Group 5 (Case No 23-27)

Aquino, Joanne
Cadavos, Mae Ann
Gabatino, Maria Kriztel
Maquio, Marlon
Sisa, Anna Mae
Vitalp, AprilRose

Case No. 23

Illegal Strike

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JOSE G. DE VERA, ALLIED BANKING
EMPLOYEES UNION NUBE, TOMAS GONZALO, CRISANTO BALISI,
NORBERTO AGUJA, BENITO BARRERA, HERNANIE SISON, MAYNARD
CUENCA, VICTOR M. ALVARES, INOCENCIO SALVADOR, LUISITO MENDOZA,
ARTURO VILLANUEVA, PEDRO PASCUAL, TAGGERT ABASTILLAS, ALICIA
ABILLE, NIDA ABUTAN, TONY ACIBAR, DAISY ADRIANO, ANDREA JOCELYN
AGUDO, ERLINDA AGUS, SONNY ALAYON, NESTOR ALCARION, RAUL
ALIGAEN, EDWIN AMORANTO, BUENERJES M. ANTE, LUISITO ARELLANO,
CARLO ARRANZAMENDEZ, ALVIN ARROCO, JOSEFINA AVILLANOSA, SUSAN
BALLESTERE, TEODORO BANATCILA, EDUARDO BANIS, NOEL BARCENAS,
MAGTANGGOL BAWAL, RODRIGO BEGINO, BENJIE C.S. BETRAN, VIRGILIO
BRILLANTES, JOSE BUFI, APOLONIO BURLAZA, EDUARDO CABALU,
REYNALDO CALAROZA, WALFRIDO CALCABIN, EDUARDO CALCES,
LORENZO CALVELO, JR., EDUARDO CANIZARES, ROY CASIDO, ANGELITO
CASTRO, SALLY CASTRO, ARTHUR CASTROGERES, EDNA CEOCO, SUSAN
CHAN, ANNE CHUA, LETTY CHUA, RODALIA CHUA, CARLOS CHUNG,
RASAURO CLERIGO, MARY ANN CO, DELIA CONDE, AVELINO CONDERO,
MAXIMO CORNEJO, JR., CHARLIE CORPUZ, CYMBELINE CRUZ, JUDITH DE
LA CRUZ, VENERANDO CUI, ADRIANO CUTINES, JR., ED DAGUMAN, MARIE
PAZ DAGUMAN, EDUARDO DAYAO, JESUS DAYAO, WENCESLAO DIMO-OS,
ROGELIO EDORA, LOLITA EL FANTE, ABELARDO EUGENIO, JAIME FERRER,
REYNALDO FERRERI, ROMEO T. FLORENTINO, JOY R. FLORES, ROBERTINO
FUCOY, BUENAVENTURA GABITAN, JOSE GACO, JR., RAUL GALSIM, RAUL
GONZALES, OSCAR CORDULA, CARMELITA GULAPA, OPHELIA DE GUZMAN,
ROGER HAO, BALAGTAS HERNANDEZ, GERARDO ILANO, ALAN DE JESUS,
JAIME JIMENA, CONNIE DE JOYA, HECTOR JULIANO, ALFREDO LEGASPI,
DANILO DE LEON, ARMANDO LIM, ANGELITA LOPEZ, ROEL LOPEZ, CAROL
MABUGAT, ERWIN MACALINO, RAUL MACATANGAY, CATALINO MACLANG,
MANUEL C. MADERAZO, REGINALD MALAPIT, MENARDO P. MALATE,
GILBERT MANAOIS, TONY MANAOIS, JAIME MANIPIS, EDGAR MARCELO,
AMELITA MARCO, ABELARDO MARIANO, JANE MINA MARQUEZ, JULINO
MARQUEZ, RUBEN MEDINA, ERNESTO MENDOZA, NORBEN MENDOZA,
BELINDA MIRANDA, LUCILLE MONTILLA, MARY ANN MUEDA, LOURDES
MUGAR, DINDO NEMIADA, RENE NG, EDGARDO NICASIO, RODEL NUNEZ,
ROLANDO OCAMPO, IRENE OCOS, ALEX OLAES, JOSEFINA ONA, AMADO F.
ONG, GERSON OZARAGA, ROSALEO PACIBE, ANGELINO PALAO, MARIO
PAPA, ELIZABETH PARUNGGAO, LILIBETH PAYPON, ERNESTINA PELAEZ,
ALFREDO DEL PILAR, ELPIDIO PINEDA, MA. LOURDES PLANA, BLESIDA
POBLETE, REMEDIOS POLINTA, AGUSTIN QUILLA, JOSEFINO RAMIREZ, ANA
ROBERTA RAMOS, ALFREDO RAYMUNDO, ROWENA REBOSA, CRISPINA
REMIGIO, EPITANIO REYES, JR., SONIA REYES, VICTORINO REYES,
ANTONIO REQUEPO, TOMAS RUBIALES, ANGELITA SACLOLO, OSCAR
SAGGE, ROMEO SALTING, NICANOR SAYSON, CARLOS SANCHEZ, DEXTER
SANCHEZ, ELOIS SAN MATEO, ALBERT SANTIAGO, CARMEN DE LOS
SANTOS, ROMEO SIMAN, HELEN T. SIY, NOEL SOLIS, GENESIS SORIANO,
TERESITA SY, EVANGELINE SAULOG, JUANITO SULLERA, AMELOU TAN,
EVELYN TAN, GENE TAN, NANCY TAN, ROSALINO P. TAN, EMILIO TARROSA,
JR., EDUARDO TOLENTINO, RUFINO TRINIDAD, JR., ARACELI UY,
ALEXANDER VALENZUELA, PRISCILA VELARDE, REUEL VELARDE, AUDIE
VELASCO, WINSTON VELASCO, LUISITO VENGCO, GRACE VICTORIA,
IMELDA VILLAR, MA. CORAZON VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLAMOR, ESTRELLA
VILLAREAL, MA. VERONICA VILLARICA, ABE VILLARINO, FE YAP, RAMON
ZAFRA, MELY ABANO, ELLEN ABRIOL, GIL AJAS, VIRGILIO ALCORIZA,
FRANCISCO AQUINO, AUDREY ANN ARMENDI, FILIPINAS BOLLER, ROZIELO
CALIWAGAN, MARIE LIAN CEMBRANO, ZERALDA CHAN, MARY
ANTONETTE CHU, VEDASTO DE CLARO, ARNOLD COLLANTES, REYNALDO
CRISTAL, RAMON DIOLAZO, PROCESO DUJUNCO, ANTONIO ENDERIZ,
FLORIAN ENRIQUEZ, ERNESTO ESBER, MARLENE GENEVIEVE ESQUIVEL,
TITA FELIPE, EDILBERTO GALSIM, RIGOBERTO GARCIA, CLARO GANO,
RAYMUNDO GANCIA, SYLVIA GUEVARRA, LAURO DE GUZMAN, ELENA
JABSON, RUBY KUIZON, ENRIQUE LABUSON, ERNESTO LAOANG, EDUARDO
TIAM LEE, AMADO LIM, SUSAN LIM, SHIRLEY LOCSIN, LEONARDO LULU,
MERLE MACARUBBO, CECILIA MAGNO, TERESITA MAHERALNAGH, PERSE-
VERANDA MALLARI, MARIO MARQUEZ, JOYCE ELIZABETH MELENCIO,
ROMEO MENDOZA, SEVERO MORIN, DANILO NATIVIDAD, JANELYN
NELSON, MA. TERESA PAMA, RAMONITA RECUENCO, EDGARDO REGOSO,
TEDDY REY, EDITHA REYES, GEORGE REYES, MA. CECILIA RIVERA,
LOURDES ROSALES, ROBERTO SABAULAN, MANUEL SAN AGUSTIN, MA.
CLEOFE SANCHEZ, MARIO SAN GREGORIO, ARTURO SANTERVA,
CARMELITO SANTOS, MEYNARDO SANTOS, LORETA SIA, MA. TERESA
SORIANO, LEOPOLDO TACUGUE, NOEL TEANO, TEDDY TUPAS, NILO
URBINA, MARY ANN UY, CYNTHIA VICTORIA, VICENTE VIDAL, ERNESTO
YAP, RUBEN ZARANDIN, TERESITA ALHAMBRA, EDMUND ARRIOLA, KELLY
CALUNGSUD, MA. LAARNI CHING, ELENITA DE CASTRO, FLORINDA
REGOSO, LEOVINO REYES, RICARDO SALVADOR, NICANOR SAYSON, and
GRACE VENERACION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 116461. July 12, 1996]

ROLANDO G. OCAMPO, ROWENA C. REBOSA, DEXTER C. SANCHEZ, ELPIDIO

PINEDA, BALAGTAS HERNANDEZ, ALAN DE JESUS, REYNALDO FERRER,
ANGELITO CASTRO, JOSE VILLAMOR, JR., EVANGELINE SUALOG, LILIBETH
PAYPON, GILBERT MANAWIS, SALLY CASTRO, JOSE BUFI, IMELDA VILAR,
JANE MINA MARQUEZ, SUSAN CHAM, CONNIE DE JOYA, TERESITA SY, SONIA
REYES, EVELYN TAN, AMELITA MARCO, HECTOR JULIANO, JUDITH DELA
CRUZ, APOLONIO BURLAZA, ROGELIO EDORA, JAIME MANIPIS, PRISCILA
VELARDE, LOURDES MUGAR, RAUL GONZALES, BLESILDA POBLETE,
ANTONIO RAQUEPO, MARIO PAPA, TONY ACIBAR, VIRGILIO BRILLANTES,
TONY MANAOIS, ELOISA SAN MATEO, MA. LOURDES PLANA, ANGELITA
LOPEZ, ARTHUR CASTRO-GERES, EDGARDO NICASIO, DAISY ADRIANO,
JESUS DAYAO, CARMEN DELOS SANTOS, FE YAP, RUBEN MEDINA, ERNESTO
MENDOZA, EDUARDO CALCES, LUISITO ARELLANO, JOSE GACO, JR.,
TEODORO BANATICLA, ROEL LOPEZ, DANILO DE LEON, NOEL SOLIS,
GENESIS SORIANO, RUFINO TRINIDAD, JR., VICTORINO REYES, MAXIMINO
CORNEJO, JR., ALVIN ARROCO, ERWIN MACALINO, TOMAS RUBIALES,
ANGELINO PALAO, EDNA CEOCO, JAIME FERRER, AUDIE VELASCO,
ANGELITA SACLOLO, CAROL RAMOS, AVELINO CORDERO, EPIFANO REYES,
JR., OPHELIA DE GUZMAN, IRENE OCOS, REGINALD MALAPIT, JOSEFINO
RAMIREZ, ABELARDO MARIANO, RAMON ZARFA, DELIA CONDE, ANNE
CHUA, NENA NG, ESTRELLA VILLAREAL, LETTY CHUA, ANA ROBERTA
RAMOS, EDUARDO CABALES, RODRIGO BEGINO, JAIME GIMENA, GENE TAN,
CARLOS CHUNG, WENCESLAO DIMO-OS, LOLITA ELFANTE, ALICIA ABILLE,
ROY CASIDO, LUCILLE MONTILLA, ALFREDO RAYMUNDO, DINDO
NEMIADA, GERARDO ILANO, CARLOS SANCHEZ, AGUSTIN QUILLA,
CHARLIE CORPUZ, WINSTON VELASCO, RODALIA CHUA, ALEXANDER
VALENZUELA, EDGAR MARCELO, ALBERT SANTIAGO, RAUL GALSIM,
CARLO ARRANZAMENDEZ, JOSEFINA ONA, CARMELITA GULAPA, ARACELI
UY, CRISPINA REMIGIO, BELINDA MIRANDA, GRACE VICTORIA, ROMEO
SALTING, EDWIN AMORANTO, ROGER HAO, MA. VERONICA VILLARICA,
ALFREDO DEL PILAR, BUENAVENTURA GABITAN, LUISITO VENGCO,
HERSON OZARAGA, SUSAN BALLESTEROS, RAMONITA RECUENCO, ABE
VILLARINO, RODEL NUNEZ, ALFRED LEGASPI, RAUL MACATANGAY,
REYNALDO CALAROZA, ADRIANO CUTINES, JR., EDGARDO DAYAO,
LORENZO CALVELO, JR., NESTOR ALCARION, EDUARDO CANIZARES,
REFUNIO MARQUEZ, NIDA ABUTAN, RAMON DIOLAZO, NORBEN MENDOZA,
ROMEO SIMAN, CYMBELINE CRUZ, ROSALEO PACIBE, ABELARDO EUGENIO,
MARY ANN CO, ANDREA JOCELYN AGUDO, EMILIO TARROSA, JR., TAGGERT
ABASTILLAS, RAUL ALIGAEN, CAROL MABUGAT, ERNESTINA PELAEZ,
ROBERTINO FUCOY, MARY ANN MUEDA, CATALINO MACLANG, REMEDIOS
POLINTAN, NICANOR SAYSON, NANCY TAN, JUANITO SULLERA, AMELOU
TAN, SONNY ALAYON, WALFRIDO CALCABIN, VENERANDO CUI, OSCAR
GORDULA, ROSAURO CLERIGO, MAGTANGGOL BAWAL, HELEN SIY,
ELIZABETH PARUNGAO, REUEL VELARDE, NOEL BARCENAS, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 116128 and 116461

July 12, 1996

Ponente: HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

Facts of the case:

The dispute between ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and ALLIED BANKING

EMPLOYEES UNION NUBE started when their collective bargaining agreement which was
to expire on June 30, 1984 came up for renewal. They failed to reach an amicable settlement
particularly on the wage increase issue. The labor union thereupon filed a notice of strike with
the Bureau of Labor Relations..

On December 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended. The orders enjoined the Union from declaring a strike and the management from
effecting a lock out. The orders notwithstanding, respondent Union nevertheless filed on
December 20, 1984, a report on the results of the strike vote that it earlier conducted. On
January 3, 1985, respondent Union staged a strike upon the Union president's contention that
the Labor Minister's assumption order was a mere scrap of paper.
On January 4, 1985, petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion praying for a return-to-work order. On January 6, 1985,
Minister Ople granted the motion and issued a return-to-work order which included a P1,000.00
grant per employee chargeable to future CBA benefits.

In an Order, issued on January 18, 1985, Minister Ople directed the parties to continue
negotiations until January 31, 1985; otherwise, if no compromise agreement is reached, he will
personally resolve the bargaining deadlock.

The parties failed to break the deadlock and so, Minister Ople issued an Order, dated January
31, 1985, directing them to incorporate in their collective agreement the awards granted.

The bank , through notices published in the Bulletin Today, the Times Journal, and the Daily
Express, directed the striking employees to return to work not later than 1:00 p.m. of February
13, 1985.

In spite of these notices, the labor union members failed to report for work on the stated
deadline. They explained that the resumption of their picketing activities was brought about by
their belief that Minister Ople's decision, dated January 31, 1985, was not based on justice,
equity and reason.

Thus, the bank issued notices of their termination.

Meeting the Union demands halfway, Minister Ople, on March 7, 1985, issued a Resolution
modifying his January 31, 1985 Order and so the union lifted its picket lines and notified
petitioner, on March 11, 1985, that the striking employees were returning back to work.
Petitioner refused to accept them back on the ground that the strikers have already been
dismissed for abandonment of work when they failed to obey the assumption order.
In order to quell further dispute, Minister Ople, on June 5, 1985, issued an Order which directed
the bank to reinstate provisionally all striking workers except (a) those who have already
accepted their separation pay; (b) officers of the union; and (c) those with pending criminal
charges.

The Union then filed with us a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction. In the said petition, the union asked that the June 5, 1985
Order of Minister Ople be modified to likewise direct the reinstatement of all union officers,
employees with pending criminal cases and employees who have received their separation pay
with full back wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and employee benefits
counted from March 8, 1985 until actually reinstated. In a Resolution, dated June 18, 1986, we
remanded the petition to the Ministry of Labor and Employment, with the instruction to resolve
all pending factual and legal issues relative to the petition.

On August 29, 1986, Minister Augusto Sanchez, the successor of Minister Ople, modified the
last Order of the latter by ordering the reinstatement of all striking employees, except those
who have already accepted their separation pay. The bank, as a consequence, filed a petition
with the Supreme Court,

Issue:

Whether or not the strikes staged by the Union and the individual respondents are legal.

Ruling:

The court ruled in the case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines., Inc.,[15]15
192 SCRA 396 (1990) that a strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor
of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus, illegal, pursuant
to Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the union officers and members who have
participated in the said illegal activity, are, as a result, deemed to have lost their employment
status. Thus, held that:

"UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 263 (g) on the settlement of
labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character
and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition
questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed
at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national
interests.

Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must
cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the
Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for
instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the
company, to justify their actions x x x"

xxx

One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending
the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be
enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose
precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the
workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a
standstill on the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or
allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the
ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical
to their employer's interest.

This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the management. Such an
unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be justified under
the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor and management. Neither
can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process clause as the order, if thus
interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.'"

In the cases of Sarmiento v. Tuico,[16]16 162 SCRA 676 (1988) and Asian Transmission
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[17]17 179 SCRA 582 (1989) the court
explained the rationale for this rule:

"It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as
it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even
against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or
voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers
so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and
promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is
the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary
servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco
Sawmills. The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company,
if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his
work even if his inclination is to strike."

WHEREFORE, the NLRC Decision of May 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED with respect to the
finding that private respondents were validly dismissed. However, as to its disposition that the
issue of reinstatement and computation of back wages be remanded to the Labor Arbiter, the
same, being inconsistent with the finding of valid dismissal, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Case No. 24

Illegal Strikes

JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU, respondents.

G.R. No. 171618-19

March 20, 2009

Ponente: CORONA, J:

Facts of the case:

Petitioner Jackbilt Industries, Inc., engaged in the business of producing concrete hollow blocks
were forced to temporarily stop its business due to the adverse effects of the Asian economic
crisis which led to compelling most of its employees to go on a leave for six months.

Respondent immediately protested the temporary shutdown alleging that the shutdown was due
to the fact that the collective bargaining agreement was expiring and that it was made to avoid
its duty to bargain collectively. Respondent went on a strike which led petitioner to file a
petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC issued the TRO directing the
respondent to refrain from preventing access to petitioners property.

However, respondent violated the order of the NLRC thus it ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner on the other hand send individual memoranda to the officers
and members of respondent who participated in the strike ordering them to explain why they
should not be dismissed for committing illegal acts in the course of a strike, which was ignored
by the respondent thus resulted to their termination.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal lockout, runaway shot and damages, unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and attorneys fees, and refusal to bargain on behalf of its officers and
members against petitioner and its corporate officers.

The labor arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout and unfair labor practice for lack
of merit. However it found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal for failure to file a petition to
declare the strike illegal before terminating respondents officers and employees. On appeal, the
NLRC modified its decision and held that petitioner should be liable for monetary awards.
Both petitioner and respondent moved for a reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
A petition for certiorari was filed in the Court of Appeals which was later on denied. Thus the
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of a petition with the labor arbiter to declare a strike illegal is
a condition sine quo for the valid termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the
course of such strike.
Ruling:

The principle of conclusiveness of judgment, embodied in Section 47( c), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, holds that the parties to a case are bound by the findings in a previous judgment with
respect to matters actually raised and adjudged therein.

Article 264e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing
the free ingress to and egress from the employers premises. Since respondent was found in the
July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles
from petitioners compound, respondents officers and employees clearly committed illegal acts
in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike.

The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore,
pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso
facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The July 13, 2005 decision and February 9,
2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65208 and CA-G.R. SP No. 65425
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Case No. 26

Effect of Illegality

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, JOSE ERAD,

FERNANDO HERNANDO, EDDIE ESTRELLA, CIRILO DAYAG,
EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO, RENE ARAO, JUANITO
GAHUM, EMILIANO MAGNO, PERLITO LISONDRA, GREGORIO
ALBARAN, ABRAHAM BAYLON, DIONESIO TRUCIO, TOMAS BASCO
AND ROSARIO SINDAY, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL.,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
CADECO AGRO DEVELOPMENT PHILS., INC., respondents.

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL.,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.

G.R. No. 95494-97

September 7, 1995

Ponente:

Facts of the case:

Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development

Philippines, Inc. were sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Lapanday
Workers Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees
of private respondents and other petitioners were member of the Union.

Respondents contracted with Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc to provide
security services for their businesses.

Unfortunately, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned
down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later identified as
Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents. As most
of the union members were saddened by the death of their leader, they were not able to catch
up with their quota and did not return to work after knowing the death.

The Companies then charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown. They then
filed a petition for illegal strike.
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened as he called the parties to settle the issue in his office.
However, with great dismay, it was fruitless as the Company refused to withdraw the case.

A strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union. The result of the vote was then
submitted to NCMB. However, 2 days after, on October 12, 1988, Union struck.

On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiters and NLRC on appeal, ruled that the Union
staged an illegal strike. Only the employees-union officers were dismissed and have lost their
employment.

Issues:

1. Whether the strike conducted by the union on October 2, 1988 illegal.

2. Whether the decision that only the employee-union officers were dismissed

Ruling:

1. Yes. There was an illegal strike in this case.

The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No.
111, dated December 24, 1986.3

Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:

1. (c)In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent
may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or
recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor
organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution
and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action
immediately.
xxx xxx xxx

2. (f)A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majorityof the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by
a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners
in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The
decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same
grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at
its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of
secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry
the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended str ike or lockout
subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
Article 264 of the same Code reads:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a

strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title
VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article
or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported
to the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided that mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours)

A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result
of an industrial or labor dispute.4 It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of
workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint
product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the
relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of
society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor
and management together with the overarching public interest.

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment
an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the
majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members
support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital
to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of
management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members
in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to
wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism,
unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate
interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our
laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is
not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote
assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity
and hence, with better chance to succeed.

Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12,
1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by
paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike
prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the
approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy
consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on
the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on
September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public respondent on the matter
is supported by substantial evidence.

2. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the public respondent limiting the
penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike, especially the officers of the
 union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate
themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure.
They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to promote their interest.

The Court agreed with the public respondent that the union members who were merely
instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part
of their benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who
were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall
not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during
the illegal strike.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the public respondent. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Case No. 27

Effect of Illegality

FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., doing business under the
name and style FIL TRANSIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her
capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG FIL TRANSIT-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NMF-
NFL), respondents.

G.R. No. 106316

May 5, 119

Ponente: MENDOZA, J.:

Facts of the case:

Petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc., is a public utility corporation doing
business under the name and style Fil Transit. Respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Fil
Transit-National Federation of Labor (NMF-NFL) is a labor union composed of employees of
Fil Transit.
The Union filed a notice of strike with the (BLR) because of alleged unfair labor practice of
petitioner. Despite several conciliation conferences, the parties failed to reach an agreement,
so that, the Union went on strike. As a result several workers were dismissed. The Union filed
another notice of strike alleging unfair labor practice, massive dismissal of union officers and
members, coercion of employees and violation of workers rights to self-organization.
Conciliation conferences were again held but the Union again went on strike. The strike
declared by the Union was attended by pervasive and widespread violence. The acts of
violence committed were not mere isolated incidents which could normally occur during any
strike. Then, the MOLE assumed jurisdiction and a return to worker order was issued.
Petitioner contends that the strike staged by the Union was illegal because no strike vote had
been taken before the strike was called.
Issues:

(1) Whether the strike was legal or not.

(2) Whether the commission of prohibited activity and any worker or union officer, who
knowingly participates in their commission during a strike, may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
Ruling:

(1) The strike was illegal because no strike vote was conducted. The Order issued by the Sec.
Of Labor indicated that The records show that a notice of strike was filed by the union with
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on May 27, 1986, and after a failure of several
conciliation conferences due to managements consistent refusal to appear, the union went on
strike on June 17, 1986, after a strike vote was obtained.
But the Secretary of Labor did not indicate the basis for her statement nor the date the strike
vote was allegedly taken. Neither did she mention whether her office had been notified of the
strike vote as required by law.
*The cooling off period and the 7-day strike ban are mandatory*
(2) YES. Although the strike was illegal because of the commission of illegal acts, only the
union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the
employer are deemed to have lost their employment status. Union members who were
merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Secretary of Labor is SET ASIDE. The
union officers who participated in the illegal strike and those who participated in the
commission of illegal acts are deemed to have lost their employment status. Petitioner is
ORDERED to pay the employees who did not participate in the commission of illegal acts
during the strike separation pay.

SO ORDERED.
Case No. 28

Effect of Illegality

CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, petitioners,

vs.

BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO

and ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, respondents

G.R. No. 168406

July 13, 2009

Ponente: CORONA., J:

NATURE OF CASE

Petition for Certiorari

Facts of the case:

Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non profit. While, respondents were
former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union).

The union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and
failure to bargain. Afterwards, the company formally responded to the demands of the union
when it submitted the first part of its economic counter-proposal then the second part.
Meanwhile, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the Department of Labor
and Employment.

In response to the companys counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved
proposal, but the company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a
strike on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock.

The company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to
declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that all union officers who participated
in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service.3

The labor arbiter4 declared the strike procedurally [infirm] and therefore illegal. NLRC
affirmed. However, CA set aside the rulings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strike staged by respondents was legal

ACTION OF THE COURT

The petition was denied
COURT RATIONALE

Yes.

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the
unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals
of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference
to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable,
state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.1avvphi1
Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section
shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the
regional branch of the Board. (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have
attached the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB
as there was no such counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6,
2001 after several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or
after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first
part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it by
submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year
after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.

The Implementing Rules use the words as far as practicable. In this case, attaching the
counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was
absurd to expect the union to produce the companys counter-proposal which it did not have.
One cannot give what one does not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was
impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike.
The law does not exact compliance with the impossible. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

Nowhere in the ruling of the labor arbiter can we find any discussion of how respondents, as
union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the strike was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.