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Quintos vs. People
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for
review[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 31 July
2012 and Resolution[3] dated 11 January 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776,
affirming the Joint Decision[4] dated 20 October
2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. L-
8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
The Facts
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor
(petitioner) was charged, in conspiracy with his
brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed
Quintos, and Narciso Buni for frustrated homicide
and homicide.
The Information[5] in Criminal Case No. L-8341
reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the
afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy
with each other, with intent to kill, did then and
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking
wounds, several lacerations and contusions on
the different parts of his body, thus, the accused
performed all the acts of execution which would
produce homicide as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of the timely medical intervention
applied on him that prevented his death, to the
prejudice and damage of the said Robert dela
Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The Information[6] in Criminal Case No. L-8342
reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the
afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy
with each other, with intent to kill, did then and
there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking
wounds and several lacerations on the different
parts of her body, thus, the accused performed
all the acts of execution which would produce
homicide as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the
timely medical intervention applied on him that
prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and
damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended
Information[7] was filed when the victim Freddie
dela Cruz died:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the
afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy
with each other, with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost,
maul and hack with bolo and samurai Freddie
dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the
different parts of his body, which caused his

death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of Freddie dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni
and petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando
evaded arrest and remain at large. Petitioner,
Pedro and Narciso all pled not guilty to the
charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses,
namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz,
Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo
Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.
The defense presented two witnesses, namely,
petitioner and Pedro Quintos. Narciso Buni
jumped bail before he could testify. Petitioner's
sister was also scheduled to testify, but since her
testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony.[8]
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution established that at about 3:30
p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz,
Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and
Eduardo Oyando were walking along the
barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan.
They were on their way to the town proper when
they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly
Quintos, Lando Quintos, Narciso Buni and
petitioner. Pedro was wielding a samurai, Lando,
Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and
Rolly was holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie,
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo
Oyando ran back towards their house, but the
five attackers caught up with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz with the samurai,
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but the latter parried the attack with his left
hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain
control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in the
face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was
carrying. Robert dela Cruz lost his hold of the
samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his
head, which caused the latter to fall face up.
Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela
Cruz, who, while defending himself with his
hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and
lost a few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed
Freddie dela Cruz's chest with the same stone he
used to hit Robert dela Cruz in the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as
the latter moved towards Robert dela Cruz.
Pedro pulled Felomina dela Cruz's hair, slashed
her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her
to the ground.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and
was prevented from helping the dela Cruzes
because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him.
The attackers left when they were done, and
only then was Eduardo Oyando able to
approach the victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela
Cruz, were brought to the hospital. They were
treated for the injuries sustained from the attack.
After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz died from his
injuries. Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz
identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his
attackers.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented a different version of the
events. In the afternoon of 15 January 2008,
Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela

Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando came to the
Quintos' house looking for trouble. Pedro, who
was in the front portion of the house, went out to
try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz punched
Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela
Cruz then went to Felomina dela Cruz and took
a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was
holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled
for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz approached
the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and
in the process got slashed with the bolo. The
scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the
ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who
was holding a bolo, was fighting with Lando.
Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie dela
Cruz to defend his brother Lando. According to
Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not
remember how many times he hacked Freddie
dela Cruz. His brothers pacified him, and Pedro
went with them back to the house; while Robert,
Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz,
were brought to the hospital.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the
version of the prosecution. Petitioner was found
guilty for the crime of homicide for the death of
Freddie dela Cruz. However, the trial court held
that the uncertainty on the nature of the wounds
of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz
warrants the appreciation of a lesser gravity of
the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted
homicide.[9]
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision
dated 20 October 2010 reads:
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WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the
Court finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed
penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal which
is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be
taken from the penalty one (1) degree lower
than the imposable penalty which is Prision
Mayor in its full extent, the range of which is from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in
favor of the accused, the accused is
accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Freddie Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php
75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as
moral damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual
damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two
(2) months and One (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay

Robert dela Cruz actual damages in the amount
of Php 1,650.00 and moral damages in the
amount of Php 15,000.00.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two
(2) months and One (1) day or arresto mayor as
minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay
Felomina dela Cruz actual damages in the
amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in
the amount of Php 15,000.00.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and
Poldo Quintos have undergone preventive
imprisonment, they shall be credited in the
service of their sentences with the time they
have undergone preventive imprisonment
subject to the conditions provided for in Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging that
the trial court gravely erred in convicting them
despite the prosecution's failure to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of
merit, thus:
Page 4 of 24
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and
the assailed Joint Decision dated October 20,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case Nos. L-
8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1)
affirming the conviction, despite the
prosecution's failure to prove petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding that
conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of
conspiracy should not be left to conjecture, in
light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to
present evidence that petitioner took part in
inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance of a
common design to kill.[12]
The Court's Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Review of Questions of Fact Improper
The review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. This
Court does not weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.[13] The narrow ambit of
review prescribed under this rule allows us to
swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of
course, admits of exceptions applicable to those
rare petitions whose peculiar factual milieu

justifies relaxation of the Rules such as based on
speculation or conjectures, or overlooked
undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead
to a different conclusion.[14]
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts,
alleging that had the said courts given weight to
the defense evidence, conviction would not
have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for
the Court to review the probative value of the
evidence presented in the proceedings below.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.[15] For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants.[16] Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact.[17]
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts
by alleging that the courts a quo indulged in
conjectures and surmises. However, a careful
reading of the decisions of the trial and
appellate courts shows that such is not the case
here. The discussion of the trial court deals
extensively with evidence from both sides,
weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the
appellate court evaluated the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense alike.
Uniform findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts deserve grave respect, and in the
absence of any compelling reason to deviate
therefrom, are final and conclusive upon this
Court. We thus proceed with our review without
disturbing the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals.
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Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not
supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. His argument revolves mainly on self-
defense, defense of relatives and absence of
conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case
show that the prosecution witnesses Eduardo
Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela
Cruz positively and consistently identified the
accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Their testimonies are corroborated by the
evidence presented by the doctors who
attended the hacking victims, as well as by the
police officer who took the statement of Freddie
dela Cruz before the latter died.
We must emphasize that the trial court found the
prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment
of the trial court on this point is generally binding
on this Court, and none of the exceptions to this
rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court
found that the prosecution witnesses did not
have any motive to testify falsely against the
accused.
Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela
Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting
Felomina dela Cruz, invoking self-defense.
Because of Pedro's admissions, he and his co-
conspirators assumed the burden to establish
such defense by credible, clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, the same admissions would
lead to their conviction.[18]
We held in People v. Nugas:
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when

it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the
accused must discharge the burden of proof by
relying on the strength of his own evidence, not
on the weakness of the State's evidence,
because the existence of self-defense is a
separate issue from the existence of the crime,
and establishing self-defense does not require or
involve the negation of any of the elements of
the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by
sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that: (a) the victim committed unlawful
aggression amounting to an actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the accused
claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable
necessity in the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused claiming self-defense or at least any
provocation executed by the accused claiming
self-defense was not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim's aggression.[19]
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that
Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of their brother
Lando.[20] The defense of relatives argument
likewise fails in light of the lack of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims. For the
accused to be entitled to exoneration based on
defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it
is essential that there be unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful
aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or
repel.[21]
The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this
point is well-taken:
We are hardly persuaded by accused-
appellants' allegations that they were acting in
self-defense because the victims were
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committing unlawful aggression. We found the
following loopholes:
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela
Cruzes were shouting for the brothers of Pedro to
come out of the house. No actual sudden or
imminent attack, however, was performed. It
has been ruled that mere intimidating or
threatening words, even if said aloud, do not
constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, in People
vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:
There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete unless there is clear and convincing
proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive
element of self-defense, must be real or at least
imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief
that a person is about to be attacked is not
sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening
attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual or imminent
danger on the life or limb of a person. Mere
shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening
attitude of the victim does not constitute
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers
to an attack that has actually broken out or
materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or
merely a threatening stance or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes
were shouting for his brothers to go out, but then,
Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the
dela Cruzes had some anger or aggression at
that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela
Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela Cruz engaged in
a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his
mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which
was in Felomina's possession and concealed

under a towel. If this is true, Robert had already
retreated and was trying to arm himself to level
the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedro's
narration, it cannot be definitely said that the
dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-
appellants with the determined intention to
inflict serious harm on Pedro.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to
defend his brother Lando Quintos who was lying
on the ground and being attacked by the
deceased Freddie dela Cruz. According to him,
he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab
Lando. Pedro would like to impress upon the
court that Lando was also involved in the fight
against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same
testimony, Pedro said that it was he alone who
was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and
that his brothers, including Lando, were "just
there, sir, pacifying."
Third, despite the alleged savagery that
transpired, surprisingly, accused-appellants did
not report the incident to the police. During
cross-examination, Pedro admitted that:
After you were threatened and you did not
report of the alleged incident that
Q:
happened on January 15 as what you are
telling now?
A: No sir.
In fact even after you were allegedly
brought to the hospital and you were
treated you did not even rel[a]y to the
Q:
police or even to your barangay the
alleged incident which you are now
narrating, am I correct?
I was not able to report anymore because
A: after I was treated to the hospital I was
brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it
must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
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such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We find it
difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who
vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties,
did not report the incident to the police. Pedro's
alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital
did not prevent them from doing so. Pedro had
at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando;
not to mention his mother and sister, who could
have easily gone to the police to report the
alleged attack upon them by the dela Cruzes.
This omission, therefore, casts doubt on the
veracity of the account of the accused-
appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the
deceased and the other victims negate[s] the
accused-appellants' claim of self-defense.
According to the medical certificate of Freddie
dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest,
septicemia and multiple hacking wounds. Then,
in the death certificate, it was further stated that
Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation of left
and right hand." Meanwhile, with respect to
Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr.
Saniata V. Fernandez, testified that the victim
suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead,
lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela
Cruz, she also suffered almost similar lacerated
wounds.
It has been ruled that the presence of a large
number of wounds on the part of the victim, their
nature and location disprove self-defense and
instead indicate a determined effort to kill the
victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already
explained, the wounds on Freddie, Robert and
Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate
accused-appellant's claim of self-defense.
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to
the evidence presented by the prosecution and

this Court believes that the version of the latter is
more credible and consistent with the truth. As a
matter of fact, by simply admitting that they
attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other
victims, the case against the accused-
appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.[22]
Existence of Conspiracy
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not
present evidence of his participation in the
attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela
Cruz. He also argues that his mere presence
during the said attacks does not by itself show
concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.
Petitioner's presence during the commission of
the crime was well-established as he himself
testified to that fact. Assuming that he was
merely present during the attack, inaction does
not exculpate him. To exempt himself from
criminal liability, a conspirator must have
performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony
and prevent the commission thereof.[23]
Indeed, mere presence does not signify
conspiracy. However, neither does it indicate
the lack thereof. Conspiracy can be inferred
from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.[24] In fact, the prosecution
established that petitioner was actively involved
in the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.
In People v. De Leon,[25] we held:
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he
need not even take part in every act or need
Page 8 of 24
not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
Each conspirator may be assigned separate and
different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another but, in fact, constitute a whole
collective effort to achieve their common
criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
The precise extent or mo[r]ality of participation
of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after
the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina
dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint
purpose and design in the commission of the
felony. The facts, found by the trial and
appellate courts, establish that petitioner,
together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all of
them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and
gave chase even as the latter were retreating
towards their house. During the attacks, each
conspirator had a different task. After the
attacks, all the accused left the felled dela
Cruzes for dead, clearly showing their united
purpose in the felonies committed. The act of
one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved,
the conviction of petitioner was in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition,
and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11
January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Alconga
Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the
banker of the card game, was playing black
jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and
Alconga were partners in the game, they had
one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion
and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who
was suffering losses in the game, found this out

and he expressed his anger at Alconga. The two
almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga
was doing his job as a home guard. While the
said accused was seated on a bench in the
guardhouse, Barion came along and said
Coroy, this is your breakfast followed by a
swing of his pingahan, a bamboo stick.
Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the
ground under the bench with the intention to
crawl out of the guardhouse. A second blow
was given by Barion but failed to hit the
accused, hitting the bench instead. Alconga
managed to go out of the guardhouse by
crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was
about to deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired at
him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and
hit the ground. The deceased stood up, drew
forth his dagger and directed a blow to the
accused who was able to parry the attack using
his bolo. A hand to handfight ensued. The
deceased, looking already beaten and having
sustained several wounds ran away. He was
followed by the accused and was overtaken
after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased
received a mortal bolo blow, the one which
slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face
downward besides many other blows delivered.
Alconga surrendered.
Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used
as a defense by Alconga
Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained.
Alconga guilty ofHomicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to
inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but
after, upon the other hand, having been
wounded with one revolver shot and several
bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury
upon him has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had
no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. He
could have only attacked if there was reason to
believe that he is still not safe. In the case at bar,
it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the
superior fighter and his safety was already
Page 9 of 24
secured after the first fight ended. There was no
more reason for him to further chase Barion. The
second fight will be treated differently and
independently. Under the first fight, self-defense
would have been valid, but that is not the case
in the second fight. In the second fight, there
was illegal aggression on the part of Alconga
and as a result, he is found
guilty of Homicide with no mitigating
circumstance (MC) of Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must
be sufficient and immediately preceding the
act. It should be proportionate to the act
committed and adequate to stir one to its
commission
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court
dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein
petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an
accessory to murder can stand in the light of the
acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate
proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March
21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at
Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan
to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch
television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto,
the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two
gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in
a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He
saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he

switched on the lights of their house. Aside from
Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and
Julius were also in the house. They went down to
meet Roberto who was crying and they called
for help from the neighbors. The neighbor
responded by turning on their lights and the
street lights and coming down from their houses.
After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw
Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle
coming from the south. Vino was the one driving
the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an
armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they
stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his
armalite at Ernesto and his companions.
Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart
Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo
Cacananta took his ante-mortemstatement. In
the said statement which the victim signed with
his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his
assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the
following-
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged
with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt.
Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22,
1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of
Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office
(JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the
military, while the case against Vino was given
due course by the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the
Page 10 of 24
fiscal's office who then filed an information
charging Vino of the crime of murder in the
Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with
the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in
his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the
prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21,
1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court
finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime
of murder and imposing on him the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4
Years and 2 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being
a mere accessory to the crime and to pay the
costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused having been denied, he interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due course, a
Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of
the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the
following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE
CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR
HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF
THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS
BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE
INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR
THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE
CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN
THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE
PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN
ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19,
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN
SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE
VIGILANCE OF THE LAW

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE
STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST
BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN
ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF
THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES
PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court
of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the
JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he
was discharged from the military service. He was
later charged with murder in the same Regional
Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal
Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading
dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed
this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by
the trial court in a decision that was rendered on
August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on
the petition. The comment was submitted by the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On
January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the
petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently
show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment.
Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to
which the respondents were again required to
comment. The required comment having been
submitted, the motion is now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the
petitioner was charged in the information as a
principal for the crime of murder, can he
thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The
answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the
commission of the crime of murder. Under Article
16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other
categories of the persons responsible for the
commission of the same offense are the
accomplice and the accessory. There is no
doubt that the crime of murder had been
committed and that the evidence tended to
show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That
the petitioner was present during its commission
or must have known its commission is the only
Page 11 of 24
logical conclusion considering that immediately
thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with
Salazar holding an armalite, and they were
together when they left shortly thereafter. At
least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada,
attested to these facts. It is thus clear that
petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape.
Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the
offense charged and the offense proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, in which case the defendant
shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the
offense charged included in that which is
proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where
after trial has begun, it appears that there was a
mistake in charging the proper offense, and the
defendant cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily
included therein, in which case the defendant
must not be discharged if there appears to be a
good cause to detain him in custody, so that he
can be charged and made to answer for the
proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was
charged in the information. The commission of
the said crime was established by the evidence.
There is no variance as to the offense
committed. The variance is in the participation
or complicity of the petitioner. While the
petitioner was being held responsible as a
principal in the information, the evidence
adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the
lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as
an accomplice or accessory under an
information charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have
charged the petitioner as an accessory right
then and there. The degree of responsibility of
petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At

any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial
rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or
not the trial of an accessory can proceed
without awaiting the result of the separate
charge against the principal. The answer is also
in the affirmative. The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and
accessory are distinct from each other. As long
as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the
alleged principal in this case was acquitted can
the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory
be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case
involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal
due to the exempting circumstance of minority
or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the
accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the
crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs.
Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson
case that the acquittal of the principal must
likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory
where it was shown that no crime was
committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of
an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the
conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime
of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner
as an accessory was established. By the same
token there is no doubt that the commission of
the same offense had been proven in the
separate case against Salazar who was charged
as principal. However, he was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge
who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial
court held that the identity of the assailant was
not clearly established. It observed that only
Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle
while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which
Page 12 of 24
testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian
who were listed in the information, who can
corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were
not presented by the prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the
dying declaration of the victim pinpointing
Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was
not shown the victim revealed the identity of
Salazar to his father and brother who came to
his aid immediately after the shooting. The
court a quo also deplored the failure of the
prosecution and law enforcement agencies to
subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug
recovered from the body of the victim and the
two empty armalite bullet empty shells
recovered at the crime scene and to compare it
with samples taken from the service rifle of
Salazar. Thus, the trial court made the following
observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage
of justice in this case due to the
ineptitude of the law enforcement
agencies to gather material and
important evidence and the
seeming lack of concern of the
public prosecutor to direct the
production of such evidence for
the successful prosecution of the
case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the
accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of
the prosecution to adduce the quantum of
evidence required to generate a conviction as
he was not positively identified as the person
who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard
the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory
was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified
person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing
from the scene of the crime immediately after
the commission of the crime of murder. The
commission of the crime and the participation of
the principal or assailant, although not identified,
was established. In such case, the Court holds

that the accessory can be prosecuted and held
liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the
principal died or escaped before he could be
tried and sentenced. Should the accessory be
acquitted thereby even if the commission of the
offense and the responsibility of the accused as
an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no,
he should be held criminally liable as an
accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the
evidence tended to show that the assailant was
Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle
aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the
separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above
discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court
was not persuaded that he was positively
identified to be the man with the gun riding on
the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case
against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce
evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable
doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the
assailant from the scene of the crime. The
identity of the assailant is of no material
significance for the purpose of the prosecution
of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not
be identified the responsibility of Vino as an
accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that
a person may be held liable as an accessory for
helping in the escape of the principal even if the
latter is himself found not guilty. The examples
given are quite convincing. However, I do not
think they apply in the case at bar, which is sui
Page 13 of 24
generis and not covered by the general
principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted
of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named
as the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the
same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in
the escape not of an unnamed principal but,
specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself
has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is
now being held liable for helping an innocent
man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction
should therefore be reversed.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's
opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories
are those who, having knowledge
of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated
therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any
of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or
assisting the offenders to profit by
the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his
public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be

habitually guilty of some other
crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may
be convicted even if the principal is acquitted,
as where the principal was found to be a minor
(U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the
son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People,
84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly
concealed or destroyed the body of the crime
or the effects or instruments may be convicted if
the commission of the crime has been proven,
even if the principal has not been apprehended
and convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who
allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or
assisted in his escape, may not be convicted
unless the principal, whom he allegedly
harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping,
has been identified and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an
accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in
the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged
killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar
(who faced trial separately and subsequently)
was acquitted, ironically by the same court that
convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's
conviction as accessory in the crime of murder
was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in
his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial
court acquitted Salazar, holding that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer
of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his
tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in
the escape of a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil.
377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in
the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case
the charge against accused as an accessory to
theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having
concealed the effects of the crime by receiving
and concealing a stolen watch. Although the
principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on
Page 14 of 24
account of her tender age and lack of
discernment, the accessory was nevertheless
convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio
captain who was charged as an accessory
under paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to
the authorities, was acquitted because the
crime of arson was not proven, the fire being
accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under
paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and
inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as
in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but
the identity of the murderer was not (for the
principal accused was acquitted by the trial
court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who
allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape from
the scene of the crime, may not be convicted
as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned
out, the said passenger was not proven to be
the murderer. The accessory may not be
convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is
acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that
"the accessory follows the principal"
appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that
a person may be held liable as an accessory for
helping in the escape of the principal even if the
latter is himself found not guilty. The examples
given are quite convincing. However, I do not
think they apply in the case at bar, which is sui
generis and not covered by the general
principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted
of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named

as the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the
same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in
the escape not of an unnamed principal but,
specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself
has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is
now being held liable for helping an innocent
man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction
should therefore be reversed.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's
opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories
are those who, having knowledge
of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated
therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any
of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or
assisting the offenders to profit by
the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his
public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other
crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may
be convicted even if the principal is acquitted,
Page 15 of 24
as where the principal was found to be a minor
(U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the
son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People,
84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly
concealed or destroyed the body of the crime
or the effects or instruments may be convicted if
the commission of the crime has been proven,
even if the principal has not been apprehended
and convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who
allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or
assisted in his escape, may not be convicted
unless the principal, whom he allegedly
harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping,
has been identified and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an
accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in
the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged
killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar
(who faced trial separately and subsequently)
was acquitted, ironically by the same court that
convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's
conviction as accessory in the crime of murder
was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in
his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial
court acquitted Salazar, holding that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer
of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his
tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in
the escape of a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil.
377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in
the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case
the charge against accused as an accessory to
theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having
concealed the effects of the crime by receiving
and concealing a stolen watch. Although the
principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on
account of her tender age and lack of
discernment, the accessory was nevertheless
convicted.

In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio
captain who was charged as an accessory
under paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to
the authorities, was acquitted because the
crime of arson was not proven, the fire being
accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under
paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and
inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as
in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but
the Identity of the murderer was not (for the
principal accused was acquitted by the trial
court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who
allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape from
the scene of the crime, may not be convicted
as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned
out, the said passenger was not proven to be
the murderer. The accessory may not be
convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is
acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that
"the accessory follows the principal"
appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
PEOPLE v. COLLADO SCRA 698 v. 628
Facts:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian
asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were
engaged in selling shabu. Afterrecording the
report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed
the information to his superior, P/Insp. Castillo,
who in turn ordered the
conduct of a surveillance operation. PO2 Noble,
et al., conducted surveillance on the couples
residence. A buy
-bust operation team
was thereafter formed, and the team
proceeded to Marcelinos and Myras residen
ce. Upon reaching the target area, the
assetintroduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a
regular buyer of shabu. During the negotiation
regarding the price, Marcelino then took fromhis
pocket a small metal container from which he
brought out a small plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance and gave thesame
to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting
Page 16 of 24
its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a
table inside the house of thecouple around
which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble
gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team
rushed to the scene.The appellate court found
the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be
lawful considering that they were caught in the
act ofcommitting a crime.
22
Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of
Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165 (sale ofdangerous drugs), as well as the
conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section
11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous
drugs).It therefore affirmed with modification the
ruling of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not there were irregularities in the
arrest of the appellant-spouses?
Held:
No, the arrest was valid.Section 5(a) is what is
known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type
of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites
mustconcur: "(1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or
isattempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer." A
commonexample of an arrest in flagrante
delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust
operation.The arrest of the appellants was an
arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.The
arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra
performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada ofhaving in his
control and custody illegal drug
paraphernalia.Moreover, assuming that
irregularities indeed attended the arrest of
appellants, they can no longer question the
validity thereofas there is no showing that they
objected to the same before their arraignment.
Neither did they take steps to quash
the Informations onsuch ground. They only raised
this issue upon their appeal to the appellate
court. By this omission, any objections on the
legality of theirarrest are deemed to have been
waived by them. Anent their claim
of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true

that under the Constitution, "a search and
consequent seizuremust be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall beinadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding." This proscription, however,
admits of exceptions, one of which is a
warrantless searchincidental to a lawful
arrest.The arrest of the appellants was lawful.
Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
"[a] person lawfully arrested may besearched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without asearch
warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly
shows that the search was made after
appellants were lawfully arrested.
______________________________________
G.R. No. 189834 March 30, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the December 23, 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02541, which affirmed the May
8, 2006 Decision in Criminal Case No. 8393-00 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22 in Imus,
Cavite. The RTC found accused Jay Mandy
Maglian guilty of parricide.
The Facts
An Information2 charged the accused as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of January 2000, in
the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court[,] accused with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and set on fire Mary
Jay Rios Maglian, his lawfully wedded spouse,
Page 17 of 24
who as a result sustained 90% Third Degree Burns
on the face and other vital parts of the body
that caused her death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said Mary Jay Rios
Maglian.
During his arraignment, the accused pleaded
"not guilty."
The prosecution presented witnesses Lourdes
Rios, Norma Saballero, Dr. Ludovino Lagat, Amy
Velasquez, and Ramon Orendain. The defense,
on the other hand, presented accused Maglian,
Atty. Ma. Angelina Barcelo, Atty. Rosemarie
Perey-Duque, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celestino
San Jose, and Lourdes Panopio as witnesses.
The facts established during the trial follow.
The accused is a businessman engaged in the
lending business and the buying and selling of
cars and real estate. He and Atty. Mary Jay Rios
(Mary Jay) were married on January 29, 1999.
They had a son, Mateo Jay.3
On January 4, 2000, the accused and Mary Jay
were having dinner at their home in Dasmarias,
Cavite when they got into an argument. The
accused did not want Mary Jay to attend a
party, causing them to fight. Incensed, the
accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy
had given him for Christmas and told her he
would burn them all and started pouring
kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to
wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the
same time, warned him not to pour it on her.
Despite his wifes plea, the accused still poured
gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his
wife on fire.4
The accused brought Mary Jay to the De La
Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias.
After four days, she was transferred by her aunt
to the burn unit of the East Avenue Medical
Center in Quezon City, where her condition
improved. Subsequently, however, the accused
transferred her to St. Claire Hospital, which did
not have a burn unit. Since her condition
deteriorated, Lourdes Rios, Mary Jays mother,
had her transferred to the Philippine General

Hospital (PGH) in Manila but she was no longer
able to recover. Before she expired, she told her
mother what had happened to her, declaring,
"Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay
Mandy burned me.)" She passed away on
February 24, 2000.5
The accused, in his defense, said the burning
incident was completely accidental. He said it
was Mary Jay who was being difficult while they
were arguing. She threatened to throw away
the clothes he had given her. To spite her, he
also took the clothes that she had given him and
told her he would burn them all. He then got a
match and a gallon of kerosene. Mary Jay
caught up with him at the dirty kitchen and took
the match and kerosene from him. In the
process, they both got wet from the spilled
kerosene. She got angry at how he was looking
at her and screamed, "Mandy, Mandy, wag
yan, wag yan, ako na lang ang sunugin mo.
(Mandy, dont burn that, burn me instead.)"
Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his
wife, left his wife and went upstairs to his son.
While climbing the stairs, he heard Mary Jay
shouting, "Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako.
(Mandy, Im burning.)" He ran down the steps
and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of
the kitchen. He embraced his wife and called
out to his mother to help them. He poured water
on her when the fire could not be put out and
brought her to the living room. He then carried
Mary Jay to the car while shouting for help from
the neighbors. In the process, he sustained burns
on his legs and arms.6
While Mary Jay was still confined at the East
Avenue Medical Center, the accused learned
from a certain Judge Tanguanco that using "red
medicine" would help heal his wifes burn
wounds. The hospital, however, did not allow
him to use the "red medicine" on Mary Jay. He
thus had his wife transferred to PGH. When there
was no space at the hospital, she was
transferred to St. Claire Hospital with the help of
a certain Judge Espaol. The doctors at St.
Claire advised him to stop using the "red
medicine" on his wife when her wounds started
to get worse and began emitting a foul odor.7
Page 18 of 24
The accused asserted that his mother-in-law,
Lourdes Rios, and their laundrywoman, Norma
Saballero, accused him of burning his wife since
his wifes family had been angry with him ever
since they got married. His mother-in-law and
Mary Jays siblings used to ask money from them
and would get angry with him if they did not
receive any help.8
The accused likewise claimed that his late wife
made a dying declaration in the presence of
PO3 Celestino San Jose and Atty. Rosemarie
Perey-Duque. This allegation was corroborated
by PO3 San Jose, who testified that Mary Jay
was a friend and he had visited her at East
Avenue Medical Center on January 13, 2000. He
was there to take Mary Jays statement upon
instructions of Chief Major Bulalacao.9 PO3 San
Jose narrated the incident during his direct
examination by Atty. Bihasa:
Q What, if any, was the reply of Atty. [Mary Joy]
Rios?
A She nodded her head.
Q And after that, what happened next:
A I told her that I will get her statement and she
told me that she could give her statement.
Q And after Atty. Rios told you that she was
capable of giving her statement, what if any
transpired?
A I took her statement, which was in my
handwriting.
Q Her statement was in your handwriting but
who uttered those statements?
A It was Atty. Rios.10
Atty. Duque testified that the last time she spoke
with Mary Jay was on January 13, 2000, when
she visited her at the hospital along with PO3 San
Jose. The statements of Mary Jay were reduced
into writing and Atty. Duque helped in lifting the
arm of the patient so that she could sign the
document.11

The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC rendered its Decision on May 8, 2006,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
finds and so it hereby holds that the prosecution
had established the guilt of the accused JAY
MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES beyond reasonable
doubt and so it hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case was
prosecuted together with the criminal aspect,
the accused is also hereby ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the following amounts
of:
a. Php500,000 as actual damages
b. Php500,000 as moral damages,
c. Php200,000 as exemplary damages,
d. Php200,000 as attorneys fees; and
e. Cost of suit against the accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial
court for not giving credence to the dying
declaration Mary Jay made to her friends who
became defense witnesses. He averred that the
trial court erred in not admitting the deposition
by oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina
Barcelo which would corroborate the
testimonies of the defense witnesses regarding
the handwritten dying declaration of Mary Jay.
The trial court was also questioned for giving
credence to the perjured and biased
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Lourdes Rios
and Norma Saballero. Lastly, accused-appellant
averred that the trial court erroneously
disallowed the defense from presenting Dr. Ma.
Victoria Briguela, a qualified psychiatrist, who
could testify that Mary Jays mental,
Page 19 of 24
psychological, and emotional condition on
February 24, 2000 was disoriented and she could
not have made a dying declaration on said
date.
The CA upheld the ruling of the trial court. The
dying declaration made by Mary Jay to her
mother Lourdes and laundrywoman Norma had
all the essential requisites and could thus be
used to convict accused-appellant. It noted
that while the testimonies of Lourdes and Norma
on the dying declaration had some
inconsistencies, these were immaterial and did
not affect their credibility. It observed that no ill
motive was presented and proved as to why the
prosecutions witnesses would make false
accusations against accused-appellant.
Hence, we have this appeal.
On December 14, 2009, this Court required the
parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so
desired. The People, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, manifested that it was
adopting its previous arguments.
The Issue
In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant
raises the following issue:
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant has
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant contends that (1) he never
or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed or so grave an offense as the
felony charged against him; and (2) that he
voluntarily, and of his own free will, surrendered
or yielded to the police or government
authorities. He claims that the victims dying
declaration showed that what happened to her
was an accident. He avers that this was
corroborated by three witnesses. The victims
attending physician, he insists, also testified that
he was told by the victim that what happened
to her was an accident.
If not acquitted, accused-appellant argues that,
in the alternative, his sentence must be reduced

due to mitigating circumstances of no intention
to commit so grave a wrong and voluntary
surrender. He claims he is entitled to the latter
since he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
before criminal proceedings were commenced
against him. The reduction of his sentence, he
contends, must be by at least another degree or
to prision mayor or lower.
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm accused-appellants conviction.
Dying declaration
While witnesses in general can only testify to
facts derived from their own perception, a
report in open court of a dying persons
declaration is recognized as an exception to the
rule against hearsay if it is "made under the
consciousness of an impending death that is the
subject of inquiry in the case."13 It is considered
as "evidence of the highest order and is entitled
to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and
false accusation."14
The Rules of Court states that a dying
declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present: "(a) it
concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and
the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant would have
been competent to testify had he or she
survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered
in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves
the declarants death."15 The question to be
answered is which dying declaration satisfies the
aforementioned circumstances, the one made
by Mary Jay to Lourdes and Norma, or the one
she made before Atty. Duque and PO3 San
Jose.
Accused-appellant contends that his late wifes
dying declaration as told to the defense
witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose
effectively absolved him from any wrongdoing.
However, it is the dying declaration presented
Page 20 of 24
by the prosecution that satisfies all the requisites
provided in the Rules. In contrast, the dying
declaration for the defense did not show that
Mary Jays death at the time of said declaration
appeared to be imminent and that she was
under a consciousness of impending death.
Moreover, We defer to the factual finding that
the witnesses for the prosecution were more
credible. Mary Jays dying declaration to her
mother Lourdes and to Norma showed that
accused-appellant was the one who set her in
flames. Lourdes and the Maglians
laundrywoman Norma both testified that Mary
Jay, moments before her actual death, told
them that it was accused-appellant who was
responsible for burning her. Lourdes and Norma
both testified that at the time of May Jays
declaration, she was lucid and aware that she
was soon going to expire. Furthermore, the so-
called dying declaration made by Mary Jay to
defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San
Jose suffers from irregularities. The dying
declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and
PO3 San Jose was handwritten by the latter but
he did not have it sworn under oath. We
reiterate too that it was not clear that it was
executed with the knowledge of impending
death since the statements were made more
than a month before Mary Jay died.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts
that Lourdes and Norma were both credible
witnesses and had no motive to lie about Mary
Jays dying declaration. The appellate court
correctly pointed out that although Lourdes was
Mary Jays mother, this relationship did not
automatically discredit Lourdes testimony. And
while accused-appellant alleged that Lourdes
as his mother-in-law did not approve of him, he
could not give any improper motive for Norma
to falsely accuse him. Between the two
competing statements of the two sets of
witnesses, the one presented by the prosecution
should clearly be given more weight as it satisfies
the requisites of an admissible dying declaration.
No intent to commit so grave a wrong

The Revised Penal Code provides under Article
13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed. We held, "This
mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular
moment when the offender executes or
commits the criminal act."16 We also held, "This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there
is a notable disparity between the means
employed by the accused to commit a wrong
and the resulting crime committed. The intention
of the accused at the time of the commission of
the crime is manifested from the weapon used,
the mode of attack employed and the injury
sustained by the victim."17
Aiming for this mitigating circumstance,
accused-appellant once again relies on the
statements of the defense witnesses that Mary
Jay told them what happened to her was an
accident. However, as earlier discussed, Mary
Jays dying declaration contradicts the alleged
exculpatory statement she earlier made to the
defense witnesses. Moreover, the prosecution
took pains in court to demonstrate that fighting
over the kerosene container would not have
caused Mary Jay to be drenched in kerosene.
As aptly explained by the trial court:
The court is convinced that the deceased did
not take possession of the gallon container with
kerosene. The accused had full control and
possession of the same. He is a bulky and very
muscular person while the deceased was of light
built, shorter, smaller and weaker. When a
demonstration was made in open court about
the struggle for possession of the container, it
was shown that the contents of the same did not
spill owing to the little amount of liquid and its
narrow opening. To be able to wet 90 percent of
the body surface the kerosene content of the
gallon container must have been poured over
the head of the deceased. This explains why
when she got ignited, the flames rose up to the
ceiling and burned her from head to toe.18
It is extremely far-fetched that accused-
appellant could accidentally pour kerosene on
his wife and likewise accidentally light her up
Page 21 of 24
and cause third degree burns to 90% of her
body. We, thus, agree with the trial courts
finding that accused-appellant knew the fatal
injuries that he could cause when he poured
kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to
ignite a fire. There was no disparity between the
means he used in injuring his wife and the
resulting third degree burns on her body. He is,
thus, not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under Art. 13(3) of the Code.
Voluntary surrender
An accused may enjoy the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender if the
following requisites are present: "1) the offender
has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or
the latters agent; and 3) the surrender was
voluntary.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009
/apr2009/gr_172832_2009.html - fnt24"19 We
explained, "The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself to the
authorities either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture."20
To avail himself of this mitigating circumstance,
accused-appellant claims that he voluntarily
yielded to the police authorities on October 14,
2002, or before the commencement of the
criminal proceedings against him. He avers that
this claim is backed by the records of the case
and a certification made by the Dasmarias
Police Station. He contends that both the RTC
and the CA inexplicably did not appreciate this
mitigating circumstance in his favor.
A review of the records shows that accused-
appellant on October 16, 2000 filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a Petition for
Review of the Resolution of the private
prosecutor in the instant case. Subsequently, a
warrant of arrest for the parricide charge was
issued against him on October 30,
2000.21 However, a Motion to Defer
Implementation of Warrant of Arrest was filed by
accused on November 13, 200022 and was

granted by the RTC on December 12, 2000 in
view of the petition for review he had filed
before the DOJ.23 On September 11, 2002, the
DOJ issued a Resolution24 denying the petition of
accused-appellant. The defense later submitted
a Certification25issued by the Philippine National
Police-Dasmarias Municipal Police Station
dated October 18 2002 stating the following:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the following are excerpts
fom the entries on the Official Police Blotter of
Dasmarias Municipal Police Station, appearing
on page 0331 and 0332, blotter entry nos. 1036
and 1047 respectively, dated 15 October 2002,
quoted verbatim as follows:
150740H October 2002 "P/I Apolinar P. Reyes
reported that one Jaymandy Maglian y Reyes,
30 years old, resident of #24 Bucal, Sampalok II,
Dasmarias, Cavite, with Warrant of Arrest issued
by RTC Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in CC# 8393-00
for Parricide, voluntarily surrendered to him on
October 14, 2002. Subject is turned over to this
station on this date".
151350H October 2002 "One Jaymandy
Maglian was transferred to BJMP and escorted
by P/I Apolinar Reyes".
(Entries written by SPO3 Ricardo V. Sayoto duty
desk officer)
We find that in the case of accused-appellant,
all the elements for a valid voluntary surrender
were present. Accused-appellant at the time of
his surrender had not actually been arrested. He
surrendered to the police authorities. His
surrender was voluntary, as borne by the
certification issued by the police. There is, thus,
merit to the claim of accused-appellant that he
is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
It bears noting that parricide, however,
according to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, is punishable by two indivisible penalties,
reclusion perpetua to death. The Code provides
under Art. 63(3) that when a law prescribes a
penalty with two indivisible penalties and the
commission of the act is attended by some
Page 22 of 24
mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied. But Section 3 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines) provides that
"persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended." The proper
sentence in the instant case would, thus, be
reclusion perpetua which is still the lesser
penalty.
Anent an issue previously raised by accused-
appellant and which was not discussed by the
CA, while accused-appellant claims that the trial
court erred in not admitting the deposition by
oral examination of Atty. Ma. Angelina Barcelo,
We note that the records show that an
Order26 was issued by Judge Norberto J.
Quisumbing, Jr. granting accused-appellants
motion to take oral deposition of Atty. Barcelo.
Pecuniary liability
The trial court ordered accused-appellant to
pay PhP 500,000 as actual damages; PhP
500,000 as moral damages; PhP 200,000 as
exemplary damages; and PhP 200,000 as
attorneys fees.
We modify the monetary awards, those being
excessive. We award a civil indemnity ex
delicto as this is "mandatory upon proof of the
fact of death of the victim and the culpability of
the accused for the death."27 As We ruled,
"When death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity
ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper
cases."28 Current jurisprudence pegs the award
of civil indemnity at PhP 50,000.29
Moral damages should also be awarded even
absent allegation and proof of the emotional
suffering by the victims heirs. The amount should

be decreased to PhP 50,000 in accordance with
jurisprudence.30 Exemplary damages in the
lowered amount of PhP 30,000 are likewise in
order in this case charging parricide, as the
qualifying circumstance of relationship is
present.31
As to the attorneys fees awarded, these must
be reasonable in accordance with Art. 2208 of
the Civil Code.32 We, thus, reduce the attorneys
fees to a more reasonable amount of PhP
50,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02541 affirming
the RTC Decision that found accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.1wphi1 The fallo
of the RTC Decision should be modified to read,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
finds and so it hereby holds that the prosecution
had established the guilt of the accused JAY
MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES beyond reasonable
doubt and so it hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case was
prosecuted together with the criminal aspect,
the accused is also hereby ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the following amounts
of:
a. PhP 500,000 as actual damages;
b. PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity;
c. PhP 50,000 as moral damages;
d. PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages;
e. PhP 50,000 as attorneys fees; and
f. Cost of suit against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO
G.R. Nos. 135667-70 1 March 1, 2001
Page 23 of 24
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of
statutory rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, it found
him guilty of three (3) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision
correctional in its maximum period for each
count. It also ordered him to indemnify the
private complainant in the amount of
P50,000.00, and P100,000.00 for moral damages.
HELD:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-
appellant guilty of three (3) counts of acts of
lasciviousness. The SC took however to its finding
that statutory rape was committed by him on 5
June 1993. A thorough evaluation of the records
will show that accused-appellant should only be
convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not for
consummated rape.
The SC held that absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.
touching of either the labia of the pudendum by
the penis, there can be no consummated rape;
at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not
acts of lasciviousness.
The SC found accused guilty of 4 counts of acts
of lasciviousness, aggravated by obvious
ungratefulness. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused-appellant was
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto
mayor maximum as minimum, to four (4) years six
(6) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional maximum as maximum, in each
count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Accused-
appellant was further directed to pay the
private complainant P30,000.00 as civil
 Page 24 of 24

indemnity, P40,000.00 for moral damages,

P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of
the four (4) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, and
to pay the costs.