TRANSPORTATION CASES for Finals

Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 574

Ruling: The fact that passengers board and alight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience and
both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice. The victim herein,
by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and
protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier of passengers
owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.

La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals, et.al., 17 SCRA 739

Ruling: It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until
the passenger has had a reasonable time of a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. And, what is
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. It was at this
instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that
the carriers agent had exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. x x x x The
presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. no. 84458, November 6, 1989

Ruling: The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated, merely by the fact that a person transported has been
carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carriers premises to claim his baggage. We cannot in
reason doubt that the victim, Anacleto Viana, was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident
occurred, the victim was in act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioners vessel. As earlier
stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a
reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Precillano Necesito, etc. v. Natividad Paras, G.R. no. L-10605, June 30, 1958

Ruling: In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering knuckle in question
was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the
manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength is up to standard, or
that it had no hidden flaws that would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the critical
importance of the knuckles resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in the loss of balance and steering control
of the bus. No argument is required that a visual could not directly determine whether the resistance of this critically
important part was not impaired. nor has it been shown that the weakening of the knuckle was impossible to detect by any
known test; on the contrary there is testimony that it could be detected. We are satisfied that the periodical visual
inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carriers agents did not measure up to legal standard of utmost
diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, and therefore the knuckles failure
cannot be considered as a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.

Carlos Singson v. Court of Appeals & Cathay Pacific Airways, Inc., G.R.no. 119995, November 18,1997

Ruling: Cathay undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioners flight reservation back
to the Philippines on account of his missing coupon. To begin with, the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the
passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements
of a complete written contract.clearly, therefore, petitioner was not a mere chance passenger with no superior right to be
boarded on a specific flight, as erroneously claimed by Cathay and sustained by the appellate court.

Interestingly, it appears that Cathay was responsible for the loss of the ticket. X x x the loss of the coupon was
attributable to the negligence of Cathays agents and was the proximate cause of the non confirmation of petitioners
return flight on July 1, 1998.it virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the carriers obligations under
the contract. Hence, to hold that no contractual breach was committed by Cathay and totally absolve it from any liability
would in effect put a premium on the negligence of its agents, contrary to the policy of the law requiring common carriers
to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Jose Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and Alatco Transportation Co., Inc. G.R. no. 52159, December 22, 1989

Ruling: While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of
the absolute safety of its passengers.

I consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a
common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely
undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and to hold itself liable for any breach thereof.

While as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their
passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when intervening acts of
strangers directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage exists.

Clearly under Article 1763 of the Civil Code, a tort committed by a stranger who causes the injury to a passenger does not
accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is
the negligent omission by the common carriers employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could
have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of
the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by
the common carrier for the protection of its passengers is only that of a good father of a family.

Fortune Express, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, Paulie Caorong and minor children G.R. no. 119756, Mar 18, 1999

Ruling:

2. Seizure of Petitioners bus is not a case of Force Majeure.

In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 1,9 (1997), the Supreme Court held that to be considered as force majeure, it is
necessary that:

1. the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
2. the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner;
and
4. the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.

In the present case, the factor of unforeseeablility is lacking. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The
seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, there-fore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
petitioner from liability.

3. Deceased is NOT guilty of Contributory Negligence

Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioner and
its employees, not its passengers.

The assailants motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioners
bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve
something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his
life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act of negligence, let
alone recklessness.