Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint[3] against CMTC, the GSIS and its
responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato. Fernando prayed, among others, that
GSIS VS HEIRS OF CABALLERO judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and
void; declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and CMTC null and void ab initio; declaring TCT
No. 76183 of the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise, null and void ab initio; declaring the bid
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside made by Fernando in the amount ofP350,000.00 for the repurchase of his property as the winning bid; and
the Decision[1] and the Resolution,[2] dated December 17, 2002 and April 29, 2003, respectively, of the Court of ordering petitioner to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of Fernando. He
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300. also prayed for payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The antecedents are as follows: In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. CMTC
misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot designated as Lot representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board of directors in an appropriate board
No. 3355, Ts-268, covered by TCT No. T-16035 of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, containing an area of resolution to participate in the bidding. The corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or invest its
800 square meters and situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a funds for purposes other than its primary purpose. Fernando further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid
residential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories. despite knowledge that said corporation has no authority to do so. The GSIS also disregarded Fernando's prior
right to buy back his family home and lot in violation of the laws. The Register of Deeds of Cotabato acted with
On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner Government Service abuse of power and authority when it issued the TCT in favor of CMTC without requiring the CMTC to submit
Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note. Fernando and his its supporting papers as required by the law.
wife likewise executed a real estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the afore-stated property as
security. Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. [4] The GSIS alleged
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, on January 20, 1973, the mortgage that Fernando lost his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the property; however, he did
covering the subject property was foreclosed, and on March 26, 1973, the same was sold at a public auction not avail of such option compelling the GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as mandated by
where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P36,283.00. For failure of Fernando to redeem the law. There is also no prior right to buy back that can be exercised by Fernando. Further, it averred that the
said property within the designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership on articles of incorporation and other papers of CMTC were all in order. In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that
September 5, 1975. Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was cancelled and TCT No. T-45874 was issued in the Fernando owed petitioner the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals, including additional interests from
name of petitioner. January 1973 to February 1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of title in its representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita Ang Hao from January 1973 to February
favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the subject 1988.
property. In reply, Fernando requested that he be allowed to repurchase the same through partial payments.
Negotiation as to the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for several years, but no After trial, the RTC, in its Decision[5] dated September 27, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
agreement was reached between the parties. complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted petitioner's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249,800.00. The foregoing amount was collected by
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public bidding. On the scheduled date of Fernando from the CMTC and represents payment which was not turned over to petitioner, which was entitled
bidding, Fernando's daughter, Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00, while to receive the rent from the date of the consolidation of its ownership over the subject property.
Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid in the amount of P450,000.00. Since
CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awarded the subject property. On May 16, 1989, the Board of Trustees of Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated March 27, 1995.
the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award of the subject property to CMTC for a total
consideration of P450,000.00. Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between petitioner and CMTC Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.[6] The CA, in its Decision dated December 17,
on July 27, 1989, transferring the subject property to CMTC.Consequently, TCT No. T-45874 in the name of 2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering
GSIS was cancelled, and TCT No. T-76183 was issued in the name of CMTC. Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 29, 2003. Hence, the instant
petition.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by
An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of Party,[7] dated July 18, 2003, was filed by the surviving heirs of Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando
Fernando, who died on February 12, 2002. They prayed that they be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the
as respondents in this case. other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees
results into the dismissal of its claim.
Petitioner enumerated the following grounds in support of its petition: To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are
the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b)
I Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim?
HOLDING THAT GSIS' COUNTERCLAIM, AMONG OTHERS, OF P249,800.00 and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
REPRESENTING RENTALS COLLECTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. [12]
CARMELITA MERCANTILE TRADING CORPORATION IS IN THE NATURE OF A
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM WHICH REQUIRED THE PAYMENT BY GSIS OF Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's view that petitioner's counterclaim
DOCKET FEES BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The
SAID COUNTERCLAIM. evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is
different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor
II of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim,i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property
HOLDING THAT GSIS' DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ITS CLAIM by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.
OF P249,800.00 LACKS PROPER IDENTIFICATION.[8]
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is
bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.[13] This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the
The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA's Decision insofar as it deleted the trial court's award collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the
of P249,800.00 in its favor representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC. RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar
as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void.
In their Memorandum, respondents claim that CMTC cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds in any Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal
purpose other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence of a corporate board before this Court.[14]
resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued in favor of the CMTC, should be
nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel have regularly performed their official duty Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try
when they conducted the public bidding; Fernando, as former owner of the subject property and former member and decide the same, considering petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees.
of the GSIS, has the preemptive right to repurchase the foreclosed property.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment
These additional averments cannot be taken cognizance by the Court, because they were substantially of Legal Fees,[15] the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act
respondents arguments in their petition for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No. No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to
156609. Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution [9] dated April 23, 2003, for exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
petitioners (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court
jurisdiction.[10] Said resolution became final and executory on June 9, 2003. [11] Respondents attempt to re- now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be
allowed. In said case, the Court ruled that:
Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion,[16] where the Court held that: DECISION
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure questions the December
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment 13, 2010 and March 7, 2011Orders1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64 (RTC), in Civil Case No.
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for 92-2311, granting the motion for execution of petitioner, but denying his prayer for the return of his cargo
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the vessel in the condition when the possession thereof was seized from him.
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
The Facts
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,[17] the Court, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, held that the
same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the The present controversy finds its roots in the Courts decision in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy2 involving the same parties. The facts, as culled from
the Courts decision in the said case and the records, are not disputed by the parties.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the
complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of Limchia
certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. In 1990, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed of become executory, the court cannot amend the same, except: x x x None of the three circumstances where a
Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.3 final and executory judgment may be amended is present in this case. And third, the present deplorable state of
M/V Pilar certainly did not happen overnight, thus, defendants should have brought it to the attention of this
Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the Court, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court after it became apparent. Their inaction until after the
scheduled payments as required in their promissory note. After receiving several demand letters from judgment has become final, executory and immutable rendered whatever right they may have to remedy the
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan. Meanwhile, Lourdes issued several checks to situation to be nugatory. [Underlining supplied]
cover the remainder of their loan but the same were dishonored by the bank, prompting respondent to institute a
criminal complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Lourdes appealed to respondent with a new Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the RTC in its March 7, 2011 Order. 12
proposal to update their outstanding loan obligations.4
Hence, this petition.
On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred
Ship Mortgage under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. The Issues
Following the filing of an affidavit of merit and the posting of bond by respondent, the RTC ordered the seizure
of M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to respondent. On September 28, 1994, respondent transferred all
Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:
of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado). 5
1. Whether or not the rule on hierarchy of courts is applicable to the instant petition?
On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted on
their loan because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being no default, the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature. The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned 2. Whether or not the honorable trial court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
to Spouses Dy.6 This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), with the modification that Spouses Dy be jurisdiction, in finding that petitioner is not entitled to the return of M/VPilar-1 in the condition that it
ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while the vessel was in the latters had when it was wrongfully seized by Orix Metro, or in the alternative, to a vessel of similar tonnage,
possession.7 On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision, dated September 11, 2009, upholding the findings length, beam, and other particulars as M/VPilar-1;
of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses Dy to reimburse respondent.8
3. Whether or not petitioner is estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition it had
Consequently, on August 17, 2010, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC. In the at the time it was seized?
intervening period, Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion, dated July 29, 2010, informing the RTC that M/V
Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sustained severe damage and deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard 4. Whether or not it was petitioners duty to look out for the vessels condition? 13
because of its exposure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the sunken
vessel into pieces, sell its parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow. 9 In his Comment/Objection, petitioner To be succinct, only two central issues need to be resolved: (1) whether petitioner was justified in resorting
insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel be returned to him in the same condition that it had been directly to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to the
at the time it was wrongfully seized by respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another vessel of the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition when it was seized by respondent.
same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-I be delivered.10 Colorado, however, responded that
the vessel had suffered severe damage and deterioration that refloating or restoring it to its former condition The Courts Ruling
would be futile, impossible and very costly; and should petitioner persist in his demand that the ship be
refloated, it should be done at the expense of the party adjudged by the court to pay the same. 11
The Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010 Order granting the motion for execution but denying
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort
petitioners prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by respondent. In so
To The Supreme Court Justified
resolving, the RTC ratiocinated:
Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the interest of
First, the judgment of the Supreme Court does not require the delivery of M/V Pilar in the state the defendants
justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is involved is a judgment of the Court which the lower
wanted it to be. Secondly, said judgment has now become final and it is axiomatic that after judgment has
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
courts cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring this case immediately to the attention of this There are considerable differences between an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari which have been
Court. Lastly, petitioner claims that the present case involves a novel issue of law that is, whether in an action exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases. The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on
to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of the subject matter in litigation may be allowed to return the the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal. 21 In
same in a deteriorated condition without any liability.14 contrast, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct errors of jurisdiction,
defined to be those "in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should have been filed with the CA, following the without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of in excess of
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to state any special or important reason or jurisdiction."22 A court or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion if its
any exceptional and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct recourse to this Court. 15 exercise of judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
must be extremely patent and gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 23
is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket. 16 Nonetheless, the invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to Therefore, a misappreciation of evidence on the part of the lower court, as asserted by petitioner, may only be
issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons reviewed by appeal and not by certiorari because the issue raised by the petitioner does not involve any
clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public jurisdictional ground.24 It is a general rule of procedural law that when a party adopts an inappropriate mode of
policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent appeal, his petition may be dismissed outright to prevent the erring party from benefiting from his neglect and
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the mistakes.25 There are exceptions to this otherwise ironclad rule, however. One is when the strict application of
immediate and direct handling of the case.17 procedural technicalities would hinder the expeditious disposition of this case on the merits, 26 such as in this
case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this
Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has been Petitioner Not Barred from Demanding
dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final Return of the Vessel in its Former Condition
judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek
final clarification. Petitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear the responsibility for the deterioration of the vessel
because the latter, despite having in its possession the vessel M/V Pilar-I during the pendency of the foreclosure
Wrong Mode of Appeal; proceedings, failed to inform the court and petitioner himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel
to take effect, there must be knowledge of the real facts by the party sought to be estopped and reliance by the
party claiming estoppel on the representation made by the former. In this case, petitioner cannot be estopped
Exception
from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition that it had been at the time it was seized by respondent
because he had not known of the deteriorated condition of the ship.27
Petitioner asserts that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to rule in his favor despite the
fact that he had been deprived by respondent of his property rights over M/V Pilar-I for the past eighteen(18)
On the contrary, respondent argues that petitioner is barred from asking for a modification of the judgment since
years. Moreover, the change in the situation of the parties calls for a relaxation of the rules which would make
the execution of the earlier decision of this Court inequitable or unjust. According to petitioner, for the RTC to he never prayed for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition that it had been at the time it was
allow respondent to return the ship to him in its severely damaged and deteriorated condition without any seized.28Petitioner could have prayed for such relief in his prior pleadings and presented evidence thereon
before the judgment became final and executory. During the course of the trial, and even at the appellate phase
liability would be to reward bad faith.18
of the case, petitioner failed to ask the courts to look into the naturally foreseeable depreciation of M/V Pilar-I
and to determine who should pay for the wear and tear of the vessel. Consequently, petitioner can no longer
Conversely, respondent submits that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the latter pursue such relief for the first time at this very late stage. 29 Moreover, respondent posits that it can only be held
merely observed due process and followed the principle that an execution order may not vary or go beyond the liable for the restoration and replacement of the vessel if it can be proven that M/V Pilar-I deteriorated through
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.19 Respondent adds that the proper remedy should have been an the fault of respondent. Nowhere in the prior decision of this Court, however, does it appear that respondent was
ordinary appeal, where a factual review of the records can be made to determine the condition of the ship at the found to have been negligent in its care of the vessel. In fact, respondent points out that, for a certain period, it
time it was taken from petitioner, and not a special civil action for certiorari. 20 even paid for the repair and maintenance of the vessel and engaged the services of security guards to watch over
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
the vessel. It reasons that the vessels deterioration was necessarily due to its exposure to sea water and the however, that the buses could no longer be returned in their original state, the Court sustained the resolution of
natural elements for the almost twenty years that it was docked in the Colorado shipyard. 30 the CA ordering MMTC to pay DMCI the value of the buses at the time of repossession.
On this matter, the Court finds for petitioner. The aforecited case finds application to the present situation of petitioner. After having been deprived of his
vessel for almost two decades, through no fault of his own, it would be the height of injustice to permit there
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. When a judgment becomes final and turn of M/V Pilar-I to petitioner in pieces, especially after a judgment by this very same Court ordering
executory, it is made immutable and unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect either by respondent to restore possession of the vessel to petitioner. To do so would leave petitioner with nothing but a
the court which rendered it or even by this Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly administration of hollow and illusory victory for although the Court ruled in his favor and declared that respondent wrongfully
justice and to put an end to judicial controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors, public policy and sound took possession of his vessel, he could no longer enjoy the beneficial use of his extremely deteriorated vessel
practice dictate that judgments must become final at some point.31 that it is no longer seaworthy and has no other commercial value but for the sale of its parts as scrap.
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a supervening event renders the execution Moreover, the incongruity only becomes more palpable when consideration is taken of the fact that petitioner's
of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the judgment to obligation to respondent, for which the now practically worthless vessel serves as security, is still
harmonize it with justice and the facts.32 A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance outstanding.35The Court cannot countenance such an absurd outcome. It could not have been the intention of
which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the parties were this Court to perpetrate an injustice in the guise of a favorable decision. As the court of last resort, this Court is
unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that time. 33 the final bastion of justice where litigants can hope to correct any error made in the lower courts.
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event.1wphi1 Petitioner, who did not WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the value of
have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated M/V Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Court, Branch 64, Makati City, for the proper determination of the value of the vessel at said time.
Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010.
During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the SO ORDERED.
worsened condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado.
G.R. No. 173038 September 14, 2011
It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should have had the foresight to ask for the return of the vessel
in its former condition at the time respondent took possession of the same during the proceedings in the earlier
ELENA JANE DUARTE, Petitioner,
case. Nonetheless, the modification of the Courts decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances, that vs.
is, the severe damage to the vessel subject of the case and the belated delivery of this information to the courts
MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, Respondent.
by the party in possession of the same.
DECISION
Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment is permissible in light of the exceptional incident
present in this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same
condition in which respondent took possession of it. Considering, however, that this is no longer possible, then DEL CASTILLO, J.:
respondent should pay petitioner the value of the ship at such time.
Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing
This disposition is not without precedent. In the case of Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. D.M. Consortium, evidence.1
Inc.,34 D.M. Consortium, Inc. (DMCI) acquired 228 buses under a lease purchase agreement with Metro Manila
Transit Corporation (MMTC). MMTC later alleged that DMCI was in default of its amortization, as a result of Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the October 26, 2005
which, MMTC took possession of all the buses. This Court upheld the right of DMCI, after having been Decision3 and May 22, 2006 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84461.
unjustly denied of its right of possession to several buses, to have them returned by MMTC. Considering,
Factual Antecedents
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 2, 2003, the MTCC rendered a Decision25 in favor of respondent. It found the receipt dated February On June 1, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Review32 with the CA. Finding the petition meritorious, the CA
18, 2002 and the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Dy, sufficient to prove that there was a contract of reversed the RTC Decision and reinstated the Decision of the MTCC. The CA said that the RTC erred in not
sale between the parties.26 Thus: giving weight and credence to the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 and the receipt dated February 18,
2002.33The CA pointed out that petitioner failed to overturn the presumption that the demand letter dated July
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the 29, 2002 sent by respondents counsel by registered mail was received by her. 34 Neither was she able to deny
latter to pay plaintiff the following measure of damages: under oath the genuineness and due execution of the receipt dated February 18, 2002. 35 Thus, the fallo of the
Decision36reads:
(a) Actual damages in the amount of Seven Thousand (P7,000.00) Pesos with interest thereon at 12%
per annum from July 29, 2002 until fully paid; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu City is REVERSED and the judgment of Municipal Trial Court in
(b) Attorneys fees in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos; and Cities Branch 5, Cebu City is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Summed up, the issues boil down to: (1) the timeliness of the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA; (2) The Petition for Review was timely filed with the CA
the existence of a contract of sale; and (3) respondents entitlement to attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we ruled in Neypes
Petitioners Arguments v. Court of Appeals56 that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41,
Petitioner contends that the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004 was beyond the 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court.57 This ruling, as we have said in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-
reglementary period.41 Records show that respondent received a copy of the RTC Decision on March 25, 2004, Valencia,58retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 12, 2004 since April 9 and 10 were holidays and April 11, 2004 2005, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. 59
was a Sunday, and received a copy of the RTC Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on May 27,
2004.42 Thus, he only had one day left from May 27, 2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with the Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was promulgated, respondent is entitled to a
CA.43 fresh period of 15 days, counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the RTC Order dated May
13, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11,
Petitioner likewise denies the existence of a contract of sale, insisting that the laptop was not sold to her but was 2004, within which to file his Petition for Review with the CA. Thus, we find that when he filed the Petition for
given as a security for respondents debt. To prove that there was no contract of sale, petitioner calls attention to Review with the CA on June 1, 2004, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf The Court finds the OCAs recommendation well-taken.
of MSU.[6] The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in itsMarch 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to
the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or elementary principle in the administration of justice:[22] no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments
preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. [7] The petition of MSU was raffled to the or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge. injunction.[23] The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
2009.[8] After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.[24]
garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[9]
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the application for the issuance of a as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. [25] A court which
writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [10] On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the ministerial officers and to control its own processes.[26] To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[11] The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion and dismissed the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is
the case.[12] obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[27]
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge withGross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial In Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,[28] the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for issuing a TRO
Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO that interfered with or frustrated the implementation of an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction.
to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[13] In Yau v. The Manila Banking Corporation,[29] the Court held that undue interference by one in the
proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.
The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City
RTC.[14] He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the In Coronado v. Rojas,[30] the judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the law when he proceeded
petition for lack of jurisdiction.[15] to enjoin the final and executory decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on the
pretext that the temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed against the HLURBs
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent writ of execution, but only against the manner of its execution. The Court noted that the judge cannot feign
Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the enforcement of the writ of execution, thus
proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting that this is frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a co-equal body.[31]
the respondent Judges second offense.[17]
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,[32] the Court penalized two judges for issuing a TRO against the That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually dismissing the petition before
execution of a demolition order issued by another co-equal court. The Court stressed that when the respondents- him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can use.[43] His lack of familiarity with the
judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on matters rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary through his
pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, which was already exercising demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan public that the kind of interference he
jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judgesstill opted to exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily, i.e., that an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted
interfere with the order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas
of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law. [33] Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and manifested that the respondent Judge is basically a good
Judge,[44] and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judges liability. This liability and the
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainants personal opinion but on the facts he alleged and
writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, proved, and on the applicable law and jurisprudence.
however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of
the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
paragraph 2,[34] speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition forcertiorari, under Rule Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [45]
65 of the Rules of Court.[35]
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but
TRO to temporarily restrain[36] Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering the attendant circumstances of this
MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on case, the Court after prolonged deliberations holds that a fine of P30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This
matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court since he even imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for
quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37] suspension since this is the respondent Judges second offense.
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional
City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16, Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations, finds no application to the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the judgment obligor or his severely.
agent;[38] a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with another court [39] which, in
the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for SO ORDERED.
injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje
committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for
Tijam Vs Sibonghanoy
MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not
from any other court,[40] or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.[41] In this case, MSU filed
the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse DIZON, J.:
through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of
erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole
discretionary.[42] As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed
before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its opposition before the issuing court Iligan City RTC which denied for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants properties, but the same
this opposition. was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month. chanroblespublishingcompany
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case
admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This affirming the orders appealed from.
counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs. chanroblespublishingcompany
On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in
had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO
defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
execution against the Suretys bond (Rec. on Appeal pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within
the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative amount of the demand does not exceed
relief : to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question (Id. p. 54) The
Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to and decide the case. Upon these premises the Suretys motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its
satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. On the date set decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees
for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Suretys counsel, granted the latter a period of five days to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court
within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as
execution and the corresponding writ was issued. chanroblespublishingcompany follows: chanroblespublishingcompany
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296).
filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors: chanroblespublishingcompany
chanroblespublishingcompany
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellants motion is an important one which merits serious
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now
submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction
provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. until after receipt of this Courts adverse decision. chanroblespublishingcompany
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in
companyappellant. connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros, et al., G. R. No. L-
10096, March 23, 1956; Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G. R. No. L14591,
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. No. L-15092,
herein bonding company- appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the undesirable practice of
or setting aside the writ of execution. appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction when adverse. chanroblespublishingcompany
Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly
nor indirectly. Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue (Sec. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we
have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify; this case to the Supreme Court.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
be forwarded to the Supreme Court. chanroblespublishingcompany peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against asserted.
the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (Dean
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subjectmatter of the action or of the parties was
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case which shall forthwith be not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
set forth We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late the court is valid and conclusive as an
hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. As already
stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of policy. chanroblespublishingcompany
jurisdiction for the first time.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses, decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of Rathbun-Jones etc. 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L.
the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin. (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with Sections affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court. (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. chanroblespublishingcompany
170). chanroblespublishingcompany
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counterbond the Surety not only filed a written of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his
opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief that it be relieved case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition lack of when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G. R. L14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. chanroblespublishingcompany et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore. raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
chanroblespublishingcompany present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
chanroblespublishingcompany decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. chanroblespublishingcompany
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the suretys counsel asked that he be given Summary hearing is not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court, as follows: prosecuted. (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved with dispatch, with the
least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings. (Ibid, p. 790). What
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr. counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is is essential is that the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is
given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties.
execution dated (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the
discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for
October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution. consideration. chanroblespublishingcompany
SO ORDERED In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs motion for execution and of the date when the
same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the suretys counsel, was present in court when the motion
was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file
Given in open court, this 2nd day of Nov. 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.
an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
(SGD.) JOSE M. MENDOZA Judge (Record on Appeal, pp. 64-65, Emphasis supplied)
It is argued that the suretys counsel did not file an answer to the motion for the simple reason that all its
Since the suretys counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the court, on defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing.
December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs motion for execution against the surety; and on (Appellants brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will
December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued. show that when the motion was called, what the suretys
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the same
was issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with,
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision,
given in open court upon request of the suretys counsel that after the fourday period within which to file an the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded. 8
answer, the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was
issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our
resolution:
It is also argued that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate action,
there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond. a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case,
(Appellants Brief, p, 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in
Rule 59, to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action, and stands in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was
place of the property so released. Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the
execution is returned unsatisfied (Section. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but
attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond. chanroblespublishingcompany
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road,
Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc. constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008 c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within
Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner, speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever
vs. presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through
DECISION reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not
prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not
NACHURA, J.:
contain an allegation to that effect?
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim
raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not
CR No. 22697.
enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section
2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 11 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691. 12 The said
charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial courts provision thus reads:
jurisdiction.7
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the
shall exercise: lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same
xxxx "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-
863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its
defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, 13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former
conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's
motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the
position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction,
jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had
jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As
undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable. But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by
the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which continuously
confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter. It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the
question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This
case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no
court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that: impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe
that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this
Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute
any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956,
large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily
organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a
lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16 contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the
Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained: decision be unfavorable: x x x20
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the
Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v.
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as
supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1
challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held: Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering
both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer
of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in
all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed
cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was
its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower courts espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure
jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised
decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
actively participated.
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q- a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both abandoned it or declined to assert it."
sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However,
private respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the
the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which
reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts
the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present;
jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC,
waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
ours)26 virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 27 where the issue
of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to
averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30 disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. 34
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply
proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said: the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule
should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a
only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoyis court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse
have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a party does not suffer any harm.35
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
33
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go, the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At
the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus: that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable,
will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights,
has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence,
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert
change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it." exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness
of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. 37 The same,
however, does not obtain in the instant case.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked
to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied
case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction
assert it.
over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking
judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian
the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 42
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over
Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997. [4] On 7
action. x x x August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997. [5]
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records
or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the were still with the RTC.[6]
status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the
controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks. 43 Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than 100,000.[7]
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default[8] and commenced with the reception of
evidence.[9] Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No.
Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department of
2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone. [12] Thereafter, it
SO ORDERED. awarded the land to respondent Corporation.[13]
Republic vs Bantigue Point Development Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
SERENO, J.: estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. [15] The CA further found that
respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the subject property after
having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II. [16]
municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following
granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporations (Corporation) application for original arguments in support of its appeal:
registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this Petition for Review. I.
I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case. In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the
period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. [18] Jurisdiction over the Registration Decree.[28]
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. [20]Consequently, questions
We disagree.
of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. [21]
The Property Registration Decree provides:
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he
has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days
in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing
estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and
order. x x x.
filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the
appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day
case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack
after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception
October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. [30] While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day
to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the
period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna
latter case.
Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for original registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order
petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application.Thus,
RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply we held:
because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither
filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of
jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such
the instant appeal.
official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the
exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it complied with all the requirements of the law.[32]
either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its
right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value
application for registration on account of events beyond its control. of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if
there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional
1997,[33] within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect was
Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)
still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again
contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration Decree. [34]
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where
Petitioner is incorrect. there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not
exceed 100,000.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations
filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the application for registration on 8 January 1998.[41]
courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order
within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does not
five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
exceed 100,000.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [35] It cannot be contingent
upon the action or inaction of the court.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling
price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of
law deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the
the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for
property.[42]
initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration, [37] except that it had to issue a second
Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are
bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale done through the second method, because this method finds application only where there are multiple claimants
annexed to respondents application for original registration was160,000, [39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point
over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,[40] the MTCs delegated
Development Corporation claims the property.
jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not
exceed 100,000.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations
submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records, we find
We are not persuaded. that the assessed value of the property is 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920 for the
entire property.[43]Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the not exceed 100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides: Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case I
be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that WHETHER OR NOT COSLAP HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE
the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.
SO ORDERED.
II
Vda. De Herrera vs Bernardo WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF A TORRENS TITLE IN THE
PERALTA, J.: NAME OF THE PETITIONER'S HUSBAND IN 2002 RENDERED THE
INSTANT CONTROVERSY ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside SUBJECT PROPERTY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[6]
the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674.
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over
powers and functions: the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all
xxxx such reliefs.[10]
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject property,
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, [11] the jurisdiction of
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which the subject property.[12]
are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social The case of Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, [13] applied by the CA and invoked by
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate the respondents, is inapplicable to the present case. Banagainvolved parties with conflicting free patent
action: applications over a parcel of public land and pending with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of
Land's inaction within a considerable period of time on the claims and protests of the parties and to conduct an
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement investigation, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction and resolved the conflicting claims of the parties. The Court
holders or timber concessionaires; held that since the dispute involved a parcel of public land on a free patent issue, the COSLAP had jurisdiction
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation over that case. In the present case, there is no showing that the parties have conflicting free patent applications
grantees; over the subject parcel of land that would justify the exercise of the COSLAP's jurisdiction.
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants; Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of rendered, are null and void.[14] A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot
lands of the public domain; and be the source of any right or create any obligation.[15] All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding in
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. [18] The fact that accordance with law.
a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging
its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties.[19] The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings before this Court as said title was
issued in the name of petitioner's husband only during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The issue on
In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly
apply, thus: instituted for that purpose[25] and the present appeal before us, is simply not the direct proceeding contemplated
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained by law.
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined April 28, 2005 and October 17, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674 are REVERSED and SET
to assert it. ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, dated December 6,
1999 and August 21, 2002, respectively, in COSLAP Case No. 99-221, are declared NULL and VOID for
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine having been issued without jurisdiction.
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception
rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction SO ORDERED.
only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner,
been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
vs.
abandoned or declined to assert it. BRITISH AIRWAYS, Respondent.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been DEL CASTILLO, J.:
rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power introduced for
submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.1
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.[22] Factual Antecedents
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application
of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint 2 for damages against respondent British
appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she took
Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested
even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. [23] Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried
luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically
Anent the issuance of OCT No. M-10991 in favor of petitioners husband Alfredo Herrerra in 2002, respondents remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!"
alleged that there was fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith in the issuance thereof. Thus, respondents are now
questioning the legality of OCT No. M-10991, an issue which this Court cannot pass upon in this present
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground manager and demanded an apology. The Court sympathizes with the alleged ill-treatment suffered by the plaintiff. However, our Courts have to
However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing their job."
apply the principles of international law, and are bound by treaty stipulations entered into by the Philippines
which form part of the law of the land. One of this is the Warsaw Convention. Being a signatory thereto, the
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral Philippines adheres to its stipulations and is bound by its provisions including the place where actions involving
damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorneys damages to plaintiff is to be instituted, as provided for under Article 28(1) thereof. The Court finds no
fees,P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit. justifiable reason to deviate from the indicated limitations as it will only run counter to the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention. Said adherence is in consonance with the comity of nations and deviation from it can only
On May 16, 2005, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through be effected through proper denunciation as enunciated in the Santos case (ibid). Since the Philippines is not the
Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.3 place of domicile of the defendant nor is it the principal place of business, our courts are thus divested of
jurisdiction over cases for damages. Neither was plaintiffs ticket issued in this country nor was her destination
On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on Manila but Rome in Italy. It bears stressing however, that referral to the court of proper jurisdiction does not
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that constitute constructive denial of plaintiffs right to have access to our courts since the Warsaw Convention itself
only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages provided for jurisdiction over cases arising from international transportation. Said treaty stipulations must be
pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,5 Article 28(1) of which provides: complied with in good faith following the time honored principle of pacta sunt servanda.
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the The resolution of the propriety of service of summons is rendered moot by the Courts want of jurisdiction over
carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has the instant case.
been made, or before the court of the place of destination.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this case is
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondents principal place of business is in London; c) hereby ordered DISMISSED.
petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome);6 and d) Rome, Italy is petitioners
place of destination, then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts of London, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied in an Order 11 dated January 4, 2006.
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari on pure questions of law, raising
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the the following issues:
respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not
its resident agent in the Philippines. Issues
On June 3, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring herein petitioner to file her Comment/Opposition on I. WHETHER X X X PHILIPPINE COURTs HAVE JURISDICTION OVER A TORTIOUS CONDUCT
the Motion to Dismiss within 10 days from notice thereof, and for respondent to file a Reply thereon. 7 Instead COMMITTED AGAINST A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND RESIDENT BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL OF A
of filing a Comment/Opposition, petitioner filed on June 27, 2005, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Formal FOREIGN CARRIER TRAVELLING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF ANY FOREIGN
Amendment to the Complaint and Issuance of Alias Summons. 8 Petitioner alleged that upon verification with COUNTRY; AND THUS IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION.
the Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that the resident agent of respondent in the Philippines
Our Ruling Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international carriage". The High
Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
The petition is without merit.
subsequently adhered to it.14
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination
was Rome, Italy.15 Both the United Kingdom16 and Italy17 signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such,
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In Santos III v. the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the
Northwest Orient Airlines,12 we held that: Warsaw Convention.
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The
Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before
Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto, "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof 1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such,
has the force and effect of law in this country.13 3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines,20 Augusto Santos III, a resident of the Philippines, purchased a ticket Tortious conduct as ground for the petitioners complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw Convention.
from Northwest Orient Airlines in San Francisco, for transport between San Francisco and Manila via Tokyo
and back to San Francisco. He was wait-listed in the Tokyo to Manila segment of his ticket, despite his prior Petitioner contends that in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 33 the cause of action was based on a breach
reservation. Contending that Northwest Orient Airlines acted in bad faith and discriminated against him when it of contract while her cause of action arose from the tortious conduct of the airline personnel and violation of the
canceled his confirmed reservation and gave his seat to someone who had no better right to it, Augusto Santos Civil Code provisions on Human Relations.34 In addition, she claims that our pronouncement in Santos III v.
III sued the carrier for damages before the RTC. Northwest Orient Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on Northwest Orient Airlines35 that "the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude
ground of lack of jurisdiction citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court granted the motion the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention," is more of an obiter dictum rather than the ratio
which ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the case was brought before us, we denied the decidendi.36 She maintains that the fact that said acts occurred aboard a plane is merely incidental, if not
petition holding that under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, Augusto Santos III must prosecute his irrelevant.37
claim in the United States, that place being the (1) domicile of the Northwest Orient Airlines; (2) principal
office of the carrier; (3) place where contract had been made (San Francisco); and (4) place of destination (San We disagree with the position taken by the petitioner. Black defines obiter dictum as "an opinion entirely
Francisco).21 unnecessary for the decision of the case" and thus "are not binding as precedent." 38 In Santos III v. Northwest
Orient Airlines,39 Augusto Santos III categorically put in issue the applicability of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
We further held that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is jurisdictional in character. Thus: Convention if the action is based on tort.
A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue In the said case, we held that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the
provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages "must" be case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention. In fact, our ruling that a cause of action based on tort did not
brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one bring the case outside the sphere of the Warsaw Convention was our ratio decidendi in disposing of the specific
of the objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international issue presented by Augusto Santos III. Clearly, the contention of the herein petitioner that the said ruling is an
transportation by air." Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction obiter dictum is without basis.
other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only
to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Relevant to this particular issue is the case of Carey v. United Airlines, 40 where the passenger filed an action
Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time against the airline arising from an incident involving the former and the airlines flight attendant during an
when the damage occurred. international flight resulting to a heated exchange which included insults and profanity. The United States Court
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charge against III
respondents for falsification of public documents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN OMB-1-96-2268 AS SUCH AUTHORITY IS GIVEN
It is further recommended that the charge against respondents for Violation of Section 3, par. EXCLUSIVELY TO THE OMBUDSMAN.[8]
(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, be provisionally dismissed. This is, however, without The petition deserves ample consideration.
prejudice to its re-opening should the outcome of DARAB Case No. 0040 pending before the
DAR Adjudication Board, Diliman, Quezon City, so warrant.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
The crux of the matter is whether the CA has jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in not required and cases may be submitted for resolution based only on affidavits, supporting documents and
criminal cases. This issue has been directly addressed in Kuizon v. Desierto[9] and reiterated in the more pleadings. Such procedure has been held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of procedural due
recent Golangco v. Fung,[10] wherein the Court declared, thus: process as all that is needed is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[14] In this case, records show that respondents had been afforded such
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the opportunities.
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore,
review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or As to the provisional dismissal of the charge for Violation of Section 3 par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
non-administrative cases. amended, the Court likewise finds no reason to overturn the ruling of the Ombudsman. The hornbook doctrine
emphasized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto [15] must be borne in mind, to wit:
In Kuizon v. Desierto, this Court clarified:
x x x the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they
judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [16]
x x x It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not
matter is void. Since the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of absolute. However, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in
the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void.[11] order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this Court.[17]
The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved party avail of to assail the In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[18] the Court defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:
Ombudsmans finding of the existence or lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases. In Estrada v. Desierto,[12] the Court emphasized that parties seeking to question the resolutions of the x x x grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may file an original action equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
for certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and
of discretion. gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.
Respondents originally filed a petition for certiorari before this Court but the same was referred to the
CA. It, thus, behooves this Court to now look into whether the Ombudsman indeed acted with grave abuse of Here, the Ombudsman based its provisional dismissal on the ground that the case between the same
discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of Public Documents and provisionally dismissing the charge parties before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), DARAB Case No. 0040, had not yet reached finality, as
of Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses there was a pending Motion for Relief from Judgment that was yet to be resolved. The Ombudsman reasoned
Edilberto and Celerina Darang. out that since what Section 3, par. (e), R.A. No. 3019 penalized was the giving of unwarranted advantage or
A close examination of the records will reveal that the Ombudsman acted properly in dismissing the preference to a private party, it was only prudent to await the final resolution in DARAB Case No. 0040, which
charge for falsification of public documents because herein respondents utterly failed to identify the supposedly would show if the favorable recommendation given by Celerina Darang benefiting her husband Edilberto was,
falsified documents and submit certified true copies thereof. In fact, respondents admitted in their petition indeed, unjustified, unwarranted or unfounded.
for certiorari,originally filed with this Court but referred to the CA, that they had not yet submitted documents The Ombudsmans reasoning was not unfounded. Note that the elements of the offense in Section 3(e)
in support of the charge for falsification of documents as they intended to present the same in a formal are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
preliminary investigation, which they expected to be conducted by the Ombudsman.[13] However, it has long public officers have committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation
been acknowledged that in administrative proceedings, even those before the Ombudsman, a formal hearing is to their public positions; (3) that they have caused undue injury to a party, whether the Government or a private
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
party; (4) that such injury was caused by giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such
party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[19] From the foregoing, it can be seen that the complainants must show that the benefits, advantage
or preference given to a party is unwarranted. Since the main issue in DARAB Case No. 0040 is whether the
disputed parcel of land should be awarded to Edilberto Darang, then it is true that a final resolution of the
aforementioned DARAB case would establish whether the benefit or advantage given to him was indeed
unwarranted.
Verily, the action of the Ombudsman in provisionally dismissing the complaint for violation of Section
3(e), without prejudice to its re-opening upon final resolution of DARAB Case No. 0040, is not whimsical or
arbitrary. Such action finds support in the Courts rulings that a trial court, or in this case a quasi-judicial
tribunal, has the inherent power to control the disposition of cases by holding in abeyance the proceedings
before it in the exercise of its sound discretion to await the outcome of another case pending in another court or
body, especially where the parties and the issues are the same. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action (in this
case, the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) before the Ombudsman) cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first action (DARAB Case No. 0040) are settled, the second action
should be stayed.[20]
The reason behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may also be applied here by analogy. The
objective of said doctrine is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency, which has special knowledge, experience and tools to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, has determined some question or a particular aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court. [21] This is not to say that the Ombudsman cannot acquire
jurisdiction or take cognizance of a criminal complaint until after the administrative agency has decided on a
particular issue that is also involved in the complaint before it.Rather, using the same reasoning behind the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is only prudent and practical for the Ombudsman to refrain from proceeding
with the criminal action until after the DARAB, which is the administrative agency with special knowledge and
experience over agrarian matters, has arrived at a final resolution on the issue of whether Edilberto Darang is
indeed entitled under the law to be awarded the land in dispute. This would establish whether the benefits or
advantages given to him by the public officials charged under the complaint, are truly unwarranted.
Thus, aside from the fact that the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman
in criminal cases, it was also incorrect to hold that the Ombudsmanacted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 2001, reversing the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated June 9, 1998, and its
Resolution dated December 11, 2001, are declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.