Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I.

COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.

Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent
judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Rizal.

The factual background is as follows:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the
following projects

1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.

2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to

shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach,
NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the
company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A
request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this
allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I.
Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of
the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive
an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded
to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued
the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins
and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.
The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work
on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint
and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts
and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States
of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which

included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the
writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant
petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result
is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor
Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when
he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A
distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p.
20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered
opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is
certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or
character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in
the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with
approval, viz.:

It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a

contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the
theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which
it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the
contract. ...

xxx xxx xxx

We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United

States government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor
services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is
evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any
contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract. The trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this
case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)

The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the
following reasons:

In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on
account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant
and over the subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the
grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its
consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this Court for
review.

In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:

 It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with
the procedure laid down in Article XXI of the contract regarding the
prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or,
stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative
remedies against said Government, the lower court acted properly
in dismissing this case.(At p. 598.)

It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity
from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an
imperative authority.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function
of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of
a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs.
Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment
buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The
plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term
of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the
apartments shall have been vacated.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The Municipal Court
of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance,
the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition,
this Court said:

On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief

and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the
Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for
back or Increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by
defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by
the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of
Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated,
the present action must be considered as one against the U.S.
Government. It is clear hat the courts of the Philippines including
the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present
 case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was
raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S.
Government has not , given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this
is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a foreign government without said government's
consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the
courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so
elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it
unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p. 323.)

In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its
consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not
for jure gestionis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent

judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.

Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, * Escolin, Relova,

Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in
the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.

In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where the
contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant
(U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay
area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States
Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with
appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our
courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract."

When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in
the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of
entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).

Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of
its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the
award for the project by the United States government, through its agency at
Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may
have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-
suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case,
helpless and without redress in his own country for violation of his rights
committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name.

Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia
vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:

Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the

jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is inapplicable to
cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts
with the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. A contrary view would
simply run against all principles of decency and violative of all
tenets of morals.

Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and applicable

as well with regard to private individuals as with regard to
governments either domestic or foreign. Once a foreign
government enters into a private contract with the private citizens of
another country, such foreign government cannot shield its non-
performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the
cloak of non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government beyond
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the
execution of unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish
as 'contratos leoninos', because one party gets the lion's share to
the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract is to
sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis
that all parties in a private contract, including governments and the
most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and that such
contracts are enforceable through the help of the courts of justice
with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of such
 contracts if the same had been entered into only by private
individuals.

Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity
in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation.
Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation
committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large,
thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual
monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for
services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the
Philippines.

The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be
over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to
be reasonably assumed and expected that the undertakings in the
contract will be complied with in good faith.

One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like
the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak nations.
The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states are equal
and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding
economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations,
subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not,
when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the American
governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of international law for
their own benefit.

In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities
at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was
honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion of the majority
will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations.
American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter,
dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover
under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines.

This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It fosters

economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our Republic.

The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-
26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance,
L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).
Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States
government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be held amenable
to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.

The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord with
paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights,
powers and authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will
not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis supplied).

Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment
dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which
recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment practices
which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and continuing
favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that an agreement
will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions
cherished by both Governments, ... the United States Government agrees to
accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the Bases, thus (1) the U.S.
Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing
Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the Amendment of May 27, 1968).

Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit express
fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of May 2 7, 1968
which directs that " contractors and concessionaires performing work for the U.S.
Armed Forces shall be required by their contract or concession agreements to
comply with all applicable Philippine labor laws and regulations, " even though
paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver
by either of the two Governments of such immunity under international law."

Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States Government

before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III on respect for Philippine law
of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also amending
RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the duty of members
of the United States Forces, the civilian component and their dependents, to
respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any
activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases Agreement and, in
particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The United States shag
take all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them
(Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further

emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas
surrounding the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States Forces
shall procure goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum extent
feasible" (Emphasis supplied).
Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6, 1979 in
connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations of the
Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of
the principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain
collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines"
(Emphasis supplied)

The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint
statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United States
dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty
extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a
Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the joint
Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7,
1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
political independence of all States are fundamental principles which both
countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the
dignity of each nation shall characterize their friendship as well as the alliance
between their two countries. "

The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base
Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base
Commander and the American Base Commander shall be guided by full respect
for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered
U.S. military operations on the other hand and that "they shall promote
cooperation understanding and harmonious relations within the Base and with
the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex
covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador
Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis
supplied).

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in
the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.

In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where the
contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant
(U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay
area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States
Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with
appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our
courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract."

When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in
the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of
entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).

Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of
its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the
award for the project by the United States government, through its agency at
Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may
have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-
suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case,
helpless and without redress in his own country for violation of his rights
committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name.

Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia
vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:

Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the

jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is inapplicable to
cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts
with the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. A contrary view would
simply run against all principles of decency and violative of all
tenets of morals.

Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and applicable

as well with regard to private individuals as with regard to
governments either domestic or foreign. Once a foreign
government enters into a private contract with the private citizens of
another country, such foreign government cannot shield its non-
performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the
cloak of non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government beyond
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the
execution of unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish
as 'contratos leoninos', because one party gets the lion's share to
the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract is to
sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis
that all parties in a private contract, including governments and the
most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and that such
contracts are enforceable through the help of the courts of justice
with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of such
 contracts if the same had been entered into only by private
individuals.

Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity
in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation.
Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation
committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large,
thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual
monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for
services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the
Philippines.

The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be
over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to
be reasonably assumed and expected that the undertakings in the
contract will be complied with in good faith.

One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like
the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak nations.
The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states are equal
and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding
economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations,
subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not,
when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the American
governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of international law for
their own benefit.

In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities
at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was
honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion of the majority
will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations.
American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter,
dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover
under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines.

This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It fosters

economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our Republic.

The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-
26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance,
L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).
Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States
government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be held amenable
to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.

The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord with
paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights,
powers and authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will
not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis supplied).

Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment
dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which
recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment practices
which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and continuing
favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that an agreement
will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions
cherished by both Governments, ... the United States Government agrees to
accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the Bases, thus (1) the U.S.
Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing
Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the Amendment of May 27, 1968).

Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit express
fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of May 2 7, 1968
which directs that " contractors and concessionaires performing work for the U.S.
Armed Forces shall be required by their contract or concession agreements to
comply with all applicable Philippine labor laws and regulations, " even though
paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver
by either of the two Governments of such immunity under international law."

Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States Government

before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III on respect for Philippine law
of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also amending
RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the duty of members
of the United States Forces, the civilian component and their dependents, to
respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any
activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases Agreement and, in
particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The United States shag
take all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them
(Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further

emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas
surrounding the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States Forces
shall procure goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum extent
feasible" (Emphasis supplied).
Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6, 1979 in
connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations of the
Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of
the principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain
collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines"
(Emphasis supplied)

The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint
statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United States
dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty
extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a
Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the joint
Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7,
1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
political independence of all States are fundamental principles which both
countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the
dignity of each nation shall characterize their friendship as well as the alliance
between their two countries. "

The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base
Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base
Commander and the American Base Commander shall be guided by full respect
for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered
U.S. military operations on the other hand and that "they shall promote
cooperation understanding and harmonious relations within the Base and with
the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex
covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador
Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis
supplied).
 EN BANC

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, G.R. No. 167798

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG
MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
EMILIA P. DAPULANG,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA,
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and
ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BAYAN MUNA Representatives G.R. No. 167930

SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO
A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, Present:
GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
ANAKPAWIS Representatives PUNO,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO QUISUMBING,
and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, CARPIO,
Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO CORONA,
and RENATO M. REYES, JR. CARPIO-MORALES,

of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ CALLEJO, SR.,

of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO AZCUNA,
of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE TINGA,
of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG CHICO-NAZARIO,
of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, and
of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, VELASCO, Jr., JJ.
AMADO GAT INCIONG,
RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,
SHARON R. DUREMDES of the
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
IN THE PHILIPPINES, and
BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC)
of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR
RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AMRSP),
Petitioners,

- versus -

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI,
in his capacity as Director-General
of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)
and the Administrator of the Promulgated:
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO),
Respondents. April 19, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of
Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND

GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION
(ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this

Administration;

WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in

government have created unnecessary and costly redundancies
and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for
individuals to be holding several identification cards;

WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate

the processes and issuance of identification cards in government to
reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those
transacting business with government;

WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate

private businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of
government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and
prevent violations of laws involving false names and identities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:

Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose

identification (ID) system for government. All government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
are hereby directed to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to
ensure the attainment of the following objectives:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden

on both the government and the public brought about
by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance
of redundant database containing the same or related
information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting
business with the government and those availing of
government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote
the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under
this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of
government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective
government service.
 Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to
their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive
order.

Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID

system The data to be collected and recorded by the participating
agencies shall be limited to the following:

Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and

a common reference number shall form part of the stored ID data and, together
with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the right
thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear on the
face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.

Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National

Economic and Development Authority, to Harmonize All
Government Identification Systems. The Director-General,
National Economic Development Authority, is hereby authorized to
streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.

Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-

General, National Economic and Development Authority. In
addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-
General, National Economic and Development Authority, shall have
the following functions and responsibilities:

a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this

executive order a unified government ID system
containing only such data and features, as indicated
 in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of
the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments,
through their respective leagues of governors or
mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
and with other branches or instrumentalities of the
government, for the purpose of ensuring government-
wide adoption of and support to this effort to
streamline the ID systems in government;
b. Call on any other government agency or
institution, or create subcommittees or technical
working groups, to provide such assistance as may
be necessary or required for the effective
performance of its functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be
necessary in pursuance of the objectives of
this executive order.

Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National

Economic and Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies
shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to
ensure that the right to privacy of an individual takes precedence
over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a
minimum, include the following:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used

only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3
of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data
in violation of a persons right to privacy shall be
allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
identification system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept
and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or
written authorization of the Owner shall be required
for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by
advanced security features and cryptographic
technology; and
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card
shall be required for any correction or revision of
 relevant data, or under such conditions as the
participating agency issuing the identification card
shall prescribe.

Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended

by the Department of Budget and Management shall be provided to
carry out the objectives of this executive order.

Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or

issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with
this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified
accordingly.

Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect

fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year
of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.

Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection
and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it

constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right
to privacy.[1]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following
grounds:

1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates

the decision of this Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et al.,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282
otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as

she has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the
 implementation of the EO will use public funds not
appropriated by Congress for that purpose.

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to

privacy
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without
the owners consent.

(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate

safeguards or penalties for any violation of its
provisions.

(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize

the necessity of EO 420.

4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO

420, the Executive Order was issued without public hearing.
5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection
of laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of and
penalizes those without ID.[2]

Issues

Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO
420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.Second, petitioners
claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of

the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the
Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount public
concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The petitions also
present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all
government entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to
implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence,
the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and

government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order. EO 420
applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been
issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities
are the GSIS,[3] SSS,[4] Philhealth,[5] Mayors Office,[6] LTO,[7] PRC,[8] and similar
government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified
multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of
their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs.Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates
the purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial

burden on both the government and the public brought about
by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of
redundant database containing the same or related
information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting

business with the government and those availing of
government services;

c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider

use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive
order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-
issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and

effective government service.
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide
convenience to the people served by government entities.

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth;
(8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like
moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.

These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal
identification by government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one
who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14
specific data.

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data

from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data
required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the
government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for
identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.

Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data
for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of
these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some government
entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the
data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs
they issue are dissimilar.

In the case of the Supreme Court,[9] the IDs that the Court issues to all its
employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name;
(2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7)
Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14)
Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15)
Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the
sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.

In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only

the first five items listed in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the
common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the
Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for
government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the
Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax
Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified,

and making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits.
These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies,
compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and
thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format
for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the
collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO
420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can individually
adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly
within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities
that are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in

either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can
enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely
an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the

government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can

direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing
laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive
branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent
constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to
the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID
cards.[10] This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory
for all branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.[11] The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus,
in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to

promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO
420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional
power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by
the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal

them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but
merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well
as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing
laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for
imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation.Private employers routinely
issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue
ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to
their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper
identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These
ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are
voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or
member of a club.

What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID

card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a
special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such
purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as
compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third,
when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data
beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the
citizens right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation
because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420
have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all
branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a
very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while
safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under
the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not
compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government
entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards
as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that
presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own
name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data
specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and
the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure
integrity and reliability of identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive
department should undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations,
insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly service
to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day
functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme
Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second
level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of the
appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals.

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts

within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the
Executive department. If government entities under the Executive department
decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to
achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not
involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does
not constitute usurpation of legislative power.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities
have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these
government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no
complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording
of personal identification data.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners
do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain against the
unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID
system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card
itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card
system under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed
than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind,
nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under
EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data
mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in
their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the
Supreme Courts ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities

prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal
identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420,
the following safeguards are instituted:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be

used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this
executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other

data in violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed or
tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the

identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be

kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or
written authorization of the Owner shall be required for
access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected

by advanced security features and cryptographic technology;

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification

card shall be required for any correction or revision of
relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating
agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
 On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even
narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to
the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the
prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems
by government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national
ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal.Other countries which do not have national
ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the
Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other
public services.[12] Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the
countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only
sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS,

Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated
functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses
arising from false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing
system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.

The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to

privacy, namely, Griswold v. Connecticut,[13] U.S. JusticeDepartment v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,[14] and Whalen v. Roe.[15] The last two
decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to
the present case.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law

that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of
the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms of married
couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship. Because the facts and the issue involved
in Griswold are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no
persuasive bearing on the present case.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could
collect and store information on individuals from public records nationwide but
whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The premise
of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and
store in a central database information on citizens gathered from public
records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of
Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification
records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to
exchange such information with officials of States, cities and other
institutions. The Department of Justice treated such information as confidential. A
CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal
records of four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of Information Act
expressly exempts release of information that would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, and the information demanded falls under that
category of exempt information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the
personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly
confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly
confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly
confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public
concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the
ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually
supports the validity EO 420.

Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional

protection for control over information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the
government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that
have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized
database containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the
identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the database
allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their
personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy
claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital

personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even
when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the
patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the
State having responsibility for the health of the community does
not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of
privacy. (Emphasis supplied)

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York
State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine
government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the
14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike
the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking
prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy.

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have

reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,[16] the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing
abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the
inspection of such records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed
to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patients
confidentiality and privacy are permissible.

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.

Casey,[17] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that required doctors performing
an abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctors name, the
womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman
had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the
marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made
such information publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of
medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no
purpose other than to make abortion more difficult.

Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S.

Supreme Court have upheld in Whalen, Danforth and Caseyas not violative of
the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far benign and
cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires
disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot
possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of
EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not
authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the
assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was
annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for
appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by
this Court.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID

systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing
laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do
not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive
issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish
[19]
a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a
national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national
data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
 In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the
Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is
declared VALID.

SO ORDERED.