforce them) ................. .........passim

CCP 1032 (mandatory costs to prevailing parties) ........................................................................ passim

CCP 1032(a)(4) and (b) (mandatory costs and attorney fees to prevailing parties) ......................... 7, 16

CCP 1161(3) (requires all landlords to name all known occupants (subtenants) ................. 6,16, 20, 21

CCP 1164 (requires all landlords to name all known occupants (subtenants) ..................... 6, 16, 20, 21

CCP 1169 (writ of possession issued if occupant does not file PCRP claim in 10 days) .................. 6, 7

CCP 1858 (courts not authorized to insert or delete words not within statutes) ............................ 15, 16

Civil Code, Chapter 2.5 (Codification of Mobile Home Residency Law aka "MRL") ......................... 5

Civil Code 798.9 (MRL's definition of homeowner) ........................................................................... 13

Civil Code 798.11 (MRL's definition of resident) .......................................................................... 13,19

Civil Code 798.55 (legislative intent-protect residents from unlawful evictions) ................... 13, 16, 17

Civil Code 798.56 (enumerated list of six offenses authorizing evictions) ............................... 5, 12, 13

Civil Code 798.85 (MRL's reciprocal fee-shifting provision to level playing field) .................... passim

Civil Code 1717 (reciprocal fees on contract clauses even if not a contracting party) ................. passim

FEDERAL & CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS

5th and 14th amendments of the United States Constitution ............................................. 2, 4, 5, 6, 14, 16

California Constitution at Article 1, 7 ............................................................................ 2, 4, 5, 6, 14, 16

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 ISSUE PRESENTED
Did Court of Appeal violate due process and equal protection under 5th and 14th
amendments of the United States Constitution and CA Constitution, Article I, 7(a)
by affirming denial of prevailing party fees under MRLs Civil Code 798.85,
mandatory reciprocal fees under Civil Code 1717 and CCP 1021.5 attorney fees
for enforcing citizens rights not being enforced by state or local government ?

WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

Review is necessary to ensure uniformity of decisions, equal protection under the law,
and to settle an important question of law. Can a court transmute a reciprocal fee-shifting
provision into a unilateral one to benefit only landlords who evict mobile home residents?
Civil Code 798.85 was enacted to level the playing field between park owners and tenants
who cannot afford an attorney to defend unlawful evictions prosecuted to steal mobile homes.
The fee-shifting provision encourages pro bono attorneys to defend arbitrary park evictions.

California follows the American Rule; i.e. each party pays his/her own attorney fees.
However, in certain cases our Legislature has authorized attorney fee awards either to a
plaintiff only (a unilateral provision) or to either prevailing party (a reciprocal provision).
In some cases hybrid fee-shifting provisions were enacted. Hybrid is for the most part
unilateral in favor of plaintiffs, but can be awarded to a defendant if the court expressly
finds that plaintiff's claim was frivolous or prosecuted in bad faith to deter such claims.

Legislators must first decide if an American Rule exception should be created with
respect to any specific claim or statutory scheme and then whether it will be unilateral,
reciprocal or hybrid. When Legislators enact a reciprocal fee provision, the public policy
underlying that decision differs from the public policy underlying enactment of a hybrid
fee-shifting provision to encourage pro bono enforcement.

Legislators never intended the reciprocal landlord/tenant fee-shifting provision they

enacted at Civil Code 798.85 to be transmuted into a unilateral provision to benefit only
landlords who contrive schemes to obtain fees if they prevail but avoid fees if they lose.
This Court expressly held that a reciprocal fee-shifting provision should never be
transmuted into a unilateral or hybrid provision at the unfettered whim of a judicial officer.
Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 599, 611. Such acts exceed a courts jurisdiction.

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 The court deprived Shipley of equal protection under the United States Constitution and
Californias Constitution, Art.1, 7(a) by denying prevailing party attorney fees on a whim.

Most of our state Mobilehome Residency Laws were enacted piecemeal over the years
and eventually codified in 1978 as Chapter 2.5 of the Civil Code. As many park residents
cannot afford an attorney to enforce MRL a limited body of law has developed since 1978.
Legislators circumscribed arbitrary evictions by enacting Civil Code 798.56 which limits
evictions to six enumerated offenses. Legislators enacted a fee-shifting provision at Civil
798.85 to encourage pro bono lawyers to enforce MRL to protect vulnerable residents:

In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing
party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section
if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is
dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties
otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise. Id

In every published case since 1978 in which a resident prevailed fees were awarded.
Two cases denied fees to park owners. MHC Fin. v. Santee (2005) 125 CA 4th 1372, 1377
[park owner sued Santee City over ordinances, prevailed on the merits, but was denied fees]
and SC Mfr. Homes v. Canyon Estates (2007) 148 CA.4th 663 [a kick-back scheme claim].
In both cases courts found the alleged claims did not arise out of the MRL. The Panels
described claims which arise out of MRL as landlord/resident disputes and evictions.

Stubblefield devised a clever scheme to insulate himself from attorney fees if he lost.
He did not name Shipley as a defendant in a Case Caption, violating CCP 1161(3) and 1164
which require landlords to name every known subtenant and serve eviction papers on them.
Stubblefield served Shipley with eviction papers as an unknown occupant -- despite having
known Shipleys name since 2012 when he identified her by name in his first eviction case.
Stubblefield lost that first attempt to evict Shipley in 2012. In his second eviction in 2014
he served her a Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession with a notice in bold reciting that
Shipley would be evicted without a hearing unless she filed a PCRP claim within 10 days.1

1
Appendix F, G pp. 26-28 [CT20: 2347, 2348] [Bookmarked in bold]

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 Under CCP 1169 a clerk must issue a writ of possession on day 11 if a landlord avers
in a Proof of Service an unknown occupant was duly served with a blank PCRP claim and
failed to file it in 10 days. Shipley had to file a claim to avoid a sheriffs lockout by default.
After losing at the jury trial Stubblefield urged the court to deny prevailing party attorney
fees arguing Shipley had voluntarily injected herself into the case for strategic reasons.
[for McCarron to get legal fees if they prevailed]. The trial court denied fees on 10/4/16.
Appellate Division affirmed the trial courts denial of prevailing party fees on 9/25/17.

The court violated Shipleys right to due process and equal protection by punishing
her and her attorney for avoiding an unlawful eviction in 10 days by filing a PCRP claim.
By denying fees the court rewarded Stubblefield for contriving a fraudulent scheme which
enabled him to roll the dice on his second eviction attempt. He lost both eviction cases.

Stubblefield prayed for MRL fees in both eviction cases. [App 6:22 Bookmarked]
He omitted Shipleys name in the Case Caption but served her a summons labeled an
unknown occupant, a complaint, and a blank PCRP. He then rolled the dice on outcome.
Either way Shipley would be shafted. If she failed to file a PCRP claim in 10 days he
could take her default as unknown occupant duly served with a PCRP claim; then obtain
a Writ of Possession under CCP 1169, deliver it to a Sheriff to physically remove her.
After Shipley was removed he could then move to dismiss the case against Duffy as moot.
If Shipley filed a PCRP and joined the case he could continue to roll the dice by filing a
Motion for Summary Judgment or prevail at trial. Under the worst case scenario, if he lost
MSJ and a jury trial he could avoid paying fees by arguing that he did not name Shipley,
she was not a necessary party, and that Duffy voluntarily injected her to obtain a fee award.
A landlord who contrives a devious scheme to transmute 798.85s reciprocal fee-shifting
provision into a unilateral one by which only he could collect fees should not be rewarded.

There is nothing in MRL or Unlawful Detainer Scheme authorizing a court to punish

a resident for exercising her due process right to file a PCRP to avoid eviction by default.
Under CCP 1032 (a)(4)+(b) Shipley had a right to costs unless a statute precluded costs.
Attorney fees are an element of costs where a fee-shifting statute applies to the litigation.
Yet, without any statutory or case authority the court arbitrarily denied fees on a whim.

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 Stubblefield argued the Trope/Gorman2 pro per fee bar should be extended to Shipley
by proxy since her defense was inextricably intertwined with Duffy McCarrons defense.
There is no case or statutory authority supporting such an absurd theory to deny all fees.
There is no published case denying fees under Trope/Gormans pro per fee bar where
an attorney/client relationship existed with a represented co-party, including a spouse.3
Secondly, the Trope/Gorman line of cases all involved contract fees under Civil 1717.

The Trope/Gorman bar does not extend to fee-shifting provisions designed to encourage
pro bono attorneys to protect residents from arbitrary evictions. There is no published case
litigated under the MRL scheme where a prevailing mobile home resident (whether she was
a homeowner or not) was denied fees based on the Trope/Gorman pro per fee bar applying
only to contract fees under Civil 1717. The court found P had no contract with Shipley.

CHRONOLOGY OF PERTINENT EVENTS

Stubblefield previously tried to evict Shipley as subtenant of her attorney Ms. McCarron.
[Exh. B., p.1] Plaintiff only named Shipley. He served a summons reciting her name as an
individual defendant. [App A:4] *App=Appendix; A=Exhibit A; 4=page 4

This proves 5 years ago [8/27/12] Stubblefield knew Shipley was not an unknown occupant.

2
Trope v.Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 ; Gorman v. Tassajara (2009) 178 CA.4th 44
3
Rickley v. Goodfriend (2012) 207 CA.4th 1528, 1533 (state case); and Rickley v.
County of Los Angeles 654 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2011) (federal case holding same)
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 Division reversed denial of Shipleys MSJ by mandamus. [Exhibit B. p. 2] [App B:5-15]
Both courts misled readers by reciting that Shipley voluntarily interjected herself into the case
by filing a Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession --- implying it was a strategic maneuver.
[Exhibit B, page 5]. Even if strategic it was not improper under stare decisis. see Rickley 4
In Rickley, plaintiff was counsels spouse. The 9th Circuit Panel, repulsed by such negative
inferences made against plaintiffs counsel, wholly rejected defendant citys argument that
strategic maneuvers should be punished by denying prevailing party attorney fee entitlement:

The district court suggested that fees might be denied for another
reasonbecause Rickley and Roit may have acted strategically
in naming Rickley as the plaintiff and Roit as the attorney.

We do not agree with the Countys assessment. Even assuming that

Rickley and Roit acted strategically in the manner suggested by the
district court, there would have been nothing improper in doing so.
Rickley, 654 F.3d 957

Roit was a plaintiff who sued the City. Shipley and McCarron did not sue anyone; they
were forced to defend 2 unlawful evictions filed by a park owner trying to filch a mobile home.
Shipley did not strategically inject herself into the case as implied by Division and trial court.
Stubblefield implemented a devious scheme to transmute a reciprocal fee-shifting statute into
a unilateral one to benefit only park owner landlords who are not even in the protected class.

THE CONTRIVED SCHEME

On 10/3/14 plaintiff filed a complaint naming only Duffy as defendant. [APP C 16-22]
Caption recited Doe defendants 1-10 and alleged the Does were subtenants. [APP C 17:6]
Bonnie Shipley was identified as a subtenant. [APP C 18: 17]. He submitted a summons
without checking any boxes at the bottom to identify defendants capacity. [APP D 23-24]:

10/3/14 (Stubblefield v. Duffy, et al) 8/27/12 (Stubblefield v. Bonnie Shipley)

4
Rickley v. County of LA 654 F.3d 950, 956-957 (9th Cir. 2011)
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 This belies Stubblefields argument that he only sued Duffy and did not sue Shipley.
Comparing both summons outs his contrived scheme. On the 8/27/12 summons (on right)
(when he only sued Shipley) he checked as an individual defendant writing Bonnie Shipley.
Why would he not do the same on a 10/3/14 summons (on left) when he only sued Duffy?
Instead, he made Maria Vega issue a summons without any checked boxes on the bottom.

He could then create one summons for Duffy [checked box: as an individual defendant]
without Duffys name, and a second summons for Shipley [checked box as an occupant ]
without Shipleys name. Stubblefield hired a process server to drive over to the mobile home
to serve Shipley with two summons; one for her and one for Duffy. [APP E 25 and APP F 26]:

Eviction Pack 1 served on Shipley 10/3/14 Eviction Pack 2 served on Shipley 10/3/14

Since Duffy was the only named defendant he did not need to serve Shipley 2 packages.
The only difference was Pack 1 recited as an individual defendant and Pack 2 recited
as an occupant with a Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession. [PCRP] [APP G 27-28]
It contained a box notifying the occupant of consequences in not filing a PCRP in 10 days:

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 Last line recited If you do not file this claim, you will be evicted without a hearing.
No reasonable occupant or attorney would ignore a process servers valid eviction notice.
Two Proofs of Service were filed. [APP J 46-47; K 48-49] Shipley had to file a PCRP in
5

10 days to avoid eviction on day 11 by default. Stubblefield promptly entered default against
all unknown occupants as soon as the process server submitted return of service. [App l 50-51].
Shipley at no time during the past 5 years has ever been an unknown occupant as Stubblefield
has known her name since serving her with Notice to Vacate Mobile Home in August 2012.
The summons served on Shipley on 8/3/12 in UDDS1204130 identified her by name. [APP 4]

Stubblefield treated Shipley as a defendant from the moment she was served as one.
He immediately noticed her videotaped deposition, sought multiple sanctions against her,
served her with a defendants Notice to Appear at Trial and to bring records to the trial.
The court imposed discovery sanctions on Shipley as a party. Shipley was vigorously cross-
examined and treated as a hostile witness at trial. Stubblefields counsel identified Shipley
as a defendant to jurors. The court entered judgment for defendant Shipley and McCarron
awarding them both costs. The court expressly recited in the judgment that twelve jurors
unanimously found park Rules 2, 5, and 17 were unreasonable. [APP O 59-61].

Divisions statement that jurors found age restrictions were unreasonable, but never
reached the issue of whether the Community Guidelines were actually part of the lease
[Exhibit B, p. 4, paragraph 1] shows that neither the Division nor trial court ever read MRL.
Civil 798.15 requires leases to contain the rules and attach MRL [incorporated by reference]:

Civil Code 798.15. Required provisions; Incorporation by reference of chapter

The rental agreement shall be in writing and shall contain, in addition to the
provisions otherwise required by law to be included, all of the following:
(a) The term of the tenancy and the rent therefor.
(b) The rules and regulations of the park.
(c) A copy of the text of this chapter shall be attached as an exhibit
and shall be incorporated into the rental agreement by reference.
Management shall provide all homeowners with a copy of this chapter
prior to February 1 of each year, if a significant change was made in the
chapter by legislation enacted in the prior year.

5
a fortiori: where only one defendant was named (Duffy) only one summons was required,
only one should have been given to Shipley as substituted service on Nancy McCarron.
CCP 415.20 (substituted service) - second copy is to be mailed to defendants last address
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 Stubblefield based eviction on revised Rules 2, 5 and 17 [APP C18:16] recited in his
Notice of Termination of Tenancy --- which 12 jurors found unreasonable [APP O 60: 1-4]
Rules 2, 5, and 17 all related to the parks unreasonable ban on sharing a home with anyone
without the parks express written consent. [APP C 18, 16, 17]. Civil 798.34(b) expressly
authorizes a homeowner to share a home with a guest who is over 40, as recited in Rule 2.
Under Rule 2 only one occupant had to be 55, which was McCarron. Rule 17 was revised
in 2010 to ban sharing with anyone absent park consentnegating a right to share under
798.34(b). Stubblefield refused to consent to sharing with Shipley. [APP C 18: 16, 17]

Stubblefield based defendants eviction on MRL--reciting Civil 798.14 [APP C 19:23]

Stubblefield recited various MRL codes in his complaint. [APP C 20:26]. Paragraph 20
recited the eviction was authorized under MRLs Civil Code 798.56 which Division recited.
[Exh. B, p. 2, last paragraph]. Stubblefield invoked 798.85s fee-shifting [APP C 21:38]:

Stubblefield prayed for attorney fees. [APP C 22:line 8]. Indeed, if Stubblefield had
prevailed at trial he would have filed a fee motion against Shipley as he did against Jacinto.
[APP 143-144]. Stubblefield was awarded $190,499.00 in fees despite averring in the
complaint that he had no contract with Jacinto [APP 137:4-5]. Stubblefield never prayed for
fees nor ever cited Civil 798.85 in his complaint. All 3 claims were tort claims. [APP 135].
Here he argued since he had no contract with Shipley the action did not arise under MRL.
[Exhibit B, p. 4, last paragraph]. Neither the trial court nor the Division cited any statute or
case authority denying fees to a prevailing resident sued under MRL simply because there
were/are no cases either could cite. Attorney fees were denied to punish Duffy McCarron
for alleging permeating judicial bias plaguing both eviction cases since 2012. McCarron
filed a complaint with Judicial Council and this court concerning permeating judicial bias.

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 In the two published cases where fees were denied both courts found the alleged claims
did not arise under MRL. [MHC Fin. v. City of Santee (2005) 125 CA 4th 1372, 1377-
park owners sued Santee City over ordinances, prevailed on merits, but were denied fees]
and [SC Mfr. Homes v. Canyon Estates (2007) 148 CA.4th 663 - kickback scheme claim].
There is no published case in which a prevailing tenant was denied attorney fee entitlement.

Divisions assertion that MRL was enacted only to protect mobile home owners is wrong.
[Exhibit B, p. 9]. It is correct that 798.56 was enacted to protect homeowners from eviction
because they nearly always lose the mobile home if evicted. See Civil 798.55 and 798.56.
However, that does not mean the entire MRL was enacted to protect only homeowners.

MRL governs disputes between park owners and residents, regardless of whether they
own the home or not. MRL defines homeowner at Civil 798.9 and resident at 798.11.
Resident is defined as homeowner or other person who lawfully occupies a mobilehome.
Division expressly found subtenant Bonnie Shipley was a lawful resident. [APP 11:1].
The MRL ( 798 et seq.) regulates relations between the owners and the residents
of mobilehome parks. Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 345.

Stubblefield admitted owning half of the mobilehomes in his park in Trial Exhibit 265
after being ordered to produce a list of homes he owns for trial as an exhibit. [Sup 1 of 2:802]
The notion that only half of the residents [homeowners] are protected under MRL is absurd.
That would mean the other half of residents are not protected against park violations of MRL.
Under this Courts holding in Cacho, and legislative intent expressed in the enactment of MRL
all residents are protected from park owner and manager violations of MRL and other torts.

Amazingly, Stubblefield never argued that Civil 798.85 did not apply to Shipley in
opposing her motion for attorney fees. see his summary of arguments [SUP 1 of 2: 894].
Stubblefield only argued that he had no contract with Shipley so Civil 1717 did not apply;
and that Trope/Gormans pro per fee bar should be extended to Shipley by proxy because,
in his self-serving opinion, apparently adopted by the trial court and Appellate Division panel,
McCarron only represented Shipley to protect McCarrons interests in her mobile home.
Under his theory McCarron should be punished for defending Shipley against two evictions.
There is no case or statutory authority to support such an inequitable, self-serving argument.

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 ARGUMENT 1

The court violated Shipleys rights under the 5th and 14th amendments of the United States
Constitution and/or CA Constitution, Art. I, 7(a) by denying attorney fees as prevailing
party under Civil 798.85, reciprocal fees under Civil 1717, or fees under C 1021.5

A. Shipley was Entitled to Prevailing Party Attorney Fees under Civil Code 798.85

There is no published case under MRL law denying attorney fees to a prevailing resident,
which is exactly why Stubblefield did not make such argument in OPPOSITION. [SUP 1:894]
His summary of arguments did not recite Civil 798.85. The trial court advocated for
Stubblefield by adopting his theory that Shipley was not entitled to fees under Civil 798.85
because she filed a PRCP to avoid eviction. [Exhibit C Order, p. 9] The court hung its hat
on extending the Trope/Gormans pro per fee bar by proxy to the pro bono lawyers client.
The court regurgitated Stubblefields citation to an 1885 case (Pardee v. Gray 66 Cal 524)
predating the 1978 enactment of MRL, numerous revisions to unlawful detainer statutes,
and the 1986 revisions to CCP 1032 which abolished the unity of interest fee bar.

The court regurgitated Stubblefields cite to In re Perl, 811 F 3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2016).
Perl is inapposite as the evictee was aware of the case and did not file the PCRP claim.
CCP 715.020(d) and 415.46(e) barred her claim for failure to file a PCRP in 10 days.
Shipley filed a PCRP in 10 days as authorized under CCP 1174.25. The court failed to
explain how a federal bankruptcy case trumps Arrieta v. Mahon (1982) 31 Cal.3d 381,
which held every occupant must be afforded due process through an eviction hearing.
This Court expressly held that federal precedent does not trump controlling state law:
Federal Decisions rest in part on evidence of congressional
intent [cite omitted] for which there is no California parallel.
We envision an independent state rule. Federal precedent serves as
a guide only when there is no California precedent on point.
Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d. 621, 639
see also Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 CA4th, 893, 903 [holding same]

Conspicuous by its absence in Divisions Opinion (Exh. B) and trial court Order (Exh. C)
is any discussion of published cases involving prevailing residents who were awarded fees.
Both courts avoided stare decisis like a plague because it did not fit their advocacy narrative.
They failed to discuss 2 controlling cases cited in the fee motion, AOB & REPLY [APP 256]

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 1. Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 387 (denial of fees reversed)

An "action" thus includes all proceedings, at least to the time of judgment,

which are required to perfect the rights. The defenses raised in the answer to the
complaint are a real part of any action. (8b) In this action the tenants raised as a
defense the fact the landlord had not complied with section 789.5 and they
prevailed in that contention. The defense in this action did arise from section
789.5 and the tenants should have the attorneys' fees provided in section 789.12.

2. Del Cerro v. Proffer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 943, 948-949 (fee award affirmed)

.Proffer was entitled to recover attorney fees under section 798.85, a statute
providing that the prevailing party in an action under the Mobilehome
Residency Law is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and that a party is
deemed the prevailing party for the purposes of that statute "where the
litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless
the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise."

There is no published case where a prevailing resident (whether homeowner or not)

was denied attorney fees, which is why Stubblefield did not argue 798.85 in opposition.
The trial court and Division Panel avoided discussing either case because they wanted to
rule for Stubblefield to punish attorney McCarron for objecting to permeating judicial bias.
The court was not authorized to arbitrarily carve out a new exception to a fee-shifting statute
to deny fees Shipley was entitled to as a matter of right under stare decisis and as stated in
unambiguous language in 798.85, and unambiguous language in CCP 1032(a)(4) and (b).

(b) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party

is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.

In 1872 when common law was first codified into book form CCP 1858 was enacted:

1858. Construction of statutes and instruments; General rule

In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply

to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein,
not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted;
and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is,
if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. Enacted 1872

15
Page 15
 Our forefathers suspected that some judges may try to circumvent their laws by inserting
what was omitted or omitting what was inserted. They expected judges to be unbiased and
to apply the law equally to all citizens regardless of personal biases against certain parties.

Californias Constitution at Article 1, 7 recites equal protections for all as follows:

7. Due process; Equal protection; Privileges and immunities

(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or denied equal protection of the laws

The trial court deprived Shipley and McCarron of a right to attorney fees as prevailing
parties under a mandatory fee-shifting statute by manufacturing a new judicial exception.
This should not be condoned by this Court who must reverse this unfair deprivation of
equal treatment under the law---violating CCP 1858, Californias constitution and the
due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The court also violated defendants rights to due process under 5th Amendment to the U.S.
constitution by taking property [a right to fees] without just compensation or due process
under color of law by adopting a scheme to enrich powerful and wealthy developers.

If this Court denies the petition a horrible precedent would be set affecting over 675,000
mobile home residents in California. [SUP 1:801]. It would encourage landlords to routinely
violate CCP 1161(3) and 1164 by failing to name known subtenants in their case captions,
and then serving them as unknown occupants with a summons, complaint, and blank PCRP
form, then rolling the dice at MSJ or trial. If the landlord does not prevail he can avoid paying
fees by arguing the occupant filed a PCRP to join the case only to obtain an attorney fee award.

It would create an unfair advantage to enable landlords to blackmail subtenants by saying,

if you lose you pay your fees and our fees; even if you win you still will have to pay your fees.
Legislators never intended such as inequitable and absurd result. It transmutes a reciprocal fee-
shifting code into a unilateral one to benefit only landlords who are not in the disadvantaged
class Legislators intended to protect by enacting Civil 798.85. Legislators expressed their
intent to protect residents from arbitrary and capricious evictions in Civil Code 798.55; they
did not express an intent to protect landlords who use eviction to illegally filch mobile homes.

16
Page 16
 Division and courts finding that this case did not arise under MRL is clearly wrong.
Civil 798.55, which governs termination of tenancies, makes it clear that all residents
(not just homeowners) are subject to MRL and park rules incorporated into park leases:

(e) The resident of a mobilehome that remains in the mobilehome park after
service of the notice to sell or remove the mobilehome shall continue to be
subject to this chapter and the rules and regulations of the park, including
rules regarding maintenance of the space. Civil 798.55 (e)

This makes it crystal clear that Bonnie Shipley, as a park resident who remained in the
mobilehome park after McCarron was served with a 60-day Notice to remove her home,
was subject to this Chapter ; i.e. Chapter 2 of the Civil Code. If Stubblefield had prevailed
the court would have awarded attorney fees against resident Shipley as well as McCarron.
Because plaintiff prayed for attorney fees in his complaint [APP 21:38] under 798.85,
Shipley, as prevailing party, is entitled to fee-shifting fees. Transmuting a reciprocal fee-
shifting provision into a unilateral provision for the sole benefit of evicting park owners
creates an unfair advantage never intended by legislators. This Court must reverse such an
inequitable, unfair, and clearly biased decision which was rubber-stamped by the trial courts
equal brethren in the San Bernardino Appellate Division and then again by 4/2 DCA.

Rather than citing controlling authorities under MRL the Division merely regurgitated
the trial courts biased analysis. The Divisions references to the record for the most part
were to Stubblefields complaint allegations which were blatant misrepresentations of the
law and the facts. These allegations were rejected by a unanimous jury voting against him.
It is inappropriate for a Division to make its purported findings by citing to disproved
allegations written by the losing party. Stubblefield argued these allegations in his briefs.

The Divisions reference to The Rutter Group for the notion that MRLs termination
provisions apply only to homeowner tenancies is misleading at best. [Exhibit B, p. 9]
MRL is not the only law governing evictions. MRL does not preempt tenant and subtenant
rights guaranteed under unlawful detainer statutes which were also enacted to protect tenants
from unlawful evictions and unscrupulous landlord tactics. see CCP 1161 et seq.

17
Page 17
 In Arrieta v. Mahon (1982) 31 Cal.3d 381 this Court issued a decision triggering the
Judicial Council to create Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession as Noren 6 explained:
The procedures contemplated by the Arrieta court were codified beginning in 1982.
(See 715.010 et seq., 1174.3, 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) pp. 1158-
1159.) Section 1174.3 was enacted in 1986. Designed to protect tenants like Arrieta
who are not named in the unlawful detainer judgment, the statute sets out a formal
procedure for making a claim of right to possession, either to the court or to the
sheriff levying the writ of possession. The statute provides in part: "... any
occupant not named in the judgment for possession who occupied the premises on
the date of the filing of the action may object to enforcement of the judgment
against that occupant by filing a claim of right to possession as prescribed in this
section.... Filing the claim of right to possession shall constitute a general
appearance...." ( 1174.3, subd. (a), italics added.) If the court determines the
claim of right to possession is valid, it shall "deem the unlawful detainer
Summons and Complaint to be amended on their faces to include the claimant
as defendant.."(1174.3(e)(2).) Cardenas @ 1349
see Codes of Civil Procedure 415.46; 715.010; 715.020; 1169; 1174.25

Stubblefield never moved the court to strike Shipley as a defendant from the action.
Stubblefield treated Shipley as a defendant by taking her deposition; propounding discovery;
serving a Notice to Appear at Trial and bring documents, and cross-examining her at trial.
The court treated Shipley as a defendant by awarding party sanctions against her three times.
The court identified Shipley as a defendant and entered judgment in her favor. [APP 0 59-61].

In the order denying fees the court found Shipley was a prevailing defendant as defined
in CCP 1032(a)(4). [Exh. C, p. 3] The courts order recited, Here defendants are the
prevailing party as they are the beneficiaries of a unanimous jury verdict. [Exh. C, p.3]

Divisions Order affirming denial of fees devoted only 2 paragraphs to 798.85.

[Exh. B, p.10]. The first paragraph recited Civil 798.85 verbatim. Paragraph 2 admits
the eviction arose out of the MRL but then opines, without discussing any controlling
authorities under Civil 798.85 [Palmer or Del Cerro] the proceeding was not an action
against Shipley, whether under the MRL or otherwise, since Shipley unilaterally interjected
herself into the lawsuit given the limited and express nature of Civil Code sections 798.12
and 798.56. There is no further discussion of any controlling authorities under 798.85.

6
Cardenas v. Noren (1991) 235 CA.3d 1344, 1349
18
Page 18
B. Non-Signatory Shipley is Entitled to Reciprocal Contract Fees Under Civil 1717
The Division recited Civil 1717 verbatim; i.e. a prevailing party is entitled to fees
whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not and shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys fees in addition to other costs. [Exh. B, p.7]. The Division cited to
controlling authority; i.e. Reynolds Metals v. Alperson (1979) 25 C.3d 124, 128. Division
admitted fees are recoverable even where one successfully argues a contract does not apply.
Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 599, 611. Division failed to discuss this Courts
controlling holding in Tract 19051 Homeowners Assn. v. Kemp (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1135, 1142:

[s]ection 1717 was enacted to establish mutuality of remedy where

[a] contractual provision makes recovery of attorney's fees available
for only one party ..., and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided
attorney's fees provisions.... The statute would fall short of this goal
of full mutuality of remedy if its benefits were denied to parties who
defeat contract claims by proving that they were not parties to the
alleged contract or that it was never formed.
see also Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219 CA.4th 809, 819-820; and
Eden Twp. Healthcare Dist. v. Eden Med. Center (2013) 220 CA 4th 418, 426-427;

Lacking any authority to justify affirming denial of fees, the Division harkened back to
the trial courts adopted Stubblefield theory that because Shipley interjected herself into the
case it precluded attorney fees under any statute [Civil 798.85, Civil 1717 or CCP 1021.5].
As an alternate theory to deny fees Division harkened back to the trial courts other theory
that Trope/Gormans pro per fee bar extends to Duffys client Shipley or that the abolished
Unity of Interest theory bars fees to a co-defendant. In 1986 Legislators abolished the
Unity of Interest fee bar by deleting its words from the revised version of CCP 1032.
After McCarron proved the doctrine had been abolished in the REPLY, this argument was
dropped and quickly replaced with yet another contrived theory that MRL did not apply to
Shipley because she did not have a contract with Stubblefield [contra to Tract 19051].

Bottom line is the decision punishes a subtenant for exercising her due process right to
file a PCRP to avoid eviction after a process server duly served her with eviction papers.
This Court in Arrieta, supra expressly held every occupant must be afforded a due process
right to a hearing to object to eviction. This court cited SCOTUS authority for that holding.
Mullane v. Central Hanover (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314. See Arrieta, supra @ 388-389

19
Page 19
C. Shipley is entitled to Fees under CCP 1021.5 under the Mandatory Whitley Test

The trial court whimsically concluded Duffy did not defend the unlawful eviction
proceeding for the public good. However, that is not the right test, as amply explained
by this Court in Conservatorship of Estate of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 1206, 1217-1218.
A partys personal interest in a litigation does not preclude an award under CCP 1021.5.
The key issue is necessity & financial burden of private enforcement and equalization of
representation when private enforcement is necessary where no public enforcement exists.
Whitley @ 1218; see also Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 CA. 4th 382, 401.
Here, the test is satisfied as no public enforcement exists as recited in Introduction to MRL:
The Mobilehome Residency Law, like provisions of conventional
landlord-tenant law, are enforced by the courts; that is, the disputing
parties must enforce the MRL against one another in a court of law.
The State Department of Housing and Community Development does
not have authority to enforce these Civil Code provisions. MRL, Intro.

Under the Whitley test Shipley is entitled to fees under CCP 1021.5 because there is
no public enforcement of MRL. McCarrons interests did not preclude a fee award under
CCP 1021.5. McCarron assumed a tremendous financial burden to privately enforce MRL
protections against arbitrary evictions, with no financial gain. There were no cross claims;
hence no damages. The only benefit from private enforcement was avoiding eviction.
Even if it could be asserted that McCarron benefited because Stubblefield was not able to filch
her mobile home there was no financial benefit to Shipley. By prevailing she did not have to
relocate to another rental. Because the trial court used the wrong test (whether their defense
was for the public good) denying fees was a prejudicial error as a matter of law. Affirming
this erroneous ruling, without applying the controlling Whitley test compounded the error.

D. GLOBAL EFFECT OF TRANSMUTING A RECIPROCAL FEE STATUTE INTO

A UNILATERAL FEE STATUTE BENEFITING ONLY EVICTING LANDLORDS
No public policy interest is served by putting landlords who willfully violat e CCP
1161(3) and CCP 1164 (requiring them to name and serve all known occupants with
a summons and complaint) in a better position than landlords who comply with the law.
As courts have repeatedly recognized, the public policy underlying reciprocal attorney
fees provisions is mutuality of remedy to put plaintiff and defendant on even playing fields.
20
Page 20
 The affirmed Decision rewards Stubblefield for willfully violating eviction statutes.
It encourages landlords to violate CCP 1161 & 1164 to insulate themselves from fees.
It transmutes a reciprocal fee-shifting statute into a unilateral one to benefit only landlords,
regardless of whether the eviction is valid or not. It puts landlords in an unfair bargaining
position, rendering the fee-shifting code a vehicle of oppression; i.e. landlord can blackmail
an occupant to vacate premises without filing a PCRP to schedule a due process hearing.
Landlord can say, If you lose you pay your fees and our fees; even if you win you will still
have to pay your attorney fees. Legislators did not intend such an inequitable result.

Moreover, California courts have many times noted that statutes must be construed to
achieve a "practical and equitable result" rather than one resulting in "mischief or absurdity.
It cannot be seriously argued that our Legislature intended to have the reciprocal provision
transformed into a unilateral one, or to put landlords who willfully violate Civil 1161(3)
and 1164 into a better position than landlords who comply with it by naming and serving
all occupants to afford them a due process right to object to eviction during a court hearing.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner hopes this honorable Court will overturn the Court of Appeals affirmation
of Divisions rubber-stamping the trial courts absurd and inequitable order denying fees.
Shipley was entitled to fees under both reciprocal fee-shifting codes Civ 798.85 & 1717.
Petitioner hopes this honorable Court will take this opportunity to set forth a clear, general
rule with respect to the application of reciprocal attorney fees statutes, whether the statute is
Civil Code 798.85, 1717 or any of the other reciprocal attorney fee-shifting statutes.

The general rule must be that reciprocal means there will be "mutuality of remedy."
If plaintiff is entitled to fees if he prevails then defendant is entitled to fees if she prevails.
This tenet ensures a level playing field. Under no circumstances should this Court permit a
judicial officer to punish a tenant for having exercised her right to file a PCRP claim to avoid
eviction--after being duly served with eviction papers containing a warning in bold that if
she does not file a PCRP claim in 10 days she will be evicted without a due process hearing.

Submitted 11/20/17 /s/

21
Page 21
 CERTIFICATE OF WORDCOUNT

I, Nancy McCarron, certify the petition contains 6,556 words in times roman font 13,
excluding Cover Page, Table of Contents and Authorities, exhibits and proof of service.
I relied on a word count generated by MS Word 2010 as recited in the status bar.

Submitted: 11/20/17 /s/

22
Page 22
 COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

ORDER

BONNIE SHIPLEY, E069254

Petitioner,
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. ACIAS1500049,
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ACIAS1600035, UDDS1204130
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, & UDFS1406978)
Respondent;
The County of San Bernardino
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,
Real Party in Interest.
_______________________________________

THE COURT

The request for judicial notice is DENIED. The petition for writ of review is
DENIED.

MILLER
Acting P. J.
Panel: Miller
Codrington
Fields

cc: See attached list

Page 23
MAILING LIST FOR CASE: E069254
Bonnie Shipley v. The Superior Court; Stubblefield Properties

Superior Court Clerk

San Bernardino County
8303 N. Haven Ave
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730

Nancy Barbara Duffy

950 Roble Ln
Santa Barbara, CA 93103

Robert G. Williamson
Hart | King
4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900
Santa Ana, CA 92707

Page 24
 N,DEPtifY

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

APPELLATE DIVISION

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Case No: ACIAS 1600035

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Trial Court: UDFS1406978)

v. PER CURIAM

OPINION

BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Defendant and A ellant.

Appeal from order denying motion attorney's fees, San Bernardino County
Superior Court, San Bernardino District, Janet M. Frangie, Judge.
Affirmed.

Hart King; Robert G. Williamsons, Jr., James S. Morse, and Rhonda H.

Mehlman for plaintiff respondent.

Law Office of Nancy Duffy McCarron; Nancy Duffy McCarron for defendant

and appella nt.

THE COURT:

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant and appellant Bonnie :shi'plev .. (shipleYI}.app,eals, the .

t. ~ .. ~

~-"_:.: :~.".,~" ~.i,'\-. -"t . ~ '''' . .'.'~{.:."'

denial of her request for attorney's fees as'agaIn~t: ~'ii.ritifLa.fl9 ~sPQn~~nt
.;: , ", .:' : . ; :_~ ., ' 'J~ >;,'." ,'~?' '*'

Stubblefield Properties (Stubblefield};'l;',hep,pr}!es and their dispute 'a,~ noC

"," ~ .., ~ -",,~ ......... -/l"T. -~~._~ " ',', - ,

new to us. Stubblefield previously filed an unlawful' detainer against

Shipley as the subtenant of her attorney, Nancy McCarron (McCarron).

1
Page 25
The prior action was premised upon Civil Code section 798.75, subdivision

(c), which is found in the Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL). The statute

authorizes the service of a five-day notice to surrender possession in the

event a "purchaser or transferee" of a mobilehome occupies a mobilehome

park's space without first executing an agreement with the park.

After the parties filed competing and unsuccessful motions for

summary judgment in the prior action, Shipley sought review of the denial

via petition for writ of mandate. We granted Shipley's request and held that

service of the five-day notice was improper since Shipley was a subtenant

and not a "purchaser or transferee." We also noted the distinction between

evictions related to a mobilehome park's "site" as opposed to evictions of

the occupants of the mobilehome "unit." Finally, in addressing

Stubblefield's concern that Shipley's occupancy violated various park rules

and regulations, we opined that Stubblefield was not without remedy since

it could seek relief as against McCarron, not Shipley. Specifically, the MRL

allows the termination of the "homeowner's" right to use the park's "site" (a

right referred to as the "tenancy") based on the homeowner's or resident's

failure to comply with the park's reasonable rules or regulations that are

part of the rental agreement. 1 (See Civ. Code, 798.12 and 798.56,

subd. (d).)

1See Shipley v. Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Bernardino (2013) (case
no. CIVDS1302013). review denied August 14,2013.

2
Page 26
 Before the prior lawsuit was completely resolved,2 Stubblefield

commenced the second action which underlies the current appeal. 3 Unlike

the first proceeding, the second action was filed only against McCarron,

though Shipley later added herself as a defendant by submitting a

prejudgment claim of right to possession. 4 In any event, through the

second action Stubblefield argued that McCarron had violated the park's

"Community Guidelines" that were part of her rental agreement. 5 The

guidelines indicate that at least one occupant of each mobilehome had to

be the registered owner, age 55 or older, and a signatory on the lease.

Furthermore, that same person had to regularly occupy the unit in the

event there was a "permanent guest" living at the residence who was

between 40 and 55 years of age. 6 According to Stubblefield, Shipley was

2 In three separate appeals that eventually arose in the prior action after the writ proceeding, we
affirmed the trial court's (1) award of $197,857.50 in attorney's fees to Shipley; (2) denial of
Shipley's request for supplemental fees; and (3) order staying enforcement of the fee award
pending appeal. (See Stubblefield v. Shipley (2016) (Appellate Division of the Sup. Ct. of the
State of California, County of San Bernardino, case no.'s ACIAS1500037, 1500046, and
1500049). The fee award was premised upon section 798.85 of the MRL which provides that "in
any action arising out of [the MRL] the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees and costs."

3 Stubblefield also had an appeal (case no. ACIAS1600020) which was abandoned after the
record was certified. However, prior to the dismissal of the appeal, and pursuant to ruleS.S39 of
the Rules of Court, we ordered one record to be prepared for both appeals to avoid duplicate
submission of documents. For reference purposes, "CT1" shall refer to documents designated in
case no. ACIAS1600020 and "CT2" shall reference the documents deSignated for case no.
ACIAS1600020.

4 CT21 and 3
5CT1178-184
6 CT1 .180 and 213-228

3
Page 27
under 55 years of age and was residing in McCarron's unit even though

McCarron herself was not a regular occupant. 7

However, as noted above, the owner of a mobilehome park may only

terminate a tenancy for noncompliance with "reasonable" rules or

regulations that are also part ofJherental agreement. Fo"owing trial, a jury

concluded that the age restrictions were unreasonable and, as a result,

they never reached the issue of whether the Community Guidelines were

actually part of the lease:.~~/McCarron and Shipley then moved for an award

of attorney's fees under (1) Civil Code section 1717, which authorizes an

award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an "action on a contract";

(2) Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which authorizes fees in cases

resulting in public benefit; and (3) Civil Code section 798.85, which

authorizes fees related to actions arising under the MRL. 9

In ruling on the fee motion, the trial court concluded that Shipley and

McCarron were the prevailing party, but McCarron was not entitled to fees

to the extent she represented herself pro per. As for Shipley, the trial court

concluded that, as an occupant of the unit, she did not have a contract nor ,

privity of contract with Stubblefield. The trial court also concluded that the

action did not confer any benefit to the-public at large and the action as it

related to Shipley did not arise under the MRL since Shipley merely

7 CT1181
B CT1 2353 and 2492
9 CT2 782-799

4
Page 28
interjected herself as a defendant. 1o Shipley, though not McCarron, then

appealed the denial of the fee motion. 11

DISCUSSION

The Standard of Review for a Denial of Attorney's Fees

"An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review .... " (MHC

Financing Ltd. Parlnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.AppAth

1372, 1397, as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 16, 2005).) Discretion is

abused "whenever it may be fairly said that in its exercise the court in a

given case exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the

uncontradicted evidence." (Nazemi v. Tseng (1992) 5 Cal.AppAth 1633,

1642; See Wal-Marl Real Estate Business Trust v. City Council of City of

San Marcos (2005) 132 Cal.AppAth 614, 620 [Whether the applicant for

attorney fees has proved Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5's

elements is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) On the other hand, a

"determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and

costs have been met is a question of law." (MHC FinanCing Ltd.

10CT1111-1122

11 In connection with the appeal, Shipley and Stubblefield ask us to take judicial notice of the
order on the fee motion. which we grant under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).
Shipley also asks us to take judicial notice of a lawsuit filed by Stubblefield against an unrelated
third-party, a request which we deny as not dispositive to the appeal. (See Doe v. City of Los
Angeles (2007) 42 CalAth 531. 544, fn. 4.) Furthermore, Shipley also asks us to take judicial
notice of what she purports is the "legislative history" of various statutes. However, the document
sUbmitted is incomplete and it otherwise appears to be a portion of a practice guide which is not a
type of document outlined in the Evidence Code. Therefore, we deny that request. Finally,
Stubblefield also asks us to take judicial notice of our own prior orders and opinions related to the
parties' dispute. We grant these latter requests.

5
Page 29
Partnership Two, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) Thus, a party's

"entitlement to attorney fees under Civil Code section 798.85 is a question

of law subject to de novo review." (Ibid.)

The Fees Claimed Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the trial court "may

award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing

parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important

right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether

pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a

large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private

enforcement ... are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such

fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any."

In this case, the trial court concluded that fees under section 1021.5

were inappropriate since McCarron, as a named defendant, was defending

the action for her own benefit. 12 Although the trial court did not expressly

come to the same conclusion as to Shipley, the same logic would

nevertheless apply to Shipley. Furthermore, the trial court indicated there

was no evidence that the other 174 mobile home owners at the park were

facing possible eviction from Stubblefield, i.e. the defense of the eviction

did not confer a benefit to the public at large. Shipley fails to cite any

12Much of the opening brief discusses whether McCarron should be entitled to fees as a pro per,
but these arguments are outside the scope of the appeal.

6
Page 30
evidence in the record which would demonstrate otherwise. Instead,

Shipley make a blanket and unsubstantiated assertion that she and her

attorney benefited a "large mobilehome tenant class.,,13

However, any statement in a brief concerning matters in the

appellate record, no matter where in the brief the reference occurs, must

be supported by a citation to the record or such arguments may be waived

or forfeited. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.883(a)(1 )(8); Myers v.

Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745; City of Lincoln

v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16.) Given the

absence of a relevant citation to the record, Shipley cannot and has not

demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding Code of Civil Procedure

section 1021.5 did not apply.

The Fees Claimed Pursuant to Civil Code section 1717

Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a), provides "[i]n any action on

a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and

costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either

to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is

determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is

the party speCified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable

attorney's fees in addition to other costs." The statute was originally

"enacted to establish mutuality of remedy where contractual provision

13 Opening Brief at 19

7
Page 31
makes recovery of attorney's fees available for only one party." (Reynolds

Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128.)

As a threshold matter, the statute only applies to an action "on a

contract," a phrase which is liberally construed: U[a]s long as the action

'involvers]' a contract it is 'on [the] contract' within the meaning of section

1717." (Dell Merk, Inc. v. Franzia (2005) 132 CaLApp.4th 443; California

Wholesale Material Supply, Inc. v. Norm Wilson & Sons, Inc. (2007) 96

CaLApp.4th 598.) The statute's purposes also require section 1717 to "be

interpreted to further provide a reciprocal remedy for a nonsignatory

defendant, sued on a contract as if he were a party to it, when a plaintiff

would clearly be entitled to attorney's fees should he prevail in enforcing

the contractual obligation against the defendant." (Reynolds Metals Co.,

supra, 25 CaL3d at p. 128.) Furthermore, a person defending a contract

action involving a fee provision is entitled to fees "by successfully arguing

the inapplicability, invalidity, unenforceability, or nonexistence of the same

contract." (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 611.)

Here, in the opening brief Shipley points to the reciprocal nature of

section 1717 and the fact that the statute authorizes an award of fees

regardless of whether the prevailing party is specified in the contract or

not. While we agree with these basic legal principals, Shipley's argument

ignores the threshold issue of whether the action, as it relates to her, is

one "on a contract." As the trial court noted, Shipley and McCarron are not

8
Page 32
similarly situated since McCarron was a homeowner with a lease to the

park's "site" and Shipley was a mere occupant of the "unit." Stubblefield's

action was therefore not an action against Shipley, whether on a contract

or otherwise, since it did not sue or seek to evict Shipley. Instead,

consistent with Civil Code sections 798.12 and 798.56, subdivision (d),

Shipley only sought to terminate the "tenancy" of McCarron and Shipley

interjected herself.14

As one well-known practice guide indicates, "[t]he MRL termination

provisions apply only to 'homeowner' tenancies" or the mobilehome

owner's rental of a "site." (The Rutter Group. Cal. Prac. Guide Landlord

Tenant Ch. 11-E, 11 :144.) "Once a mobilehome tenancy is properly

terminated under the MRL, the normal summary repossession procedures

([Code of Civil Procedure section] 1159 et seq.) apply to affect an eviction

of a tenant who remains in occupancy after the termination date." (ld. at

11: 147 [citing Civil Code section 798.60 which indicates the provisions of

the MRL shall not affect any rights or procee,dings set forth in Code of Civil

Procedure section 1159, et seq.].) These concepts are also in line with the

express and limiting language of Civil Code sections 798.12 and 798.56

and the MRL's purpose of protecting "owners of mobilehomes" from "th~

high cost of moving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting

14 For this reason, we also reject Shipley'S estoppel argument.

9
Page 33
therefrom, the requirements relating to the installation of mobilehomes,

and the cost of landscaping or lot preparation." (Civ. Code, 798.55.)

Therefore, under the facts presented we cannot conclude that the

trial court erred in denying Shipley's request for fees given the limited

scope of the proceeding and Shipley's unilateral interjection into the

lawsuit as an occupant of McCarron's mobilehome unit.

Shipley's Request for Fees under Civil Code Section 798.85

Under Civil Code section 798.85, "[i]n any action arising out of the

provisions of [the MRL] the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable

attorney's fees and costs," Here, Stubblefield's attempt to evict McCarron

arise from the MRL given the dispute over whether the Community

Guidelines were reasonable and part of the underlying lease agreement as

is required under Civil Code section 798.56, subdivision (d).

Here, the attempted eviction of McCarron arose from the MRL given

Stubblefield's attempt to terminate the tenancy over the alleged violation of

the parks rules and regulations. However, as we noted above, the

proceeding was not an action against Shipley, whether under the MRL or

otherwise, since Shipley unilaterally interjected herself into the lawsuit

given the limited and express nature of Civil Code sections 798.12 and

798.56. Therefore, under the facts before us we cannot conclude that the

trial court erred in denying Shipley's request for fees under the MRL.

10
Page 34
 DISPOSITION

The trial court's denial of the motion for attorney's fees is affirmed.

MM
CARLOS CABRERA
Judge of the Appellate Division

DAVID A. WILLIAMS
JI.ldge of the Appellate Division

11
Page 35
 $uperior <!Court $tate of <!California
<!Count!' of $an ~ernarbino
Appellate Division

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA }
} vs. Case # ACIAS 1600035
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO } Trial Court# UDFS1406978

The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the age of
eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested in the
proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate Clerk of said
County. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of
correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence would be
deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.
On the date of mailing shown below, I placed for collection and mailing following ordinary business
practices, at the request and under the direction of the Superior Court in and for the State of
California and County above-named, whose office is at the Courthouse, Rancho Cucamonga,
California, a sealed envelope which contained a true copy of each annexed document, and which
envelope was addressed to the addressee, as follows:

LAW OFFICE OF NANCY DUFFY HART KING

MCCARRON 4 HUnON CENTER DR STE 900
950 ROBLE LANE SANTA ANA. CA 92707
SANTA BARBARA, CA 93103

cc: Honorable Judge JANET FRANGIE, San Bernardino Justice Center Courthouse

Trial Court: San Bernardino Justice Center Courthouse

Date and Place of Mailing: September 25. 2017. Rancho Cucamonga, California.

Document Mailed: PER CURIAM OPINION

y' t f1 (: ~1 " ""~ _,__
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing'(s"true,)anq ~ect.

Page 36
I

SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT

SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER
DEPARTMENT 29 FILED
247 W THIRD STREET SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92415 COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO
SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT

' 4 2016
BYd
I*u
o6)
. U..d,L
DEPUTY

SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

-
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a CASE NO.: UDFS 1406978

California general Partnership, dba
Mountain Shadows Mobile Home ORDER ON ATTORNEYS FEES
community,

Plaintiff,
v.

NANCY B. DUFFY, et al,

Defendant.
I
On July 29, 2016, Defendants' Motion for attorneys' fees was heard.
Plaintiff Stubblefield Properties (STUBBLEFIELD) appeared by HART / KING, by
Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Esq, and Defendants Nancy DufTy McCarron (McCARRON)
and Bonnie Shipley (SHIPLEY) appeared by Nancy Duffy McCARRON, Attorney at law.
The motions were argued and then submitted on the same date.

Page 37
 The Court, having read the pleadings filed by the parties', and considering the
oral argument of the parties, now rules as follows:
I. Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice:
The Court declines Defendants' Request for judicial notice of the documents
attached to Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice filed April 15, 2016 as irrelevant.
II. Plaintiff's Evidentiarv Obiections filed May 20, 2016:

1.-5. overruled
6. sustained
7.-9. overruled
10.-13. sustained
14. overruled
15.-16. sustained
17.-18. overruled
19.-20. sustained

Plaintiff's Evidentiarv Obiections filed June 1, 2016:

overruled
sustained
overruled
sustained
overruled
sustained
overruled
sustained
overruled
sustained
overruled
Ill. Motion:
Defendants seek an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to California Civil Code
$1 717, California Code of Civil Procedure $1021.5 and Civil Code 5798.85.
A. Civil Code 4 1717:
Califomia Civil Code I71 7 provides, in relevant part:

'The Court admonishes both parties for filing briefs that exceed the page length
provided under the Califomia Rules of Court, Rule 3.113(d). Defendants' "Reply Brief'
exceeds the rule by 18 ~ a q e s !

Page 38
 (a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically
provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred
to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of
the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is
determined to be the party prevailing on 'the contract, whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall
be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other
costs. * * *

Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and

shall be an element of costs.

Code of Civil Procedure 91032 defines prevailing party. Under 1032(a)(4), a

lo /1 prevailing party includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose
I
11 1/ favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains I
any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief

l3 li against that defendant. When any party recovers other than monetary relief and in

I/11 situations other than specified, the "prevailing party" shall be as determined by the I
I
l4
15 court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not

l6
17
I
11
and, if allowed may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides
pursuant to rules adopted under section 1034. Here, Defendants are the prevailing I
l8 I1 party as they are the beneficiaries of a unanimous jury verdict in their favor.

i/I/
Plaintiff does not dispute defendant McCARRON was a party to the mobile home
l9
20 lease agreement. It contends, however, that McCARRON is not entitled to attorney
I
il
//
fees under Civil Code 51717 because she is an attorney representing herself, citing
i
22 Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 ~ a l . 4274,
' ~ 284-285. In Trope, the California Supreme Court 1
23 1 considered the issue of whether an attorney who successfully represents himself in

24 1/ / litigation may recover attorney fees when these fees are provided for by contract or
25 statute.
I
26 I/ The Trope Court held that an attorney who chooses to litigate in propria persona

27 It and therefore does not pay or become liable to pay cons id era ti or^ in exchange for legal

Page 39
 1
1/ 1
1
representation cannot recover reasonable attorney fees under Civil Code I 717 as

1
/I
compensation for the time and effort she expends on her own behalf or for the
3
professional business opportunities shd foregoes as a result of his decision. Id. at 291.
I
4
This Court determines that the Trope decision and its progeny are applicable in this
5
case.
Defendant McCARRON argues, despite Trope, that she is entitled to attorney
fees because she was representing Defendant SHIPLEY, citing Healdsburg Citizens for
/1 1
/1
Sustainable Solutions v. City of Healdsburg (2012) 2 06 ~ a. ~l p p 988. Healdsburg is
distinguishable. In the Healdsburg case, an attorney was a member of an
environmental organization that was challenging an Environmental Impact Report under 1
1
/
CEQA, and although she was not lead counsel, she carried out work for lead counsel.
l2 The Court distinguished Trope and noted that although the attorney enjoyed the
13
// benefits conferred by the litigation with her co-petitioners and the public, she was not in 1
l4 1/ the kind of legal relationship with her co-petitioners that would have made her own 1
l5 // interests interchangeable with, or legally indistinct, from theirs. Healdsburg, supra, 206 /
/1 4 '997.
c a l . ~ p ~ .at ~ Furthermore, the Court noted the case did not involve contractual i
l7 11 fees to enforce a private right, but conferred benefits on a large group under 51021.5 !
and the private attorney general doctrine. Id.
As will be discussed in more detail infra, this is not a case where $1021.5
applies. Here, McCARRON was essentially representing her own interests in her
mobile home. SHIPLEY was her resident, and it was in McCARRON's interests to keep
SHIPLEY as a resident.

1
Plaintiff made no claim against SHIPLEY and SHIPLEY1sclaims to possession
24 flowed only through McCARRON's possessory rights as a leaseholder with Plaintiff. i
25
I/ With respect to any right to possession asserted by SHIPLEY, her "right to possession1' 1
11 I
1
applies only to the mobile home unit owned by McCARRON, not to any site or space
27 on which the mobile home unit is located that is the subject of the rental agreement 1
Page 40
 between STUBBLEFIELD and McCARRON. SHIPLEY's right to possession of the
mobile home unit is not in issue in this case, and STUBBLEFILED had no right to
attempt to evict SHIPLEY ,from the mobile home unit. There was no privity of contract
between Plaintiff and SHIPLEY which finding was made by the Appellate Division of this
Superior Court in another case which preceded this action.*
SHIPLEY was only brought into the action either by her own doing or by
McCARRON as a result of her filing a Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession.
To the extent McCARRON is claiming SHIPLEY was a third party beneficiary
under the mobile home lease agreement, Plaintiff argues McCARRON has continuously
asserted SHIPLEY was not a party to the lease. The cases cited by McCARRON are
also distinguishable. The case of Hsu v. Abarra (1995) 9 ~ a l . 4863
' ~ did not involve an
attorney representing herself and did not involve privity of contract. Hsu involved
determining whether a party was the prevailing party on a contract. In Shenvood &
Sherwood v. Gill & Lutz (1918) 36 Cal. App. 707, which did not discuss attorney fees,
the court held that a party for whose benefit a contract was made need not name the
party, but it must appear by the terms of the contract that it was made for the benefit of
the party. Id. at 712. Shenvood predates the enactment of Civil Code $1 71 7 and is
inapposite because it does not discuss an award of attorney's fees at all.
Here, McCARRON and Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD entered into the mobile home
lease agreement long before SHIPLEY ever became an occupant, and there could have
been no contract terms for SHIPLEY's express benefit.3 Defendants are therefore not
erlt~tledto attorney fees under Civil Code I 71 7. Defendant McCARRON, an attorney,

* See the Opinion entered May 6, 2013 in Stubblefield v. Shipley, Case No. ClVDS
1302013.
Notably, in SHIPLEY's Answer to STUBBLEFIELD's complaint for unlawful detainer,
SHIPLEY asserted in the Twenty-fifth Affirmative Defense that, "Plaintiff's allegations fail
to state facts sufficient to award attorney fees against Bonnie Shipley which she never
agreed to pay. Plaintiff has no oral or written lease with defendant Shipley."

Page 41
 1
was representing herself and SHIPLEY was not a party to the contract; not in privity of
// contract with Plaintiff, and her interests were interchangeable and inextricably
11 intertwined with McCARRON's who is not entitled to any award of attorney's fees as a
self-represented litigant.
5
6 . Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5:

Defendants also assert a claim for attorney's fees under the private attorney

1 general statute. Code of Civil Procedure $1021.5, entitled "Attorney Fees in Cases

/I Resulting in Public Benefit", provides:

Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a

successful party against one or more opposing parties
in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of
an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary,
has been conferred on the general public or a large class
of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against
another public entity, are such as to make the award
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of
justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. * * *

l7 il The fundamental objective of this provision is to encourage suits effectuating a

l8 11 strong public policy by awarding substantial attorney fees to those who successfully

l9 I/ bring such suits, and bring about a benefit to a large group of citizens. Daniels v.

2o 11 McKinney (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 49. The allowance of recovery of attorneys' fees

21 I1 is based on the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are essential to effectuating

22 I/ public policies embodied in the constitutional or statutory provisions, and such lawsuits

23 I/ may be impractical if attorney fees are not awarded. Id.

24 I1 To determine whether an action has resulted in the enforcement of an

25 /I important public right, the court makes a qualitative evaluation of the weight or social

26 I/ importance of the right involved. Woodland Hills Residents Assn., lnc. v. City Council

27 /I (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 935.) It assesses the litigation to determine "from a practical

Page 42
perspective" whether the action "served to vindicate an important public right." Id. at p.
I
938. There is no concrete standard. Beach Colony I1 Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm.
I
The public always derives a "benefit" when illegal private or public conduct
I
is rectified, but in order to determine whether a "significant" benefit has been conferred,
the court must determine both the significance of the benefit and the size of the class
receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances
of the gains which have resulted in the particular case. Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d
917 at pp. 939-940. The significant benefit analysis thus focuses on the results obtained
in the action.
In this action, McCARRON was not litigating for a public benefit. She was
named as a defendant in an unlawful detainer action and was litigating for her own
benefit. The judgment does not confer any public rights and found only that three rules
in STUBBLEFIELD's restated 2010 rules were not reasonable. There was no evidence
that the other 174 mobile home owners referred to by McCARRON were facing any
I
danger of eviction as a result of STUBBLEFIELD's claims against her. The record is I
,
devoid of any evidence that McCARRON was litigating for any public benefit. Therefore
an award under this section is inappropriate as is any multiplier $1027.5.
C. California Code of Civil Procedure 6798.85:
The final basis McCARRON asserts for an award of attorney's fees is under
the Mobilehome Residency Law. 5798.85 provides:

In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter

the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party
for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered
in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his
or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties
otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise.

Page 43
 It is undisputed that the action arises out of the MRL and that defendants are the
prevailing parties.
The issue still remains, however, whether or not defendant McCARRON is
entitled to any attorney fees for representing herself under the MRL and whether

McCARRON is entitled to any attorney fees for her representation of Shipley under the
MRL. The Court has already determined that McCARRON is not entitled to attorney
fees because of her self-representation.
Although the Trope decision was decided in the context of attorney fees under
Civil Code 51717, it referred to other decisions where attorney fees were denied for self-
representation in other contexts. In City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473,
the defendant in an inverse condemnation action was an attorney defending himself and
a co-defendant. They obtained an interlocutory judgment in their favor and the
defendant attorney filed separate cost bills claiming, among other costs, attorney fees.
The trial court allowed attorney fees for the co-defendant, but taxed the attorney fees
claimed by the attorney defendant. The California Supreme Court affirmed. Citing an
earlier decision, Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, which held that the plaintiff
attorney in a foreclosure suit was not entitled to attorney fees, the Sten court ruled
attorney fees were not allowed for the attorney representing himself in the inverse
condemnation action.

In O'Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.3d 330, 336, the Court

disallowed attorney fees for an attorney representing himself in an interpleader action,
stating, "When an attorney represents himself in an action he may not recover the
reasonable value of his fee, for he has paid no fee nor has he incurred any liability to
pay an attorney fee." O'Connor v. Zimmerman, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d at 337. Based
on these authorities, McCARRON is not entitled to any attorney fees for her self-
representation under Civil Code 5798.85.

Page 44
 With respect to SHIPLEY. she was not originally named as a defendant in this
action but injected herself into the action by filing a claim for possession and her rights
were inextricably linked to any outcome obtained by McCARRON. Plaintiff cites to
/( Pardee v, Gray (1885) 66 Cal. 524 which held that an occupant of a house was subject

6
/I to be removed when the original lessee defaulted on payments of rent due. In a more
recent case, In re Perl, 81 1 F.3d 1120 (gthcir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that under
7
C.C.P. 5715.020(d), no occupant of the premises retains any possessory interest of any
* 1/ kind following service of the writ of possession. Here. SHIPLEY admitted she had no
1/ contractual or leasing agreement with Plaintiff and she claimed only to be a co-resident.
lo // In earlier litigation, when Plaintiff had filed an unlawful detainer action against SHIPLEY.
the Appellate Division of this Court ruled Plaintiff had to proceed as McCARRON as the
homeowner.
Plaintiff urges the court to follow Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp.
l4 // (2009) 178 c a L ~ p p . 444.
' ~ In Gorman, the plaintiffs were husband and wife and they
l5
16
I/ sued a general contractor and other subcontractors for construction of their residence.
The husband was an attorney and he and his law firm represented their interests. After
17
a settlement was reached in which it was agreed plaintiffs were .the prevailing parties
l8 /1 and could recover attorney fees, the plaintiffs requested their fees and costs. The trial
11 court awarded fees and costs, but the appellate court reversed and remanded.

2o !! The Gorman court held the trial court properly disallowed any fees billed
by the attorney personally for any work he did on the case on his own behalf and on
behalf of his wife. The Court stated:

We can certainly imagine cases in which a true attorney-client

relationship exists between spouses. However, in this case,
husband and wife sued for and obtained recovery for the defective
construction of their residence. There is no indication that
Cheng suffered any damages apart from those suffered
by her husband. Their interests in this matter appear to be
joint and indivisible. There is no claim that Gorman spent

Page 45
 extra time in this case representing his wife in addition to
the time he spent representing himself. There is no claim
that each of them owes half his fees. Their community
estate is liable for ,their contracts. Since Gorman's billable
hours appear to be entirely attributable to representing
his common interests with Cheng, we conclude that the
rule of Trope a plies to this situation. (Gorman, supra,
R
178 caL~pp.4' at 96.)
The Gorman Court remanded, however, for a determination as to the total
fees claimed by other attorneys and paralegals who had performed work for him as well
as other firms with which they had signed retainer agreements.
While not husband and wife as in Gorman, the interests of SHIPLEY and
McCARRON were certainly aligned. SHIPLEY was not named as a defendant in this
action after the Court's Appellate Division found SHlPLEY was not the proper
defendant. In this action, SHIPLEY was not a necessary defendant but was interjected
into the action by McCARRON. SHIPLEY's claim to any right of possession was
entirely dependerst upon McCARRON's continued possession of the mobile home. In
her reply, McCARRON points out that the amended judgment does, in fact, name
SHlPLEY as a defendant and judgment is entered in her favor, but the fact remains that
SHIPLEY's interests were aligned with McCARRON's interests throughout this litigation.
McCARRON argues she and SHIPLEY did not share similar risks because McCARRON
stood to lose her entire interest, whereas SHIPLEY could simply rent elsewhere. The
Court disagrees. McCARRON's interest was in keeping her property and in keeping
SHIPLEY as an occupant. By pursuing her own interests, McCARRON was necessarily
protecting SHIPLEY's interests. Therefore, neither McCARRON nor SHIPLEY are
entitled to attorney fees.
As this action does not arise out of the MRL as to SHIPLEY, since she is only
interjected in the action as a person in possession, she is not entitled to attorney's fees
and because McCARRON represented herself in the action, under Trope she is not
entitled to attorney's fees.

Page 46
 The judicial assistant is directed to serve this Order on the parties.

DATED: OCT 4 2016 M3-

H~NORABLEJANET M. FRANGIE

Page 47
 SUPERIOR COURT IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

I, Theresa Handyside, the undersigned state:

I am employed in the County of San Bernardino, State of California; I am over the
age of 18 years and not a party to this action; my business address is 247 W. Third
Street, San Bernardino, California, 92415.
I am familiar with this court's practice for collection and processing of documents
1
for mailing with the United States Postal Service. The documents below are enclosed in 1
a sealed envelope, with postage fully paid, and mailed to the interested partylies below
and placed for collection and mailing this date, following standard court practices.

ORDER ON ATTORNEYS FEES

UDFS 1406978
- a---
---
- -

Robert G.^Williamson,-~r.,~sq. Nancy Duffy McCARRON

HART KING ~ttorneyat ~ a w
A PROFESSIONAL 950 ~ o b l eLane
CORPORATION Santa Barbara, California 93103
4 Hutton Centre Drive
Suite 900
Santa Ana, California 92707

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of California, that the
foregoing is true and correct.
1
Executed on, - San Bernardino, California.

Theresa ~ a n d ~ s i d ( e
Judicial Assistant
San Bernardino Superior Court

Page 48
 ORIGINAL
A
APP-009
PROOF OF SERVICE (Court of Appeal)
o Mail D Personal Service iI/Y\ c\ dt.Ctlrn ~ c..
Notice: This form may be used to provide proof that a document has been
served in a proceeding in the Court of Appeal. Please read Information
Sheet for Proof of Service (Court of Appeal) (form APP.009-INFO) before
completing this form. Do not use this form for proof of electronic service.
See form APP-009E.
Case Name: Bonnie Shipley v. San Bernardino Superior court
Court of Appeal Case Number: E069254
Superior Court Case Number: UDFS1604978 ACIAS1600035

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.

2. My residence business address is (specify):

cIa Nancy Duffy, Attorney 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103

I mailed or personally delivered a copy of the following document as indicated below (fill in the name of the document you mailed or
delivered and complete either a or b):
PETITION FOR REVIEW (filed electronically through TrueFiling on Nov'tQ017) sent 1 unbound copy + CIP by 2-day US Mail to:
California Supreme touill, 350 McAllister St., San Francisco, CA 94102 per phone instruction SC Clerk Simone 415-865-7000

a. 0 Mail. I mailed a copy of the document identified above as follows: !..!Yt No LI a e:> I "2...0 I '7
(1) I enclosed a copy of the document identified above in an envelope or envelopes and
(a) 0 deposited the sealed envelope(s) with the U.s. Postal Service, with the postage fully prepaid.
(b) placed the envelope(s) for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in items below,
following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice of collecting
and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection
and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the U.S. Postal Service, in a sealed
envelope(s) with postage fully prepaid.

(2) Date mailed: Nov,2b 2017

(3)
.
The envelope was or envelopes were addressed .as fOllows:
(a) Person served: '
(i) Name: Fourth District Court of APpeall(Jt\:f'.-;;t
(ii) Address:

3389 12th. St.

Riverside, CA 92501

Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730

I (b) Person served:

(i) Name: Appellate Division of San Bernardino Superior court

(ii) Address:
8303 No. Haven Ave. 1st. Floor

Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730

(c) Person served:

/ (i) Name: Hon. Janet M. Frangie, Dept. S-29
(ii) Address:

Justice Ctr, San Bernardino Superior Court

247 W Third S1.

San Bernardino, CA 92415-0210

Additional persons served are listed on the attached page (write "APP-009, Item 3a" at the top of the page).

(4) I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The dO,cument.was maile,.d from 0. S
(City and state): Santa Barbara,CA 93103 5~ Cl.,..+keh-e,4
J2-(aC+ft"'V\l'L rD Pagelof2

Form Approved for Optional Use PROOF OF SERVICE www.courts.ca.gov

Judicial Council of Calffomia
APP.Q09 [Rev. January 20171 (Court of Appeal)

Page 49
P4je.. ,
 APP-009

~ase Name: Bonnie 8hlpley v, 8an Bernardino ::;uperior court I\.;ourt ot Appeal case Number:
~9~254~~~~~~~~________~
Superior Court Case Number:
UDFS1604978 ACIAS1600035

3, b, D Personal delivery. I personally delivered a copy of the document identified above as follows:
(1) Person served:
(a) Name:
(b) Address where delivered:

(c) Date delivered:

(d) Time delivered:

(2) Person served:

(a) Name:
(b) Address where delivered:

(c) Date delivered:

(d) Time delivered:

(3) Person served:

(a) Name:
(b) Address where delivered:

(c) Date delivered:

(d) Time delivered:

[KJ ~ames and addre~~es of additional persons served and deliVery,., d::::rnd times are listed, on the atta,,ched page (write
APP-009, ltem3batthetopofthepage), Se.e..~-1t~ 'E::Ic~" c.,.. POS

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct

Date: NovaD 2017

Timothy S, McCarron
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)
URE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)

APP-OOg [Rev, January 1, 2017] PROOF OF SERVICE Page 201 2

(Court of Appeal)

Page 50
 APP..o09E
PRooF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE (Court of Appeal)

Notice: This form may be used to provide proof that a document has been
served in a proceeding In the Court of Appeal. Please rea~d Information
Sheet for Proof of Service (Court of Appeal) (form APP..oI)9-INFO) before
completing this form.

f
Case Nam~~1\1 I~ ~""'San Bernardino Supe~or Court '1
Court of Appeal Case NJrft\er: c D~ E 1 ;{5
Superior Court Case Number:, (!CF S ko(,q 19'
1, At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age.
2. a. My c:::::::J residence business address is (specify):

950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103

b. My electronic service address is (specify); nancyduffysb@yahoo,com )

/3. I electronically served the following documents (exact titles): ...,!..;I ~.,....
()e~,:..i!..~~Iu.lJI\~_..:'+e~I~...;f\..I!.r;...;.;;_-
+', L '....... J) tIl.....
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('-Sur" c~+- t/

V ...rCertificate of Interested Entities and Parties

4. I electronically served the documents listed in 3. as follows: (bu 4" ,.~~t) , t

V -
a, Name of person served: Robert Williamson
J J. 'Jc, reCe"
.f1>'~1dfiLL I
r
On behalf of (name or names ofparties represented, if person served is an attomey):
Stubblefield Properties, Real party in Interest

b. Electronic service address of person served: rwilllamson@hartkinglaw.com

c. On (date): Ubl(17
The documents listed in 3. were served electronically on the persons and in the manner described in an at1achment (write
RAPP-009E, Item 4- at the top of the page).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Slate of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: 'fit. 7
Nancy Duffy McCarron
(lYPE OR PRINT NAIIIE OF PERSON CCIiIPLEllNG THIS FORM) ~'7(J~~ (SlaruPERSON COMPlETING THIS FORM)

If /zc /17

P"IJII 1 of1

Form Apjll'O\/l!d !or 0pliallII Use PROOF OF ELECTI~ONIC SERVICE

Judicial Counal of CaiIOmia

Af'P..()09E[NewJanuary 1,2017] (Court of Appeal)

Page 51