Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CORPORATION, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION , G.R. No. 166554, November 27, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
Facts:
On June 18, 2001, Security Guard Waldo Magtangob, upon instructions from
Senior Guard Bonifacio Aranas, apprehended petitioner in the act of taking
out from Rustans Supermarket a plastic bag. Upon examination, it was
discovered that the plastic bag contained 1.335 kilos of squid heads worth
P50.00. Petitioner was not able to show any receipt when confronted. Thus,
he was brought to the Security Office of respondent corporation for proper
endorsement to the Makati Headquarters of the Philippine National Police.
Subsequently, petitioner was brought to the Makati Police Criminal
Investigation Division where he was detained. Petitioner was later ordered
released pending further investigation.
Issues:
(2) Assuming that the answer is in the affirmative, is the penalty of dismissal
proper?
Held:
Necessarily then, the employer bears the burden of proof to show the basis
of the termination of the employee.
In the case at bar, respondent has discharged its onus of proving that
petitioner committed the crime charged.
We stress that the quantum of proof required for the application of the loss of
trust and confidence rule is not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is
sufficient that there must only be some basis for the loss of trust and
confidence or that there is reasonable ground to believe, if not to entertain
the moral conviction, that the employee concerned is responsible for the
misconduct and that his participation in the misconduct rendered him
absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence.
It is also of no moment that the criminal complaint for qualified theft against
petitioner was dismissed. It is well settled that the conviction of an employee
in a criminal case is not indispensable to the exercise of the employers
disciplinary authority.
2. NO. The penalty of dismissal is too harsh under the circumstances. The
free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its
purpose cannot be denied. The only condition is that the exercise of
management prerogatives should not be done in bad faith or with abuse of
discretion. Truly, while the employer has the inherent right to discipline,
including that of dismissing its employees, this prerogative is subject to the
regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.
We do not condone dishonesty. After all, honesty is the best policy. However,
punishment should be commensurate with the offense committed. The
supreme penalty of dismissal is the death penalty to the working man. Thus,
care should be exercised by employers in imposing dismissal to erring
employees. The penalty of dismissal should be availed of as a last resort.
SOLVIC INDUSTRIAL CORP. and ANTONIO C. TAM, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and DIOSDADO LAUZ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 125548. September 25, 1998] FIRST DIVISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Respondent on the other hand, averred that the complainant who was hired
in 1977 was actually terminated for cause. That the termination of
complainant arose from the incident that transpired on 17 January 1994 at
about 7:00 p.m. On said occasion, complainant upon seeing Foreman Carlos
Aberin confronted him and thereafter struck him in the shoulder beside the
neck with a bladed weapon in the process, inflicting bodily injury on him.
That several days after said incident, complainant did not report for work,
hence, was issued a memorandum of preventive suspension.
Correspondingly, Mr. Aberin executed an affidavit and submitted a medical
certificate.
Complainant on the other hand, submitted his letter of explanation denying
complicity in the acts imputed to him. Thereafter, a series of administrative
investigation was conducted where complainant refused to give any further
statement or explanation. Subsequently, he was served his letter of
termination dated 21 February 1994, which however, he refused to receive.
Relatedly, in a meeting/conference held with the union officers by Carlos
Aberin and Diosdado Lauz, complainant admitted to attempting to take the
life of Mr. Aberin and apologized for the same.
In reply, complainant countered that he never struck Mr. Aberin with a bladed
weapon, and that the incident was not job related, hence cannot serve as
basis for termination.
Respondents, on the other hand in reply, argued that complainant was given
his day in court as an investigation was conducted. Moreover, complainant in
the course of his meeting with Mr. Aberin and with the union officers,
admitted that he assaulted the latter and even apologized in exchange for
the withdrawal of the criminal case filed against him.
The NLRC found that the wrong imputed to the private respondent did not
merit the penalty of dismissal. Thus, ordering his reinstatement, but omitting
the award of back wages. It held that the imposition of the supreme penalty
of dismissal is not commensurate with the gravity of the offense he
committed.
Issue:
Held:
We agree with the NLRC that the acts of private respondent are not so
serious as to warrant the extreme penalty of dismissal. Private respondent
was accused of hitting the victim once with the blunt side of a bolo. Private
respondent could have attacked him with the blade of the weapon, and he
could have struck him several times. But he did not, thus negating any intent
on his part to inflict fatal injuries. In fact, the victim merely sustained a minor
abrasion and has since forgiven and reconciled with the private respondent.
If the party most aggrieved -- namely, the foreman -- has already forgiven
the private respondent, then petitioner cannot be more harsh and
condemning than the victim. Besides, no criminal or civil action has been
instituted against private respondent. Furthermore, in his twenty years of
service in the company, he has not been charged with any similar
misconduct.
Facts:
On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc.,
issued several Board Resolutions which states that all officers and employees
are subject to reshuffle of assignments. Moreover, this resolution does not
preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers and employees from the
branch office to the head office and vice-versa.
Pursuant to such Resolution, petitioner was one of the employees who were
reshuffled to a new assignment without changes in their compensation and
other benefits. He was assigned as an appraiser and later assigned as a
Clerk-Meralco Collection.
The new assignments were to be effective on May 1, 1999 without changes
in salary, allowances, and other benefits received by the aforementioned
employees. However, in a letter, petitioner wrote to the management about
such assignment. In his letter, he averred that his assignment is tantamount
to a demotion without any legal basis.
In its reply, the respondent informed petitioner that it was never the
intention of management to downgrade his position in the bank considering
that his due compensation as Bank Appraiser is maintained and no future
reduction was intended. The respondent also said that the conduct of
reshuffle is also a prerogative of bank management.
On June 7, 1999, petitioner applied for a leave of absence from work for ten
(10) days. On June 21, 1999, petitioner again submitted a letter asking for
another leave of absence for twenty days effective on the same date.
On June 24, 1999, while on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a
Complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation
pay and damages against the Rural Bank of Lucban and/or its president,
Alejo B. Daya.
The labor arbiter held that respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal. It also
ordered the reinstatement of the complainant to his former position without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter and held that there was no
bad faith or malice to the respondent bank for its implementation of its Board
Resolution directing the reshuffle of employees at its Tayabas branch to
positions other than those they were occupying.
After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought
before the CA. The CA held that there was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the NLRC in issuing its decision. It ruled thus that when
Mendoza was reshuffled to the position of clerk at the bank, he was not
demoted as there was no diminution of his salary benefits and rank. The
reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made the
basis of a finding of constructive dismissal. The fact that Mendoza was no
longer included in the bank's payroll for July 1 to 15, 1999 does not signify
that the bank has dismissed the former from its employ. Mendoza separated
himself from the bank's employ when, on June 24, 1999, while on leave, he
filed the illegal dismissal case against his employer for no apparent reason at
all. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Held:
"Like other rights, there are limits thereto. The managerial prerogative to
transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion,
bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right
should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised.
Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee;
nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries,
privileges and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this
burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to constructive
dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive
dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with
no option but to forego with his continued employment."
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. ALICIA LAPLANA, Hon. RICARDO ENCARNACION, and NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 76645 , July 23, 1991, FIRST DIVISION
NARVASA, J.
Facts:
Alicia Laplana was the cashier of the Baguio City Branch Office of the
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (hereafter, simply PT & T).
Sometime in March 1984, PT & T's treasurer, Mrs. Alicia A. Arogo, directed
Laplana to transfer to the company's branch office at Laoag City. Laplana
refused the reassignment and proposed instead that qualified clerks in the
Baguio Branch be trained for the purpose. She set out her reasons therefor in
her letter that she have already established Baguio City as her permanent
residence and that working in Laoag will involve additional expenses for her
part like her board and lodgingly, fare, and other miscellaneous expenses. As
a result, her salary alone will not be enough for her family.
On April 12, 1984, Mrs. Arogo reiterated her directive for Laplana's transfer
to the Laoag Branch, this time in the form of a written Memorandum,
informing Laplana that effective April 16, 1984, she will be reassigned to
Laoag branch assuming the same position of branch cashier and ordering her
to turn over your accountabilities such as PCF, undeposited collections, used
and unused official receipts, other accountable forms and files to Rose
Caysido who will be in charge of cashiering in Baguio.
Apparently Laplana was not allowed to resume her work as Cashier of the
Baguio Branch when April 16, 1984 came. She thereupon wrote again to Mrs.
Arogo advising that the directed transfer was unacceptable, reiterating the
reasons already given by her in her first letter. Subsequently, Laplana
received a telegram from Mrs. Arogo ordering her to report to Manila for a
ner job assignment but the same was refused by petitioner and asked that
she be retrenched instead.
On October 9, 1984, Laplana filed with the Labor Arbiters' Office at Baguio
City, thru the CLAO, a complaint against PT & T its Baguio Northwestern
Luzon Branch, Baguio City, and Paraluman Bautista, Area Manager. In her
complaint she alleged, as right of action, that when she insisted on her right
of refusing to be transferred, the Defendants made good its warning by
terminating her services on May 16, 1984 on alleged ground of
"retrenchment," although the truth is, she was forced to be terminated and
that there was no ground at all for the retrenchment; that the company's act
of transferring is not only without any valid ground but also arbitrary and
without any purpose but to harass and force her to eventually resign.
Issue:
Held:
In this case, the employee (Laplana) had to all intents and purposes resigned
from her position. She had unequivocally asked that she be considered
dismissed, herself suggesting the reason therefor retrenchment. When so
dismissed, she accepted separation pay. On the other hand, the employer
has not been shown to be acting otherwise than in good faith, and in the
legitimate pursuit of what it considered its best interests, in deciding to
transfer her to another office. There is no showing whatever that the
employer was transferring Laplana to another work place, not because she
would be more useful there, but merely as a subterfuge to rid itself of an
undesirable worker, or to penalize an employee for union activities. The
employer was moreover not unmindful of Laplana's initial plea for
reconsideration of the directive for her transfer to Laoag; in fact, in response
to that plea not to be moved to the Laoag Office, the employer opted instead
to transfer her to Manila, the main office, offering at the same time the
normal benefits attendant upon transfers from an office to another.
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that whether the banks penalty for his
refusal be Suspension or Dismissal it will all the more establish and fortify his
complaint now pending before the NLRC. In the same letter, he charged
Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer.
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its
management prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod
and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not
amount to insubordination. The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas
transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to
incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the other hand,
the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency
that would justify the transfer.
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida
without just cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer order was
unreasonable and unjustified, considering the family considerations
mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer as a demotion
since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem
branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted Galanida, an
assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran
branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not
transfer several junior accountants in Cebu.
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied.
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision
and Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not
warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a
regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively
a demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford
Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no
notice of termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank would issue a
notice of termination but there was no such notice.
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Held:
YES. The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the
ambit of the employers prerogatives. The employer exercises the
prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the
requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion
in rank or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and other privileges.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the
transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced
employee.
The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated
against Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer. Allied
Banks letter of 13 June 1994 showed that at least 14 accounting officers and
personnel from various branches, including Galanida, were transferred to
other branches. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter
explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment outside Cebu
because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. The person first in
line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu for more than ten
years, had already transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note
that none of the other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or
corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not
present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his salary,
benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied Bank assured Galanida that he
would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the transfer would
involve the same rank, duties and obligations.
GENUINE ICE COMPANY INC., Petitioner, - versus ALFONSO S.
MAGPANTAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 147790, June 27, 2006, FIRST DIVISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner countered that he was not illegally dismissed, since the dismissal
was based on a valid ground, i.e., he led an illegal strike at petitioners sister
company, Genuino Agro Industrial Development Corporation, which lasted
from November 18 to 22, 1995, resulting in big operation losses on the
latters part. Petitioner also maintained that respondents dismissal was
made after he was accorded due process.
Respondent replied, however, that assuming that he led such illegal strike,
he could not be liable therefore because it was done in petitioners sister
company which is a separate and distinct entity from petitioner.
Issue:
Held:
No.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in concluding that petitioner
had just cause for dismissing respondent, as his act of leading a strike at
petitioners company for four days, his absence from work during such time,
and his failure to perform his duties during such absence, make up a cause
for habitual neglect of duties, while his failure to comply with petitioners
order for him to transfer to the GMA, Cavite Plant constituted insubordination
or willful disobedience. The CA, however, differed with said conclusion and
found that respondents attitude has not been proved to be visited with any
wrongdoing, and that his four-day absence does not appear to be both gross
and habitual.
The Court sustains the CAs finding that respondents four-day absence does
not amount to a habitual neglect of duty; however, the Court finds that
respondent was validly dismissed on ground of willful disobedience or
insubordination.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
ETEU contended that the unjustified and malicious refusal of the company to
pay the subject bonuses was a clear violation of the economic provision of
the CBA and constitutes unfair labor practice (ULP). According to ETEU, such
refusal was nothing but a ploy to spite the union for bringing the matter of
delay in the payment of the subject bonuses to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). It prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees for the unfair labor practice allegedly
committed by the company.
The NLRC dismissed ETEUs complaint and held that ETPI could not be forced
to pay the union members the 14th, 15th and 16th month bonuses for the
year 2003 and the 14th month bonus for the year 2004 inasmuch as the
payment of these additional benefits was basically a management
prerogative, being an act of generosity and munificence on the part of the
company and contingent upon the realization of profits. The NLRC
pronounced that ETPI may not be obliged to pay these extra compensations
in view of the substantial decline in its financial condition. Likewise, the NLRC
found that ETPI was not guilty of the ULP charge elaborating that no
sufficient and substantial evidence was adduced to attribute malice to the
company for its refusal to pay the subject bonuses.
Respondent ETEU moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by
the NLRC.
Aggrieved, ETEU filed a petition for certiorari before the CA ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the NLRC for disregarding its evidence which allegedly
would prove that the subject bonuses were part of the union members
wages, salaries or compensations.
The CA declared that the Side Agreements of the 1998 and 2001 CBA
created a contractual obligation on ETPI to confer the subject bonuses to its
employees without qualification or condition. It also found that the grant of
said bonuses has already ripened into a company practice and their denial
would amount to diminution of the employees benefits.
Issue:
1. Whether the members of ETEU are entitled to the payment of 14th, 15th
and 16th month bonuses for the year 2003 and 14th month bonus for year
2004.
Held:
2. YES. A reading of the CBA provision reveals that the same provides for the
giving of 14th, 15th and 16th month bonuses without qualification. The
wording of the provision does not allow any other interpretation. There were
no conditions specified in the CBA Side Agreements for the grant of the
benefits contrary to the claim of ETPI that the same is justified only when
there are profits earned by the company. Terse and clear, the said provision
does not state that the subject bonuses shall be made to depend on the
ETPIs financial standing or that their payment was contingent upon the
realization of profits. Neither does it state that if the company derives no
profits, no bonuses are to be given to the employees. In fine, the payment of
these bonuses was not related to the profitability of business operations.
The records are also bereft of any showing that the ETPI made it clear before
or during the execution of the Side Agreements that the bonuses shall be
subject to any condition. Indeed, if ETPI and ETEU intended that the subject
bonuses would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention
should have been expressly declared in the Side Agreements or the bonus
provision should have been deleted altogether. In the absence of any proof
that ETPIs consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed
that it entered into the Side Agreements voluntarily, that it had full
knowledge of the contents thereof and that it was aware of its commitment
under the contract.
Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA Side Agreements, the grant of
14th, 15th and 16th month bonuses has become more than just an act of
generosity on the part of ETPI but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.
Moreover, the continuous conferment of bonuses by ETPI to the union
members from 1998 to 2002 by virtue of the Side Agreements evidently
negates its argument that the giving of the subject bonuses is a
management prerogative.
The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the
employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the
constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their
welfare and to afford labor full protection.
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION- PTGWO, Petitioner,
-versus-
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 167760, March 7, 2007, FIRST DIVISION
GARCIA, J.:
Facts:
Issues:
Whether or not the act of the company is changing the work schedule of the
employees is part of management prerogative.
Held:
Facts:
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his
District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with
Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in
September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy
gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he
and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs,
although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible
because he was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against
entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He
explained that Astra, Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca,
another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy
package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation from her company,
the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same time, they
would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem.
In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division,
thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos
"least-movement-possible" policy.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the
matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer
order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his
salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product
conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery
level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered
Tecson a separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year of service,
or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000,
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision
declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
assailing the NCMB Decision.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Review on the ground that the
NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that
Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships
with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision,
but the motion was denied by the appellate court.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from
competitor companies is valid;
Held:
YES. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled
that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with
an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Facts:
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in
the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991
and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later,
its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private
respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that
memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not
accepting married women for employment.
In her reply letter, private respondent stated that she was not aware of
PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was
dismissed from the company which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost
of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
The Labor Arbiter declared that private respondent, who had already gained
the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her
reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA,
was correspondingly ordered.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and it ruled that private respondent had
indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her
employer, PT & T.
Issue:
Whether the act of the petitioner constituted a marital discrimination.
Held:
Facts:
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma
Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27,
1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy.
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard
Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should
they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga , also a co-worker.
Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but
she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal to the
NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC.
They appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC decision
declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and ordering
private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal
until actual reinstatement;
Issue:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the
same company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Held:
These policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from
the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the
same company. We note that two types of employment policies involve
spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company
(no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-
nepotism employment policies).
Facts:
The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for an indefinite time to
work in the latter's industrial enterprises involving the manufacture of
umbrellas in the city of Manila. The defendant admitted that he discharged
the plaintiff without giving him the "written advice of six months in advance"
as provided in the contract, but alleged that the discharge was lawful on
account of absence, unfaithfulness, and disobedience of orders. The
defendant sought affirmative relief for a further alleged breach of the
contract by the plaintiff after his discharge.
The plaintiff admits that he entered the employment of Mr. Whalen in the
Philippine Islands as a foreman on some construction work for a cement
factory within a few days after his discharge and without the consent, either
written or verbal, of the defendant. This work was entirely different and
disassociated from that engaged in by the defendant Gsell, yet this act of the
plaintiff was a technical violation of the above-quoted provisions of the
contract wherein he expressly agreed and obligated himself "not to enter
into the employment of any enterprise in the Philippine Islands, whatever,
save and except after obtaining special written permission therefor" from the
defendant.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the contract are valid and binding upon the
plaintiff.
Held:
No.
The contract under consideration, tested by the law, rules and principlest
forth is clearly one in undue or unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore
against public policy. It is limited as to time and space but not as to trade. It
is not necessary for the protection of the defendant, as this is provided for in
another part of the clause. It would force the plaintiff to leave the Philippine
Islands in order to obtain a livelihood in case the defendant declined to give
him the written permission to work elsewhere in this country.
The said contract was acknowledge before a notary on the same day of its
execution.
The plaintiff alleges that the provisions and conditions contained in the third
paragraph of said contract constitute an illegal and unreasonable restriction
upon his liberty to contract, are contrary to public policy, and are
unnecessary in order to constitute a just and reasonable protection to the
defendant; and asked that the same be declared null and void and of no
effect. The defendant interposed a general and special defense. In his special
defense he alleges "that during the time the plaintiff was in the defendant's
employ he obtained knowledge of his trade and professional secrets and
came to know and became acquainted and established friendly relations with
his customers so that to now annul the contract and permit plaintiff to
establish a competing drugstore in the town of Legaspi, as plaintiff has
announced his intention to do, would be extremely prejudicial to defendant's
interest."
Issue:
Facts:
Petitioner had been working for Solidbank Corporation since July 1, 1977. He
was initially employed as an Audit Clerk, then as Credit Investigator, Senior
Clerk, Assistant Accountant, and Assistant Manager. Prior to his retirement,
he became the Manager of the Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of
the Consumers Banking Group.
Deciding to devote his time and attention to his poultry business in Cavite,
Rivera applied for retirement under the SRP. Solidbank approved the
application and Rivera was entitled to receive the net amount of
P963,619.28. Rivera received the amount and confirmed his separation from
Solidbank on February 25, 1995.
When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given
period, Solidbank filed a complaint for Sum of Money with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Attachment before the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Held:
Yes.
Facts:
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent
Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time
in November 1998, a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a
letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual
harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending
investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT placed petitioner under a 30-
day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee
believed that petitioners continued stay during the investigation affects his
performance as a faculty member, as well as the students learning; and that
the suspension will allow petitioner to prepare himself for the investigation
and will prevent his influences to other members of the community.
Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the
Regional Trial Court in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on
May 21, 1999 when the parties entered into a compromise agreement
wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and
regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-
SexualHarassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings
and conduct anew an investigation on the charges againstpetitioner.
Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules and
regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and
decide the administrative case against him.
Issue:
Held:
On May 16, 1995, it hired Candelaria Roco as helper, at its chicken dressing
plant on a probationary basis.
With respect to Candelaria Roco, there is no dispute that she was employed
on probationary basis. She was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were
terminated on November 15, 1995 due to poor work performance. She did
not measure up to the work standards on the dressing of chicken. The Labor
Arbiter sustained CALS in terminating her employment. The NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiters ruling.
The Court of Appeals did not disagree with the NLRCs finding that Candelaria
was dismissed because she did not qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the company to
her at the time of her employment.
However, the Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC ruling on the ground that
at the time Candelarias services were terminated, she had attained the
status of a regular employee as the termination on November 15, 1995 was
effected four (4) days after the 6-month probationary period had expired,
hence, she is entitled to security of tenure in accordance with Article 281 of
the Labor Code.
Issue:
Held:
In Cebu Royal v. Deputy Minister of Labor, our computation of the 6-month
probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the
same calendar date of the 6th month.
Facts:
The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during the petitioners
probationary period, he showed poor performance on his assigned tasks, was
late couple of times and violated the companys rule. Thus, the petitioner
was terminated and his application to become a regular employment was
disapproved. The respondent also insisted that the removal of the petitioner
from office was within the probationary period.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal
of the petitioner was done before his regularization because the 6- month
probationary period, counting from May 20, 1996 shall end on November 20,
1996. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The status of the petitioner at the
time of his termination was still probationary. His dismissal on November 20,
1996 was within the 6- month probationary period. Article 13 of the Civil
Code provides that when the law speaks of years, months, and days and
nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, months of 30 days,
days of 24 hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is
composed of 30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed of
180 days. And the computation of the 6- month period is reckoned from the
date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month
following. Since, the number of days of a particular month is irrelevant,
petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of his dismissal.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
FACTS
ISSUE:
The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a
probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The
Court stresses the existence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor
Code which specifies that the employer must inform the employee of the
standards they were to meet in order to be granted regularization and that
such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the
employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship agreement.
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
It must be noted that the reading of exhaust air balancing is under the
category of heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) which are within
the realm of field of work of mechanical engineers. Being an electrical
engineer, petitioner obviously has no knowledge of the procedure and the
equipment used by mechanical engineers in the conduct of the reading of
the exhaust air balancing.
After the Centigrade personnel finished their job, they submitted their report
to Agustin. Petitioners allege that Agustin accepted and signed the report,
without verifying its correctness. Engineer Abad later checked the work of
the Centigrade employees only to find out that four rooms in the fifth floor
and five rooms in the sixth floor were incorrectly done. In contrast, Agustin
states that after the report was handed to him, he took the same to Engr.
Abad, who he claims was responsible for evaluating and confirming the said
report. Allegedly, instead of signing it himself, Engr. Abad directed
respondent to sign it, giving the reason that Agustin was present when the
reading was conducted. Respondent Agustin complied, but he now points out
that his signature was not accompanied by any qualification that he
accepted the report on behalf of Aberdeen. He claims that he signed merely
to evidence that he received a copy of the report.
The parties also differ on the occurrences two days after the signing of the
report or on January 15, 1997. According to petitioners, Aberdeen
management confronted Agustin with his failure to check the job and asked
him to explain his side. Agustin allegedly ignored management and left the
company, which made it impossible for Aberdeen to transmit any further
notice to him.
On January 15, 1997 or two days after the report was submitted by
Centigrade Industries, petitioner [herein respondent] was summarily
dismissed. In the afternoon of that day, he received a telephone call from
the personnel office of respondent company ordering him to report to that
office after his tour of duty. At about seven p.m. at the personnel office, Ms.
Lani Carlos of the Personnel Department, informed him that Aberdeen Court
is terminating his services as electrical engineer. Petitioner was
flabbergasted. Ms. Carlos then informed him that he could get his two (2)
weeks salary in the amount of P4,000, more or less, on the condition that he
will sign some documents which provides that the company has no more
liability and that he is voluntarily resigning from Aberdeen Court. Aware of
his rights, petitioner did not sign the offered documents. He was then
hurriedly led to the door by Ms. Carlos.
ISSUE:
Ruling:
It can be gleaned from Article 281 of the Labor Code that there are two
grounds to legally terminate a probationary employee. It may be done either:
a) for a just cause or b) when employee fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the start of the employment.
In Servidad v. NLRC et al., where effectively the probationary period was for
one year, the Court stated:
If the nature of the job did actually necessitate at least one year for the
employee to acquire the requisite training and experience, still, the same
could not be a valid probationary employment as it falls short of the
requirement of Article 281 of the Labor Code. It was not brought to light that
the petitioner was duly informed at the start of his employment, of the
reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular employee.
The rudiments of due process demand that an employee should be apprised
beforehand of the conditions of his employment and the basis for his
advancement.
It bears stressing that even if technically the reading of air exhaust balancing
is not within the realm of expertise of the complainant, still it ought not to be
missed that prudence and due diligence imposed upon him not to readily
accept the report handed to him by the workers of Centigrade Industries.
Required of the complainant was that he himself proceed to the work area,
inquire from the workers as to any difficulties encountered, problems fixed
and otherwise observe for himself the progress and/or condition/quality of
the work performed.
As it is, We find it hard to believe that complainant would just have been
made to sign the report to signify his presence. By saying so, complainant is
inadvertently degrading himself from an electrical engineer to a mere
watchdog. It is in this regard that We concur with the respondents that by
his omission, lack of concern and grasp of basic knowledge and common
sense, complainant has shown himself to be undeserving of continued
employment from probationary employee to regular employee.
[G.R. No. 145417. December 11, 2003]
FACTS:
On May 27, 1996, petitioner Florencio M. de la Cruz, Jr. was hired by private
respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation (Shemberg) as senior sales
manager with a monthly salary of P40,500. Shemberg was engaged in the
business of manufacturing, trading, distributing and importing various
consumer products. The position of senior sales manager was then newly
created in line with Shembergs objective of product positioning in the
consumer market. Its duties included, among others, the supervision and
control of the sales force of the company. The senior sales manager was also
vested with some discretion to decide on matters within the scope of his
functions, including the appointment of district sales representatives and the
reshuffling of salesmen to achieve sales targets.
ISSUES:
RULING:
FACTS:
Marin used to work for Saudia Airlines as a ticketing agent. When he applied
for employment as a Reservation Officer in Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
(Cathay), he was interviewed by the following: Senior Supervisor Nenita
Montallana, Reservations Manager Elizabeth Leviste, Staff and Administrative
Supervisor M.A. Canizares, and Country Manager (Philippines) Peter W.
Foster.
On October 15, 1992, Marin filed a complaint6 for illegal dismissal against
Cathay and Foster before the NLRC. The complaint was later amended to
include claims for 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marin is a probationary employee
RULING
In Secon Philippines, Ltd. v. NLRC, this Court held that the probationary
employment of an employee may be terminated when he fails to qualify as
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known to
him by his employer at the time of employment and after due process; in
Manlimos v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
constitutional protection on the probationary employee ends upon the
expiration of the period provided for in the probationary contract of
employment. Thus, a probationary employee remains secure in his or her
employment during the time that the employment contract remains in effect,
but the moment the probationary employment period expires, the employee
can no longer invoke the constitutional protection. Thereafter, the parties are
free to renew the contract or not; or for the employer to extend to such
employee a regular or permanent employment. If the employee is not given
a permanent or regular employment contract on account of his
unsatisfactory work performance, it cannot be said that he was illegally
dismissed. In such case, the contract merely expired.
We agree with the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC that respondent's
employment was not terminated during the period of his probationary
employment, and that he was not extended a regular employment by
petitioner Cathay on account of his unsatisfactory work performance during
the probationary period.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc. (M.Y. San) was previously engaged in the
business of manufacturing biscuits and other related products.
The Company agrees to submit the list of all its present employees to the
new corporation for purposes of rehiring if said employee applies and
qualifies, subject to such criteria as the new corporation may impose. In the
rehiring, the covered employees shall be given hiring preference, if qualified.
The corresponding Notice as to whom of the covered employees have been
hired by the new corporation shall be issued immediately after January 31,
2001. During the entire rehiring process and until the election and
qualification of the new officers, the PTGWO, through its National President,
or his authorized representative, shall act as the TRUSTEE of the UNION.
All employees hired by MONDE M.Y. SAN CORPORATION and/or the new
owner of the COMPANY, shall upon hiring, subject to the terms and conditions
of their probationary employment, become members of the UNION. The
continued existence of the UNION in the company and/or MONDE M.Y. SAN
CORPORATION shall not be interrupted by the payment of the Companys
employees of their separation package or the temporary closure of the
Companys operations.6
On 31 January 2001, all the employees of respondent M.Y. San received their
separation pay and the cash equivalent of their vacation and sick leaves.
Thereafter, they signed their respective Quitclaims.
ISSUE:
However, employers are also accorded rights and privileges to assure their
self-determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. This
mass of privileges comprises the so-called management prerogatives.
Although they may be broad and unlimited in scope, the State has the right
to determine whether an employers privilege is exercised in a manner that
complies with the legal requirements and does not offend the protected
rights of labor. One of the rights accorded an employer is the right to close
an establishment or undertaking. Just as no law forces anyone to go into
business, no law can compel anybody to continue the same.
The closure, therefore, of the business operation of respondent M.Y. San was
not tainted with bad faith or other circumstance that would give rise to
suspicions of malicious intent. Other than their mere allegations, petitioners
failed to present independent evidence that would otherwise show that the
closure of M.Y. San was without factual basis and done in utter bad faith.
Mere allegation is not evidence. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party
must prove his affirmative allegation.
G.R. No. 128682 March 18, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
From May 10, 1994 to November 10, 1994, or for a period of six (6) months,
the EMPLOYEE shall be contractual during which the EMPLOYER can
terminate the EMPLOYEE's services by serving written notice to that effect.
Such termination shall be immediate, or at whatever date within the six-
month period, as the EMPLOYER may determine. Should the EMPLOYEE
continue his employment beyond November 10, 1994, he shall become a
regular employee upon demonstration of sufficient skill in the terms of his
ability to meet the standards set by the EMPLOYER. If the EMPLOYEE fails to
demonstrate the ability to master his task during the first six months he can
be placed on probation for another six (6) months after which he will be
evaluated for promotion as a regular employee.
On November 9, 1995, or after working for six (6) months, he was made to
sign a three-month probationary employment and later, an extended three-
month probationary employment good until May 9, 1995.
On July 7, 1994, the petitioner was given an overall rating of 100% and 98%
in the work evaluations conducted by the company. In another evaluation,
petitioner received a rating of 98.5% given by the private respondent.
On May 9, 1995, petitioner was dismissed from the service on the ground of
alleged termination of contract of employment.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts
must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shops, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Similarly telling is the case of Pakistan Airlines Corporation vs. Pole, et al. 20
There, it was said:
On the averment that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that
petitioner failed to meet the standards of the company, we find for petitioner.
The decision at NLRC on the matter simply stated that the petitioner fell
short of the expectations of the company without specifying factual basis
therefor. The public respondent overlooked the undisputed satisfactory
ratings of the performance of petitioner in the two job evaluations conducted
by the respondent company. Even granting, therefore, that the contract
litigated upon is valid; still, the petitioner, who was permitted to work beyond
six months could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to meet the
standards of Innodata. By the provisions of the very contract itself, petitioner
has become a regular employee of private respondent. Therein, it is
stipulated that: ". . . Should the EMPLOYEE continue employment beyond
November 10, 1994, he shall become a regular employee upon
demonstration of sufficient skill in the terms of his ability to meet the
standards set by the EMPLOYER. . . ."
[G.R. No. 119253. April 10, 1997]
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
RULING:
At the outset, it will be noted that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
its "Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment", dated 19 June 1995,
agreed with the findings of the labor arbiter that the petitioners were illegally
dismissed, and prayed of this Court that the questioned NLRC decision dated
24 November 1994 and resolution dated 26 January 1995, be set aside.
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process when they were
dismissed without a written notice (specifying the particular charges
constituting the grounds for their dismissal), and a hearing, as required by
law. They further contend that the memorandum dated 11 January 1993,
supposedly issued by Corfarm to petitioners directing them "to explain why
they should not be dismissed for alleged acts of negligence and
carelessness" was never received by them. Besides, said memorandum did
not specify the particular acts or omissions of petitioners. It merely stated
that based on the results of the investigation conducted by Corfarm's
internal audit staff, petitioners were found to have been negligent in the
performance of their duties.
This Court has consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing constitute essential elements of due process in the dismissal of
employees.As to the requirement of notice, it has been held that the
employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought, and; (b) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him.
With regard to the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, and not that an
actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.
FABELA vs SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION Case Digest
[G.R. No. 150658 February 9, 2007] NOELITO FABELA, MARCELO
DELA CRUZ III, ROGELIO LASAT, HENRY MALIWANAG, MANUEL DELOS
SANTOS, and ROMMEL QUINES, Petitioners, vs. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION and ARMAN HICARTE, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners were hired by respondent San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) as Relief Salesmen for the Greater Manila Area (GMA)
under separate but almost similarly worded Contracts of Employment with
Fixed Period. After having entered into successive contracts of the same
nature with SMC, the services of petitioners were terminated after SMC no
longer agreed to forge another contract with them. Respondent SMC claimed
that the hiring of petitioners was not intended to be permanent, as the same
was merely occasioned by the need to fill in a vacuum arising from SMCs
gradual transition to a new system of selling and delivering its products.
Respondents explained that SMC previously operated under the Route
System, but began implementing in 1993 the Pre-Selling System in which
the salesmen under the earlier system would be replaced by Accounts
Specialists which called for upgraded qualifications. While some of the
qualified regular salesmen were readily upgraded to the position of Accounts
Specialist, respondents claimed that SMC still had to sell its beer products
using the conventional routing system during the transition stage, thus
giving rise to the need for temporary employees; and the members of the
regular Route Crew then existing were required to undergo a training
program to determine whether they possessed or could be trained for the
necessary attitude and aptitude required of an Accounts Specialist, hence,
the hiring of petitioners and others for a fixed period, co-terminus with the
completion of the transition period and Training Program for all prospective
Accounts Specialists. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, petitioners
filed complaints for illegal dismissal against respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were validly hired for a fixed period.
HELD:
The SC held that under article 280 of the Labor Code, there are two kinds of
regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities
which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one
year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in
which they are employed. Article 280 also
recognizes project employees, those whose employment has been fixed for
a specific
project or undertaking. Project employment is distinct from casual
employment referred to in the second paragraph of Article 280 for the
proviso that any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service . . . shall be considered a regular employee does not apply to project
employees, but only to casual employees. Although Article 280 does not
expressly recognize employment for a fixed period, which is distinct from
employment which has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, it has
been clarified that employment for a fixed period is not in itself illegal. Even
if the duties of an employee consist of activities usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the employer, it does not necessarily follow
that the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the
performance of such activities through a contract of employment for a fixed
term.
FACTS:
The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private respondent employees
have formed a union. When the union became the collective bargaining
representative in the certification election, the petitioner refused to sit down
to negotiate a CBA. Moreover, the respondents were not given work for a
month amounting to unjustified dismissal. As a result, the complainants
staged a strike to protest but was settled through a memorandum of
agreement which contained a list of those considered as regular employees
for the payroll.
The NLRC held that there was illegal dismissal and this was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees. For them to be excluded
as regulars, it is not enough that they perform work that is seasonal in
nature but they also are employed for the duration of one season. The
evidence only proved the first but not the second requirement.
The ruling in Mercado v. NLRC is not applicable since in that case, the
workers were merely required to perform phases of agricultural work for a
definite period of time, after which, their services are available to other
employers. The management's sudden change of assignment reeks of bad
faith, it is likewise guilty of ULP.
G.R. No. 167045 August 29, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
They are regular employees, not project employees. A project employee is
one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking,
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season." Before an employee hired on a per-project basis can be
dismissed, a report must be made to the nearest employment office, of the
termination of the services of the workers every time completes a project.
Department Order No. 19, as well as the old Policy Instructions No. 20,
requires employers to submit a report of an employees termination to the
nearest public employment office every time his employment is terminated
due to a completion of a project. Petitioners' failure to file termination reports
is an indication that the respondents were not project employees but regular
employees.
The repeated and continuing need for their services is sufficient evidence of
the necessity, if not indispensability, of their services to petitioners' resort
business.
FACTS:
Later, two other cases were filed against ETS for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims when the complainants thereat were refused work
in another ETS project, i.e., Richville project, allegedly because they refused
to sign individual employment contracts with ETS. These two other cases
were Nelson Catong, Roger Lamayon, Christopher Lamayon v. Equipment
Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-02-01429-99; and Rey Albino, Ernesto Padilla, Reynaldo Lima v.
Equipment Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito, docketed as NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-02-01615-99.
The three cases were consolidated before the labor arbiter. Following failed
conciliation efforts, all concerned, except Roger and Christopher Lamayon,
submitted, as the labor arbiter directed, their respective position papers.
ETS position may be summed up as follows: (1) private respondents were its
contractual/project employees engaged for different projects of the
company; (2) they were not illegally dismissed, having been hired on a per
project basis; (3) ETS was unable to fully release private respondents 13th
month pay because Uniwide failed to pay for its contracted plumbing project;
(4) ETS was forced to abandon the Uniwide project and undertake another
project, the Richville project, because the chances of being paid by Uniwide
were dim; (5) ETS asked private respondents to sign employment contracts
to formalize their previous agreement but said private respondents refused;
and (6) as a result, ETS was constrained to deny employment to private
respondents as it considered the execution of employment contracts part of
management prerogative before employment commences.
ISSUE:
RULING:
It bears to stress at the outset that ETS admits hiring or employing private
respondents to perform plumbing works for various projects. Given this
postulate, regular employment may reasonably be presumed and it
behooves ETS to prove otherwise, that is, that the employment in question
was contractual in nature ending upon the expiration of the term fixed in the
contract or for a specific project or undertaking. But the categorical finding of
the CA, confirmatory for the most part of that of the labor arbiter, is that not
a single written contract of employment fixing the terms of employment for
the duration of the Uniwide project, or any other project, was submitted by
ETS despite the latters allegations that private respondents were merely
contractual employees. Records of payroll and other pertinent documents,
such as job contracts secured by ETS showing that private respondents were
hired for specific projects, were also not submitted by ETS.
Moreover, if private respondents were indeed employed as project
employees, petitioners should have had submitted a report of termination
every time their employment was terminated owing to the completion of
each plumbing project. As correctly held by the CA in its Amended Decision,
citing Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC, ETS failure to report the employment
termination and file the necessary papers after every project completion
tends to support the claim of private respondents about their not being
project employees. Under Policy Instruction No. 20, Series of 1977, the report
must be made to the nearest public office employment. The decision in
Violeta v. NLRC is also apropos, particularly when it held:
FACTS:
Issue:
Ruling:
The foregoing provision provides for three kinds of employees: (a) regular
employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; (b) project employees or those whose employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season; and (c) casual employees or
those who are neither regular nor project employees. The principal test for
determining whether an employee is a project employee or a regular
employee is whether the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee. A project employee is one
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. A
true project employee should be assigned to a project which begins and ends
at determined or determinable times, and be informed thereof at the time of
hiring.
Petitioners contend that respondent's repeated hiring of their services
qualifies them to the status of regular employees.
FACTS:
In the complaint filed with the POEA, private respondents Alfredo Davila and
Bonifacio Roquero sought to recover from the petitioner salary, overtime pay,
vacation and sick leave, and completion bonus differentials; Davila further
asked for payment of his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
contract. They therein alleged that they had been working as security guards
of PNCC since 1980. Having passed the criteria set by PNCC for overseas
workers, they were assigned as company security guards at PNCC Iraq
Expressway Project with a salary of US$350.00 a month each. Their contracts
are evidenced by master employment contracts approved by the POEA which
explicitly state:
They departed for Iraq on 14 May 1985; however, before they left they were
made to sign printed forms in blank. The necessary papers for their overseas
assignment were not given to them not until they were already at the Manila
International Airport. They found out to their disgust that contrary to the
master employment plan, the printed forms they had earlier signed in blank
already contain an entry that their salary rate is US$260.00 a month. Thus,
private respondent Roquero received only US$260.00 as monthly salary
during his entire two-year assignment in Iraq and three-week extended
period of assignment therein. Private respondent Davila received the same
salary until he was repatriated prior to the expiration of his contract due to a
reduction of work force. For their four-hour daily overtime work, they were
paid only two-hour overtime pay at the rate of US$260.00 per month.
The PNCC resisted the complaint by claiming that the so-called Master
Employment Contracts relied upon by the private respondents were but
notices or offers for overseas employment, and mere offers without
acceptance by them do not constitute contracts of employment. The
contracts which bound them were those providing for a salary of US$260.00
per month.
ISSUE:
RULING:
It is true that the only way by which a labor case may reach this Court is
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 8 It must,
however, be shown that the NLRC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 9
Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows an
aggrieved party to file a motion for the reconsideration of any order,
resolution, or decision of the Commission based on palpable or patent errors.
Such a motion constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy which the
aggrieved party may avail of.
It is settled that before certiorari may be availed of, the petitioner must have
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order or act complained of to
enable the tribunal, board, or office concerned to pass upon and correct its
mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. 10 The petitioner has
not endeavored to show any justifiable reason why it did not file a motion for
reconsideration to give the NLRC an opportunity to re-examine its resolution.
Besides, in an earlier case brought by the petitioner and involving the same
issue but with other employees similarly situated as the private respondents,
12 this Court upheld the resolution of the NLRC affirming the POEA findings
as follows:
. . . The only dispute which remains unsolved is whether or not the monthly
salary of herein complainants is US$350.00 a month or US$260.00.
The petitioner's contention that the private respondents' claims are barred
by laches do not deserve even a short shrift.
G.R. No. 106090 February 28, 1994
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Noteworthy in this case is the fact that herein private respondent's lay-off
reports and the termination reports were duly submitted to the then Ministry
of Labor and Employment everytime a project was completed in accordance
with Policy Instruction No. 20, which provides:
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated
as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which
they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have
been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the
company is not required to obtain a clearance from the Secretary of Labor in
connection with such termination. What is required of the company is a
report to the nearest Public Employment Office for statistical purposes.
The presence of this factor makes this case different from the cases decided
by the Court where the employees were deemed regular employees. The
cases of Ochoco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 5 Philippine
National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 6
Magante v. National Labor Relations Commission, 7 and Philippine National
Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations, et al., 8 uniformly held
that the failure of the employer to report to the nearest employment office
the termination of workers everytime a project is completed proves that the
employees are not project employees. Contrariwise, the faithful and regular
effort of private respondent in reporting every completion of its project and
submitting the lay-off list of its employees proves the nature of employment
of the workers involved therein as project employees. Given this added
circumstance behind petitioner's employment, it is clear that he does not
belong to the work pool from which the private respondent would draw
workers for assignment to other projects at its discretion.
ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. AND PAUILINO ENERO v. NLRC, VIC DEL
ROSARIO, VIVA FILMS
GR No. 120969
Facts:
Maraguinot and Enero were separately hired by Vic Del Rosario under Viva
Films as part of the filming crew. Sometime in May 1992, sought the
assistance of their supervisor to facilitate their request that their salary be
adjusted in accordance with the minimum wage law.
On June 1992, Mrs. Cesario, their supervisor, told them that Mr. Vic Del
Rosario would agree to their request only if they sign a blank employment
contract. Petitioners refused to sign such document. After which, the Mr.
Enero was forced to go on leave on the same month and refused to take him
back when he reported for work. Mr. Maraguinot on the other hand was
dropped from the payroll but was returned days after. He was again asked to
sign a blank employment contract but when he refused, he was terminated.
Consequently, the petitioners sued for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. The private respondents claim the following: (a) that VIVA FILMS is
the trade name of VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC. and that it was primarily
engaged in the distribution & exhibition of movies- but not then making of
movies; (b) That they hire contractors called producers who act as
independent contractors as that of Vic Del Rosario; and (c) As such, there is
no employee-employer relation between petitioners and private respondents.
The Labor Arbiter held that the complainants are employees of the private
respondents. That the producers are not independent contractor but should
be considered as labor-only contractors and as such act as mere agent of the
real employer. Thus, the said employees are illegally dismissed.
The private respondents appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter declaring that the complainants were project employees
due to the ff. reasons: (a) Complainants were hired for specific movie
projects and their employment was co-terminus with each movie project;
(b)The work is dependent on the availability of projects. As a result, the total
working hours logged extremely varied; (c) The extremely irregular working
days and hours of complainants work explains the lump sum payment for
their service; and (d) The respondents alleged that the complainants are not
prohibited from working with other movie companies whenever they are not
working for the independent movie producers engaged by the respondents.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the complainants but was denied
by NLRC. In effect, they filed an instant petition claiming that NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in: (a) Finding that petitioners were
project employees; (b) Ruling that petitioners were not illegally dismissed;
and (c) Reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
In the instant case, the petitioners allege that the NLRC acted in total
disregard of evidence material or decisive of the controversy.
Issues:
(b) W/N the private respondents are engaged in the business of making
movies.
Held:
Respondents also admit that the petitioners were part of a work pool wherein
they attained the status of regular employees because of the ff. requisites:
(a) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation
of a project; (b) The tasks performed by the alleged project employees are
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer; and (c) However, the length of time which the employees are
continually re-hired is not controlling but merely serves as a badge of regular
employment.
Since the producer and the crew members are employees of VIVA and that
these employees works deal with the making of movies. It can be said that
VIVA is engaged of making movies and not on the mere distribution of such.
The producer is not a job contractor because of the ff. reasons: (Sec. Rule VII,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.)
It can be said that the producers are labor-only contractors. Under Article
106 of the Labor Code (reworded) where the contractor does not have the
requisites as that of the job contractors.
G.R. No. 121605 February 2, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
The owners and the barbers shared in the earnings of the barber shop. The
barbers got two-thirds (2/3) of the fee paid for every haircut or shaving job
done, while one-third (1/3) went to the owners of the shop.
During the mediation meeting held at Atty. Abragan's office a new twist was
added. Despite the assurance that he was not being driven out as caretaker-
barber, private respondent demanded payment for several thousand pesos
as his separation pay and other monetary benefits. In order to give the
parties enough time to cool off, Atty. Abragan set another conference but
private respondent did not appear in such meeting anymore.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Magcalas is a regular employee, not just a project employee
RULING:
Absent a clear showing that petitioners and private respondent had intended
to pursue a relationship of industrial partnership, we entertain no doubt that
private respondent was employed by petitioners as caretaker-barber. Initially,
petitioners, as new owners of the barbershop, hired private respondent as
barber by absorbing the latter in their employ. Undoubtedly, the services
performed by private respondent as barber is related to, and in the pursuit of
the principal business activity of petitioners. Later on, petitioners tapped
private respondent to serve concurrently as caretaker of the shop. Certainly,
petitioners had the power to dismiss private respondent being the ones who
engaged the services of the latter. In fact, private respondent sued
petitioners for illegal dismissal, albeit contested by the latter. As a caretaker,
private respondent was paid by petitioners wages in the form of honorarium,
originally, at the rate of one-third (1/3) of the shop's net income but
subsequently pegged at a fixed amount per month. As a barber, private
respondent earned two-thirds (2/3) of the fee paid per haircut or shaving job
done. Furthermore, the following facts indubitably reveal that petitioners
controlled private respondent's work performance, in that: (1) private
respondent had to inform petitioners of the things needed in the shop; (2) he
could only recommend the hiring of barbers and masseuses, with petitioners
having the final decision; (3) he had to be at the shop at 9:00 a.m. and could
leave only at 9:00 p.m. because he was the one who opened and closed it,
being the one entrusted with the key.7 These duties were complied with by
the private respondent upon instructions of petitioners. Moreover, such task
was far from being negligible as claimed by petitioners. On the contrary, it
was crucial to the business operation of petitioners as shown in the
preceding discussion. Hence, there was enough basis to declare private
respondent an employee of petitioners. Accordingly, there is no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the labor arbiter and NLRC on the existence
of employer-employee relationship between herein private parties.
With regard to the second issue, jurisprudence has laid out the rules and
valid ground for termination of employment. To constitute abandonment,
there must be concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt acts
from which it may be inferred that the employee concerned has no more
interest in working.8 In other words, there must be a clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship on the part of the employee.
FACTS:
On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School
with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services
effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was
"completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment."
Although protesting the announced termination stating that his services were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status of
regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a
receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the
period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
ISSUE:
RULING:
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on
July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442)
had not yet been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment
was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended
by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which
governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly
acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil
Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became
effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No
prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its
articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between
Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a
stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly
recognized as valid by this Court.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was
altered by eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed
period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).
As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts
to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also
appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee
to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it
logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or
avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term
employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to
remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees
from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face
or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an
agreed period of employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the
recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26,
1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her
school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three
successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact
that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a
definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract,
her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the
non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may
be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a
mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire and
that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of
termination.
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The issue in this case has been decided already in the case of PNOC-EDC
vs Leogardo. It is true that PNOC is a GOCC and that PNOC-EDC, being a
subsidiary of PNOC, is likewise a GOCC. It is also true that under the 1973
Constitution, all GOCCs are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the
1987 Constitution change all this as it now provides:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. (Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
Hence, the above provision sets the rule that the mere fact that a
corporation is a GOCC does not automatically place it under the CSC. Under
this provision, the test in determining whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil
Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations
created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those
incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.
Even though the facts of this case occurred while the 1973 Constitution was
still in force, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution regarding the legal
matters [procedural aspect] are applicable because it is the law in force at
the time of the decision.
G.R. No. 101013 February 2, 1993
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
In a letter dated March 29, 1983, Minister Blas F. Ople approved the RRR
Program without any serious objection, but with the requirement that the
implementation thereof shall be instituted without prejudice to whatever
benefits may have accrued in favor of the employees concerned. 2
ISSUE:
RULING:
Facts:
(a) whether or not the respondent was still a contractual employee of the
petitioner as of June 4, 1993;
The two kinds of regular employees under the law are (1) those engaged to
perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at
least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the
activities in which they are employed. The primary standard to determine a
regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the
former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year,
even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law
deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the
business of the employer. Hence, the employment is also considered regular,
but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.[22] The
law does not provide the qualification that the employee must first be issued
a regular appointment or must be declared as such before he can acquire a
regular employee status. In this case, the respondent was employed by the
petitioner on May 8, 1992 as production operator. She was assigned to wire
building at the transistor division. There is no dispute that the work of the
respondent was necessary or desirable in the business or trade of the
petitioner.
She remained under the employ of the petitioner without any interruption
since May 8, 1992 to June 4, 1993 or for one (1) year and twenty-eight (28)
days. The original contract of employment had been extended or renewed
for four times, to the same position, with the same chores. Such a continuing
need for the services of the respondent is sufficient evidence of the necessity
and indispensability of her services to the petitioners business. By operation
of law, then, the respondent had attained the regular status of her
employment with the petitioner, and is thus entitled to security of tenure as
provided for in Article 279 of the Labor Code which reads:
(b) whether or not the petitioner dismissed the respondent from her
employment;
if so, whether or not she was accorded the requisite notice and investigation
prior to her dismissal; and
On the second and third issues, we agree with the appellate court that the
respondent was dismissed by the petitioner without the requisite notice and
without any formal investigation. Given the factual milieu in this case, the
respondents dismissal from employment for incurring five (5) absences in
April 1993, three (3) absences in May 1993 and four (4) absences in June
1993, even if true, is too harsh a penalty. We do agree that an employee may
be dismissed for violation of reasonable regulations/rules promulgated by the
employer. Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an
employee. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps
may have been committed by the worker ought not to be visited with a
consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. For, the
Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure. The
misery and pain attendant to the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there
be acceptance of the view that under certain circumstances of the case the
workers should not be deprived of their means of livelihood.
Price, et al., v Innodata Phils., G.R. No. 178505, September 30, 2008
Facts:
INNODATA had since ceased operations due to business losses in June 2002.
Petitioners Cherry J. Price, Stephanie G. Domingo, and Lolita Arbilera were
employed as formatters by INNODATA. The parties executed an employment
contract denominated as a Contract of Employment for a Fixed Period,
stipulating that the contract shall be effective from FEB. 16, 1999 to FEB. 16,
2000 a period of ONE YEAR. On 16 February 2000, the HRAD Manager of
INNODATA wrote petitioners informing them of their last day of work, at the
end of the close of business hours On February 16, 2000. According to
INNODATA, petitioners employment already ceased due to the end of their
contract.
The Labor Arbiter issued its Decision finding petitioners complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages meritorious.
Issues:
Ruling:
The Court finds merit in the present Petition. There were no valid fixed-term
contracts and petitioners were regular employees of the INNODATA who
could not be dismissed except for just or authorized cause.
The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not
by what the parties say it should be. Equally important to consider is that a
contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor
contracts must yield to the common good. Thus, provisions of applicable
statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at
liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor
laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. Regular
employment has been defined by Article 280 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which reads: Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment.
The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for
the duration of the season.
Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, the applicable test to determine
whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
However, it is also true that while certain forms of employment require the
performance of usual or desirable functions and exceed one year, these do
not necessarily result in regular employment under Article 280 of the Labor
Code. Under the Civil Code, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited,
as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for
specific projects with predetermined dates of completion; they also include
those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of
termination.
FACTS:
DANILO DIMABAYAO seeks to set aside through this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the 15 March 1995
Decision and 23 June 1995 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding
private respondents guilty of having illegally dismissed petitioner from their
employ.
On 30 July 1992, while petitioner was assigned to sort out rejects, with prior
permission first obtained from his checker, he went to the comfort room to
answer the call of nature and relieve himself, afterwhich he returned to his
work place. But private respondent Cheng Suy Eh was unhappy seeing
petitioner away from his work station and immediately demanded from him a
written explanation allegedly for abandoning his work. As a matter of policy,
respondent company discourages its employees from going to the comfort
room during working hours for sanitary or hygienic purposes as the company
is engaged in the food business.[1]
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. While it may be true that complainant has been leaving his work area
without permission, this Arbitration Board finds that complainant's habit of
going to the toilet in the morning during production is merely a call of nature
and by force of habit he had to relieve himself. Whether or not the
complainant relieved himself is not the issue. The call of nature is a
reasonable reason for him to leave his work area. Although complainant is
not entirely without fault since he has been leaving his workplace without
permission from his supervisor and his disrespect towards his superiors as
borne out by the reports of his supervisor and guards, the infraction
committed by the complainant is not so grave that would warrant the
ultimate penalty of dismissal . . .
The NLRC also endeavored to justify its decision by taking into account
offenses allegedly committed by petitioner way back in 1990. These
offenses as enumerated in the NLRC decision were infractions imputed to
petitioner prior to the 17 July, 30 July and 20 October 1992 incidents. As
such, they should have been outrightly ignored by the NLRC in determining
and upholding the validity of petitioner's dismissal since, as may be gleaned
from the termination letter, petitioner's dismissal was based merely on the
17 July, 30 July and 20 October 1992 alleged incidents, without reference to
any infraction committed before then. This only shows that the offenses
attributed to petitioner before 17 July 1992 were mere afterthoughts
conceived in the course of the trial to further justify his dismissal. To refer to
those alleged earlier violations as further grounds for dismissal is
undoubtedly prejudicial to petitioner. Significantly, it would also be doubly
prejudicial to him to penalize him for those committed on 17 and 30 July
1992 as he was already suspended for fifteen (15) days for those infractions.
This, obviously, denied petitioner procedural due process and deprived him
of his right to be heard, to refute and present evidence to controvert such
accusations prior to his actual dismissal from employment.
FACTS:
Believing that their union was the certified collective bargaining agent, the
members and officers of NAMA-MCCH staged a series of mass actions inside
MCCHs premises starting February 27, 1996. They marched around the
hospital putting up streamers, placards and posters.
Subsequently, on March 28, 1996, MCCH notified the petitioners that they
were to be investigated for their activities in the mass actions, with the
hearings being scheduled on March 28, 1996 and April 1, 1996. Petitioners,
however, denied receiving said notices. In a notice dated April 8, 1996,
MCCH ordered petitioners to desist from participating in the mass actions
conducted in the hospital premises with a warning that non-compliance
therewith would result in the imposition of disciplinary measures. Petitioners
again claimed they did not receive said order. Petitioners Bascon and Cole
were then served notices terminating their employment effective April 12,
1996 and April 19, 1996, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the Petitioners were just cause for their
termination?
RULING:
No, the acts of the did not constitute petitioners were terminated for
allegedly participating in an illegal strike and gross insubordination to the
order prohibiting them from wearing armbands and putting up placards, not
for ipso facto failing to show up in the scheduled investigation. Thus, the real
issue is whether or not petitioners were validly terminated for (1) allegedly
participating in an illegal strike and/or (2) gross insubordination to the order
to stop wearing armbands and putting up placards.
As to the first ground, Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides in part that:
Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners actual participation
in the illegal strike was limited to wearing armbands and putting up placards.
There was no finding that the armbands or the placards contained offensive
words or symbols. Thus, neither such wearing of armbands nor said putting
up of placards can be construed as an illegal act. In fact, per se, they are
within the mantle of constitutional protection under freedom of speech.
Evidence on record shows that various illegal acts were committed by
unidentified union members in the course of the protracted mass action. And
we commiserate with MCCH, patients, and third parties for the damage they
suffered. But we cannot hold petitioners responsible for acts they did not
commit. The law, obviously solicitous of the welfare of the common worker,
requires, before termination may be considered, that an ordinary union
member must have knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike.
FACTS:
Helen, in her explanation,[9] admitted the offense and even manifested that
she would accept whatever penalty would be imposed upon her. She,
however, did not reckon that respondent company would terminate her
services for her admitted offense.[10]
Keihin, on the other hand, maintained that Helen was guilty of serious
misconduct because there was a deliberate act of stealing from the company.
Respondent company also claimed that motive and value of the thing stolen
are irrelevant in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Helen was valid based on serious misconduct
RULING:
At any rate, we are aware that it is the policy of courts to encourage full
adjudication of the merits of an appeal. Dismissal of appeals purely on
technical grounds, especially an appeal by a worker who was terminated and
whose livelihood depends on the speedy disposition of her case, is frowned
upon. Thus, while we affirm the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari,
we shall still discuss the substantive aspect of the case and go into the
merits.
[G.R. No. 158232. March 31, 2005]
FACTS:
The garbage and scrap materials of FCPP were collected and bought by the
Saros Trucking Services and Enterprises (Saros). On January 15, 1999,
respondent De Guzman as Facilities Section Manager, for and in behalf of
FCPP, signed a Garbage Collection Agreement[5] with Saros, and the latters
signatory therein was its owner and general manager, Larry Manaig.
Sometime in the third week of July 1999, petitioner Ernesto Espinosa, HRD
and General Affairs Director of FCPP, received a disturbing report from
Manaig. Manaig reported that respondent De Guzman had caused the
anomalous disposal of steel [purlins][6] owned by FCPP.[7] Two of Manaigs
employees, Roberto Pumarez[8] and Ma. Theresa S. Felipe,[9] executed
written statements detailing how respondent De Guzman had ordered the
steel purlins to be brought out.
ISSUE:
RULING:
After a careful and painstaking study of the records of the case, the Court
rules that the respondents dismissal from employment was not grounded on
any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
However, to be valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must
be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of
the employer.[34] Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a
shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee
was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned
is unfit to continue working for the employer.[35]
The Court had the occasion to reiterate in Nokom v. National Labor Relations
Commission[36] the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of
confidence-
We have carefully evaluated your case and we are convinced that you have
committed grave abuse of authority amounting to serious misconduct and
willful breach of trust and confidence.
Based on our findings, as supported by strong and competent evidences, and
contrary to your explanation per your Letter dated July 26, 1999, the
following facts were satisfactorily established:
1. That sometime in the first week of July 1999, you intimated to Mr.
Roberto Pumarez, Supervisor of Saros Trucking Services, your intention to
buy from Saros the metals which were then piled up and kept inside the Fuji
Electric Philippines compound;
3. However, it turned out later some pieces of metals which you have
earlier declared as scraps and ordered to be sold to Saros were still to be
used in the construction of FCPPs Building B. Thus, on July 10, 1999, while
Saros employees were initially loading the metals, an Engineer of SNK
Philippines, Inc., FCPPs building contractor, stopped them. It was only later
after they were prevented from further loading the metals that you checked
with the SNK personnel if the metals can already be disposed of as scraps
which prove that you have prematurely declared the metals as scrap;
5. That, as of this date, you have not yet settled/paid your obligation to
Saros. That immediately after you were placed under preventive suspension
and to support your explanation that the transaction was between Saros and
Sta. Rosa Baptist Church, you caused, through some people representing to
be members of the Baptist Church and who are unknown to Saros, to issue a
check in favor of Saros. When this failed, another person, representing to be
a member of the Baptist church and who appeared for the first time, went to
the office of Saros and tried to serve a letter addressed to Mr. Larry Manaig,
Saros Proprietor, allegedly inquiring about the total obligation of the Baptist
Church to Saros but, which was again not accepted as, in truth and in fact,
there was really no transaction between Saros and the Sta. Rosa Baptist
Church. All along, it was you and Mr. Camcaman who dealt directly with
Saros.
6. That in previous occasions, it was reported by Mr. Manaig that you
solicited from him empty drums, pails and corrugated cartons which were all
part of those scraps picked up from FCPP and you never paid any of them, a
fact which you never denied in your explanation which is tantamount to
admission.
Based on the foregoing, it is our well-discerned view that the transaction was
exclusively limited between you and Saros. Except for your self-serving
explanation, you failed miserably to present direct evidence that it was the
Sta. Rosa Baptist church which bought the subject metals from Saros, as
what you want us to believe. At best, your explanation is a mere
afterthought desperately concocted to exculpate yourself.
FACTS:
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence,this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Soriano was forced to resign, due to professional and
sexual harassment, thus amounting to constructive dismissal.
HELD:
Sorianos own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if
not downright puny. An analysis of her statements shows that her own
conclusion that she was being sexually and professionally harassed was on
the basis of her own suppositions, conjectures, and surmises.
She could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently
professionally harassed by respondent Severino. The latters alleged words:
How come you claim you know so much yet nothing ever gets done in your
department? do not jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly establish
professional harassment. Aside from these words, the complainant could
only venture to allege instances in general and vague terms. As to the facts
allegedly constituting sexual harassment advanced by Go and Severino,
after an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their respective
counter-affidavits and further considering the other supporting documents
attached to the respondents pleadings, it is found that these far out weigh
the Sorianos own evidence
A reading of the affidavit of the witness, who was never an employee nor
present at the party of Digitel, reveals, however, that she merely
concluded that the employees of Digitel were instructed or harassed not to
testify in favor of Soriano when they failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel
employee who kept avoiding to meet with such tendency to threaten
resignation every time higher management would refuse her demand to
transfer subordinates who had administrative differences with her, we
therefore have no doubt that complainant voluntarily resigned when
respondent Severino refused to heed her demand that Ms. Arnedo and Ms.
Inductivo, her subordinates, be transferred to other departments. We also
have no doubt that such resignation does not constitute constructive
dismissal, much less an illegal one.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is
not the violation of the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the
employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry "foul" provided
the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period
within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels.
The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and
more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee. Esmso
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally
coming out with her employer's sexual impositions. Not many women,
especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony
and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had
not issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private
respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her
silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one
employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily
"monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up
one's employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable
means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as she could
outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider
them as mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work
thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only
imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset
her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had
no place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his
office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for
finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason to
terminate her. Mse sm
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the
U.S., bringing giftsfor the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In
the afternoon of the same day, heentered her room and greeted her by
shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him andkissed her on her
cheek.On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he
called complainant by phone,saying he will get something in her office.
Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her,
"Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She wasable
to free herself by slightly pushing him away.On the first working day in
January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she couldsee him
in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived
there,respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual
attempt.Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding
the jurisdiction of the CTA,while complainant and her companions were
congratulating and kissing each other, respondentsuddenly placed his arms
around her shoulders and kissed her.In the morning of February 14, 2001,
respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to hisoffice. She then
asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany
her.Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left.The
last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called
complainant andasked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill
on the CTA. She again requestedRuby to accompany her. The latter agreed
but suggested that they should act as if they met byaccident in respondents
office. Ruby then approached the secretarys table which was separatedfrom
respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in
front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the
Senate bill. Respondentseemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at
Ruby who was searching for something atthe secretary's desk. Forthwith,
respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and
stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she
was looking for and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying,
me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her.
Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent
held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed
himaway, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on
his chair and covered hisface with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left
crying and locked herself inside a comfortroom. After that incident,
respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, sorry, it wonthappen
again.Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually
harassment.Held: No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is
exonerated of the chargesagainst him and is advised to be more circumspect
in his deportment. A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct
or favor and does not fallwithin the purview of sexual harassment under R.A.
No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, towit:'Sec. 3.
Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined
. - Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, employee, manager, supervisor,agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who,having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training
or educationenvironment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardlessof whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of saidAct.a)In a work-
related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:1)The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or
in granting said individualfavorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions or privileges; or the refusal togrant sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which inanyway would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwiseadversely affect said employees;2) The above acts would impair
the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws;or 3) The above
acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
theemployee.'"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of
sexual harassment are as follows:1)The employer, employee, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moralascendancy
over another;2)The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a
working environment;
3)
The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority,
influence or moral ascendancymakes a demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor.Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that
respondent judge demanded,requested or required any sexual favor from
complainant in exchange for favorablecompensation, terms, conditions,
promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual
favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued
employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to
him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos
perception of malice in his alleged acts a "product of her own imagination"
that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint .Likewise, Rayala assails
the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is
malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing.
He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a
particular person, not against society as a whole. Rayala next argues that AO
250 expands the acts proscribed in RA7877. In particular, he assails the
definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
FORMS OFSEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1.
Forms of Sexual Harassment.
Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms: a) Overt
sexual advances ;b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection; c) Request
or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates,
outings or the like for the same purpose; d) Any other act or conduct of a
sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally
annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.
FACTS:
2nd (LIGAYA ANNAWI): She alleged in her complaint that on four separate
occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her
groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ
pressing the lower part of her back.
ISSUE1.
WON Magdalena is a credible witness
WON Belegan is guilty of grave misconduct.
HELD1.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to
join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with
her packed lunch and swimsuit. Before the activity started, she warned the
pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However,
while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went
after them to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When she
returned, the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation on Chiara Mae. The child was still alive when respondent rushed
her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival. Corazon P. Taguiam was dismissed for gross negligence resulting to
loss of confidence.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes the dismissal was valid. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and
habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an
employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a
period of time, depending upon the circumstances. Respondent had been
grossly negligent. First , it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was
unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally
bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. The purpose
of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed their
child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore
this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around
when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have requested the
mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called
her up to obtain her conformity. Second, it was respondent's responsibility as
Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school.
Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were
present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that
with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself
alone to keep an eye on each one of them. Notably, respondent's negligence,
although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant
damage, however, the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.
This is not the first time that the SC have departed from the requirements
laid down by the law that neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual.
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL)
cannot be legally compelled to continue with the employment of a person
admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties
although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a
mere delay on PAL's flight schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems
like hotel accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of
law suits, and payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring
costs of replacing aircraft parts. In another case, Fuentes v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine
Banking Corporation to continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we
observed that although the teller's infraction was not habitual, a substantial
amount of money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior
to its loss and the amount reflected thereon is already considered as current
liabilities in the bank's balance sheet. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence
as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the
dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming
the life of a child. As a result of gross negligence in the present case,
petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if
it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.
Otherwise stated, it must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the
employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be
genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to
justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an
occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature.
There must, therefore, be an actual breach of duty committed by the
employee which must be established by substantial evidence. All told, there
being a clear showing that respondent was culpable for gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
FACTS:
On May 31, 1985, Pinuela was assigned as a member of the group tasked to
park and position the Boeing 747 aircraft registered as N-745 at the Manila
International Airport (now Ninoy Aquino International Airport, [NAIA]) for a
flight to the United States. The group members and their respective
assignments were: Pinuela tow tug operator, Rolando Manalaysay
leadman and wingtip guide; Rodrigo Camina-headsetman; Arturo Balagat
breakman, and a certain Taada guide. The head of the group in charge of
the parking/positioning of said aircraft was Nolie Domingo.
On or about 12:55 in the afternoon, the aircraft was towed from the PAL
technical center to Bay 16 area at the NAIA. While the Boeing 747 was being
towed, the airplane collided with the bridge at Bay 16 causing damage to the
plane's left landing light and the left wing flop and scratching its No. 2
engine. Consequently, on June 1, 1985, Pinuela was placed under preventive
suspension and was charged administratively. After investigation by the PAL
Administrative Board, he was dismissed from the service effective July 1,
1985.
Thereafter, Pinuela filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice against PAL. On July 21, 1987, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
Pinuela and ordered PAL to reinstate him to his former position without loss
of seniority rights with full backwages until actual reinstatement. 1
Hence, this recourse, the issue being whether or not the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in appreciating the facts of the case. Petitioner PAL
contends that the records do not reveal that a tow operator can rely only on
a headsetman. According to the Engineering Manual of petitioner, a tug
operator must tipguide positive visual contact with the wing tipguide when
towing aircraft in congested areas. Thus, PAL avers that Pinuela should have
relied on the signal of Manalaysay, then wing tipguide, and not on Camina,
the headsetman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Nathaniel Pinuela constitute gross and habitual
neglect of duties
RULING:
Pinuela's act of towing beyond normal speed, his failure to observe proper
parking procedure as provided in the Engineering and Maintenance Manual,
and the unanimous statement of the members of the towing crew that he
completely disregarded their warning shouts indicate that Pinuela is grossly
negligent of his responsibilities as a tug operator. Pinuela's dismissal must
therefore follow for a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees
if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest. 10
Philippine Airlines, as employer, cannot be legally compelled to continue with
the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties. 11
Lastly, Pinuela should not compare the penalty of dismissal imposed on him
in relation to lesser sanctions previously meted by PAL on its other
employees. We are solely concerned here with the sufficiency of the
evidence surrounding Pinuela's dismissal. Besides, Pinuela's examples do not
involve a plane with a scheduled flight. A mere delay on petitioner's flight
schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems like hotel accommodations
for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and payment of
special landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft.
parts. All told, Pinuela's gross negligence which called for dismissal is evident
and it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal to have
ruled otherwise.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Fuentes on the ground of gross and habitual
neglect of duties valid?
RULING:
In the case at bar, the bank's inaction merely created a condition under
which the loss was sustained. Regardless of whether there was a failure to
investigate, the fact is that the money was lost in the first place due to
petitioner's gross negligence. Such gross negligence was the immediate and
determining factor in the loss.
Petitioner argues further that the NLRC failed to consider that petitioner left
her cage at the instance of the Chief Teller. Again we are not persuaded. The
findings of the NLRC are clear. Petitioner left at her own volition to approach
her Chief Teller to ask for the remaining checks to ascertain their authenticity
and completeness. Besides, irrespective of who summoned her, her
responsibility over the cash entrusted to her remained.
Although petitioner's infraction was not habitual, we took into account the
substantial amount lost. Since the deposit slip for P200,000.00 had already
been validated prior to the loss, the act of depositing had already been
complete and from thereon, the bank had already assumed the deposit as a
liability to its depositors. Cash deposits are not assets to banks but are
recognized as current liabilities in its balance sheet.
G.R. No. 139847 March 5, 2004
FACTS:
On July 18, 1975, respondent Edgardo Bondesto started work in the employ
of petitioner Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. Nineteen (19) years later,
the events which preceded the respondents dismissal from work unfolded.
At that time, he was working as production technician at the companys
Tondo Plant in Tondo, Manila.
On June 13, 1994, the respondent received a letter2 dated June 3, 1994,
asking him to explain why his absences consisting of 35 days3 should not be
classified as "unauthorized absence." Unauthorized absence, as a company
policy, is a ground for termination of employment.4
The respondent presented his explanation in two (2) separate letters5, both
dated June 16, 1994. However, on June 22, 1994, he received another letter,
this time informing him that his employment in the company was to be
terminated effective June 23, 1994 on the ground of "unauthorized
absences."
Claiming that his dismissal was without just cause, the respondent,
represented by the United Employees Union of Procter and Gamble Phils.,
Inc., filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The respondent contended that his absences were
justified.
On April 6, 1994, or after more than two months, the petitioner finally
released the respondents reimbursements.
One week later, or on April 13, 1994, the respondent received a letter asking
him to explain his "excessive absences"7, which according to him, included
the days he worked on his reimbursements. The respondent demurred. He
claimed that the seventeen (17) days should be considered as compensable
working time since he was then at the Makati office working on the
reimbursement of his money.
ISSUE:
RULING
The Court agrees, however, with the petitioner that the respondent failed to
justify his prolonged absences during the months of May to June. While his
intention to go back to work was manifest, he regrettably failed to show that
he exerted any effort to locate his physician. Nevertheless, the failure to
locate the physician cannot amount to "serious misconduct or willful
disobedience," as the petitioner would like this Court to believe.
"Misconduct" has been defined as "the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment."22
On the other hand, "willful disobedience" envisages the concurrence of at
least two (2) requisites: the employees assailed conduct has been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
attitude;" and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made
known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent had worked with the
petitioner for nineteen (19) years. It has not been shown that the respondent
committed any infraction of company rules during his two (2) decade stint
in the company. Undoubtedly, dismissal is too harsh a sanction. Dismissal
has always been regarded as the ultimate penalty.
While the Court recognizes the rights of an employer to terminate the
services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of an
employee must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the
tenets of equity and fair play. Truly, the employers power to discipline its
workers may not be exercised in such an arbitrary manner as to erode the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.The Constitution mandates the
protection of labor. This command the Court has to heed and cannot
disregard.
In sum, the Court is convinced that the respondent has been illegally
terminated from employment. The normal consequences of illegal dismissal
are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and the payment of back
wages computed from the time the employees compensation was withheld
from him. However, in view of the Courts finding that some of the
respondents absences were not wholly justified, the Court agrees with the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals that backwages should be limited to one (1)
year.
The petitioner claims that the existence of strained relationship between the
parties militates against the reinstatement of the respondent. While the
Court agrees that human nature engenders, in the normal course of things, a
certain degree of hostility as a result of litigation, the strained relations are
not necessarily sufficient to rule out reinstatement. As aptly put by the Court
of Appeals, "if petitioners contention should be sustained, reinstatement
would thus become the exception rather than the rule in cases of illegal
dismissal."
Facts:
ISSUE:
Held:
The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Respondents rule
penalizing with discharge any employee incurring six (6) or more absences
without permission or subsequent justification is admittedly within the
purview of the labor standard. However, while it is not disputed that
complainant incurred absences exceeding 6 days, respondent was able to
subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules and
policy: that she was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that the
fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses had been duly proven through
substantial evidence; that the respondent attempted to file leaves of
absence but the petitioners supervisor refused to received them; that she
could not have filed prior leaves due to her continuing condition, and that
petitioner dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a
prohibited act. Art. 137 of the Labor Code provides: It shall be unlawful for
any employer: x x x (2.) To discharge such woman on account of her
pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy; x x x.
WPP Marketing Communications Inc., et al., vs. Galera,
G.R. No. 169207, March 25, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner is Jocelyn Galera, an American citizen who was recruited from the
US by private respondent John Steedman, Chairman-WPP Worldwide and
Chief Executive Officer of Mindshare, Co., a corporation based in Hong Kong,
China, to work in the Philippines for private respondent WPP Marketing
Communications, Inc. (WPP). On December 14, 2000, GALERA alleged she
was verbally notified by private
STEEDMAN that her services had been terminated from private respondent
WPP. Atermination letter followed the next day. On 3 January 2001, Galera
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, incentive plan, actual and moral damages, and
attorney's fees against WPP and/or John Steedman (Steedman), Mark
Webster (Webster) and Nominada Lansang (Lansang). The Labor Arbiter's
Ruling for illegal dismissal and damages in favor of GALERA. The First
Division of the NLRC reversed the ruling of Arbiter Madriaga. Yet it was
reversed again by CA.
Issue:
Ruling:
Employee. Galera, on the belief that she is an employee, filed her complaint
before the Labor Arbiter. On the other hand, WPP, Steedman, Webster and
Lansang contend that Galera is a corporate officer; hence, any controversy
regarding her dismissal is under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
We agree with Galera. Corporate officers are given such character either by
the Corporation Code or by the corporation's by-laws. Galera's appointment
as a corporate officer (Vice-President with the operational title of Managing
Director of Mindshare) during a special meeting of WPP's Board of Directors
is an appointment to a non-existent corporate office. At the time of Galera's
appointment, WPP already had one Vice-President in the person of Webster
and all five directorship positions provided in the by-laws are already
occupied. Another
indicator that she was a regular employee and not a corporate officer is
Section 14 of the contract, which clearly states that she is a permanent
employee not a Vice-President or a member of the Board of Directors.
Another convincing indication that she was only a regular employee and not
a corporate officer is the disciplinary procedure, which states that her right of
redress is through Mindshare's Chief Executive Officer for the Asia-Pacific.
This implies that she was not under the disciplinary control of private
respondent WPP's Board of Directors (BOD), which should have been the
case if in fact she was a corporate officer because only the Board of Directors
could appoint and terminate such a corporate officer.
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as branch teller by respondent Manila Electric
Company-Mandaluyong Office for the handling and processing of payments.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the legality of his dismissal
due to habitual absenteeism.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA nullified the NLRCs Decision and
reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that
the award of separation pay is neither justified nor warranted under the
circumstances
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a validly dismissed employee may be entitled to separation
pay.
RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED petition for lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
unauthorized absences and repeated infractions of company rules on
employee discipline manifest gross and habitual neglect of duty that merited
the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from work. Serious
misconduct is said to be a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
indicative of wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Oddly,
petitioner never advanced any valid reason to justify his absences.
vs.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
In spite of his previous absences, petitioner, as union officer, asked for fifty-
four (54) days of leave from 9 July 1990 to 31 August 1990 to prepare for
CBA negotiations and union activities. The request was denied and instead
the management advised petitioner to file his leave on a weekly basis, as
approval thereof was contingent on the necessity of his presence in the
operations of the Texturizing Department of respondent company. Petitioner
completely ignored this directive and absented himself from work starting 21
July 1990 until 16 August 1990. In a memorandum of the personnel
department dated 3 August 1990, petitioner was asked to submit a written
explanation for his absences. Respondent company never received any letter
of explanation. In a memorandum dated 28 August 1990, the company,
through its personnel manager, terminated petitioner's services to take
effect on 29 August 1990 "for excessive absences, insubordination, and
violation of existing company rules and regulations".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the excessive absences of the petitioner a valid ground for
his termination.
RULING:
The NLRC found that petitioner had no regard for his work. His applications
for a series of leaves of absence attest to his unconcern for his duties in
respondent company. On the other hand, respondent company has to protect
its interests in order to have an efficient and productive enterprise. It is in
this light that the law recognizes what are clearly "management
prerogatives", or the right of the employer to hire, fire, transfer, demote or
promote employees. Doubtless, what respondent did in this case was a
management prerogative. The need for petitioner's presence in the
company's Texturizing Department cannot be denied. Therefore, the
continuous and unauthorized absences of petitioner adversely affected the
operations of respondent company. The petitioner left the company with no
other choice but to terminate his employment.
It is evident from the said provisions that the employer is required to furnish
an employee who is to be dismissed two (2) written notices before such
termination. The first is the notice to apprise the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. This may be loosely
considered as the proper charge. The second is the notice informing the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. This decision, however,
must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt
of the first notice within which to answer the charge, and ample opportunity
to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if
he so desires.
In the case at bar, petitioner was given only a letter of dismissal without
earlier informing him of the charges against him and without giving him the
opportunity to defend himself. Non-compliance by private respondent with
these requirements is a violation of the petitioner's right to due process.
BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. V NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU)
DAVIDE, JR; April 17, 1997
FACTS
- Private respondent NAFLU, a co-complainant in the labor case, is a labor
union of which complainant is amember.- Complainant was first employed by
Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as route helper with the latest daily
wageof P119.00.- From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of 1
month, complainant went on absent without permission(AWOP).- On 20 May
1993, Brew master sent him a Memo: Please explain in writing within 24
hours of your receipt of thismemo why no disciplinary action should be taken
against you for the following offense: You were absent sinceApril 19, 1993 up
to May 19, 1993.- In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant
explained:Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam sainyo dahil inuwi
ko ang mga anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa koay lumayas at walang mag-
aalaga sa mga anak ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or
telegrama dahilwala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro utang pa.-
Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, the company issued a Notice of
Termination: ...we regret to inform youthat we do not consider it valid. You
are aware of the company Rules and Regulations that absence without
permission for 6 consecutive working days is considered abandonment of
work...- Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was
done without just cause; that it was notsufficiently established that individual
complainants absence from April 19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are
unjustified;that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that
in imposing such penalty, respondent should havetaken into consideration
complainants length of service and as a first offender, a penalty less
punitive will sufficesuch as suspension for a definite period.- Upon the other
hand, respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed for
cause allowed by thecompany Rules and Regulations and the Labor Code;
that the act of complainant in absenting from work for 1month without
official leave is deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result to
stoppage of productionwhich will not only destructive to respondents
interests but also to the interest of its employees in general; that
thedismissal of complainant from the service is legal.- The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of managerial
control, whichrecognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable
rules and regulations to govern the conduct of hisemployees. He relied on
Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC
: ...that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his work...therefore,
under the law and jurisprudence which upholds the right of an employer to
discharge an employee whoincurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained
absences as being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and
istherefore, dismissed for cause. An employee is deemed to have abandoned
his position or to have resigned from thesame, whenever he has been absent
therefrom without previous permission of the employer for three
consecutivedays or more. - the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision
and held that complainants dismissal was invalid for thefollowing
reasons:Complainant-appellants prolonged absences, although
unauthorized, may not amount to gross neglect or abandonment of work to
warrant outright termination of employment. Dismissal is too severe a
penalty...Relianceon the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is
quite misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities--complainant in the
Shoemart Case was an inveterate absentee who does not deserve
reinstatement compared toherein complainant-appellant who is a first
offender
ISSUE
HELD
NO. Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is
misplaced. Abandonment as a just andvalid ground for dismissal requires the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment.Two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason;and (2) a clear intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship. b) Verily, relations between
capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public
interestand labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.While
the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the conduct of his employees,these rules and their implementation
must be fair, just and reasonable.
Reasoning
- complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his
wife unexpectedly deserted him andabandoned the family. Considering that
he had a full-time job, there was no one to whom he could entrust
thechildren and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province. He
was then under emotional, psychological,spiritual and physical stress and
strain. The reason for his absence is, under these circumstances, justified.
Whilehis failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission
which must be corrected and chastised, he didnot merit the severest penalty
of dismissal from the service.- the elements of abandonment are not present
here. First, as held above, complainant's absence was justified under the
circumstances. As to the second requisite, complainant immediately
complied with the memo requiring him toexplain his absence, and upon
knowledge of his termination, immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These
plainlyrefuted any claim that he was no longer interested in returning to
work.- our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and
protects his rights not only under a generalstatement of a state policy, but
under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor
contracts ona higher plane and with greater safeguards.- While we do not
decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and Regulations on continuous,
unauthorizedabsences, what is plain is that it was wielded with undue haste
resulting in a deprivation of due process, thus notallowing for a
determination of just cause or abandonment. In this light, petitioner's
dismissal was illegal. This isnot to say that his absence should go
unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award back
wages.
G.R. No. 168931 September 12, 2006
PAULINO ALITEN,
Petitioner,- versus -
U-NEED LUMBER & HARDWARE, and COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On April 30, 1992, petitioner asked permission from U-Need Manager Virginia
Tan for a 15-day leave of absence. He planned to go to his hometown to visit
his parents and vote for his uncle Elias Balot who was running for
congressman in the May 11, 1992 national and local elections. He needed a
15-day leave because his hometown was a remote area; and considering the
mountains and rivers he had to cross, travel could be very difficult and could
take roughly 12 days.[3] Petitioner signed a typewritten application for a
one-week vacation leave starting May 4, 1992,[4] a Monday, wherein he
declared that should he fail to report back for work at the end of his vacation,
it is understood that he would be automatically terminated by his employer.
He signed the typewritten application without reading its contents because
he was being scolded by Virginia Tan, who likewise forced him to sign.
Thereafter, he took some of his belongings from the lumbers bunkhouse and
left with his brother using a government vehicle.[5] When he left U-Need on
May 4, 1992, he had an outstanding account. However, it was not in the sum
of P1,750.00 as alleged by private respondent because as far as he knew,
amounts had been automatically deducted from his wages.[6]
It turned out that, as gleaned from the records of the Election Registrar,
Baguio City, he was a registered voter of Middle Rock Quarry, Baguio City,
not Calanasan.[7] He claimed that he only registered therein so that he
could cast his vote in Baguio should he fail to return to his domicile.[8] When
he reported for work on May 14, 1992, he was told that he had already been
dismissed from employment.
FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that
respondent was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering
petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay his backwages and other benefits,
separation pay, and attorneys fee equivalent to 10% of the monetary
awards,
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
"a) Your allegation that part of your cash shortages was used for payment of
salaries/wages and retirement benefits is not true because these have been
accounted previously per auditors report;
"b) As Station Cashier you must be aware of our company Circular No. 63
which strictly requires the daily and up-to-date preparation of Statistical
Report and depositing of cash collections twice a day. But these procedures -
more particularly on depositing of cash collections twice a day - was
completely disregarded by you;
"d) The position of Station Cashier is one which requires utmost trust and
confidence.[5]
ISSUE:
RULING:
Assuming further that there was breach of trust and confidence, it appears
that this is the first infraction committed by petitioner. Although the
employer has the prerogative to discipline or dismiss its employee, such
prerogative cannot be exercised wantonly, but must be controlled by
substantive due process and tempered by the fundamental policy of
protection to labor enshrined in the Constitution.[16] Infractions committed
by an employee should merit only the corresponding sanction demanded by
the circumstances. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct
or omission imputed to the employee[17] and imposed in connection with
the employers disciplinary authority.
FACTS:
Carlos Pedro Sara was charged with incompetence and dishonesty. During
the administrative investigation conducted on 05 December 1997, the
investigating committee reported that Sara admitted having intentionally
overweighed an item in favor of a customer but the report about which he
refused to sign. It was also discovered that Sara was directly responsible for
the loss of certain jewelry as disclosed in an audit report.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination of the respondents were with just cause?
RULING:
At the onset, it is pertinent to note that the second issue raised in the instant
petition inquires into the factual findings of the court a quo. The petitioners
are fundamentally raising a question of fact regarding the appellate courts
finding that the charge of falsification was not substantially proved. The
petitioner would have us sift through the evidence on record and pass upon
whether the signatures found on the Affidavit of Loss vis--vis the pawn
tickets are similar or not. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the
determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC.[20]
Elementary is the principle that this court is not a trier of facts. Judicial
review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which its labor officials findings rest.[21] As such, the
findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only
great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding
on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[22] We
find no basis for deviating from the aforestated doctrine without any clear
showing that the findings of the labor arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals, are bereft of sufficient substantiation. Well-settled is
the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors
of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely
devoid of support from the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is
based on a gross misapprehension of facts.[23] What is more, factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court.[24]
In the case at bar, the issue of the veracity of the signature appearing on the
questioned Affidavit of Loss has been undoubtedly passed upon by, not one,
not two, but three tribunals all having the same findings that there is no
evident showing that the said document is indeed falsified.
. . . There is no showing that the affidavit of loss was a falsified one. Neither
is there any competent evidence submitted by the respondents to prove that
Mrs. Montenegro was the one who caused the execution thereof, granting
that the same is a falsified one. Henceforth, her dismissal from employment
based on the charge against her is illegal.[25]
The Affidavit of Loss not having been repudiated by the one who executed
the same, said affidavit stands and cannot be said to have been forged or a
fake one. Hence, we sustain the findings and ruling of the Labor Arbiter
relative to complainant Ms. Montenegro.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Bungabong had been working for five years as a food attendant
in petitioners Ermita outlet. On December 6, 1997 at around 1:30 a.m., the
Duty Manager Alvin Biscocho, allegedly caught one Felix Sabado, another
employee, consuming some beer from the establishments beer dispenser.
While the duty manager did not actually see respondent, he concluded that
respondent was involved too, because earlier that night, a driver, Jonathan
Andra, reported that he saw respondent with Sabado drinking beer from the
dispenser. The next day, the duty manager called respondent, inquiring
about the latters involvement, and showed him a letter of Sabado admitting
to the offense of drinking beer, and then told him to file an incident report.
Thereafter, Criselda Cusi, the outlets unit manager, issued an offense notice.
Respondent denied any involvement in the theft of beer, asserting that only
Sabado was involved and was caught. Cusi reported the incident to the head
office of Pizza Hut.
On December 15, respondent was informed of his preventive suspension. He
was told to report to the Human Resources Department (HRD) of the
company for investigation. During the investigation, respondent stated,
driver Andra was with the Vice-President for HRD, co-petitioner Janet Ruth M.
Solsoloy. Andra then pointed to respondent, and stated that respondent was
with Sabado in drinking the companys beer on December 5, 1997, at around
11:30 to 12:00 p.m. A guard on duty, Rossman Manaloto, also stated that on
the evening of said date, he confronted respondent and asked why
respondent smelled of beer, but respondent ignored the inquiry and hurriedly
left. A crew member of the outlet, Daniel Gatdula, also reported on how the
respondent bragged how much beer he could drink on his way passing out of
the beer dispenser area.
After the investigation, a certain Ms. Ellen of the HRD explained to the
respondent the penalty for his alleged offense. She told respondent he
should no longer report for work. Respondent was advised to go home. He
then refused to receive his letter of termination, which followed after the
investigation.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Contrary to the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, which even-
tually the Court of Appeals affirmed, we find that petitioner Philippine Pizza,
Inc. established the existence of just cause to terminate respondent on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Where the employee has access to the employers property in the form
of merchandise and articles for sale, the relationship of the employer and the
employee necessarily involves trust and confidence.[24] Hence, when
respondent drank stolen beer from the dispenser of Pizza Hut-Ermita on
December 6, 1997, he gave cause for his termination and his termination
was within the ambit of Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Now, however, as regards violations of the procedural requirement for
valid dismissal, the petitioners could be justly faulted. Book V, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in effect at the time
respondent was terminated, outlines the procedure for termination of em-
ployment.[25] It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dis -
missed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omissions constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known
address.
. . .
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representatives, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately no tify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
In this case, we find that petitioners violated respondents right to due
process, particularly the requirement of first notice. The offense notice[26]
petitioners gave to respondent is insufficient first notice because it did not
comply with the requirement of the law that the first written notice must
apprise the employee that his termination is being considered due to the
acts stated in the notice.[27] The first notice issued in this case merely
stated that respondent is being charged of dispensing and drinking beer on
December 5, 1997, around 11:30 to 11:45 p.m.,[28] and nothing more.
In 1991, FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU)
[3] entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),[4] the duration of
which was for a period of five (5) years starting on September 12, 1991 until
September 12, 1996. On September 19, 1991, the members of FPSILU
ratified the CBA in a document entitled RATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN.[5]
Bergante and Inguillo, who were members of FPSILU, signed the said
document.[6]
During the lifetime of the CBA, Bergante, Inguillo and several FPSI
employees joined another union, the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
(NLM), which was affiliated with a federation called KATIPUNAN (NLM-
KATIPUNAN, for brevity). Subsequently, NLM-KATIPUNAN filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute[7]
against FPSILU and FPSI. In said case, the Med-Arbiter decided[8] in favor of
FPSILU. It also ordered the officers and members of NLM-KATIPUNAN to
return to FPSILU the amount of P90,000.00 pertaining to the union dues
erroneously collected from the employees. Upon finality of the Med-Arbiter's
Decision, a Writ of Execution[9] was issued to collect the adjudged amount
from NLM-KATIPUNAN. However, as no amount was recovered, notices of
garnishment were issued to United Coconut Planters Bank (Kalookan City
Branch)[10] and to FPSI[11] for the latter to hold for FPSILU the earnings of
Domingo Grutas, Jr. (Grutas) and Inguillo, formerly FPSILU's President and
Secretary for Finance, respectively, to the extent of P13,032.18. Resultantly,
the amount of P5,140.55 was collected,[12] P1,695.72 of which came from
the salary of Grutas, while the P3,444.83 came from that of Inguillo.
ISSUE:
RULING:
We hold that all the requisites have been sufficiently met and FPSI was
justified in enforcing the Union Security Clause, for the following reasons:
FACTS:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and
members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and
registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of the petitioner company.
While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private
respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition for
certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which
development compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU.
TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance
with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents.
Thereafter, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by
TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for
disloyalty to the Union. By letter, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents
had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the
employment of private, respondents because they had lost their membership
with TDLU.
The private respondents were later on terminated. In their petition, private
respondents contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL
and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to
their constitutional right to self-organization.
ISSUES:
a) whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondents'
employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the
enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU;
and
b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice in complying with
TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents.
HELD:
The dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in
accordance with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority
rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice.
Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the
closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the
union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the
maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of
union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor
are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the Constitution.
There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of
the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union
security arrangements brought to us for review.
FACTS:
On February 5, 1990, petitioner Rene Valiao was appointed by private
respondent West Negros College (WNC) as Student Affairs Office (SAO)
Director, with a starting salary of P2,800 per month. On May 14, 1990, he
was assigned as Acting Director, Alumni Affairs Office.
On July 29, 1990, petitioner was transferred to a staff position and designated
as Records Chief at the Registrars Office but was again re-assigned as a
typist on June 24, 1991.
The latest re-assignment was due to his tardiness and absences, as reflected
in the summary of tardiness and absences report, which showed him to have
been absent or late for work from a minimum of seven (7) to a maximum of
seventy-five (75) minutes for the period March to October 31, 1991, and to
have reported late almost every day for the period November to December
1991.
On June 15, 1992, another adverse report on tardiness and absences from
the Registrar was made against the petitioner prompting WNC to send him
another memorandum with an attached tardiness and absences report,
calling his attention on his tardiness and absences for the period February to
April 1992.
On June 20, 1992, petitioner sent a letter of appeal and explained his side to
the new college president, Suzette Arbolario-Agustin, who gave petitioner
another chance. The petitioner was then appointed as Information Assistant
effective immediately. However, the petitioner did not immediately assume
the post of Information Assistant prompting the President of private
respondent WNC to call his attention. When the petitioner finally assumed
his post, he was allowed a part-time teaching job in the same school to
augment his income.
Sometime in December 1992, WNC won a case against the officials of the
union before the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of
this victory but the petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground
that such a press release would only worsen the already aggravated situation
and strained relations between WNC management and the union officials.
When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was
relieved from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as
Records Evaluator. Not for long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to
the Human Resources Manager complaining about the petitioners poor
performance and habitual absenteeism, as shown in the daily absence
reports.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner constitute gross and habitual
neglect of duties
RULING
Considering the submissions of the parties as well as the records before us,
we find the petition without merit. Petitioners dismissal from employment is
valid and justified.
For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid
cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.[7]
Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes
for terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross
negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period
of time, depending upon the circumstances.[8] The Labor Arbiters findings
that petitioners habitual absenteeism and tardiness constitute gross and
habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of employment are
sufficiently supported by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated acts of
absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent
attitude to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated
and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute
gross misconduct unexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This
Court has held that habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross
negligence and is sufficient to justify termination of an employee.[9]
However, petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or
absences but for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is
merely speculative. We find such contention devoid of basis. First, the
decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are
indubitable. They show that indeed petitioner had incurred numerous and
repeated absences without any leave. Moreover, he was not punctual in
reporting for work. These unexplained absences and tardiness were
reflected on the summary reports submitted by WNC before the labor arbiter,
but petitioner failed to controvert said reports. Second, contrary to
petitioners assertion, the NLRC did not base its conclusions on the fact of
the arrest of petitioner for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 but on the totality of
the number of infractions incurred by the petitioner during the period of his
employment in different positions he occupied at WNC. Thus:
Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis
for terminating petitioner from employment. It bears stressing that
petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but
manifested a pattern of habituality. In one case, we held that where the
records clearly show that the employee has not only been charged with the
offense of highgrading but also has been warned 21 times for absences
without official leave, these repeated acts of misconduct and willful breach of
trust by an employee justify his dismissal and forfeiture of his right to
security of tenure. The totality of infractions or the number of violations
committed during the period of employment shall be considered in
determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The
offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in
their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct,
and ability separate and independent of each other.
Alvarez vs. Golden Tri Bloc Inc., G.R. No. 202158, September 25,
2013
FACTS:
Sometime in November 1996, respondent GTBI hired the petitioner as a
Service Crew in one of its Dunkin Donuts franchise store in Antipolo City,
Rizal. Six (6) months later, he attained the status of a regular employee. He
was thereafter promoted as Shift Leader and served as such for four (4)
years. Sometime in 2001, he was again promoted as Outlet Supervisor and
was assigned to three (3) Dunkin Donuts outlets located at San Roque,
Cogeo and Super 8, Masinag, all in Antipolo City. He received a monthly
salary of P10,000.00.
On May 27, 2009, the petitioner reported for duty at around 12:30 in the
afternoon at Dunkin Donuts, Super 8, Masinag branch. Since his time card
was at the San Roque branch, he telephoned Chastine3 Kaye Sambo
(Sambo), shift leader, and requested her to punch-in his time card to
reflect that he is already on duty. She obliged. Roland Salindog (Salindog),
the petitioners senior officer called the Super 8, Masinag branch and verified
that he has indeed reported for work.
The following day, however, the petitioner was informed by Sambo that both
of them are suspended and that he had to prepare an incident report
regarding his time card.
In his incident report4 dated May 29, 2009, the petitioner admitted
instructing Sambo to punch-in his timecard. He explained that he went
straight to and arrived at the Super 8, Masinag branch at around 12:35 p.m.
He inspected the stocks in the branch and taught a certain Ritz on how to
prepare stocks acquisition report for June 2009. He owned up to his fault and
stated that he should have instead recorded the time of his arrival by writing
on the time card and that he should have brought it with him. He apologized
and promised that a similar incident will not happen again.
On June 5, 2009, GTBI sent him a letter directing him to report to the main
office for a dialogue on June 9, 2009 failing which would amount to the
waiver of his right to be heard and the management may make a decision
based only on his written explanation.5 The dialogue pushed through. After
which the petitioner was placed on preventive suspension for 30 days
without pay.
On June 23, 2009, GTBI notified the petitioner of its decision to terminate his
employment effective that day on the ground of loss of trust.
ISSUE:
RULING:
"In Merin v. NLRC, the Court ruled that in determining the sanction imposable
to an employee, the employee may consider and weigh his other past
infractions, thus:
"'The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the
period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner
should not be taken singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment
cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of
character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While
it may be true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this
does not and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped
clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant
consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out since an
employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in
determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed
upon petitioner, he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable
behavior on board. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a
misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It
has the right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-
protection. (Citations omitted)'"
The NLRC and the CA were thus correct in applying the totality of infractions
rule and in adjudging that the petitioner's dismissal was grounded on a just
and valid cause."
Yrasuegui vs. Phil Airlines, G.R. No. 168081, Oct. 17, 2008
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code. The weight standards of PAL constitute a continuing qualification
of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as
prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal would fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the
employer; they were the prescribed weights that a cabin crew must
maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company.
In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications
for an employees position. The failure to meet the employers qualifying
standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to
(d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and
after an employee is hired. x x x
We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not
be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary.
John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. vs. Davis, G.R. No. 169549, Sept.
3, 2008
Facts:
Joanna Cantre Davis was agency administration officer of John Hancock Life
Insurance Corporation. On October 18, 2000, Patricia Yuseco, JHLICs
corporate affairs manager, discovered that her wallet was missing. She
immediately reported the loss of her credit cards to AIG and BPI Express. To
her surprise, she was informed that "Patricia Yuseco" had just made
substantial purchases using her credit cards in various stores in the City of
Manila. She was also told that a proposed transaction in Abenson's-Robinsons
Place was disapproved because "she" gave the wrong information upon
verification. Because loss of personal property among its employees had
become rampant in its office, petitioner sought the assistance of NBI. The
NBI, obtained a security video from Abenson's showing the person who used
Yuseco's credit cards. Yuseco and other witnesses positively identified the
person in the video as Davis NBI and Yuseco filed a complaint for qualified
theft against Davis but because the affidavits presented by the NBI
(identifying respondent as the culprit) were not properly verified, the city
prosecutor dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.
Meanwhile, petitioner placed Davis under preventive suspension and
instructed her to cooperate with its ongoing investigation. Davis filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her
employment without cause. The labor arbiter, in
May 21, 2002, found that Davis committed serious misconduct (she was the
principal suspect for qualified theft committed inside petitioner's office
during work hours). There was a valid cause for her dismissal. Thus, the
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Upon appeal, NLRC affirmed the
labor arbiter in July 31, 2003 and denied her motion for reconsideration in
October 30, 2003. Upon petition for certiorari filed with the CA, CA on July 4,
2005 granted the petition holding that the labor arbiter and NLRC merely
adopted the findings of the NBI regarding respondent's culpability. Because
the affidavits of the witnesses were not verified, they did not constitute
substantial evidence. The labor arbiter and NLRC should have assessed
evidence independently as "unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations and
conclusions of employers (did) not provide legal justification for dismissing
an employee". Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the ground for an
employee's dismissal need only be proven by substantial evidence. Thus, the
dropping of charges against an employee (especially on a technicality such
as lack of proper verification) or his subsequent acquittal does not preclude
an employer from dismissing him due to serious misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner substantially proved the presence of valid cause for
respondent's termination.
Ruling:
Supreme Court granted the petition and ruled that petitioner validly
dismissed Davis for cause analogous to serious misconduct. Article 282 of
the Labor Code provides: Termination by Employer. An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or his representatives in connection with his work;
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In this case, petitioner dismissed Davis based on the NBI's finding that the
latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was not
committed against petitioner itself but against one of its employees,
respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not
be dismissed for serious misconduct. Nonetheless, Article 282 (e) of the
Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of
comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be
validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282,
the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the
employee. A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or
willful act or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft
committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if
proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.
Did petitioner substantially prove the existence of valid cause for
respondent's separation? Yes. The labor arbiter and the NLRC relied not only
on the affidavits of the NBI's witnesses but also on that of respondent. They
likewise considered petitioner's own investigative findings. Clearly, they did
not merely adopt the findings of the NBI but independently assessed
evidence presented by the parties. Their conclusion (that there was valid
cause for respondent's separation from employment) was therefore
supported by substantial evidence.
Redundancy
Facts: In September, 1991, the Parsons family, who originally owned the
controlling stocks in Asian Alcohol, were driven by mounting business losses
to sell their majority rights to prior Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Prior Holdings). The next month, Prior Holdings took over its management
and operation. To thwart further losses, Prior Holdings implemented a
reorganizational plan and other cost-saving measures. Some one hundred
seventeen (117) employees out of a total workforce of three hundred sixty
(360) were separated. Seventy two (72) of them occupied redundant
positions that were abolished. Of these positions, twenty one (21) were held
by union members and fifty one (51) by non-union members. The six (6)
private respondents are among those union members whose positions were
abolished due to redundancy. Private respondents Carias, Martinez, and
Sendon were water pump tenders; Amacio was a machine shop mechanic;
Verayo was a briquetting plant operator while Tormo was a plant helper
under him. They were all assigned at the Repair and Maintenance Section of
the Pulupandan plant. In October, 1992, they received individual notices of
termination effective November 30, 1992.
Ruling: In the case at bar, Prior Holdings took over the operations of Asian
Alcohol in October 1991. Plain to see, the last quarter losses in 1991 were
already incurred under the new management. There were no signs that these
losses would abate. Irrefutable was the fact that losses have bled Asian
Alcohol incessantly over a span of several years. They were incurred under
the management of the Parsons family and continued to be suffered under
the new management of Prior Holdings. Ultimately, it is Prior Holding that will
absorb all the losses, including those incurred under the former owners of
the company. The law gives the new management every right to undertake
measures to save the company from bankruptcy. We find that the
reorganizational plan and comprehensive cost-saving program to turn the
business around were nor designed to bust the union of the private
respondent. Retrenched were one hundred seventeen (117) employees.
Seventy two (72) of them including private respondent were separated
because their positions had become redundant. In this context, what may
technically be considered as redundancy may verily be considered as
retrenchment measures. Their positions had to be declared redundant to cut
losses. Redundancy exists when the service capability of the work is in
excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands on the enterprise.
A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors,
such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a
particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing
out of a service activity priorly undertaken by the business. Under these
conditions, the employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more
employees than are necessary for the operation of its business. For the
implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must
comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the
employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one moth
prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every
year of service whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the
redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what
positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.
Facts: Private respondent Vicente T. Ong was the Sales Manager of petitioner
Wiltshire File Co., Inc. ("Wiltshire") from 16 March 1981 up to 18 June 1985.
As such, he received a monthly salary of P14,375.00 excluding commissions
from sales which averaged P5,000.00 a month. He also enjoyed vacation
leave with pay equivalent to P7,187,50 per year, as well as hospitalization
privileges to the extent of P10,000.00 per year. On 13 June 1985, upon
private respondent's return from a business and pleasure trip abroad, he was
informed by the President of petitioner Wiltshire that his services were being
terminated. Private respondent maintains that he tried to get an explanation
from management of his dismissal but to no avail. On 18 June 1985, when
private respondent again tried to speak with the President of Wiltshire, the
company's security guard handed him a letter which formally informed him
that his services were being terminated upon the ground of redundancy.
Private respondent filed, on 21 October 1985, a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal alleging that his position could not possibly be
redundant because nobody (save himself) in the company was then
performing the same duties. Private respondent further contended that
retrenching him could not prevent further losses because it was in fact
through his remarkable performance as Sales Manager that the Company
had an unprecedented increase in domestic market share the preceding
year. For that accomplishment, he continued, he was promoted to Marketing
Manager and was authorized by the President to hire four (4) Sales
Executives five (5) months prior to his termination.
Ruling: The Court agrees with the CA that the organizational realignment
introduced by SMART, which culminated in the abolition of CSMG/FSD and
termination of Astorgas employment was an honest effort to make SMARTs
sales and marketing departments more efficient and competitive. Indeed, out
of our concern for those lesser circumstanced in life, this Court has inclined
towards the worker and upheld his cause in most of his conflicts with his
employer. This favored treatment is consonant with the social justice policy
of the Constitution. But while tilting the scales of justice in favor of workers,
the fundamental law also guarantees the right of the employer to reasonable
returns for his investment.38 In this light, we must acknowledge the
prerogative of the employer to adopt such measures as will promote greater
efficiency, reduce overhead costs and enhance prospects of economic gains,
albeit always within the framework of existing laws. Accordingly, we sustain
the reorganization and redundancy program undertaken by SMART. However,
as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the mandated one (1)
month notice prior to termination. The record is clear that Astorga received
the notice of termination only on March 16, 199839 or less than a month
prior to its effectivity on April 3, 1998. Likewise, the Department of Labor and
Employment was notified of the redundancy program only on March 6, 1998.
Retrenchment
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
(FASAP) v. PAL G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008
Ruling: The burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove economic or
business losses with sufficient supporting evidence. Its failure to prove these
reverses or losses necessarily means that the employees dismissal was not
justified. Any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy certain
established standards, all of which must concur, before any reduction of
personnel becomes legal. These are: (1) That retrenchment is reasonably
necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are
not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only
expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good
faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to
the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer
pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench
employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat
or circumvent the employees right to security of tenure; and, (5) That the
employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status,
efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers. In view of the facts and the issues raised, the resolution of the
instant petition hinges on a determination of the existence of the first, fourth
and the fifth elements set forth above, as well as compliance therewith by
PAL, taking to mind that the burden of proof in retrenchment cases lies with
the employer in showing valid cause for dismissal; that legitimate business
reasons exist to justify retrenchment.
Ruling: The Court is accordingly convinced, and so hold, that both the
retrenchment program of private respondent and the dismissal of petitioners
were valid and legal. First, it has been sufficiently and convincingly
established by AG & P before the voluntary arbitrator that it was suffering
financial reverses. Even the rank and file union at AG & P did not contest the
fact that management had been undergoing financial difficulties for the past
several years. Hence, the voluntary arbitrator considered this as an
admission that indeed AG & P was actually experiencing adverse business
conditions which would justify the exercise of its management prerogative to
retrench in order to avoid the not so remote possibility of the closure of the
entire business which, in the opinion of the voluntary arbitrator, would in the
last analysis be adverse to both the management and the union. Second, the
voluntary arbitrator's conclusions were premised upon and substantiated by
the audited financial statements and the auditor's reports of AG & P for the
years 1987 to 1991. 14 These, financial statements audited by independent
external auditors constitute the normal and reliable method of proof of the
profit and loss performance of a company. Third, contrary to petitioners'
asseverations, proof of actual financial losses incurred by the company is not
a condition sine qua non, for retrenchment. Retrenchment is one of the
economic grounds to dismiss employees, which is resorted to by an
employer primarily to avoid or minimize business losses. In its ordinary
connotation, the phrase "to prevent losses" means that retrenchment or
termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be
undertaken by the employer sometime before the anticipated losses are
actually sustained or realized. It is not, in other words, the intention of the
lawmaker to compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his
employees until after losses shall have in fact materialized. If such an intent
were expressly written into the law, that law may well be vulnerable to
constitutional attack as unduly taking property from one man to be given to
another.
Facts: On April 23, 1988, Arturo Margallo, General Manager of the Camarines
Sur III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (private respondent herein), issued
Memorandum No. 24-88 providing for austerity measures (retrenchment).
On the same date, private respondent filed with the Department of Labor
and Employments Regional Office No. V in Legaspi City a Notice of
Retrenchment covering some thirty (30) employees on the basis of the
guidelines and priorities specified in the abovementioned memorandum. The
Regional Director in his Resolution dated June 6, 1988 granted authority to
terminate the employment of the said 30 employees pursuant to the
categories, priorities and effective dates under Memo No. 24-88. On June
20, 1988, Margallo issued Memorandum No. 60-88[8] declaring some fifty-
two (52) employees, including herein petitioners Juan Saballa, Lailani
Miranda, Nelia Ibarrientos, Helen Quiambao, Wilberto Amparado and Fidel
Manaog, on forced leave without pay for a period of three (3) months,
effective five (5) days after receipt by the employees concerned. Such
forced leave was purportedly part of the cost-saving measures instituted to
enable the Coop to meet (its) financial obligations especially with NPC and
NEA. The memo assured the subject employees of rehiring as soon as the
Coop shall have financially recovered/regained its financial viability expected
within the above specified period. A copy of said memorandum was
furnished the Regional Office of the DOLE in Legaspi City on June 23, 1988.
Eastridge Golf Club, Inc., v. Eastridge Golf Club, Inc., Labor Union-
Super G.R. No. 166760, August 22, 2008
Ruling: Article 283 of the Labor Code clearly provides inter alia that the
employer may terminate the employment of his employees to prevent
losses. Closure or cessation of operations for economic reasons is, therefore,
recognized as a valid exercise of management prerogative. The
determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management which the
State does not usually interfere with, as no business or undertaking must be
required to continue operating at a loss simply because it has to maintain its
workers in employment. Such an act would be tantamount to a taking of
property without due process of law. However, the burden of proving that
such closure is bona fide falls upon the employer. In this case, petitioner
corporation presented the analysis of an independent certified public
accountant, showing in detail the imminent losses it would suffer should it
continue its operations. It is understandable that no audited financial
statements or other similar documents were presented as the company is
claiming impending future losses, not past or actual ones. Moreover, the fact
that petitioner company has ceased operations and has not resumed to do
so only reinforces its claim to a valid closure, not to mention the other
established fact that its Stanply Plant has also the capacity and capability to
produce veneer, the product it solely manufactured in its now closed plant.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner corporation complied with the
requirements mandated by law to effectuate valid termination of
employment on account of closure. Under the law, for an employer to validly
terminate the service of his employees under the aforesaid ground, he has to
comply with two (2) requirements, namely: (a) serving a written notice on the
workers and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the effective date of the
closure and (b) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay
or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered one (1)
whole year. The records bear out that petitioner had sufficiently complied
with the aforecited requirements. It informed its employees and the DOLE
District Office at Butuan of the termination of service of the employees
effective December 10, 1989 in a Letter dated November 9, 1989. The
employees were, likewise, informed of the availability for release of the funds
for their separation pay and other CBA benefits. Unfortunately, only 63
employees availed of the benefits. The rest chose to file the instant action.
Disease or illness
Crayons Processing, Inc., v. Pula G.R. No. 167727, July 30, 2007
Cebu Royal Plant v. Minister of Labor G.R. No. L-58639, August 12,
1987
Ruling: The law lays down the procedure prior to the dismissal of an
employee. It need not be observed to the letter, but at least, it must be done
in the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment. In the case at bar,
there is no doubt that at the very outset, that is, prior to investigation, the
petitioner was informed that his services had been terminated. He was made
to air his side subsequently, it is true, yet the stubborn fact remains that
notwithstanding such an opportunity, if an opportunity it was, he had been
dismissed from the firm. The Court has held that the procedure under Batas
Blg. 130 and the rules implementing it are conditions sine qua non, before
dismissal may be validly effected.
King of Kings Transport, Inc., v. Mamac G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007
Issue: Was there compliance with the procedural due process for dismissal?
Ruling: None. First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him
of committing an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal appraisal
of the charges against an employee does not comply with the first notice
requirement. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, the Court held that
consultations or conferences are not a substitute for the actual observance
of notice and hearing. Also, in Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Mesano, the
Court, sanctioning the employer for disregarding the due process
requirements, held that the employees written explanation did not excuse
the fact that there was a complete absence of the first notice. Second, even
assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish respondent an Irregularity
Report notifying him of his offense, such would not comply with the
requirements of the law. We observe from the irregularity reports against
respondent for his other offenses that such contained merely a general
description of the charges against him. The reports did not even state a
company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly violated. Likewise,
there is no mention of any of the grounds for termination of employment
under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thus, KKTIs standard charge sheet is not
sufficient notice to the employee. Third, no hearing was conducted.
Regardless of respondents written explanation, a hearing was still necessary
in order for him to clarify and present evidence in support of his defense.
Moreover, respondent made the letter merely to explain the circumstances
relating to the irregularity in his October 28, 2001 Conductors Trip Report.
He was unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already being effected.
Thus, he was surprised to receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter
indicating as grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his
previous infractions.
Administrative Hearing
Asia Terminals, Inc., v. Marbella G.R. No. 149074, August 10, 2006
Shoppers Gain Supermart v. NLRC G.R. No. 110731, July 26, 1996
Facts: From 1982 to 1990, private respondents had worked in the Shoppers
Gain Supermarket in various capacities as "merchandiser, cashier, bagger,
check-out personnel, sales lady, printer/film and warehouseman" for at least
one year each. Private respondents were part of a pool of workers supplied
by three (3) manpower service companies under "labor-only" contracts. In
December of 1990, due to an unavoidable circumstance, petitioner
constrained to stop its business and consequently terminate its contract with
the three (3) manpower service companies. Petitioner was able to pay
separation pays for its regular employees but not for private respondents. A
complaint for illegal dismissal was filed for which the Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision finding Shoppers Gain Supermarket guilty of labor-only contracting
and ordered it to pay separation pay and backwages to respondents. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed said decision.
Elevating the case to the Supreme Court, petitioners raised the following
grounds inter alia: (a) That for employer-employee to exist, the following
requirements must be satisfied, namely: (1) selection and engagement of the
employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control employees' conduct; and (b) Since the manpower agencies
themselves admitted per their respective position papers that they selected,
hired, paid, disciplined, dismissed and controlled the private respondents, it
followed that the latter are not the employees of the petitioner corporation
but of the agencies only.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that what was controlling in the issue is the
provisions of Artcile 106 of the Labor Code and not that of Article 208. The
former clearly defines what constitute labor-only contractor as differentiated
from a direct contractor, including the legal effects of each, while the latter is
merely for the purpose of determining whether or not an employee is
considered regular. Based on the provision of Article 106, the Supreme Court
ruled that the petitioner was indeed the direct employer of private
respondents and was therefore 0bliged to pay them separation pay. The
Supreme Court reasoned that since it is undeniable that the private
respondents' work as merchandisers, cashiers, baggers, check-out
personnel, sales ladies, warehousemen and so forth were directly related,
necessary and vital to the day-to-day operations of the supermarket and that
their jobs involved normal and regular functions in the ordinary business of
the petitioner corporation, the provision of Article 106 clearly applied thus
making the manpower agencies merely agents of petitioner corporation.
Consequently, private respondents are considered employees of petitioner
Shoppers Gain Supermart.
Issue: Was there compliance with the procedural due process for dismissal?
Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal
dismissal case.
Development of Doctrines
Issue: Was the dismissal proper without compliance with the requirements of
due process?
Ruling: The decision in Columbia Pictures does not mean that if a new rule is
laid down in a case, it should not be applied in that case but that said rule
should apply prospectively to cases arising afterwards. Private respondent's
view of the principle of prospective application of new judicial doctrines
would turn the judicial function into a mere academic exercise with the result
that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum and would
deprive the holding in the case of any force. Indeed, when the Court
formulated the Wenphil doctrine, which we reverse in this case, the Court did
not defer application of the rule laid down imposing a fine on the employer
for failure to give notice in a case of dismissal for cause. To the contrary, the
new rule was applied right then and there. For that matter, in 20th Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals the Court laid down the rule that in
determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant in copyright infringement cases, the court must require the
production of the master tapes of copyrighted films in order to compare
them with the "pirated" copies. The new rule was applied in opinion of the
Court written by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in the very same case of 20th
Century Fox in which the new requirement was laid down. Where the new
rule was held to be prospective in application was in Columbia Pictures and
that was because at the time the search warrant in that case was issued, the
new standard had not yet been announced so it would be unreasonable to
expect the judge issuing the search warrant to apply a rule that had not been
announced at the time. A good illustration of the scope of overruling
decisions is People v. Mapa, where the accused was charged with illegal
possession of firearms. The accused invoked the ruling in an earlier case that
appointment as a secret agent of a provincial governor to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order sufficiently put the appointee in the
category of a "peace officer" equal to a member of the municipal police
authorized under 879 of the Administrative Code of 1917 to carry firearms.
The Court rejected the accused's contention and overruled the prior decision
in People v. Macarandang on the ground that 879 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 was explicit and only those expressly mentioned therein were
entitled to possess firearms. Since secret agents were not among those
mentioned, they were not authorized to possess firearms. Although in People
v. Jabinal the Court refused to give retro active effect to its decision in Mapa,
because the new doctrine "should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted in good faith thereon" and, for this reason, it
acquitted the accused of illegal possession of firearms, nonetheless it applied
the new ruling (that secret agents of provincial governors were not
authorized to possess firearms) in the very case in which the new rule was
announced and convicted the accused. In the case at bar, since private
respondent does not even claim that it has relied in good faith on the former
doctrine of Wenphil and its progeny Sebuguero v. NLRC, there is no reason
not to apply the new standard to this case.
Ruling: The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the
dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated
Due Process Rule. On January 27, 2000, in Serrano, the rule on the extent of
the sanction was changed. We held that the violation by the employer of the
notice requirement in termination for just or authorized causes was not a
denial of due process that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal
is ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from the time of
termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause. The rationale for the re-examination of the Wenphil
doctrine in Serrano was the significant number of cases involving dismissals
without requisite notices. We concluded that the imposition of penalty by
way of damages for violation of the notice requirement was not serving as a
deterrent. Hence, we now required payment of full backwages from the time
of dismissal until the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause. Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to
dismiss now and pay later by imposing full backwages. We believe,
however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full meaning of
Article 279 of the Labor Code which states: ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In
cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. This means
that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or
authorized causes provided by law. Payment of backwages and other
benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was
unjustly dismissed.
Facts: Respondents were employees of Marina Port Services, Inc. (MPSI) and
members of the Associated Workers Union of the Philippines (AWU). In a
letter dated 9 June 1993 to MPSI, the AWU president sought the dismissal
from service of respondents who were expelled from AWU. On 11 June 1993,
the MPSI issued a memorandum to respondents terminating them effective
immediately pursuant to the closed-shop provision of the MPSI-AWU
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Respondents filed a complaint for
constructive illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC.
Ruling: The Court holds that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is,
for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude,
like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the
effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his
offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and
that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed.
Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is
granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that
he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks
he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced
compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage
the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and
concern of the Constitution.
Facts: In 1990, Golden Ace Builders hired Jose A. Talde (Talde) as a carpenter.
In February 1999, the owner-manager, Arnold Azul, stopped giving Talde
work assignment due allegedly to the unavailability of construction projects.
Consequently, Talde filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in Taldes favor and ordered his immediate reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights, with payment of full backwages as well as premium pay
for rest days, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. The company
brought the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
review. Pending such appeal, the company advised Talde to report for work
within 10 days from notice. Talde, however, manifested to the Labor Arbiter
that due to actual animosity between him and the company and threats to
his life and his familys safety, he opted for payment of separation pay. The
company denied there was such an animosity. The NLRC later dismissed the
companys appeal. The companys appeal to the Court of Appeals was
likewise dismissed. The Court of Appeals decision attained finality. The
monetary award, as recomputed by the NLRCs Fiscal Examiner, was
approved by the Labor Arbiter who thereupon issued the writ of execution.
The company questioned the recomputation before the NLRC, arguing that
since Talde refused to report back to work as the company advised, he
should be deemed to have abandoned the same, thus, the re-computation
should not be beyond 15 May 2001, the day he manifested his refusal to be
reinstated. T he NLRC vacated the re-computation, holding that since Talde
did not appeal the Labor Arbiters decision granting him only reinstatement
and backwages, not separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, he may not be
afforded affirmative relief, and since he refused to go back to work, he may
recover backwages only up to 20 May 2001, the day he was supposed to
return to the job site. When Taldes motion for reconsideration was denied by
the NLRC, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC findings and held that Talde was entitled
to both backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not
granted by the Labor Arbiter, in view of the strained relations between the
parties. Consequently, the company filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Talde was entitled to separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement on account of strained relations between him and the
company.
Facts: In 1990, Golden Ace Builders hired Jose A. Talde (Talde) as a carpenter.
In February 1999, the owner-manager, Arnold Azul, stopped giving Talde
work assignment due allegedly to the unavailability of construction projects.
Consequently, Talde filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in Taldes favor and ordered his immediate reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights, with payment of full backwages as well as premium pay
for rest days, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. The company
brought the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
review. Pending such appeal, the company advised Talde to report for work
within 10 days from notice. Talde, however, manifested to the Labor Arbiter
that due to actual animosity between him and the company and threats to
his life and his familys safety, he opted for payment of separation pay. The
company denied there was such an animosity. The NLRC later dismissed the
companys appeal. The companys appeal to the Court of Appeals was
likewise dismissed. The Court of Appeals decision attained finality. The
monetary award, as recomputed by the NLRCs Fiscal Examiner, was
approved by the Labor Arbiter who thereupon issued the writ of execution.
The company questioned the recomputation before the NLRC, arguing that
since Talde refused to report back to work as the company advised, he
should be deemed to have abandoned the same, thus, the re-computation
should not be beyond 15 May 2001, the day he manifested his refusal to be
reinstated. The NLRC vacated the re-computation, holding that since Talde
did not appeal the Labor Arbiters decision granting him only reinstatement
and backwages, not separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, he may not be
afforded affirmative relief, and since he refused to go back to work, he may
recover backwages only up to 20 May 2001, the day he was supposed to
return to the job site. When Taldes motion for reconsideration was denied by
the NLRC, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC findings and held that Talde was entitled
to both backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not
granted by the Labor Arbiter, in view of the strained relations between the
parties. Consequently, the company filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Ruling: The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the
award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is
no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and
the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been
earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for
computing backwages is usually the length of the employees service while
that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was
unlawfully prevented from working. As to how both awards should be
computed, Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines instructs: [T]he
award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no
illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a
catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and
without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment
of separation pay in lieu thereof: Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no
longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. The normal consequences
of respondents illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where
reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an
alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of
backwages.
Constructive dismissal
Ruling: Where there is conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision
and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what
appears in the body.[14] While the body of the decision, order or resolution
might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning
preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and
imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. Hence, for the Court of
Appeals to have affirmed the assailed judgment is to adopt and uphold the
NLRC finding of abandonment and its award of full back wages to respondent
as an "act of grace" from petitioners. However, the Court believes this is not
the proper view as the records reveal that respondent was constructively
dismissed from service. Constructive dismissal exists where there is
cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay." All these are discernible in respondent's situation. She
was singularly edged out of employment by the unbearable or undesirable
treatment she received from her immediate superior Cacholo M. Santos who
discriminated against her without reason - not preparing and submitting her
performance evaluation report that would have been the basis for her
increased salary; not forwarding her project proposals to management that
would have been the source of commendation; diminishing her supervisor
stature by assigning her to house-to-house sales or direct sales; and
withholding from her the enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar
benefits that were necessary for her efficient sales performance. Although
respondent continued to have the rank of a supervisor, her functions were
reduced to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent. This was
tantamount to a demotion. She might not have suffered any diminution in
her basic salary but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she was
deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits
which she apparently used to receive.