EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRESIDENTS POWER TO EXTEND PARDON

1. ARTICLE IX-C Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
2. ARTICLE VII Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
3. Cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction.

ROMULO v YNIGUEZ

Facts

Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for
the impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment. Said resolution
and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government (CJHRGG). The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to
warrant its further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the charges contained in
the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of RN
644 and the verified complaintattached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The present
petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power
to the Batasan to determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power to approve of
deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644
and the impeachment complaint attached thereto be declared null and void. It is the
petitioners contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional because they amend Sec.
3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the amendatory process provided in the
Constitution. Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide whether to impeach or
not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a collegiate body and not by a small body of the Batasan.
They also content that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order
that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of
all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment,
the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings.

Issue:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the Archives and report out the
resolution and complaint for impeachment?

2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled from the
Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint?

3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional?

Held:

No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for the recall from the Archives of RN
644 and the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing said
complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that no official shall be convicted without the
concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the
Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically impossible the required vote
for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the members. It would serve no purpose to proceedany further when it is
obvious that the require 2/3 vote forconviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the impeachment
proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and
complaint for impeachment as in the dismissal of Mitras motion in the case makes irrelevant under what
authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the
impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of the powers vested upon it by
the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct
the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the
complaint and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to proceed with the
impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are constitutional. The
Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure
to govern impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in impeachment cases providing for
the dismissal of an impeachment complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when
sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or requiring
majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973 Consti. Injunction cannot lie to
restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules (aside from the fact that the question
involved is a political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained had already been
consummated.

PROCEDURE OF IMPEACHMENT

ARTICLE XI SECTION 3

1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.

MA. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ VS HR COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

Facts: Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner) facing impeachment complaints because of
charges of the office have alleged underperformance and failure to act on several cases during the presidency
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Impeachment complaint was filed by;

Baraquel group: Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao upon
the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello on july 22, 2010. A day after
the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte,
Jr. who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business

Reyes group: Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand
Gaite and James Terry Ridon with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier
Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus
on August 3, 2010. The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who,
by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business

Issue: WON 2 impeachment complaints in the period of 1 year is valid?

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

Held: the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of
public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep.
Tupas stated that [c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may
come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for
purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we
need to consolidate. Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely contemplated.

FRANCISCO VS DE VENECIA

Facts: Estrada filed an impeachment complaint on June 2, 2003 against CJ Davide and 7 associate justices
for betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.The House Committee ofn Justice dismissed it after 4
months and 3 weeks.
 Teaodoro and Fuentebella filed a subsequent impeachment complaint on July 22, 2003. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue: Petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

ART XI section (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.

Held: The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

The meaning of the word INITIATE

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Section 16. Impeachment

Impeachment. Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files a
verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files
a verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable
officer, impeachment
proceedings against such
official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the
case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
 complaint and/or resolution,
as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by
at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT

Section 17. Bar Against

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.
Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of one
(1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as
provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same
official.(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

DEGREE OF LOYALTY OF GOVT. EMPLOYEES

LIM-ARCE VS ARCE

Facts: Conchita Lim Arce (Petitioner) is the wife of Deputy Sheriff Alejandro Arce. Lim-Arce found
malicious letters of Carmen Barbasa, an assistant at the court Library of Leyte, who is allegedly having an
illicit relation with Conchitas husband.

Conchita was hospitalized because of the affair and during those times Alejandro allegedly maltreated their
children.

Conchita filed a case against her husband but the case was found to be moot and academic as Alejandro
already filed for an early retirement and can no longer be dismissed from service.
However Barbasa was dismissed from service for immorality as it was considered as a disgraceful conduct
and is a ground for dismissal.

The Sandigang Bayan

MANDATE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. (Art. XIII), 1973 Constitution.

SEC. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. (Art. XI), 1987 Constitution.

The Tanod Bayan

The 1973 Constitution (Sections 5 and 6, Article XIII) provided for the establishment of a special court
known as the Sandiganbayan and an Office of the Ombudsman known as the Tanodbayan. Presidential
Decree Nos. 1486 and 1487 created the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan, respectively, on June 11, 1978.
Subsequent amendments were made to both decrees.

The Tanodbayan shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in appropriate cases,
file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases before the proper court or body. On the other hand,
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned
or controlled corporations.

NUNEZ VS SB

Facts: Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He
was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of
Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses
of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection,
because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise
was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there
is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while
all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two
appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be
concerned.

Held: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court
that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption.
The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January
17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must
be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing
that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

MANGUBAT VS SB

Facts: Mangubat was charged for six (6) suits for estafa complexed with falsification of public and
commercial documents.

Issue: Mangubat assails the constitutionality of the law creating the Sandiganbayan contending that the same
violates his rights under the equal protection, due process and ex-post facto clauses of the Constitution.

Held: Petitioner's aforesaid contention is devoid of merit. These are the same legal issues raised in the case
of Nuez vs. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433, which was the first case to
put to the most severe test the constitutionality of the decree creating the Sandiganbayan. Speaking thru
former Chief Justice Fernando, this Court held that the decree creating the Sandiganbayan is constitutional
and it does not violate the equal protection, due process and ex-post facto clauses of the Constitution. This
doctrine was reiteratde in the cases of Calubaquib vs. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-54272-73, September 30, 1982, 177
SCRA 493; De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337; Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659; Bayot v.
Sandiganbayan, 126 SCRA 383; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.

GABISON VS DELOS ANGELES

Facts: Sometime between March 1 to April 4, 1979, the Tanodbayan filed with the respondent
Sandiganbayan one hundred twenty-six (126) cases charging certain public officials/employees of Region VII
of the Ministry of Public Highways and the Danao City Highway Engineering District, including four private
contractors/suppliers of road constructing materials, with the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and
commercial documents. Two of the said private contractors/suppliers charged were Erasmo Gabison and
Juliana de los Angeles, petitioners herein. Out of the 126 cases, Gabison was charged in thirty-seven (37) of
them, while de los Angeles was charged in nineteen (19).

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan was validly created and constituted; (2) whether PD 1606 which amended
PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan, partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law and violates the rights of
the accused to due process and equal protection of the law.
Held: The aforesaid legal issues have been set at rest in the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433,
which was the first case contesting the constitutionality of the decree creating the Sandiganbayan. In said
cases, we ruled that PD 1606 as amended, is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection, due
process and ex post factoclauses of the Constitution. This ruling was reiterated in the cases of Calubaquib vs.
Sandiganbayan, 117 SCRA 493; De Guzman vs. People, 119 SCRA 337; Rodriguez vs. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA
659; Alviar vs. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63, and recently in Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 52872-52997,
promulgated on January 30, 1987.

ZALDEVAR VS GONZALES

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority
of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the
petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from
investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court;
that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to
explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising
his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the
Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

Held: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices
of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect
for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the
Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties
of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the
judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than
that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at
bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached
him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,9 the Court held that it is the Ombudsman and no other who has the right to
conduct preliminary investigations and direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan. The
prosecution may be undertaken by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, under the supervision and control of
the Ombudsman.

BAGASO VS SB

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

DE JESUS VS PEOPLE

Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo defeated candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a
complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the
1978 Election Code.

Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors,
conducted an investigation.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense

Issue: Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed
by a public officer in relation to his office the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance
[now the regional trial court] or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan?

Held: The Commission on Elections and the Regional Trial Courts, and not the Sandiganbayan have
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office.

It is noted that while Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4 of
PD No. 1606 speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office. Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does.

PD 1606 should be understood to refer to offenses other than election offenses committed by public officers
in relation to their office.
The grant to the COMELEC of the power. among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without
compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to
ensure the free, and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result i ii the frustration of the true
will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.

QUIMPO VS TANOD BAYAN

Facts: Corporation X allege that they are a private corporation because they are covered by the Labor Code
and other labor laws and not by the civil service laws. Its operation is profit-oriented, but it is also funded by
the government.

Issue: Whether or not Corp. X is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman?

Held: Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are within the jurisdiction of the
Tanodbayan/Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan. While Corp. X was originally created as a private corporation,
it has since been acquired and funded by the Government to perform functions related to government
programs and policies.

It should make no substantial difference that it was not originally created as a government-owned or
controlled corporation. What is decisive is that it has since acquired by the Government to perform functions
related to government programs and policies on oil.

INTING VS TANOD BAYAN

Facts:

1. Inting filed complaints for perjury at the City Fiscal of Davaos office, against Angelina S. Salcedo (in
latters personal data sheets, she indicated that she completed the 1- year Secretarial Science course at USC in
Cebu although she never enrolled in, and neither did she complete the course) Salcedo is an appurtenant of
the judicial staff of the City Court of Davao.

2. City Fiscal of Davao thru Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte conducted preliminary investigation

3. found prima facie case for perjury and filed 3 separate counts of perjury under article 183 of RPC

4.Salcedo interposed appeal to the ministry of Justice.

5.Ministry of Justice forwarded records to Tanodbayan, pursuant to Section 10 (f) of the PD No. 1630, which
vests on the latter the power to file and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office.

6.Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta reversed decision of City Fiscal.

7.directed city fiscal to move for dismissal of the 3 criminal cases for perjury against Salcedo.

Issue: WON Tanodbayan has jurisdiction and authority to review and nullify the resolutions of the City of
Davao.

Held: Yes

1. Tanodbayan has authority to file and prosecute Salcedos case even if it does not involve graft and corrupt
offices because it falls under such other offenses covered by section 10 (f) of PD 1630

2. Act of perjury was in relation to Salcedos office. Section 18 of PD 1630 gives Tanodbayan authority to
conduct investigations and file case for such occurrence.

3.Tanodbayan therefore had authority to nullify and review resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao as the case
involved the actions of a government official related to his office.

PROSECUTION, INVESTIGATION, FILING OF INFO AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS

(1) The Ombudsman has exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations, file and prosecute
criminal cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan .

The Office of the Ombudsman has the sole power to 'investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."' 6 The Special Prosecutor, "an organic
component of the office of the Ombudsman ** under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman,7 has the power
to conduct preliminary investigation, file and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The Ombudsman may investigate criminal cases involving public officials regardless of whether the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts. He may, however, not directly file
informations with the regular courts. He must refer the result of his preliminary investigation to the proper
city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor for the filing of the proper information with the regular
courts.

CORPUZ VS TANODBAYAN

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

DISQUALIFICATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

MINOR VS AGBU
Facts: George M. Minor and four other members of the Board of Directors of the Zamboanga del Sur
Electric Cooperative filed a case against respondent judges are charged with dishonesty, breach of trust and
gross misconduct.

The complainants pray that the respondent judges be ordered (a) to desist from acting and sitting as directors
of ZAMSURECO, (b) to restitute or refund to the cooperative all financial emoluments availed of, received
and actually enjoyed as such Directors, (c) for having committed dishonesty, breach of trust and misconduct
as members of the bench and Bar, that they be subjected to grave disciplinary action if not outright dismissal
from the service as judges and disbarment as attorneys, as well as for such administrative sanctions as the law
may warrant

Court by resolution dated January 8, 1987 directed MTC Judges Delfin Agbu and Loreto Quinto to tender
their resignations immediately from their positions or suffer the consequences, considering that their acting
and sitting as such will constitute an interference in the expeditious performance of their judicial functions.

Judges and personnel of the Judiciary are not explicitly disqualified by P.D. 269 to become members or
Directors of Electric Cooperatives. However, We have resolved and adopted in our resolution dated May 29,
1980 5 to enjoin judges from acting as directors of an electric cooperative on the ground that their duties and
function as such will prejudice and interfere with the expeditious and proper administration of justice. This
policy adopted by the Court enjoining judges from participating in the affairs of electric cooperatives stands
and must be complied with.

This policy was adopted by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof to ensure impartial, expeditious and proper
administration of justice

MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING VS TAGLE

Facts: GSIS owned a parcel of land with a building and printing equipment in Paco, Manila. It was sold to
Maharlika in a Conditional Contract of Sale with the stipulation that if Maharlika failed to pay
monthly installmentsin 90 days, the GSIS would automatically cancel the contract. Because Maharlika failed
to pay several monthly installments, GSIS demanded that Maharlika vacate the premises. Even though
Maharlika refused to do so, the GSIS published an advertisement inviting the public to bid in a public
auction. A day before the scheduled bidding, Adolfo Calica, the President of Maharlika, gave the GSIS head
office 2 checks worth 11,000 and a proposal for a compromise agreement. The GSIS General Manager
Roman Cruz gave a not to Maharlika saying Hold Bidding. Discuss with me. However, the public bidding
took place as scheduled and the property was subsequently awarded to Luz Tagle, the wife of the GSIS
Retirement Division Chief. Maharlika demanded that the sale be considered null and void, as Mrs. Tagle
should have been disqualified from bidding for the GSIS property. RTC and CA both ruled that the Tagles
were entitled to the property and Maharlika should vacate the premises.

Issue: Whether or not Tagle are entitled to the property ?

Held: NO. The sale to them was against public policy. First of all, the GSIS head office was stopped from
claiming that they did not give the impression to Maharlika that they were accepting the proposal for a
compromise agreement. The act of the general manager is binding on GSIS. Second, Article 1491 (4) of the
CC provides that public officers and employees are prohibited from purchasing the propertyof the state or
any GOCC or institution, the administration of which has been entrusted to them cannot purchase, even at
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another. The SC held that as an
employee of the GSIS, Edilberto Tagle and his wife are disqualified from bidding on the propertybelonging
to the GSIS because it gives the impression that there was politics involved in the sale. It is not necessary that
actual fraud be shown, for a contract which tends to injure the public service is void although the parties
entered into it honestly and proceeded under it in good faith.

POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO DISMISS OR SUSPEND PUBLIC OFFICIALS

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases (Sec. 15(1) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec. 13(1),
Article XI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties (Sec. 15(2) R.A. No.
6770; Sec 13(2) Article XI, 1987 Constitution);

3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 or this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer (Sec. 15(3)
R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(3), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);

4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action (Sec. 15(4)
R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec. 13(4), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);

5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents (Sec. 15(5), R.A.
No.6770; see also Sec. 13(5), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);
 6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and
(4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due determine what cases may not be made
public: Provided further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair, and
true (Sec 15(6) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(6), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);

7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards
of ethics and efficiency (Sec 15(7) R.A. No. 6770; see also Sec 13(7), Article XI, 1987 Constitution);

8. Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or
inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records (Sec 15(8),
R.A. No. 6770);

9. Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with
the same penalties provided therein (Sec 15(9), R.A. No. 6770);

10. Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure
the effective exercise of performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter
provided (Sec 15(10), R.A. No. 6770);

11. Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein (Sec 15(11), R.A.
No. 6770);

12. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law (Sec 13(7), Article XI, 1987 Constitution; see also Sec. 18, R.A. No.
6770);

BONCALON VS OMBUDSMAN

Facts

On November 25, 1997, Loida C. Arabelo, the State Auditor II of Bago City, Negros Occidental, conducted
an audit on the cash accounts of Boncalon, a Cashier IV at Bago City Treasurers Office. The audit revealed a
cash shortage of P1,023,829.56. The state auditor also discovered, upon verification from the depository
bank, that the entry in Boncalons cashbook pertaining to the deposit of P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997
was false. Deposits totaling said amount were made only on November 25, 1997 and December 22, 1997, in
the amounts of P200,000.00 and P819,535.21, respectively. In view of the audit findings, Boncalon was
administratively charged with dishonesty before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).

Issue
Is the Ombudsman limited only to the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee?

Ruling

Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of an erring public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, within the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the
1987Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic Act No. 6770. While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that
the Ombudsman has the power to recommend, removal, suspension, demotion of government officials and
employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21of RA 6770. The word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative power.
Section 21 of RA 6770 states that, the power of disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the Government, except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and the Judiciary vests in the
ombudsman. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings
the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at
the discretion of the ombudsman.

LEDESMA VS CA

Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora
M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A.
Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the complaint. Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor
Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D.
No. 911. The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor
to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. 5 Accordingly, a
"Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before
the court a quo. 6 On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and deferred petitioner's
arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review. 7 Without the consent or approval of the
trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9,
1992 and to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial

Issue : WON the letter is libelous

Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was written
to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and
against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center Petitioner's
letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of
professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart
Center. It is a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's
letter was a private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her intention was
not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior.
The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable
motive exists; and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to
allege the existence of malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July
27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a
countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioner's administrative action against him

OMBUDSMAN VS CA

FACTS:

Pua, a Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Cebu, filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas, alleging thatVillamor, Municipal Mayor; Bebelia C. Bontia (Bontia), Municipal Treasurer; and
respondent Dinah C. Barriga (Barriga), Municipal Accountant, all public officials of Carmen, Cebu, entered
into several irregular and anomalous transactions in their official capacity. These transactions pertained to the
handling of the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation
Project. Villamor and Barriga denied Pua's allegations.

Subsequently, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found Barriga guilty of misconduct and she was
suspended from service for 6 months. The case had become moot and academic with respect
to Villamor and Bontia because Villamor was no longer the incumbent mayor of Carmen, Cebu
and Bontia had already been dismissed from government service.

Upon review, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman modified the decision and found Barriga guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on her the penalty of suspension for one
year. The motion for reconsideration was denied and the petition for review with the Court of Appeals was
denied for lack of merit.

The Office of the Ombudsman then directed the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu to implement the
decision. Barriga filed a petition for review with the CA but it was denied. The case went up to the Supreme
Court which denied the petition. The motion for reconsideration and a second motion for reconsideration
were also denied.

The Office of the Ombudsman advised the mayor again to implement the decision. Barriga then requested
that the implementation of the penalty of one-year suspension be held in abeyance pending the issuance of
the entry of judgment. This was denied. WhileBarriga's petition for review was with the CA, the Supreme
Court already issued the entry of judgment and Barriga's suspension from service was implemented by the
mayor. Meanwhile, Barriga's earlier appeal to the CA was dismissed but upon motion for reconsideration, the
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman were declared null and void. The CA explained that the acts of
petitioner went beyond mere recommendation but rather imposed upon the mayor to implement the order of
suspension which runcounter to its authority. The appellate court said that the immediate implementation of
the Office of the Ombdusmans order was premature pending resolution of the appeal. Since Republic Act
No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 gives parties the right to appeal then such right also generally
carries with it the right to stay these decisions pending appeal. Thus, the CA concluded that the acts of
petitioner cannot be permitted nor tolerated.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the orders of the Office of the Ombudsman to
the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu for the immediate implementation of the penalty of suspension from service of respondent
Barriga even though the case was pending on appeal.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Administrative Law; Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman submits that it is possessed with jurisdiction to entertain an administrative
complaint against a public official and if found guilty, has the authority to impose a penalty and implement
the decision. It explains that the implementation of administrative sanctions over erring public officials is not
merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. It is absurd for the
Ombudsman to only recommend a penalty to a head of office, in this case, a municipal mayor, since political
independence is the element that provides integrity to its quasi-judicial findings. Petitioner adds that a
municipal mayor has no authority to adopt or reject petitioners decision, as if in review, where no such
recourse is provided by law.

Also, according to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17, when a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the
Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, just like in the present case, an
appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and
the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course.

Barriga appealed to the CA the decision to suspend her for one year and it then reached the Supreme Court,
which denied the appeal. The decision became final on October 28, 2004. But in order to delay the
implementation Barriga once again elevated the case to the CA, which then ruled in her favor by nullifying
the Ombudsman's order for implementation.
The CA is incorrect. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that
an appeal by a public official from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals and Macabulos, we held that decisions of
the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal in the CA.

BUENASEDA VS FLAVIER

In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Brigida
Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman
(then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then
DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order.
NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the
lawyers of Buenaseda et al.

Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a lawful
order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a
violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenasedas lawyers as he maintained that all the
Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on
Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter
alia the power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether or not a
Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.

HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the
Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation
thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the Constitution
contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.

Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It cannot
be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the
purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.
However, the lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in espousing their clients cause. The
language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession.
JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is perhaps one of the most often amended provision from the 1973
Constitution to RA 8249 of 1997. Before RA 8249, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was determined on the
basis of the penalty imposable on the offense charged. Then, it was amended such that regardless of the
penalty, so long as the offense charged was committed by a public officer, the Sandiganbayan was vested with
jurisdiction. Under RA 8249, to determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, lawyers must look
into two (2) criteria, namely:

The nature of the offense and The salary grade of the public official.

Thus, Sec.4 of RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original exclusive jurisdiction over:

I.) Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law);

II.) RA 1379 (Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Wealth);

III.) Crimes by public officers or employees embraced in Ch. II, Sec.2 Title VII, Bk. II of the RPC (Crimes
committed by Public Officers) namely:

a) Direct Bribery under Art. 210 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985;

b) Indirect Bribery under Art. 211 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985;

c) Qualified Bribery under Art. 211-A as amended by RA 7659, Dec. 13, 1993;

d) Corruption of public officials under Art. 212

where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Republic Act
No. 6758) specifically including:

a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial

treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;

b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other department heads;

c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank;
 e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of Provincial Director and those holding the rank
of Senior Superintendent or higher;

f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants; officials and the prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor ;

g) President, directors or trustees or managers of government owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations;

2) Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989;

3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;

4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provision of the
Constitution;

5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

IV.) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed in relation to their
office by the public officials and employees mentioned above;

V.) Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986

VI.) Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the
Supreme Court

VII.) Petitions for Quo Warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or that may be filed under EO 1, 2,
14 & 14- A

VIII.) OTHERS provided the accused belongs to SG 27 or higher:

a.) Violation of RA 6713 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

b.) Violation of RA 7080 THE PLUNDER LAW

c.) Violation of RA 7659 The Heinous Crime Law

d.) RA 9160 Violation of The Anti-Money Laundering Law when committed by a public officer

e.) PD 46 referred to as the gift-giving decree which makes it punishable for any official or employee to
receive directly or indirectly and for the private person to give or offer to give any gift, present or other
valuable thing on any occasion including Christmas, when such gift, present or valuable thing is given by
reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favors or the giver hopes or
expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or employee concerned in
the discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainment in honor of the official or employee or his immediate relatives.

f.) PD 749 which grants immunity from prosecution to any person who voluntarily gives information
about any violation of Art.210, 211 or 212 of the RPC, RA 3019, Sec.345 of the NIRC, Sec. 3604 of the
Customs and Tariff Code and other provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part
of the public officials concerned and other laws, rules and regulations penalizing graft, corruption and other
forms of official abuse and who willingly testifies against the public official or employee subject to certain
conditions.

It should be noted that private individuals can be sued in cases before the Sandiganbayan if they are alleged to
be in conspiracy with the public officer.

The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
RTC whether in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil cases falling within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but which were committed by public officers below
Salary Grade 27.

DUNCANO VS SB

Danilo was a Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with Salary Grade 26 when he was charged
with violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act 6713. An Information was thus filed
against him before the Sandiganbayan. Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, asserting that under Presidential Decree 1606 as amend by Section 4
(A) (1) of RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear a case because he is an official of
the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified
as below Salary Grade 27. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he qualification as to
Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director
and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term Regional Director and higher are separated
by the conjunction and, which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but
are conjoined together relating one to the other to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the
position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding that the position of Regional Director is one
of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It
was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has
jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those
officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Courts
pronouncements in Inding and Binay v. Sandiganbayan were cited.

The petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

The Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.

The Ruling:

We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.1 By
virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.2 The decree was later
amended by P.D. No. 1606,3 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 1294 P.D. No. 1860,5 and P.D. No.
18616.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article
XI thereof.7 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 148 and 14-a,9 and R.A. 7080,10 which expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 797511, R.A. No.
8249,12 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.13

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:

SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.

x x x

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1)
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in
Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.14 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers
only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15

That the phrase otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher qualifies regional director and higher is
apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353 and 844, which
eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned
to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of
regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain
with the Sandiganbayan.16 (Emphasis supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on
the larger fish and leave the small fry to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and
it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade 26 or
lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade 27 or higher and over other specific public
officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x17 (Emphasis supplied)

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases
involving the so-called big fishes in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry, which, in turn, helps the court decongest its
dockets.18

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.19 In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.20 The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.21 As ruled in Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying
to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those
officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper trial courts where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher. By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory
construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give
effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. 22
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,23 a department manager
of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),24 a student regent of the University of the
Philippines,25 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding
ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)26 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours
with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX,
Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26.27 It was opined:

Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position
of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.

We sustain petitioners contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade 27 or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II
with Salary Grade 26 under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed
for.28

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows
that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary
Grade 26.29

There is no merit in the OSPs allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that when a
warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond
on September 17, 2009. Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010, prior to the filing of the petition on April
30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18,
2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied
petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.