ARTICLE IX
rules promulgated by Comelec.
Section 1. Independent Commissions
The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit
The independent Constitutional Commissions
are:
(1) The Civil Service Commission, which
administers the Civil Service;
(2) The Commission on Elections, which
enforces and administers all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscites, inititatives, referenda, and recall;
and exercises jurisdiction over all election
contests of regional, provincial, city, municipal,
and barangay officials; and
(3) The Commission on Audit , which has
the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post- audit basis, among
others, commissions and offices that have
been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10,
2003
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo Macalintal seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity, such as the provision
authorizing Congress to review IRR
promulgated by the Comelec.
May Congress assume power to review rules
promulgated by the Comelec? NO
Congress may not assume power to review
By vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend, and revise the IRR for the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the Comelec.
The phrase subject to the approval of the
Congressional Committee, which empowers
the Commission to authorize the voting by
mail in not more than 3 countries for the May
2004 elections; and the phrase only upon
review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee are
unconstitutional as they require review and
approval or disapproval of voting by mail in
any country after the 2004 elections.
Congress may not confer upon itself the
authority to approve or disapprove the
countries wherein voting by mail shall be
allowed, as determined by the COMELEC.
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission,
GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005
Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M.
Clemente and Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr.
were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III
of petitioner by the Ombudsman.
The CSC approved the appointments on the
condition that for the appointees to acquire
security of tenure, they must obtain CES or
Civil Service Executive (CSE) eligibility which
is governed by the CESB
then Ombudsman requested for the change of
status, from temporary to permanent, of the
appointments of Carandang, Clemente and
De Jesus
The Ombudsman requested to the CSC for
the change of status from temporary to
permanent, of the appointments of
Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus,
 emphasizing that since the Office of the
Ombudsman is not governed by the Career
Executive Service Board, security of tenure
can be granted despite the absence of CES
eligibility
De Jesus was the only one which was not
appointed.
ISSUE: WON they can be appointed without
complying with the CES qualifications NO
DOCTRINE:
While it is true that constitutional agencies
such as the Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to appoint its officials in accordance
with law, such law does not necessarily imply
that their appointment will not be subject to
Civil Service Law and Rules; otherwise, these
independent bodies will arrogate upon
themselves a power that properly belongs to
the Civil Service Commission.
Had the intention of the framers of the
Constitution been to isolate and grant full
independence to Constitutional Commissions
in the matter of appointments, it would have
been so provided.
the Philippine Constitution provides: The
Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their
officials and employees in accordance with
law (Article IX-A, Section 4). Specifically,
Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution states
that The officials, shall be appointed by the
Ombudsman according to the Civil Service
Law. And since all matters pertaining to
appointments are within the realm of expertise
to the CSC, all laws, rules and regulations it
issues on appointments must be complied
with.
Section 2. Prohibition on Members
Shall not, during tenure, hold any
other office or employment.
Shall not engage in the practice of
any profession
Shall not engage in the active
management or control of any
business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office.
Shall not be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or - controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries
Section 3. Salary
The salary of the Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall
not be decreased during their tenure.
Section 4. Power to Appoint
The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint
their officials and employees in accordance
with law.
In accordance with these rules, the
designation of a commissioner as acting
chairman by the President is unconstitutional.
That being said, when an ad interim
appointment of a member of a ConComm is
not confirmed, another ad interim appointment
may be extended without violating the
constitution.
Section 5. Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy shall be respected
The automatic release of approved annual
appropriations to the constitutional
commissions vested with fiscal autonomy
means that no condition to fund releases to it
may be imposed,
A no report, no release policy may not be
validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy, without violating Sec. 5, Art.
IX-A of the Constitution.
CSC v. DBM, 482 SCRA 233
The CSC via a petition for mandamus seeks
 to compel DBM to release the balance of its
budget for FY 2002.
CSC claims that the reason for the withholding
was the no report, no release policy.
DBM claims that the failure to release the fund
in full is due to shortage of funds.
ISSUE: W/N the no report, no release policy
may be validly enforced against CSC? NO
The policy may not be validly enforced against
offices vested with fiscal autonomy.
Being automatic connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory.
It means that no condition to fund releases to
it may be imposed.
The justification of the DBM does not lie.
Shortage of funds is not an excuse for not
releasing the fund in full of offices vested with
fiscal autonomy.
Section 6. Promulgation of Rules
Each Commission en banc may promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices.
Such rules, however, shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.
Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July
10, 2003
For violating the constitutional mandate of
independence of the Comelec, Secs. 17.1, 19
and 25 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003), insofar as they relate to
the creation of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee, and the grant to it of the
power to review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Comelec, were declared
unconstitutional
May Congress assume power to review rules
promulgated by the Comelec? NO
Congress may not assume power to review
rules promulgated by Comelec.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend, and revise the IRR for the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the Comelec.
The phrase subject to the approval of the
Congressional Committee, which empowers
the Commission to authorize the voting by
mail in not more than 3 countries for the May
2004 elections; and the phrase only upon
review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee are
unconstitutional as they require review and
approval or disapproval of voting by mail in
any country after the 2004 elections.
Congress may not confer upon itself the
authority to approve or disapprove the
countries wherein voting by mail shall be
allowed, as determined by the COMELEC.
Sabili v. COMELEC, GR 193261, April 24,
2012
Main Question: whether petitioner Sabili had
complied with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials
respondent Florencio Librea (private
respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification against him
before the COMELEC
respondent alleged that petitioner made
material misrepresentations of fact in the
latters COC and likewise failed to comply with
the one-year residency requirement under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code
Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under
oath in his COC that he had already been a
resident of Lipa City for two years and eight
months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010
 local elections
ISSUE: WON the Courts can review
COMELECs decision
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the Court does not
ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation
and evaluation of evidence.
However, exceptions thereto have been
established, including when the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence
become so grossly unreasonable as to turn
into an error of jurisdiction.
In these instances, the Court is compelled by
its bounden constitutional duty to intervene
and correct the COMELEC's error.
findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported
by substantial evidence, shall be final and
non-reviewable
in light of our limited authority to review
findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in
a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation
and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by
the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of
its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged,
but has the constitutional duty to intervene.
When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse
mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction.
Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions
Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
Review of final orders, resolutions and
decisions:
1. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions
Any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
2. Rendered in the exercise of administrative
functions
When rendered in the exercise of
administrative functions, it cannot be deemed
as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by
the Supreme Court.
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v.
Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for
the manufacture and supply of voting booths.
However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the
instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an
Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the
contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of
elections, and hence, the said resolution may
not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be
imposed by the COMELEC from said order,
and no direct and exclusive appeal by
certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order.
Any question arising from said order may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the
trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final
orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers.
Saligumba v. CA, 117 SCRA 669
An administrative case was filed against
Auditing Examiner accusing him of rape. It
was dropped by COA due to insufficient
evidence.
The court dismissed the petition as it held that
the power of the Supreme Court to review
COA decisions refers to money matters and
not to administrative cases involving the
discipline of its personnel and even assuming
that it does have jurisdiction to review
decisions on administrative matters as
mentioned above, the court can not do so on
factual issues since its power to review is
limited to legal issues only.
PTTC v. COA, 146 SCRA 190 (1986)
Commission on Audit cannot make a final
decision on tax questions.Then too,
respondent Commission cannot render a
"final order, decision or award" on the
question of whether petitioner should
pay 1% or % of franchise tax. This is
not a matter falling under its jurisdiction.
Rather, it is a matter for resolution by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue whose
decision may be appealed to the Court of
Tax Appeals.
Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582 (1987)
The First Division of the COMELEC rendered
a 2-1 decision favoring Cua but nevertheless
suspended his proclamation as winner in the
lone congressional district due to the lack of
the unanimous vote required by the
procedural rules in COMELEC.
SC held that the 2-1 decision of the First
Division was a valid decision of the
COMELEC itself despite the above rule
because of Article IX-A. Section 7 of the new
Constitution, providing that "each Commission
shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before
it." He argues that this applies to the votings of
the COMELEC both in division and en banc
and that the private respondent himself
recognized this when he filed the motion for
reconsideration/appeal with the COMELEC en
banc.
Estrella v. COMELEC, GR No. 160465, May
27, 2004
In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC
En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, five of the
then incumbent seven members of the
COMELEC participated.Three voted for the
issuance of said order, while one dissented.
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it
should be the majority vote of all its members
and not only those who participated and took
part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. Since the above-quoted
constitutional provision states all of its
members, without any qualification, it should
be interpreted as such.
This Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid
down in Cua.
Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445 (1990)
A COA Decision was signed only by the
Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA
and was adopted in toto as a decision of the
COA.
In the first place the decision was void ab
initio. As manager of the COA Technical
Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
power whatever to render and promulgate a
decision of or for the Commission. Indeed,
even the Chairman, alone, had not that power.
As clearly set out in the Constitution then in
force, the power was lodged in the
Commission on Audit, "composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners." It was the
Commission, as a collegial body, which then
as now, had the jurisdiction to "decide any
case brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for resolution,"
subject to review by the Supreme Court on
certiorari.
Paredes v. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 653 (1984)
In the first leading case on the matter under
the 1935 Constitution, Sotto v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 64033, July 25, 1983, 123
SCRA 758, the opinion of Justice Feria, after
setting forth the applicable constitutional
provisions and the Rules of Court, stated: "In
accordance with the provision of Section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 657, this Court can
not, therefore, review the rulings or findings of
fact of the Commission on Elections." A
caveat is in order. Such rulings or findings of
fact of the Commission on Elections must be
lacking in arbitrariness to be conclusive on
this Court. The above doctrine, of course, is
only applicable under facts that would show
arbitrariness.
Ambil v. COMELEC, 344 SCRA 358 [2000]
A final decision or resolution becomes binding
only after it is promulgated and not before.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member
of the Commission at the time the final
decision or resolution is promulgated cannot
validly take part in that resolution or
decision.[47] Much more could he be the
ponente of the resolution or decision. The
resolution or decision of the Division must be
signed by a majority of its members and duly
promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a
draft ponencia prior to his retirement from
office, but when he vacated his office without
the final decision or resolution having been
promulgated, his vote was automatically
invalidated.[48] Before that resolution or
decision is so signed and promulgated, there
is no valid resolution or decision to speak of.
Mateo v. CA, GR No. 113219, August 14, 1995
[F]inal resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable to the Court
of Appeals. In any event, whether under the
old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving dismissal of officers and employees
covered by the Civil Service Law.
Reyes v. Regional Trial Court, GR No.
108886, May 5, 1995
the decisions, orders and rulings of
COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari" the Constitution in its Art.
IX, A, 7 means the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, 1.2 Since a basic
condition for bringing such action is that the
petitioner first file a motion for
reconsideration,3 it follows that petitioner's
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the First Division of the
COMELEC is fatal to his present action.
Conformably to these provisions of the
Constitution all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, must be decided
by the COMELEC in division. Should a party
be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a
motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en
banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, 7,
"may be brought to the Supreme Court on (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are
certiorari." subject to the exclusive review by this Court;
but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny
by the Regional Trial Court,[17] citing Filipinas
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 611 Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer
(135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
The Comelec's concern with the possible
noncommunicative effect of exit polls --
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested
disorder and confusion in the voting centers --
by the Constitution and the law on the
does not justify a total ban on them.
Commission on Elections may either be
Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec
classifi1ed as those pertaining to its
Resolution is too broad, since its application is
adjudicatory or quasi judicial functions, or
without qualification as to whether the polling
those which are inherently administrative and
is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the
sometimes ministerial in character.[18]
Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive
behavior around the voting centers.[45] There
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that [t]he
is no showing, however, that exit polls or the
conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant to
means to interview voters cause chaos in
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is
voting centers. Neither has any evidence been
not adjudicatory [or quasi judicial] in nature
presented proving that the presence of exit
but simply ministerial or administrative in
poll reporters near an election precinct tends
nature [and only] in obedience to the aforesaid
to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Ordinance and Resolution, citing Garces vs.
Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents
the collection of exit poll data and their use for
xxx To rule otherwise would surely burden the
any purpose. The valuable information and
Court with trivial administrative questions that
ideas that could be derived from them, based
are best ventilated before the RTC [Regional
on the voters' answers to the survey questions
Trial Court], a court which the law vests with
will forever remain unknown and unexplored.
the power to exercise original jurisdiction over
Unless the ban is restrained, candidates,
all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
researchers, social scientists and the
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
electorate in general would be deprived of
judicial or quasi judicial functions.
studies on the impact of current events and of
election-day and other factors on voters'
choices.
Garces v. CA, GR. No. 114 795, July 17, 1996
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec
cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not
leave open any alternative channel of Facts:
communication to gather the type of Garces was appointed as Election Registrar of
information obtained through exit polling. On Gutalac, Zamboanga Del Norte. Before the
the other hand, there are other valid and appointment, the position is held by
reasonable ways and means to achieve the Conception, who was transferred to Liloy,
Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing Zamboanga Del Norte. Conception refused to
disorder and confusion that may be brought be transferred, thus, Election Supervisor
about by exit surveys. Empeynado issued a resolution prohibiting the
transfer. Subsequently, COMELEC cancelled
Conceptions transfer to Liloy. Garces filed a
mandamus with the RTC to effect the
Salva v. Makalintal, GR 132603, September appointment. RTC denied and dismissed the
18, 2000 case, CA affirmed dismissal.
petitioners assert that when the COMELEC
Issue:
exercises its quasi judicial functions under
W/N RTC has jurisdiction to try the case. -Yes
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code

Held/Ratio:
Section 7 of Art-IX A is inapplicable since the
nature of the complaint is administrative.
The case or matter referred to by the
constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must
pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule
is that decision, rulings, order of the
COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art.
IX-A are those that relate to the COMELECs
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers involving elective regional, provincial
and city officials. In this case, what is being
assailed is the COMELECs choice of an
appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is
an administrative duty done for the operational
set-up of an agency. The controversy involves
an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly
can this matter call for the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule
otherwise would surely burden the Court with
trivial administrative questions that are best
ventilated before the RTC, a court which the
law vests with the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
Dumayas v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 141952-53,
April 29, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Dumayas and Respondent Bernal
are rival candidates for Mayor. During the
canvassing of the MBC, petitioner appealed to
the COMELEC 2nd division to exclude 3
barangays due to some irregularities.
COMELEC granted and subsequently
proclaimed Dumayas as the winner. Bernal
filed a MR with the COMELEC en banc and a
quo warranto proceeding with the RTC.
COMELEC en banc granted the MR of Bernal
and reversed the proclamation in his favour.
However, the decision was made with 2
Commissioners (Gorospe and Guiani) already
retired at the time of its promulgation.
Issue:
W/N the COMELEC en banc has a valid
decision despite the retirement of the 2
Commissioners. Yes
Held/Ratio:
In Jamil vs. Commission on Elections, it was
held that a decision becomes binding only
after its promulgation. If at the time it is
promulgated, a judge or member of the
collegiate court who had earlier signed or
registered his vote has vacated office, his vote
on the decision must automatically be
withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes
of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should
merely be considered as withdrawn for the
reason that their retirement preceded the
resolutions promulgation. The effect of the
withdrawal of their votes would be as if they
had not signed the resolution at all and only
the votes of the remaining commissioners
would be properly considered for the purpose
of deciding the controversy.
However, unless the withdrawal of the votes
would materially affect theparty result insofar
as votes for or against a is concerned, we find
no reason for declaring the decision a nullity.
In the present case, with the cancellation of
the votes of retired Commissioners Gorospe
and Guiani, the remaining votes among the
four incumbent commissioners at the time of
the resolutions promulgation would still be 3 to
1 in favor of respondent. Noteworthy, these
remaining Commissioners still constituted a
quorum. In our view, the defect cited by
petitioner does not affect the substance or
validity of respondent Commissions
disposition of the controversy. The nullification
of the challenged resolution, in our view,
would merely prolong the proceedings
unnecessarily.
Aguilar v. COMELEC, GR No. 185140, June
30, 2009
Aguilar vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Aguilar won in a barangay election
against Respondent Insoy by virtue of just 1
vote (265/264). Undeterred, respondent filed
an election protest against the petitioner with
the MTC. Trial Court granted and reversed the
decision. Petitioner raised the decision in
COMELECs first division after payment of an
appeal fee of P1,000. However, COMELEC
dismissed the case for not paying the correct
amount of appeal fee (P3,000). Petitioner filed
an MR which was still denied by COMELECs
first division, this time because of a prohibited
pleading. 2nd MR was filed but was still
denied. Petitioner raised the issue that it
should have been the COMELEC en banc and
not the COMELEC division who should have
rendered the decision on his MR.
Issue:
W/N the COMELEC division has jurisdiction
on the MR No.
Held/Ratio:
In this case, petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing his
appeal was not resolved by the COMELEC en
banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in
obvious violation of the provisions of the
Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Stated differently, the division,
after dismissing petitioners appeal, arrogated
unto itself the en bancs function of resolving
petitioners motion for reconsideration. In
Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we
emphasized the rule that a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling of a COMELEC division, except with
regard to interlocutory orders, shall be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc. Here,
there is no doubt that the order dismissing the
appeal is not merely an interlocutory, but a
final order. It was, therefore, incumbent upon
the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC
First Division to certify the case to the
COMELEC en banc within two days from
notification of the filing of the motion.
This rule should apply whether the motion
fee has been paid or not, as what happened
in Olanolan v. Commission on Elections.
Indeed, Rule 40, Section 18 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure gives discretion to the
COMELEC, in this case, to the en banc and not
to the division, either to refuse to take action
until the motion fee is paid, or to dismiss the
action or proceeding
Cayetano v. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12,
2011
Facts:
Petitioner Cayetano won against Respondent
Tinga for the position of Mayor in Taguig City.
Respondent filed an election protest against
the petitioner while the petitioner filed a
counter-protest against the respondent.
COMELEC division denied the affirmative
defences of Petitioner and ordered the parties
to abide by its decision. Petitioner raised the
case to the SC on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion against the COMELEC
division.
Issue:
W/N SC has jurisdiction. No
Held/Ratio:
The general rule is that a decision or an order
of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated
directly to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be
elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.
However, a motion to reconsider an
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division
shall be resolved by the division which issued
the interlocutory order, except when all the
members of the division decide to refer the
matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a
COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor
can they be proper subject of a petition for
certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only
delay the disposition of cases but would also
unnecessarily clog the Court docket and
unduly burden the Court. This does not mean
that the aggrieved party is without recourse if
a COMELEC Division denies the motion for
reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still
assign as error the interlocutory order if in the
course of the proceedings he decides to
appeal the main case to the COMELEC En
Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and
Repol is when the interlocutory order of a
COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because
of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC
Division issued a temporary restraining order
without a time limit, which is the Repol case,
or where a COMELEC Division admitted an
answer with counter-protest which was filed
beyond the reglementary period, which is the
Kho case.
Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, COA, GR
180989, February 7, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Dela Llana, as a taxpayer,
questioned the resolutions of COA regarding
the recommendation of the Senate Committee
on Agriculture and Food to set up a pre-audit
service on the Department of Agriculture.
COA replied that it has the prerogative to do
so under previously issued resolutions.
Petitioner filed a certiorari that the pre-audit
duty cannot be lifted by mere circulars.
Issue:
W/N the petitioner took the proper mode in
assailing the resolutions of COA No
Held/Ratio:
Petitioner is correct in that decisions and
orders of the COA are reviewable by the court
via a petition for certiorari. However, these
refer to decisions and orders which were
rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial
capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was
promulgated by the COA under its quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers. Hence,
Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable by
certiorari.
Neither is a petition for prohibition appropriate
in this case. A petition for prohibition is filed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions who has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, and the petitioner
prays that judgment be rendered,
commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceeding in the action or matter
specified in the petition. However, prohibition
only lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-
legislative functions.
Cagas v. COMELEC, 663 SCRA 644 (2012)
Facts:
Petitioner CAGAS lost in an election against
Respondent Bautista, He filed protest with the
COMELEC First Division raising election
irregularities. COMELEC denied the
affirmative defences of the petitioner. MR was
filed holding that the matter be certified by the
division and raise the case en banc. It was
denied because the issues questioned are
interlocutory.
Issue:
W/N the SC can acquire jurisdiction No
Held/Ratio:
A decision, order or resolution of a division of
the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
Exception is Kho vs. COMELEC, in which the
COMELEC First Division committed grave
abuse of discretion when it issued
interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not
fall under any of the instances mentioned in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is not to refer the controversy to the
Commission en banc as this is not permissible
under its present rules but to elevate it to this
Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
Section 8. Other Functions
Each Commission shall perform such other
functions as may be provided by law.
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Qualifications of Chairman and of Two
commissioners
natural-born citizens
at the time of appointment, they must
be at least 35 years of age
with proven capacity for public
administration
not candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment
Term: 7 years without reappointment
Term of those 1st appointed: (without
reappointment)
Chairman = 7 years
1 Commissioner = 5 years
1 Commissioner = 3 years
Appointment to any vacancy = for the
unexpired term of predecessor

**Members cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity
Gaminde v. COA 347 SCRA 655 (2000)
President appointed Gaminde as ad interim
Commissioners of CSC. She assumed office
on 22 June 1999. Her appointment was
confirmed on 07 Sept. 1993. Gaminde
clarified from the Office of the President the
expiry date of her term of office. Said office
stated that her term will expire on 02 February
1999. She remained in office until said period.
COA disallowed the payment of her salaries
and emoluments and her co-terminous staff
effective on 02 February 1999, the expiration
date stated in their appointment paper.
Gaminde moved for the reconsideration of the
decision.
ISSUE
Whether the term of office of Gaminde as
Commissioner of CSC expired on 02 February
1999 (stated in her appointment) or on 02
February 2000 (based on her claim)?
HELD
It expired on 02 February 1999, which is
stated in her appointment paper.
The term is the limit during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixed
the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. On the other hand,
the tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. The tenure can be shortened by
either removal from office for cause, becoming
incapacitated to discharge duties of their
office, or their appointment to a new term.
Mathay Jr. v. CA, GR No. 124374, December
15, 1999
During the term of Simon (mayor of QC), he
appointed private respondents to the Civil
Service Unit (CSU) of the local government
of QC. However, the CSC issued a
memorandum to recall, revoke and
disapprove all appointments on said unit.
Simon remedied the situation by offering
contractual appointments to them. However,
Mathay Jr. (newly elected mayor) renewed
once the contractual appointments and later,
did not renew it. Subsequently, CSC ordered
the mayor to reappointment the private
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the CSC has the authority to direct
the mayor to reinstate the respondents?
HELD:
NO. The Civil Service Commissions power is
limited to approving or disapproving an
appointment. It does not have the authority to
direct that an appointment of a specific
individual be made. Once the Civil Service
Commission attests whether the person
chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its
role in the appointment process necessarily
ends. The Civil Service Commission cannot
encroach upon the discretion vested in the
appointing authority.
Under Batas Pambansa 337 (old local govt
code the applicable law), the power to
appoint rests exclusively with the local chief
executive and thus cannot be usurped by the
city council or sanggunian through the simple
expedient of enacting ordinances that provide
for the absorption of specific persons to
certain positions. CSC erred when it applied
an ordinance which states that reappointment
to the Dept Public Order and Safety was
automatic. Section 3 of the said Ordinance is
invalid for being inconsistent with B.P. 337.
Section 2.Scope of the system
1. All branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.
2. Appointments in the civil service =
made according to merit and fitness
 **merit and fitness determined by
competitive examination, except to
the followingpositions: policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or
highly technical.
3. Officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended for
cause provided by law only.
4. No officer or employee in the civil
service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
5. The right to self-organization shall not
be denied to government employees.
6. Temporary employees of the
Government shall be given such
protection as may be provided by law.
Cuevas v. Bacal, GR 139382, December 6
2000
Under Civil Service Law
PARAGRAPH 1
MWSS v. Hernandez 143 SCRA 602 [1986]
NSC v. NLRC 168 SCRA 122
UP v. Regino 221 SCRA 598 [1993]
Dismissed employee questioned WON UP is
under the jurisdiction of CSC
As a mere government-owned or
controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part
of the Civil Service under the 1973
Constitution and now continues to do so
because it was created by a special law and
has an original charter. As a component of the
Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by
P.D. 807 and administrative cases involving
the discipline of its employees come under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Mateo v. CA 247 SCRA 284 [1995]
Private respondent questioned WON RTC has
jurisdiction over Morong Water District, a
quasi-public corporation
MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation
created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 198, known as the provincial Water
Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees
of government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter fall under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.and are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules
and Regulations.
DOH v. NLRC 251 SCRA 700 [1995]
The eternal problem of jurisdiction over
Government employees is again posed in this
case: Which Government agency the
National Labor Relations Commission or the
Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over
contests relating to the civil service?
As the central personnel agency of
the Government, the Civil Service
Commission administers the Civil Service
Law. It is, therefore, the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service
Juco v. NLRC 277 SCRA 528 [1997]
Petitioner from NHC questioned WON who
has jurisdiction over him
Although we had earlier ruled in
National Housing Corporation v. Juco that
employees of government owned and,or
controlled corporations whether created by
special law or formed as subsidiaries under
the General Corporation Law are governed by
the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor
Code this ruling has been supplanted by the
Constitution which now provides:
 The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original
charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2(1).
The rule now is that the Civil Service now
covers only government owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Having
been incorporated under the Corporation Law
respondent NHC's relations with its personnel
are governed by the Labor Code and come
under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Feliciano v. Gison 629 SCRA 103 [2010]
LMWD claims it is a private corporation
subject to the Corporation Code
LWDs [referring to local water districts] are not
private corporations because they are not
created under the Corporation Code. LWDs
are not registered with the SEC. Section 14 of
the Corporation Code states that "[A]ll
corporations organized under this code shall
file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission articles of incorporation x x x."
LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no
incorporators and no stockholders or
members. There are no stockholders or
members to elect the board directors of LWDs
as in the case of all corporations registered
with the SEC. The local mayor or the
provincial governor appoints the directors of
LWDs for affixed term of office. This Court has
ruled that LWDs are not created under the
Corporation Code, thus:From the foregoing
pronouncement, it is clear that what has been
excluded from the coverage of the CSC are
those corporations created pursuant to the
Corporation Code. Significantly,petitioners are
not created under the said code, but on the
contrary, they were created pursuant to a
special law and are governed primarily by its
provision
GOCCs Under the Corporation Code
BLISS v. Calejo 237 SCRA 271 [1994]
Question WON Bliss Corp is covered by the
Civil Service Law for being a GOCC since
HSDC (Human Settlement Development
Corporation), a wholly owned government
corporation, is the owner of the majority of its
stocks when it filed for CE.
BDC is a GOCC created under the
Corporation Law (through incorporation under
the general law). The Civil Service does not
include GOCC which are organized as
subsidiaries of GOCC under the general
corporation law. The BDC is without a
CHARTER, hence it is governed by the Labor
Code and not the Civil Service Law. [1973
versus 1987 CONSTITUTION, In the 1973
(Article II-B, Sec. 1): The civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or
controlled corporation; In the 1987 (Art. IX-B,
Sec. 2): The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter.
Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis society
479 SCRA 628
Extant on the records is the respondents
admission that although its employees are
compulsory members of the GSIS, said
employees are not governed by the Civil
Service Law. If the respondent is truly a
government-owned or controlled corporation,
and petitioners are employees in the public
sector, then, they should have been covered
by said law. The truth, however, is that, the
respondent is a non-profit but private
corporation organized under the Corporation
Code, and the petitioners are covered by the
Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law.
LRTA v. Venus 485 SCRA 301
We agree with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1),
Article IX B, 1987 Constitution, expressly
provides that "[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters." Corporations with
original charters are those which have been
created by special law and not through the
general corporation law. Thus, in Philippine
National Oil Company Energy Development
Corporation v. Hon. Leogrado, we held that
"under the present state of the law, the test in
determining whether a government-owned or
controlled corporation is subject to the Civil
Service Law is the manner of its creation such
that government corporations created by
special charter are subject to its provisions
while those incorporated under the general
Corporation Law are not within its
coverage."12There should be no dispute then
that employment in petitioner LRTA should be
governed only by civil service rules, and not
the Labor Code and beyond the reach of the
Department of Labor and Employment, since
petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter,
Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as
amended.
PARAGRAPH 2
Classifications and Appointments
HIGC v. CSC 220 SCRA 148 [1993]
Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known
as the "Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines," provides the following levels of
positions in the career service: (a) the first
level which includes clerical, trades, crafts and
custodial service positions involving non-
professional or sub-professional work in a
non-supervisory capacity requiring at least
four years of college work up to Division Chief
level; and, (c) the third level; which includes
positions in the Career Executive Service.
Positions in the Career Executive Service
consist of Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau
Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent ranks
as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
the President. Entrance to the first two levels
shall be through competitive examinations,
while entrance to the third level shall be
prescribed by the Career Executive Service
Board. The Constitution clearly mandates that
appointments in the civil service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable, and except
to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by
competitive examination.
Mauna v. CSC 232 SCRA 388 [1994]
The principles defining the power of the
appointing authority vis-a-vis that of the Civil
Service Commission are well-settled. 16 The
power of appointment is essentially
discretionary and the CSC cannot substitute
its judgment for that of the appointing power.
Neither does it have the power to overrule
such discretion even if it finds that there are
other persons more qualified to the contested
position. 17 The CSC may only approve or
disapprove the appointment after determining
whether or not the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the
required qualifications. It cannot order or
direct the appointment of a successful
protestant. Thereafter its participation in the
appointment process ceases. Substituting its
judgment for that of the appointing authority
constitutes encroachment on the latter's
discretion. In fact, even this Court cannot
control the appointing authority's discretion as
long as it is exercised properly and judiciously.
Furthermore, as a civil service employee with
a permanent appointment, petitioner cannot
be removed except for cause provided by law.
Well-entrenched is the rule on security of
tenure that such an appointment is issued and
the moment the appointee assumes a position
in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable right (to the position), which is
protected not only by statute, but also by the
Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2,
paragraph (3)] and cannot be taken away from
him either by revocation of the appointment,
or by removal, except for cause, and with
previous notice and hearing.
Rimonte v. CSC 244 SCRA 498 [1995]

Gloria v. De Guzman 249 SCRA 126 [1995]
We hold that reappointment to the position of
Board Secretary II is an act which is
discretionary on the part of the appointing
power. Consequently, it cannot be the subject
of an application for a writ of mandamus.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a
new appointment which is essentially
discretionary, to be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by
law. 12 Such exercise of the discretionary
power of appointment cannot be controlled,
not even by the Court as long as it is
exercised properly by the appointing authority.
13
It is Our holding that the questioned order of
reinstatement amounts to an undue
interference by the Court in the exercise of the
discretionary power of appointment vested in
the PSCA Board of Trustees.
Atty. Ellas Omar A Sana v. Career Executive
Service Board, GR 192926, 15 November
2011
Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have
suffered any violation of a right vested in him
under EO 883. He was not among the 13
officials granted CESO ranking by President
Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that no
conferment of CESO rank was ever made by
President [Arroyo] in relation to EO 883.19
Hence, for the Court to nevertheless reach the
merits of this petition and determine the
constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 despite their unquestioned
repeal and the absence of any resulting
prejudice to petitioners rights is to depart from
its constitutional role of settling actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
Competitive
Samson v. CA 145 SCRA 654[1986]
Mayor Marcial F. Samson summarily
terminated the services of the private
respondent, Feliciano C. Talens, who held the
position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor,
on the ground of lack and loss of confidence.
In support of his action, Mayor Samson cites
section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of
1959. The cited provision declares the
position of secretaries to city mayors non-
competitive and this was interpreted by herein
petitioner Mayor as to include the position of
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor.
The Supreme Court ruled that under a strict
construction of R.A. 2260, or who belong to
the non-competitive service, the position of
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is deemed to
belong to the competitive service inasmuch
only secretaries to governors and mayors are
expressly enumerated as non-competitive. If
the law intended assistant secretaries to
belong to the non-competitive service, it
should have been worded: Secretaries and
their assistance."
We are not disposed to agree with petitioners.
What petitioners fail to consider is that an
assistant secretary, although described as
secretary, technically differs in function from
the Secretaries. An assistant merely helps,
aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the
person who is actually clothed with all the
duties and responsibilities of secretary.
Needless to say, the functions strictly
attributable to a secretary and which would
repose on such person the trust and
confidence of the employer, is not
automatically vested or transferred to an
assistant secretary, because the latter
simply assists or aids the former in the
accomplishment of his duties.
Non-Competitive
Astraquillo v. Mangalupas 190 SCRA 280
[1990]
Petitioners, Ambassadors, argue that their
separation from the service is illegal despite
the fact that it was effected by the President

The SC ruled that Petitioners' appointments
as Ambassadors to the Foreign Service were
not based on merit and fitness determined by
competitive examinations, or based on highly
technical qualifications, hence, their tenure is
coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasures.
Petitioners' appointments as "chief of mission"
has no effect on the essential character of
their positions as pertaining to the non-career
service, consequently, the termination of their
services lay entirely within the will of the
President, in the exercise of her discretion
Office of the President v. Buenaobra 501
SCRA 302
In this case, Petitioner argues that
respondent, Buenaobra, was a presidential
appointee and a holder of a non-career
service position, hence, she could be removed
from the service at the pleasure of the
President.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent
who is the Chairman of the Komisyon sa
Wikang Pilipino (KWP) is a non-career service
personnel whose tenure is limited to seven
years as provided under R.A. No. 7104
since her tenure is fixed by law, her removal
from office is not at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
Under Section 4, Article IV, of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 807, or the Civil Service
Decree, positions in the civil service are
classified into career service and non-career
service. Section 6 of same article describes a
non-career service employee or officer as
follows: Sec. 6. The Non-Career Service shall
be characterized by (1) entrance on bases
other than those of the usual tests of merit
and fitness utilized for the career service; and
(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified
by law, or which is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of
a particular project for which purpose
employment was made. The Non-Career
Service shall include: x x x x 3. Chairman and
members of commissions and boards with
fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff.
We have consistently ruled that non-career
service personnel enjoy security of tenure
they may not be removed without just cause
and non-observance of due process.
Policy-Determining & Primarily Confidential
Borres v. CA 153 SCRA 120 [1987]
Private respondents Lumapac and Elizondo
were appointed by the then Mayor of Cebu
City, Cuison, as Senior Security and Security
Guard, respectively, in the Office of the Vice-
Mayor, as recommended by then Vice-Mayor
of Cebu City, Diores. In the 1967 local
elections, Sergio Osmea, Jr. and petitioner
Eulogio Borres ran and won as Mayor and
Vice-Mayor, respectively, of Cebu City.
Osmea, Jr., however, did not assume office;
hence petitioner Borres became the Acting
Mayor of Cebu City. Upon assuming office, or
on 3 January 1968, petitioner Borres
terminated the services of private respondents
"due to lack of confidence."
The Supreme Court ruled that the private
respondents were not removed or dismissed
from the service but their terms merely
expired.
The Court further stated that there are two (2)
instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential:
1. When the President, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service, has declared the position to
be primarily confidential; or
2. In the absence of such declaration, when
by the nature of the functions of the office,
there exists close
intimacy between the appointee and
the appointing power, which insures freedom
of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.
However, upon the enactment of the 1959
Civil Service Act (RA 2260), it is the nature of
the position which finally determines whether
a position is primarily confidential. Executive
pronouncements can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case
of conflict.
In the present case, the positions of Senior
Security and Security Guard in the Office of
the Vice-Mayor of Cebu City, are primarily
confidential in nature because of the duties
and functions attached to said positions. In his
request for certification for eligibility as Senior
Security, private respondent German O.
Lumapac enumerated his duties, as follows:
(1) to give adequate protection for the Vice-
Mayor's safety; (2) to accompany the Vice-
Mayor in all his appointments; and (3) to
perform other duties assigned to him by the
Vice-Mayor from time to time. On the other
hand, as Security Guard, private respondent
Bartolome Elizondo performs the following
duties: (1) to act as bodyguard of the person
of the Vice-Mayor; (2) to prepare security
measures for the safety of the Vice-Mayor;
and (3) to perform other duties which the Vice-
Mayor may assign to him from time to time. By
virtue of the nature of the duties and functions
attached to said positions, the relationship
between the Vice-Mayor and his Security is
one that depends on the highest degree of
trust and confidence, such that trust and
confidence are the primary reasons for
appointment thereto. As a matter of fact,
private respondents were appointed to said
positions upon the recommendation of the
then Vice-Mayor Luis V. Diores.
Petitioner Borres should not be deprived of
the right to choose his own men to act as his
Security.
Grino v. CSC 194 SCRA 458 [1991]
The main issue in this petition is whether or
not the position of a provincial attorney and
those of his legal subordinates are primarily
confidential in nature so that the services of
those holding the said items can be
terminated upon loss of confidence.
The Supreme Court ruled that the position of a
City Legal Officer is one which is primarily
confidential. the position of a City Legal
Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence
on the part of the mayor be extended to said
officer. The relationship existing between a
lawyer and his client, whether a private
individual or a public officer, is one that
depends on the highest degree of trust that
the latter entertains for the counsel selected.
the phrase primarily confidential denotes not
only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse, without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust on confidential
matters of state.
Tenure of officials holding primarily
confidential position ends upon loss of
confidence and their cessation entails no
removal but an expiration of their term.
Position of Provincial Attorney is the
counterpart of City Legal Officer; Both
positions were created under Sec. 19 of R.A.
5185 which are categorized as positions of
trust.
Santos v. Macaraig 208 SCRA 74 [1992]
Santos, a career service officer with the rank
of Chief of Mission II and Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, assails the
appointment of her replacement as a
representative of the Philippines in Geneva by
the President.
The Supreme Court ruled that a
representative of the Philippine Government
to the United Nations and other International
Organizations in Geneva, was one based on
the special trust and confidence which the
appointing power, the President, had in the
appointee. Once that trust and confidence
ceased to exist, the incumbents continuance
in the position became untenable.
The tenure of officials holding primarily
confidential positions ends upon loss of
confidence, because their term of office lasts
only as long as confidence in them endures.
When that confidence is lost and the officer
holding the position is separated from the
 service, such cessation is not removal from
office but merely an expiration of his/her term.
An incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure of the
appointing power. When the pleasure turns
into displeasure, the incumbent is not
removed or dismissed from officehis term
merely expires.
Primarily confidential denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for
the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.
It is the fact of loss of confidence, not the
reason for it, that is important and controlling.
As holder of a primarily confidential position,
petitioners foreign assignment was at the
pleasure of the President. The recall order
terminating her tour of duty in Geneva and
returning her to the home office was merely a
change of post or transfer of location of work.
Hilario v. CSC 243 SCRA 206 [1995]
Petitioner, Hilario, is the City Attorney of
Mayor Simon who was later replaced by
Mayor Mathay. On 1992, Mayor Mathay
served Hilario a letter stating that his position
as City Legal Officer is co-terminous with
Mayor Simon. As such, he was being asked to
tender his resignation. The Civil Service
Commission ruled that Hilario was no longer
entitled to hold his position.
The Supreme Court ruled that the position of
City Legal Officer is a confidential one.
Nothing in the Administrative Code precludes
the CSC from deciding a disciplinary case
before it. Precisely, Section 47 thereof, states:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.1) The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank
or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office. A complaint may be filed directly
with the Commission by a private citizen
against a government official or employee in
which case it may hear and decide the case or
it may deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation. The results of the investigation
shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to be taken.
When CSC determined that petitioner was no
longer entitled to hold the position of City
Legal Officer, it was acting within its authority
under the Administrative Code.
Rosete v. CA 264 SCRA 147 [1996]
Prior to 1988, Petitioner was the Chief of
Hospital of the Olongapo City General
Hospital. Respondent Richard J. Gordon, then
Olongapo City Mayor, found petitioner guilty
as charged and summarily dismissed him for
being notoriously undesirable. Said dismissal
by Mayor Gordon could not be invoked to
justify his second dismissal. After the EDSA
Revolution, OIC Macapagal, respondent
Mayors successor, reversed the first
dismissal and manifested before us that the
charges against petitioner were unworthy of
credence.
Respondents claim that the position of the
Chief of Hospital is primarily confidential,
policy determining and/or highly confidential,
such that when petitioner was summarily
dismissed by respondent Gordon on 2
January 1986 he was not actually removed
but his tenure of office expired due to loss of
trust and confidence. Nowhere is it alleged in
the formal charges submitted by respondent
Mayor that petitioners dismissal was due to
loss of confidence. In any event, this is merely
an afterthought.
In Cortez v. Bartolome: As an employee in
the civil service and as civil service
eligible, respondent is entitled to the
benefits, rights and privileges extended to
those belonging to the service. He cannot
be removed or dismissed without just
cause. The guarantee of security of tenure
is extended to both those in the career and
 non-career positions. officer-in-charge he protested his replacement
and declared he was not surrendering his
office because his resignation was not
CSC v. Salas 274 SCRA 414 [1997] voluntary but filed only in obedience to the
Presidents directive.
Salas was appointed by PAGCOR Chairman
A permanent appointment can be issued
as Internal Security Staff (ISS) Member
only to a person who meets all the
assigned to the casino at Manila Pavilion
requirements for the position to which he
Hotel. Later on, he was dismissed. It was
is being appointed, including the
argued that he was not actually removed but
appropriate eligibility prescribed.
his tenure of office expired due to loss of trust
Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his
and confidence (applicable to confidential
appointment could be regarded only as
employees). Section 16 of Presidential Decree
temporary. And being so, it could be
No. 1869 provides that all employees of the
withdrawn at will by the appointing authority
casino and related services shall be classified
and at a moments notice.
as confidential appointees. cannot be given a
literally stringent application without
The mere fact that a position belongs to the
compromising the constitutionally protected
Career Service does not automatically confer
right of an employee to security of tenure.
security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications.
SC held that Salas was not a confidential
A person who does not have the requisite
employee. Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as
qualifications for the position cannot be
it exempts PAGCOR positions from the
appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it
been amended, modified or deemed
merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
appropriate eligibles. The acting appointee is
Administrative Code of 1987.
separated precisely because his term has
expired. Expiration of the term is not covered
The primary purpose of the framers of the
by the constitutional provision on security of
1987 Constitution in providing for the
tenure.
declaration of a position as policy-
determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical is to exempt these Felix v. Buenaseda 240 SCRA 139 [1995]
categories from competitive examination (par.2)
as a means for determining merit and
fitness.
Felix worked as Medical Specialist I for the
The power to declare a position as policy- government [National Center of Mental Health
determining, primarily confidential or highly (NCMH)]. He started as a Resident Physician
technical as defined therein has subsequently with an annual salary. Later he got promoted
been codified and incorporated in Section to Senior Resident Physician [permanent],
12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or which he held for some time, and thereafter
the Administrative Code of 1987. accepted the appointment as Medical
Specialist I [temporary] which Felix held for
three years without remonstrations.
Acahacoso v. Macaraig 195 SCRA 235
[1991] Pursuant to an EO 119, a general
reorganization in the government ensued. In
view of this, DOH effected a reorganization,
Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
and one of the guidelines made Felix unfit for
POEA. In compliance with the Presidents
the position [he was not yet accredited by the
request to all Dept heads, Usecs, Asecs etc.,
Psychiatry Specilaty Board]. Medical
Tomas filed a courtesy resignation. The
Committee [of National Center of Mental
Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over
Health, NCMH], which eventually
his office to the Deputy Administrator as
recommended non-renewal of Felixs
appointment and informed him of the same.
Weighty reasons of public policy and
convenience demand that any claim to any
position in the civil service, permanent,
temporary or otherwise, or any claim to a
violation of the constitutional provision on
security of tenure be made within a
reasonable period of time.
It is crystal clear, from the facts of the case at
bench, that the petitioner accepted a
temporary appointment (Medical Specialist I).
Civil Service Commission (CSC) has correctly
pointed out, the appointment was for a definite
and renewable period which, when it was not
renewed, did not involve a dismissal but an
expiration of the petitioners term.
Pamantasan ng Maynila v. CSC 241 SCRA
503 [1995]
SC cited CSCs resolution:
PLM (Pamantasan ng Lungsod ny Maynila)
committed unfair labor practice when it
terminated the services of the complainants.
PLM did not renew the appointments of these
members of the faculty with temporary
contracts but those who were hired as
replacements possess even lesser
qualifications than the 16 complainants.
PLM Management decided to terminate the
services of these employees except to bust
their organization/ union. Even temporary
employees enjoy that basic right to form
organization or association for purposes
not contrary to law. PLMFO is that
organization. Thus, its members cannot be
separated from the service for the simple
reason of membership in the said
organization.
And when the appointment status of these
members happens to be temporary in
nature, such becomes merely incidental
and the doctrine that temporary employees
have no security of tenure must yield or is
not applicable. When the clear intent
therefore of PLM Management in
terminating the services of these
employees is to abridge their
constitutional right to self-organization,
the Commission has the duty to give them
protection and uphold their basic right.
This constitutional right of employees is
superior to the right of management not to
renew the temporary appointment of its
employees. When the exercise of discretion
by the management is calculated to bust the
union as what PLM Management had done,
the Commission has no choice but to declare
it as a grave abuse of discretion
Province of the Camarines Sur v. CA 246
SCRA 231 [1995]
Dato had no civil service eligibility for the
position he was appointed as Assistant
Provincial Warden. When he passed the civil
service examination for supervising security
guards, Gov. Alfelor approved the change in
Dato's employment status from temporary to
permanent. This was not favorably acted upon
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
At the time Dato was appointed Assistant
Provincial Warden, he had not yet qualified
in an appropriate examination for the
aforementioned position. Such lack of a
civil service eligibility made his
appointment temporary and without a fixed
and definite term and is dependent entirely
upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
The fact that private respondent obtained
civil service eligibility later on is of no
moment as his having passed the
supervising security guard examination,
did not ipso facto convert his temporary
appointment into a permanent one.
What is required is a new appointment since a
permanent appointment is not a continuation
of the temporary appointment these are
two distinct acts of the appointing authority.
The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama
to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear
arrogation of power properly belonging to the
appointing authority. CSC has the power to
approve or disapprove an appointment set
before it.
PEZA v. Mercado 614 SCRA 683 [2010]
Respondent was appointed as Group
Manager for Policy and Planning of PEZA in a
temporary capacity. Then, she was promoted
to the position of Deputy Director General for
Policy and Planning. Her appointment
indicated the same as on permanent basis,
but with the following annotation: No Security
of Tenure Unless He/She Obtains CESO OR
CSEE Eligibility. Petitioner Lilia B. de Lima, in
her capacity as PEZA Director General
advised respondent of the termination of her
appointment.
For an examinee or an incumbent to be a
member of the Career Executive Service
(CES) and be entitled to security of tenure,
she/he must pass the CES examinations,
be conferred CES eligibility, comply with
the other requirements prescribed by the
CES Board and be appointed to a CES rank
by the President. Admittedly, before and up
to the time of the termination of her
appointment, respondent did not go through
the four stages of CES eligibility examinations.
CSC v. CA 635 SCRA 749 [2010]
Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to
appoint the following:
Josefina A. Sarsonas (Sarsonas) as
Assistant Department Manager II of the
Internal Audit Department (IAD) of PCSO
under temporary status; and
Lemuel G. Ortega (Ortega) as Assistant
Department Manager II of its Planning and
Production Department under a temporary
status.
Civil Service Commission Field OfficeOffice
of the President (CSCFO-OP) disapproved
their appointment for failure to meet eligibility
requirement.
The Court is of the position that the Career
Executive Service (CES) covers presidential
appointees only. In order for a position to be
covered by the the Career Executive Service
(CES), two elements must concur. First, the
position must either be (1) a position
enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsection
A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 or (2) a position
of equal rank as those enumerated, and
identified by the Career Executive Service
Board to be such position of equal rank.
Second, the holder of the position must be a
presidential appointee.
The position of Assistant Department
Manager II does not require appointment
by the President of the Philippines, it does
not fall under the Career Executive Service
(CES). Therefore, in this case, the
temporary appointments of Sarsonas and
Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II
do not require third level eligibility
pursuant to the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations.
Permanent
Permanent status
A permanent appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed,
in accordance with the provisions of law, rules
and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.
Temporary appointment
In the absence of appropriate eligible and it
becomes necessary in the public interest to fill
a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility; Provided, that such
temporary appointment shall not exceed
twelve months, but the appointee may be
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available.
Luego v. CSC 143 SCRA 327 [1986]
FACTS:
Petitioner was Admin Officer II of the office of
the Mayor in Cebu. The appointment was
described as permanent, but CSC approved
it only as temporary. Then, CSC found that
private respondent was better fit for the
position and removed petitioner.
DOCTRINE:
CSC cannot determine the kind or nature of
appointment, as it only has to approve or
review the appointment with reh requirements
 under law. When the appointee is qualified,
the CSC has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the CSC
Laws.
Pangilinan v. Maglaya 225 SCRA 511 [1993]
(par.2)
FACTS:
Pangilinan was appointed as NBI agent, with
civil service eligibility. He was then given a
different position with the LTO then to the
MIAA. When he returned to the LTO, he was
given the position of Executive Director, and
was designated as Resident Ombudsman, in
addition to his regular duties. When he
discovered the license plate mess, he filed
cases against employees of the DOTC. The
following day, he was replaced by a certain
Borra. He claimed that his position was
permanent because he had civil service
eligibility.
DOCTRINE:
Pangilinan was only an acting appointee
because he did not have the requisite
qualifications; as such, he could not claim
security of tenure. This Court has repeatedly
held that this guaranty is available only to
permanent appointees. The fact that he was
qualified for his initial appointment as agent in
the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all
other positions he might later occupy in the
civil service.
Reorganization
Reassignment is the movement of an
employee from one organizational unit in the
same department or agency which does not
involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary,
and does not require the issuance of an
appointment.
Demotion is a movement from one position to
another involving the issuance of an
appointment with diminution of benefits,
responsibilities, status, rank, which may or
may not involve reduction of salary.
The rule on security of tenure, which
proscribes transfers without consent as
anathema to the security of tenure, is
predicated upon the theory that the officer
involved is appointed---not merely assigned---
to a particular station.
Santiago v. CSC 178 SCRA 733 [1989]
FACTS:
Santiago was appointed from Collector of
Customs I to III. Jose, Collector of Customs II
petitioned that he should be appointed
because of the next-in-rank rule.
DOCTRINE:
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to a
preferential consideration for promotion, but it
doesnt necessarily follow that he, and no one
else, can be appointed.
THere is no mandatory or peremptory
requirement in the civil service law the
persons next in line are entitled to preference
in appointment.
The appointing power has a wide latitude of
choices as to who best qualifies for the
position.
Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, GR
NO. 131954. June 28, 2001
FACTS:
Employees in the Metropolitan Cebu Water
District were reclassified to conform with
position descriptions and salary grades in the
Civil Service Law. Three employees applied
for the position of Secretary to the Asst.
General Manager. CSC failed to approve their
appointments as permanent, as their positions
were primarily confidential and co-terminus
positions.
DOCTRINE:
CSC is empowered to declare which positions
are permanent, and which are primarily
confidential. The CSC is expressly
empowered to do this. This also signifies that
the enumeration in the Civil Service Decree is
not exclusive. The Commission can
supplement this enumeration, as it did in this
case, when it issued the Memorandum Order,
which specified their positions as primarily
confidential, and therefor coterminous with the
officials they serve.
Gatmaitan v. Gonzales 492 SCRA 591
FACTS:
 Dr. Gonzales reassigned Gatmaitan from
lobby to the OR-DR Complex to perform
janitorial task, when he was hired as Hospital
Housekeeper, in order to give way to a certain
to Villegas. Claimed that he was harassed to
leave his position.
DOCTRINE:
The reassignment is valid.
An employee may be reassigned from one
organizational unit to another; Provided that
such reassignment does not involve a
reduction in rank, status, and salary. There
was no demotion involved in the transfer of
petitioners workstation since what merely
transpired was a reassignment brought about
exigencies of the service.
Nieves v. Blanco 673 SCRA 638 [2012]
FACTS:
Nieves is employed in the DTI, and was
reassigned from Sorsogon to Albay. CSC
dismissed his appeal. After a year, Nieves
wanted to be reassigned to Sorsogon but this
was denied.
DOCTRINE:
Reassignment of an employee with a station-
specific work indicated in their respective
appointments is allowed, provided that this
should not exceed one year. On the other
hand, reassignment of an employee with a
position that is not station specific has no
definite period, unless otherwise revoked by
the Head of the Agency, the CSC or a
competent court.
Reassignment is presumed to be regular and
made with the interest of public service. Thus,
the mere allegation cannot hold water, as this
needs to be substantiated.
Appointment vs. designation
See Binamira doctrine
Binamira v. Garucho 188 SCRA 154 [1990]
(par.2) (designation by Dept. Sec.)
Appointment is the selection by the authority
vested with the power of an individual who is
to exercise the functions of a given office. It is
usually with confirmation and if completed,
also usually results in security of tenure (but
replaceable at loss of confidence).
Designation is merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official, or
may be considered loosely as an
appointment, but not by the authority himself
which means the person designated holds
such position temporarily until the authority
appoints.
In this case, Binamira was designated by a
DOT Secretary as GM of Phil Tourism Auth,
after which he was named into one of its
Board by reason of his being GM.
However, Binamira was asked to resign by the
new Secretary. Under PTAs charter, the GM
is appointed by the President for 6 years
unless removed for a cause. Hence, him not
being an appointee of the President but
merely designated by the previous Secretary,
he enjoys no security of tenure
Removal for Cause/Security of Tenure
Cause for Removal: PARAGRAPH 3
Sec. 2(3) Art. IX-B: No officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.
The grounds and procedure for investigation
of charges and discipline of career civil
service officers and employees are provided
in the CSL. Non-compliance therewith
constitutes denial of the right to security of
tenure.
However, presidential appointees are under
the direct disciplinary authority of the
President
1. Loss confidence
It is the nature of the position which
determines if it is confidential, policy-
determining, or highly technical.
Confidence usually denotes confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee, close intimacy
which ensured freedom from misgivings on
confidential matters of state. Proximity rule is
also important in determining confidentiality, if
 the predominant reason why he was chosen
by the authority was the authoritys belief that
he can share a close intimate relationship with
the occupant.
Hence, loss of these indicators of confidence
would make the appointed official lose his
office at the whim of the appointing authority
Hernandez v. Villegas 14 SCRA 544 [1965]
Art. IX-B Sec.2(3), in stating that no officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed
except for cause as provided by law
recognizes no exception. It is misleading to
think that appointment to any of the 3
exempted positions (exempted from
competitive exam: confidential, highly
technical, and policy determining, Nachura
p.335) is terminable at the will of the
appointing power. Their termination must still
follow Sec.2(3), and the justification is the loss
of confidence.
In this case, Atty Villegas was Director of
Security of BoC, sent to US to study
enforcement techniques, and when he came
back, he was temporarily detailed as Arrastre
Superintendent. In his stead, a certain Keefe
was designated in acting capacity in BoC.
Later, SoF recommended the permanent
status of both Keefe (as Dir of Security) and
Villegas (as Arrastre Supt.), which was
approved. Villegas was technically demoted.
Villegas did not know of this until very late.
2. Abolition of Office
A valid abolition of office does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure,
but a pretended abolition will not justify
dismissal
Briones v. Osmena 104 PHIL. 588 [1958]
While abolition of the office does not imply
removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only
where the abolition is made in good faith; the
right to abolish can not be used to cover the
discharge of employees in violation of the civil
service law nor can it be exercised for
personal or political reasons.
In this case, petitioners positions as City Hall
employees of various positions, were
abolished through an Ordinance. The Court
found that the reasons given for the abolition
of the positions are untrue, and constitute a
mere subterfuge for removal without cause.
Being a member of the Civil Service, his
tenure is protected by the Constitution.
Eugenio v. CSC 243 SCRA 196 [1995]
The power to restructure granted to the CSC
is limited to offices under it. The law that
created a government body intended said
office to be an autonomous entity although it
is administratively attached to the CSC.
In this case, Eugenio passed the Career
Executive Service Eligibility, conducted by
Career Executive Service Board (CESB), but
was impeded when CESB was abolished by
CSC.
3. Reorganization
Romualdez-Yap v. CSC 225 SCRA 285
[1993]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 80 (Revised Charter of
the PNB) was approved on 3 December 1986.
Said executive order authorized the
restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of
PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the
Fund Transfer Department was abolished and
its functions transferred to the International
Department
Such reorganization led to the separation from
service of petitioner Conchita Romualdez-
Yap.
Issue: W/N the reorganization is valid?
Held/Ratio: YES
Dario v. Mison: Reorganizations in this
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist.
PNB's reorganization was by virtue of a valid
law. At the time of reorganization, due to the
critical financial situation of the bank,
departments, positions and functions were
abolished or merged. The abolition of the
Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was
deemed necessary. This, to the Court's mind,
was a management prerogative exercised
pursuant to a business judgment.
Reorganization whether in a government
bureau performing constituent functions or in
a government-owned or controlled corporation
performing ministrant functions must meet a
common test, the test of good faith.
Whether there was a hidden political agenda
to persecute petitioner due to her
consanguinial relation to Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, the widow of former
President Marcos, is not clearly shown. On
the other hand, it is entirely possible that,
precisely because of such consanguinial
relation, petitioner may have been the object
of deferential, if not special treatment under
the Marcos regime.
But a discontinuance of such deferential or
special treatment in the wake of a change in
government or administration is not bad faith
per se. It may be merely putting things in their
proper places.
Fernandez v. Sto Tomas 242 SCRA 192
[1995]
Facts:
Resolution 94-3710 was issued by the CSC
merging three offices to form the Research
and Development Office, renaming some of
the offices, and reallocating the functions of
some offices. As a result, petitioners were
transferred or reassigned to other areas.
Issue: W/N the resolution was valid?
Held/Ratio: YES
The Office is an internal department or
organizational unit within the Commission and
that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR,
as well as all the other Offices within the
Commission constitute administrative
subdivisions of the CSC.
The Commission was moved by quite
legitimate considerations of administrative
efficiency and convenience in promulgating
and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710
and in assigning petitioners to different
locations.
Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any
public office as that term is used in the law of
public officers. It is essential to note that none
of the "changes in organization" introduced by
Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or
necessarily involved the termination of the
relationship of public employment between the
Commission and any of its officers and
employees.
Appointments to the staff of the Commission
are not appointments to a specified public
office but rather appointments to particular
positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be
appointed to the position of Director III or
Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or
Attorney V; or to the position of Records
Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In
the instant case, petitioners were each
appointed to the position of Director IV,
without specification of any particular office or
station. The same is true with respect to the
other persons holding the same position or
rank of Director IV of the Commission.
Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a
vested right to serve at the Commission's
Head Office.
Chato v. Natividad 244 SCRA 787 [1995]
Facts:
CIR Chato issued Revenue Administrative
Order No. 5-93 and Revenue Travel
Assignment Order No. 80-93 which essentially
reorganized the BIR. As a result, a private
respondent revenue district officer was
transferred from San Fernando, Pampanga to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Issue: W/N the transfer was valid?
Held/Ratio: YES
The transfer of private respondent to a
different revenue district did not really entail
any diminution in rank, salary, status and
responsibilities. Private respondent's claim
that the Tuguegarao revenue district is smaller
than that in San Fernando, Pampanga has no
basis because, as already noted, the
classification of RDOs' into Class A-1, A, B, C
and D has been abolished and all RDO's are
now considered to be of the same class.
Private respondent failed to show patent
illegality in the action of the Commissioner
constituting violation of his right to security of
tenure. To sustain his contention that his
transfer constitutes a demotion simply
because the new assignment is not to his
liking would be to subordinate government
projects, along with the great resources and
efforts they entail, to the individual
preferences and opinions of civil service
employees. Such contention would negate the
principle5 that a public office is a public trust
and that it is not the private preserve of any
person.
Under the law, any employee who questions
the validity of his transfer should appeal to the
Civil Service Commission. Respondent judge
should have dismissed the action below for
failure of private respondent to exhaust
administrative remedies
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas 244 SCRA 595
[1995] (par.3)
Facts:
Mancita was holding the position of Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator. On
the other hand, Nacario was holding the
position of Municipal Budget Officer. Because
of certain reorganizations, Mancita was
separated from service and Nacario was
appointed in her position. Consequently, San
Luis was appointed in Nacarios former
position in the Budget Office.
Mancita appealed to the CSC-MSPB. The
CSC-MSPB ruled in favor of Mancita.
Accordingly, Mayor Divinagarcia was directed
to reappoint Mancita to her former position as
MPDC. As a result, Nacario went back to her
position as Municipal Budget Officer and San
Luis was removed.
Issue: W/N Nacario may reassume her
previous position as Budget Officer?
Held/Ratio: YES
Under the Section 13 of the Omnibus Rules
implementing E.O. 292, before a public official
or employee can be automatically restored to
her former position, there must first be a
series of promotions; second, all
appointments are simultaneously submitted to
the CSC for approval; and third, the CSC
disapproves the appointment of a person
proposed to a higher position.
The essential requisites prescribed under Sec.
13 do not avail in the case at bench. To start
with, the movement of Nacario from the
Budget Office to the Office of MPDC cannot
be considered a promotion for the term
connotes an increase in duties and
responsibilities as well as a corresponding
increase in salary.
A transfer is a "movement from one position to
another which is of equivalent rank, level and
salary, without break in service." Promotion is
the "advancement from one position to
another with an increase in duties and
responsibilities as authorized by law, and is
usually accompanied by an increase in salary"
. . . A transfer that results in promotion or
demotion, advancement or reduction or a
transfer that aims to "lure the employee away
from his permanent position," cannot be done
without the employees' consent. For that
would constitute removal from office. Indeed,
no permanent transfer can take place unless
the officer or employee is first removed from
the position held, and then appointed to
another position.
Where the appointment does not indicate a
specific station, an employee may be
transferred or assigned provided the transfer
affects no substantial change in title, rank and
salary . . . . Such a rule does not proscribe a
transfer carried out under a specific statute
that empowers the head of an agency to
periodically reassign the employees and
officers in order to improve the service of the
agency . . . . Neither does illegality attach to
the transfer or reassignment of an officer
pending the determination of an administrative
charge against him; or to the transfer of an
employee, from his assigned station to the
main office, effected in good faith and in the 44 of RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act).
interest of the service
The unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario Issue: W/N the Section 44 of RA 8189 is
from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC valid?
was arbitrary for it amounted to removal
without cause hence, invalid as it is anathema Held/Ratio: YES
to security of tenure. The singling out of election officers in order to
"ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity
Vinzon-Chato v. Zenarosa, GR 120539, with the people of their place of assignment"
October 20, 2000 does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Facts:
Pursuant to RTAO 8-95, private respondent
Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe
Estrella Martinez was reassigned from
the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly
Assistant Revenue District Officer of RDO No.
deprive them of due process of law.
34 to Assistant Division Chief in the National
Office in QC. Private respondent questions
The guarantee of security of tenure under the
her reassignment.
Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment. It only means that an employee
Issue: W/N the reassignment was valid?
cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the
service for causes other than those provided
Held/Ratio: YES
by law and after due process is accorded the
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is
employee. What it seeks to prevent is
authorized to assign or reassign internal
capricious exercise of the power to dismiss.
revenue officers and employees of the BIR as
But, where it is the law-making authority itself
the exigencies of service may require, without
which furnishes the ground for the transfer of
demotion in rank and salary in accordance
a class of employees, no such capriciousness
with Civil Service Rules and Regulation.
can be raised for so long as the remedy
proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane
Nowhere in the assignment order, RTAO 8-
to the purposes of the law.
95, can it be gleaned that the reassignment
was for the purpose of harassing private
Said section provides the criterion or basis for
respondent. In fact, private respondent was
the reassignment or transfer of an election
not the only one reassigned to a new post.
officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of
its power to appoint, and maintain its authority
Such reassignment is not a demotion for there
over its officials and employees. As a matter
is no diminution of rank, salary, status and
of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions
responsibilities. Private respondent was
and directives illustrate that it is still the
merely assigned as Assistant Revenue District
COMELEC which has the power to reassign
Officer of BIR Revenue District Office No. 34
and transfer its officials and employees.
and the Commissioner may assign or reassign
revenue officers, as the exigencies of the
There is no impairment or emasculation of its
service may require. Such reassignment of
power to appoint its own officials and
revenue officers entails the prevention of
employees. In fact, Section 44 even
familiarity and patronage between BIR officers
strengthens the COMELECs power of
and taxpayers of a particular area.
appointment, as the power to reassign or
transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
De Guzman v. Comelec, GR 129118, July 19, domain.
2000
Facts: Cuevas v. Bacal, GR 139382, December 6,
COMELEC issued Resolutions No. 97-0002 2000
and 97-0610 which caused the reassignment
Facts:
of several election officers pursuant to Section
Private respondent Josefina Bacal, a career to his CES rank
executive service officer holding the rank of
CES III, was appointed as Chief Public
Attorney (CES Rank Level I) in the PAO. Later 4. Qualification for Eligibility
on, she was reassigned without her consent to Mayor v. Macaraig 194 SCRA 672 [1991
the Office of the Regional Director of PAO
Facts:
(CES Rank Level III).
The case involves the constitutionality of RA
6715 so far as it declares vacant "all positions
Issue: W/N the reassignment was valid?
of the Commissioners, Executive Labor
Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National
Held/Ratio: YES
Labor Relations Commission," and operates
First: As respondent does not have the rank
to remove the incumbents upon the
appropriate for the position of Chief Public
appointment and qualification of their
Attorney, her appointment to that position
successors. In addition, the new law has
cannot be considered permanent, and she
provided for additional qualifications for
can claim no security of tenure in respect of
certain positions.
that position.
Issue: W/N RA 6715 abolished the offices
It is settled that a permanent appointment can
involved thereby rendering the incumbent
be issued only to a person who meets all the
officers to have vacated their offices?
requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate
Held/Ratio: NO
eligibility prescribed
The provisions conferring a somewhat greater
measure of autonomy; requiring that its
Second: Appointments, assignments,
membership be drawn from tripartite sectors
reassignments, and transfers in the Career
(workers, employees and the public sector);
Executive Service are based on rank.
changing the official stations of the
Commission's divisions, and even those
Security of tenure in the career executive
prescribing higher or other qualifications for
service is thus acquired with respect to rank
the positions of Commissioner which, if at all,
and not to position. The guarantee of security
should operate only prospectively, not to
of tenure to members of the CES does not
mention the fact that the petitioners have
extend to the particular positions to which they
asserted without dispute that they possess the
may be appointed a concept which is
new qualifications none of these can be
applicable only to first and second-level
said to work so essential or radical a revision
employees in the civil service but to the rank
of the nature, powers and duties of the NLRC
to which they are appointed by the President.
as to justify a conclusion that the Act in truth
Accordingly, respondent did not acquire
did not merely declare vacant but actually
security of tenure by the mere fact that she
abolished the offices of commissioners and
was appointed to the higher position of Chief
created others in their place.
Public Attorney since she was not
subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I
Their incumbents' constitutionally guaranteed
based on her performance in that position as
security of tenure cannot be defeated by the
required by the rules of the CES Board.
provision for higher or other qualifications than
were prescribed under the old law; said
Third: Within the Career Executive Service,
provision can only operate prospectively and
personnel can be shifted from one office or
as to new appointees to positions regularly
position to another without violation of their
vacated; and there is, besides, also no
right to security of tenure because their status
showing that the petitioning Arbiters do not
and salaries are based on their ranks and not
qualify under the new law
on their jobs.

Should he be assigned or made to occupy a

CES position with a lower salary grade, he 5. Abandonment; Acceptance of
shall continue to be paid the salary attached
Incompatible/Other Employment
 No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Canonizado v. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 [2001]
Facts:
Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of
the National Police Commission when
Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as
the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act.
No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of
the incumbent commissioners were deemed
expired.
Petitioners claimed that this violated their
security of tenure.
Held: Petitioners are members of the civil
service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not
expressly abolish the positions of petitioners.
Doctrine: Where one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with
similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to
office. It is of no moment that there are now
new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a
well-entrenched principle that when a regular
government employee is illegally dismissed,
his position never became vacant under the
law and he is considered as not having left his
office. The new appointments made in order
to replace petitioners are not valid.
Salvador v. CA, GR 127501, May 5, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Conrado C. Salvador had
been a permanent employee of the
DENR. Sometime in 1987,
reorganization of the DENR under
Executive Order No. 192 commenced.
Petitioner was constrained to accept
reappointment on September 16,
1988 as Senior Executive Assistant I,
R-66/SG-17, a coterminous position
with a term not to exceed three (3)
years.
Petitioner filed a protest with
respondent Civil Service Commission.
Petitioner was then terminated from
the service effective December 31,
1991, his position being a
coterminous position.
The ruling in G.R. No. 103121 called
for nothing less than the
reinstatement of petitioners and
respondent CA ruled that petitioner
falls outside the scope of said
decision since he accepted a
permanent position and thus became
different from the petitioners therein
who were in danger of losing their
jobs.
Held: The act of finding employment
elsewhere does not bar reinstatement of an
illegally terminated employee.
Doctrine: The anxiety and fear of losing ones
job after more than twenty-seven continuous
years of service, experienced by an employee
during the time of reorganization of his office,
must have compelled him to accept a position
which was not lower but of a co-terminus
status such that his application for and
acceptance of a lower position, under the
circumstances, was the practical and
responsible thing to do, and cannot be
construed against him such as to foreclose his
right to question the legality of his termination
and to claim the position he held previous to
the reorganization.
Due Process in Removal
No officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.
In any civil service is a guarantee of
security of tenure, a guarantee
against arbitrary impairment, whether
total or partial of the right to continue
in the position held.
Thus, the prohibition in Article IX (B)
(2) (3) of the Constitution against
dismissal of a civil service officer or
employee "except for cause provided
by law" is a guaranty of both
procedural and substantive due
process.
 Procedural due process-
requires that the dismissal
comes only after notice and
hearing.
Substantive due process-
requires that the dismissal be
for cause.
For Cause
Means for reasons which the law and
sound public policy recognize as
sufficient for removal, that is legal
cause, and not merely causes which
the appointing power in the exercise
of discretion may deem sufficient; and
The cause must relate to and affect
the administration of the office, and
must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting
the rights and interests of the public.
Enrique v. CA 229 SCRA 180 [1994]
Facts:
Petitioners were all employees of the
Civil Service Regional Office No. 3,
San Fernando, Pampanga. They were
charged by the CSC for dishonesty,
grave misconduct etc.
Petitioners denied the charges
against them and moved for an
immediate dismissal of the case. They
asked for a formal hearing. The CSC
denied the request for a formal
hearing, resolved to proceed
summarily against the respondents.
Petitioners contend that the CSC, its
jurisdiction being merely appellate,
has no original jurisdiction to hear and
to decide disciplinary cases involving
officers and employees of the Civil
Service.
Held: The petition is devoid of merit.
Doctrine: P.D. Nos. 807 and 1409 vest
concurrent jurisdiction over disciplinary
matters to both the CSC and the Merit
Systems Protection Board with respect to
officials and employees connected with the
CSC. Summary proceedings against
employees under Sec. 40 of PD 807 prior to
the repeal of said provision was valid so long
as said employees were duly informed of the
charges against them and were given the
opportunity to present their side.
CSC v. Magnaye 619 SCRA 347 [2010]
Facts:
In March 2001, Mayor Rosales of
Lemery, Batangas, appointed
Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the
OEE. After a few days, Mayor
Rosales detailed him to the Municipal
Planning and Development Office.
In June 30, 2001, Mayor Bendaa,
assumed office. Thereafter, Magnaye
was returned to his original
assignment at the OEE. Thereafter,
the new mayor served him a notice of
termination from employment for
unsatisfactory conduct and want of
capacity.
Magnaye questioned his termination
before the CSC head office on the
ground that Mayor Bendaa was not in
a position to effectively evaluate his
performance because it was made
less than one and one-half months
after his (Mayor Bendaas) assumption
to office.
Held: Magnaye was denied due process since
he was not informed of what constituted the
alleged unsatisfactory conduct and want of
capacity that led to his termination.
Doctrine:
While unsatisfactory conduct and
want of capacity are valid causes that
may be invoked for dismissal from the
service, the Memorandum issued by
Mayor Bendaa terminating Magnayes
employment did not specify the acts
constituting his want of capacity and
unsatisfactory conduct. The notice
indisputably lacks the details of
Magnayes unsatisfactory conduct or
want of capacity.
The CSC is the central personnel
agency of the government exercising
quasi-judicial functions. In cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied when, on the basis of the
evidence on record, there is
 reasonable ground to believe that the
person terminated was evidently
wanting in capacity and had
unsatisfactory conduct.
Rubenecia v. CSC 244 SCRA 640 [1995]
Facts:
Petitioner Rubenecia claims that the CSC
itself (as distinguished from the MSPB) did not
acquire jurisdiction over his case because he
had not been notified by individual written
notice sent by mail that his case had been
elevated to the Civil Service Commission as
required by Resolution No. 93-2387.
Held: CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 did not
require individual written notice sent by mail to
parties in administrative cases pending before
the MSPB. Assuming that Rubenecia had not
in fact been sent an individual notice, the fact
that Resolution No. 93-2387 of the CSC was
published in a newspaper of general
circulation is deemed as substantial
compliance with the requirement of written
notice to affected individuals. Furthermore, the
motion for reconsideration filed by Rubenecia
before the Commission cured whatever defect
might have existed in respect of alleged denial
of procedural due process.
Doctrine: The fundamental rule of due
process requires that a person be accorded
notice and an opportunity to be heard. These
requisites were respected in the case of
petitioner Rubenecia. Denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked by a party who
has had the opportunity to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration. In the instant case,
petitioner was heard not only in respect of his
motion for reconsideration; he was also in fact
afforded reasonable opportunity to present his
case before decision was rendered by the
Commission finding him guilty.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Board
Of Directors v. Marie Jean C. Lapid, GR
191940, 12 April 2011
Facts:
Lapid, a Casual Clerk (Teller) of the PCSO
was found guilty of Discourtesy in the Course
of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct and
imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from
the Service. Lapid was NEVER formally
charged with the administrative offenses of
Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties
and Grave Misconduct. According to the CSC,
the Formal Charge, was even unsigned, and it
categorically stated that PCSO failed to
observe due process.
Held: Casual employees are entitled to due
process especially if they are to be removed
for more serious causes or for causes other
than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No.
001. The reason for this is that their
termination from the service could carry a
penalty affecting their rights and future
employment in the government.
Doctrine: Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the
Constitution provides that no officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause provided by
law. Apparently, the Civil Service Law echoes
this constitutional edict of security of tenure of
the employees in the civil service. Thus,
Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law
provides that no officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law after due
process.
Security of Tenure
The appointment in the government
employees in the career service is
classified as follows:
1. Permanentone issued to person who
has met requirements to which appointment is
made
2. Temporaryin absence of appropriate
eligible and it becomes necessary in the
public interest to fill a vacancy. Provided not
exceed 12 months but appointee may be
replaced sooner is a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available
3. Non Career Service (a) entrance on
bases other than those usual tests of merit
and fitness utilized by career service; (b)
tenure is limited to a specific period laid down
by law or coterminous with appointing
authority
a. Elective officials and their personal or
confidential staff
b. Secretaries and other officials of cabinet
who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal confidential
staff(s)
c. Chairman and Members of Commissions
and boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff
d. Contractual personnel or those whose
employment in the govt is in accordance with
special contract to undertake specific work
requiring technical or special skill not available
in the employing agency to be accomplished
in a specific period
e. Emergency and seasonal personnel
f. Casualwhere and when employment is
NOT permanent but occasional,
unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature
4. Co-terminous statusentrance in the
service characterized by confidentiality by the
appointing officer or and is co-existent with his
(appointer) tenure also a non career service
a. Co-terminous with projectsecurity of
tenure until completion of project
b. Co-terminus with appointing authority
security of tenure co-existent with authority
c. Co-terminous with incumbentsecurity
of tenure is granted during incumbency of the
appointing authority
d. Co-terminous with specific period
security of tenure is for the specific period
stated
Chua v. CSC 206 SCRA 65 [1992]
When RA 6683 was passed, it provided for
the benefits of early retirement and voluntary
separation from government service as
involuntary separation due to the
reorganization. Those qualified were if they
have rendered at least 2 consecutive years of
government service as of date of separation.
Chua tried to avail of the benefits with NIA.
CSC denied her application because they
claimed she does not have the two year
qualification and that she being a contractual
employee did not make her eligible for the
benefits.
HELD: Chua was first an emergency status
(1974) with NIA then became temporary
(1980) and while in the WMECP project, she
became permanent until completion of the
project (1982-1988) as shown in her
Appointment paper. Employment of personnel
hired under FOREIGN-ASSISTED
PROJECTS is considered co-terminous (for
the duration of the project or until completion).
In total, she was in 4 successive projects in a
span of 15 years. And entitled to benefits.
NLTD v. CSC 221 SCRA 145
Quick facts: EO 649 passed that authorized
reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission into the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA) and in turn abolished existing
positions. Garcia appointed as Deputy
Register of Deeds VII in 1977. After EO 649,
she was appointed as Deputy Registere of
Deeds II under temporary status because she
was not a member of the bar. Later on she
was terminated because she was reported to
have received bribe money. Later on, the
reason for termination was due to expiration of
her temporary appointment. However, CSC
directed under Resolution 2 that Garcia be
restored to her position or equivalent.
NALTDRA contends EO 649 abolished all
positions in LRC and the creation of new
offices required issuance of new appointments
to qualified holders. Since she is not a
member of the bar, she cannot be reinstated.
HELD: Abolition of a position does not
involve removal or mean removal for the
reason that removal implies that the post
subsists and that one is merely separated
therefrom. After abolition, there is in law no
occupant. There can be no tenure to speak of
so the question of impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. There is NO such thing
as a vested interest or an estate in an office or
even an absolute right to hold it. Except for
constitutional offices, where there have a
special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, nobody is said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary. This is not the
case here.
Cabagnot v. CSC 223 SCRA 59 (
QUICK FACTS: Under the new organizational
structure and staffing pattern of Aklan,
reorganization caused only an availability of
364 regular plantilla positions to which Gov.
Cabagnot invited all provincial officials and
employees to apply for any of the authorized
positions in the new staffing pattern subject to
the evaluation and assessment of Provincial
Placement Committee. 21 employees who did
not get the job claimed they were entitled and
protected under the Security of Tenure of Civil
Officers and Employees and prayed to be
appointed to positions. CSC said the
reorganization rendered all positions vacant
and the employees have no vested right to
their original positions.
HELD: The power to appoint is discretionary.
The only condition for its proper exercise by
the appointing authority is that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by
law. The determination of who among several
candidates for a position possesses the best
qualifications rests solely on the appointing
authority who determines which individual can
best fill the post and discharged its functions.
Once the discretion is exercised, the CSC
cannot replace the appointee with an
employee of its choice even if CSC believes
another is better qualified. CSC only
determined whether the appointee possesses
the required qualifications under the law.
HOWEVER, under RA 6656, to protect the
security of tenure of civil service officers and
employees, there must be a prior
determination of a VALID CAUSE after DUE
NOTICE AND HEARING before any officer or
employee in the career service can be
removed, or demoted. In this case, there was
a clear demotion, which is tantamount to
removal, with no hearing or notice. There is
demotion even if allowed to receive the same
salary as a previous higher position. What
matters is that they are lower in position than
those previously held. Thus, CSC was correct
to order immediate appointment and
restoration to positions comparable in rank in
their previous positions without loss of
seniority rights as they were unlawfully
dismissed.
Marohombsar v. CA, GR 126481, February
18, 2000
QUICK FACTS: Mahurom was appointed as
Technical Assistant to the Office of Chancellor
of Mindanao State University (MSU) granted
by the Board of Regents. When RA 6788
(Salary Standardization Law) was enacted, his
position was converted to Executive Assistant
II under a temporary status since she was not
Civil Service eligible at the time. After passing
the examinations, however, she was extended
permanent appointment in 1991 approved by
CSC and without objection from Board of
Regents. By 1993, she was sent a letter of
termination from the NEW President of MSU
(Alonso) due to the urgent need to establish a
new order and maintain trust and confidence.
She claimed her position was covered by the
Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure
and was illegally terminated. However, the
claim of petitioner is that he was only
appointed ad interim because the appointment
was made by MSU President and not the
Board of Regents.
HELD: The power to appoint is vested in the
Board of Regents upon recommendation of
the President. Ad interim appointment is only
the manner upon which appointment is made
it is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointment given to the appointee. The
permanent status was recognized and
attested to by the CSC without object of the
Board. As such, he holds an appointment
under PERMANENT STATUS and thus enjoys
SECURITY OF TENURE. As an employee in the
civil service and as a civil service eligible, he is
entitled to benefits, rights and privileges
which included not to be removed or
dismissed from service without just cause and
without due process. There was illegal
termination in this case
Ong v. OP 664 SCRA 413 [2012]
PGMA appointed De Castro as Asst General
Manager for Operations (AGMO) of the
MMDA, concurred by MMDA in 2009. In 2010,
OP Memo 2 was released stating that all Non-
Career Exec Service Officials occupying
Career Executive Service positions shall
remain until Oct 2010 or until their
resignations accepted. When MMDA Chair
Tolentino designated Cruz as OIC to AGMO,
de Castro was reassigned to Legal and
Legislative Affairs Office and by Virtue of
Memo Circ No 2, was removed from MMDA
Payroll. Sine ADMO was not yet classified and
not yet considered as belonging to Career
Executive Service, she stated that her position
was no coterminous and therefore she was
not covered by the Memo Cir.
HELD: Career service is characterized by
existence of security of tenure whereas non-
career is whose tenure is coterminous with
appointing authority. AGMO is a CAREER
POSITION since MMDA Charter specifically
provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure.
Elements of CES:
(1) position under Book V Title I Subsection A
Chapter 2 Section 7(3) Admin Code or
position of equal rank; AND
(2) presidential appointee
iMPORTANT NOTES:
Career Executive service (CES) includes:
a. Open career where appropriate
examination is required
b. Closed career which are scientific or
highly technical in nature
c. Positions in career executive service:
undersecretary, asst. secretary, bureau
director, asst bureau director, regional
director, asst. regional director, chief of dept
service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by Career Executive
Service Board (appointed by President)
d. Career officers, other than those in
CES appointed by President such as Foreign
Service Officers in DFA
e. Commissioned officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain
separate merit system
f. Personnel of govt-owned or controlled
corporations, whether performing govt or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under
non-career service
g. Permanent laborers, whether skilled
or semi-skilled or unskilled.
ADDITIONAL Elements ** RESOLUTION 799
released 2009 classified positions falling
within coverage of CES included unless
provided otherwise, all other managerial or
executive positions in the government,
including govt-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters are
embraces within the CES provided met the ff
criteria:
a. Career position
b. Above division chief level
c. Duties and responsibilities require
performance of executive and management
functions
Electioneering or Partisan Political Activity
Santos v. Yatco 106 PHIL 21
Due to compromise agreement between
Santos and Mendonez made in the sale by
installment of land, court issued decision
approving agreement and released judgment
is hereby rendered in accordance with terms
and conditions set forth by parties. When
there was neglect in payment, motion for
execution was filed. Judge quashed writ of
execution.
HELD There was no abuse of discretion on
the Part of the judge because compromises
cannot be execution without a valid hearing. In
this case, there was none. Also, when
Mendonez secured a loan from GSIS and with
the forfeiture of payment of more than
P12,000 already, there was no irreparable or
undue harm to the plaintiff by judgment of the
judge. Additionally, the 10% interest was
substantial not to give too much loss.
People v. De Venecia 14 SCRA 864 [1965]
In this case, De Venecia handed leaflets that
bore the symbol of the Nacionalista Party
stating to vote for Mayor Oda to which such
was not only mentioning the candidate to
express opinion but was already a form of
solicitation. you should vote for Mayor Oda
for office because he is our political
candidateif you are true party-men, do not
vote for independent Atty. Tomelda It was an
indorsement of the request for his support by
governatorial candidate Conrado Estrella.
SEC 54: Active intervention of public officers
 and employees. No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer, or assessor of any province, no
officers or employee of the Army, no member
of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force, and no classified civil
service officer employee shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in
any election or take part therein except to
vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public
peace, if he is a peace office. (PENAL
STATUTE)
SEC 29: Political Activity. Officers and
employees in the civil service, whether in the
competitive or classified, or noncompetitive or
unclassified service shall not engage directly
or indirectly in partisan political activities or
take part in any election except to vote.
Nothing herein provided shall be understood
to prevent any officer or employee from
expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning
the names of candidates for public office
whom he supports (ADMIN IN NATURE)
DOCTRINE: Electioneering is the distribution
of party handbills by a classified civil service
employee urging election of a particular
candidate as solicitation of electors vote. This
is punishable by Section54 Revised Election
Code where classified civil service employees
cannot aid any candidate. Section29, as an
exception, only allows civil service employees
to express his views or mention name of HIS
candidate for public office.
Right to Self-Organization and Right to Strike
The right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees.
SSS Employees v. CA 175 SCRA 686 [1989]
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS
failed to act upon the unions demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA
DOCTRINE:
But while the right to organize and join unions,
associations or societies cannot be curtailed,
government employees may not engage in
strikes to demand changes in the terms and
conditions of employment because the terms
and conditions of employment are provided by
law
Balingasan v. CA 276 SCRA 557 [1997]
FACTS:
Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were
among the 800 public school teachers who
staged mass actions on September 17 to 19,
1990 to dramatize their grievances
concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of
the public authorities to implement in a just
and correct manner certain laws and
measures intended for their material benefit.
DOCTRINE:
The ability to strike is not essential to the right
of association x x x the right of the sovereign
to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public
employees is clearly recognized at common
law; thus, it has been frequently declared that
modern rules which prohibit strikes, either by
statute or judicial decision, simply incorporate
or reassert the common law rules
Jacinto v. CA 281 SCRA 557 [1997]
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from
various schools in Metropolitan Manila
Between the period September 17 to 21,
1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in
connection with the mass actions then staged;
and on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Isidro Cario immediately issued a return-to-
work order
ISSUE: WON Public workers have the right to
strike NO
workers in the public sector do not enjoy the
right to strike
Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by the workers in the private sector

to secure concessions from their employers
While we recognize and appreciate the toil
and hardship of our public schoolteachers in
fulfilling the states responsibility of educating
our children, and realize their inadequately
addressed plight as compared to other
professionals, we have the equal task of
promoting the larger public interest which
withholds from them and other similarly
situated government workers the right to
engage in mass actions resulting in work
stoppages for any purpose.
Although the Constitution vests in them the
right to organize, to assemble peaceably and
to petition the government for a redress of
grievances, there is no like express provision
granting them the right to strike. Rather, the
constitutional grant of the right to strike is
restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall
be done in accordance with law.
De la Cruz v. CA 305 SCRA 303
Petitioners are public school teachers who
were simultaneously charged, preventively
suspended, and eventually dismissed
The Civil Service Commission, upon appeal,
found the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of service, and imposed
upon them the reduced penalty of six months
suspension
ISSUE: WON public teachers have the right to
strike NO
DOCTRINE:
the mass actions amounted to a prohibited
strike of civil service servants.
Although the right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution,
this liberty must be exercised within
reasonable limits.
The public school teachers committed acts
prejudicial to the interest of the service by
staging the mass protests on regular school
days, abandoning their classes and failing to
return despite the return to work order.
GSIS v. Kapisanan 510 SCRA 622
A four-day October 2004 concerted
demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout
waged/held in front of the GSIS main office in
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all
Forming a huge part of the October 4 to
October 7, 2004 mass action participants
were GSIS personnel, among them members
of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the
"Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-
and-file employeesISSUE: WON they
participated in a prohibited activity YES
the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that
employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and
other forms of mass action that will lead in the
temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service.
The right of government employees to
organize is limited to the formation of unions
or associations only, without including the
right to strike, adding that public employees
going on disruptive unauthorized absences to
join concerted mass actions may be held
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
"prohibited concerted activity" refers to any
collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their
employees' organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption
in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and
acts of similar nature
Indeed, for four straight days, participating
KMG members and other GSIS employees
staged a walk out and waged or participated
in a mass protest or demonstration right at the
very doorstep of the GSIS main office building
Temporary Employees
Temporary Employees. Temporary
employees of the Government shall be given
 such protection as may be provided by law.
Gloria v. CA, GR 119903, August 15, 2000
Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed
Schools Division Superintendent, Division of
City Schools, QC, by the then Pres. Cory
Aquino.
Secretary Gloria recommended to the Pres.
Aquino that the Icasiano be reassigned as
Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute
of Science and Technology], to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro.
The President approved the recommendation
of Sec. Gloria.
Icasiano requested Sec. Gloria to reconsider
the reassignment, but the latter denied the
request.
Icasiano prepared a letter to Pres. Aquino,
asking for a reconsideration of his
Section 3. Purpose of a Civil Service System
reassignment, and furnished a copy of the
same to the DECS. However, he
subsequently changed his mind and refrained
from filing the letter with the Office of
President.
Petitioner was a permanent employee
transferred to another permanent position
without her consent.
ISSUE: W/N such transfer violates
security of tenure? How about temporary
transfer? YES
The transfer of a permanent employee to
another permanent position without the
consent of the employee violates security of
Lazo v. CSC, 236 SCRA 469
tenure.
Reassignment of petitioner to MIST
"appears to be indefinite".
The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Sec. Gloria for Pres. Fidel
V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment
of private respondent will "best fit his
qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical
education."
It can thus be gleaned that subject
reassignment is more than temporary as the
private respondent has been described as fit
for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in
the field.
As to temporary transfer: While a temporary
transfer or assignment of personnel is
permissible even without the employees
prior consent, it cannot be done when the
transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or is a scheme to lure him away
from his permanent position, or designed to
indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation.
Such a transfer would in effect circumvent
the provision, which safeguards the tenure
of office of those who are in the Civil
Service.
As central personnel agency of the
Government, to establish a career service,
and
To adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service.
To strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and
To institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability.
the Civil Service Commission received a letter
from a certain Efren L. Pagurayan, reporting
that petitioner Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to
him that he had bought his career service
(subprofessional) eligibility from the Civil
Service Commission for P7,000.00, P4,500.00
of which had been paid to the examiner and
computer programmers in the Manila Office,

and P2,500.00 to the Regional Office at
Tuguegarao
ISSUE: WON Lazo was denied due process
when he wasnt granted notice and hearing
NO
DOCTRINE:
Under the Constitution, the Civil Service
Commission is the central personnel agency
of the government charged with the duty of
determining questions of qualifications of merit
and fitness of those appointed to the civil
service.
Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility
carries with it the power to revoke a certificate
for being null and void
The argument is made, however, that the
CSC cannot motu propio revoke a certificate
of eligibility without notice and hearing to the
examinees concerned.
While this is true as a general proposition, in
the context of this case, which simply involves
the rechecking of examination papers and
nothing more than a reevaluation of
documents already in the records of the CSC
according to a standard answer key previously
set by it, notice and hearing was not required
Section 4. Oath or Affirmation
All public officers and employees shall take an
oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
Section 5. Standardization of Compensation
The Congress shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required
for, their positions.
Section 6. Prohibition of Appointment of
Lame Ducks
No candidate who has lost in any election,
shall within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or
any Government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
People v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 164185,
July 23, 2008
Villapando, Municipal Mayor of San Vicente,
Palawan appointed Tiape as Municipal
Administrator. Tiape lost in the previous
election.
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public
officer who shall knowingly nominate or
appoint to any public office any person lacking
the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Legal disqualification cannot be read as
excluding temporary disqualification in order
to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Section 7. Prohibitions; Appointments;
Office; Employment
No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including Government-owned or controlled
 corporations or their subsidiaries.
Flores v. Drilon 223 SCRA 568 (1993)
The principal question is whether the proviso
in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states,
"Provided, however, That for the first year of
its operations from the effectivity of this Act,
the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials
to other government posts.
The view that an elective official may be
appointed to another post if allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his office, ignores
the clear-cut difference in the wording of the
two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by
not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective
official to the government post, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution
itself, e.g., the President as head of the
economic and planning agency; the Vice-
President, who may be appointed Member of
the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who
may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction being clear, the exemption
allowed to appointive officials in the second
paragraph cannot be extended to elective
officials who are governed by the first
paragraph.
In re Eduardo Escala, 653 SCRA 141
Respondent while employed in the Court as
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and receiving
his regular compensation, he continued to be
a bonafide member of the PNP.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible
and abstract quality with no technical meaning
or statutory definition, and it encompasses,
among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of design
to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage.
Respondents actuation amounts to gross
dishonesty. His receipt of salaries from the
PNP despite not rendering any service thereto
is a form of deceit.
All court personnel ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity,
considering that their positions primarily
involve service to the public.
Escala was dismissed from the service and all
of his benefits were forfeited with prejudice to
re-employment in any government agency.
La Carlota City v. Rojo , GR 181367, 24 April
2012
As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can
vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding
officer votes when it matters the most, that is,
to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the
vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering
that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA
7160 to vote to break a tie
In the same manner, a quorum of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod should be
computed based on the total composition of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In this case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota
City, Negros Occidental is composed of the
presiding officer, ten (10) regular members,
and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of
thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
at least seven (7) members, is needed to
constitute a quorum to transact official
business. Since seven (7) members (including
the presiding officer) were present on the 17
March 2004 regular session of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a
quorum such that the irrevocable resignation
of respondent was validly accepted.

Sec. 8 Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign
Gift/Office/Title
Sedusasta v. Municipality of Surigao 72
PHIL. 482 [1941]
Peralta v. Mathay 38 SCRA 296 (1971)
Santos v. CA GR No. 139792, Nov. 22, 2000
Cabili v. CSC, GR No. 156503, June 22, 2006
Benguet State University v. Colting, GR No.
169637, June 8, 2007
Herrera, et al v. NPC, GR No. 166570,
December 18, 2009
NEA v. CSC 611 SCRA 14 [2010]
Doctrine of Finality
Administrative finality is the concept that a
determination or decision becomes final and
binding when rendered, unless it is timely
appealed or later reopened and revised for
special reasons.
Office of the President v. Board of Airlines,
GR 194276, 14 September 2011
Facts:
Petitioner questions the validity of the amount
received by BOC officials as additional
remunerations from foreign airlines regarding
the processing of immigration and custom
matters after office hours. It alleged that these
amounts are in violation of Section 8, Article
IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution regarding
double compensation.
Issue:
W/N the identified remuneration violates the
constitutional provision No
Held/Ratio:
BOC employees rendering overtime services
are not receiving double compensation for the
overtime pay, travel and meal allowances
provided for under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-
2005. Section 3506 provides that the rates
shall not be less than that prescribed by law to
be paid to employees of private enterprise.
The overtime pay, travel and meal allowances
are payment for additional work rendered after
regular office hours and do not constitute
double compensation prohibited under
Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987
Constitution as they are in fact authorized by
law or Section 3506 of the TCCP.
Yap v. COA 619 SCRA 154 [2010]
Facts:
Petitioner is a Director at the National
Development Company, by virtue of his
position he also holds a board seat as VP for
Finance and Treasury in Manila Gas
Corporation (MGC). MGC is a GOCC. He
receives allowances from the latter position
which was denied by COA in its audit.
Issue:
W/N the questioned allowances may be
allowed. No
Held/Ratio:
COA has the general audit power to give light
in the check and balance system in the form
of our government. COA is not required to
limit its review only to the grounds relied upon
by a government agencys auditor with respect
to disallowing certain disbursements of public
funds. In consonance with its general audit
power, respondent COA is not merely legally
permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its
own assessment of the merits of the
disallowed disbursement and not simply
restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the
ground relied upon by the auditor of the
government agency concerned. To hold
otherwise would render COAs vital
constitutional power unduly limited and
thereby useless and ineffective (Power of
COA).
Respondent COA is in the best position to
determine which allowances and benefits may
be properly allowed under the circumstances,
as it is the sole constitutional body mandated
to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations such as the MGC and
the NDC in the case at bar. Even if we
assume the truth of petitioners assertion that
the said allowances are normally given, this
 fact alone does not operate to preclude
respondent COA from performing its
constitutional mandate.
Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al v. Board of Airlines,
GR 193247
Facts:
Petitioner questions the validity of the amount
received by BOC officials as additional
remunerations from foreign airlines regarding
the processing of immigration and custom
matters after office hours. It alleged that these
amounts are in violation of Section 8, Article
IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution regarding
double compensation.
Issue:
W/N the identified remuneration violates the
constitutional provision No
Held/Ratio:
Section 3506 provides: Customs employees
may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime
work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of
Customs when the service rendered is to be
paid by the importers, shippers or other
persons served. The rates to be fixed shall
not be less than that prescribed by law to be
paid to employees of private enterprise. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the CA in
excluding airline companies, aircraft owners,
and operators from the coverage of Section
3506 of the TCCP. The term other persons
served refers to all other persons served by
the BOC employees. Airline companies,
aircraft owners, and operators are among
other persons served by the BOC employees.
The processing of embarking and
disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as
well as their baggage and cargoes, forms part
of the BOC functions. BOC employees who
serve beyond the regular office hours are
entitled to overtime pay for the services they
render. The SC also noted that the BOC
created a committee to re-evaluate the
proposed increase in the rate of overtime pay
and for two years, several meetings were
conducted with the agencies concerned to
discuss the proposal. BAR and the Airline
Operators Council participated in these
meetings and discussions. Hence, BAR
cannot claim that it was denied due process in
the imposition of the increase of the overtime
rate.
PEZA V. COA 675 SCRA 513[2012]
Facts:
PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13
members which includes USECS from various
Departments of Government. These USECS
serve as ex officio members of PEZA and are
granted per diems for every attendance in a
board meeting. COA upon discovering the per
diem, disallowed it.
Issue:
W/N the additional per diem remuneration is
constitutional No
Held/Ratio:
The Framers of RA 7916 must have realized
the flaw in the law which is why the provision
pertaining to the remuneration was removed
in the amendment in RA 8748. PEZAs
insistence that there is legal basis in its grant
of per diems to the ex officio members of its
Board does not hold water. The constitutional
prohibition explained in Civil Liberties Union
case still stands and this Court finds no
reason to revisit the doctrine laid down therein
as said interpretation, to this Courts mind, is
in consonance with what our Constitution
provides.
Dimagiba v. Espartero 676 SCRA 420 [2012]
Facts:
Petitioner Dimagiba are employees of
LIVECOR, a GOCC. Subsequently SIDCOR
was created and absorbed LIVECOR and
HSDC. Dimagiba was instituted as employees
of SIDCOR to facilitate basic corporate
functions and provided her honoraria and
monthly representation allowances. Upon the
retirement of Dimagiba in LIVECOR she
received her gratuity and separation pay.
Consequently, the issue on double pay was
highlighted when she received gratuity pay for
her performance with LIVECOR/HSDC.
Issue:
W/N there is a violation of the constitution. -
Yes
Held/Ratio:
As a general rule pensions or gratuities shall
 not be considered as additional, double, or
indirect compensation. However, the gratuity
pay being given to petitioners by the HSDC
Board was by reason of the satisfactory
performance of their work under the trust
agreement. It is considered a bonus and by its
very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional
remuneration or compensation. It bears
stressing that when petitioners were
separated from LIVECOR, they were given
separation pay which also included gratuity
pay for all the years they worked thereat and
concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting
them another gratuity pay for the works done
in HSDC under the trust agreement would be
indirectly giving them additional compensation
for services rendered in another position
which is an extension or is connected with his
basic work which is prohibited. This can only
be allowed if there is a law which specifically
authorizes them to receive an additional
payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board
Resolution No. 05-19-A granting petitioners
gratuity pay is not a law which would exempt
them from the Constitutional proscription
against additional, double or indirect
compensation.
The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX
specifically adds that "pensions and gratuities
shall not be considered as additional, double
or indirect compensation." This has reference
to compensation already earned, for instance
by a retiree. A retiree receiving pensions or
gratuities after retirement can continue to
receive such pension or gratuity even if he
accepts another government position to which
another compensation is attached.
C. Commission on Elections
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Section 1:
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective
positions in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991)
Facts:
Respondent Monsod was nominated by Pres.
Aquino to chair the COMELEC. Petitioner
questioned the qualifications of Monsod
holding that the latter does not have the
necessary 10 year experience in the practice
of law.
Issue:
W/N Monsod is qualified Yes
Held:
Practice of law is not limited to litigation.
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990)
Facts:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred
prompting the president to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by
Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate
his chairmanship over the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an
associate commissioner in the COMELEC,
was appointed by then President Corazon
Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short,
she was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto
Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such
appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution in no case shall any member of
the COMELEC be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the
president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC. -Yes
HELD/Ratio:
Yoracs designation as acting chairman is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled
that although all constitutional commissions
are essentially executive in nature, they are
not under the control of the president in the
discharge of their functions. The designation
made by the president has dubious
justification as it was merely grounded on the
quote administrative expediency to present
the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from
such justification, it found no basis on existing
rules on statutes. It is the members of the
COMELEC who should choose whom to sit
temporarily as acting chairman in the absence
of Davide (they normally do that by choosing
the most senior member).
Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49
Facts:
PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason
as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a
term of seven years and all expiring on
February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of
office and assumed the position of COMELEC
Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took
their oaths of office and assumed their
positions as COMELEC Commissioners.
However, they were not confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on several
meetings due to its adjournment.
Issue:
W/N the appointments are valid Yes
Held/Ratio:
The ad interim appointments and subsequent
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on
reappointments because there were no
previous appointments that were confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. A
reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim
appointments and renewals of appointments
will also not breach the seven-year term limit
because all the appointments and renewals of
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are for a fixed term expiring on February 2,
2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not
extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever
that the renewal of the ad interim
appointments of these three respondents will
result in any of the evils intended to be
exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the
Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad
interim appointment of these three
respondents, for so long as their terms of
office expire on February 2, 2008, does not
violate the prohibition on reappointments in
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Hayudini v. Comelec, GR No. 207900, 723
SCRA 223, April 22, 2014
FACTS
Hayudini filed his COC for the position of
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian. Omar
questioned Hayudinis COC for making false
representation regarding his residence, stating
he was a resident South Ubian but in truth a
resident of Zamboanga City. He was
proclaimed winner for the said position and
later took his oath. RTC excluded Hayudini
from the list of voters. Subsequently,
COMELEC en banc cancelled his COC and
declared Omar as Mayor.
Whether it is proper for COMELEC en bancs
ruling is proper? YES
HELD
A candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
These facts pertain to a candidate's
qualification for elective office, such as his or
her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the
candidate's status as a registered voter falls
under this classification as it is a legal
requirement which must be reflected in the
CoC.
The false representation must pertain to a
material fact, not to a mere innocuous
mistake. It must be also be made with a
malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to
the potential candidate's qualifications for
public office.
It is proper for COMELEC en banc to cancel
Hayudinis COC and proclaim Omar as Mayor
since there was false representation in the
Hayudini COC. He made a clear and material
misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because
he was not, in fact, registered as a voter of
South Ubian.
Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851, July 8,
2014
FACTS
This involves the cancellation of Navals COC
as Board Member of Camerines Sur for
violating the 3-term limit imposed upon elective
local officials. From 2004-2007 and 2007-2010,
Naval had been elected and had served as a
Board Members of Camarines Sur (2 nd district).
Later, the province of Camarines Sur was
reapportioned and the old 2nd district was
changed to 3rd district excluding Gainza and
Milaor. Naval ran as Member of 3rd district
Board member and won. COMELEC division
and en banc cancelled Navals COC.
ISSUE
Whether the 3-term limit applicable to Naval?
HELD
YES because the 3rd district does not form a
different set of constituents.
The words of R.A. No. 9716 (reapportionment
law) plainly state that the new Second District is
to be created, but the Third District is to be
renamed. The verb create means to make or
produce something new. On the other hand,
the verb rename means to give a new name to
someone or something. In this case, the
district, which elected him for the third and
fourth time, is the same which brought him to
office in 2004 and 2007.
**A provincial board member cannot be elected
and serve for more than three consecutive
terms.
Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004,
February 24, 2015
FACTS
Timbol filed COC for the position of Caloocan
City Councilor. Timbol was initiatlly included in
the list of nuisance candidates posted in
Comelecs website. He was assured that his
name be removed from said list after the
clarificatory hearing with an election officer.
Since his name was not removed, he filed a
petition to include him in the certified list of
candidates for 2013 election. COMELEC
denied petition.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC can motu proprio
deny or cancel an alleged nuisance
candidates COC?
HELD:
YES provided that the candidate was afforded
an opportunity to be heard. In election cases,
due process requirements are satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.
In this case, Timbol was declared as a
nuisance candidate without giving him a
chance to explain his bona fide intention to
run for office. COMELEC had already issued
resolution when he appeared before Election
Officer in a clarificatory hearing. This was an
ineffective opportunity to be heard.
**To minimize the logistical confusion caused
by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or
cancelled by respondent. To minimize the
logistical confusion caused by nuisance
candidates, their certificates of candidacy may
be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may
be motu proprio or upon a verified petition of
an interested party, subject to an opportunity
to be heard.
Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286,
September 23, 2014
FACTS
In 2012, Osme filed his COC for position of
Mayor of Toledo City, Cebu. He indicated
therein that he has been a resident for 15
years prior to the election. Before running for
said position, he also served as
Congressional representative of 3rd district of
Cebu from 1995-1998, which includes the City
of Toledo. Even prior to his actual transfer of
residence to Toledo City, he had been able to
establish ties with said city in view of family
business interest and his political linkages.
Petitioners questioned Osmes COC because
he made material misrepresentations in his
COC, particularly his residency because he
did not own any real property, even his
alleged residence, in said city. Likewise, he
was not physically present in said city as he
was only seen in the month of September
2012 to conduct political meetings.
ISSUE
Whether Osme satisfied the residence
requirement?
HELD: YES
To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of this
intention.To fulfill the residency requirement,
the law does not require a person to be in his
home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The fact
that Osme had no registered property under
his name does not belie his actual residence
in Toledo City because property ownership is
not among the qualifications required of
candidates for local election. It is enough that
he should live in the locality, even in a rented
house or that of a friend or relative. To use
ownership of property in the district as the
determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that only the
landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement.
Section 2. Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
1. Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebsicite, initiative,
referendum or recall
2. Jurisdiction: EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials
a. APPELLATE jurisdiction: all
contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general
jurisdiction
b. APPELLATE: elective
barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited
jurisdiction
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
3. Decide all questions affecting elections
except those involving the right to vote
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered.
6. Cancel registration and penalize political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates to elections if it/they received
financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies since it
constitutes as interference in national affairs
7. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its
own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
8. Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending, and
to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
9. Recommend to the President the removal
of any officer or employee it has deputized, or
the imposition of any other disciplinary action,
for violation or disregard of, or disobedience
to, its directive, order, or decision.
10. Submit to the President and the Congress,
a comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.
Alfiado v. Comelec, GR 141787, September
18, 2000
FACTS
Vice-Mayor Navarro became the new Mayor
of Santiago City by virtue of the law on
succession when the election and
proclamation of the mayor was annulled.
Preparatory Recall Assembly, composed of
barangay officials, passed a resolution for the
recall of the vice mayor on the ground of loss
of confidence and fitness and of fitness to
discharge her duties. Said resolution was
forwarded to the COMELEC. Navarro filed a
petition to nullify the resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an elective official who
became City Mayor by legal succession can
be the subject of a recall election by virtue of
said resolution which was passed or adopted
at the time when she was still the Vice-Mayor?
HELD:
NO
A resolution for the recall of a vice mayor
becomes moot and academic when said
elective official has become mayor by legal
succession. The specific purpose of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly was to remove
her as the elected Vice-Mayor. However, the
said resolution is no longer applicable to her
because she has already vacated the office of
Vice-Mayor when she assumed the position of
City Mayor.
Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were
to reconvene to adopt another resolution for
the recall of Navarro as Mayor, it will not
prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local
Government Code which provides that No
recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the officials assumption of office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
election.
Columbres v. Comelec, GR
142038,September 18, 2000
FACTS
Columbres filed an election protest in relation
to the election and proclamation of Guzman
as Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan. RTC
invalidated the contested 124 votes. However,
COMELEC division invalidated only 13 ballots
in favor of Guzman. MR was filed but this was
denied by COMELEC en banc because the
issue pertains to a finding of fact that may not
be subject of MR.
ISSUE
1. Whether the findings of the COMELEC
division in relation to matters of appreciation
of ballots is absolute and cannot be subject of
MR before the COMELEC en banc?
2. Whether there is a presumption that the
markings placed by a third person is a marked
ballots even in the absence of evidence
aliunde?
HELD:
NOT ABSOLUTE. IT CAN BE SUBJECT OF
MR BEFORE THE COMELEC EN BANC
Any question on the appreciation of the ballots
would directly affect the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting an assailed decision,
order or ruling of a COMELEC Division is also
a proper subject of MR before the COMELEC
en banc.
NO PRESUMPTION
There is no such presumption in law that the
markings found on the ballots have been
made by third persons, absent concrete
evidence showing that they were placed by
the voters themselves. The legal presumption
is that the sanctity of the ballot has been
protected and preserved. In order to ascertain
the real nature of the alleged markings, there
is a need to actually examine the questioned
ballots.
Sahali v. Comelec, GR 134169, February 2,
2000
 DOCTRINE COMELEC has inherent power to
amend and control its processes and orders
within the 30 day period from promulgation
before it becomes final and executory.
FACTS During 1998 elections for
governatorial candidates in tawi tawi, Sahali
was proclaimed by Provincial Board as duly
elected governor, COMELEC passed a minute
resolution (MR1) directing the immediate
manual recounting of ballots and suspend
effects of proclamation due to system
breakdowns. However, when COMELEC
decided to pass another minute Resolution
(MR2) stating to hold in abeyance MR1
because of the petition for certiorari filed with
SC, COMELEC issued another minute
resolution (MR3) which recalled earlier
resolutions MR 1 and MR 2 and followed the
order of SC for status quo ante order, thus,
holding Sahali as duly proclaimed.
Held Court held that petitioner failed to show
that promulgation by COMELEC of MR3 was
GAD. The recall of COMELEC under MR3
was well within its power as this was within
the 30 day period before it became final and
executory. COMELEC has the inherent power
to amend and control its process and order.
Claudio v. Comelec, GR 140560, May 4, 2000
Quick Facts: Claudio elected Mayor of
Pasay City in the 1998 elections. Before
May 1999, chair of brgys MET to discuss
possibility of recall elections, the concening
preparatory recall assembly (PRA), to which
by July 1999 (one year and one day after
assumption of office by Claudio), they adopted
Resolution No 1 for the RECALL of Claudio.
COMELEC granted the petition finding
signatures of members sufficient and set the
date for the recall elections. Petitioner claims
the one year ban applies and therefore
COMELEC guilty of GAD stating the Recall
refers to a process versus the recall election
and so when the PRA met on May 1999, they
violated the one-year ban. COMELEC
contends that the process of recall starts with
the FILING of the petition and not with the
convening for purposes of recall.
HELD: Court held that Recall is a process
does not start with convening preparatory
recall assembly (PRA). There can be many
preliminary steps for purposes of initiating
recall but the exercise of the power of recall
lies with the Electorate when they do the
actual voting. The PRA is to determine
whether there are sufficient grounds. Thus,
when the recall election was scheduled by
COMELEC on April 15, 2000, it was already
more than a year from when Claudio assumed
office.
DOCTRINES RECALL is the election itself by
means of which voters decide whether they
should retain their local official or elect his
replacement. It is a process which begins
with convening preparatory recall
assembly (PRA) or gathering signatures of at
least 25% of the registered voters of a local
govt unit, and then proceed to filing a recall
resolution with COMELEC. The law is clear
and states the power vested on the electorate
is to ELECT the official into office (power of
recall) and it is not the power to initiate the
recall proceedings (PRA). Since the voters do
not exercise power of recall until actual
elections, it is clear that the initiation of recall
proceedings is NOT prohibited within the one-
year period. The PRA is for purposes of
providing voters a sufficient basis for judging
elective local official and final judging is not
done until election. COMLEC determines
sufficiency, grants the petition, and orders the
schedule for the recall election
Two limitations on recall: (1) no recall shall
take place within one year from the date of
assumption of office of the official concerned,
and (2) no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
De Guzman v. Comelec, GR 129118, July 19,
2000
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 97-
0002 and 97-0610 and then issued directives
reassigning petitioners City/ Municipal
Election Officers to different stations. They
contend that RA 8189 violates the equal
protection clause since it singles out City and
Municipality Election Officers from holding
office in same city for more than 4 years,
singling them out from other COMELEC
officials. Singling out is not violative of EP
Clause especially since this insures
impartiality. There is also no infringing on
security of tenure because this does not mean
perpetual employment but only that they
cannot be removed without due process.
Lastly, there is no undermining COMELEC
authority to appoint its own officials because
Section 44 establishes a guideline for
COMELEC to follow (criterion for
reassignment or transfer) but does not deprive
it of its power to appoint and maintain
authority over all its officials and employees. It
must be remembered that although it is a
government agency tasked with
implementation and enforcement of election
laws, COMELEC is still duty bound to comply
with the laws passed by Congress. There is
no impairment of its power to appoint, rather
Section 44 strengthens its power to appoint.
Doctrine Singling out of election officers to
ensure impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity
with people of their place of assignment does
not violate equal protection clause. Section 44
of RA 8189 does not undermine COMELECs
power to appoint its own officials.
Social Weather Station, Inc v. COMELEC, GR
NO. 147571, May 5, 2001
SWS brought action for prohibition to enjoin
COMELEC to enforce Sec 5.2 RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act) stating surveys affective national
candidates not published 15 days before
election and local not published 7 days before
election. Election surveys are measurement of
opinions and perceptions of voters. Petitioners
claim that previous elections allowed them to
release even as close as 2 days before.
COMELEC states that it has supervisory
power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of franchise for operation of media of
communication.
HELD: Comelec Resolution is invalid because
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression and it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even
if it is of a limited period, and governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression. HOWEVER, it must be
noted that COMELEC is given the power to
stop any illegal activity or confiscate, tear
down and stop any unlawful, libelous,
misleading or false election propaganda, after
due notice and hearing.
Doctrine There is no basis for the COMELEC
claim that petition for prohibition is
inappropriate. Resolution 3636 was not an
exercise by COMELEC of its adjudicatory
power to settle claims of parties, it was to
implement RA 9006, and therefore, petition for
prohibition was appropriate because it tests
the constitutionality of various election laws,
rules, and regulations. Therefore, ART 9-A
Section 7 of the constitution on decisions,
orders, or resolutions may be reviewed by this
Court only by Certiorari does not apply.
Information Technology Foundation v.
Comelec, GR 159139, Jan 13, 2004
Facts COMELEC approved resolution and
awarded Contract to Mega Pacific eSolutions
Inc (MPEI) for 2004 elections but contends it
did not participate in the bidding but it was
actually Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) that
participated in the bidding. However, it is
claimed that Mega Pacific did not meet eligible
requirements such as the 99.99% accuracy
rating, not able to detect previously
downloaded results, and unable to print
statutorily required audit trails.
Held Court held that there was not two
envelop process submitted to COMCLEC. As
shown in the eligibility requirements
submitted by COMELEC, there was no
showing that MPEI and MPC signed into a
joint venture agreement, consortium MOA or
business plan showing any relationship
between the firms. Therefore, during bidding
process, COMELEC had no basis fat all
Buac v. Comelec, 421 SCRA 92
Doctrine The enforcement and administration
of a law relative to a plebiscite falls under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, which gives it
the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of a
plebiscite (Art 9C of Constitution).
The conduct of Taguig plebiscite is the core of
the controversy and it is a matter that involves
the enforcement and administration of a law
relative to a plebiscite. COMELEC is an
independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, it
has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws. Thus, must give
enough latitude in the exercise of its expertise
where to straightjacket its discretion might
render elections impotent.
Capalla v. COMELEC 673 SCRA 1 [2012]
Doctrines (1) The three principles of bidding:
(1) offer to the public (2) opportunity for
competition (3) basis for exact comparison of
bids this is to protect public interest by
giving the public the best possible advantages
through open competition in order to place all
qualified bidders in equal footing giving
government lower possible price under most
favorable terms and conditions
(2) A winning bidder is not precluded from
modifying certain provisions in a bidded
contract but must ensure such are not
substantial or material amendments
held Comelec, being confronted with time and
budget constraints, and in view of its mandate
to ensure free, honest, and credible elections,
the acceptance of the extension of the option
period, and exercise of it, are more prudent
choices available to COMELEC for successful
2013 elections.
After smartmatic was granted contract, there
were some amendments to the contract to
which other bidders held violative of their right
to equal bidding and rules. Court ruled that (1)
Smartmatic-TiM was not granted additional
right previously not available to other bidders.
The AES contract granted to Smartmatic is a
contract primarily of that of a lease of goods to
which COMELEC had an option to purchase
(OTP) the goods agreed upon. All bidders
were apprised of this that aside from the lease
of goods and purchase of services, the
proposals should include an OTP. (2), the
amendment after the contract was awarded
only pertained to the period within which
Comelec can exercise the OTP. Morever, the
approved budget of COMELEC was for P11B
and the AES contract with OTP gave contract
price of P7.9B plus P2.1B when decides to
exercise option, which is still within the budget
and competitive bidding conducted was
sufficient. And (3), amendment with OTP was
more advantageous for COMELEC. OTP is a
preparatory contract for a fixed period of time,
binds the party given the option not to enter
into a principal contract with any other person
during period designated; it is a continuing
offer to enter into a principal contract. If it does
not decide to purchase, another bidding can
be held. Here, the extension of the option was
more advantageous for COMELEC since the
alleged defects in the machines as seen can
be corrected and undertaken by Smartmatic
during the extended time to ensure successful
election.
Election Contests
Flores v. COMELEC 184 SCRA 484 [1990]
Petitioner contending WON the decisions of
Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 or of
the RTC
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC
shall Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal
or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under
the afore-quoted section.
Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, should have been
appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to
 the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act
No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the
decision of the municipal or metropolitan court
in a barangay election case should be
appealed to the RTC, must be declared
unconstitutional.
Galido v. COMELEC 193 SCRA 78 [1991]
Mercado v. BES 243 SCRA 422 [1995]
Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690
[1995]
People v. Delgado 189 SCRA 715 [1990]
Garces v. CA 259 SCRA 99 [1996]
Zarate v. Comelec and Lallave GR 129096,
November 19, 1999
Regalado v. CA, GR 115962, February 15,
2000
The two elements of the offense prescribed
under 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code,
as amended, are: (1) a public officer or
employee is transferred or detailed within the
election period as fixed by the COMELEC,
and (2) the transfer or detail was effected
without prior approval of the COMELEC in
accordance with its implementing rules and
regulations.
Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or
detail personnel as the exigencies of public
service require.[19] However, during election
period, as such personnel movement could be
used for electioneering or even to harass
subordinates who are of different political
persuasion, 261(h) of the Omnibus Election
Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless
approved by the COMELEC.
Faelnar v. People,GR 140850-51, May 4, 2000
Rule 13. - Prohibited Pleadings.
SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed.
The following pleadings are not allowed:
....
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc
ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases; . . . (Emphasis added).
Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for
reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or
decision of the COMELEC en banc is allowed
in cases involving election offenses.
Here, there is no question that what is
involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en
banc in an election offense. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration of such resolution is
allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC.
In cases where the State Prosecutor, or
Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the
delegated power[10] to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offense cases, after
the investigating officer submits his
recommendation, said officers already resolve
the issue of probable cause. From such
resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As
the exercise by the Commission of its review
powers would, at this point, already constitute
a second look on the issue of probable cause,
the COMELECs ruling on the appeal would be
immediately final and executory. Oldmisox
On the other hand, if the preliminary
investigation of a complaint for election
offense is conducted by the COMELEC itself,
its investigating officer prepares a report upon
which the Commissions Law Department
makes its recommendation to the COMELEC
en banc on whether there is probable cause to
prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc
which determines the existence of probable
cause.[11] Consequently, an appeal to the
Commission is unavailing. Under the present
Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC,
however, a motion for reconsideration of such
resolution is allowed. This effectively allows
for a review of the original resolution, in the
same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal
or motu proprio, may review the resolution of
the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City
Fiscal.
Tan v. Comelec, GR 148575, Dec. 10, 2003
Alauya v. Comelec, GR 158830, August 10,
2004
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lays
down three instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely, (1) the
election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; (2) the election in any polling place
has been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes; or (3) after the voting
and during the preparation and transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
cases. In all instances there must have been a
failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two
scenarios, where the election was not held
and where the election was suspended. As to
the third scenario, the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns, which
give rise to the consequence of failure to
elect, must as aforesaid be literally interpreted
to mean that nobody emerged as a
winner.[27]
Hence, before the COMELEC can act on a
verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
elections, two conditions must concur,
namely, (1) no voting took place in the
precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law,
or even if there was voting, the election
resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes
not cast would have affected the result of the
election. Note that the cause of such failure of
election could only be any of the following:
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes.
Moreover, the proclamation of the petitioners
enjoys the presumption of regularity and
validity.[30] To destroy the presumption, the
respondents must convincingly show that the
petitioners victory was procured through extra-
legal means. This they tried to do by alleging
matters in their petitions which they believed
constituted grounds for a declaration of failure
of election, such as massive substitution of
voters, fraud, terrorism, disenfranchisement of
voters, and other anomalies. The attendance
of the alleged fraud and irregularities in the
elections as catalogued by the respondents,
however, constitute merely the causes or
events which may give rise to the grounds to
declare failure of elections, namely, (a) no
election held on the designated election date;
(b) suspension of election before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of voting; and (c)
election in any polling place resulted in a
failure to elect. But as aforesaid, the grounds
cited by the respondents do not fall under any
of the instances under Section 6 of Rep. Act
No. 7166, the winning candidates having been
proclaimed by the PBC. While fraud is a
ground to declare a failure of election, the
commission of fraud must be such that it
prevented or suspended the holding of an
election, including the preparation and
transmission of the election returns.
Powers Not Given
It is not empowered to decide questions
involving the right to vote
The power to determine WON a person can
exercise or is precluded from exercising the
right is a judicial question and the power to
resolve such question has been excluded
from the Commissions powers. Section 2(6)
places cases involving inclusion or exclusion
of voters under the jurisdiction of courts.
Section 2 and 3, authorizing to make minor
adjustments. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the subject
clearly excluded the power to transfer whole
municipalities. -
Election cases must first be decided in
division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc may
not decide an election case still pending
before a division.
A decision, resolution or ruling of a division is
elevated to the COMELEC en banc. However,
while a motion to reconsider an interlocutory
order of a division should be resolved by the
division w/c issued the interlocutory order, it
may be referred to the COMELEC en banc if
all the members of the division agree.
If a case w/c should go to the COMELEC en
banc is erroneously filed w/ a division, it may
automatically be elevated to the COMELEC
en banc. This is not provided for in the
COMELEC Rules of procedure, but such
action is not prohibited.
Deputizing Law Enforcement Agencies
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987
Constitution
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcementi agencies and
instrumantalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on
its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
People v. Basilla 179 SCRA 87[1989]
We note that while Section 265 of the Code
vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to
prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at
the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail
itself of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the Government.
The contention of private respondents that the
deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting
arms of the Government would be warranted
only before the elections and only to ensure
tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible
elections, that is, to perform the peace-
keeping functions of policemen, lack
substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires
such a pinched niggardly interpretation of the
authority of the Comelec to appoint as its
deputies, officials or employees of other
agencies and instrumentalities of the
government. The prompt investigation and
prosecution and disposition of election
offenses constitute an indispensable part of
the task of securing free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. The
investigation and prosecution of election
offenses are, in an important sense, more
important than the maintenance of physical
order in election precinct. 'without the
assistance of provincial and city fiscals and
their assistants and staff members, and of the
 state prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses committed
before or in the course of nationwide elections
would simply not be possible, unless,
perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy
many times larger than what it actually has.
Moreover, the prosecution officers designated
by the Comelec become deputies or agents of
the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the
authority, control and supervision of the
Comelec in respect of the particular functions
covered by such deputation. The acts of such
deputies within the lawful scope of their
delegated authority are, in legal
contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself.
The only limitation the Constitution itself
places upon the Comelec's authority over its
deputies relates to the enforcement of such
authority through administrative sanctions.
Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal-
may be recommended by the Comelec to the
President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987
Constitution) rather than directly imposed by
the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid
potential difficulties with the executive
department of the Government where the
prosecution and other officers deputized are
ordinarily located.
Registration of Parties and Organization
LDP v. Comelec, GR 161265, February 24,
2004
The only issue in this case, as defined by the
COMELEC itself, is who as between the Party
Chairman and the Secretary General has the
authority to sign certificates of candidacy of
the official candidates of the party. Indeed, the
petitioners Manifestation and Petition before
the COMELEC merely asked the Commission
to recognize only those certificates of
candidacy signed by petitioner Sen. Angara or
his authorized representative, and no other.
To resolve this simple issue the Supreme
Court ruled that, the COMELEC need only to
turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go
so far as to resolve the root of the conflict
between the party officials. It need only
resolve such questions as may be necessary
in the exercise of its enforcement powers.
The ascertainment of the identity of a political
party and its legitimate officers is a matter that
is well within the authority of the Commission
on Elections. COMELEC, however, cannot
grant a party official greater authority than
what the party itself grants, lest the same
amount to a violation of the partys freedom of
association.
The repercussions of the question of party
identity and leadership do not end at the
validity of the endorsement of the certificates
of candidacy of persons claiming to be the
partys standard bearer; as the Supreme
Court will have to assume jurisdiction to
determine factional controversies within a
political party where a controlling statute or
clear legal right is involved
A certificate of candidacy makes known to the
COMELEC that the person therein mentioned
has been nominated by a duly authorized
political group empowered to act and that it
reflects accurately the sentiment of the
nominating body.
Atienza v. COMELEC 612 SCRA 761 [2010]
Franklin Drilon is contesting the LP election
that made petitioner Atienza the President of
the said party. The matter was brought to
COMELEC and it annulled the election of
Atienza. Likewise, COMELECs resolution
ruled that Drilons term may be deemed to
have ended. Soon thereafter, another election
for party-leader was held by the Liberal Party
and Manuel Roxas II was elected as the party
President. COMELEC upheld the election of
Roxas II. Now, Atienza challenges
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party
leadership disputes
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELECs
jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the
Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections that the
COMELECs powers and functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
include the ascertainment of the identity of
the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELECs
power to register political parties necessarily
involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political
parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as
LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended
LP Constitution, the LP president is the
issuing authority for certificates of nomination
of party candidates for all national elective
positions. It is also the LP president who can
authorize other LP officers to issue certificates
of nomination for candidates to local elective
posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president
who certifies the official standard bearer of the
party.
Lokin v. COMELEC 674 SCRA 538[2012]
CIBAC Foundation and CIBAC Sectoral Party
were at odds with one another with regard to
who should be their party nominees. Despite
the infighting, CIBAC submitted their
nomination and manifestation of Intent to
participate in the party-list elections.
COMELEC thereafter ruled on who were the
true nominees of CIBAC. Petitioners now
challenge COMELECs jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled that even as
petitioners insisted on the purely intra-
corporate nature of the conflict between
CIBAC Foundation and the CIBAC Sectoral
Party, they submitted their Certificate of
Nomination and Manifestation of Intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Precisely,
petitioners were seeking the COMELECs
approval of their eligibility to participate in the
upcoming party-list elections. In effect, they
invoke its authority under the Party-List
System Act. Contrary to their stance that the
present dispute stemmed from an intra-
corporate matter, their submissions even
recognize the COMELECs constitutional
power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
More specifically, as one of its constitutional
functions, the COMELEC is also tasked to
register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government.
In any case, the COMELECs jurisdiction to
settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well established. This singular power
to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as
an incident to its enforcement powers.
Prosecution of Election Offenses
People v. Inting 187 SCRA 788 [1990]
The sole issue here is whether a Provincial
Fiscal can file an information charging one of
an election offence or prosecute one for a
violation of election law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the 1987
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not
only to investigate but also to prosecute cases
of violation of election laws. This means that
the COMELEC is empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping
the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in court. This power is
exclusive with COMELEC. As such, the
Provincial Fiscal assumes no role in the
prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal
or Prosecutor files an information charging an
election offense or prosecutes a violation of
election law, it is because he has been
deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do
so under the sole authority of his office.
Corpus v. Tanodbayan 149 SCRA 281[1987]
COMELEC dismissed a complaint filed by
Mangaser against Castillejos who was then a
candidate for mayor. Mangaser proceeded to
file a complaint with the Tanodbayan. The
issue in this case is whether the Tanodbayan
or Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offences?
The Supreme Court ruled that an examination
of the provisions of the Constitution and the
Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear
intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
election offenses committed by any person,
whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance,
irrespective of whether the offense is
committed in relation to his official duties or
not.
In other words, it is the nature of the offense
and not the personality of the offender that
matters. As long as the offense is an election
offense jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its
all-embracing power over the conduct of
elections.
COMELEC v. Silva 286 SCRA 177[1998]
Respondents, who were charged of having
tampered some certificates of canvass,
moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed
against them. The Chief State Prosecutor,who
had been designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining
in private respondents' request. Eventually,
the cases were dismissed.The COMELEC
sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to
the CA.
The authority to decide whether or not to
appeal the dismissal of a criminal
prosecution for an election offense
belongs to the COMELEC, not the
designated prosecutor. Prosecutors
designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the
cases act as its deputies. They derive their
authority from it (COMELEC) and not from
their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the
power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to
oppose the appeal of the COMELEC.
Moreover, if the Chief State Prosecutor
thought there was no probable cause for
proceeding against private respondents, he
should have discussed the matter with the
COMELEC and awaited its instruction.
The COMELEC has the right to appeal, in
its own name, from a decision dismissing
a criminal case filed by it. Considering the
authority of the COMELEC over the
prosecution of election offenses, its decision
to bring a petition for certiorari and mandamus
is conclusive on the Solicitor General.
Comelec v. Hon. Espanol, GR 149164, Dec.
10, 2003
Bautista filed before the Law Department of
the Comelec a complaint against certain
individuals for vote buying. By virtue of a
resolution, an information was filed against
respondents with the RTC. COMELEC later
on recommended that the resolution of the
Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be
nullified because the accused are exempt and
that the prosecution of election offenses were
under the sole control of the COMELEC.
COMELECs act was proper. The
Constitution empowers the COMELEC to
investigate and when appropriate,
prosecute election offenses. The
prosecutors deputized by the petitioner
(COMELEC) are subject to its authority,
control and supervision in respect of the
particular functions covered by such
deputation. The acts of such deputies within
the lawful scope of their delegated authority
are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the
petitioner itself.
The power to grant exemptions is vested
solely on the petitioner. This power is
concomitant with its authority to enforce
election laws, investigate election offenses
and prosecute those committing the same.
Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181[2012]
The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint
Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases. One of the
issues raised in this case is whether or not the
DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation
only when deputized by the Comelec but not
 exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
The Constitution envisions a truly independent
Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections and
to serve as the guardian of the peoples
sacred right of suffragethe citizenrys vital
weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting
political stability.
Under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants are given
continuing authority as deputies to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints
involving election offenses under election laws
and to prosecute the same.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases of election offenses
to the Comelec was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election
Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now
conducts preliminary investigation of
election offenses concurrently with the
Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.
Recommendatory Powers
Section 3. Decisions
The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Pangilinan v. COMELEC 228 SCRA
36[1993]
Petitioner Pangilinan and respondent
Belmonte were both candidates for
congressman in the 4th legislative district of
Quezon City. However, respondent was
alleged to have violated the Omnibus Election
Code by giving money and other material
considerations to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend the Canvass and Proclamation of
Belmonte before the COMELEC. COMELEC
argued that they are not able to judge on pre-
proclamation cases involving members of
House of Representatives under Section 15 of
R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution 2413.
While the COMELEC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests of all
elective regional, provincial and city
officials, the Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives is the sole judge
over election contests of all its members.
Sec. 15 of R.A. 7166 is consistent with
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which makes the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate and the House of Representatives the
sole judge of all election contests of their
respective members.
Where the candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an
electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives.
Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307[1992]
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
resolved the appeals of petitioners in 9
Special Cases without first referring them to
any of its Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit
en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void
and must be set aside. Consequently, the
appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.
Carnicosa v. COMELEC 282 SCRA
512[1997]
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers that the
COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide
cases first by Division and then, upon
motion for reconsideration, by the
COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional. In the instant case, as
aforestated, the issues presented demand
only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions.
Canicosa alleged that he was credited with
less votes than he actually received. But he
did not raise any objection before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers; instead, he
went directly to the COMELEC. He now
claims, after the COMELEC en banc
dismissed his petition, that it was error on the
part of COMELEC to rule on his petition while
sitting en banc.
In Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections it
was made to appear in the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the
Winning Candidates that respondent therein
received 4,951 votes or more than what he
actually obtained. In resolving the case we
ruled that the correction of the manifest
mistake in mathematical addition calls for a
mere clerical task of the board of canvassers.
The remedy invoked was purely
administrative.
In Feliciano v. Lugay, we categorized the
issue concerning registration of voters,
which Canicosa cited as a ground in his
petition for declaration of failure of
election, as an administrative question.
Likewise, questions as to whether elections
have been held or whether certain returns
were falsified or manufactured and therefore
should be excluded from the canvass do not
involve the right to vote. Such questions are
properly within the administrative
jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be
acted upon directly by the COMELEC en
banc without having to pass through any
of its divisions. No grave abuse of discretion
committed by public respondent COMELEC
dismissing the petition before it on the ground
that the allegations therein did not justify a
declaration of failure of election.
Ramas v. COMELEC 286 SCRA 189[1998]
Petitioners and private respondents were the
official candidates for elective municipal
positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur.
Petitioners were proclaimed as the duly
elected
municipal officials. Respondents filed an
election protest wherein the court ruled in their
favor. Respondents filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution of Decision pending
Appeal. Petitioners opposed.
As to election cases involving regional,
provincial, and city officials, which fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution vests the COMELEC with the
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure
in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. Additionally, the Omnibus
Election Code empowers the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations
implementing the provisions of the Code
or other laws which it is required to
enforce and administer.
Accordingly, the COMELEC promulgated
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section
1 of Rule 41 thereof expressly provides
that [i]n the absence of any applicable
provision in [said] Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy
or in a suppletory character and effect
SC has explicitly recognized and given
approval to execution of judgments pending
appeal in election cases filed under existing
election laws. All that was required for a valid
exercise of the discretion to allow execution
pending appeal was that the immediate

execution should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order.
Garvida v. Sales 271 SCRA 767[1997]
Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for
the position of Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan. Respondent filed with the
COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial
and/or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy against petitioner for falsely
representing her age qualification. COMELEC
en banc granted the petition.
Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the
COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc.
Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc
when the required number of votes to
reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is
not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only
motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. COMELEC en banc
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion when it entertained the petition.
Velayo v. Comelec, GR 135613, March 9, 2000
FACTS:
Velayo and Natividad were running as mayor
of Gapan. During the canvass, Natividad
wanted to annul illegally canvassed election
returns. In the meantime, Velayo won, but this
was annulled by the COMELEC.
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC en banc acted in grave abuse
of discretion when it annulled the proclamation
of Velayo. Although pre-proclamation
controversies shall be disposed of summarily
by the COMELEC within 7 days, parties
should be afforded due process. THe non-
inclusion of a proclaimed winner in a pre-
proclamation controversy and his lack of
notice, which resulted to the cancellation of
his proclamation, is clearly a denial of due
process.
Sebastian v. Comelec, GR 139573, March 7,
2000
FACTS:
Sebastian and Romano ran for mayor in Sto.
Tomas, Davao Del Norte. During the canvass,
the Sebastian sought the exclusion of votes
from certain precincts as these were prepared
under extreme duress, threat, intimidation,
and political pressure and influence. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers denied the
petition, so Sebastian lodged three appeals.
Finally, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of the second division (which ordered
exclusion of election returns).
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC need not inquire into
allegations of irregularities in the casting of
counting or casting of votes. Pre-proclamation
controversies require the examination of
election returns on their face.
Requiring the COMELEC to pierce the veil of
election returns that appear prima facie
regular is remedied by an election protest
lodged with the regular courts.
Soller v. Comelec, GR 139853, September 5,
2000
FACTS:
Soller and Saulong both ran for mayor in
Oriental Mindoro. Soller was proclaimed as
winner. Thus, Saulong filed with the
COMELEC an annulment of the proclamation,
and with the RTC a protest. The COMELEC
en banc eventually dismissed the case. Soller
filed a motion to dismiss in the RTC, claiming
that COMELEC already dismissed the case.
DOCTRINE:
COMELEC en banc does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide election
cases involving pre-proclamation
controversies in the first instance.
Any decision by the COMELEC en banc as
regards to election cases decided by it in the
first instance is null and void.
Barroso v. Ampig et al, GR138218, March 17,
2000
FACTS:
Barroso and Escobilio ran for mayor in
Tampakan, Cotabato. Escobilio filed with the
COMELEC several cases against Barroso,
which were dismissed. Barroso was then
proclaimed the winner, which Escobilio
questioned in the RTC. This was due to the
failure to disclose the pendency of two pre-
proclamation controversies.
DOCTRINE:
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the
COMELEC in the 1998 elections were
deemed terminated at noon of June 30, the
beginning of the term involved, and the rulings
of the board of canvassers were deemed
affirmed without prejudice to the filing of a
regular election protest with the regular courts.
Maruhom v. Comelec, GR 139357, May 5,2000
FACTS:
Maruhom and Dimaporo were candidates for
mayor. Because of serious irregularities,
anomalies, and electoral frauds allegedly
committed, Dimaporo lost by a margin of 20
votes, and Maruhom was declared winner.
Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC a petition
to annul the proclamation of Maruhom. The
case was dismissed. Dimaporo eventually
filed a protest ad cautelam with the RTC, to
which Maruhom opposed because of an
alleged forum shopping.
DOCTRINE:
An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of
the people is imperative, much more so in this
case considering that a mere 20 votes
separated the winner from the loser in the
contested election returns.
The motion to dismiss by Maruhom was
clearly a perfidious plot to delay the
proceedings, which was seen in previous acts
hoping to avert the revision of the ballots.
Balindong v. Comelec, GR 153991, Oct. 16,
2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Anwar, Aklima and Amir-Oden are
half brothers all running for mayor in
Malabang, in the 2001 elections. Anwar was
proclaimed as mayor with 42 votes over
Aklima. COMELEC consolidated the two pre-
proclamation cases lodged with it. COMELEC
en banc Resolution proclaimed Amir-Oden as
the winner.
DOCTRINE:
The matter should have been settled by the
COMELEC Division, and not the poll body as
a whole, as this is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The COMELEC en banc does
not have the requisite authority to hear and
decide pre-proclamation controversies at the
first instance.
Jaramilla v. Comelec, GR 155717, Oct. 23,
2003
FACTS:
Suyat and Jaramilla ran for member of the
Sangguniang Bayan for the municipality of
Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur. Upon review by Suyat,
Jaramilla was credited 23 votes from a
precinct, the figures of which were increased
to 73 in the statement of votes by precinct.
Thus, Suyat filed with the COMELEC a
petition for correction of manifest errors.
DOCTRINE:
A petition for correction of manifest errors
alleges an erroneous copying of figures from
the election return to the Statement of Votes
by precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of
results, which merely requires clerical
correction without opening of the ballot boxes
or examining the ballots, demands only
exercise of administrative power of the
COMELEC. Hence, the COMELEC en banc
may assume jurisdiction.
Likewise, the petition was filed beyond the 5
day period from proclamation. In this case, the
Court found that the COMELEC had the
authority to suspend the period to meet the
ends of justice.
Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796-97, Oct. 23,
2003
FACTS:
Bautista filed a certificate of candidacy as
punong barangay in the 2002 elections, but
COMELEC did not accept this because he
was not a registered voter. The RTC,
however, ordered COMELEC to include his
name, but the COMELEC recommended
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.
COMELEC en banc failed to act before the
 election, so his name was still included in the
list, and he eventually won the election.
DOCTRINE:
A division of the COMELEC should have first
heard the case. The COMELEC en banc can
only act on a case when there is a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the
COMELEC decision. Thus, since there was
none in this case, the COMELEC en banc did
not have the jurisdiction to render the
decision.
De Llana v. Comelec, GR 152080, Nov. 28,
2003
FACTS:
Dela Llana and Pabo were candidates for
Provincial Board Member in Zambales, where
there were three seats allotted. During the
election, respondent Pablo ranked fourth,
having garnered 24 votes less than the third
placer. Pablo field an election protest with the
COMELEC, alleging that he obtained 42 votes
in a precinct, but the canvass only stated that
he had 4. COMELEC division treated this as a
correction of manifest errors and annulled the
proclamation of Dela Llana.
DOCTRINE:
Although the case was lodged as an election
protest, it can be validly treated as a
correction of manifest errors when such is
evident from the pleadings. Likewise, in the
interest of justice, COMELEC can suspend
the reglementary period for filing the petition,
especially since only 24 votes separated the
parties in this case.
Repol v. Comelec, GR 151418, Apr. 28, 2004
SC and COMELEC en banc can only take
cognizance of final decisions, not interlocutory
orders. SC can only take cognizance of
decisions from COMELEC EB, and
COMELEC EB can only take cognizance of
final Division decisions.
In this case, Repol lost and filed a protest
before the RTC. It was initially dismissed but
COMELEC Div remanded it. RTC then ruled
IFO of Repol, voiding the proclamation of his
opponent Ceracas for Mayor of Pagsanghan,
Samar. Repol then filed a motion for execution
pending appeal, which was granted by RTC.
Ceracas appealed RTC decision, but pending
appeal, filed for TRO before COMELEC Div.
It was granted, and Div. issued Status Quo
ante until further orders. Hence, this petition
by Repol. SC held (first paragraph), but said
that it wasnt ironclad, and may be relaxed if
the issue involves the principle of social
justice, and may be glossed over to prevent
miscarriage of justice.
Pedragoza v. COMELEC 496 SCRA 513
While there is a rule requiring COMELEC
Commissioners to state the reason for their
inhibition, the requirement concerns the judge
himself and not the ruling involved. Hence, if
for example in an en banc case involving 5
commissioners, 2 inhibited without stating the
reason, it does not necessarily invalidate the
ruling.
In this case, Pedragoza initially won by 39
votes, and when contested by respondent
Sumulong, RTC initially dismissed but
COMELEC Div granted and en banc
sustained, 5 commissioners signed the
resolution and 2 did not take part, without
citing the reason. SC said it wouldnt affect the
validity of the order, as there is already
quorum.
Cayetano v. COMELEC 479 SCRA 514
In raising the case to SC by R65, only
GADALEJ or involving jurisdiction may be
raised. Factual matters such as appreciation
of the ballots, which SC said to be best left
with COMELEC.
This case pertains to taguigs cityhood where
Cayetano was questioning the plebiscite
conducted. Initially, Cayetano was saying
COMELEC was without jurisdiction to
determine the conduct of a plebiscite, but SC
pointed out that no less than the constitution
itself under Sec.2(1) Art. IX(C) specifies it.
Upon reaching the SC, it was found that
Cayetano was merely raising factual grounds
which SC said is best left with COMELEC
Munoz v. COMELEC 495 SCRA 407
Mere pendency of two cases before the same
division of COMELEC is not a ground for their
outright consolidation. The rules provide that
cases may be consolidated if it involves
similar questions of law and fact.
COMELEC is also authorized by law to annul
any canvass and proclamation which was
illegally made. [This case implies that] The
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) must
wait for authorization from COMELEC before
proclaiming any candidate as the winner, or
else such proclamation is void ab initio.
HOWEVER, COMELEC EB in this case made
a decision that gravely exceeded its authority.
The parties were competing candidates for
Mayor of Albay. Several ERs were contested
by respondent to MBC, but was denied, thus
the MBC included the contested ERs in the
count. Respondent appealed to COMELEC
(Case 1)
Pending Case 1, Petitioner was proclaimed.
Respondent then filed a petition to annul
proclamation (Case 2, raffled at SAME
division)
Division granted Case 2 petition, annulling
proclamation. MR to EB denied, setting aside
Petitioners proclamation anddirected MBC to
recount and re-canvass. Hence this petition.
SC held that the Case 2 decision by EB was
with excess of authority, as it was issued even
before its Division could decide Case 1. Note
that EB can only decide on final division
decisions.
Tan v. COMELEC 507 SCRA 352
This case concerns simultaneous petitions to
suspend the proclamation and petitions to
annul the proclamation of Benjamin loong as
Governor of Sulu. One of the issues raised
was whether it can be entertained
simultaneously by COMELEC
Background to election laws, a petition to
suspend the proclamation is filed pre-
proclamation and tolls the running of the 10-
day period in petitions to annul the
proclamation (filed after proclamation, you
have 10 days after proclamation to file a
petition).
These two separate petitions are allowed
because it prevents the practice of grab the
proclamation and prolong the protest.
Moreover, they differ in issues involved, is
more practical than piecemeal adjudications,
which in turn leads to speedy disposition of
cases.
Eriguel v. COMELEC 613 SCRA 809
In this case, Eriguel won by about 3k votes
against Dumpit for Agoo Mayor position.
Dumpit filed an election protest contesting
some ballots to RTC, but Eriguels
proclamation was upheld.
On appeal to COMELEC, the division that the
case was raffled to has one inhibiting
commissioner. The divisions presiding
commissioner then issued an order elevating
it to en banc, where Eriguels proclamation
was reversed.
SC held that an automatic elevation of the
appeal to EB is invald; it must follow Sec.3
Art.IX-C, and may only decide on the case
upon MR of the divisions order. Until then, EB
has no jurisdiction
Mendoza v. COMELEC 616 SCRA 443
If the opinion is equally divided, there must be
re-hearing. If after re-hearing no decision is
reached, the action must be dismissed if
originally commenced with the Commission;
and if appealed, the judgment appealed from
must stand and the petition denied.
In this case, the protest was filed by
Respondent on 2007, but COMELEC Div only
issued the resolution in 2009. Pending MR to
EB, a motion for execution was filed in Div,
and the EB ruled in 2010 dismissing the MR
and granting the Motion for Execution.
Protestant then filed the instant petition for
Certiorari before SC, calling for re-hearing as
the EB decision lacked the concurrence of
majority of COMELEC.
Pending petition to SC, COMELEC Eb issued
another resolution scheduling the re-hearing.
 The re-hearing again failed to have the
required majority vote, 3 not taking part and 1
dissenting.
Maria Laarni L Cayetano v. Comelec, GR
193846, 12 April 2011 (also in Sec. 7, Art IX-
A)
Almost same with Repol. The interlocutory
order in this case is the order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss at COMELEC
Div.
An MR of an interlocutory order shall be
resolved by the division issuing the order,
except when all members of the division
decide to refer to the COMELEC en banc.
Also, interlocutory division orders may be
elevated to en ban if the interlocutory order is
of patent nullity because of absence of
jurisdiction to issue such order
Section 4. Supervision/Regulation of Public
Utilities, Media Grants, Privileges
The Commission may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Unido v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
Facts:
The case involves several COMELEC
Resolutions which prohibited UNIDO from
campaigning through mass media for NO
votes for the amendment of the 1973
Constitution.
Issue: W/N the Resolutions are valid?
Held/Ratio: YES
The provisions of all election laws regulating
propaganda through the mass media, for
example, Section 41 of the Election Code of
1978, must be deemed applicable to
plebiscites. Therefore, it is the duty of the
Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by
TV and radio stations insure(s) that time
equal as to duration and quality is available to
all candidates for the same office or political
parties, groups or aggrupations at the same
rates or given free of charge.
If the effect of COMELEC regulations impairs
free speech and freedom of the press, it is
because they must have been contemplated
to precisely constitute an exception to
freedom of speech and of the press clauses,
on account of considerations more paramount
for the general welfare and public interest
which exceptions after all would operate only
during limited periods that is during the
duration of the election campaign fixed in the
charter itself and/or by law.
The COMELEC has indeed the power to
supervise and regulate the mass media in
such respect, but such authority arises only
when there is a showing that any sector or
member of the media has denied to any party
or person the right to which it or he is entitled.
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of
Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167
in relation to the upcoming plebiscite for the
organic act of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. The assailed section provides that
during the plebiscite campaign period, on the
day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues.
Issue: W/N the Section 19 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional?
Held/Ratio: NO
 It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums
among candidates are ensured. The evil
sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or
give any undue advantage to a candidate in
terms of advertising space or radio or
television time.
However, neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of
R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite.
In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on
some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of
specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or
against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Osmena v. COMELEC 199 SCRA 750 [1991]
(Wrong citation. The correct case is Osmena v.
COMELEC [1998])
Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of RA
6646 which prohibits mass media from selling
or giving free of charge print space or airtime
for campaign or other political purposes,
except to the COMELEC. Petitioners allege
that although the issue has already been
decided in NPC v. COMELEC, the effects of
such decision needs reconsideration because
the law creates a disadvantage for the poor
candidates.
Issue: W/N the law is constitutional?
Held/Ratio: YES
The term political ad ban, when used to
describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is
misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the
sale or donation of print space and air time to
political candidates, it mandates the
COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the
candidate's space and time in the media.
There is no suppression of political ads but
only a regulation of the time and manner of
advertising.
The laws concern is not with the message or
content of the ad but with ensuring media
equality between candidates with deep
pockets, as Justice Feliciano called them in
his opinion of the Court in NPC, and those
with fewer resources.
There is no total ban on political ads, much
less restriction on the content of the speech.
Given the fact that print space and air time
can be controlled or dominated by rich
candidates to the disadvantage of poor
candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate
governmental interest justifying exercise of the
regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art.
IX-C, 4 of the Constitution
They only prohibit the sale or donation of print
space and air time to candidates but require
the COMELEC instead to procure space and
time in the mass media for allocation, free of
charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the
election period, the COMELEC takes over the
advertising page of newspapers or the
commercial time of radio and TV stations and
allocates these to the candidates.
The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any
restriction on speech is only incidental, and it
is no more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in
the use of mass media for political advertising.
The restriction on speech, as pointed out in
NPC, is limited both as to time and as to
scope.
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR
No. 119654, May 22, 1995
Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 which
requires newspaper companies and the like to
provide in their publications a COMELEC
Space which shall be allocated for the
candidates for free.
Issue: W/N COMELEC Resolution No. 2772
is constitutional?
Held/Ratio: NO
To compel print media companies to donate
"Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified
in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less
than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of
private personal property for public use or
purposes.
The taking of private property for public use is,
of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation"
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for
"Comelec space" is precisely what is sought
to be avoided by respondent Commission.
There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper
and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does
not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide
free print space for Comelec purposes.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise
of the power of eminent domain.
Telecom v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337 [1998]
Facts:
This case involves the constitutionality of
Section 92 of BP881 which provides for
COMELEC Time as applied to broadcast
media. The main contention of the petitioners
is that Section 92 of BP881 constitute
deprivation of property without just
compensation because it requires air time to
be given to the COMELEC for free, as
opposed to print space.
Issue: W/N the assailed section is
constitutional?
Held/Ratio: YES
The law prohibits mass media from selling or
donating print space and air time to the
candidates and requires the COMELEC
instead to procure print space and air time for
allocation to the candidates. It will be noted
that while 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the
COMELEC to procure print space which, as
we have held, should be paid for, 92 states
that air time shall be procured by the
COMELEC free of charge.
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to assign.9 A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amended by
Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so
requires.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee
of some form of public service.
What the COMELEC is authorized to
supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the
Constitution, among other things, is the use by
media of information of their franchises or
permits, while what Congress (not the
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of
print space or air time for political ads. In other
words, the object of supervision or regulation
is different from the object of the prohibition.
49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which 92 of B.P.
Blg. 881 was taken, expressly provided that
the COMELEC Time should be considered as
part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the
dissemination of public information and
education under their respective franchises or
permits. There is no reason to suppose that
92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC
Time therein provided to be otherwise than as
a public service which petitioner is required to
render under 4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252).
In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid
amendment of petitioners franchise but the
enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by
petitioner in accepting a public grant of
privilege.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, Jan.
28, 2000
Facts:
This case involves the exit polls conducted by
ABS-CBN. A TRO was issued by COMELEC
against such activity and broadcasting for
possible conflict with the results of the count
made by COMELEC and Namfrel.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC can ban the
conduct of exit surveys?
Held/Ratio: NO
First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at
random, so that the results will as much as
possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or
group polled. Second, the survey result is not
meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from
polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here
are the credibility and the integrity of the
elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls.
The holding and the reporting of the results of
exit polls cannot undermine those of the
elections, since the former is only part of the
latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec
cannot, therefore, be justified.
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination
of their results through mass media constitute
an essential part of the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot
ban them totally in the guise of promoting
clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.
Quite the contrary, exit polls properly
conducted and publicized can be vital tools
in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and
fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may
be prescribed by the Comelec so as to
minimize or suppress the incidental problems
in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing in any manner the fundamental
rights of our people.
SWS v. COMELEC, GR No. 147571, May 5,
2001
Facts:
The case involves the validity of Section 5.4 of
RA9006 which provides that Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published seven (7) days before an
election.
Issue: W/N the assailed section is
constitutional?
Held/Ratio: NO
5.4Iays a prior restraint on freedom of
speech, expression, and the press prohibiting
the publication of election survey results
affecting candidates within the prescribed
periods of fifteen (15) days immediately
preceding a national election seven (7) days
before a local election. Because of the
preferred status of the constitutional rights of
speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption
of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy Presumption against its
constitutional validity
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-
C, 4 of the Constitution, which gives the
COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the
operation of media of communication, no
presumption of invalidity attaches to a
measure like 5.4.
For as we have pointed out in sustaining the
ban on media political advertisements, the
grant of power to the COMELEC under Art.
IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring "equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates
of charges for the use of such media facilities
"public information campaigns and forums
among candidates.
5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is
a direct and total suppression of a category of
 expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
Section 5. Favorable Recommendation for
Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of
Sentence
No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
Power of COMELEC to Recommend
Executive Clemency
Section 6. Free and Open Party System
A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice
of the people, subject to the provisions of this
Article.
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771,
May 6, 2010
Facts:
The case involves the registration of
political coalitions, the grant of
accreditation to the dominant parties
and validity of the Comelec en bancs
authority to act on the registration of
political party coalitions.
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed
with the COMELEC its petition for
accreditation as dominant minority
party. On the same date, the
Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
filed a petition for registration as a
coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it
be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes
of the May 10, 2010 elections.
The Liberal Party, who was also
seeking accreditation as dominant
minority party, objected to this
petition.
Held: In the absence of any note, explanation
or reason why the deadline only mentions
political parties, the term political parties
should be understood in its generic sense that
covers political organizations and political
coalitions as well.
Doctrine: The registration of political parties,
their accreditation as dominant parties, and
the benefits these recognitions provide
constitute distinct advantages to any party and
its candidates, if only in terms of the ready
information enabling them to react faster to
developing situations. To the public, the
proper registration and the accreditation of
dominant parties are evidence of equitable
party representation at the scene of electoral
action, and translate in no small measure to
transparency and to the elections credibility.
Section 7. No Block-Voting
No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.
Section 8. Prohibition on Political Parties
Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters' registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards
of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.
Section 9. Election Period
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in
special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of
election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Power to Fix Election Period in
Special Cases
Election Period vs. Campaign Period
Election period refers to the period
of time needed for administering an
election. It can thus go beyond the
date for the casting of ballots.
Campaign period refers to the period
of active solicitation of votes. This
may be set by the legislature for a
 period less than the election period
(cannot extend beyond the election
day)
Section 10. No Harassment and
Discrimination
Bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
Equal protection of all candidates
Discrimination
i.e. Unequal treatment in the
availment of media facilities.
Section 11. Funds
Funds certified by the Commission as
necessary to defray the expenses for holding
regular and special elections, plebiscites,
initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be
provided in the regular or special
appropriations and, once approved, shall be
released automatically upon certification by
the Chairman of the Commission.
D. Commission of Audit
Section 1. Qualifications; Term
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines;
2. At least 35 years of age at the time of
their appointment,;
3. Certified Public Accountants with not
less than 10 years of auditing
experience, or members of the
Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at
least 10 years;
4. Must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their
appointment.
(At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.)
Term:
7 years (without reappointment).
Of those first appointed:
The Chairman shall hold office for 7
years;
1 Commissioner for five years: and
1 Commissioner for 3 years.
Composition:
Chairman; and
2 Commissioners
Appointment:
Appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
Appointment to any vacancy:
Shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445
Facts:
The case involves the validity of COA
Decision No. 77-142, which signed only by the
Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA
and was later on ratified by then COA
Chairman Francisco T. Tantuico, Jr. to Atty.
Juan T. David."
Held: The "Espiritu decision" was void ab
initio.As manager of the COA Technical
Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
power whatever to render and promulgate a
decision of or for the Commission. Indeed,
even the Chairman, alone, had not that power.
As clearly set out in the Constitution then in
force, the power was lodged in the
Commission on Audit, composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners.
Doctrine: It was the Commission, as a
collegial body, which then as now, had the
jurisdiction to decide any case brought before
it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for resolution, subject to review
by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Section 2. General Function; Powers
Powers and Duties
(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in properly spent.
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or Classification of Functions:
instrumentalities, including government-owned To examine and audit all forms of
or controlled corporations with original government revenues;
charters, and on a post- audit basis: To examine and audit all forms of
(a) constitutional bodies, commissions government expenditures;
and offices that have been granted To settle government accounts;
fiscal autonomy under this To define the scope of techniques for
Constitution; its own auditing procedures;
(b) autonomous state colleges and To promulgate accounting and
universities; auditing rules including those for the
(c) other government-owned or prevention and disallowance of
controlled corporations and their irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
subsidiaries; and extravagant, or unconscionable
(d) such non-governmental entities expenditures,
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or To decide administrative cases
indirectly, from or through the involving expenditures of public funds.
Government, which are required by
law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of Examine and Audit: Government revenues
subsidy or equity. and Government expenditures
Post-audit
However, where the internal control system of
The provision on post-audit is a
the audited agencies is inadequate, the
recognition of the fact that there are
Commission may adopt such measures,
certain government institutions which
including temporary or special pre-audit, as
can be hampered in their operation by
are necessary and appropriate to correct the
pre-audit requirements.
deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such
The COA has only post-audit authority over:
period as may be provided by law, preserve
Constitutional bodies, commissions
the vouchers and other supporting papers
and offices that have been granted
pertaining thereto.
fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution;
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive
Autonomous state colleges and
authority, subject to the limitations in this
universities;
Article, to define the scope of its audit and
Other government-owned controlled
examination, establish the techniques and
corporations and their subsidiaries;
methods required therefor, and promulgate
Such non-governmental entities
accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
including those for the prevention and
indirectly, from or through the
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
government, which are required by
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
law or by the granting institution to
expenditures or uses of government funds
submit to such audit as a condition
and properties.
of subsidy or equity.
General Function:
If the internal control system of audited
To examine the accuracy of the
agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
records kept by accountable officers
adopt such measures, including temporary or
and to determine whether
special pre-audit, as are necessary and
expenditures have been made in
appropriate to correct any deficiencies.
conformity with law.
It is therefore through the Commission
In cases where pre-audit is allowed and pre-
on Audit that the people can verify
audit has already been performed, the
whether their money has been
Commission is not estopped from making a
post-audit.
Public corporations may employ private
auditors (COA's power to examine and audit is
non-exclusive)
While, the COA's authority to define the scope
of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive. However, the
COA's findings and conclusions necessarily
prevail over those of private auditors, at least
insofar as government agencies and officials
are concerned.
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Tantuico 163 SCRA
716 [1988]
Facts:
Sometime in 1976, respondent Acting
Chairman of the COA initiated a special audit
of coconut end-user companies, which include
petitioners, with respect to their Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections
and the subsidies they had received. The
petitioners question the respondents' authority
to audit them. They contend that they are
outside the ambit of respondents' "audit"
power which is confined to government-owned
or controlled corporations.
Held: COA has authority to audit petitioners.
Doctrine: Private entities which handle
government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said
funds by the government auditors.
DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 [1994]
Facts:
COA Circular No. 89-299 was passed lifting
the pre-audit of government transactions. A
new Corporate Auditor was assigned to
petitioner. After a post-audit, the new
Corporate Auditor sent an "Auditor's Notice to
Person's Liable" to the Chairman of DBP
notifying him of the disallowance of the
amount of P246,539.25 representing customs
duties and taxes and at the same time holding
him, along with the other petitioners herein,
jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid
sum.
Held: Regardless of the result of the pre-
audit, it cannot be denied that respondent
COA is so empowered to conduct a post-
audit. DBP is no doubt a government
corporation and the question of whether COA
Circular 86-299 was retroactively applied to
the subject transaction is thus of no moment.
To begin with, there was never any retroactive
application of post-audit.
Doctrine:
Article IX(D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution
expressly grants respondent Commission the
power to conduct a post-audit.
To wit: Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit
shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit
basis:
(a) constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
(b) autonomous state colleges and
universities;
(c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
(d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by
law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity x x x
Eslao v. COA 236 SCRA 161 [1994]
Facts:
The case is a Petition for Certiorari filed by
Eslao in his capacity as President of the
Pangasinan State University ("PSU") to set
aside COA decisions which denied honoraria
and per diems claimed under National
Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU
personnel including petitioner. The COA
apparently does not agree with the policy
basis of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No.
80-4 since COA argues that loan proceeds
regardless of source eventually become public
funds for which the government is
accountable. The result would be that any
provisions under any foreig] loan agreement
should be considered locally-funded.
Held: The COA is not authorized to substitute
its own judgment for any applicable law or
administrative regulation with the wisdom or
propriety of which it does not agree at least
not before such law or regulation is set aside
by the authorized agency of government as
unconstitutional or illegal and void.
Doctrine: The COA, like all other government
agencies, must respect the presumption of
legality and constitutionality to which statutes
and administrative regulations are entitled
until such statute or regulation is repealed or
amended, or until set aside in an appropriate
case by a competent court and ultimately the
Court.
F.F. Manacop v. CA 266 SCRA 235 [1997]
Facts:
FF Manacop Construction Company
Inc, was contracted by MIAA to
construct a perimeter fence from Asia
Overseas Inc to Airscope
Development Corp. for and in
consideration of the quoted price of
307,440.00. Due to the urgency of the
need, petitioner proceeded with the
fence construction even if the Notice
to Proceed has not yet been signed
by the General Manager. By the time
of the halt in construction it is already
95% finished which was worth
282,068.00.
During trial it has been found that
MIAA is liable to pay 238,501.48
based upon quantum meruit since
there is an absence of a written
contract between parties. On appeal
the Appellate Court held that the
computation for the obligation owed
by MIAA should be referred to the
Commission on Audit.
Held: No need to refer to COA since the LC
has already determined the actual amount
owed by MIAA to FMCC. In the cases of Eslao
and Royal Trust, the Court found it necessary
to refer to the COA the task of determining the
total compensation due to the claimants
considering that the matter on the exact
amount was not at issue and the
determination thereof involves a review of the
factual findings and evidence in support
thereof. On the other hand, the lower court in
this case, had already made a factual finding
on the amount reasonably due to petitioner
and scrutinized the evidence to sustain the
claim.
Doctrine:
Unliquidated claims present a
justiciable question ripe for judicial
determination which is beyond the
powers of the COA to adjudicate.
Recovery based on quantum meruit is
in the nature of such claim because
its settlement requires the application
of judgment and discretion and cannot
be adjusted by simple arithmetical
processes.
There is nothing in the cited cases
which would imply that only the COA
can determine the specific amount
due to a contractor guided by the
equitable principle of quantum meruit.
Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan 265 SCRA 121
[1996]
DBP v. COA, 422 SCRA 459 [2004]
Home Development Mutual Fund v. COA, GR
142297, June 15, 2004
DBP v. COA 498 SCRA 537 [2006]
Nava v. Palattao 499 SCRA 745 [2006]
Gualberto De Llana v. COA, GR 180989, 7
Feb. 2012
Candelario L. Versoza Jr. v. Guillermo N
Carague, GR 157838, 7 February 2012

Philippine Coconut v. Republic 663 SCRA
514 [2012]
Audit Jurisdiction
The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under
this Constitution; (b) autonomous state
colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through
the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit
as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of
the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as
are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies.
It shall keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period as may be
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
The Commission shall have exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties
Caltex v. COA 208 SCRA 726 [1992]
COA sent a letter to Caltex, directing it to
remit its collection to the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF), excluding that unremitted for
the years 1986 and 1988, of the additional tax
on petroleum products authorized under the
PD 1956
Pending such remittance, all of its claims for
reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in
abeyance. The grant total of its unremitted
collections of the above tax is
P1,287,668,820.
Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the
payment and the recovery of claims.
COA approved the proposal but prohibited
Caltex from further offsetting remittances and
reimbursements for the current and ensuing
years. Caltex moved for reconsideration but
was denied.
ISSUE: WON COA has authority to disallow
it? YES
DOCTRINE:
COAs powers under the Constitution are
broader and more extensive than the ones
under 1973 Constitution.
Indeed, when the framers of the last two (2)
Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more
active role and invested it with broader and
more extensive powers, they did not intend
merely to make the COA a toothless tiger, but
rather envisioned a dynamic, effective,
efficient and independent watchdog of the
Government.
Mamaril v. Domingo 227 SCRA 206[1993]
Narciso Mamaril was formerly an
Evaluator/Computer of the LTO at its San

Pablo City Branch. In the course of the
performance of his duties, he committed errors
in his evaluation and computation, resulting in
the under collection of registration, license and
other miscellaneous fees and penalties.
Petitioner availed of the Early Retirement
Program under RA 6683.
As a result of the decision of the COA, holding
that the amount of P44,515.90 be withheld
from petitioners terminal leave pay other than
his retirement gratuity, he has not received in
full the benefits due him from his retirement.
Petitioner contended that he could not be held
liable on the audit disallowances because he
was not an accountable officer within the
meaning of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445
(1978) since: (a) his work was purely clerical;
(b) he did not come into possession of any
money or property for which he is now asked
to pay; and (c) he did not act in bad faith or
with gross negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA has the power
over non accountable officers? YES
DOCTRINE:
The responsibility for state audit is vested
by the Constitution on the COA. State audit
is not limited to the auditing of the
accountable officers and the settlement of
accounts, but includes accounting functions
and the adoption in the audited agencies of
internal controls to see to it that the correct
fees and penalties due the government are
collected. The verification of the
correctness of the evaluation and
computation of the fees and penalties
collectible under the Land Transportation
Law are parts of the functions of the COA,
which examines and audits revenue
accounts.
When any person is indebted to any
government agency, the COA may direct the
proper officer to withhold the payment of any
money due such person or his estate to be
applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
Philippine Airlines v. COA 245 SCRA 39
[1995]
FACTS:
PAL usually gets their fuel supply from Petron,
Caltex and Shell
But COA issued a directive mandating PAL to
only get fuel supply from PETROPHIL Corp
(PETRON) because according to existing
government regulations, all government
institutions shall only procure fuel from
PETRON
ISSUE: WON COA has exceeded their
jurisdiction NO; but because of PALs
justifications, they are not covered with said
directive; moreover, the case has been moot
and academic
DOCTRINE:
The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the
"exclusive authority, subject to the limitations
in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules, and regulations
including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties."
The authority granted under this constitutional
provision, being broad and comprehensive
enough, enables COA to adopt as its own,
simply by reiteration or by reference, without
the necessity of repromulgation, already
existing rules and regulations.
It may also expand the coverage thereof to
agencies or instrumentalities under its
audit jurisdiction.
Its multiple supplier set-up was designed
precisely to meet every contingency that might
disrupt its fuel supply.
It bespoke of foresight, careful planning and
sound business judgment on the part of PAL.
As a business operation heavily dependent on
fuel supply, for PAL to rely solely on a single
supplier would indeed be impracticable.
To compel it to do so would amount to a grave
abuse of discretion on its part as this might
well lead to irregular, excessive or
unconscionable expenditures, the very evil
sought to be avoided in the creation of the
COA.
CIR v. COA 218 SCRA 203 [1993]
Repeat case
The issues joined in these consolidated
petitions focus, as it were, on the general
audit jurisdiction of the Commission of Audit
vis-a-vis the Bureau of Internal Revenue's
power to determine entitlement to the tax
informer's reward under Section 316 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner Tirso B. Savellano furnished the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with a
confidential affidavit of information2
denouncing the National Coal Authority (NCA)
and the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC) for non-payment of taxes totalling
P234 Million on interest earnings of their
respective money placements with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB)
Then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr.
recommended to the Minister of Finance
payment to petitioner Savellano of an
informer's reward equivalent to 15% of the
amount of P15,986,165.00 paid by NCA, or
P2,397,924.75
This was approved by the Department of
Finance
respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
rendered COA Decision No. 7407 disallowing
in audit the payment of informer's reward to
petitioner Savellano in the NCA case on the
ground that payment of an informer's reward
under Section 281 of the National Internal
Revenue Code is conditioned upon the actual
recovery or collection of revenues, and no
such revenue or income was actually realized
or recovered on any benefit accrued to the
government
ISSUE: WON COA has authority to disallow
the payment? YES; WON the disallowance
was valid? NO
DOCTRINE:
The exercise by respondent COA of its
general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the
check-and-balance system inherent in a
republican form of government such as ours.
Taken in this light, such exercise cannot be
regarded as an unlawful or unwarranted
invasion of, or interference with, the authority
and power of the executive agency concerned
to determine whether or not a person is
entitled to a reward provided by law and the
amount thereof
However, the delinquencies of these agencies
are not condoned, much less rewarded. It is
the person whose information led to the
discovery of their transgressions who is being
rewarded. Although this results in a reduction
in the amount of revenues actually received,
the net effect is that the government still gains
from the remaining amount paid, which
otherwise would have been lost to it.
CSC v. Pobre, GR 160568, Sept. 15, 2004
Repeat case
Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former
government official who retired from the
government service three times
He was a retired COA Commissioner,
Chairman of Board of Accountancy and
Associated Commissioner of PRC
On his third retirement, respondent Pobre
claimed payment of his terminal leave based
on his highest monthly salary as PRC
chairman but to be reckoned from the date he
first entered the government service as
budget examiner in the defunct Budget
Commission in 1958
CSC: DENIED, only from the time he
assumed as PRC commissioner
Pobre challenged CSCs jurisdiction, saying it
was COA which has jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON COA has jurisdiction YES
DOCTRINE:
While the determination of leave benefits is
within the functions of the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the government, the duty
to examine accounts and expenditures
relating to such benefits properly pertains to
the COA.
Where government expenditures or use of
funds is involved, the CSC cannot claim
exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave
matters are involved.
Thus, even as we recognize CSCs jurisdiction
in this case, its power is not exclusive as it is
shared with the COA.
Luciano Velos, et al. v. Commission On
Audit, GR 193677,6 Sept. 20011
Repeat case
the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing
the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service
Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila
Who Have Been Elected for Three (3)
Consecutive Terms in the Same Position
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of
Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time
served in the position for three (3)
consecutive terms, subject to the availability
of funds as certified by the City Treasurer
It even made partial payments
But this was being questioned for being
excessive and tantamount to double
compensation
COA: it was deemed double compensation
ISSUE: WON COA has authority to disallow
the disbursement YES
DOCTRINE:
COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the
government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise
covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy,
autonomous state colleges and universities,
other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, and such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity from or through the government
The power of the COA to examine and audit
government agencies cannot be taken away
from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution mandates that no law shall be
passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the [COA].
pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of
public funds, the COA is vested with broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and
the uses of public funds and property.
This includes the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for
such review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations
The Court had therefore previously upheld the
authority of the COA to disapprove payments
which it finds excessive and disadvantageous
to the Government; to determine the meaning
of public bidding and when there is failure in
the bidding; to disallow expenditures which it
finds unnecessary
Boy Scout of the Philippines v. COA, GR
177131, 7 June 2011
Repeat case
A COA Resolution was issued whereby the
COA is to conduct an annual financial audit of
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) in
accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. BSP is now questioning whether it
can be subject to thre COAs audit
jurisdiction?
Does the BSP fall under the COAs audit
jurisdiction?
YES
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are
subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the COA has jurisdiction
over the BSP
HELD: Yes
POLITICAL LAW: Jurisdiction of COA
After looking at the legislative history of its
amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both
parties, we find that the BSP is a public
corporation and its funds are subject to the
COAs audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No.
111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled
"An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be
Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
and to Define its Powers and Purposes"
created the BSP as a "public corporation"
There are three classes of juridical persons
under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the
BSP, as presently constituted under Republic
Act No. 7278,falls under the second
classification.Article 44 reads:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities
for public interest or purpose created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and
associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a
public interest or purpose, is subject to the
law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1
and 2 of the preceding article are governed
by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of
general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning
partnerships.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its
amended charter shows that it was created in
order to implement a State policy declared in
Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution,
which reads:
Dela Llana v. COA 665 SCRA 176 [2012]
Repeat case
FACTS:
In 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002,
which reinstituted the selective pre-audit of
government transactions in view of the rising
incidents of irregular, illegal, wasteful and
anomalous disbursements of huge amounts
of public funds and disposals of public
property. 2 years later, COA issued Circular
No. 2011-002, which lifted the pre-audit of
government transactions implemented by
Circular No. 2009-002. Petitioner alleges that
the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA
cannot be lifted by a mere circular,
considering that pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-
D of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate on the COA. NO.
DOCTRINE:
There is nothing in Sec. 2 of Article IX-D that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear
reference to a pre-audit requirement is found
in Sec. 2, par. 1, which provides that a post-
audit is mandated for certain government or
private entities with state subsidy or equity
and only when the internal control system of
an audited entity is inadequate. In such a
situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to
correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of
a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this
Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA
has the exclusive authority to define the scope
of its audit and examination
Settle Government Account
Philippine Operations, Inc. v. Auditor
General, 94 Phil 868 [1953-1954]
Repeat case
Petitioner claims unliquidated damages for the
failure of Burau of Prisons to deliver sawed
lumber.
In these cases involving unliquidated
damages, the most important questions to be
determined are judicial in nature, involving the
examination of evidence and the use of
judicial discretion. To assume that the
legislature granted this jurisdiction to an
administrative officer like the Auditor General
is not warranted, because it would amount to
an illegal act, as a delegation of judicial power
to an executive officer. If the power were
interpreted as having been granted to the
Auditor General to pass upon the rights of
private persons, without the judicial process
established by the Constitution and the laws,
private parties would be deprived of their
property without due process of law. The term
used under the law is moneyed claims
ICNA v. Republic, 21 SCRA 40 [1967]
Repeat case
Consignee filed a claim against the Bureau of
Customs, as arrastre operator.
The Republic of the Philippines and the
Bureau of Customs, answered and alleged
among others, non-suability and non-
compliance with Act 3083, which requires
money claims to be filed with the Auditor
General.
On grounds of public policy, the Republic of
the Philippines or its agencies, may not be
sued for the performance of arrastre
operations as a function necessarily incidental
to the governmental function of taxation.
Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782 [1988]
Layson was hired as a casual employee in the
Bureau of Treasury Office in order to do away
with the hiring of a private carpenter and
electrician. COA subsequently reduced his
daily rate for being "excessive and
disadvantageous to the government
Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA)
vested with the power and authority, but it is
also charged with the duty, to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the
expenditures or uses of funds ... owned ... by,
or pertaining to, the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities
(Article IX [D], Section 2 [1],1987
Constitution). That authority extends to the
accounts of all persons respecting funds or
properties received or held by them in an
accountable capacity (Section 26, P. D. No.
1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it
determines whether or not the fiscal
responsibility that rests directly with the head
of the government agency has been properly
and effectively discharged (Section 25.), and
whether or not there has been loss or wastage
of government resources. It is also
empowered to review and evaluate contracts
(Section 18 [4].).
NHC v. COA 226 SCRA 55 [1993]
Petitioner argues that the renewal of the loan
agreement with the KFW would have been
jeopardized if it did not agree to the extension
of the services of Engr. Murdoch. The petition
at bar assails the disallowance by the
respondent COA of a contract extending the
services of a foreign consultant.
The power of the Commission on Audit to
audit and examine government
expenditures is enshrined in Section 2 (1),
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The
Constitution also granted to COA the
power to "promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties."
Pursuant to the said constitutional mandate,
COA promulgated Circular No. 88-55-A dated
September 8, 1985 defining the term
"unnecessary" expenditures, Unnecessary
expenditures are those not supportive of the
implementation of the objectives and mission
of the agency relative to the nature of its
operation. . An expenditure that is not
essential or that which can be dispensed with
without loss or damage to property is
considered unnecessary.
There can be no dispute on the proposition
that the continued extension of the services of
Engr. Murdoch as a foreign consultant
constitutes an unnecessary expense. Crystal
clear from the records is that the nature of the
terminal phase of the Dagat-Dagatan project
does not require the expertise of a foreign
consultant.
Euro-Med v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA
30 [2006]
This case is a complaint for sum of money
filed by petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories,
Phil., Inc. against respondent Province of
Batangas. The resolution of this case turns on
whether it is the COA or the RTC which has
primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners
money claim against the Province of
Batangas. SC ruled that COA has jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that
if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had
even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement
of a claim for a certain amount of money
against a local government unit. This brought
the case within the COAs domain to pass
upon money claims against the government or
any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of
the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines:
The authority and powers of the
Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to x x x x
the examination, audit, and settlement of
all debts and claims of any sort due from
or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities.
Second, petitioners money claim was
founded on a series of purchases for the
medical supplies of respondents public
hospitals. Both parties agreed that these
transactions were governed by the Local
Government Code provisions on supply and
property management and their implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the COA
pursuant to Section 383 of said Code.
Define Scope and Techniques of Auditing
Procedures
The power of the Commission to define
the scope of its audit and to promulgate
auditing rules and regulations and the power
to disallow unnecessary expenditures, is
exclusive, but its power to examine and audit
is not exclusive.
Danville Maritime v. COA,175 SCRA 701
[1989]
Petitioner seeks to set aside the letter-
directive of respondent COA disapproving the
result of the public bidding held by the PNOC
of the sale of its tanker-vessel "T/T Andres
Bonifacio" on the ground that only one bidder
submitted a bid and to direct COA to approve
the said sale.
1988 Amendments to the Implementing Rules
and Regulations to P.D. No. 1594 (Prescribing
Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations
for Government Infrastructure Contracts
provides: At the time of opening of bids, there
shall be at least two (2) competing bidders. In
case there is only one bidder, the bid shall be
returned unopened and the project shall be
advertised anew for bidding.
SC sees no reason to disturb the
interpretation given by the COA to the term
"public bidding" and what constitutes its
"failure." The Constitution has ordained that
the COA shall have exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefore, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or use of
government funds and properties.
Promulgate Accounting and Auditing Rules
This includes those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
expensive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds
or property.
Leycano v. COA, 482 SCRA 215
Petitioner Manuel Leycano, Jr. was the
Provincial Treasurer of Oriental Mindoro and
at the same time a member of the Provincial
School Board (PSB) of that province
Inspectorate Team which, according to him,
had the function of monitoring the progress of
PSB projects.
In the year 1995, several checks were issued
to various private contractors in connection
with the repair, rehabilitation, and construction
projects covered by the Special Education
Fund (SEF) of public schools in Oriental
Mindoro. The Special Audit Team, COA
Regional Office No. IV found deficiencies in
the projects.
In light of this function of the Inspectorate
Team, its members may be held liable by the
COA for any irregular expenditure of the SEF
if their participation in such irregularity can be
established. While petitioner, in his capacity
as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not
an accountable officer he may, nonetheless,
be held liable by the COA under the broad
jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution.
COA has jurisdiction to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by,
or pertaining to, the Government. The
authority of the COA to hold petitioner
liable is also implied in its duty to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
Decide Administrative Cases Involving
Expenditures of Public Funds
NCMH v. COA, 265 SCRA 390 [1996]
An increase in its budgetary allocation of from
P145 million in 1987 to P191 million in 1988
enabled petitioner NCMHM, headed by Dr.
Brigida Buenaseda, to finally undertake the
rehabilitation, apparently long overdue, of
various facilities in the NCMHM.
COA adopted the findings of SAT. Petitioners
argue that findings and recommendations of
the SAT (Special Audit Team) have been
made without fully appreciating the
circumstances peculiarly attendant to the
operation of the center: Incurrence of
unnecessary, extravagant and excessive
expenditures in violation of COA Circular No.
85-55A.
COA Circular: Unnecessary expenditures are
those not supportive of the implementation of
the objectives and mission of the agency
relative to the nature of its operation.
SC ruled: While the items for renovation and
improvement of the center, on the surface,
might seem not too urgent in nature,
petitioners, however, did plausibly come out
with the fact that the questioned transactions
were indeed long overdue. The delay made it
most compelling to fast track what had been
felt to be essential in providing due and proper
treatment and care for the center's patients.
Nothing before us suggests, even remotely,
that the disbursements have been made for
personal or selfish ends. Decision of COA is
set aside.
Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 [1971]
FACTS:
The provincial fiscal of Rizal wanted to
conduct a preliminary investigation against
petitioners even after the Auditor General
approved the vouchers subject to an alleged
malversation by the petitioners. They allege
that it is the AUditor General, and not the
fiscal, who has the responsibility to determine
whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly
discovered in the courage of his audit.
DOCTRINE:
The fiscal has the authority to investigate
whether a criminal act had been committed or
not in the disbursement of public funds, and
the Courts to try any person involved in the
alleged malversation of public funds. This is
not curtailed by the administrative findings of
the Auditor General.
Salva v. Carague, 511 SCRA 258
FACTS:
Salva was the president of Palawan State
University, and was held to be personally
liable for the excess amount in the building of
a multi-purpose building in PSU. She
contested the computation, as well as her
personal liability to pay the excess, amounting
to P274K.
DOCTRINE:
While the COA has the authority to make an
Approved Agency Estimates (AAE), the same
can exceed when there is justifiable reason to
do so. Likewise, the petitioner justified the
additional costs, such as the need to construct
temporary roadway for heavy equipment, thus
making it important to pay for the additional
costs. Likewise, there was no showing that
there were disbursements made for personal
or selfish gain.
City of Basilan v. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711
[1974]
FACTS:
The City Council of Basilan passed an
ordinance creating the position of Asst. City
Auditor, to which Antonio was appointed. A
few years later, the city enacted another
ordinance, this time abolishing the position of
Asst. City Auditor.
DOCTRINE:
The office of the Asst. City Auditor is not just a
municipal creation. It is part and parcel of a
highly responsible task, national in scope, that
of auditing. This is provided for by the
Constitution, and the Administrative Code.
Where ordinance conflicts with statute,
ordinance must give way. Municipal
Corporations are without authority to abolish,
by ordinance, position or office created by
statute.
Section 3. COA Jurisdiction
Luciano Veloso v. Commission on Audit, GR
193677, 6 September 2011
FACTS:
The City of Manila passed an ordinance
authorizing the conferment of Exemplary
Service Award (EPSA) to elective officials of
the city who have been elected for three
consecutive terms. Their pay was equivalent
to the time served in the position for three
consecutive terms.
DOCTRINE:
The COA is vested with authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs,
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of these funds. LGUs,
although with fiscal autonomy, are still within
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
 The COA is vested with authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs,
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 4. Annual Report to the President
and to Congress
Supreme Court to submit, within 30 days from
the opening of each regular session of
Congress, to the President and to Congress
an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.
Unido v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Osmena v. COMELEC 199 SCRA 750 [1991]
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR
No. 119654, May 22, 1995
Telecom v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337 [1998]
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, Jan.
28, 2000
SWS v. COMELEC, GR No. 147571, May 5,
2001
Section 5. Favorable Recommendation for
Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of
Sentence
Section 6. Free and Open Party System
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771,
May 6, 2010
Section 7. No Block-Voting
Section 8. Prohibition on Political Parties
Section 9. Election Period
Section 10. No Harassment
Discrimination
Section 11. Funds
D. Commission of Audit
Section 1. Qualifications; Term
Section 1. Qualifications; Term
Chairman and 2 commissioners
natural-born citizens
at the time of appointment, they must
be at least 35 years of age
not candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment
must be either:
1. Certified public accountant (CPA)
with not less than 10 years of auditing
experience
2. Members of PH bar engaged in
practice of law for at least 10 years
*all members should not belong to the same
profession
Term: 7 years without reappointment
Term of those 1st appointed: (without
reappointment)
Chairman = 7 years
1 Commissioner = 5 years
1 Commissioner = 3 years
Appointment to any vacancy = for the
unexpired term of predecessor
**Members cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity
Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445
Due to the illegal seizure of Japanese registry
vessels, the Commissioner on Customs
ordered its release. However, it was not
released as the vessel sank while in the
custody of the COC. It was also not salvaged
for lack of funds. The owner of the vessel filed
and a claim with the COA for the payment of the
value of vessel. The manager of Technical
Service Office of the COA denied the claim.
The Acting Chairman of COA later adopted
said decision.
ISSUE: Whether the manager and the
chairman has the authority to decide on the
matter?

NO. The decision rendered by a manager of
the COA Technical Service Office Is void even
if ratified or adopted by the Acting COA
Chairman. Both the manager and the
chairman have no authority. The power to
decide cases brought before the COA is
lodged only to the Commission duly
constituted by the appointment
qualification of its Chairman and 2
commissioners.
control system of audit agencies is
inadequate)
Duty to keep the general accounts of
the Government
Duty to preserve the vouchers and
other supporting papers pertaining
thereto, for such period as may be
provided by law.
and
Examine and Audit: Government revenues
and Government expenditures

Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Tantuico 163 SCRA

Section 2. General Function; Powers
716 [1988]

Power, authority, and duty to

examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the following:
revenue and receipts of,
expenditures or uses of funds
and property,
owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, Government, or
any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned
or controlled corporations with
original charters
Power to conduct Post-audit basis:
constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that
have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this
Constitution;
autonomous state colleges
and universities;
other government-owned or
controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries; and
such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly,
from or through the
Government, which are
required by law or the
granting institution to submit
to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity.
Power to adopt measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, which
are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies (if the internal
DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 [1994]
Procurement of DBP conducted a public
bidding for the purchase of Uninterruptible
Power Supply. After evaluation of all bidders,
Voltronics won the bid. DBP submitted all the
bidding documents to the Corporate Auditor
for pre-audit. After review, Corporate Auditor
of COA found the transaction in order but
with the corresponding observation that
quotation price or bid price includes the
customs duties and/or other charges. A new
corporate auditor was assigned. He then
conducted a post-audit and held the Chairman
of the DBP liable for disallowance of the
custom duties and taxes. Now, DBP chairman
questioned the post-audit findings stating it
was already passed during the pre-audit
findings.
Whether it is proper for the COA to conduct
post-audit?
YES
The Constitution expressly grants the
Commission the power to conduct a post-
audit. Regardless of the result of pre-audit,
COA is empowered to conduct a post-audit.
A pre-audit is an examination of financial
transactions before their consumption or
payment and is basically a special
 development of the control aspect of
accountancy as well as integral part of the
accounting and payment process. In spite of
the favorable action of Corporate Auditor does
not necessarily mean that it passed in audit.
Eslao v. COA 236 SCRA 161 [1994]
Payment of honoraria and per diems are given
to PSU personnel involved in government
reforestation operation. COA resident auditor
at PSU found excess payments of honoraria
based on CPG No. 80-4 and later disallowed
the release. President of PSU based its claim
upon the DBM clarification which states that
the basis of honoraria should be NCC No. 53,
which pertains to foreign-assisted projects.
They contend that DBMs position must be
respected since DBM has the authority to
classify positions and determine appropriate
salaries for specific position classes, review
the compensation benefits programs of
agencies and design job evaluation programs.
ISSUE
Whether the DBMs position must be
respected?
YES.
Administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret
the law have the force of law and are entitled
to great respect. As such, the COA, like all
other government agencies, must respect the
presumption of legality and constitutionality to
which statutes and administrative regulations
are entitled until such statute or regulation is
repealed or amended, or until set aside in an
appropriate case by a competent court.
J.F.F. Manacop v. CA 266 SCRA 235 [1997]
Polloso v. Gangan, GR 140563, July 14, 2000
Audit Circ No 86-255 restricts government
agencies and instrumentalities in their hiring of
private lawyers to render any form of legal
services or handle their cases. No public
funds will be disbursed for payment of private
lawyers unless prior to hiring, there is a written
conformity and acquiescence from Solicitor
General. Thus, payment to Atty Satorre was
correctly disallowed by COA. The COA
circular cannot be considered curtailment on
practice of legal profession because the
government has its own counsel, the OSG.
Uy v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000
The exercise of COA to decide administrative
cases involving expenditure of public funds
involved quasi-judicial aspect of government
audit. This pertains to the examination, audit,
and settlement of all debts and claims of any
sort due from or owing to the government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities. The process of audit is
adjudicative in nature. Thus their work
involves investigations, weighing evidence,
and resolving whatever items should or should
not be included. Its conclusions are not mere
opinions but are decisions which may be
elevated by certiorari to the SC. However, it
must be remembered that although the
administrative agencies should not be
hidebound by technical procedures, they must
still follow due process of law. Notice to
enable other party to be heard and present
evidence is not a mere technicality but an
indispensable requirement.
In this case, COA rendered a decision to
disallow further payment of backwages on the
illegally dimissed employees. Court held that
COA was wrong to disallow payment on
backwages by claiming bad faith on the
Governor solely on the MSPB decision without
affording Governor opportunity to be heard.
MSPB never claimed bad faith on Governor
nor held him personally liable for payment.
MSPB had jurisdiction to render the decision
and order payment of backwages to illegally
dismissed employees. Thus, the Acting
Provincial Treasurer released government
funds to partially pay backwages, during
pending COA case. However, COA cannot set
it aside in their broad powers of audit without
due process being met. Their power is to
prevent irregular unnecessary expenditures;
here, there is nothing irregular in payment of
backwages to illegally dismissed employees.

Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan 265 SCRA 121
[1996]
COAs approval of the government officials
disbursements only relates to the
administrative aspect of the matter of his
accountability but it does not foreclose the
Ombudsmans authority to investigate and
determine whether there is a crime to be
prosecuted for which such official is
answerable. Thus,COA was right to assist in
gathering evidence to substantiate the
malversation case but such is not conclusive
as to whether there is adequate cause
because that is within the power of the
Ombudsman and not COA. Thus, even if COA
claims there is substantial compliance with
accounting rules, that ruling alone will not
dismiss the criminal case because the
conclusive effect of finality of COAs decision
relates solely to the administrative aspect and
not the criminal aspect. Thus, nowhere does it
stop the filing of a criminal case despite the
provision under PS 1445 that after settlement
of accounts, they can only be reopened within
a period of 3 years.
DBP v. COA, 422 SCRA 459 [2004]
Section 2 Article 9D of the constitution does
not bar government instrumentalities from
questioning decisions of COA. They can do
this through Petitions for Certiorari under Rule
64 Rules of Court stating judgment or final
order or resolution of COMELEC and COA
may be brought to the SC under Rule 65.
However, this is not available to anyone.
In looking into the Gratuity Plan and the
Special Loan Program under DBP for its
employees, the court held that the employees
right to fund is inchoate. They may only claim
such gratuitous under the Fund when they
retire but this does not invalidate the Trust
created by DBP. THUS, COA was right to
disallow the P11M under the Special Loan
Program because such was allows a
prospective retiree to utilize in the form of a
loan, a portion of their Fund which can only be
taken upon retirement. The funds were part of
public funds, and COA was justified to look
into such pension program. DBP employees
had standing to question the Decision of COA.
Home Development Mutual Fund v. COA, GR
142297, June 15, 2004
Court held that COA was right to disallow.
When RA 6971 was enacted that provided
incentive bonus, HDMF granted bonus despite
advise of USec of DBM that all govt owned
and controlled corporations should defer from
payment pending issuance of definitive ruling
the President. When Supplemental Rules
were released by DOLE, it excluded those
created under the original charter. Thus COA
disallowed the grant of productivity bonus to
HDMF personnel.
Court held that COA was right to
disallow.Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF) is covered by the Civil Service under
Art9 Section 2(1) of the constitution and
excluded from the coverage of RA 6971. It is a
government-owned and controlled corporation
performing proprietary functions with original
charter created by special law. Thus, even if
HDMF granted the Productivity Incentive
Bonus (RA 6971) before supplemental rules
clarifying exclusion form coverage, the
employees of HDMF did not acquire a vested
right over said bonus since they were not
entitled to it.
DBP v. COA 498 SCRA 537 [2006]
Letter of Instruction NO 667 is not a mere
technicality, otherwise, administrative
agencies will be free to utilize their funds
freely as long as they can justify their use
through mere invocation of laudable purposes.
DBP imputed GAD to COA on the
disallowance of DBP acquisition on 2 vehicles
to which COA claimed it was because of non-
compliance with its Letter of Instruction No
667, that they needed a presidential approval
for purchases of transport. DBP cannot claim
that the Letter of Instruction is a mere
technicality. It is clear that presidential
approval is a prerequisite to allowance of
disbursement.
Nava v. Palattao 499 SCRA 745 [2006]
In the finding of the Sandiganbayan (SBN)
that the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools
and Devices by Rodriguez was violative of
Anti Graft Law for not conducing public
bidding in accordance with COA Circular, with
the excess in market price for purchase based
on COA team, Petitioner claimed COA
Circular was directory but not mandatory.
Court ruled that COAs findings are accorded
not only with respect but also finality when
they are not tainted with GAD. In this case,
SBN correctly followed COA Report that
petitioner transacted violative of its circular.
Gualberto De Llana v. COA, GR 180989, 7
Feb. 2012
COA is the guardian of public funds. It has
been given broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenues and
expenditures and the use of public funds and
property, including exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination.
Its exercise of general audit is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the
check and balance system inherent in our
form of government. However, a pre-audit is
not a mandatory duty under the Constitution; it
is part of COAs discretion to which the
supreme court cannot compel COA to do.
Candelario L. Versoza Jr. v. Guillermo N
Carague, GR 157838, 7 February 2012
Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy, the
Constitution provides that decisions, orders or
rulings of COA may be brought to the SC on
certiorari under Rules of Court.
In bidding, the price is considered excessive if
it is more than 10% allowable price variance
between price paid for the item bought and
price of the same item per canvass of the
auditorHere, the price difference far exceeded
the 10% allowable variance in the purchase of
Coop Development Authority (CDA) from
Tetro the 46 computer equipment and
peripherals totaling P2M, to which it was
found by the auditor as overpriced by a total of
P881k and also found that the technical
evaluation report was manipulated to favor
Tetrathus COA was correct to issue the
Notice of Disallowance. Lastly, Petitioners
used the wrong mode of appeal.
Philippine Coconut v. Republic 663 SCRA
514 [2012]
COA is an independent supreme State
auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be
undermined by any law. Thus, under Art9D,
no law shall be passed exempting any entity
of the Govt or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the COA. Thus, the
coconut levy funds, being special public funds,
is subject to the jurisdiction of COAand any
property purchased using such funds are ublic
property. Thus, COA and can examine the
UCPB shares purchased using such public
funds.PD 961 and 1468 stating that the funds
shall not be construed or interpreted, under
any law or regulation, as special or fiduciary
funds, divests COA of its constitutionally-
mandated function, therefore undermining its
constitutional independence.
Audit Jurisdiction
Caltex v. COA 208 SCRA 726 [1992]
Mamaril v. Domingo 227 SCRA 206[1993]
Philippine Airlines v. COA 245 SCRA 39
[1995]
CIR v. COA 218 SCRA 203 [1993]
CSC v. Pobre, GR 160568, Sept. 15, 2004
Luciano Velos, et al. v. Commission On
Audit, GR 193677,6 Sept. 20011
Boy Scout of the Philippines v. COA, GR
177131, 7 June 2011
Dela Llana v. COA 665 SCRA 176 [2012]
Settle Government Account
Philippine Operations, Inc. v. Auditor
General, 94 Phil 868 [1953-1954]
Petitioner claims unliquidated damages for the
 failure of Burau of Prisons to deliver sawed
lumber.
In these cases involving unliquidated
damages, the most important questions to be
determined are judicial in nature, involving the
examination of evidence and the use of
judicial discretion. To assume that the
legislature granted this jurisdiction to an
administrative officer like the Auditor General
is not warranted, because it would amount to
an illegal act, as a delegation of judicial power
to an executive officer. If the power were
interpreted as having been granted to the
Auditor General to pass upon the rights of
private persons, without the judicial process
established by the Constitution and the laws,
private parties would be deprived of their
property without due process of law. The term
used under the law is moneyed claims
ICNA v. Republic, 21 SCRA 40 [1967]
Consignee filed a claim against the Bureau of
Customs, as arrastre operator.
The Republic of the Philippines and the
Bureau of Customs, answered and alleged
among others, non-suability and non-
compliance with Act 3083, which requires
money claims to be filed with the Auditor
General.
On grounds of public policy, the Republic of
the Philippines or its agencies, may not be
sued for the performance of arrastre
operations as a function necessarily incidental
to the governmental function of taxation.
Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782 [1988]
Layson was hired as a casual employee in the
Bureau of Treasury Office in order to do away
with the hiring of a private carpenter and
electrician. COA subsequently reduced his
daily rate for being "excessive and
disadvantageous to the government
Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA)
vested with the power and authority, but it is
also charged with the duty, to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the
expenditures or uses of funds ... owned ... by,
or pertaining to, the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities
(Article IX [D], Section 2 [1],1987
Constitution). That authority extends to the
accounts of all persons respecting funds or
properties received or held by them in an
accountable capacity (Section 26, P. D. No.
1445). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it
determines whether or not the fiscal
responsibility that rests directly with the head
of the government agency has been properly
and effectively discharged (Section 25.), and
whether or not there has been loss or wastage
of government resources. It is also
empowered to review and evaluate contracts
(Section 18 [4].).
NHC v. COA 226 SCRA 55 [1993]
NHC contends that COA acted beyond its
jurisdiction when it disallowed a duly entered
contract, valid, regular, with all the formalities
of law.
The Constitution also granted to COA the
power to "promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties."
The term pertains to expenditures which could
not pass the test of prudence or the diligence
of a good father of a family, thereby denoting
non-responsiveness to the exigencies of the
service. Unnecessary expenditures are those
not supportive of the implementation of the
objectives and mission of the agency relative
to the nature of its operation.
Crystal clear from the records is that the
nature of the terminal phase of the Dagat-
Dagatan project does not require the expertise
of a foreign consultant.
Euro-Med v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA
30 [2006]

The resolution of this case turns on whether it
is the COA or the RTC which has primary
jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners money
claim against the Province of Batangas.
Petitioners collection suit was within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances
surrounding petitioners claim brought it
clearly within the ambit of the COAs
jurisdiction.
Petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a
claim for a certain amount of money against a
local government unit. This brought the case
within the COAs domain to pass upon money
claims against the government or any
subdivision thereof.
The scope of the COAs authority to take
cognizance of claims is circumscribed,
however, by an unbroken line of cases holding
statutes of similar import to mean only
liquidated claims, or those determined or
readily determinable from vouchers, invoices,
and such other papers within reach of
accounting officers
Define Scope and Techniques of Auditing
Procedures
Danville Maritime v. COA,175 SCRA 701
[1989]
Commission on Audit disapproved the result
of the public bidding held by the Philippine
National Oil Company of the sale of its tanker-
vessel on the ground that only one bidder
submitted a bid.
The phrase "public auction" or "public bidding"
imports a sale to the highest bidder with
absolute freedom for competitive bidding.
Competitive bidding requires that there be at
least two (2) bidders who shall compete with
each other on an equal footing for winning the
award. If there is only one participating bidder,
the bidding is non-competitive and, hence,
falls short of the requirement.
Promulgate Accounting and Auditing Rules
Leycano v. COA, 482 SCRA 215
Petitioner was the Provincial Treasurer of
Oriental Mindoro. Petitioner admits having
signed the Certificate of Inspection in which
he attested that the projects were 100%
completed. Nevertheless, he alleges that the
Inspectorate Team has the duty to perform
monitoring functions of the projects.
Petitioner may, nonetheless, be held liable by
the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested
on it by the Constitution "to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government." In
addition, the authority of the COA to hold
petitioner liable is also implied in its duty to
"promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties."
Decide Administrative Cases Involving
Expenditures of Public Funds
NCMH v. COA, 265 SCRA 390 [1996]
Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 [1971]
Salva v. Carague, 511 SCRA 258
City of Basilan v. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711
[1974]
Section 3. COA Jurisdiction
Luciano Veloso v. Commisssion on Audit,
GR 193677, 6 September 2011
Section 4. Annual Report to the President
and to Congress
Article X. Local Government
Section 1. Territorial and Political
Subdivisions of the Philippines
The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Cordillera Broad v. COA GR No. 79956
January 26, 1990
In this case concerning Cory Aquinos EO 220
in the exercise of her legislative powers
creating CAR, following a ceasefire from the
Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army.
Petitioners assail its validity for preempting
Congress from its mandated task to create
such region.
SC held that the EO does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the
constitution, but merely prepared the grounds
for it. Since the Constitution outlines complex
procedures for its creation, it will take time and
the Eo merely addresses the urgent needs of
Cordillera
RA 6766 would later be enacted creating the
CAR.
Section 2. Local Autonomy
Art X Sec.2: The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
This principle simply means decentralization,
it does not make the local governments
sovereign within the state, or imperium in
imperio.
Autonomy can either be decentralization of
administration or power. Congress retains
control of the local government, but to a
significantly reduced degree. The autonomy
granted to the local governments must still
conform to the national law.
Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No.
80391, February 28, 1989
Nachura p. 575: relative to the establishment
of the autonomous regional governments in
Regions IX and XII under the 1973
Constitution, the Supreme Court declared:
Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
The second is abdication by the national
government of political power in favor of the
local government; the first consists merely in
the delegation of administrative powers to
broaden the base of governmental power.
Against the first there can be no valid
constitutional challenge.
In this case, Sultan Limbona was elected
speaker for a Central mindanao Legislative
Assembly. Cong. Matalam, chairman of the
Committe on Muslim Affairs invited Limbona
for consultation, which was accepted.
Limbona advised his Assembly that there shall
be no session while he is away.
But his Assembly conducted a session
anyway and Limbona was unseated. Limbona
now comes to SC to nullify the Assembly
proceedings, to which the Assembly said that
SC has no jurisdiction due to their local
autonomy.
SC disagreed, citing doctrine in Paragraph 1,
and said that the sessions basis for unseating
Limbona was due to him calling a recess
without the direction of the Pampook. SC held
that it is not a settled matter if Limbona could
call for a recess, and the reason for the
recess, if ever, was actually justifiable.
San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)
Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.
In this case, the position for Provincial Budget
Officer (PBO) in Rizal was vacant, to which
the Rizal Governor San Nominated Santos.
However, DBM Region Dept. Head did not
endorse the nominee, and recommended
instead Almajose, which was approved by
DBM. San Juan contested this saying that
under EO 112, the appointee should come
from his nominees.
The cited provision however is subject to
qualifications, and if the nominee failes to
meet the standards, DBM can reject them.
The question then is if the nominee is
unqualified, is DBM now free to appoint
anyone? Hence, applying teh doctrine stated,
it must be resolved IFO autonomy that if the
 nominee fails to qualify, the nomination list
must be returned and ask for new
recommendees.
Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135 [1994]
In distinguishing control vs supervision,
Control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act, and if not followed, order such act redone
or undone. Supervision merely sees to it that
the rules are followed.
In this case, SoJ declared a Manila ordinance
null and void for non-compliance with the
procedure of enacting tax ordinances. RTC
reversed, saying that Sec.187 of LGC, the
basis of SoJ ruling for vesting on SoJ the
power of control over LGU, is unconstitutional
for violation of local autonomy.
SC reversed, saying that the provision is
constitutional, because the Secretary only
reviewed the legality of the ordinance, and,
finding it illegal, is not control but mere
supervision.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, GR No.
111097, July 20, 1994
Ordinances should not contravene a statute.
LGUs exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred by COngress.
The Ordinance in this case is in Cagayan De
oro, and prohibits the issuance of business
permit and cancelling existing ones to
operation of casino. Respondents contested it
for violating PD 1869, which permitted the
operation of casinos which is regulated by
PAGCOR.
Judge Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec.
11, 2003
Judge Leynes was assigned to MTC Oriental
Mindoro. He was receiving Salary, and
Representation/Transportation Allowance
(RATA) from SC, and allowance from the local
government.
Sangguniang Bayan approved increasing
local allowance and their own RATA to the
judge. Provincial Auditor directed the Mayor to
stop the RATA, saying that the GAA prohibits
anyone from collecting RATA from more than
one source.
Judge appealed to COA Reg. Dir. but upheld
Provincial Auditor. Hence, this petition.
SC held that GAA is a general law and LGC is
a specific law. LGC specifically allows LGUs
to provide for additional allowances to, among
others, judges (Se. 447(a)(i)(xi)). Hence, the
specific law prevails and COAs Administrative
Circular that is based on GAA (in disallowing
additional allowances) is invalid insofar as it
violates the law.
To rule against the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges will threaten the principle
of local autonomy.
Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City,
GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004
LGUs act only as an agent of the Congress,
and there being no law authorizing LGUs to
grant franchises to operate CATV, its
ordinance for doing so is invalid.
In this case, Batangas issued such ordinance
pursuant to Sec. 177(c) and (d) of LGC (of
1983), that authorized LGUs to regulate
businesses.
SC held that EO 436 governs the operations
of CATV, not the LGU. In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to grant
franchises
CREBA v. Secretary of DAR, GR 183409,
June 18, 2010
A DAR AO making reclassification of
agricultural lands subject to the requirements
and procedure for land use conversion,
violates LGC because it was not provided that
the reclassification by LGUs shall be subject
to procedures and requirements, or that
DARs approval must be secured to effect
reclassification. Effectively, it also violates
local autonomy.
However, the AO provision reclassification of
agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to
the requirements of land use conversion
procedure or that DARs approval or
clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification did not violate the autonomy
because the LGC itself provides for it.
Section 3. Local Government Code
The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993)
Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of a
preparatory recall assembly initiated by the
mayors and other officials of Bataan against
petitioner Governor Garcia.
Issue: W/N the preparatory recall assembly
as an alternative mode of recall was
constitutional?
Held/Ratio: YES
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer
by the people before the end of his term of
office. The people's prerogative to remove a
public officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations. Such power has
been held to be indispensable for the proper
administration of public affairs. Not
undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in a
representative democracy.
There is nothing in the Constitution that will
remotely suggest that the people have the
"sole and exclusive right to decide on whether
to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let
alone a single mode, of initiating recall
elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption
of multiple modes of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of
the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a
local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this
constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly
given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment
dictates. The power given was to select which
among the means and methods of initiating
recall elections are effective to carry out the
judgment of the electorate.
What the Constitution simply required is that
the mechanisms of recall, whether one or
many, to be chosen by Congress should be
effective. Using its constitutionally granted
discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact
an alternative mode of initiating recall
elections to supplement the former mode of
initiation by direct action of the people.
Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. In
this Code, Congress provided for a second
mode of initiating the recall process through a
preparatory recall assembly which in the
provincial level is composed of all mayors,
vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities
The legislative records reveal there were two
(2) principal reasons why this alternative
mode of initiating the recall process thru an
assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the
difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct
action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its
expenses
Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)
Facts:
Barely a year after winning the elections for
the position of Mayor, barangay officials
convened and initiated a preparatory recall
assembly. COMELEC gave due course to the
PRA Resolution.
Issue: W/N the preparatory recall assembly
was done in accordance with law?
Held/Ratio: YES
The issue of propriety of the notices sent to
the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a
function of the COMELEC. In the absence of
patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the
findings, the Court should not disturb the
same. The factual findings of the COMELEC,
based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are
conclusive upon the court, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack on the
validity of the same.
The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an
entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall
Assembly. It just so happens that the
personalities representing the barangays in
the Liga are the very members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of
whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor
of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor
Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the
record, in accordance with the existing law.
Thus, the Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members convened
and voted as members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and
not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Malonzo v. Zamora 323 SCRA 875
Facts:
The case is a motion for reconsideration of an
earlier case involving the decision of the
Office of the President suspending certain
local government officials for alleged failure to
comply with procedures for passing the
budget and misconduct. In the earlier case,
SC ruled that the OP committed GADALEJ in
suspending the local government officials.
Issue: W/N SC erred in overturning the
suspension given by the OP?
Held/Ratio: NO (not sure how this relates to
Section 3)
The law does not require the completion of the
updating or adoption of the internal rules of
procedure before the Sanggunian could act on
any other matter like the enactment of an
ordinance. It simply requires that the matter of
adopting or updating the internal rules of
procedure be taken up during the first day of
session. It would be inequitable to read
something more into the requirement of the
law and use it as a basis for finding petitioners
guilty of misconduct, especially when the
charge is serious enough to warrant a penalty
of suspension from office for three (3) months
without pay.
There is nothing in the law, however, which
prohibits that the three readings of a proposed
ordinance be held in just one session day.
Respondents themselves are aware of this.
And it certainly is not the function of this Court
to speculate that the councilors were not given
ample time for reflection and circumspection
before the passage of the proposed ordinance
by conducting the three readings in just one
day considering that it was a certain Eduardo
Tibor, by himself as taxpayer, and not the
councilors themselves, who raised such
complaint. It might not be amiss to point out
that the salaries of the city employees were to
be funded by the said ordinance which
embodied the supplemental budget for 1998,
hence, the urgency for its passage. Even the
five (5) councilors who abstained from voting
for the passage of Ordinance 0254, Series of
1998 took advantage of its benefits by
submitting to the office of petitioner Malonzo
the names of the employees assigned to their
respective offices for salary and accounting
purposes
Section 4. Supervision by the President
The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities
and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271
Facts:
The case involves the suspension of 2 local
government officials of Iloilo City which was
ordered by the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government.

Issue: W/N the Sec. of DILG may suspend
local government officials?
Held/Ratio: YES
Notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not
intend to divest the legislature of its rightor
the President of her prerogative as conferred
by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanctions against local officials. It is our
opinion that the omission (of as may be
provided by law) signifies nothing more than
to underscore local governments autonomy
from congress and to break Congress
control over local governments affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the
sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
The petitioners are under the impression that
the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is
not incompatible with disciplinary authority. x x
x Control has been defined as the power of perform their duties. If the subordinate
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for test of the
latter. Supervision on the other hand means supervision means no more than the power of
overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.
Under the Local Government Code, it cannot
exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need
not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter
period is otherwise sufficient, and which is
also to say that it ought to be lifted if
prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a
shorter span
Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
Facts:
The case involves the validity of
Administrative Order No. 23 which designates
the DILG as the disciplining authority for local
government officials.
Issue: W/N AO No. 23 is valid? W/N there
was valid delegation of authority?
Held/Ratio: YES to both
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary
actions against elective local officials is lodged
in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority
and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit
from A.O. No. 23. Pursuant to these
provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the
President of the Philippines, whether acting by
himself or through the Executive Secretary.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is the Investigating Authority,
who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the
DILG, however, is not the exclusive
Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG
Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may
designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over
administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local
governments. The power of supervision
means overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see that the subordinate officers
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the
official may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. The Presidents power of general
ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or
that subordinate officers act within the law.
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.
And the power to discipline and ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order
an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires.
The power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate. As the Disciplining
Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials.
A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to
investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This
 is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Josons claim. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to
discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to
investigate administrative complaints is based
on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency.
Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)
Facts:
The case involves the act of Secretary Drilon,
as Secretary of Justice, in setting aside the
Manila Revenue Code for non-compliance
with the procedures set by the law.
Issue: W/N Secretary Drilon exercised the
power of control?
Held/Ratio: NO
Where the Secretary of Justice reviews,
pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by a
local government unit to determine if the
officials performed their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers under the
Local Government Code, the same is an act
of mere supervision, not control
An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-
done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner
for the doing of the act. He has no judgment
on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with
his own version of what the Code should be.
He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He
did not say that in his judgment it was a bad
law. What he found only was that it was
illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with
law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant
of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code.
Bito-onon v. Fernandez 350 SCRA 732
Facts:
Bito-Onon and Quejano were both
candidates for the position of
Executive Vice-President in the
August 23, 1997 election for the Liga
ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the
province of Palawan.
Onon was proclaimed the winning
candidate in the said election
prompting Quejano to file a post
proclamation protest with the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES), which
was decided against him.
Not satisfied with the decision,
Quejano filed a Petition for Review
with the RTC.
Onon filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that the Supplemental
Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election issued by the DILG
on August 11, 1997 in its
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193,
providing for review of decisions or
resolutions of the BES by the regular
courts of law is an ultra vires act and
is void for being issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance
is not a mere act of supervision but
rather an exercise of control over the
Ligas internal organization.
Held: The amendment of the GUIDELINES is
more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of
control, which the President does not have
over the LIGA.
Doctrine:
The Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking
whether a local government or the
officers thereof perform their duties as
 provided by statutory enactments. He
cannot interfere with local
governments provided that the same
or its officers act within the scope of
their authority.
Supervisory power, when contrasted
with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority
over such body.
Officers in control lay down the rules
in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, it is discretionary on his part
to order the act undone or redone by
his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officers merely
see to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them.
If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done to
conform to the prescribed rules. He
cannot prescribe his own manner for
the doing of the act.
SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92 [2009]
National Liga v. Paredes 439 130 [2004]
Facts:
The DILG was appointed as interim
caretaker to administer and manage
the election affairs of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. DILG issued 2 reclassified the area described therein
memorandum circulars which alter,
modify, nullify or set aside the actions
of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILGs
appointment constitutes undue
interference in the internal affairs of
the Liga, since the latter is not subject
to DILG control and supervision.
Held: Presidents power of general
supervision, as exercised by the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga
ng mga Barangay. However, the DILGs
authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it
that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay
down such rules itself, nor does it have the
discretion to modify or replace them. Like the
local government units, the Liga ng mga
Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego.
Doctrine:
The Constitution permits the
President to wield no more authority
than that of checking whether a local
government or its officers perform
their duties as provided by statutory
enactments.
Supervisory power, when contrasted
with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority
over such body.
The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He
has no judgment on this matter except
to see that the rules are followed.
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and
Atienza passed it the following day, it
from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within
six months from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies.
Thereafter, the city of Manila and the
DOE entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the oil companies.
They agreed that the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals was the
most viable and practicable option.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97
and declared that the MOU was
 effective only for a period of six local governments, so long as they
months starting July 25, 2002 but was act within the scope of their authority.
extended to 2003. In local affairs, the wisdom of local
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC officials must prevail as long as they
urging the city to implement are acting within the parameters of
Ordinance 8027. Respondents the Constitution and the law.
defense is that Ordinance No. 8027
has been superseded by the MOU
and the resolutions and that the MOU Province of Negros v. COA, GR No. 182574,
was more of a guideline to 8027. September 28, 2010
Facts:
Held: Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution
Petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang
confines the President s power over LGUs to
Panlalawigan resolution, granted and released
one of general supervision. Hence, the DOE
the disbursement for the hospitalization and
cannot exercise the power of control over
health care insurance benefits of the
LGUs. Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to
provinces officials and employees without any
set aside an ordinance enacted by local
prior approval from the President. The COA
officials, a power that not even its principal,
disallowed the premium payment for such
the President, has.
benefits since petitioner disregarded AO 103
and RA 6758.
Doctrine:
Supervisory power, when contrasted
Held: Petitioner did not violate the rule of prior
with control, is the power of mere
approval from the President since the
oversight over an inferior body; it does
requirement under AO 103 is applicable only
not include any restraining authority
to departments, bureaus, offices and
over such body. It does not allow the
government-owned and controlled
supervisor to annul the acts of the
corporations under the Executive branch. In
subordinate.
other words, AO 103 must be observed by
This is because under our present
government offices under the Presidents
system of government, executive
control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII
power is vested in the President. The
of the Constitution.
members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter
Doctrine:
egos. As such, they are subject to the
LGUs are subject only to the power of
power of control of the President, at
general supervision of the President,
whose will and behest they can be
the Presidents authority is limited to
removed from office; or their actions
seeing to it that rules are followed and
and decisions changed, suspended or
laws are faithfully executed.
reversed.
The grant by LGU of additional
In contrast, the heads of political
compensation like hospitalization and
subdivisions are elected by the
health care insurance benefits in the
people. Their sovereign powers
present case does not need the
emanate from the electorate, to whom
approval of the President to be valid.
they are directly accountable.
The Presidents power of general
By constitutional fiat, they are subject
supervision means the power of a
to the Presidents supervision only,
superior officer to see to it that
not control, so long as their acts are
subordinates perform their functions
exercised within the sphere of their
according to law.
legitimate powers. By the same token,
This is distinguished from the
the President may not withhold or
Presidents power of control which
alter any authority or power given
gives the President the power to
them by the Constitution and the law.
revise or reverse the acts or decisions
Thus, the President and his or her
of a subordinate officer involving the
alter egos, the department heads,
exercise of discretion.
cannot interfere with the activities of

Section 5. Taxation Power of Local
Government
Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local governments.
The power to tax is primarily vested
in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdictions, it may be exercised by
local legislative bodies, no longer
merely by virtue of a valid delegation
as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5,
Article X of the Constitution. (Mactan
Cebu International Airport v. Marcos)
Scope and Limitation of Power:
Subject to such guidelines and
limitations as Congress may provide.
However, Congress must not be such
as to frustrate the basic policy of
local autonomy.
i.e. The local government units have
no power to tax instrumentalities of
the National Government, such as
PAGCOR (Basco v. PAGCOR).
Fund sources of local governments:
Local taxes, fees and charges;
Share in the national taxes;
Share in the proceeds of the
utilization of national resources within
their respective areas;
Other sources of revenues which
they may legitimately make use of
either in their public or governmental
capacity, or private or proprietary
capacity.
Fundamental Principles:
Taxation shall be uniform in each
LGU;
Taxes, fees, charges and other
impositions shall be equitable and
based as far as practicable on the
taxpayers ability to pay; levied and
collected only for public purposes; not
unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory; and not contrary to law,
public policy, national economic
policy, or in restraint of trade;
The collection of local taxes, fees and
charges and other impositions shall in
no case be let to any private person;
The revenue collected shall inure
solely to the benefit of, and be subject
to disposition by the local government
unit, unless specifically provided
herein; and
Each LGU shall as far as practicable
evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805
Facts:
City of Butuan asserts that one of the
salient provisions introduced by the
LGC is in the area of local taxation
which allows LGUs to collect
registration fees or charges along
with, its view, the corresponding
issuance of all kinds of licenses or
permits for the driving of tricycles.
Hence, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Butuan, passed SP Ordinance no.
916-42, which provided for among
other things, the payment of franchise
fees for the grant of the franchise of
tricyles-for-hire, fees for the
registration of the vehicle, and fees for
the issuance of a permit for the driving
thereof.
Held: The City of Butuan may not issue
license and permit and collect fees for the
operation of tricycle.
Doctrine:
LGUs indubitably now have the power
to regulate the operation of tricycles-
for-hire and to grant franchises for the
operation thereof.
To regulate means to fix, establish,
or control; to adjust by rule, method,
or established mode; to direct by rule
or restriction; or to subject to
governing principles or laws.
A franchise is defined to be a special
privilege to do certain things conferred
by government on an individual or
corporation, and which does not
 belong to citizens generally of
common right.
On the other hand, to register
means to record formally and exactly,
to enroll, or to enter precisely in a list
or the like, and a drivers license is
the certificate or license issued by the
government which authorizes a
person to operate a motor vehicle.
Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)
Facts:
The entire controversy stemmed from
the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue
a mayors permit for the operation of a
lotto outlet in favor of private
respondent.
According to the mayor, he based his
decision on an existing ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto in the
province of Laguna.
Held: The ordinance merely states the
objection of the council to the said game. It
is but a mere policy statement on the part of
the local council, which is not self-executing.
Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna.
Doctrine:
The basic relationship between the
national legislature and the local
government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in
the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy.
Congress retains control of the local
government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than
under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the
power to destroy. The power to grant
still includes the power to withhold or
recall.
True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like
the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax
(citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution),
which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute.
By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot
defy its will or modify or violate it.
Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16,
2008
Facts:
In accordance to Ordinance 92-03,
petitioner was assessed a total tax of
P6,259,087.62. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a letter protest arguing that it is
exempt from paying local business
taxes as provided by Article 232 (h) of
the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint
and required Petron to pay the
assessed tax.
Held: LGUs cannot impose business taxes on
petroleum products.
Doctrine:
Congress has the constitutional
authority to impose limitations on the
power to tax of local government
units, and Section 133 of the LGC is
one such limitation.
Indeed, the provision is the explicit
statutory impediment to the enjoyment
of absolute taxing power by local
government units, not to mention the
reality that such power is a delegated
power.
The prohibition with respect to
petroleum products extends not only
to excise taxes thereon, but all taxes,
fees and charges.
Even absent Article 232, local
government units cannot impose
business taxes on petroleum
products. If anything, Article 232
merely reiterates what the LGC itself
already provides, with the additional
explanation that such prohibition was
in line with existing national policy.
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, GR
No. 154993, October 25, 2005
Facts:
Lepanto Condominium received a tax
assessment in the amount of P1.6
million from Luz Yamane, the City
Treasurer of Makati, for business
 taxes. Lepanto protested the
assessment as it averred that, as a
corporation, it is not organized for
profit and that it merely exists for the
maintenance of the condominium.
Held: Lepanto, condominium corporation
organized solely for the maintenance of a
condominium, is not liable for local taxation for
the fees it was collecting from the
condominium unit owners redound to the
owners themselves because the fees
collected are being used for the maintenance
of the condo.
Doctrine:
The power of local government units
to impose taxes within its territorial
jurisdiction derives from the
Constitution itself, which recognizes
the power of these units to create its
own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy of local
autonomy.
These guidelines and limitations as
provided by Congress are in main
contained in the Local Government
Code of 1991 (the Code), which
provides for comprehensive instances
when and how local government units
may impose taxes.
The significant limitations are
enumerated primarily in Section 133
of the Code, which include among
others, a prohibition on the imposition
of income taxes except when levied
on banks and other financial
institutions.
Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililla,
GR No. 90773, June 3, 1991
Facts:
PPC owns and maintains an oil
refinery including 49 storage tanks for
its petroleum products in Malaya,
Pililla, Rizal. In 1974, the Municipality
of Pilillia, Rizal enacted The Pililla
Tax Code Of 1974 wherein Sections
9 and 10 of the said ordinance
imposed a tax on business, while
section 139 of the disputed ordinance
imposed surcharges and interests on
unpaid taxes, fees or charges.
Enforcing the provisions of the above
mentioned ordinance, the respondent
filed a complaint on April 4, 1986
against PPC for the collection of the
business tax from 1979 to 1986;
storage permit fees from 1975 to
1986; mayors permit fee and sanitary
permit inspection fees from 1975 to
1984.
Held: The Municipality cannot impose taxes
on petitioners business.
Doctrine:
While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits
the imposition of local taxes on
petroleum products, said decree did
not amend sections 19 and 19 (a) of
PD 231 as amended by PD 426,
wherein the municipality is granted
the right to levy taxes on business of
manufacturers, importers, producers
of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature.
A tax on business is distinct from a
tax on the article itself.
The exercise by local governments of
the power to tax is ordained by the
present constitution.
Under section 5, article X of the 1987
constitution, only guidelines and
limitations that may be established by
congress can define and limit such
power of local governments.
The storage permit fee being imposed
by Pilillias tax ordinance is a fee for
the installation and keeping in storage
of any flammable, combustible or
explosive substances.
Acebedo Optical v. CA, GR 100152, March 21,
2000
The issuance of business licenses and
permits by a municipality or city is essentially
regulatory in nature. Grant is not a contract
between sovereignty and licensee but it is in
the nature of a special privilege, a permission
to do what is within its terms. There is no
vested, permanent, or absolute right. CA erred
in adjudging subject business permit as
having been issued by Mayor in the
performance of its proprietary functionssuch
 was in the exercise of the police power of the
state, within the contemplation of the general
welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
Here, the business permit can be issued by a
Mayor only to regulate the conduct of
business but not regulate the practice of a
profession such as optometry, which is
already under the PRC. Here, petitioner
wanted to run an optical shop and not to
engage in the practice of optometry.
Corporations are not excluded from hiring a
duly licensed physician in places where such
articles are sold. THUS, Mayor ordered to
reissue the permit.
Samahan ng Optometrist of the Philippines
(SOPI) through its acting President filed
complaint against city Mayor for its revocation
of its business permit. Mayor claims that there
was violation of conditions and therefore
disqualified to operate its business. Court held
that the authority of the Mayor to grant
business permits and licenses is within its
power as stated in Section 171 of Local Govt
Code. The power to grant includes the power
to revoke or cancel and restrict through
imposition of certain conditions. However,
such restriction must be within the laws.
PLDT v. City of Davao, GR 143867, March 25,
2003
The term exemption in RA 7965 does not
mean tax exemption but exemption from
certain regulations and requirements imposed
by the NTC such as exemption from
requirement of securing permits from NTC
every time there is an import of equipment.
Thus, the intent to exempt cannot be derived
from the lawthere must be clear and
unequivocal provision declaring such; taxation
should be strictly construed in favor of the
state because such entails a derogation of
sovereignty; a privilege given by the state.
In the enactment of RA 7925 (Public
Telecomm Policy of PH) granting certain
privileges and exemption under existing
franchises, PLDT applied for mayors permit to
operate in Davao and required to pay local
franchise tax. PLDT challenged the power of
govt to collect tax using RA 7925 in granting
exemptions.
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v.
Lim, GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
Incentives granted under RA 7227 on the
Bases Convention Act are exclusive only to
Subic SEZ. Thus, the extension of the same
under Proclamation No 420 John Hay SEZ
cannot be sustained because the law is clear.
It is the legislature, unless limited by a
provision of the Constitution, that has full
power to exempt any person or corporation.
Local Governments can only pass ordinances
on exemption only from local taxes.
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR
No. 131359, May 5, 1999
While local government units are made
autonomous, the legislature must still see to it
that (a) the taxpayer will not be overburdened
or saddled with multiple and unreasonable
impositions; (b) each local government unit
will have its fair share of available resources;
(c) the resources of the national government
will not be unduly disturbed and (d) local
taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
MERALCO granted franchise by National
Electric Administration to operate in Laguna in
1983. LGC was passed 1991 that included
LGCs power to impose a franchise tax on
businesses to which MERALCO was sent
demand letter to pay the tax and any provision
contrary, be in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatever nature imposed by
local authority in sale of electric current.
MERALCO claimed that such was in
contravention of PD551 where it only had a
2% franchise tax on sale of electric current
and paid such to the CIR and so when it
claimed for refund with LGC, it was denied.
The passage of LGC has effectively
withdrawn under Section 193, tax exemptions
or incentives enjoyed by certain entities
stating that unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to
or presently enjoyed by all persons whether
natural or juridical EXCEPT water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
nonstock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions are hereby withdrawn
upon effectivity of this Code. THUS, when
there was no mention of electric distribution,
the passage of the LGC effectively withdrew
MERALCOs earlier exemption.
Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No.
152675, April 28, 2004
ENRON and NPC entered into a Fast Track
BOT project to which Enron will supply a
power station to NOC and transfer it to such
afer 10 years of operation. BOT Agreement
provided that NPC will be responsible for the
payment of all taxes imposed. Enron later on
assigned its obligation to Batangas Power
Corporation (BPC). BPC registered as a BOI-
certified pioneer enterprise to which it was
granted a 6 year tax holiday. Batangas City
demanded payment of business tax on
October 1998 but refused to pay claiming
exemption.
Sec 133g of LGC proscribed LGUs from
levying taxes on BOI-certified pioneer
enterprises for a period of 6 years from date of
registration. This applies to taxes imposed by
the local government such as business taxes.
In this case, such was done on July 1993 and
therefore will end July 1999. However, the
court ruled that although the BPC remains
doing business subject to business tax, the
NPC is the one ultimately liable to pay the
taxes under the 1992 BOT Agreement and
1991 Local Government Code. NPC cannot
claim exemption because the passage of the
LGC had a blanket provision on the removal
of tax exemption upon effectivity of LGC.
Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR
No. 155491, September 16, 2008
The grant of tax exemption by RA 7294 is not
interpreted from a consideration of a single
portion or of isolated words or clauses but
from a general view of the act as a whole. The
line in lieu of all taxes in the Smart franchise
clause is uncertain on whether it is exempted
from both local and national; thus a strict
interpretation of this would show that it will
ONLY apply to national taxes such as VAT
and not local taxes.
Section 6. Share in National Taxes
Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000)
President Ramos issued AO 372 to reduce
total expenditure by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriations.
It also provided that pending the
assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation,
10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of
the AO as it holds back 10% of the IRA.
Ruling: The provision withholding 10% of the
IRA is unconstitutional.
It violates Sec. 286 of the LGC and Sec. 6,
Art. X of the Constitution, which provides for
the automatic release of each of these units
its share in the national internal revenue.
Any retention is prohibited.
The withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA
pending assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating
Committee, although temporary is equivalent
to a holdback, which means something held
back or withheld, often temporarily,
contravenes the Constitution.
The president may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given to them by the
Constitution and the law.
As to Sec. 1 which provides that All
government department and agencies,
including state universities and colleges,
GOCCs and LGUs will identify and
 implement measures in 1998 FY that will
reduce total expenditures for the year by at
least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services
items constitutional.
Merely advisory and therefore cannot be
proscribed as an attempt to exercise control
over LGUs
Province of Batangas v. Executive Secretary,
GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004
President Estrada issued EO 48, which
created the the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF), to address the
funding shortfalls of functions and services
devolved to the LGUs and other funding
requirements.
Pursuant to EO 48, the General
Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000, and
2001, included provisions wherein:
P5 Billion of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) was uniformly earmarked for the
LGSEF; and
It imposed conditions and guidelines for its
release
The Province of Batangas, represented by
Governor Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of the
GAA of 1999, 2000, and 2001.
ISSUE: WON the disputed provisions are
constitutional - NO
DOCTRINE:
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share"
of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject
its distribution and release to the vagaries of
the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight
Committee from time to time, as sanctioned
by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions,
makes the release not automatic, a flagrant
violation of the constitutional and statutory
mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs
"shall be automatically released to them."
While it is conceded that Congress may
amend any of the provisions in the Local
Government Code, it may not do so through
appropriations laws or GAAs.
Any amendment to the Local Government
Code of 1991 should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law, because
Congress cannot include in a general
appropriation bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in a separate legislation
Alternative Center v. Zamora, GR No. 144256,
June 8, 2005
FACTS:
then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
submitted the National Expenditures Program
for Fiscal Year 2000. In the said Program, the
President proposed an Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) in the amount of
P121,778,000,000
The act, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000,
provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS
TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the
IRA for local government units shall amount to
P111,778,000,000
This was being contested because this
violated the autonomy of local government
when it comes to automatic release of budget.
The IRA reduced their allotment by 10 Billion
pesos
ISSUE: WON it was unconstitutional YES
DOCTRINE:
As the Constitution lays upon the executive
the duty to automatically release the just
share of local governments in the national
taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from
performing this duty.
To hold that the executive branch may
disregard constitutional provisions which
define its duties, provided it has the backing of
statute, is virtually to make the Constitution
amendable by statute a proposition which is
patently absurd.
If indeed the framers intended to allow the
enactment of statutes making the release of
IRA conditional instead of automatic, then
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would
have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the
Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words as
determined by law, and not the release
thereof, the plain implication is that Congress
is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder
or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
the Court held that the only possible exception
to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is,
as held in Batangas:
if the national internal revenue collections
for the current fiscal year is less than 40
percent of the collections of the preceding
third fiscal year
This Court recognizes that the passage of the
GAA provisions by Congress was motivated
by the laudable intent to lower the budget
deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.
The pronouncement in Pimentel, however,
must be echoed: [T]he rule of law requires
that even the best intentions must be carried
out within the parameters of the Constitution
and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must
be carried out by legal methods
League of Cities v. COMELEC August 24,
2010
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court
En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the
subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the
equal protection clause.
ISSUE: WON the cityhood laws are
unconstitutional YES
It stressed that while all the criteria for the
creation of cities must be embodied
exclusively in the Local Government Code,
the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an
exemption from the increased income
requirement for the creation of cities under
sec. 450 of the LGC.
The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws
lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of
the Constitution.Congress exceeded and
abused its law-making power, rendering the
challenged Cityhood Laws void for being
violative of the Constitution, the Court held.
The Court further held that limiting the
exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into
cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities
can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if
it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
Section 7. Equitable Share in the National
Wealth
Local governments shall be entitled to an
equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national
wealth within their respective areas, in the
manner provided by law, including sharing the
same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.
Section 8. Term of Local Officials
The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157

Jose T. Capco was elected Vice Mayor.
When the Incumbent mayor died, he
assumed office.
1992 election: He ran for Mayor and won.
1995 Election: He ran again for mayor and
won.
1998 election: He filed his CoC.
Borja contested, claiming that Capco had
already served for three consecutive terms,
therefore ineligible to serve for another term.
That when he succeeded the Mayor, is he
considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Ruling: Capco has not yet served for 3
consecutive terms and therefore, eligible to
run.
In order that the three-term limit of local
elective official except barangay officials
to apply, two conditions must concur:
The local official concerned has been
elected three consecutive times; and
He has fully served three consecutive terms.
Sec. 8 embodies two policies:
To prevent political dynasties; and
To enhance the freedom of choice of the
people.
Thus, the term limit of elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
Since Capco was not elected when he
succeeded office by virtue of the Mayors
death and merely continued the unexpired
term, such is not counted.
Lozanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July
28, 1999
Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate
Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales
He served as mayor for two terms. During the
third term (95 elections), he won again but his
proclamation was contested by his opponent
Juan Alvez
The RTC ruled that there was failure of
election
COMELEC said that Alvez may now assume
office for the remainder of the term
Then, during the 98 elections, Lozanida filed a
CoC this was being contested again
because he was proclaimed a winner during
the 95 elections (supposedly his third time)
ISSUE: WON he has already reached the
limit? NO
DOCTRINE:
three-term limit which is now embodied in
section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was
initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any
elective local government official from running
for the same position after serving three
consecutive terms
The said disqualification was primarily
intended to forestall the accumulation of
massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order
to perpetuate his tenure in office
it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply
the two requisites for the application of the
three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections,
and second, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office.
Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927,
February 4, 2002
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena
City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to

Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before
Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall
election was conducted in May 2000 wherein
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for
mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged
on the ground that he had already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms
The term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus,
there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the
LGC.
Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)
After three consecutive terms, an elective
official cannot immediate re-election for a
fourth term, The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the same
office following the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall
election, is no longer an immediate reelection
after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The
intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June
30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when
he won by 3,018 votes over his closest
opponent, Socrates.
Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10,
2003
An elective local official, therefore, is not
barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions
concur: 1.) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms to
the same local government post, and 2.) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of
the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier,
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is
the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city.
These inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be
their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as
their chief executive for nine years.
David v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997)
How long is the term of office of barangay
chairmen and other barangay officials who
were elected to their respective offices on the
second Monday of May 1994? Is it three
years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code) or five years, as contained
in RA 6679?
The intent and design of the legislature to limit
the term of barangay officials to only three (3)
years as provided under the Local
Government Code is clear. The cardinal rule
in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the law.
RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was
enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in
case of an irreconciliable conflict between two
laws of different vintages, the later enactment
prevails.

Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679,
being a special law, should prevail over RA
7160, an alleged general law pursuant to the
doctrine of generalia specialibus non
derogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA 7160 is a
codified set of laws that specifically applies to
local government units.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not
expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any
term of office for barangay officials. It merely
left the determination of such term to the
lawmaking body, without any specific
limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the
lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public
service.
Rivera v. COMELEC 523 SCRA 41
Respondent Morales admitted that he was
elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-
1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term),
but he served the second term from 1998-
2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a
"de facto officer" since his proclamation as
mayor was declared void by the RTC. He was
also preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman in an anti--graft case from
January to July 1999.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term
1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding
the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting
him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial
courts ruling was promulgated only after the
1998-2001 term).
Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50
Respondent was elected for three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor. However, he
claimed that the service of his second term
was interrupted when he succeeded as vice
mayor due to the retirement of the incumbent.
Respondents assumption of office as vice-
mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary
severance from his office as municipal
councilor, resulting in an interruption in the
service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of
law.
Ong v. Alegre, GR No. 163295, January 23,
2006
Ong was elected as mayor on 1995, 1998 and
2001 elections. However after the term of the
contested office has expired, it was ruled that
it was Alegre who won in the 1998 mayoralty
race and, therefore, was the legally elected
mayor of San Vicente. He then filed certificate
of candidacy for 2004 election for the same
position.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof
from start to finish of the term, should legally
be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
His full term from 1998 to 2001 could not be
simply discounted on the basis that he was
not duly elected thereto on account of void
proclamation because it would have iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and
inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified
and repudiated loser with a crown of victory
Laceda v. Lumena GR 182867, November
25, 2008
Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January
30, 2009
Alboin v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836,
December 23, 2009
Bolos v. COMELEC 581 SCRA 786 [2009]
Aldovino v. COMELEC 609 SCRA 234
[2009]
Datu Michel Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, GR 196271, February 2012
(reconsideration; holdover provision in RA
9054 Unconstitutional as Congress in
passing RA 10153 has made clear)
Section 9. Sectoral Representatives
Supangan Jr. v. Santos, GR No. 84662,
August 24, 1990
Section 10. Creation, Abolition, Change of
Boundaries
Section 10.
No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
Facts:
BP 885 was enacted. It created a new
province in Negros to be known Negros del
Norte. Pursuant to its implementation
COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite. Petitioners
opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and
contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord
with the Local Government Code because the
voters of the parent province of Negros
Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del
Norte, were not included in the plebiscite and
the area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte is less than what
is required by the LGC.
Issue:
W/N it complies with the Constitution No
Held/Ratio:
Whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries, the approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected must first be obtained. The creation
of the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106 [1994]
(metes and bounds)
Facts:
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of
1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994.
The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No.
7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only
14.41% of the voting population.
Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,
R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in
effect.
Issue:
W/N the inhabitants of San Juan should be
made to participate in the plebiscite - No
Held/Ratio:
Petitioners contend that the people of San
Juan should have been made to participate in
the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same
involved a change in their legislative district.
The contention is bereft of merit since the
principal subject involved in the plebiscite was
the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto.
Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were
properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of
status of neighboring Mandaluyong
Mun. of Jimenez v. Judge Baz 265 SCRA
182 [1996](de jure corporation)
Facts:
By virtue of a Municipal Resolution, the
Municipality of Sinaclaban laid claim on the
territory of the Municipality of Jimenez in
Misamis Occidental. Consequently, the latter
questioned the legal standing of the former on
the ground that it does not have a corporate
personality being created by a mere executive
order by Pres. Quirino.
Issue:
W/N the Municipality of Sinaclaban has legal
personality. Yes
Held/Ratio:
The SC has considered the following factors
as having validated the creation of a municipal
corporation, which, like the Municipallity of
Sinacaban, was created by executive order of
the President before the ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor general: (1) the fact that for nearly 30
years the validity of the creation of the
municipality had never been challenged; (2)
the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no
quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the
municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal
circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives. Morever, following the ruling
in Municipality of san Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured
any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This
provision states: Municipalities existing as of
the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal district organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Cawaling v. COMELEC GR146319, October
26, 2001
Facts:
There are two separate petitions challenging
the constitutionality of RA 8806 which created
the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the
plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), on December 16, 2000,
conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification. On December 17, 2000,
the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers
(PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite.
Issue:
W/N the plebiscite is compliant to Section 10
Art. X of the Constitution Yes
Held/Ratio:
The phrase A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a
component city is not a criterion but simply
one of the modes by which a city may be
created. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, quoted earlier and which
petitioner cited in support of his posture,
allows the merger of local government units to
create a province, city, municipality or
barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. Verily, the creation
of an entirely new local government unit
through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or
division shall comply with the requirements
prescribed by the Code.
League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC, GR 176951, Nov. 29, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners filed the present petitions to
declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the
equal protection clause. Petitioners lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all
cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue:
W/N the Cityhood Laws are constitutional
No
Held/Ratio:
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10,
Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional. First, applying the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009 to the
present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later. Second, the
Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450
of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into
a city are clear, plain and unambiguous,
needing no resort to any statutory
construction. Fifth, the intent of members of
the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th
Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law
passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if
the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were
written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still
be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700
Facts:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature,
the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities
in the first district of Maguindanao. Later, 2
new municipalities were carved out of the
original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan,
resulting to total of 11. Cotabato City is not
part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters
ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a 29
October 2006 plebiscite.
Issue:
W/N Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays is constitutional
No
Held/Ratio:
Only Congress can create provinces and
cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts. Creation of province or a
city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district. The Constitution mandates
that a province or a city with at least 250,000
inhabitants is entitled to at least one
representative. The ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law
creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because
the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution.
Camid v. Office of the President, GR No.
161414, January 17, 2005
Navarro v. Executive Secretary, GR No.
180050, February 10, 2010
Section 11. Metropolitan Political
Subdivisions
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association Assoc.,
GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000
MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15,
2005
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon
City, 658 SCRA 853
Section 12. Highly Urbanized Cities,
Component Cities
Abella v. COMELEC, GR No. 100710,
September 3, 1991
Section 13. Local Government Units
Grouping Themselves
Section 14. Regional Development Councils
and Other Similar Bodies
Pimentel v. Ochoa 676 SCRA 551 [2012]
Sec. 15 Purpose, and how many
Autonomous Regions
Section 15. Autonomous Regions
Disomangcop v. Sec. of DPWH,GR 149848,
Nov. 25, 2004
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR
No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Section 16. General Supervision of the
President
Ampatuan v. Hon Ronaldo Puno, GR 190259.
17 June 2011 (Proclamation 1946 and AOs
and 273 A do not violate the principle of
local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of
the Constitution, and Section 1 Article V of
the Expanded ARMM Organic Act)
Kulayan v. Tan 675 SCRA 482 [2012]
Section 17. Powers Not Vested to the ARMM
Datu Michel Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, GR 196271, 18 October 2011.
Sections 18 and19. Organic Act for
Autonomous Regions
Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)
Ordillos v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)
Badua v. CBA, 194 SCRA 101 (1991)
The sole issue here is whether the tribal court
of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can
render a valid and executory decision in a
land dispute is the legal issue presented by
this petition.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Maeng
Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court under
the customs and traditions of an indigenous
cultural community. It is not a part of the
Philippine judicial system and does not
possess judicial power. The decision rendered
by the Maeng Tribal Court is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction
Atitiw v. Zamora, 471 SCRA 329
Taxpayers, officers and members of the
various units of the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR). They seek, among others, the
declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the
Special Provisions of Republic Act No. 8760
(GAA 2000), directing that the appropriation
for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its
activities and pay the separation and
retirement benefits of all affected officials and
employees. Among other things, the 2000
GAA appropriation for CAR was P17,612,000
lesser than the previous year.
The issue here is whether Congress can
unilaterally repeal E.O. 220 (An Act Creating
the Cordillera Administrative Region)
Cordillera Autonomous Region; The Cordillera
Autonomous Region (CAR) was not
abolished, as concluded by petitioners, with
the reduction of its budgetary allocation; what
took place was only a discontinuance of its
programs and activities.
However, even assuming that the limitation on
the CARs budget had the effect of abolishing
certain offices, the authority of Congress to do
so cannot be denied and should be
recognized. Except for such offices as are
created by the Constitution, the creation of
public offices is primarily a legislative function.
The CAR created by virtue of E.O. No. 220
is not the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. E.O. No.
220 has not established an autonomous
regional government. Instead, it has created a
region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main
objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services;
indeed, as its very name denotes it is a mere
administrative region. The bodies created by
E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
government structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They
merely constitute the mechanism. for an
umbrella that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the
National Government, the ethno-linguistic
groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No.
Director and Secretary of the Department of
82217, Jan. 29, 1990 Health of ARMM. Dr. Macacua designated
Pandi as Officer in Charge of IPHO-APGH of
Lanao Del Sur, and Sani to the ARMM
The constitutionality of Executive Order No.
Regional Office in Cotabato City. Meanwhile,
220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the
Provincial Governor Mutilan designated
Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed
Saber as the Officer in Charge of IPHO-
on the primary ground that it pre-empts the
APGH of Lanao Del Sur.
enactment of an organic act by the Congress
and the creation of the autonomous region in
The issue here is who can designate the
the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
Officer in Charge of Lanao Del Sur?
the act through a plebiscite.
The Supreme Court ruled that as Regional
The Supreme Court ruled that a reading of
Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of
E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it
November 6, 1993, the official vested by law
actually envisions is the consolidation and
to exercise supervision and control over all
coordination of the delivery of services of line
provincial health offices in the ARMM. The
departments and agencies of the National
Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive
Government in the areas covered by the
Order No. 133, assumed the administrative
administrative region as a step preparatory to
powers and functions of the Secretary of
the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It
Health of the National Government with
does not create the autonomous region
respect to provincial health offices within the
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
ARMM. The official exercising supervision and
provides for transitory measures in
control over an office has the administrative
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act
authority to designate, in the interest of public
and the creation of an autonomous region. In
service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the
This does not necessarily conflict with the
authority on November 6, 1993 to designate
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous
an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health
regions.
office of Lanao del Sur pending the
appointment of the permanent provincial
The Cordillera Administrative Region is not a
health officer.
territorial or political subdivision, it is a mere
sophisticated version of a regional
However, after the effectivity of the ARMM
consultative council.
Local Code, which was enacted by the
Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and
The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
approved by the Regional Governor on March
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
3, 1994, the Regional Secretary of Health lost
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
the authority to make such a designation.
contemplates the grant of political autonomy
Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial
and not just administrative autonomy to these
health officer became for the first an official of
regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution
the provincial government even though he is
for an autonomous regional government with
appointed by the Regional Governor and
a basic structure consisting of an executive
draws his salary from regional funds. The
department and a legislative assembly and
ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial
special courts with personal, family and
Governor the power to exercise general
property law jurisdiction in each of the
supervision and control over all programs,
autonomous regions
projects, services, and activities of the
provincial government. Upon the effectivity of
the ARMM Local Code, the power of
supervision and control over the provincial
Pandi v. CA, GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002 health officer passed from the Regional
Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From
then on the Provincial Governor began to
On August 1993, Dr. Macacua is the Regional exercise the administrative authority to
 designate an Officer-in-Charge in the
provincial health office pending the
appointment of a permanent provincial health
officer.
Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16,
2008
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature,
the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
The issue here is whether the Regional
Assembly of ARMM has the power to create
provinces and cities?
The Supreme Court ruled in the negation,
stating that Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution does not authorize autonomous
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
Organic acts of autonomous regions cannot
prevail over the Constitution. The power to
create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Likewise, The
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that every province
shall have a legislative district.
As such, Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act
No. 9054 declared unconstitutional insofar as
it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the
power to create provinces and cities.
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Panel
This is a consolidation of a number of cases
regarding the issues, mostly in relation to its
constitutionality, surrounding the MOA on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the
Government of the Philippines (GPR) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)1 and the
issue regarding the extent of the powers of the
President in pursuing the peace process.
One of the issues is whether the MOA-AD is
in violation of the Constitution and Statutes?
It violates of a number of articles in the
Constitution
1. Article X, Section 20 (defines the powers of
autonomous regions)
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
xxx
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
2. It is only the President who has the power
to enter into treaties however,
paragraph 3 under RESOURCES in the MOA-
AD states that the BJE is
free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign
countries: provided however that such
relationships and understandings do
not include aggression against the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines x x x
3. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution
must also be amended to effect the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD.
The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development
Court says that because of the associative
ties between the BJE and the national
government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which in
international practice has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, February 2012
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly
states that The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by
the majority of the votes case by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. With these wordings as standard, we
interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic
Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of
autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution
which Congress must provide for in the
Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic
Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic
structure of the regional government; (b) the
regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts
with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of
the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 20. Legislative Powers of the
Autonomous Regions
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of
the Philippines Peace Panel, 568 SCRA 492
This is a consolidation of a number of cases
regarding the issues, mostly in relation to its
constitutionality, surrounding the MOA on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the
Government of the Philippines (GPR) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)1 and the
issue regarding the extent of the powers of the
President in pursuing the peace process.
One of the issues is whether the MOA-AD is
in violation of the Constitution and Statutes?
It violates of a number of articles in the
Constitution
1. Article X, Section 20 (defines the powers of
autonomous regions)
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
xxx
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
2. It is only the President who has the power
to enter into treaties however,
paragraph 3 under RESOURCES in the MOA-
AD states that the BJE is
free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign
countries: provided however that such
relationships and understandings do
not include aggression against the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines x x x
3. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution
must also be amended to effect the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD.
The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development
Court says that because of the associative
ties between the BJE and the national
government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which in
international practice has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
Section 21. Preservation of Peace and Order
Article XI. Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1. Public Office
Hipolito v. Mergas 195 SCRA 6 [1991]
Respondent was held to have committed acts
which may be called "moonlighting" and which
are contrary to civil service rules and
regulations. Respondent is not supposed to
be following up extraneous matters outside
Manila, in other government offices and for
private individuals, to the prejudice of his work
in the judiciary as a deputy sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. While
"moonlighting" is not normally considered as a

serious misconduct, nonetheless, by the very
nature of the position held by respondent, it
obviously amounts to a malfeasance in office.
Public service requires utmost integrity and
strictest discipline. A public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity. This yardstick has been
imprinted in the 1973 Constitution under
Section 1 of Article XIII, thus: "Public office
is a public trust. Public officers and
employment shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people. This is
reiterated more emphatically in the 1987
Constitution.
Bornasal, Jr. v. Montes 280 SCRA 181
[1997]
Respondents act of signing the Notice of
Sheriffs Sale apparently for and in behalf of
his superior is a clear case of insubordination
and gross misconduct. His alleged partiality in
favor of the mortgagors to help them settle
their obligation cannot be countenanced by
this Court. As the enforcement arm of the
judiciary, deputy sheriffs must at all times be
circumspect in the performance of their duties.
The Constitutional mandate requiring all
public officers and employees to be
accountable to the people at all times is a
tall order. Sheriffs and deputy-sheriffs, as
officers of the Court and, therefore, agents
of the law, must discharge their duties with
due care and utmost diligence because in
serving the courts writs and processes and in
implementing the orders of the court, they
cannot afford to err without affecting the
efficiency of the enforcement process of the
administration of justice.
It is beyond question that the administration of
justice is a sacred task so that respondent
deputy sheriff, by the very nature of his duties
and responsibilities, should have borne in
mind that his unauthorized acts were violative
of the norms of public accountability, hence,
contributory to the diminishing image of the
peoples faith in the Judiciary.
Almario v. Resus AM NO. P941076,
[November 22, 1999]
Saclolo, deserves to be dismissed from the
service for her grave misconduct in preparing
in advance a TSN of a hearing yet to take
place and inserting it into the records of the
case even though the hearing did not push
through. Her acts were violative of the very
essence of a TSN, which is supposed to be a
faithful and exact recording of all matters that
transpire during a court proceeding. As for
respondent Resus, even assuming arguendo
that he did not have a hand in the preparation
of the subject TSN, he must be held
answerable for willfully turning a blind eye on
Saclolos acts of preparing the said TSN in
advance and attaching it to the records of the
LRC cases.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that
all those involved in the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach. Their conduct or behavior must,
at all times, be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility as to let
them free from any suspicion that may
taint the judiciary. As the administration of
justice is a sacred task, this Court condemns
and cannot countenance any act or omission
on the part of court personnel that would
violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith
of the people in the judiciary.
Juan v. People, GR 132378, January 18, 2000
This case involves the provision on preventive
suspension in the Anti-Graft Law and whether
it applies to such officers even if the alleged
violations are primarily considered as election
offenses.
Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law)
reinforces the principle that a public office is a
public trust. Its purpose is to prevent the
accused public officer from hampering his
prosecution by intimidating or influencing
witnesses, tampering with documentary
evidence, or committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. Preventive
suspension is not a penalty; petitioners, whose
culpability remains to be proven, are still
entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Re; AWOL of Antonio Makalintal, AM 99-11-
06-SC, February 15, 2000
By his habitual absenteeism, Mr. Macalintal
has caused inefficiency in the public service.
Although we understand his plight, it does not
excuse his total disregard of his official duties.
Time and again, this Court has pronounced
that any act which falls short of the exacting
standards for public office, especially on the
part of those expected to preserve the image
of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.
Public office is a public trust. Public
officers must at all time be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency. Mr. Antonio B. Macalintal guilty
of malfeasance in office for habitual
absenteeism.
Estrella v. Sandiganbayan, GR 125160, June
20, 2000
This is is a Criminal Case No. 12960,
convicting petitioner Nicanor E. Estrella,
Municipal Cashier, in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat of
the crime of malversation of public funds as
defined and penalized under Article 217(4) of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
holds liable for malversation a public
officer who shall appropriate public funds
or property for which he is accountable, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person
to take such public funds or property.
Furthermore, the failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses.
Malbas v. Blanco, A.M P99-1350, December
12, 2001
Sheriff Blanco cannot feign ignorance of the
fact that complainants were not parties to the
case in which the writ of execution was
issued. Respondents cannot escape liability
by claiming that they relied on the
misrepresentations of the representatives of
Chemical Fibers, the prevailing party. Sheriff
Gatlabayan was not principally authorized to
enforce the writ of execution. He was not the
assigned sheriff. Nonetheless, he assisted the
sheriff in the execution of the writ.
By their acts, respondents committed grave
misconduct, oppression and conducted
themselves in a manner highly prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. We have held
that all those involved in the administration of
justice must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate,
and invigorate the principle solemnly
enshrined in the Constitution that a public
office is a public trust. Any act or omission
on their part, which violates the norms of
public accountability or even merely tends
to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary, must be condemned and not
countenanced.
The Court cannot overstress the need for
proper and circumspect behavior on
everyone connected with an office charged
with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge, to the sheriff and the
lowliest clerk. Said conduct is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility and must, at all times, be
characterized with propriety and decorum.
Every employee of the judiciary should be
an example of integrity, honesty and
uprightness. He must always be above and
beyond suspicion. Sheriffs, in particular,
must show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of
their duties given the delicate task theyre
reposed with.
Manaois v. Lemeo, AM MTJ-03-1492, Aug. 26,
2003
FACTS:
SPO4 Manaois, who was supposed to arrest a
certain Rowena when she went in the police
station to inquire about a police car, filed a
case against Judge Lemeo for obstruction of
justice for fleeing with Rowena. In return,
Judge Lemeo issued a warrant of arrest
against him and made him explain alleged
groundless accusations against him.
DOCTRINE:
Disciplinary actions against public officers and
employees, including those in the judiciary do
not involve private or personal matters. Their
offices are imbued with public interest, as
provided in the Constitution.
In this case, there was showing that
respondent obstructed normal course of law
enforcement. In addition, he used his power to
unnecessarily delay administration of justice,
which he is bound to uphold.
Re; Gideon Alibang, AM 2003-11-SC June 15,
2004
FACTS:
Alibang was charged of unreasonable
tardiness between the months of January (13
times) and February (11 times). In his
defense, he claimed that his wife gave birth,
that he was forced to do chores before
working, and that it was traffic going to work.
He was reprimanded.
DOCTRINE:
The punishment was proper, as this was
found in the CSC Memorandum Circular.
Likewise, moral obligations are not sufficient
reasons to incur habitual tardiness, although
this may mitigate liability.
By reason of the nature and functions of their
office, officials and employees of the Judiciary
must be role models in the faithful observance
of the constitutional canon that public office is
a public trust. Inherent in this mandate are the
observance of prescribed office hours and
efficient use of every moment thereof for
public service.
ABAKADA v. Purisima 562 SCRA 251[2008]
FACTS:
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005,
claiming that establishing a system of rewards
and incentives when they exceed revenue
targets, BIR and BOC employees will turn into
bounty hunters.
DOCTRINE:
Public office is a public trust---it must be
discharged by its holder not for his own
personal gain but for the benefit of the public
for whom he holds it in trust.
The accusation is purely speculative. Public
officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties. This
presumption necessarily obtains in favor of
the BIR and BOC officials and employees.
Likewise, the law provides for sanctions in
case of abuse of authority in the
implementation of the law as a safeguard.
Salumbides v. OMB, GR 180917, April 23,
2010
FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed
officials in Quezon, while the mayor was an
elected official. Seeing the need for new
classrooms, they wanted to build two of these;
however there was no longer budget for 2001
to do the same. Despite this, the project was
done without bidding and without
appropriation. Salumbides, Glenda, the mayor
and other officials were charged of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty.
The mayor was then absolved due to his
reelection. Salumbides and Glenda wanted
the same extended to them.
DOCTRINE:
The Doctrine of Condonation, which states
that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting the right to
remove him therefor. The Court should never
remove a public officer for the acts done prior
to his present term in office.
While this doctrine applies to elected officials,
who are elected at large, this does not apply
to appointed officials, such as Salumbides and
Glenda, who are selected only by their
appointing officer.
** This doctrine has been abandoned.
Section 2. Officers Subject to Removal by
Impeachment
Ombudsman v. CA 452 SCRA 714 [2005]
(exclusive list)
FACTS:
Deputy Ombudsman was charged of
extortion, sexual harassment, and oppression.
The Committee of Peers initially
recommended that the investigation be turned
into one for impeachment.
DOCTRINE:
The Constitution provides who are
impeachable officials:
1. President
2. Vice president
3. Members of the Supreme Court
4. Members of Constitutional
Commissions
5. Ombudsman
All others may be removed from office as
provided by law, including the deputy
Ombudsman.
In determining whether it was the office or the
person who would be impeachable, the Court
looked into records of the Constitutional
Commission, where it appeared that the
Ombudsman is impeachable, excluding his
deputies.
Section 3. Procedure for Impeachment
In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)
FACTS:
Miguel Cuenco, former member of the House
of Representatives, made unfounded serious
accusations against then Justice Fernan, and
asking Mr. Raul Gonzales to do something
about it.
DOCTRINE:
A public officer, who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar
as a qualification for office held by him and
may be removed only by impeachment, may
not be disbarred during his incumbency.
Likewise, these persons also cannot be
charged in the Sandiganbayan, where the
offense carries with it the penalty of removal
from service.
Marcoleta v. Brawner 582 SCRA 474 [2009])
FACTS:
Marcoleta filed a case against Brawner and
Borra for violating the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, when they rendered a decision in favor
of one of the factions of ALAGAD party-list.
They claimed that they cannot be disbarred
without first being impeached.
DOCTRINE:
It bears emphasis that the provision that
majority of COMELEC members should be
lawyers pertains to the desired composition of
the COMELEC. While the appointing authority
may follow such constitutional mandate, the
appointment of a full complement of lawyers in
the COMELEC membership is not precluded.
Brawner and Borra are both impeachable
officers, and as such, could be removed only
by impeachment before they may be held
administratively liable for errant resolutions
and actions.
Romulo v. Yniguez, 141 SCRA 260 (1986)
SC cannot compel Batasan by power of
review if it is exercising its powers, more so in
its procedures. Doing so would make the court
interfere with the conduct of an independent
body.
In this case, the mandamus prayed for is the
restraint of the enforcement of several
provisions in Batasans procedures that would
enable petitioners to recall from Batasans
archives a previously dismissed impeachment
complaint against Marcos for insufficiency in
form.
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415
SCRA 44
Nachura, p. 369: Supreme Court said that
considering that the first impeachment
complaint was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. along with seven associate
justices of this Court on June 02, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 05, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Edilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003,
violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings
 against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
This case involves Eraps impeachment
complaint against former CJ Davide and other
justices. It was found sufficient in form but
lacks substance. Hence, a second complaint
was filed, accompanied by a signed resolution
of of all members of HoR the following day.
The second complaint was opposed by
various groups because under Sec.5 Art. XI,
no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once in a
year. SC agreed, see first paragraph
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001);
MR, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot
claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting
President. From the deliberations, the intent
of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure(the term during which the incumbent
actually holds office) and not his term.
Moreover, the congress has passed a
resolution expressly stating support to GMA,
and the Senate has passed HR83 declaring
the impeachment courts as functus officio and
thereby terminated. Therefore, the Court
cannot exercise judicial power for such
pronouncements are political in nature.
Gutierrez v. Committee on Justice, 643 SCRA
198
The term initiate means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it. The initiation starts
with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress taking initial action of said
complaint.
In this case, two groups filed separate
impeachment complaints against petitioner:
one before the 15th Congress, and another a
day after its opening. The first complaint was
transmitted to the Committee to include it in
the order of business, while the second one
was also transmitted the day after.
Respondent found the two complaints
sufficient in substance. Hence, petitioner goes
to SC, to which it was held that the initial
action is the referral itself.
Section 4. Sandiganbayan
The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433
[1982] (creation of Sandiganbayan)
The 1973 Constitution had provided for the
creation of a special court that shall have
original jurisdiction over cases involving public
officials charged with graft and corruption.
Hence, it is not necessarily violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Nunez in this case assailed the validity of PD
1486 creating Sandiganbayan, because he
was accused therein of estafa. He cited equal
protection.
Lecaros v. Sandiganbayan 128 SCRA 324
[1984] (crimes in relation to public office)
It is clear from the Art XIII Se.5 of the
Constitution that respondent court has
jurisdictional competence not only over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices committed by public officers
and employees but also over other crimes
committed by them in relation to their office,
though not involving graft and corrupt
practices, as may be determined by law. The
intention of the framers of the New
Constitution is patent from the explicit
language thereof as well as from Section 1 of
the same Article XIII titled "Accountability of
Public Officers."
The Constitution also validly delegated to the
lawmaking body the determination of such
other offenses.
In this case, petitioner was charged with grave
coercion.

Cunanan v. Arceo 242 SCRA 88 [1995]
(averment of the nature of the crime
committed)
Cunanan was charged with Murder, and the
information alleged that he was a member of
PNP, but no averment that he committed
the charge in relation to his office.
Meanwhile, SC promulgated a decision that
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original
jurisdiction to take cognizance of offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their
office if the penalty is higher than prision
correccional or 6yrs. Moreover, the case held
that if the Information failed to allege that the
accused had committed the offense charged
in relation to his office, RTC must conduct a
preliminary hearing to determine this fact. If
present, RTC will transfer the case to
Sandiganbayan as if the case was originally
instituted there
Judge Arceo then conducted such preliminary
hearing, and found that it is in fact committed
in relation to his office. SC held this to be valid
despite Cunanans opposition. RTCs initial
assumption of jurisdiction did not prevent it
from subsequently declaring itself without
jurisdiction, and such transfer will not violate
double jeopardy.
Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 58327,
March 22, 1991
In relation to conspiracy, the act complained
of here is falsification of public documents
relating to a public purchase. Petitioners
herein are not charged with conspiracy, but
causing undue injury to the Government.
However, the Sandiganbayan has no clear
factual basis that the purchase price of
5.00/sqm as fixed by the assessor was the
correct market value that the 8.00/sqm
purchase price would cause undue damage to
the Government.
Hence, failing to allege and prove conspiracy,
and for failing to prove damage to
government, SC reversed Sadniganbayans
conviction.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbanyan, GR No. 116033,
February 26, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Azarcon volunteered himself as a
custodian of the properties in his possession
which belongs to the tax delinquent Jaime
Ancla. However, later on, petitioner Azarcon
allegedly allowed Ancla to take the seized
properties in his custody. Because of this, a
complaint for malversation was filed against
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a private individual who has
been designated by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property?
Held/Ratio: NO
The jurisdiction of the court must appear
clearly from the statute law or it will not be
held to exist. It cannot be presumed or
implied. And for this purpose in criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the law at the time of commencement of
the action
The applicable statutory provisions are those
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their
amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16,
1995
The foregoing provisions unequivocally
specify the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a
private individual, i.e. when the complaint
charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged
with a crime within its jurisdiction.
It is evident that the petitioner did not cease to
be a private individual when he agreed to act
as depositary of the garnished dump truck.
Therefore, when the information charged him
and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan
for malversation of public funds or property,
the prosecution was in fact charging two
private individuals without any public officer
being similarly charged as a co-conspirator.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore
all the proceedings taken below as well as the
Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction
 Mayor Layus was charged with estafa through
Binay v. Sandiganbayan GR NO. 120681-83 falsification of public documents with the
[October 1, 1999] Sandiganbayan. Later on, the petitioner mayor
was suspended pende lite for 90-days by the
Facts:
Sandiganbayan.
The case involves the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in relation to mayors of cities
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has
in Manila. It is argued that the salary of a
jurisdiction over 5th class municipality mayors?
Mayor does not fall within the ambit of Salary
Grade 27 which is the minimum salary grade
Held/Ratio: YES
that falls under the jurisdiction of the
Although municipal mayors are not included in
Sandiganbayan.
the enumeration under Section 4.a. of
Republic Act No. 7975, Congress,
Issue: W/N the mayor falls under the
nevertheless, provided a catchall proviso in
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?
paragraph (5) thereof.
Held/Ratio: YES
(5) All other national and local officials
The nature of an officials position should be
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
the determining factor in the fixing of his or her
Compensation and Position Classification Act
salary.
of 1989.
The [salary] grade, therefore, depends upon
The fact that LAYUS is getting an amount less
the nature of ones positionthe level of
than that prescribed for SG 27 is entirely
difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification
irrelevant for purposes of determining the
requirements thereofrelative to that of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. That
another position. It is the officials Grade that
LAYUS is receiving a rate within SG 25 should
determines his or her salary, not the other way
not, however, be construed to mean that she
around
falls within the classification of SG 25.
To determine whether an official is within the
Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for
exclusive original jurisdiction of the
the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should
officer who has been validly charged with a
be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, or
Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or
Salary Grades. Salary level is not
any offense involving fraud upon government
determinative. An officials grade is not a
or public funds or property. This is based on
matter of proof, but a matter of law of which
the presumption that unless the public officer
the Court must take judicial notice.
is suspended, he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the
malfeasance or both.
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades list the Municipal Mayor
The imposition of the suspension, however, is
under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors
not automatic or self-operative. There must
come within the exclusive original jurisdiction
first be a valid information, determined at a
of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are
pre-suspension hearing, where the court is
local officials classified as Grade 27 and
furnished with the basis to suspend the
higher under the Compensation and Position
accused and proceed with the trial on the
Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall
merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the
provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as
latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part
amended by R.A. No. 7975
of the proceedings which impairs its validity.

Mayor Layus v. Sandiganbayan GR 134272,

Abbot v. Mapayo, GR 134102, July 6, 2000
December 8, 1999
Facts:
Facts:
Petitioner Teodoto Abbot, Chief of the
Irrigation System, NIA, was charged with
malversation through falsification of public
documents before the Sandiganbayan.
However, because of RA7975, the case was
transferred to the RTC. Later on, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition
with the CA. CA and SolGen argues that it
should have been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over petitions involving special civil
actions?
Held/Ratio: YES
In Garcia, Jr. v Sandiganbayan:
Sandiganbayan was a court with only special
and limited jurisdiction, hence, could not
exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto filed
by petitioner.
After the promulgation of the Garcia, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan decision herein cited,
Congress enacted RA 7975. In Sec. 4(c)
thereof, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
was expanded to include petitions for the
issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction
In effect, our ruling in Garcia, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan was supplanted in RA 7975
which was the law already in force at the time
of the commission of the offense charged.
Hence, both the Court of Appeals and the
Office of the Solicitor General are correct in
concluding that it is the Sandiganbayan which
has jurisdiction over the questioned Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition.
Defensor-Santiago, 356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Facts:
A criminal complaint for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against
then Commission of Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago. The prosecution filed a
motion for suspension of the accused.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
placed petitioner on suspension for a period of
90-days.
Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan committed
GADALEJ in suspending a Senator for
charges allegedly committed in a former
office?
Held/Ratio: NO
The provision of suspension pendente lite
applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent
or temporary employees, or pertaining to the
career or non-career service
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial
duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity
of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form
and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course,
and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not
state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which
he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate
that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands
accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the
accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate
a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of
the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether
or not his continuance in office could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other
evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension
pending the trial of the case.
Section 5. Ombudsman
There is hereby created the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the

Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy, and at least one Deputy
each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment
may likewise be appointed.
Baluyot v. Holganza, GR 136374, February
2000
Facts:
During an audit, a shortage was found in the
funds of the Philippine National Red Cross
Bohol Chapter. Accordingly, a criminal
complaint was filed with the Ombudsman
against petitioner Baluyot. In addition, an
administrative complaint for dishonesty was
also filed against petitioner. Petitioner argues
that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
considering that the PNRC is not a GOCC.
Issue: W/N Ombudsman has jurisdiction.
Held/Ratio: YES
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government owned and controlled
corporation, with an original charter under
Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to
determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled or private in
nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or
by incorporation under the general corporation
law?
The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a
private corporation" simply because its charter
was amended to vest in it the authority to
secure loans, be exempted from payment of
all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all
kinds on all importations and purchases for its
exclusive use, on donations for its disaster
relief work and other services and in its
benefits and fund raising drives, and be
allotted one lottery draw a year by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the
support of its disaster relief operation in
addition to its existing lottery draws for blood
program.
Clearly, public respondent has jurisdiction
over the matter, pursuant to Section 13, of
Republic Act No. 6770
Garcia v. Ombudsman, GR 127710, February
16, 2000
Facts:
Private respondents (controller, disbursing
officer, and assistant GM of NDC) deducted
withholding tax on the amount of provident
fund benefits given to the petitioner
corresponding to the amount over and above
the latters contributions. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3(e), RA3019. The
complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsman.
Issue: W/N the Ombudsman committed
GADALEJ?
Held/Ratio: NO
Petitioner has not shown that she suffered
actual damage or that private respondents
acted with evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence
Private respondents merely complied with
their duty under the law. They were guided by
the prevailing opinion of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue that provident fund benefits above
the employee's personal contribution were
taxable, and hence, it was their duty to
withhold the corresponding income taxes
thereon. They could not have foreseen that
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would
change his views on the issue at a later time.
The CIR's change of opinion, while favoring
petitioner, will not make private respondents
act prior thereto amount to bad faith as they
relied on the prevailing legal opinion on the
issue.
Lapid v. CA, GR 142261, June 29, 2000
Facts:
The case involves the issue on the
alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga
& exaction of exorbitant fees
purportedly perpetrated by
unscrupulous individuals with the
connivance of high-ranking
government officials including
petitioner.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman rendered
a decision in the administrative case
finding the petitioner administratively
liable for misconduct.

Issue: WON the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively
liable is immediately executory pending
appeal.
Held: Yes. The punishment imposed upon
petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one
month, is not among those listed as final and
unappealable, hence, immediately executory.
Doctrine:
Petitioner was charged
administratively before the
Ombudsman and accordingly the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act
should apply in his case.
Section 27 states that all provisionary
orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory; and that any
order, directive or decision of the said
Office imposing the penalty of
censure or reprimand or suspension
of not more than one months salary is
final and unappealable.
As such all other decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman which
impose penalties that are not
enumerated in the said section 27 are
not final, unappealable and
immediately executory.
Tirol v. COA, GR 133954, August 3, 2000
Facts:
The case involves petitioners acts
during his capacity as the DECS
Regional Director of Region VIII,
where he and some officials of the
Lalawigan National High School in
Eastern Samar entered into a contract
with Fairchild Marketing and
Construction in the total amount of
P80,000.
Upon filing of complaint by the
Teachers and Employees Union, COA
investigated the transaction and found
that there was malversation of public
funds.
In this case, there is only the claim of
petitioner that he had acted in good
faith and that there was no
conspiracy. The Ombudsman
believes otherwise.
The SG asserverates that it is beyond
the ambit of the Court's authority to
review the power of the Ombudsman
in prosecuting and dismissing a
complaint filed before it.
Held: It is clear from the pleadings that the
questions raised by the petitioner are
questions of fact rather than of law. What
petitioner wants to happen is for the Supreme
Court to review the evidence and determine
whether in fact he acted in good faith and that
no conspiracy existed among the accused.
Doctrine:
It is settled that the Court ordinarily
does not interfere with the discretion
of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate
courts.
This rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by
immeasurable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in as much
the same way that the courts would
be extremely swamped if they would
be compelled to review the exercise
of discretion on the part of the fiscals
or prosecuting attorneys each time
they decide to file an information in
court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
Mamburao v. Desierto, 429 SCRA 76
Facts:
Petitioners applied for a P6 Million
loan with the Balagtas branch of
Landbank of the Philippines.
Petitioners claim that when
 respondent went to Garcias (head of
the Provincial Lending Office) office,
she recommended the denial of their
loan accusing Mamburao of
establishing a front for prostitution
where the main merchandise are
GROs.
The application was subsequently
denied.
Petitioners subsequently filed a
charges against respondents for
slander, libel, falsification and use of
falsified documents, and perjury.
However, the Ombudsman dismissed
their complaints.
Held: No GAD on the part of the
Ombudsman.
Doctrine: Under Republic Act No. 6770, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and
conduct preliminary investigations. Absent any
grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts
will not interfere with the Ombudsmans
supervision and control over the preliminary
investigation conducted by him. The
Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a
complaint outright without going through a
preliminary investigation. It has been the
consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
his investigatory powers.
Carandang v. Desierto, 639 SCRA 293
Facts:
Petitioner Carandang, the GM and
COO of RPN was charged with grave
misconduct along with other officials
before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner questions the jurisdiction
over him of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that
RPN is not a GOCC, hence, he is not
a public official or employee.
Previously, a certain Roberto S.
Benedicto who allegedly holds about
72.4% of the shares of RPN ceded to
the government his shares of stock.
However, Benedicto moved to
reconsider, saying that the stocks he
agreed to cede was only 32.4%.
The said motion is yet to be resolve.
Held: The Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan may not validly charge
petitioner as a public official as there is still no
finality with regard to the share of Benedicto
that was ceded to the government, RPN
cannot be said to be a GOCC.
Doctrine: It is not disputed that the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving grave
misconduct committed by the officials and
employees of GOCCs and that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and
decide criminal actions involving violations of
R.A. 3019 committed by public officials and
employees, including presidents, directors and
managers of GOCCs. The respective
jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly
defined and delineated by the law.
Lacson v. ES, 649 SCRA 142
Facts:
Petitioners were non-presidential
appointee and career service officials
of Philippine Estates Authority.
A complaint was filed accusing
petitioners for overpricing the contract
for the construction of the Central
Boulevard Project.
The Ombudsman investigated both
the criminal and administrative
aspects of the case.
Petitioners were subsequently
charged with violation of RA 7080 and
Dishonesty, Misconduct and Acts
Inimical to the Interest of the Public
Service in violation of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases. The
PAGC also proceeded against
petitioners administratively.
Petitioners contend that because they
are not presidential appointees, it is
only the Ombudsman who has
jurisdiction over them.
Held: The Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with similarly authorized agents
Doctrine: The power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officials is
not exclusive, but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the
government in relation to the offense charged.
Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the
Ombudsman may share its authority to
conduct an investigation concerning
administrative charges against them with
other agencies.
People v. Morales, 649 SCRA 182
Facts:
The Philippine Centennial project was
marred by numerous allegations of
anomalies, among them, the lack of
public biddings.
An investigation resulted in the filing
in 2001 of an Information by the
Ombudsmans Fact-Finding and
Investigation Bureau against
respondent Morales, the acting
president of Expocorp at the time
relevant to the case.
In the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for
the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over his person and over
the offense charged.
He alleged that Expocorp is a private
corporation and that he is not a public
employee or official.
He added that Expocorp is not a
GOCC because it was not created by
a special law, it did not have an
original charter, and a majority of
Expocorps capital stock is owned by
private individuals.
Held: Expocorp is a private corporation. It was
not created by a special law but was
incorporated under the Corporation Code and
was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Doctrine: Since Expocorp is a private
corporation, not a government-owned or
controlled corporation, Morales, as Expocorps
president who now stands charged for
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in this
capacity, is beyond the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction.
Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580
Facts:
The petitioner is the Chief of the
CESPD, Bureau of Equipment,
DPWH, Port Area, Manila.
As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head
of the Special Inspectorate Team
(SIT) of the DPWH.
While the respondents are members
of the SIT.
On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary
Simeon Datumanong created a
committee to investigate alleged
anomalous transactions involving the
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts
of DPWH service vehicles in 2001.
Petitioner Quarto assails the
Ombudsmans grant of immunity to
private respondents that resulted in
their exclusion from the criminal
informations filed at the
Sandiganbayan.
Held: The respondents exclusion in the
informations is grounded on the
Ombudsmans grant of immunity. In the
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, the Ombudsman is generally no
different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged. He also
enjoys the same latitude of discretion in
determining what constitutes sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable
cause (that must be established for the filing
of an information in court)and the degree of
participation of those involved or the lack
thereof.
Doctrine: If, on the basis of the same
evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes
from an indictment some individuals while
impleading all others, the remedy of
mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a
rule, to include in the information all persons
who appear responsible for the offense
involved. An immunity statute does not, and
cannot, rule out a review by the Supreme
Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of
discretion. Like all other officials under our
constitutional scheme of government, all their
acts must adhere to the Constitution.
Section 6. Appointments
Ombudsman v. CSC, GR No. 162215, July 20,
2007
Career Executive Service (CES) covers
presidential appointees only. Director II in
Central Administrative Service of Office of
Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman
and not the President. Thereore, he is not
under the CES and does not need CES
eligibility. To classify such position as CES
and allowing him to acquire security of tenure
is therefore unconstitutional as it vests
appointing power for said position in the
President and it includes a CES position not
held by presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code.
Section 7. Tanodbayan as Special
Prosecutor
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan 146 SCRA 137
[1986]
Tanodbayan has jurisdiction to entertain and
prosecute complaint against employees of a
corporation which started as private
corporations but later on acquired by
government as subsidiaries of a govt owned
corporation (PetroPhil as a subsidiary of
PNOC). Thus tanodbayan had jurisdiction
when petitioner filed complained against
Petrophil for violation of Anti Graft Law when it
refused to release fees and enabled Greater
Marin Cargo to win the bidding.
Jurisdiction of Tanodbayan is explicit in Article
13, Sections 5 and 6 of the constitution where
the Sandiganbayan is a special court having
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corruption practices
committed by public officers (s5) and that the
Batasang Pambansa shalcreate a The power of the Ombudsman finds itself in
Tanodbayan which will receive, investigate
complaints relative to public office, including
govt-owned or controlled corporations (s6)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843
(1988)
Incumbent Tanodbayan (special Prosecutor
under 1987 Constitution) lost right to conduct
preliminary investigation and direct filing of
criminal case with Sandiganbayan. This is
explicitly given in the Ombudsman effect Feb
2, 1987. Special Prosecution cannot initiate
prosecution of cases unless instructed by the
Ombudsman. As such, power to issue
Subpoena was transferred to Ombudsman.
Acop v. Ombudsman, GR No. 120422,
September 27, 1995
Although the Constitutional Commission
withheld prosecutorial powers from
Ombudsman, the Commission still indicated
that the Legislature could, through a statute,
prescribe such other powers, function, and
duties to the Ombudsman. Thus under
Section 13 of Article 11 of Constitution,
Ombudsman shall have the power to
promulgate its rules and procedures and
exercise other function or duties as may be
provided for by law. Thus, when Congress
passed RA 6770, Congress made the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan
before) an organic component of the
Ombudsman.
Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545
The law does not require an act or omission
be related or arise from performance of official
duty; it is broad enough to cover any public
officialall kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance that have
been committed during his tenure of office.
the Constitution and he is also empowered,
under section 13, to direct the officer
concerned (Special Prosecutor) to take
appropriate action against a public official and
to recommend his prosecution. Lastly,
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over cases
when penalty is higher than precision
correctional. Anything below that is with
Ombudsman. Thus it was within power of
Special Prosecutor to refer to Ombudsman
the murder case of Gov Deloso, punishable
by RT, for preliminary investigation as having
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.

Almonte v. Vasquez, GR No. 95367, May 22,
1995
There is no claim that military or diplomatic
secretes will be disclosed by producing the
records of personnel in the EIBB nor is there
any law that considers such documents as
confidential. Thus, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, are
required to act promptly on complaints in any
form or manner against public officials. The
testimony given at a fact-finding investigation
and charges made at a PLEADING in a case
in court constituted SUFFICIENT BASIS for
Ombudsman to commence investigation.
Thus the Ombudsman was acting within its
power when it ordered the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal
Services Funds for year 1988 and salary
vouchers for whole plantilla for 1988 on the
basis of an ongoing case and testimony of
Alimonte that the only funds released to his
agency by DBM were insufficient and that
there were ghost agents in the EIIB that
claimed disburdements for open and
closed: plantillas cleared by the COA.
Azarcon v. Guerrero, GR No. 121017, Feb 17,
1997
The case is about an employee who failed the
CPA exam but claimed she passed the exam
in her data sheet to be submitted to BIR
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman is empowered
to conduct preliminary investigation under the
Constitution? - YES
DOCTRINE:
The Ombudsman, under the 1987
Constitution, particularly under paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI, may be validly
empowered with prosecutorial functions by the
legislature, and this the latter did when it
passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the
Ombudsman, among others, the power to
investigate and prosecute individuals on
matters and/or complaints referred or filed
before it.
the Office of the Ombudsman is a distinct
constitutional body whose duties and
functions are provided for by the Constitution
itself.
Considering that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
criminal cases emanates as it does from the
Constitution itself, particularly, under
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI as above-
quoted, which empowers the Ombudsman to
"exercise such other powers or perform such
other function or duties" as Congress may
prescribe through legislation, it cannot be
logically argued that such power or the
exercise thereof is unconstitutional or violative
of the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution.
Azarcon v. Guerrero , GR No. 116033, Feb 26,
1997
The case talks about malversation of public
funds committed by Azarcon who owned
dump truck. Said equipment was sub-
contracted to Ancla, who was served a
Warrant of Distraint and Levy over said
equipment. The equipment was being used by
PICOP.
Hence, BIR gave Azarcon safekeeping duties
over said property, but Azarcon said that the
business between him and Ancla ceased, so
he told to BIR that he will no longer have that
duty to oversee the property so he returned
the property to PICOP and mandated PICOP
that the property should not be taken out of its
premises.
Therefore, BIR sued Azarcon and claimed he
committed malversation of public funds.
Azarcon challenged Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction saying he is not a public officer. He
was just merely assigned by BIR as a
depositary of a distrained property.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework,
which mandates a limited government, that its
branches and administrative agencies
exercise only that power delegated to them as
"defined either in the Constitution or in
legislation or in both."
Thus, although the "appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, . . ."
the quantum of powers possessed by an
administrative agency forming part of the
executive branch will still be limited to that
"conferred expressly or by necessary or fair
implication" in its enabling act.
Hence," (a)n administrative officer, it has been
held, has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him and those necessarily implied
in the exercise thereof."
Corollarily, implied powers "are those which
are necessarily included in, and are therefore
of lesser degree than the power granted. It
cannot extend to other matters not embraced
therein, nor are not incidental thereto."
For to so extend the statutory grant of power
"would be an encroachment on powers
expressly lodged in Congress by our
Constitution."
However, we find no provision in the NIRC
constituting such person a public officer by
reason of such requirement. The BIRs power
authorizing a private individual to act as a
depositary cannot be stretched to include the
power to appoint him as a public officer.
Camanag v. Hon Guerrero 286 SCRA 473
[1997]
The case is about an employee who failed the
CPA exam but claimed she passed the exam
in her data sheet to be submitted to BIR
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman is empowered
to conduct preliminary investigation under the
Constitution? - YES
DOCTRINE:
The Ombudsman, under the 1987
Constitution, particularly under paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI, may be validly
empowered with prosecutorial functions by the
legislature, and this the latter did when it
passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the
Ombudsman, among others, the power to
investigate and prosecute individuals on
matters and/or complaints referred or filed
before it.
the Office of the Ombudsman is a distinct
constitutional body whose duties and
functions are provided for by the Constitution
itself.
Considering that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
criminal cases emanates as it does from the
Constitution itself, particularly, under
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI as above-
quoted, which empowers the Ombudsman to
"exercise such other powers or perform such
other function or duties" as Congress may
prescribe through legislation, it cannot be
logically argued that such power or the
exercise thereof is unconstitutional or violative
of the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution.
Buenasada v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645
This case talks about the preventive
suspension of Buenaseda etc from their office
done by the Ombudsman
They petition also that the Ombudsman
should disqualify Director Arnaw and
Investigator Rosero from participating in the
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the
authority to suspend officials from other
offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman YES
DOCTRINE:
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is
expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or
prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent
determination whether to recommend such
actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an
investigation. In turn, in order for him to
conduct such investigation in an expeditious
and efficient manner, he may need to suspend
the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may
arise from several causes, among them, the
danger of tampering or destruction of
evidence in the possession of respondent; the
intimidation of witnesses, etc. The
Ombudsman should be given the discretion to
decide when the persons facing administrative
charges should be preventively suspended.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him
by the Constitution. Such being the case, said
statute, particularly its provisions dealing with
procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and
objectives of the Constitution.
A statute granting powers to an agency
created by the Constitution should be liberally
construed for the advancement of the
purposes and objectives for which it was
created
Being a mere order for preventive suspension,
the questioned order of the Ombudsman was
validly issued even without a full-blown
hearing and the formal presentation of
evidence by the parties.
Macalino v. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452
Macalino (Loan officer of Philippine National
Construction Corporation) and Tan (Owner of
Wacker Marketing) were charged with estafa
thru falsification of official documents, and
frustrated estafa through falsification of
mercantile documents
Macalino moved to dismiss the case on lack
of jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over him
because he is not a public officer
ISSUE: WON Macalino is a public officer
NO
DOCTRINE:
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original
charter as it was incorporated under the
general law on corporations, it follows
inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him. The only instance when
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint
charges him either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer
who has been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
Hence, there can be no investigation done by
Ombudsman wherein its jurisdiction is only
over public officials or employees of the
Government.
BIR v. Ombudsman, GR No. 115103, April 11,
2002
Graft Investigation Officer II Christopher S.
Soquilon of the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMBUDSMAN, for brevity) received
information from an informer-for-reward
regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax
refunds to Distillera Limtuaco & Co., Inc.
(Limtuaco, for brevity) and La Tondea
Distilleries, Inc.
Upon receipt of the information, Soquilon
recommended to then Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez that the case be docketed and
subsequently assigned to him for investigation
So the Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces
tecum to Atty. Manseuqiao of the Legal
Department of BIR.
He refused.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has authority
to issue the subpoena? YES
DOCTRINE:
there is no requirement of a pending action
before the Ombudsman could wield its
investigative power.
The Ombudsman could resort to its
investigative prerogative on its own or upon a
complaint filed in any form or manner.
Even when the complaint is verbal or written,
unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman
could, on its own, initiate the investigation
(T)he Ombudsman undertook the
investigation not as an appellate body
exercising the power to review decisions or
rulings rendered by a subordinate body, with
the end view of affirming or reversing the
 same, but as an investigative agency tasked
to discharge the role as protector of the
people pursuant to his authority to investigate
xxx any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.
Laurel v. Desierto, GR No. 145368, April 12,
2002
Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed
as the head of the National Centennial
Commission.
The he was appointed as the Chairman of
ExpoCorp
There were alleged anomalies with the
bidding contracts to some entities and Laurel
was involved.
Then the Ombudsman conducted
investigation over the case, so Laurel was
alleged to have committed a violation under
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Laurel then questions the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman because he is a private
individual and Expo Corp. is a private
corporation.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
YES
DOCTRINE:
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.
The law defines such primary jurisdiction as
authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of
the government, the investigation of such
cases.
The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its
jurisdiction of cases involving public officers
and employees by other courts.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with
the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers and employees. I
ndeed, it must be stressed that the powers
granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman
are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees
during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman should not be equated with the
limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
under Section 11 of RA 6770.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation
and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera 471
SCRA 715 [2005]
Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Then, the Ombudsman received a complaint
which alleged that Valera violated the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and other
administrative offenses
Then he was placed under preventive
suspension for his commission of
administrative offenses by Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio (who was delegated the task
because Ombudsman Marcelo inhibited
himself from this case)
ISSUE: WON Special Prosecutor has
authority to preventively suspend Valera NO
DOCTRINE:
Ombudsman Marcelo did not state in the said
memorandum the reason for his inhibition.
Ombudsman Marcelo has no unfettered
discretion to inhibit himself. The inhibition
must be for just and valid causes
No such cause was proffered by Ombudsman
Marcelo for his inhibition
R.A. No. 6770 (OMB Act) granted to the Office
of the Ombudsman prosecutorial functions
and made the Office of the Special Prosecutor
an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman
R.A. No. 6770 vests on the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, under the supervision and
control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreement;
and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it
by the Ombudsman
Based on the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, the powers of
the Ombudsman have generally been
categorized into the following: investigatory
power; prosecutory power; public assistance
functions; authority to inquire and obtain
information; and function to adopt, institute
and implement preventive measures
On one hand, the investigatory and
prosecutorial power of Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. On the other hand, the
authority of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor has been characterized as limited
can only act under the supervision and
control of the Ombudsman
with respect to the grant of the power to
preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No
6770 makes no mention of the Special
Prosecutor
Perez v. Sandiganbayan 503 SCRA 252
The petitioners contend that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction when it admitted the Amended
Information which bears no approval of the
Ombudsman, thus, constituting denial of
procedural due process.
The incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and
who is supposed to retain powers and duties
not given to the Ombudsman) is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This
right to do so was lost effective February 2,
1987.
Under the present constitution, the Special
Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere
subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
and can investigate and prosecute cases only
upon the latters authority or orders. The
Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the
prosecution of cases but can only conduct the
same if instructed to do so by the
Ombudsman.
Calingin v. Desierto 529 SCRA 720 [2007]
Verily, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is
but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman
and is subject to his supervision and control.
In Perez v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held
that control means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Clearly, in disapproving the recommendation
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
dismiss all the charges against petitioner and
his co-accused, respondent Ombudsman did
not act with grave abuse of discretion.
Lazatin v. Desierto 588 SCRA 285 [2009]
The OSP recommended the dismissal of the
cases against petitioners for lack or
insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman,
however, ordered the Office of the Legal
Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. It
recommended that the OSP be directed to
proceed with the trial of the cases against
petitioners.
The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of
the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A.
 No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution
was also made the foundation for the decision
in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held
that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations,
which power had not been delegated to the
OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed
from legislating the grant of additional powers
to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 8. Qualifications
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and
at the time of their appointment, at least
forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the
Philippine Bar, and must not have been
candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The
Ombudsman must have, for ten years or
more, been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to
the same disqualifications and prohibitions
as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A
of this Constitution.
Section 9. Appointments
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at
least six nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council, and from a list of three
nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
Such appointments shall require no
confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.
Section 10. Rank
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall
have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions, and they shall receive the
same salary which shall not be decreased
during their term of office.
Section 11. Term
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall
serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified
to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation
from office.
Section 12. Prompt Action on Complaints
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action
taken and the result thereof.
Laurel v. Desierto, GR No. 145368, April 12,
2002
The most important characteristic which
distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of
an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time
being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this
nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the
NCC functions that can be described as
legislative or judicial. We hold that the NCC
performs executive functions. The executive
power is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due
observance. The executive function,
therefore, concerns the implementation of the
policies as set forth by law.
Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995)
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and
Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all
documents relating to Personal Service Funds
yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988
A government privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar
matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in
and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen, even though, as
a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed
by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such
as, but not limited to, economic sabotage,
smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently while in cases which involve
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine
the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can
be made for privilege resting on other
considerations.
Under COA circular, the "only item of
expenditure which should be treated strictly
confidential" is that which refers to the
"purchase of information and payment of
rewards."
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 105965, March
20, 2001
The issue is whether or n the Ombudsman is
clothed with authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute all criminal
cases involving public officers and employees,
not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law
does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held
that the clause any illegal act or omission of
any public official is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public officer or
employee
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, GR 108431, July 14,
2000
Neither is there factual support to petitioners
claim that the 4-year delay in the completion
of the preliminary investigation is unexplained.
The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on
Complaints brought before him. But such duty
should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution
of cases at the expense of thoroughness and
correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of
 the fact that the nature of the Office of the
Ombudsman encourages individuals who
clamor for efficient government service to
freely lodge their Complaints against
wrongdoings of government personnel, thus
resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, GR 136082, May
12, 2000
Roxas v. Vasquez, GR NO. 114944, June 19,
2001
Kara-an v. Ombudsman, GR 119990, June 21,
2004
People v. Sandiganbayan 451 SCRA 413
[2005]
Laxina v. Ombudsman 471 SCRA 542
[2005]
Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission On Audit-
Region VII, Gr 180236, 17 January 2012
(power of the Ombudsman to determine and
impose administrative liability is mandatory)
Gonzales III v. OP 679 SCRA 614 [2012]
Section 13. Powers; Functions; Duties
In General
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own
instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation
with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his
office involving the disbursement or use of
public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for
assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its
investigation when circumstances so warrant
and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red
tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption
in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Cruz v. Sandiganbayan 194 SCRA 474
[1991]
Facts:
Respondent PCGG filed a complaint against
the Petitioner Cruz for alleged irregularities
with GSIS. Petitioner questioned the mandate
and position of the Respondent and alleged
that it has no ground to prosecute him.
According to Petitioner, the Ombudsman has
Jurisdiction over his case.
Issue:
W/N the authority to prosecute his case solely
belongs to the ombudsman No
Held/Ratio:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the
Constitution does not show that the power of
investigation including preliminary
investigation vested on the Ombudsman is
exclusive. Hence, the said provision of the
Constitution did not repeal or remove the
power to conduct an investigation, including
the authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation, vested on the PCGG by
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 14.

Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464 [1993]
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a
complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his
certificate of service by certifying that all civil
and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in
fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision
had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda falsified his certificates of service for
17 months.
Issue:
W/N the Ombudsman encroaches upon the
Jurisdiction of the SC Yes
Held/Ratio:
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or
other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the SC for determination whether
said judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
Macalino v. Sandiganbayan 376 SCRA 452
Facts:
A case for Estafa was filed against petitioner
as an employee Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC),
government-controlled corporation. He filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that
according to him, he is not a public officer,
thus Respondent does not have jurisdiction.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner is a public officer as an
employee of PNCC No
Held/Ratio:
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original
charter as it was incorporated under the
general law on corporations, it follows
inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him. The only instance when
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint
charges him either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer
who has been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
Garcia v. Miro, GR No. 148944, Feb 5, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner is ordered by the Ombudsman to
file a counter-affidavit to the complaint against
him with regard to the anomalies purchase of
asphalt of Cebu City. Petitioner questions the
authority of the Ombudsman in that it cannot
compel him to do so, based on the ground
that a COA Special Audit Report is not a
proper basis of the complaint (Duterte vs.
Sandiganbayan).
Issue:
W/N the Ombudsman can order the petitioner
to file a counter-affidavit Yes
Held/Ratio:
Petitioners reliance on Duterte is misplaced.
When petitioners therein were asked to file a
comment on a COA Special Audit Report,
they were already being subjected to a
preliminary investigation without being so
informed. The complaint being referred to by
petitioner is the complaint filed in court in a
criminal case. For purposes of initiating a
preliminary investigation before the Office of
the Ombudsman, a complaint in any form or
manner is sufficient.
a Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors GR No. 159747, April 13, 2004
Facts:
A complaint-affidavit was filed against
Petitioner on the ground of his participation on
the Oakwood mutiny with the DOJ. Petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ and
alleged that it should have been the
Ombudsman on the basis of his public office.
Issue:
W/N the DOJ can prosecute by virtue of
Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001 Yes
Held/Ratio:
The power to investigate or conduct a
preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman
case may be exercised by an investigator or
prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman,
or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their
assistance, either in their regular capacities or
as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The
prevailing jurisprudence and under the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All
recognize and uphold the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to
conduct preliminary investigation on charges
filed against public officers and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed
with it because the DOJ's authority to act as
the principal law agency of the government
and investigate the commission of crimes
under the Revised Penal Code is derived from
the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case13 as not
being contrary to the Constitution.
Samson v. OMB, GR 117741, Sept 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the dismissal
of his complaint against Respondent Chiefs of
the Quezon City Health Sanitation and Food
and Drugs Divisions based on the ground that
the latter committed corrupt practices in the
conduct of their office.
Issue:
W/N the Court can review the decision of the
OMB in dismissing the case NO
Held/Ratio:
The Constitution and RA 6770 (the
Ombudsman Act of 1989) endowed the Office
of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
virtually free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from
outside pressure and improper influence.
Moreover, petitioner fails to present sufficient
evidence to warrant the investigation.
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, GR 162214, Nov.
11, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with a complaint with
the Sandiganbayan in relation to the alleged
tax scam perpetrated by them. However, there
were delays on the part of Sandiganbayan to
file its report on its investigations resulting to
the petitioners to file a motion to
dismiss/quash the complaints. They assert
that the more than 1 year delay is intolerably
capricious.
Issue:
W/N Respondent should have expedited their
investigation Yes
Held/Ratio:
There was an undue and inordinate delay in
the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor, and,
consequently, the submission of his report
thereon. Despite the lapse of more than one
year, he failed to comply with the Orders of
the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that a
reinvestigation is summary in nature, and
merely involves a reexamination and re-
evaluation of the evidence already submitted
by the complainant and the accused, as well
as the initial finding of probable cause which
led to the filing of the Informations after the
requisite preliminary investigation.
Undeniably, the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor is saddled with cases of equal, if
not of more importance than the cases against
the petitioners. However, this is not a valid
justification for an inordinate delay of one (1)
year in the termination of the reinvestigation of
the cases. The Prosecutor should have
expedited the reinvestigation not only because
he was ordered by the Sandiganbayan to
submit a report within sixty (60) days, but also
because he is bound to do so under the
Constitution, and under Section 13 of Rep. Act
No. 677.
Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman, GR No. 125296,
July 20, 2006
FACTS:
Former officers of PAL were charged for
violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices. A
motion to dismiss was filed on ground that
OMB has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether OMB has jurisdiction over
former officers of PAL for violation of Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices?
HELD
NO.
The Office of the Ombudsman exercises
jurisdiction over public officials/employees of
GOCCs with original charters. As such, it can
only investigate and prosecute acts or
omissions of the officials/employees of
government corporations. Therefore, although
the government later on acquired the
controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains
that the latter did not have an original charter
and its officers/employees could not be
investigated and/or prosecuted by the
Ombudsman.
of the complainants, even with the
acquiescence of the DECS and OMB.
The better rule in the event of conflict between
two courts of concurrent jurisdiction as in the
present case, is to allow the litigation to be
tried and decided by the court which, under
the circumstances obtaining in the
controversy, would, in the mind of this court,
be in a better position to serve the interests of
justice, considering the nature of the
controversy, the comparative accessibility of
the court to the parties, having in view their
peculiar positions and capabilities, and other
similar factors.

Ombudsman v. Lucero, November 24, 2006

Ombudsman v. Estandarte, GR No. 168670,
Lucero was appointed as Clerk II of the LTO
April 13, 2007
Regional Office No. VII. He was assigned at
the Chief Finance Division. Upon request of
OIC-Regional Director Mendoza of the LTO,
COA conducted an audit in the Cash Section
The complaint against Estandarte (school
of the Operations Division of their office in
principal) was referred to the OMB, which
order to determine the extent of malversation
treated the matter as a request for assistance.
of funds discovered. The audit findings
As such, the OMB referred the matter to the
revealed that Lucero altered miscellaneous
DECS and the COA for appropriation action.
receipts. Due to this, an administrative claim
DECS dismissed the complaint without
was filed before the OMB. The latter found
prejudice. Another complaint was filed but was
him guilty of dishonesty. Hence, it ruled to
again dismissed for lack of verification and
dismiss her from service and to disqualify her
certificate against forum shopping. After
to hold public office.
submission of the requirements, DECS
assumed jurisdiction over the case. It required
ISSUE
the principal to answer the charges and
Whether the OMB has the power to directly
created the Committee to investigate the
dismiss her from service?
matter. The Committee recommended its
dismissal. Meanwhile, the COA referred the
HELD:
complaint to the Provincial Auditor, who then
YES because it is a valid exercise of its
submitted his findings to the OMB. The OMB
administrative disciplinary authority under
decided to refer the administrative aspect of
Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
the case to the DECS. Upon request of the
and Republic Act No. 6770. The OMB is
complainant, OMB took over the case. DECS
empowered not merely to recommend, but to
then turned over the records to the OMB.
impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault.
ISSUE:Whether OMB has jurisdiction over the
case?
The Court stated that this was the manifest
intent of the legislature. The provisions in
HELD: NO.
Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal
When the complainants filed their formal
the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow
complaint with the DECS-Region VI,
on the Office of the Ombudsman full
jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot
administrative disciplinary authority. These
now be transferred to OMB upon the instance
provisions cover the entire gamut of
administrative adjudication which entails the
authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure,
summon witnesses and require the production
of documents, place under preventive
suspension public officers and employees
pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said
penalty.
Ombudsman v. CA, GR No. 169079, July 17,
2007
Respondent was the Local Treasury
Operations Assistant of the City Treasurers
Office in Bacolod City. COA conducted an
examination of respondents cash and
account. Based on its findings, it revealed a
shortage. He implicated Baja (paymaster) in
relation to the shortage. OMB dismissed them
from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
disqualification to hold public office. CA
reversed OMBs ruling because the latter has
no power to impose directly sanctions against
govt officials and employees.
Whether the OMB has the direct power to
remove government officials, whether elective
or appointive, who are not removable by
impeachment?
YES.
The Ombudsman has the constitutional power
to directly remove from government service an
erring public official, other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary. Under RA 6770,
the Ombudsman has the power to impose
directly administrative penalty on public
officials or employees. While Section 15(3) of
RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the
power to recommend removal, suspension,
demotion of government officials and
employees, the same Section 15(3) also
states that the Ombudsman in the alternative
may enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of RA 6770. The word
or in Section 15(3) grants the Ombudsman
this alternative power. Section 21 of RA 6770
vests in the Ombudsman disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government, except
impeachable officers, members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.
Sangguniang Barangay v. Punong Barangay,
GR No. 170626, March 3, 2008
Martinez, an incumbent Punong Barangay,
was administratively charged with Dishonesty
and Graft and Corruption before the
Sangguniang Bayan. Pending the
administrative proceedings, Martinez was
placed under preventive suspension. The
Sangunniang Bayan removed him from office.
Due to this, the authority of the Sangunniang
Bayan to impose an administrative penalty of
removal was questioned. TC ruled that it
exceeded its authority.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sangguniang Bayan may remove
an elective local official from office?
HELD
NO. Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to
do so.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal
of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested
with this power under Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. The most extreme penalty
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the
barangay official are of a grave nature and, if
found guilty, would merit the penalty of
removal from office, the case should be filed
with the regional trial court. Once the court
assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over
the case even if it would be subsequently
apparent during the trial that a penalty less
than removal from office is appropriate.
Perez v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 166062,
September 26, 2006
Buencamino v. CA, GR No. 175895, April 4,
2007
Pursuant to the ordinance enacted by
Sangguniang Bayan, Buencamino (mayor of
Bulacan) demanded payment (without official
receipt) of a pass way fee or a regulatory fee
of P1000 for every delivery truck that passes
San Miguel, Bulacan. Pascual (President of
Rosemoor Mining) filed an administrative
complaint against Buencamino (mayor of
Bulacan) for grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, acts unbecoming of public officer
and violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices. OMB declared him administratively
liable and suspended him from office for 6
months without pay. Petitioner contends that
his suspension is not immediately executory.
OMBs decision cannot be enforced during the
pendency of his appeal. CA denied the
injunctive relief on the ground that the OMB
decision is immediately executory.
ISSUE
Whether the OMB decision is final and
executory?
HELD
YES.
Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution
authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to
promulgate its own rules, and that, under
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to amend or
modify its rules as the interest of justice may
require.
In this case, under Administrative Order No.
17, the amendatory rule, it states that
decisions of the OMB are immediately
executory even pending appeal.
Medina v. COA, GR No. 176478, February 4,
2008
COA conducted audit on the cash and
accounts handled by Medina as Municipal
Treasurer of Cavite. Based on the audit
findings, it discovered a shortage. Later, COA
filed an administrative case against Medina for
grave misconduct and dishonesty. OMB
dismissed Medina from service and noted
Medinas failure to file his counter-affidavit and
position paper despite notice. An urgent
motion praying that the defenses be
considered was filed. Both orders of OMB
denied the motion. CA affirmed the orders.
Medina invokes her right to due process
based on Administrative Code of 1987,
Section 48 (2) and (3). On the other hand,
OMB support its argument that the propriety of
conducting a formal investigation rests on the
sound discretion of the hearing officer,
respondent COA, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), relies on
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, which governs
the procedure in administrative cases filed
before OMB.
ISSUE
Which of the rules govern? (Administrative
Code or Administrative Order No. 07?)
HELD
The latter will govern.
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, particularly
governs the procedure in administrative
proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Rules of Procedure of the
OMB was issued pursuant to the authority
vested under Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it makes
a new law with the force and effect of a valid
law. Rules and regulations when promulgated
in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by
law, partake of the nature of a statute.
On the other hand, the provisions in the
Administrative Code cited by petitioner in
support of her theory that she is entitled to a
formal investigation apply only to
administrative cases filed before the Civil
 Service Commission (CSC).
The administrative complaint against
petitioner was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of
procedural rules govern.
Villas Nor v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 180700,
March 4, 2008
Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, GR No. 172700,
July 23, 2010
OMB v. Estendarte 521 SCRA 155 [2007]
Salvador v. Mapa 539 SCRA 34 [2000]
OMB v. Masing 542 SCRA 253 [2008]
Medina v. COA 543 SCRA 684[2008]
Borja v. People 553 SCRA 250 [2008]
Preventive Suspension and Imposition of
Penalties
Buennaseda v. Favier 226 SCRA 645
[1993](when to suspension)
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole 251 SCRA 243
[1995] (nature)
Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio 271 SCRA 67
[1997] (not in relation to duties)
OMB v. CA 491 SCRA 92
OMB v. Madriaga 503 SCRA 631
OMB v. CA 507 SCRA 593
Estarija v. Ranada 492 SCRA 652 (Case
title corrected)
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
RA 6770.
The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 6770
is consistent with the intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution to give Congress the
discretion to give the Ombudsman powers
that are not merely persuasive in character.
The Constitution does not restrict the powers
of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, but allows the
Legislature to enact a law that would spell out
the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically
Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the
Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring
officials and employees, except members of
Congress, and the Judiciary. To conclude, we
hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of
Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally
sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are
not merely recommendatory. His office was
given teeth to render this constitutional body
not merely functional but also effective. Thus,
we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and
the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has
the constitutional power to directly remove
from government service an erring public
official other than a member of Congress and
the Judiciary.
OMB v. Lucero 508 SCRA 106 (Citation
corrected)
In this case, the Court declared that in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary
authority under Section 12, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770,
the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered
not merely to recommend, but to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer
or employee found to be at fault.
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770
taken together reveal the manifest intent of
the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority. These provisions cover the entire
gamut of administrative adjudication which
entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold
hearings in accordance with its rules of
procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under
preventive suspension public officers and
employees pending an investigation,
determine the appropriate penalty imposable
on erring public officers or employees as
warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily,
impose the said penalty.
Balbastro v. Junio 527 SCRA 680 [2007]
Petitioners were charged with Malvesation of
Public funds. The Ombudsman found them
guilty and ordered their dismissal from
service. Petitioners argue that the
Ombudsmans decision violates par. 3, Sec.
13, Art. XI of the Constitution which grants the
Ombudsman only the power to recommend
sanctions against erring officials; and that the
Ombudsmans decision is not supported by
facts and evidence, contravenes basic
principles in criminal law and violates
petitioners right to due process.
It is settled that the Office of Ombudsman has
the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee
found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. R.A. No.
6770, which provides for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was passed by Congress to
deliberately endow the Ombudsman with the
power to prosecute offenses committed by
public officers and employees to make him a
more active and effective agent of the people
in ensuring accountability in public office.
Moreover, Congress has vested the
Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him
to implement his own actions. The Court has
pronounced that R.A. No. 6770 is consistent
with the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, to accord Congress the
discretion to give the Ombudsman powers
that are not merely persuasive in character.
Under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary.
As to the findings of the Ombudsman, it is
settled that in administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt
is only substantial evidencethat amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
OMB v. CA 527 SCRA 798 [2007]
The issue in this case is whether the
Ombudsman can impose administrative
penalties on erring public officials or
employees.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the
Ombudsman has the power to recommend x
x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x of
government officials and employees, the
same Section 15(3) also states that the
Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce
its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of RA 6770. The word or in
Section 15(3) before the phrase enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative
power. Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the
Ombudsman disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the
Government, except impeachable officers,
members of Congress, and the Judiciary. And
under Section 25 of RA 6770, the
Ombudsman may impose in administrative
proceedings the penalty ranging from
suspension without pay for one year to
dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken
or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman x x x. Clearly, under RA 6770
the Ombudsman has the power to impose
directly administrative penalty on public
officials or employees.
COA v. CA 529 SCRA 245 [2007]
The powers of the Ombudsman are not
merely recommendatoryunder Republic Act
No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman has a constitutional power to
directly remove from government service an
erring public official other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary.
The findings of an offices fact-finding
investigation which does not qualify as a
quasi-judicial proceeding wherein respondents
are named, offenses are charged, and parties
are heard, cannot act as a bar to the
Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction and
rendition of decision.
OMB v. Santiago 533 SCRA 305 [2007]
In interpreting a statute, care should be given
that every part thereof be given effectthe
use of the word recommend in Section
13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, must
be read in conjunction with the words ensure
compliance therewith in order not to run
counter to the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and
complete disciplinary authority, with powers
that are not merely persuasive in character.
Section 13(3), Article XI is complemented by
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770 which
reads: SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and
Duties.The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and
duties: ... (3) Direct the officer concerned to
take appropriate action against a public officer
or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21 of this Act:
Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order
of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer; x x
x Considering that the refusal, without just
cause, of any officer to comply with an order
of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring
officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, it follows that the Ombudsmans
recommendation is not merely advisory but
is actually mandatory within the bounds of
law.
Govenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 502 [2008]
The immediately executory quality of a
preventive suspension order does not
preclude the preventively suspended
employee from seeking reconsideration of
such order; An order of preventive suspension
is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation and is usually made immediately
effective and executory to prevent the
respondent from using his/her position or
office to influence prospective witnesses or
tamper with the records which may be vital to
the prosecution of the case.
As things stand, the Office of the Ombudsman
can, as a matter of statutory empowerment,
validly order the immediate execution of a
preventive suspension after determining the
propriety of the imposition, regardless of the
remedy of reconsideration made available
under the law to the suspended respondent; A
preventive suspension, not being a penalty for
an administrative infraction, is imposable
without prior hearing.
The Office of the Ombudsman possesses full
administrative disciplinary authority over
public officials and employees, except
impeachable officials, members of Congress,
and the Judiciary, including the power to
determine the penalty therefor and to cause
the same to be implemented by the head of
the government agency concerned.
Marahomsalic v. Cole 547 SCRA 98
Petitioner Romulo J. Marohomsalic was
employed as Special Land Investigator I of
the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(PENRO-DENR) in Koronadal City. An
administrative complaint for grave
misconduct was filed against Marohomsalic
in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Ombudsman found Marohomsalic guilty and
dismissed him from the service.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has the power to
directly impose administrative penalties on
erring public officials and employees. The
legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770
thus bears out the conclusion that the Office
of the Ombudsman was intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of
a public officer or employee found to be at
fault.

OMB v. Lisondra 548 SCRA 83
Administrative charges for dishonesty and
grave misconduct were filed by complainant
Renato S. Muoz, Mayor of the Municipality of
La Paz, Agusan del Sur, before the OMB
against therein respondents Municipal Supply
Officer (MSO) and Municipal Planning
Development Officer (MPDO).
The legislative history of Republic Act No.
6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the
Office of the Ombudsman was intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of
a public officer or employee found to be at
fault.
Under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary. It is the intent of the lawmakers was
to bestow on the OMB full administrative
disciplinary authority. Ombudsmans order
to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is
actually mandatory.
Miro v. Abugan 549 SCRA 34
The Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc. later
filed a complaint in the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) against respondent
Abugan, Venacio Camarillo Labiano, Jr.
(Labiano, Jr.) and Cristina Labiano for
carnapping, falsification of public/official
document, and violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft
Law) and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards).
Under RA 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman
was mandated not only to act promptly on
complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liabilities of
erring government officers and employees to
promote efficient government service. RA
6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman
with the power to penalize public officers and
employees to ensure accountability in public
office.
Cesa v. OMB 553 SCRA 357
The Office of the Ombudsman suspended
Cebu City Treasurer Eustaquio B. Cesa for six
months without pay for tolerating illegal
practices relative to the granting of cash
advances to paymasters. Under Republic Act
No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman has the constitutional power to
directly remove from government service an
erring public official other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary.
While Section 15(3) of Rep. Act No. 6770
states that the Ombudsman has the power
to recommend the suspension of
government officials and employees, the
same Section 15(3) also states that the
Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce
its disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 of Rep. Act No. 6770. The word or in
Section 15(3) before the phrase enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative
power.
OMB v. De Sahagun 562 SCRA 122
A complaint was filed with the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PGAC) against Intramuros Administrator
Edda V.Henson in relation to the contracts
entered into with Brand Asia, Ltd.
Henson was dismissed from the service by
the Office of the President upon
recommendation of the PGAC which found
that the contracts were entered into without
the required public bidding and in violation of
Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
It is already well-settled that the
Ombudsmans power as regards the
administrative penalty to be imposed on an
erring public officer or employee is not
merely recommendatory; Ombudsman has
the power to directly impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution of a public officer
or employee other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary, found to be at
fault.
OMB v. samaniego 564 SCRA 502
COA, through its Regional Cluster Director
Atty. Francisco R. Velasco, filed two
administrative complaints against Samaniego
for dishonesty and grave misconduct. The
provisions in [RA] 6770 taken together reveal
the manifest intent of the lawmakers to
bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman
full administrative disciplinary authority.
These provisions cover the entire gamut of
administrative adjudication which entails the
authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure,
summon witnesses and require the production
of documents, place under preventive
suspension public officers and employees
pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring
public officers or employees as warranted
by the evidence and necessarily, impose
the said penalty.
Boncalon v. OMB GR 171812, December
24, 2008
Petitioner contends in her defense that the
power of the Ombudsman concerning penalty
after an investigation of public officials or
employees is merely recommendatory. Thus,
it cannot directly impose sanctions against
them.
The Ombudsman has the power to directly
impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution of an erring public official,
other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary, within the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. In
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA
437 (2005), is that the power of the
Ombudsman with regard to imposing
sanctions is not merely advisory but
mandatory.
OMB v. Beltran 588 SCRA 574 [2009]
In declaring that the Ombudsman had no
authority to directly dismiss Beltran from
government service, but only had the power to
recommend the removal of the public official
or employee found to be at fault, the appellate
court relied on the following statement in
Tapiador.
In Tapiador, The Ombudsman can only
recommend the removal of the public official
or employee found to be at fault, to the public
official concerned. There was reversible error
on the part of the appellate court in relying on
the above-cited statement. The statement in
Tapiador on the Ombudsmans power is at
best merely an obiter dictum and thus cannot
be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the
Supreme Court.
The provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken
together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. These provisions
cover the entire gamut of administrative
adjudication which entails the authority to,
inter alia, receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance
with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses
and require the production of documents,
place under preventive suspension public
officers and employees pending an
investigation, determine the appropriate
penalty imposable on erring public officers
or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and, necessarily, impose the
said penalty.
OMB v. Apolonio, GR 165132, 07 March
2012 (power to directly impose
administrative penalties, including removal
from office)
Nicasio I. Marte, an National Book
Development Board (NBDB Consultant), filed
a complaint against Dr. Apolonio and Mr.
Montealto before the Ombudsman. The
complaint alleged that Dr. Apolonio and Mr.
Montealto committed grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for the unauthorized
purchase and disbursement of the gift
cheques. CA annulled the decision of
Ombudsman finding Dr Apolonio guilty of
grave misconduct. The Ombudsman has the
power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or
employee, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. SC
finds Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio GUILTY of
SIMPLE MISCONDUCT.
Jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Natividad v. Felix 229 SCRA 680 [1994]
(amount)
FACTS:
Mayor Natividad was charged of the murder of
Severino Aquino. He claimed that Hon. Felix,
the prosecutor, had no jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation, and that this should
be done by the Ombudsman.
DOCTRINE:
A criminal offense may fall under the
jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman/Sandiganbayan when it fulfills
the following requisites:
1. It is committed by a public officer in
relation to his office
2. The penalty be higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six
years, or a fine of P6,000
While the Ombudsman has jurisdiction for
offenses done by public officers, it is not an
exclusive authority but is shared with similar
agencies of the government. The
Ombudsman may take over the investigation
of such case at any stage from any
investigative agency of the Government.
Lastimosa v. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497 [1995]
(prosecutors assistance)
FACTS:
Lastimosa was Asst. Provincial Prosecutor in
Cebu. She and the provincial prosecutor
refused to file a criminal charge for attempted
rape against Mayor Ilustrimo. The
Ombudsman, then, filed a case against them
for grave misconduct, insubordination, and
gross neglect of duty for refusal to file the
case against the mayor.
DOCTRINE:
In the exercise of his powers, the
Ombudsman is authorized to call for the
assistance of prosecutors, as provided in the
Ombudsman Act.
When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes
under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman, meaning, he is subject to the
power of the Ombudsman to direct, review,
approve, reverse and modify his decision.
Presidential v. Desierto 528 SCRA 20 [2007]
FACTS:
The PCGG filed a case against Disini et al for
giving president Marcos shares in VIMC and
TEC worth more than P65M. However,
despite an abundance of evidence, the case
against them was eventually dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the non-filing of an
information is primarily lodged with the full
discretion of the Ombudsman. He decides
whether an information should be filed or not.
However, when it is clear from the evidence,
that there should be reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
information should be filed. When this
happens, the Supreme Court can interfere
with the exercise of the Ombudsman of his
powers.
Fact-finding distinguished from Preliminary
Investigation
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, GR 108431, July 14,
2000

FACTS:
Raro was tasked to supervise the small town
lottery (STL), when he was then accused of
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally demanding
and receiving on four different occasions, the
amount totalling P116K from Luis Albano,
provincial manager of STL in Camarines Sur.
He claims that the preliminary investigation,
which was done by the NBI, was done
erroneously.
DOCTRINE:
In preliminary examination for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, the judge is not tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted during
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that
the judge should personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted
by the prosecution in determining probable
cause.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148468, Jan
28, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Serapio, former member of the
Board to Trustees and legal counsel of Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, was charged with
the crime of plunder along with former
President Estrada for allegedly receiving
millions from illegal activities.
He questioned the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, which denied his request for
bail, motion for reconsideration, and motion to
quash. He also claimed that the Ombusman
did not conduct a preliminary investigation.
DOCTRINE:
Preliminary investigation is not a constitutional
right, but is merely a right conferred by
statute.
The Court, however, does not interfere with
the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of
preliminary investigation. His findings are
essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts.
Section 14. Fiscal Autonomy
The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
Section 15. Right to Recover Properties
Unlawfully Acquired
The right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel
Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. SB, GR 157438,
October 18, 2004
The intent of Sec. 15 lies in the special
attendant circumstances and the primordial
state interests involved in cases of such
nature. However, in this case, the original
complaint filed on 1987 underwent
amendments and it was only by the
amendment in 1991 that it included Licaros.
While the rules allow amendments, it must be
made on just and reasonable grounds. It is
unwarranted if it involves facts already within
the knowledge of plaintiffs at the time of filing.
Be that as it may, due to the unprescribing
nature of ill-gotten wealth, it cannot be
dismissed by prescription.
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. OMB Desierto, GR
135715, 13 April 2011. (reiterating
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto, GR 130140;
provision applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases)
Sec. 15 applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to
criminal cases. Thus, prosecution of offenses
relating, or incident to, or involving ill-gotten
wealth in the said provision may be barred by
prescription
Section 16. Loan, Guaranty or Other Form of
Financial Accommodation
No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose
may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any
government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, Vice
 President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Disqualification due to permanent residence
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the belongs to HRET for HoR.
Constitutional Commissions, the OMB, or to
any firm or entity in which they have In this case, petitioners seeks to disqualify
controlling interest, during their tenure. Daza for being a Green Card holder who has
not renounced his permanent resident status.
However, the case became moot since by the
Section 17. Declaration of Assets and time SC decided, Dazas term is over.
Liabilities
A public officer or employee shall, upon Test test lorem ipsum dolor sit amet
assumption of office and as often thereafter as
may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces of general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in
the manner provided by law.

Section 18. Allegiance of Public Officers

Public officers and employees owe the State
and this Constitution allegiance at all times,
and any public officer or employee who seeks
to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.

Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 229 (1990)

To be qualified to run for an elective office, the
law requires that the candidate holding green
card status must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country.

In this case, Respondent Merito Miguel,

elected as Mayor of Bolinao, was holding a
green card. Petitioners moved for his
disqualification under such basis, and Miguel
said the Green Card was just for convenience
and his permanent residence is at Bolinao.
COMELEC even agreed with him.

SC held (see doctrine), and that a Green Card

is proof that the holder is a permanent
resident of US.

Sampayan v. Daza 213 SCRA 807 [1992]