Salvador v People (SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES)

FACTS:

A Special Mission Group of the Philippine Air Force were conducting routine surveillance
operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of drug trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by Philippine Airlines personnel.
An identified aircraft was kept on close watch by the authorities after an unusual activity
involving three PAL personnel were observed
The three persons who earlier boarded the aircraft later disembarked with their abdominal
areas bulging, and proceeded to ride a tow truck with its lights off
The PAF surveillance team promptly followed the tow truck and blocked and stopped the tow
truck. Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos, and the driver of the tow
truck were identified and were asked to alight
Uniforms of the personnel were observed to be bulging and one was seen as slightly open, when
one of the authorities noticed a girdle and a package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell
Thereupon the rest of the team surrounded the accused without a fight and found more
packages were found underneath their uniforms which were found to be watches and jewelry

ISSUE:

Whether the seized items were admissible in evidence

HELD

The Constitution does not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as unreasonable.
Searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a warrant in the following cases: a) search
of moving vehicle; b) search in plain view; c) customs searches; d) waiver or consented searches;
e) stop-and-frisk situations; and f) search incidental to lawful arrest
The search made by the PAF team was in the nature of a customs search where law enforcers
who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to
search and seize without a search warrant
Moreover, at the time of the search, petitioner and co-accused were on board a moving PAL
aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this
jurisdiction as a valid exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy
to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the
search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
People v Vinecario et al (CHECKPOINTS)

FACTS:

On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at
Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC
gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario),
Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers.
When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack
contains which the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected
that it was a bomb
Upon opening the bag, it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then
brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by
police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some
documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty
for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged marijuana violated their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.

HELD:

Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies
of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individuals right against unreasonable search.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential
interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by
surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not
be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are
operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not
chosen by officers in the field, but by official responsible for making overall decisions as to the
most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials
will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a
 class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room
for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops.
Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is
unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped
and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle
are or have been instruments of some offense.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted
to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even
after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when
interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply
of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he
was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of
the backpack were instruments of some offense.
People v Sinoc (PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFENSE)

FACTS:

Isidoro Viacrusis was riding his company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, when they were stopped
by several armed men who identified themselves as NPA. The said men ordered them to drive a
certain distance and upon reaching Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis
and his driver to alight where their hands were bound. The victims were ordered to lie face doen
on the ground and shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived.
He was able to identify only one of the malefactors who was Danilo Sinoc alyas Colot.
Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of the consolidated cases: Marlyn
Legaspi a resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao del Sur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero,
also of Barangay San Vicente.
The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of the following day, a
secret informant reported to the Police Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen
(carnapped) Pajero was parked behind the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss
Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station Commander, a police team
went to the place. They saw the Pajero and, their initial inquiries having yielded the information
that the man who had brought it there would return that morning, posted themselves in such a
manner as to keep it in view. Some three hours later, at about 10:30 o clock, they saw a man
approach the Pajero who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out
that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc, of Surigao del Norte, had the key of the Pajero, and was
acting under instruction of certain companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at
Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered Pajero, the police officers brought Sinoc to the
Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there. They later turned over
Sinoc to the 459th Mobile Force, together with the Pajero
Four months afterwards, SPO1 Roger A. Basadre and two other officers (of the CIS) brought Danilo
Sinoc to the Public Attorneys Office at Curato Street Butuan City. They asked one of the attorneys
there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinocs statement in writing in his office. Sinoc
asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an affidavit of confession.

ISSUE:

Whether the arrest is valid

HELD:

The law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer, inter
alia When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an offense had just
been committed: i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a Pajero belonging to a private company
had been stolen (carnapped) and its driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the
latter being on the verge of death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer (asset) had reported
 that the stolen Pajero was at the Bliss Housing Project at the Moncayo. It was precisely to
recover the Pajero that a team composed of SPO1 Micheal Aringo and joint elements of 459 PNP
MFC and Monkayo Police Stn. Led by Insptr. Eden T. Ugale, went to that place and, on taking
custody of the Pajero, forthwith dispatched a radio message to Higher Headquarters advising of
that fact.
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached the place where
the Pajero was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the apartment behind which
the vehicle was parked, that the man who had brought the Pajero would be back by 12:00 noon;
that the person thus described did in fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately
identified by Overa as the one who rode on that car Pajero; just as there is no question that when
the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the stolen Pajero and was in the act of
moving toward it admittedly to take possession of it (after having arrived by bus from Tagum
together with another suspect, Ram). Sinocs link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the
kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take
possession of the Pajero. His arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises
the officers clear duty to apprehend him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
People v Enrile (MARKED MONEY)

FACTS:

In the evening of October 25, 1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat.
Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio
Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on
the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the
buyer.
both policemen said that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked
money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and
returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen
then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the
wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with
flowering tops weighing 22 grams.
Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the
marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal

ISSUE:

Whether the arrest was valid

HELD:

Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances :

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the
information supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the
search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on
the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the
police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling
marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would
not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.
 A man's house is his castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate.
There were measures available under the law to enable the authorities to search Enrile's house
and to arrest him if he was found in possession of prohibited articles. The police did not employ
these measures.
Luz v People (VALIDITY OF CONVICTION)

FACTS:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City
Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003, hesaw
the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet. This prompted him to
flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle
drivers to wear a helmet.
He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station, and while he and SPO1
Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He
was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
as the latter may have a weapon inside it.
The accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was
a nickel-like tin or metal container about two to three inches in size, including two
cellphones, one pair of scissors and one Swiss knife.
Upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four plastic
sachets: two of which were empty while the other two contained suspected shabu.

ISSUES:

Whether the arrest was valid

Whether the search was valid

HELD:

There was no valid arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or
she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required.
It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.[11]
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be
said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
 deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In
fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the
police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence,
it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent
and emergency circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.