Juliano-Llave v Republic

Facts
A new law ought to affect the future, no what is past. No vested rights shall be impaired that
pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a Married couple.
Before Sen. Tamanos death, he married Estrellita, twice. Under Islamic laws (1993) and
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Private respondents Zorayda Tamano, in behalf of the rest of the legitimate Tamano Children
filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Sen. Tamano and Estrelitta
being bigamous alleging that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda and that their marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita.
The first marriage having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, complainant Zorayda
asserts that they were not validly divorced because this is not allowed under the New Civil Code.
Moreover, the deceased could not have divorced under Muslim Law as their marriage was never
deemed, legally and factually, contracted under the said law.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case because the Muslim Code questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Sharia courts. The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted
its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. The RTC continued to try the case since there can
be no default but was later postponed in view of the CAs temporary restraining order and eventually
resolving the petition adverse to Estrellita.
The jurisdiction of the RTC was upheld as it is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over
such cases. The RTC rendered Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano void ab initio for being bigamous
under Art. 35 of the Family Code and Art. 83 of the Civil Code.
RTC RULING
Estrellitas motion was denied hence a petition for certiorari was filed by her. The fact that the
late Senator declared civil status as divorced will not in any way affect the void character of the second
marriage, divorce obtained by a Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects
of a previous marriage especially if solemnized under the Family Code and Civil Code.
CA Ruling
In dismissing the appeal, the CA held that Estrellita can no longer file having been given ample
opportunity having asked numerous postponements. With regard to the pending petition for certiorari it
does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court. Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano is void ab
initio for being bigamous the first marriage being governed by the Civil Code. Estrellita asserting the
validity of her marriage under the Muslim Code is steadfast in pursuing the case, thus the issues given.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latte was
rendered prematurely as a) judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Courts final
resolution of her certiorari petition; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process
and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
 Whether Zorayda and Adib have legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab
initio
Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer led to the loss of her right to answer; her petition for
certiorari does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v Macias in justifying the suspension of the period to file an
answer, which was misappreciated. All that was pronounced in the said case is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. In
upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend
the proceedings before the trial court.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that the petition shall not interrupt the course
of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
Estrellita refused to file an answer or to present evidence, her failure to do so were attributable
to her and should not be allowed to benefit from such dilatory tactics. The trial court correctly
proceeded without her answer as shes deemed to have waived her right to present her side.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) requires participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. The trial court immediately directed to the public prosecutor which was sufficient compliance
with the rule above. Further held in Tuason v Court of Appeals, the lack of participation of a fiscal does
not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
neve invalidated by PD1083. The latters marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage has been severed by divorce under PD1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Art. 13(1) thereof provides marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. It does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
The Muslim Code cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
rights on the marriage of the late Senator and Zorayda. The Civil Code provided for the prospective
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code
shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right
acquired or liability incurred thereby.
Art. 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
 Zorayda as injured party have legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of
marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a
bigamous subsequent marriage. The interpretation that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage,
in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Ablaza v Republic
Facts
In October of 2000, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration of
the absolute nullity of the marriage contacted between his late brother, Cresencio Ablaza and Leonila
Honato. Petitioner alleged that the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license rendering
it void ab initio; insisting that he is a real party in interest being the surviving brother of Cresenciano
entitling him to half of the real properties acquired by the latter.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and that petitioner is
not a part to the marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the order and held that
while an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void ab initio does no prescribe it must be
filed by any of the parties to the marriage; the proper party.
Issue
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise
to the mutual rights, duties and liabilities arising out of such relation. The validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. The nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC) demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code; it extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

In Carlos v Sandoval, the following are excepted from the limitation:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity of A. M. 02-11-10-SC; and
 2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

The law in effect at the time of marriage was celebrated is the old Civil Code, the rule on
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC has absolutely no application to the petitioner.
In Ninal v Bayadog, A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The effect of a void marriage is as though no marriage had ever taken place, its invalidity can
be maintained in any proceeding either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facets rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either
the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the
death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground of defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible.
In Carlos v Sandoval, it was held that only the party who can demonstrate proper interest can
file the action. Interest which means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment. The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, for every action must be prosecuted and defended by the real party in
interest.
The wife of Crescenciano, who stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her
own marriage was not impleaded; being an indispensable party under any and all conditions her
presence being sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power the action should be dismissed. Absence
of an indispensable party renders actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act. The
omission to implead the indispensable party was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering Sec. 11, Rule 3 stating that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action, petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading. Decision of the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside.
Carlos v Sandoval
Facts
Reyes, R. T., J.:
Only a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to Mar. 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, o
confession of judgment.
 Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate leaving six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs. During Felixs lifetime, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo who in turn
undertook to deliver and turn onver the share of the other legal heir, Juan Carlos, the petitioner. Three
parcels were registered in the name of Teofilo; the fourth in the name of petitioner.
Teofilo died and was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Upon Teofilos
death, lots 5 and 6 were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTCwhere the parties caused
the approval of a compromise agreement acknowledging their respective shares in the proceeds from
the sale of a portion of the parcel of land. The parties then executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
dividing the remaining lands of the first parcel between them. In the case Rillo v Carlos, the remaining
10, 000 square meter was divided between petitioner and respondents, the same being embodied in a
compromise agreement. Subsequently, the parties entered into a contract equally dividing between
them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In 1995, petitioner commenced, among others, an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage asserting that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and Felicidad was a nullity in
absence of the required marriage license. He also prayed for the avoidance of the contracts entered
with respondent, likewise its cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents.
Respondents contended that the requisite marriage license did no invalidate Felicidads
marriage to Teofilo. Respondent moved for a summary judgment. Petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage.
RTC and CA
The RTC declared that the marriage is void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license; the
contact entered into null and void; and lastly, ordered the Registry of Deeds co issue another title.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. It opined that the summary judgment by the court
a quo is contrary to law and public policy. Art. 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibits the
rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
Material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is
not as fatal as represented. The burden of proof to shoe the nullity of the marriage rests upon the
plaintiff and in any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Petitioner then
moved for reconsideration.
Issue
Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. Procedural issues include the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Ruling
I
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity pf marriage must be proved. Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. The Court
of Appeals was correct in reversing the summary judgment, both rule on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment has no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the significant principle laid down in the said rule provides
Sec. 17 (2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleading, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
In Republic v Sandiganbayan it was held that actions for nullity or annulment of marriage are
excluded from the application of summary judgments. The trial court divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. Participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of
the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present evidence before judgment was rendered.
Active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings of such kind.
II
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the rule Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -(a) Who may file. - A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
The innovation in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets a demarcation between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule marks the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. Compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 As emphasized in Enrico v Heirs of Sps. A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code and is prospective in its application. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. However, the Civil Code is silent who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
Interest within the meaning of the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree of judgment of the cases, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
III
The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
Upon the death of Teofilo, all his property, rights and obligations are transmitted to his
compulsory heirs under Art. 887 where a brother is not among those considered as compulsory but still
has a right to succeed to the estate under Art. 1001 and Art. 1003.
However, the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case hinges upon the
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted or illegitimate son of Teofilo as it would determine
if petitioner is excluded by it or not.
IV
The Family Code provides Art. 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage. Finally, the disposition of the trial court must be
vacated. Case remanded; Teofilo II is proven to be legitimate; The action for nullity of marriage
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Fujiki v Marinay
Facts
Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Marinay in the
Philippines on January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with Fujikis parents; Fujiki went to
Japan leaving Marinay since he could not bring her.
Marinay met Shinichi Maekara, another Japanese national in 2008. Both married in
Quezon City the year 2008 without the first marriage being dissolved. Marinay suffered physical
abuse from Maekara which led to contacting Fujiki while leaving the Maekara.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan; obtained a judgment from a family court in
Japan declaring the second marriage void on the ground of bigamy. In 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the Regional Trial Court for judicial recognition of foreign judgment paying the ruling
from japan be recognized, that the second marriage be declared void ab initio and to direct the
local civil registrar to annotate on the Certificate of Marriage pursuant to the Japanese Family
Court judgment.
RTC Ruling
The RTC dismissed the petition citing the rule that this may be filed solely by the
husband or wife per Sec. 2 (a) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages(A. M. 02-11-10-SC). Sec. 4 of which provides that it be
filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to date of filing or where he may be found in case of
a non-resident.
Fujiki argued that A. M. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage; that his petition is simply a special proceeding contending
that the foreign judgment was consistent with Art. 35 (4) on the Family Code on bigamy and
was therefore entitled recognition.
Fujikis view is that it would be absurd if only the guilty parties would be permitted to
sue. Further, he argued that Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108)
is applicable since entries in the civil registry relating to marriages, judgments of annulments
of marriage as well as those declaring marriages void ab initio are subject to cancellation or
correction.
He asserted that the RTC gravely erred it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue arguing that it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case motu proprio
citing Dacoycoy v IAC which held that trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
The RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration stating that A. M. 02-
11-10-SC applies since petitioner prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage reiterating
the 2 grounds for dismissal previously given. It considered Fujiki a third person since he is not
the husband decreed by the Japanese Family Court without explaining the impropriety of
venue.
On the issue of dismissal of the case motu proprio it cited Braza v The City Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental which ruled that in a special proceeding for correction
of entry under Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages. Emphasizing
that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action and not through collateral attack. This, it held as a jurisdictional ground to
dismiss the petition.
Office of the Solicitor General
The OSG agreed with the petition and prayed that the RTCs pronouncement be set
aside and the reinstatement of the case had. Citing Juliano-Llave v Republicwhich held that A.
M. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy and explains The latter (Injured Spouse) is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
The OSG contended the foreign judgment may be recognized citing Corpuz v Santo
Tomas which held that the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in Rule 108
as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. It asserted that the said judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact under Rule 108. It further argued that there is
no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage citing De Castro v De Castroand Ninal v
Bayadogwhich declared that validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Issues
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable;
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy;
Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
Petition granted. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. In Juliano-Llave v Republic the
rule that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity if annulment or marriage does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
I.
The petitioner needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under Rules of Court; a copy
thereof may be admitted in evidence and proven as fact through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment.
It would be absurd if A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment because it will litigate the case anew. Itd defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. The RTCs interpretation is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits; the plaintiff would be forced on his original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
A foreign judgment relates or affects the status, condition and legal capacity of the parties, this
however, is not automatic. Philippines courts must determine if this is consistent with domestic public
policy. Art. 15 provide that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Recognition
is required of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which such judgment was
rendered and can only recognize the same as a fact according to the Rules of Evidence. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits thereof exercising limited review respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.
In Adong v Cheong Seng Gee, recognition does not involve the extended procedure under A. M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. There is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the second marriage on the ground of bigamy. While
there is no divorce law in this country, the Japanese court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
Public Policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void ab initio under the Family Code.
II.
 Recognition only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court as it creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State. As noed by the OSG, in Corpuz v Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that the recognition of the foreign divorce decreed may be made in a rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a
particular fact.
Sec. 1, Rule 108 states Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located
Fujiki has personality because the judgment (Japanese) concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay, he has personal and material interest which derives from a substantive right of the spouse to
preserve his most intimate human relation and to protect the property interest arising therefrom.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution but a spouses right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights under the Family Code. A. M. 02-11-10-SC cannot
diminish, increase, or modify the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of
his marriage but rather limits the personality to sue, it does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy.Sec. 2 (a) stats that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife which refers to any one from the subsisting
marriage.
Bigamy is a public crime, thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.
III.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A. M. 02-11-10-SCand other related laws. A
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Recognition of foreign judgment is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Art. 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. Second paragraph provides where a marriage
between a Filipino Citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
In Republic v Orbecido the court recognized the legislative intent which is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. It only authorized courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree because the Philippines does not allow divorce
and to try the case on the merits is tantamount to trying the case for divorce.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. As part of comity of nations,
Philippine courtswill recognize foreign judgments as long as there is no inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment. Such right becomes conclusive and the
judgment serves as basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
RTC ordered to reinstate the petition for further proceedings.
Catalan v Catalan
Facts
Orlando Catalan, a naturalized American citizen contracted a second marriage after allegedly
obtaining a divorce from his first wife. In 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
The petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando (docketed Spec. Proc. No. 288) A
similar petition was filed by Louella Catalan-Lee (Spec. Proc. 232), one of Orlandos children from his first
marriage.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Prof. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Prof. 228 was already pending. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not an
interested person and alleged that a case for bigamy was filed against petitioner. Felicitas Amor filed
an action for declaration of nullity against the deceased and petitioner considering the action to be a
prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy (since she was still
allegedly married to Eusebio Bristol) but was acquitted by the RTC since the deceased was a divorced
American citizen and that the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
The RTC dismissed the petition by petitioner and granted that of respondent which held that the
marriage between the former and Eusebio Bristol was valid when she married Orlando, hence, not an
interested party.
In 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision. It held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy but since the petition was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period
it allowed the petition.
It ruled that the issue of litis pendent was not applicable. There must be (a) identity of the
parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and,(c) the identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. It is an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. It involves no defendant or respondent; the
only party is the petitioner. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration
can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both
petitions are filed by the same person. The petitioner is not a party to the petition filed by the private
respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former.
 Any person, regardless of valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be
appointed as administrator for as long as he filed his petition ahead of any other person.As a spouse,
she wouldve had been preferred however a marriage certificate is only prima facie evidence.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that the reason of the CA was illogical in
stating that she was acquitted of bigamy and at the same time holding that her marriage was invalid
insisting that the said acquittal enjoys presumption of validity with regard to their marriage. The CA
denied her motion.
Ruling
The RTC failed to appreciate the finding in the criminal case that petitioner was never married to
Eusebio Bristol. In Van Dorn v Romillo, Jr. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Art. 1 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
Relevant to this case as was held in Quita v CA that once proven that respondent was no longer
a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would apply and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit.
In Garcia v Recio,it was held thatthe fact of divorce must first be proven,as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document.If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries.
Burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. Well settled is that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
The trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce as well as
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, a need to remand the case to establish the
facts thereof, should the validity of the divorce be proved she has preferential right to be issued the
letters of administration. It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce
to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Corpuz v Sto. Tomas
Facts
Petitioner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino Citizen who acquired Canadian Citizenship
through naturalization in 2000. In 2005, he married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Gerbert
left to Canada due to his work right after marriage; April of the same year he came home to surprise his
wife only to find out that shes having an affair with another. Thereafter, he returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce which took effect January of 2006.
 Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Thus, he went to the Civil
Registry of Pasig and registered Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. The NSO then
informed Gerbert his first marriage still subsists and that the said decree must be first judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, which he so did. Daisylyn on the other hand did not file any
responsive pleading whatsoever but requested to be considered a party-in-interest.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition concluding that he was not the proper party to instituyte the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen ruling that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Par. 2, Art. 26.
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that in Orbecido; he further contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse
and that the interpretation of the RTC is contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code.
Issue
Whether the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
Ruling
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. The Family Code recognizes only two
types of defective marriages void and voidable marriages. The basis for judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time for marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after marriage. Our family laws
do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
The Court reasoned in Van Dorn To maintain that under our laws, the Filipino spouse has to be
considered still married to the alien spouse, cannot be just. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino Spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the proviso provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Art. 26 the judicial recognition of
the foreign decreed would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond. Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides for the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country; Art. 26 provides
for the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, the said proviso is not limited to the recognition of the foreign decree. The courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage if the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry. However, no court in this jurisdiction can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse whose status and legal capacity are governed by his
national law.
The RTC was correct limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph; the alien can claim no right under it.
 Par. 2 of Art. 26 bestows no rights in favor of aliens the unavailability thereof to aliens,
however, does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
the foreign decree, this serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law.
Being the subject of the foreign judgment suffices in clothing a party the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for recognition of foreign judgment. As a rule, explained by Justice
Herrera, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country.
Gerbert failed to include a copy of the Canadian Law on divorce. Every precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties (Sec. 48, Rule 39) The res judicata
effect serves as basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms.
The recorded divorce decree made by the Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on the Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate which is legally improper. Art. 407 of the Civil
Code provides that acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, no ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. No judicial order yet exists recognizing the foreign decree thus the
City Civil Registry acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the marriage
certificate hence patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Art. 412 declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court supplements in detail the requirements thereof. Petition granted,
case remanded.
Republic v Orbecido
Facts
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or he to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine Law?
In May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Villanueva in Ozamis City. Lady left for the
Unied States in 1986 along with their son where Lady would then be naturalized as an American. In
2000, Cipriano, through his son, learned that Lady obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley.
Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 pf Art. 26 of the
Family Code; which the court granted. The Office of the Solicitor General sought for reconsideration but
was denied, the OSG then raises a pure question of law contending that Par. 2, Art. 26 only applied to a
valid mixed marriage. The petition for authority to remarry filed before the tial court actually
constituted a declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63 the requisites of which are (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
Historical Background
Art. 26 All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the county where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Legislative Intent
The intent of Par. 2 of Art. 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino Spouse. In
Quita v Court of Appeals the court hinted by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. Thus, it
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who at the time of the celebration were Filipino
citizens but later on one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
Issue
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code
Ruling
The twin elements of Par. 2, Art. 26 are as follows:
1. Theres a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Such foreign law must also be proved as courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Nevertheless, Par. 2 Art. 26 should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, to remarry.