CPR; ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Jessie Campugan vs. Atty. Federico Tolentino Jr.

A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

1. Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Verily,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times
the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility
exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.

In this case, the Court finds no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by the lawyers
with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546 as they merely perform their ministerial duty
without unnecessary delay.

2. Pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.

Thus, even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated
in the amicable settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so as it is their
obligation as lawyers to do so. The presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement
subsisted.

3. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to
the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between
the attorney and the client.

Thus, Atty. Victorio, Jr.s alleged failure to respond to the complainants calls or visits, or to
provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment
without the credible showing that he continued to come under the professional obligation
towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.

JUDGES; DISPOSITION OF CASES; TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

Olaguer vs. Ampuan

632 SCRA 226, October 06, 2010

Lack of transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs) shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend
the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the
deciding judge. Additional court assignments or designations imposed upon respondent Judge did not
make him less liable for the delay.
Respondent Judge really failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously dispose the case. The
respondent should have forthwith issued the order directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs
after the complainant had manifested that the defendants had not filed their memorandum. Yet, he
did not, but instead took more than seven months before issuing such order. Further, had his
additional court assignments or designations unduly prevented him from deciding the case,
respondent Judge could have easily sought additional time by requesting an extension from the
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, but he did not avail himself of this remedy.
Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his failure to decide within the required period
constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative sanction.

Presiding Judge Alfredo D. Ampuan of Branch 33 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City is
reprimanded, with stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

ATTORNEYS FEES

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Nable

675 SCRA 253, June 27, 2012

Under Article 2208, Civil Code, an award of attorneys fees requires factual, legal, and equitable
justifications. Clearly, the reason for the award must be explained and set forth by the trial court in
the body of its decision. The award that is mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision
should be disallowed.

Here, the deletion of the RTCs award of 10% attorneys fees should be sustained considering that the
reason for the award of attorneys fees was not clearly explained and set forth in the body of the
RTCs decision. The Court cannot make its own findings on the matter because an award of
attorneys fees demands the making of findings of fact.

ATTORNEYS; DISBARMENT; MORAL TURPITUDE

Interadent Zahntechnik, Phil., Inc. vs. Francisco-Simbillo

801 SCRA 298, August 24, 2016

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely:
(1) deceit;
(2) malpractice;
(3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(6) violation of the lawyers oath;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.

In this case, a complaint for disbarment based on the respondent attorneys alleged moral turpitude
cannot prosper after the criminal cases charging him with offenses involving moral turpitude were
dismissed by the competent trial courts. The rule regarding this ground for disbarment requires the
respondent attorneys conviction of the offense involving moral turpitude by final judgment.